


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UNITED STATES ARMY

COMBAT FORCES *Journal*

Infantry Journal • Field Artillery Journal

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This sensible, thoughtful editorial, so typical of Colonel Greene's thinking and writing, was found in his desk after his death. It was in longhand on small sheets of note paper and was probably written on a train trip in 1949, a year before Infantry Journal *and* The Field Artillery Journal *were merged. It doesn't appear to be finished and Colonel Greene must have intended to add to it. In any event we know our readers will agree that it is still timely and deserves publication. The answer to the question of why it wasn't published when written is that Colonel Greene was so busy that he sometimes wrote editorials in spare moments and then would mislay or forget them.*

WHAT MORE CAN WE LEARN ABOUT LEADING?

COLONEL JOSEPH I. GREENE

IN its forty-five years of publication this JOURNAL has printed hundreds of articles on what makes a great leader and on how to lead men. It is the big subject always. The big subject for war and peace.

The Army has always paid some official attention to leadership, but never so much as in World War II and since. The postwar years especially have seen much emphasis on this great and central military topic—with a good deal of dressing it up under fancier names, like "personnel management," "career guidance" and the like. And along with the greater attention to leadership under several different names, there has arisen, we think, a considerable amount of resistance to it—more from men of combat experience, we would guess, than from others.

What more is there to learn about leading men? Why get into all this fancy business of psychology and management? War brings out the successful leaders. The last war brought out plenty of them. Just use the good old methods those men used. There isn't much you can learn about it from anyone else. Why drag in all this stuff about handling men in industry? We've got plenty of men who have handled troops in battle.

There is a certain amount of sense in such thoughts. "Personnel management" is a cold, unhuman sounding expression. It is a standard editorial practice here at the *Infantry Journal* to cross out the word "personnel" and replace it with "men" or "soldiers" whenever possible. There are times when "personnel" is the correct word. But often it's used incorrectly as a too formal word for flesh-and-blood fighting men. So the *Journal* makes this correction whenever we need to.

"Management" is also a cold-sounding word. There is the objection in it that no good man wants to be "managed." It's true that when you manage a business, an industry or an army, you must also manage the men who are part of it. But just the same there's a feeling about the word "management" which includes some sense of putting something over on the people who get managed. The word has an honest and legitimate meaning, but when you join it to "personnel" in "personnel management" it has a push-button, automatic sound. The manager does this or that —to make his men (excuse us, his "personnel") do that or this. Each thing he does, whether coldly or kindly, sternly or gently, is a calculated act. He does things to get results. He does them only to get results. He does nothing except those things intended to get results. He is an expert at "management" and what he manages is "personnel."

WHEN it all gets written out in textbooks and manuals, it often seems as if you never manage personnel because you like to deal with men, like to help them, like to build a human team—a team that does things because you see the need for doing them and the team does too.

Actually this idea of warm human relationships is the idea on which all personnel management must be founded. Otherwise, it is empty nonsense. And the trouble is that experts in the "theory" of the management of men seldom know how to put warmth in their words—may even get to feeling that they know all the answers. And thinking that leadership is actually a cold science, possible to spell out in rules, tables and formulas.

You can't blame a tested combat leader for wanting to brush off "personnel management" when he runs into signs that it knows much better than he does. But he can be wrong, too.

He wouldn't be wrong about it if he could tell you *exactly how* he has led men so successfully in the heavy strain of combat.

If he is a good clear talker or writer and not too mistakenly modest, he can tell you many things he did. And those will be helpful to others who may have to act some day in similar circumstances. He may have some simple rules about how to treat troops. And those are likely to be sound and helpful for other leaders, too, though not always —because what one leader does is not always the best way for another. For example, the quiet serious leader cannot make himself into a jolly loud-voiced man, no matter how hard he tries.

One leader, like General Patton, may believe as that General once wrote—that the commander must constantly be an actor. But it takes a lot of practice to become a good, convincing actor. And acting that looks like acting and is recognized as such is worse than no acting. The actor general had better be good at it—or have something human and solid for men to recognize the moment they see through his make-up and his part-playing.

Yes, if the able experienced leader could tell you why he is good, and tell it plainly enough for others to readily learn, there might not be any need for a science of leadership. What such men said and wrote would be the science.


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Col. Joseph I. Greene Inside Front Cov

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COLONEL JOSEPH I. GREENE, SOLDIER

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
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★ To the Editors . . . ★

Importance of Being Average

To the Editors:

Various JOURNAL articles and letters "To the Editors" concerning Army efficiency reports bring to mind the thoughts of my troop commander of some twenty years ago, on the "importance of being average." His ideas were:

(1) Army officers fall into three general groups of "poor, average, and above average," based upon a combination of their individual mental capabilities and personal interest in the Service;

(2) Poor officers consistently receive only "average or low" efficiency ratings and eventually are eliminated through "B" board action;

(3) Average officers normally are selected for assignment only to routine duties which they discharge with "superior efficiency" by following the book, particularly in regard to their paper work which provides the permanent records of performance [incident to which the Captain commented that nothing insures poor efficiency ratings more effectively than poor paper work sent to higher authority];

(4) Only above average officers normally are detailed to the new and/or difficult projects requiring the individual to blaze a trail; but, since being right seven times out of ten is a high average, even the best qualified officer must face the fact that his trail blazing failures, few though they be, will be remembered in his efficiency report record long after the original circumstances are forgotten.

Observation and experience of many years make me agree with my captain's ideas in many respects, and to agree with many others that the then and the current efficiency reports are too far from perfect to receive the weight they do. Perhaps an equitable solution to the efficiency report problem would be for the individual to rate himself first and such rating then be re-rated by his peers.

LT. COL. HORSEMASTER

Solutions

To the Editors:

I have read a great deal recently about the low morale and discipline of the army which is resulting in many Regular enlisted men resigning, and although different regulations make it less noticeable, the same factors affect officers.

I should like to offer a solution which I feel is worthy of consideration and with modifications, better known to the high command, might get us out of the woods. I'll list the attempted solutions and show how I feel they might be modified to secure better results.

Recently the Infantry has been fancying up its uniform. I think the problem of uniform is long past mending, but not just for the Infantry. The rest of us could stand to look a little snappier. Why not have an Army-wide design contest among the men and a board of fashion experts select the best one? This of course applies only to dress. Other types are best designed by the services.

My solution to promotions is to make a temporary promotion exactly that for both officers and men. If an enlisted man or officer fills a TO above his rank, his commanding officer by assigning him automatically promotes him to that position. Loss of assignment means a return to regular rank. The Navy has recently stated "Par for the course of 30 years service is Captain." I think perhaps we have need of established pars in the Army, and that we should make some attempt to keep an officer's or an enlisted man's age or length of service in line with his rank. Judging by the number of lieutenant colonels age 33 to 37 and master sergeants age 27 to 33 in the Army today, I wouldn't be surprised to find us adopting a Chinese idea and forming officer combat regiments to take care of the extra chiefs.

Morale and discipline can be handled by returning to an old custom. Put the soldier in a unit and keep him there for his military life. Rotate units, not individuals. There is hardly any power on earth that can make a man devoted to his unit just after he has been assigned to it and when he knows damn well it's just a way station to the next one. Morale is dependent on a sense of belonging. None of us has it any more. We are the largest group of insecure American men and women in existence. Since we have two choices of retirement for enlisted men let's give them an option of combat pay or extra time toward a 30 years' retirement for different overseas assignments. It might even help buck up the Mrs.' morale to know that she will have a longer retired life with me to look forward to because of the present separation.

Last but not least, develop a service wide "suggestion box" where the ideas of the millions of men and women in service can be accepted, sorted, weighed and channeled into a headquarters which will act as an efficiency agency similar to those employed by major industries. This would, I feel, serve a twofold purpose: first, it would make use of many valid ideas which are not finding an outlet in our present

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
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LT. PAUL E. CHAMBERLAIN
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Rommel Fan

To the Editors:

I am a fan of the late Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. As a fan, I greedily read Brigadier Desmond Young's *The Desert Fox,* but it served only as an hors d' oeuvre for what promised to be military knowledge of banquet proportions.

Brigadier Young referred several times to a book Rommel wrote in 1937 on his World War I experiences as an infantry commander called *Infanterie Greift an.* This book was translated under the title of *Infantry Attacks* and printed by Infantry Journal Press in 1944. I made an effort to acquire this book from your Book Service but was told that it was out of print and unobtainable.

I recently came across one copy of this book in our Camp Pendleton library and through a kind librarian was able to take it out and read it.

The book impressed me tremendously and I feel that all students of small-unit tactics, battalion and below, would enjoy it as much as I. The problem is how to create a demand for the book that would make it profitable for you to reprint it.

With an eye toward this, I thought that the publishing of portions of this letter in your magazine might bring forth sufficient response from your readers to impress the publishers.

I plan on writing a letter similar to this one to the *Marine Corps Gazette* in the hope that it will appeal to a still wider range of prospective Rommel readers.

Incidentally, I instruct the students at our NCO school to read your magazine in order to advance their professional knowledge. Admittedly, I warn them not to forget the traditional "grain of salt" when so doing, however.

LT. ROBERT G. HUNT, JR.
USMC
NCO School
Supporting Arms Training Reg't.
Camp Pendleton, Cal.

Promotion and Command

To the Editors:

The tribulations of many an officer concerning his promotion(s) can easily be solved. Here are two possible solutions.

Change first the method of selection. Let's consider junior officers each quarter year and field grade officers twice per annum. This will allow the Department of the Army sufficient time to prepare a roster of officers who are eligible for the next higher rank. The rosters should then be forwarded to field commanders for their recommendations.

Promotions up to and including the ran

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of captain should be concurred in by the incumbent's superior officers. Where there is a slightest doubt that the officer is qualified for promotion at the particular time he should be told why. At the same time he should be given an opportunity to better himself. Transfer him to another organization where he can serve under a different commander. At least three such opportunities should be afforded each junior officer. If he then doesn't show enough improvement weed him out of the Army.

Promotion to the rank of field grade should follow the same pattern. The Department of the Army should forward rosters of eligible officers (age and time in grade, in that order, should be considered), to field commanders. These in turn should appoint boards of officers, one for each camp, post, area or a divisional size unit, whose mission would be to interview them as to qualification and make recommendations. The final selection for promotion on all field grade promotions should be made on the Department of the Army level.

The members of these boards should be made up on a percentage basis, 80 per cent reserves and 20 per cent regulars, or whatever is the percentage of reserves/regulars in the particular activity the board meets. Age of the eligible officer concerned should be the number one factor to be considered. Because with age goes experience, the know-how, and that something a young officer just simply doesn't possess.

Under the above solution many an officer who is a hard and efficient worker today stands a good chance to be promoted because he knows his immediate superior will have a say on it. Conversely, many an officer who may have been a good worker and received good efficiency reports up to yesterday but who is not worth a damn today, will not get promoted. What is more important, he will be told why.

The second solution is radical, but could easily be adopted. The problem of promotion exists primarily in the field grades where there just aren't enough ranks to go around. Some people feel slighted and many have a morbid fear they will never get any higher. Why not then de-evaluate the responsibility the field ranks have held heretofore? Why not make majors command companies, colonels command battalions and brigadier generals command regiments?

Lieutenant colonels should be the second-in-command of battalions and regiments, or their executives.

A company today is not only worth in dollars what a battalion was yesterday, but it has practically the same responsibilities a battalion had in prewar days. This rule applies equally well to battalions and regiments.

One of the biggest and greatest problems we have in the army today is lack of leadership among junior officers. And yet it is these same officers who command the most important units from the disciplinary and moral point of view. At the most, companies today are commanded by first lieutenants, very seldom by captains. To say that all junior officers lack the knowledge and application of leadership would be unfair to some who are excellent leaders.

Under this solution most officers could expect to reach colonel, at least, and many would get the star they dream of.

MAJOR FRANK NOVAK
7781 SCU (PM)
APO 742, c/o PM
New York, N. Y.

Wavell Letters

To the Editors:

I am engaged in sorting out the papers of my father, the late Field Marshal Earl Wavell, and I am most anxious to collect all possible material about him before people's memories fade.

I would be most grateful for the loan of any letters or an account of any personal incidents, meetings, or conversations with my father, which any of our readers will be kind enough to send to me.

No early publication is in view, but I wish to collect material for an eventual biographer.

MAJOR THE EARL WAVELL
51 South Street
London, W. 1.

One Bad Report

To the Editors:

In a recent issue of the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, I read several gripes on the injustices of the promotion system. This is not a gripe, but I would like to show up the injustice which is done to officers of one service when they serve under senior officers from a sister service.

I am an infantry officer who commanded a regiment in World War II and received the DSC, and other decorations. I was among the first to attend the National War College. I served in the Pentagon where I received superior ratings and two letters of commendations. It was because of this work that I was selected to be an Army member of a joint staff which was being organized overseas.

Shortly after the staff was organized my group was placed under an Air Force general who took a very dim view of intelligence activities. Although he was not enthusiastic about officers who were in G2, he gave me the impression that I was doing a superior job. When I returned to the ZI two years later and saw my efficiency reports, I found that I had been damned with faint praise. It is interesting to note that since I have returned to work for senior Army officers, my reports have returned to their former high level.

The injustice, as I see it, is that a senior officer from a sister service can ruin an officer, not because the officer was inefficient, but because a senior officer in a sister service so judges him. Isn't there some factor which can be applied in cases like this so that an officer won't lose a chance for promotion?

COL. SCARRED HEART



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
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JOSEPH I. GREENE, SOLDIER

COLONEL JOSEPH INGHAM GREENE, Infantry-retired, suffered a heart attack and died in Newark, New Jersey, on the evening of 25 June 1953. He had been editor of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL and Secretary-General Manager of the Association of the United States Army since their organization in 1950. He was editor of *Infantry Journal* and Secretary-General Manager of the U.S. Infantry Association from 1940 to 1950, and Associate Editor of *Infantry Journal* from 1938 to 1940.

Colonel Greene enlisted in the Army on 8 May 1918 and served as Private, Private First Class and Corporal in the 48th, 89th and 46th Infantry regiments until 13 June 1919 when he entered the Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1923. He was a graduate of the Infantry School and the Command and General Staff College. He retired in 1945 but continued on active duty until 1946. He held the Legion of Merit.

Funeral services were held at Fort Myer Chapel, 29 June 1953, with the former Chief of Chaplains, Major General Luther Miller, Retired, conducting the services. The grave is on a steep slope of Arlington cemetery overlooking the Pentagon Building.

FOR too many years Colonel Greene carried too heavy a load and tried to do more things than can be done in a twenty-four-hour day, seven-day week, or twelve-month year. Time was the one implacable enemy of this gentlemanly, warm-hearted, friendly man. In sickness and in health (and for many years he suffered from far more than any reasonable number of aches and pains), he fought against its tyranny. The unfinished work that was piled high on his desk during those years was a symbol of this battle and a mark of his refusal to face up to the fact that there wasn't time to do all of the things his sense of duty demanded of him, his standards of friendship required of him, his generous nature imposed upon him. His spirit would never admit there wasn't time to do all the things the world asked of this talented man.

His spirit never failed him, but finally his heart did—that big, friendly, generous, grievously overburdened heart gave out and the battle against time was over.

But the battle wasn't lost. In the words of Horace *(Non omnis moriar),* Joe Greene will not all die. For this magazine and its association stand today as his monument. He was the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL and the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL was Joe Greene. It was so much a part of him that the separation by death is a greater wrench than any man can know. Whatever the JOURNAL may become—and he could see no limits to its potentialities for service—a part of it died with him. But a part of Joe Greene will always remain in this magazine. It is impossible not to believe that.

Colonel Greene was a great editor; make no mistake about that! He put his own wide and wonderful talents to the fullest possible service of his magazine, his army, and his native land. He mixed high idealism with common sense and hard work. His intelligence was keen and perceptive, his judgment incisive and good. He was quick to praise and his criticism was invariably constructive and kind.

During Colonel Greene's long editorship the JOURNAL received high marks from private soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers of all ranks. It was also highly respected by civilian readers and received the praise of other editors, authors and journalists. That these professionals know that a magazine is largely the product of its directing editor, testifies to the greatness of Colonel Greene as an editor.

It would be impossible accurately to weigh the influence for good that Colonel Greene exerted on the Army through his editorship. Many of his most valuable contributions were hidden in the anonymity of the editor-author relationship. But it can be said that Colonel Greene did much to make the Army conscious of the power of the written word and to realize that both the accomplishments and the failures of the Army of a free country are legitimate public interests.

HE was quick to recognize talent, even in the rough, and he was generous with time-consuming encouragement and criticism of young and old writers alike. In the years before books and the business problems took so much of his time, he would search for young Army writers of promise and work with them until they developed into first-class writing talent.

There was Brigadier General Paul W. Thompson, now in charge of the French edition of *The Reader's Digest.* He was Captain Thompson on duty in the Office of the Chief of Engineers when Colonel Greene, then new to the editorship of *Infantry Journal,* found him and gave him the opportunity to develop into a first-class writer.

The case of Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall was a bit different. Marshall was a veteran newspaperman who had given years to the study of war when Colonel Greene was introduced to him by reading and reviewing *Blitzkrieg* and *Armies on Wheels,* books Marshall had published back in 1940 and 1941. In *Infantry Journal* Colonel Greene hailed the author as "a military expert of the first class." General Marshall's subsequent career as a military historian bore out this acclaim and it is to Colonel Greene's credit that many of S. L. A. Marshall's important battlefield discoveries were given to the Army for the first time in the columns of his magazine.

He never completely lost touch with young writers of promise—as many in the Army today can testify—but it was a constant source of regret to him that he didn't have more time for this.

Colonel Greene was a superb copy editor. He could swiftly and surely transform a crudely written, badly organized manuscript into clear, sensible prose by clarifying with a simpler word or phrase here and there, and by rewriting and re-arranging with a deft, certain pen (instead of a pencil he used a pen with a very fine point that maddened typists until they became familiar with his handwriting). He was so skillful an editor that occasionally articles lost their original style and flavor and partook of the style and flavor of the editor. In most cases this was a distinct gain, but once in a rare while it unfortunately resulted in the loss of the flavor of a rough and ready writer.

As a stylist he was contemporary, holding that the purpose of writing was to tell the reader something in words that could not be misunderstood. So he preferred the simple word to the complex, the Anglo-Saxon word to the Latin, the active verb to the passive.

These stylistic standards were largely responsible for the JOURNAL's readability and liveliness, and in the days when Colonel Greene had little time for JOURNAL copy editing he would remind his subordinate editors of the need for simple and clear writing and careful editing. The little article by Colonel Greene on the inside front cover of this issue is a wonderful example of the kind of writing he wanted in the magazine.

IN the master index of articles and authors of *Infantry Journal* there are thirty-five cards under Colonel Greene's name and these list a total of 322 articles he wrote for it between 1929 and 1950. In the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL index there are seven cards with 64 entries. His first article in the *Infantry Journal* appeared in September 1929 and was a study of the dispersion of machine-gun fire when used against aircraft. Through the years his subject-matter reflected first the changing attitudes, requirements and problems of the Army, and secondly his own changing interests. For many years he wrote more book reviews than anything else and this reflected his love of books, his passionate belief that more soldiers should read more books. And write them, too. He once told one of his subordinate editors that books written by military men should be criticized gently in the JOURNAL if they were bad and praised if at all possible. "We must encourage soldiers to write and they won't if they are too sharply criticized in their own service magazines," he said. And at another time he observed that non-professional writers are much more sensitive to criticism than the professionals, who know criticism is part of the business.

Colonel Greene would have no objections if we reveal here that the initials "G.V." that appeared on so many book reviews in the past fifteen years were his pseudonym. He used them, not so much to hide his identity (many of his intimates were aware of it), as because he believed it was unwise for the name of the editor to appear too often. How he came to choose "G.V." isn't remembered now, but it tickled his fancy; "G.V." stood for *Giuseppe Verdi*—which is Italian for Joseph Greene.

His love of books and bookmaking led him to his great wartime work in publishing paper-backed "Fighting Forces" books. This was an accomplishment of great magnitude and a distinct service to his country. It was performed under extremely difficult conditions. Colonel Greene not only had to select the books he wanted to publish and obtain the rights from authors and publishers who sometimes were slow to understand his program, but he also had to persuade the services of the benefits that would be derived from making it possible for good military and semi-military books to

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be widely distributed in all theaters of war. And he had also to fight for supplies during the years of shortages.

Among Colonel Greene's major interests was the study of military history. His competence as a historian was recognized by long service as a member of the Board of Trustees of the American Military Institute, of which he was also President for several years. It was therefore with full realization of the value of recording American campaigns that after the war he encouraged the publishing of unit histories.

The unit histories published by the Infantry Journal Press are by any standard superior specimens of their kind. This can be attributed directly to Colonel Greene. He was lavish in the assistance and counsel he gave the writers and editors of these books and he was insistent that the books be well done. A few of them are masterpieces of bookmaking and all of them are excellent.

It was during these early postwar years that he became interested in the overseas library and publishing problems of the Government. He extended his assistance to the Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff and embarked on an ambitious program of selecting American books for publication in the occupied countries. When occupation responsibilities were transferred from the Army to the State Department, Colonel Greene was called upon to continue this work. He believed passionately in the rightness and urgency of the work he did on our overseas information programs and he was proud that the Association was able to participate in them. He understood that the first battle we had to win was the battle for the minds of our allies and of the neutrals; that we had to make them see us as we are instead of as they imagine we are or wish we were, or as our enemies say we are. To the extent that we could win this battle, the task of our fighting forces in some future battles might be lighter, and Joe Greene fought for it with all of his strength.

He had a large circle of friends and acquaintances in the book world, where he was honored, respected and loved. He served on the Council on Books in Wartime and with other book-industry groups and committees. In these contacts he was a constant advocate of better understanding of the Army. In Colonel Greene the military services had the best possible ambassador to the Republic of Letters.

COLONEL GREENE almost single-handedly conceived, planned, cajoled and persuaded until the support and the backing, and the belief in the wisdom of a single association and magazine for the fighting arms of the Army took hold and became a reality. Many other men helped, but it was Colonel Greene who stayed by it and followed through during the years the idea was developing. Members of his staff can vividly recall the suppressed excitement and pleasure in his voice as he told them that General Jacob L. Devers, then Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, had told him he believed in and favored a single combat arms association and magazine. In the years that followed, Colonel Greene was always quick to credit General Devers for his early support and encouragement, but we believe that General Devers himself would say that Joe Greene was the commander as well as the operations officer in the campaign for an Association of the U.S. Army and a COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. When the time came to establish them, he received the help of many infantrymen and artillerymen, including, as Colonel Greene always remembered, the selfless service of Colonel Breckinridge Day, the then Secretary and Editor of the Field Artillery Association and *Journal*.

The concept of a common association developed slowly in him. One colleague, looking back after Colonel Greene's death, could see that it had had an uphill battle in its formative years. Partly for the same reasons that every soldier develops branch pride and loyalty, but emphasized because his position as editor of *Infantry Journal* made him the spokesman and advocate of the infantry, Colonel Greene first developed his unity theme by proposing the unification of the Army around the infantry. The first public soundings on the theme from his pen, so far as can be remembered, came in 1941 when for the August issue he wrote an editorial on "The Infantry Mind." The title was obviously picked up from those critics who mistakenly and ignorantly use the word infantry as a synonym for reactionary fuddy-duddies. In this editorial Colonel Greene turned the tables on them.

"The Infantry mind," he wrote, "is a mind that thinks men are the essence of fighting power . . . every fighting man and every man who helps him fight."

"The Infantry mind," he continued, "is a mind that wants every weapon and gadget . . . adopted that will add strength and power and speed and sureness to the whole fighting force."

And finally: "The Infantry mind, so the Infantryman thinks, must be the same mind as the Air Force mind, the Armored Force mind, the Quartermaster mind, the Field Artillery mind, the Ordnance mind, the Coast Artillery mind, the Finance mind, the Cavalry mind, the Chemical Warfare mind, the Signal Corps mind, the Engineer mind, the Medical Corps mind, the Morale Branch mind, and the minds of Chaplains and Inspectors and Adjutants General. One mind there must be—one single mind, with one single, hard-driving aim—the defeat, the crushing defeat, of the enemy."

This was one of the finest editorials Colonel Greene ever wrote and it deserves to be remembered.

COLONEL GREENE had a bump of curiosity that dug into all manner of things and he possessed the kind of intelligence that ranged beyond the conventional and into the outer reaches where new ideas and new thinking lurk unseen and uncomprehended by less perceptive minds.

He was an accomplished amateur mathematician, surely unusual among editors! Back in the Benning days he and Brigadier General Leonard R. Boyd, retired, then a major, invented an antiaircraft machine-gun sight. He became an excellent lay psychologist, respected and honored by the professionals. His editorship of *Psychology for the Armed Services* gave him a wide acquaintanceship among psychologists and the close friendship of Dr. Edwin G. Boring of Harvard. His interest in psychology was not extracurricular and apart from his work as an editor or his duty as a soldier. He turned to it in search of knowledge that could be used to improve the leadership of combat commanders.

Colonel Greene was a better editorial craftsman than he was a writer. This he might dispute for he took pride in his best writing. And his best stuff was indeed top drawer. But that bedeviled tyrant time interfered too often with careful writing. Probably few of his acquaintances knew that he occasionally wrote poetry and had published at least one short story. He edited the *Infantry Journal Reader*, published in 1942 by Doubleday and Company, as a labor of love and pride in the magazine he was editing. He wrote a wartime "quickie"—*What You Should Know About the Army Ground Forces*—that was far sounder than most such

books. He was the co-editor and compiler of four fine anthologies: *First Love, Husbands and Lovers, Stories for Here and Now,* and *Stories of Sudden Truth.*

He loved the company of poets and they loved him. During the war years in Washington when arthritis troubled him greatly he thoroughly enjoyed Sunday morning walks through Rock Creek Park with Colonel Edward Davison, a poet, and like Colonel Greene, a lover of trees.

He loved to sing and a perfect day to him would have been a long walk through a woods in early spring with good companions all possessed of rich melodious voices lifted in song.

His happiest vacations may have been in those years when he stole a few weeks to go to the Bread Loaf Writers' conferences in Vermont. There he spent long, enjoyable hours in rich talk with poets and novelists.

WE have written much here of Colonel Greene as an editor and we have written frankly because we who loved and respected him know that he would have wanted it that way. And we have also tried to catch in words something of Joe Greene the man—the warm-hearted, thoughtful, gentlemanly man who was our friend and yours.

But there was also Joseph Ingham Greene, O-15267, Infantry, U.S.A. Indeed all the other Joe Greenes—the editor and writer, the warm, generous, gentlemanly friend—were conditioned by the all-important fact that Joe Greene had a deep and abiding love for his chosen profession of arms.

His generation has seen much of war. He was nineteen when the first World War began and he joined the Army a few months later. He didn't get overseas, but he liked the taste of Army life and word has come down from those now distant days that Joe Greene was a crackerjack private first class and corporal. He won an Army appointment to West Point when such appointments were not plentiful and competition was keen.

In the years leading up to World War II it saddened him at times to see how some of his comrades and colleagues could so far lose interest in their profession as to put more emphasis on sports than on training. Nothing was more exciting to him than a hard day of training in the field. He believed that the competitive spirit of sports could be transferred to training and he sought to establish this. Once when commanding a machine gun platoon, he worked to make machine gunnery as exciting to his men as a game of football. He was succeeding until higher authority sent down a directive that two of his key men should be excused from training in order to play on the regimental baseball team.

It is a mark of Joe Greene's qualities of leadership that he could excite men's interest in machine gunnery. His great capacity for sharing in the joys and sorrows, the tears and laughter of those around him kindled fires of loyalty and devotion in men. Joe Greene would have been a great battlefield leader.

It was his personal tragedy that this was not to be. When the Second World War came around he was a fitter candidate for Walter Reed Hospital and a disability retiring board than the command of a regiment. But he didn't want to retire and so he fought off the doctors, and the *Infantry Journal* contributed mightily to the war effort in ways that only Colonel Greene had the vision to see.

His perception and his knowledge of soldiers and their trade gathered through thirty years of practicing the soldier's trade stood him in good stead and he was a staunch and vocal advocate of the ground fighting man during those long years when too few stay-at-home Americans understood what it was their soldier sons were enduring.

He was one of a handful of officers on duty in General McNair's ground force headquarters during the war who thought long and hard about proper recognition for the combat infantryman. This small group was largely instrumental in the adoption of that cherished emblem: the Combat Infantryman's Badge.

Men who rose high in the service during and since the war had much respect and affection for Joe Greene. He was a good soldier by their exacting standards. One of his most treasured mementos was a totally unexpected note he received from General George C. Marshall. Written on the stationery of the Chief of Staff of the Army and dated 24 September 1942, the note read:

Dear Colonel Greene:

I wish to express my appreciation for the distinction and high professional competence with which the Infantry Journal, under your editorship, has served the Army.

Faithfully yours,

MARSHALL

Colonel Greene was deeply affected by this note. In the margin there appears in his handwriting this touching comment: "How typical of General Marshall's thoughtfulness that he should find the time to do this in the midst of war."

He enjoyed the company of young officers and when Colonel Greene would see one in the offices of the association, he would unfailingly talk to him and show him about. One of his great regrets was that he could so seldom find the time to visit Forts Benning and Sill and other posts where he could again get the feeling of service. He invariably returned from such visits refreshed in mind and spirit. In the week of his death he had visited Fort Sill with another member of the staff who reports that Colonel Greene had had a wonderful time visiting with the young officers in the BOQ to which he was assigned.

There is not an old employee of the Association who cannot recall more than one act of considerate kindness Colonel Greene had shown him, whether at a time of personal distress or unexpectedly and for no reason except that Colonel Greene had a deep feeling of kinship with all of his subordinates.

WE are able to speak of Joe Greene as the fair-minded and indulgent boss who never spared himself. His contemporaries in uniform could and do remember him as a loyal and friendly comrade in arms. He often spoke of the happy days at Fort Benning, and in the Philippines, and in China, when officers who had been lieutenants for years (and he among them) worked and studied and thought hard about future war and enjoyed the rich, satisfying talk of good companions sincerely interested in exploring the depths of a subject.

His oldest and most intimate friends know what they and the Army have lost in the death of Joe Greene. As one of them wrote when the sad news came to him: "The thing has just plain knocked the hell out of me. . . . Joe was truly the greatest gentleman of his day, a gentleman of the old school—warm-hearted, generous, thoughtful of everyone. His untimely death is a heavy blow to the whole Army—a heavier one that it knows. . . . We shall not see his like again."

We shall not indeed.

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
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ILLUSTRATED BY MAJOR LACHLAN FIELD

Where Is the Regimental Commande

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE E. LYNCH

It depends upon the type of action, bearing in mind, however, that the regimental commander cannot directly influence squads and platoons but must exert his battle leadership through his staff, and his battalion and company commanders

I AM sure this matter has bothered a number of commanders, for there is considerable emotional and psychological content in it aside from the central question of the location from which the regimental commander can best influence the action of his battalions and companies.

The current manuals give this guidance to the perplexed commander:

Field Manual 100-5 says, in paragraph 89: "He keeps in close touch with all subordinate units by means of persona visits and observations."

And in paragraph 128: "After provid ing for the issuance of orders, the com mander places himself where he can bes control the course of action and exer



is leadership. When opportunity offers
nd when his presence at the command
ost is not urgently required, he will
sit his subordinate commanders and
is troops in order to inspire confidence
nd to assure himself that his orders are
nderstood and properly executed. Dur-
g the decisive phases of battle, the
ace of the commander is near the criti-
l point of action."

RIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE E. LYNCH is Assistant Division Commander of the 43d Infantry Division. Since he graduated from West Point in 1929 he has been both an infantryman and a field artilleryman. In 1950 he completed the course at the National War College.

Paragraph 312 adds: "In an advance, commanders and their staffs are well forward. The commander goes where he can best control the operation, usually with his principal columns or with the column along which the axis of signal communications is being established. . . ."

Field Manual 7-40 gives essentially the same guidance as 100-5.

Let it be clear that we are speaking of battle situations rather than training maneuvers or field exercises. In infantry unit training more often than not the commander is acting in an observer or inspector capacity, over and above commanding.

VENTURING to prescribe just where any commander should go or be during battle is an impossibility which the field manuals wisely recognize. It must be determined by the conditions of each situation. Situations can be typified but in practice each contains enough variables to cause at least a momentary thought by the commander as to where he should place himself.

In addition, temperament enters into the matter. I do not mean different degrees of physical courage between commanders, although, commanders being men, this undeniably exists. What I do mean is that infantry commanders, under pressure of battle, find different natural outlets for this pressure which builds up as the battle grows. One commander cannot resist the compelling attraction of getting into action and participating in the fight. Another feels he must see everything that is happening in his zone. Another cannot avoid the pressing need to think ahead and foresee the results of the current action and plan and make arrangements for whatever action seems necessary to follow. Another feels compelled to supervise his own staff or the commander and staff of one of his combat team or regimental units. There are any number of important activities which, depending on the make-up of the commander, can engage his attention. And in pursuit of any of them he may feel that he has selected the critical activity for his attention at the time. At the risk of offending other regimental commanders of World War II and Korea who have worked out their own solutions, I will try to set down my thoughts and some conclusions concerning this question which should be of interest to the infantry commander.

Fluid Situations

MOTORIZED or mechanized reconnaissance is generally found in a rapidly moving or crumbling situation. The regimental commander does not belong out in a reconnaissance group of this kind except when the group is a part of the regimental combat team. The reconnaissance group performing its mission separately from the action or disposition of the regiment can report the information on which the regimental commander may base his initial action and set his troops in motion. The deployment of the regiment would be delayed if its commander were some distance off with the reconnaissance unit, trying to relay to his battalion and other commanders information which can best be given person to person.

But if, as often happens, the reconnaissance element is a part of a motorized combat team column, we have another matter. The action in a sense has already started, the order of battle has been arranged. Once the enemy has been met, the results of the clash are often determined by the speed with which combat team elements can be brought into action.

In infantry-artillery actions of pre-World War II days, uncomplicated by motors and tanks, we were taught that in a moving column the commander belonged at the head of his main body or between the tail of the advance guard and the main body. In terms of motorized movement of combined arms, this position for the combat team commander would seem to be the best one to forfeit to the enemy that jump in time which may decide the battle. Here the advance guard might consist of a reconnaissance platoon, an infantry battalion (in trucks), a tank platoon, a heavy mortar platoon, an engineer platoon and an artillery battery. This mixed element, all on wheels or tracks, would occupy over three miles of road space—road space which, once occupied by a column, does not allow easy doubling by other vehicles.

Once he is committed to a position behind or in the rear of the column, this regimental commander cannot see the situation about which he must make some early decisions. Getting up to a position where he can intelligently form his decision may use up precious time he cannot afford to lose. No, in this case he should be following the reconnaissance element, somewhere with the leading rifle company, preferably with his advance guard commander.

He is not there to give that commander detailed instructions but to make his combat team plan and to issue instructions to the elements of his column or columns. The commanders of these elements should be at the head of the main body rather than with their units. Hav-



ing satisfied himself that the advance guard is proceeding with its work, the regimental commander should leave the advance guard and see to the deployment of the rest of his column.

Now this is a touchy matter. Many commanders think they ought not to be seen leaving an area where action is developing or soon expected. Afraid of criticism by their own troops or loss of prestige, they prefer to stay at the spot, even when this means neglect of the activities of the bulk of their command. But important mistakes may well be averted if he leaves the point of developing action and goes back to see that those initial movements of the rest of his command on which the whole action depends are started in the way he had envisioned and ordered them.

It is more important to see that all the forces are brought to bear as intended than to see that just one of them is doing well and merely hoping that the rest are carrying on.

Once he is satisfied that the whole of his force is moving in harmony with his plans, then the commander can select his post where he wants to and as the developing situation requires.

Foot Patrols

ACCOMPANYING foot patrols into areas behind the enemy lines in static situations is also a frequent temptation to active regimental commanders. There is little harm and possibly some good in yielding to this temptation. Contrary to popular impression, such patrols are not extremely dangerous. They incur few casualties. Probably more casualties are received at battalion CPs and dumps from mortar and artillery fire than small patrol actions receive. Going on patrols builds up a certain amount of prestige in his own unit but his information is not much improved beyond what the patrol report contains. One patrol can only see a very limited area.

Observation Posts

THE use of OPs by the regimental commander is a matter of judgment. An observer, visiting me during the early campaigns in Italy, sat down with a list of questions he was to ask me, and one of them was this: "During a battle, do you command your regiment from your CP or an OP?" The thought behind this question may have been that the good commander went to his OP and roosted there until the battle was over, while the timid commander hung on to the end of a telephone wire in his CP. But of course, there is no rule. I have tried both ways and still other ways.

At the attack of Monte La Difensa which was a part of the 1943-44 winter battle for Cassino and my first combat action as a regimental commander, I spent most of the first day encumbering an 81mm mortar OP on a crag which was on the outpost line at the start of the battle. From there I observed, searched and looked. Once in a while I saw the fire of a German mortar which my mortar observer would promptly attend to. Or a fleeting sight of a German or American foot soldier working through the trees and bushes. But I never saw anything that would tell me one way or another what to do or when to do it. Considering that it was an hour's climb to reach this desolate rock, my presence there made small difference in the action I was trying to view—and it was a relatively good OP.

Actually, however, I should modify this statement somewhat. During the first thirty minutes after daylight I was able to see that the wind and terrain were adaptable to smoking another mountainside on our right forward flank from which enemy mortar and artillery fire could be directed and from which enemy machine gun fire could hamper our advancing infantry. So, we did smoke that mountain effectively and it gave us no trouble. But after that I could better have been any place else.

Incidentally, there were three other persons with me, all of us peering over the crag, and this drew German mortar fire, which did no harm but probably annoyed our mortar observer who would have remained undetected if he had been alone. OPs, it can be said, are valuable for forming estimates and materializing the map, but not as a location from which to direct the action.

A VERY common characteristic of ground OPs is that, if they are well forward, say on the outpost line or the line of departure, the view is usually limited to a small segment of the battle area. But if the view does include all of the critical area, then the OP is too far to the rear for good vision or effective command. Regiments in these days operate over generous portions of land, and somehow the action seldom takes place in open, viewable terrain. If the terrain is open, the time of attack is most likely at night.

The Air OP is just another kind of OP. What has been said of ground OPs applies equally except that the regimental commander obtains a much better view of his arena and can form the image of his action more effectively than ever he could from several ground OPs. Even so, the Air OP is not a place from which the regimental commander can best influence the course of action, however much help it may be to him in arriving at his plan of action.

There may be one exception to this statement, the case of a long motorized column. Command of such a column can be conducted from an Air OP, but the Air OP should be abandoned when the column is about to be committed to action.

When Closely Engaged

THE most usual situation finds opposing troops in contact, each with closed flanks. Where, says the regimental commander, should I be? He should usually be at his command post. A US corps commander of World War II says that any commander who is found at his own CP three times in succession by his own immediate commander, should be summarily relieved of his command. The thought behind this rule is good, but any rigid application of it would work havoc. I have visited my battalion commanders and found them in their CP three times in a row many a time. They may have just returned from visits to their own units; they may be preparing to go to an OP or a company. They may be preparing patrol plans or engaged in any one of the dozens of things a battalion commander must do at his own CP. Or they may just be snatching some needed sleep. No; generally speak

ng, both regimental and battalion commanders must spend at least two-thirds of their time at their CPs if they are to get the things done they must do.

Visiting by the regimental commander is essential. But he visits outside of his own area rarely, and must then be certain his own staff and the division staff know where he is. In battle, even though the situation seems quiet, visits to division headquarters are infrequent and usually unnecessary. The division commander and his staff by their own visits furnish the regimental commander all he needs from above.

Every day the regimental commander should visit at least two of his battalions. Each time he can usually visit one of the companies of the battalions. Sometimes terrain, weather and discourtesies of the enemy make such visiting time-consuming and slow. A few minutes at an OP while in the battalion area is usually profitable. But at none of the places he visits should the regimental commander drag things out beyond the time he needs for the real purpose of his visit. If he merely wants to see for himself the state of mind of a battalion commander who the day before received a near-miss mortar shell, he stays long enough to see that the near-missee is not too badly shaken. He may verify his own impression by tactful talk with some officer of the battalion staff—and then leave. This is not to say that he takes an official attitude or creates an impression of haste. Informality and an easy feeling of understanding are fundamental. And whatever else he may feel about his visits, the commander must always remember that his presence unavoidably slows down or stops the business that usually must go on in every CP he visits.

IT is a strong temptation to the regimental commander, once he arrives at a battalion CP actively engaged in an attack or in defending against an enemy thrust, and once he has received a summary of the situation and possibly viewed a part of the action—then to settle down and supervise the battalion commander and his staff in their handling of the situation. This procedure may possibly be justified when the regimental commander uses it to form an opinion of a battalion commander of whom he is uncertain. But even then it is doubtful, for there are other tests that can be applied for the same purpose.

What does happen when he camps on a battalion this way? If the battalion commander is a good one, doing a good job, his attention is diverted from the things which should have his whole attention. He feels impelled to stay at the CP when he ought to leave it. Or he feels impelled to get out of it when he possibly should stay at it. The regimental commander cannot avoid the inclination to intervene or suggest other courses of action or refinements of the course the battalion commander is following. The battalion commander likewise can't help feeling that his duties of command have been invaded, and he becomes frustrated or annoyed or decides that the regimental commander has taken over the initiative and so sits back and waits for instructions as the battalion action progresses. The regimental commander, without so intending, has unjustly seized his subordinate's command, crippled his initiative and possibly damaged his usefulness for future operations. The only exception when "seizure of command" can be justified is when a battalion commander has demonstrated his ineptitude. This should not happen more than two or three times before replacement is arranged.

It is a good practice to time your visits so as to be at a subordinate CP at mealtime. This, of course, only applies in stable situations, for in the attack and other more active phases of operations, mealtimes are unpredictable. No matter what the fare may be, the act of eating with the subordinate commander and his staff draws the group together, encourages understanding and talk that may be helpful. This seems so obvious as hardly deserving of mention. But I have not observed it to be the common practice it should be.

In the Attack

IN attacks launched from assembly positions or positions in contact with the enemy, it is important for the regimental commander to observe the jump-off of his major elements or as much of them as the situation will allow, even though it is at night—when he can probably learn as well by ear as by eye whether his plan is developing as envisioned. If the attack begins by movement of troops from assembly areas to a line of departure, again even in the nighttime, the regimental commander should post himself to see that the movement starts on time as planned, and he should accompany the major unit in its movement to the attack. So often there are misunderstandings or mishaps in such forward movements or in the actual jump-off from the line of departure, that instant knowledge of changes in, or failure of, plans will enable the regimental commander to effect other changes and co-ordination to make possible the successful continuance of his original plan, or else prevent a disastrous outcome from a plan gone wrong. This is particularly true in night attacks and attacks that start in darkness and continue in daylight.

PERHAPS I can illustrate from personal experience a situation that showed how the regimental commander needs to weigh carefully his choice of location. The time was 30 May 1944, the eighth day of the operations of VI Corps to break out of the Anzio beachhead. Heroic and costly efforts had been made to smash the German defenses. Many gains had been made and some attacks had failed; but the Allied forces were not achieving a rapid breakout. The 36th Infantry Division constituted VI Corps reserve. As the beachhead expanded, units of the division continuously moved to forward assembly areas so as to be more available for rapid commitment. The usual and onerous task of a reserve force plagued us, that of having several plans on hand so we could quickly start whatever course of action the corps commander might choose. A new plan, involving reconnaissance for and selection of assembly areas from which it was expected the 36th Division might launch an attack through the 34th Division, was received at the CP of my regiment, the 142d Infantry. I decided that the situation was too uncertain to leave my CP for any appreciable period of time. I also felt that this uncertainty made it necessary for battalion commanders to stay in the assembly areas with their battalions. So, a reconnaissance party consisting of the regimental executive, the battalion executives and a number of unit guides was sent to select routes and assembly areas and to obtain information of the area in which this plan, if executed, would place the regiment.

Within two hours of the time this party started out, my liaison officer at Division headquarters arrived breathless, with instructions for me to report immediately to Division headquarters for orders. (We had so recently arrived at that particular assembly area that telephone communication had not yet been established. I assume also that radio security was distrusted.) At Division headquarters I learned, it now being about 1300 hours, that my regiment was to entruck, move about eighteen miles to the right flank, and prepare and launch an attack after dark that night.

Full darkness was expected by 2200 hours, so we had nine hours to accom-

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plish the many actions leading to an attack, an attack not envisioned in any of our preliminary planning. It is clear that precious time was saved by the fact that the key commanders were right at their CPs and not off somewhere on a reconnaissance. Every minute of that time and the use of several extraordinary measures were vital to the successful launching of our attack that night. Even with this saving of time, the leading battalion was unable to cross the outpost line until 0100 that night. The initial and key objectives it was hoped to reach by daylight were reached with no more than a half hour margin to spare. Time was the irreplaceable ingredient.

THE need for the regimental commander to see his troops cross their line of departure in the attack was clearly apparent later in this action. The three battalions had arrived in forward assembly areas. Commanders down to include those of the companies had viewed the initial objectives which were more than two miles behind the German front and two thousand feet higher than our outpost line. By 1000 hours, orders had been issued, supplies had been prepared for man-pack and the units stripped down for mountain fighting. The regiment moved out of assembly areas in a column of battalions.

A reduced regimental command group moved out at the same time as the leading battalion, but arrived at the outpost line where final co-ordination was to be effected, ahead of this battalion. This was understandable for the movement of a battalion in the dark is slower and more complicated than any rule of thumb ever envisions. This time movement was further hindered by the cross-movements of other units beginning a relief of the front-line unit through which we were passing. This relief was supposed to be done after the 142d Infantry had passed through. But the planned timing required considerable concurrent movement of other troops. Thus the situation held nightmare capabilities apparent to any infantryman.

After waiting at the outpost line an hour for the leading battalion to arrive, the S3 and I set out by separate courses to search for it. We each found one of the two leading companies of the battalion (both they and the battalion commander were uncertain of their location) and led them to their jump-off position. Thereafter, the attack went well and the key objectives were in our hands by daylight, but with a slim, uncomfortable margin of time.

The initial objectives of this action were of limited depth. But success in seizing them was to be followed by a continuing foot movement through the Alban Hills with Rome as the ultimate objective. As in a motor movement with the future uncertain, such an action as this required the regimental commander to keep himself and a small command group on a mobile basis moving along with the troops. The situation did not allow successive establishment of formal CPs in echeloned style with moves made each time enough ground was gained. The regimental commander and the rest of his mobile group accompanies or follows his leading battalion so he can see his situation and act without delay. Time is almost always the key. Communications may suffer somewhat with this increase of mobility. After the action I learned that Division headquarters had not been too happy with the number and brevity of the radio reports I had been able to send. But technology should eventually overcome this embarrassment.

And for another thing, I am far from convinced that the regimental commander's presence with an assault rifle company is at all helpful to the success of the company. I have tried it several times but the only clear result I could see was that the company commander got flustered and embarrassed by my being there. I undoubtedly hampered his freedom of action and, though the men probably enjoyed seeing the colonel uncomfortable too, I doubt if I inspired them to anything they wouldn't have done anyway. Again, to guard against faulty conclusions, such an excursion in the nature of a visit is good. But the visit should not be prolonged. The regimental commander can be seen by men of the company, and if things are awry he can do something to correct the situation. But he should not seize the captain's command.

The Regimental Reserve

THE regiment usually has a reserve which by the nature of battle is expected to furnish the punch that will determine the outcome. However good the regimental executive or S3 may be, the regimental commander must so arrange matters that he himself visits the places he must visit, observes the actions important to his planning and thinking and keeps his own planning up to and ahead of the course of the battle; so that he stays in a position to give clear instructions to the right people when he wants to put the weight of his last battalion into the balance. He can usually best issue orders to the reserve battalion commander from his CP or from a suitable (and accessible) OP.

Since much of the regimental commander's time must be spent at his CP the location of it deserves some discussion.

In the situation where the regimental commander accompanies his leading battalion, his headquarters organization, a cumbersome and initially a somewhat inert affair, can best travel in the center of gravity of the column, between second and third battalions. A moderate amount of mobile means of communications is with the commander, so he can effectively carry on up forward until the situation clarifies and the more extensive headquarters operations needed as the battle develops can be set in motion.

In the offense, or when passage from the defense to the offense is planned, the CP should be placed with reference to the roads and trails and toward the flank that promises most success. Or if the direction of success cannot be predicted, it should be near the center of the area. The exact location depends on the road nets.

ONE common error is to choose a location from which wire communications can be laid along convenient roads to each of the regiment's battalions and rear installations. Such a location generally puts the command post too far to the rear. Equally good communications can be had from some more forward location. Communications officers should remember that most failures of wire communications are caused by friendly vehicles and enemy artillery and mortar fire both of which are dense along roads and at road junctions. Wire laid across country is less subject to these things and cuts down the endless amount of wire repairing required with wire circuits laid along roads.

Location of the command post well forward means between eight hundred yards and two miles of the foremost elements, depending on the width of front, the terrain and roads, and the mission. It is not inflexible even within these distances. Even when the command post cannot be located near a point from which you can view the whole regimental front, or even that part of the front you judge to be most critical, a forward location does allow the commander to hear the important sounds of battle. These sounds often carry their own intelligence before the intelligence system has had time to understand, evaluate and report the enemy actions that cause such sounds. Undeniably, forward

cation of the command post encourges the lower echelons to keep their mmand post locations close to their wn troops and lends a certain sense of lidarity and compactness to all who now the situation or see it portrayed n the map.

Visiting Supporting Units

HE three rifle battalions properly get the greater share of the regimental mmander's time. Their success deends greatly on the help they receive om the combat team artillery, supportg tanks, and heavy mortars, and from e medical service, the engineers and e administrative services of the comt team. In combined arms actions, ese supporting elements must generalbe relied on to pull their weight ithout much supervision from the comt team commander. But in a war of y length there will be periods of intion or stabilization when the comander should visit these units to learn r himself what they are like and to mulate in them a feeling of being rt of the combat team—of being imrtant enough to the combat team for commander to be concerned about em, their welfare and their activities.

Regimental Executive

should be axiomatic that only in emergencies does the regimental comander or the regimental executive ever ave the command post while the other away. In many regiments of World ar II, the custom of using the regiental executive as the "inside" or "adinistrative" agent grew into a pattern. his may be said to be a matter of rsonalities and therefore subject to no le. But I think there is a better use for e executive.

He can relieve the regimental comander of many of his administrative ties and still have time to perform utside" tasks. He should visit units, ake reconnaissances and be ready at all nes to take over in the event misrtune overtakes this commander. But is in no position to do this if his job s limited him to the administrative le of the picture. At times he may ve to take temporary command of one the battalions—for which he is not ell fitted if his scope has been limited housekeeping.

Influence of the Commander

HAVE given some reasons and purposes for the regimental commander's sits and some methods which have rked. I had hoped to avoid "leader-



ship" because even the mention of this powerful word very nearly takes a volume before the writer can extricate himself. But since leadership is obviously a principal reason for visits, it must be mentioned.

In modern war, both our own and the enemy's weapons cause a great deal of planned dispersion of units and men on the battlefield and new wars will see this tendency increase. The actual weight of powerful infantry units, divisions, in their most forward parts is made up of thinly manned posts scattered over distances, armed with weapons to cover intervening areas, and heavily supported by overhead-firing weapons in the rear. Leadership in these small posts is and must be within each such group.

In a literal sense leadership can be exercised only over those the eye can see. Noncommissioned officers and lieutenants are usually the only persons who can exercise this form of leadership, though sometimes a captain can. But when the captain assumes direct leadership of one of his platoons, he is seizing the privilege and duty of that platoon's commander, who if capable of the job himself has been unjustly dispossessed of it. Indeed his future usefulness and growth may have been impaired.

If the platoon commander has become a casualty and his second in command is not qualified, or if the platoon commander is not big enough for the task, the captain can and should lead the platoon. But he must find a new platoon commander before another action.

This may seem a far cry from the regimental commander, but I am attempting to show that, in battle, leadership in the sense of direct influence over troops is carried out in different ways at different levels. The higher the echelon, the less the direct influence a commander can exercise over his soldiers. There are many ways the regimental commander can and does influence the men of his regiment. But he must early learn that in battle he has little direct influence over his small units, squads and platoons and little more over his companies. He must, in fact, concentrate his efforts on his captains, majors and lieutenant colonels. His attitudes, views, character and determination are forced into the minds of these officers by every means and at every opportunity until their actions, in turn translated into the actions of the troops, become the realization of the direct influence of the regimental commander. But while centering his attentions on these officers, he does take every opportunity to talk to his men individually or in groups wherever he may see them—a smile, a wave, a word or two, no matter what—the soldier values these attentions and responds to them.

And it is for these reasons that the regimental commander, in selecting for himself the critical spot at the critical time, does so with the purpose of leading his field officers and captains rather than his squads and platoons.

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GIVE US BACK OUR PRIDE

An old-timer says we soldiers are homesick for an outfit we can "belong" to.

THERE has been a lot of noise about ways to make the Army an attractive career in order to get the high-class young men that the Army will need for high positions in twenty or thirty years. Some of the noise has to do with being underpaid, curtailment of post exchange privileges, loss of dependent medical care and lack of stabilized tours of duty. All of these have some effect. But nobody in any of the services is starving to death. There are plenty of new 1953 cars around every camp, post, air base and naval installation. Nobody is dying for lack of medical care, and you can still buy a lot at the post exchange.

THE one thing that is making the service unattractive is never mentioned. That is the lack of a sense of accomplishment a soldier can get from doing his duty. There used to be a great sense of pride in the service, pride in doing a job well, pride in being a part of an efficient and effective machine devoted to the defense of our country.

Much if not all of the pride developed in the Army came from a definite feeling of being identified with something. We served with particular units for fairly long periods of time, and built up strong friendships, we worked with people we knew to a common end. In the Army, you had a "home." When you were not on duty with a unit, you had a home in the "Chief's Office" in Washington.

Before the war, units were small, but training was vigorous in spite of obstacles. When you went to school you received instruction from the very cream of the Army. There was drive, energy, and, above all, efficiency in the entire program. You felt alive, and you knew that you were going places with a going concern.

The war didn't change this too much. The regulars were scattered far and wide and became, just as we had always known we would, a small highly trained segment in the entire structure required to fight a major war. But for most of us we still belonged to a "unit," be it a separate tank battalion, a division, or corps. We were part of a team, and what we did affected the entire team. Sometimes the team hubbled and bubbled, but most of the time you were caught up in a tremendous act, in which the individual contributed all that he could for the common cause.

TODAY the entire picture is changed. Nobody, from the newest selective service recruit, to colonels with thirty years' service, and many generals, belongs to anything. Here today and gone tomorrow. Few officers stay over one year in any one job, unless it's a staff job in the Pentagon. It's the same for enlisted men: old-timers, NCOs, and recruits fresh from training centers, all are casual. Punch a button, out fall the cards, send them all to hell and gone. Through the "pipeline," join a unit, stay a few months, back into the pipeline. Punch the button, officers and enlisted men, old and young, experienced and green, just punch the button, and send them on their way, for everyone in the Army now is a number in an IBM machine.

Nobody has a home any more. The bright young staff officers shy away from com

mand. Get on the staff. You can make decisions without responsibility. Get on the staff, your efficiency rating is bound to be high, no one low-rates a staff officer. Get on the staff, you can't get your throat cut because of the VD rate, and the AWOL rate.

THERE are too many "staff studies" and too much talk; not enough decisive action. The Army is waiting for the strong, clear voice of command; a voice that will blow away the fog imposed by boards and committees and *ad hoc* groups of well-meaning advisers; a voice that will give meaning and direction to an Army that is sound, but bewildered. Look at what we have been doing.

Who worries about training the "young idea how to shoot"? Marksmanship doesn't count for too much any more. Are your TI&E bulletin boards up to date and sparkling with the gems of wisdom dispensed by higher authority? Don't bother to really get down and know your men and really talk to them about the things that are a soldier's life.

And watch your Supply Economy Program. Do you have the very latest slogan pasted in every nook and corner? What does it matter if you have only about one-third of the maintenance personnel required to keep your equipment in shape? Why worry because you have been issued tanks costing over 350,000 dollars apiece but have never been issued the tools to keep them in proper condition?

Is morale low? Don't give a soldier pride in his unit. Don't train him in the essentials of a soldier's knowledge until he knows that he's the best damn soldier in the best damn squad, in the best damn platoon in the best damn company in the best damn battalion in the Army. That isn't necessary any more. Just give him a bright scarf to wear around his neck, and a fancy cord to wear around his shoulder.

THERE must be a commander. The General Staff should become *the* general's staff, with the G's functioning as responsible advisers. Put the crown back on the troop commander and pat him on the back once in a while. Honor the troop commander above the staff when he is good, and bounce him out on his ear when he isn't. Cut the staffs back, reduce the pipeline and form enough units to command.

Give everybody a "home," officers and professional enlisted men. Keep your officers and enlisted men in units, under good commanders, and they will carve out a career for themselves.

Put back the "Chiefs" of the combat arms so that every one will have a home, even during those tours of duty when he cannot be with a unit. This is imperative. The combat services are dying on the vine for lack of a strong authoritative spokesman to represent them in the Pentagon. The Chiefs of the technical services are now the tail that is wagging the dog they are supposed to support.

Clear away the undergrowth that prevents positive action, clear away the weeds that prevent efficiency. Once the high command begins to function effectively and efficiently, we will have our pride back.

You don't believe it? Just ask that young captain, or that young lieutenant colonel. Ask the first sergeant of any unit, or the platoon sergeant sweating over a new group of men in a replacement training division. What! They all said the same thing. "Sure, we need more pay, you have to live, but that isn't everything. I love the Army, and I keep staying on because I just can't help believing that some day someone will come along and there will be a *change,* and we'll have an army again."

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A National Guardsman says that if we're really serious about creating a Ready Reserve force it is time to

FISH OR CUT BAIT

COLONEL ROBERT F. COCKLIN

THERE is evidence that the Pentagon and Congress have embarked on the almost-annual re-evaluation of the Army Reserve program. Despite the passage last year of the Armed Forces Reserve Act, the so-called "Magna Charta" for the Reserves, it appears now that it wasn't quite what they wanted after all and the Reserve Officers' Association which fought long and hard for it is back looking for more service secretaries and a larger military staff to look after the Reserves. There are vague stirrings in other directions too, and if Congress can only find the time, a full session of oratory, and very little in the way of concrete accomplishment that will honestly help to increase the size and efficiency of our civilian components can be expected to result.

Excess verbiage and compromise are habitual when this subject comes up, so a brief examination of some of the pertinent facts that always seem to get waylaid should be worthwhile.

Stated briefly, our whole Reserve program revolves around one basic fact: since the end of World War II the National Guard has delivered the goods and the Reserve has not. There are a variety of reasons for this and none will be overcome by getting bigger staff sections or more under or assistant secretaries.

Stripped of all the nice turns of phrase, there are some good, solid, practical reasons why the Army knows that it must have a National Guard and why it really wants it. Probably the first and foremost reason is the matter of dollars. The Federal Government, in this instance the Department of Defense, must foot the entire bill for the Organized Reserve Program. The Guard on the other hand gets part of its sustenance from state treasuries. For fiscal year 1953, the Congress appropriated $153,300,000 to support the activities of the Army National Guard. The several states and their political subdivisions likewise anted up almost $100,000,000 in support of the National Guard during the same period. Even the most rabid exponent of the Army Reserve would have to admit that no such sums in the way of state support could ever be raised to back a purely federal reserve force.

What's more, the Chief of National Guard Bureau, as a primary program director, was responsible for establishing and justifying the amounts the Guard received from the Federal Government. And the Guard helped push the budget through Congress. With the terrific economy pressures being exerted against the Pentagon, is it any wonder that a reserve force that can obtain $100,000,000 from state taxpayers is in high favor?

Actually, this financial picture goes even farther than the appropriations indicate. Not only is the dollar support there but also the National Guard provides a reservoir of men and equipment that is readily available to the regular services in the event of an emergency. After the bell rang on Korea, the Army National Guard turned over to the Army $193,000,000 worth of tanks, trucks, radios, recoilless weapons and other items which had been paid for out of Federal funds appropriated for the National Guard. In addition, National Guard units that were called to active duty took with them an additional billion dollars worth of equipment. Most of this equipment, incidentally, stayed with the Army. When National Guardsmen were released from Federal service, they came home complete with duffel bag and the clothes on their backs, and that's about all. The money for stockpiling and maintenance of such quantities of equipment as the Guard had in 1950 would never have been appropriated to the Army for its reserves. Therefore the Guard's stockpile represents a welcome backlog when the sirens of war or "police actions" sound off in the Pentagon.

Another financial reason why the Guard merits support lies in the more than $500,000,000 worth of state-owned armories, camps, and other training facilities. To replace these would cost well over two billion dollars and it seems highly doubtful that the states would relinquish these properties without adequate compensation.

IN the past (and with some justification), the Guard was criticized for playing politics and having "political" officers. Since the Regular Army and Air Force have been given the veto power on Guard commissions and promotions, this whipping boy has lost his usefulness.

One other obstacle—either real or imagined—has likewise gone by the board. There was a time when each governor had to be consulted on any and all plans to send the Guard out of the state for training. Written agreements now exist which not only readily facilitate this kind of training but permit the calling to duty of certain units without clearing them through the governor.

Let's look now at the job that has been done in organizing, recruiting and training civilian-component units, which is after all, the basic consideration. Just before the Korean emergency, the Guard had allotted 98 per cent of the 5,37[illegible] units in its troop basis and 95 per cent of these units had surpassed and maintained the strength necessary to gain and keep Federal recognition. This was done even though the Guard accepted a much higher troop basis than it originally wanted and was in competition with the regular services, the Army Reserve, and the draft board for men. The Army Reserve program, on the other hand, has been undergoing constant change and it is difficult to arrive at any figures that would provide a fair comparison. The Reserve did find, however, that when it was authorized to establish so-called "Class A" units which would be comparable in status to National Guard units, it was unable to even organize any appreciable numbers of units

COLONEL ROBERT F. COCKLIN, Artillery-NGUS, needs no introduction to our readers in his dual capacity as Artillery Editor and Advertising Director of this magazine. But he is also Chief of Staff of the District of Columbia National Guard and in six short years has become an ardent and faithful Guardsman. He entered the Army in 1942, attended the artillery OCS at Fort Sill, and served in the Pacific with the 93d Infantry Division. After the war he was Associate Editor of *The Field Artillery Journal* for a time and then joined the staff of *The National Guardsman*. He joined the staff of the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL when it began publication in 1950.

That program has never attained even minimum goals.

Why should the National Guard be able to accomplish these things and get such support when the Reserve can't? There are many reasons. There is evidence, for example, that those citizen-soldiers who wish actively to engage in military training gravitate toward the National Guard because it is well organized, has the units, equipment, pay and training facilities. This doesn't leave many like-minded patriots for the Reserve to draw on.

Certainly a good bit of state and local support for the Guard has its roots in the historical dual-mission status of the Guard. Local support is vital, not because state legislators feel sorry for the Federal budget, but because the National Guard is a state force the governors can use in disasters and emergencies and for maintaining internal security. As a "force in being" it has probably stopped more riots and public disorders without being called out than it has when called out.

You can't discount either the long and colorful history of the Guard and its standing, particularly in the smaller cities and towns where service in the local Guard unit is, by long tradition, an honor and a privilege. These things give the Guard a community tie which the purely Federal Reserve program can never get.


In the matter of officers, there has never been available to the Guard or Reserves a better qualified and trained group of officers than exists today. Practically every officer in the National Guard has had World War II combat experience and many are now returning from their additional Korean tours. The same is true of the officers in the Army Reserve.

The National Guard is a purely voluntary force . . . and therein lie both its greatest strength and its greatest weakness. It makes the Guard stronger because the men who join the Guard are there because they want to be. At the same time though, it weakens the Guard because valuable training time must be devoted to recruiting in order to keep the units up to strength. This has naturally resulted in proposals to draft young men into the Guard or some similar method of forced service in the Guard. Most Guard leaders strongly oppose such measures. They want the Guard to remain a voluntary service (despite the time and difficulties in recruiting), and they have not yet seen a workable method of forcing civilians to attend training sessions against their will. Both the Army Reserve and the National Guard have found that the wording of the Universal Military Training and the Selective Service Acts which requires draftees to fulfill a reserve obligation after their active duty service is just words and that these men are not attending drills or joining organized units in any appreciable numbers. The law contains neither the teeth nor the incentive to induce veterans to enroll voluntarily when they can satisfy the legal requirements by letting their names be carried in the index card files.

THAT leads into the biggest problem in the whole civilian component picture . . . how to get citizen-soldier units whipped into shape so that a minimum of training time after mobilization is required before the unit is combat-ready in the fullest sense. The Korean emergency showed that we had come a long way in this direction since mobilization for World War II. But we're still not doing well enough.

Strength is a big part of the problem, to be sure. Also, Regular Army instructor personnel have been in very short supply. Then, too, you can only expect citizen-soldiers to put in so much time without completely neglecting their families and their means of livelihood. A typical National Guard unit commander puts in two nights a week (one administrative, and one training), six week-ends a year, fifteen field training days, *plus* assorted inspections, parades, and other ceremonies and meetings. And he gets paid for only the regularly scheduled program; the rest is on him and his family. This aspect of the problem must be met by making every moment of the training time worthwhile. Fortunately progress is being made in this direction.

IF we are to build a really strong citizen Reserve, we are going to have to face the facts as they exist—even though we may wish them to be different. We've got to provide a place for all officers and enlisted men who want to participate actively, and we've got to keep a firmer grip on those who will only fulfill that portion of their military obligation that is forced on them. Those who serve voluntarily and actively in a Reserve or National Guard component are certainly entitled to greater consideration in matters of pay and promotion than those who have to be coerced into serving their country.



Several schemes have been advanced in the past for strengthening our Reserve components. In a past issue of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL a Reserve colonel advanced a good suggestion. He would have all enlisted men serve in organized National Guard units. Each of the Guard units would have as satellites one, two, or three Reserve units composed wholly of officers. The Reserve officers could take on some of the instruction—the Guard units would have some vitally needed help and the training for all would be greatly improved. Such a program as this has the merit of simplicity. It seems entirely workable except in those few regions where there isn't a National Guard outfit.


Looking a little farther into the future, there is always the possibility of the National Guard and Army Reserve becoming the training vehicle in full or in part for a real Universal Military Training program. If reserve duty were made an alternative to active duty, reserve ranks would fill up fast. But this would not be fair in time of emergency such as now exists. It is for the future.

One alternative for these times would be to re-draft to active duty those draftees who fail to fulfill their reserve obligation. Such action, if diligently pursued, would supply the greatest single source of reluctant patriots for the immediate future. Coming back to our earlier points though, there would have to be a greatly expanded National Guard, since the Guard has the facilities and equipment and the Reserve does not.

THERE may be a better solution and we would stand a better chance of finding it if the Reserve program could be evaluated dispassionately and realistically. We cannot afford the illusion of strength created by millions of names in filing cabinets. We need organized and operating civilian component units training the maximum number of citizen-soldiers.

The National Guard needs a "Magna Charta" for the 1950s. Take it off George Washington's broad back and out from behind the militia clause of the Constitution. It can stand on its feet and it can deliver the goods. And that should be the determining factor.

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By moving the piece forward maximum elevation can be attained. However, one disadvantage is a loss of 400 mils in deflection.

OVERHEAD COVER FOR ARTILLERY

CAPTAIN RICHARD JENNINGS

A frontal view of the bunkers shows that cannoneers have almost complete protection against air bursts, and limited protection against ground bursts, even on hits and near hits.



AT twilight on 6 October 1952, about 200 rounds of 76mm and 122mm artillery whistled into the Able and Baker positions of the 7th Division's 48th Field Artillery near Kumwha, Korea. Manning their howitzers in the midst of the fire, the cannoneers returned the fire of the enemy batteries.

Most of the incoming rounds fell over but one burst directly in front of the Number 2 gun of Baker Battery, knocking the tube from the carriage and wounding the chief of section and two cannoneers.

The Chinese fire was part of the preparation for the CCF attack on White Horse Mountain to the west, and followed the normal Chinese practice of taking all known artillery and mortar positions under fire during an attack. Although our counterbattery fire soon silenced the enemy guns, the enemy did succeed in knocking out one of our howitzers and partially neutralized the ability of the two batteries to fire.

During the many months of stalemated fighting, Communist artillery had literally gone underground. Tunneled through the Korean mountains and holed up in caves, the Chinese field pieces were becoming increasingly more difficult to locate and destroy. U. N. artillery was finding itself facing a numerically superior, cleverly dug-in artillery force that proved a formidable opponent during the Triangle Hill and later battles.

As an answer to enemy counterbattery fire, the 7th Division's artillery borrowed an idea from the ROK battalions of the 5th Field Artillery Group and developed overhead cover for the individual artillery pieces. While scarcely practicable during a war of movement, the overhead gun bunkers serve as worth

CAPTAIN RICHARD MILBURN JENNINGS, Artillery, has been operations officer and a battery commander since his arrival in Korea in September of 1952. As a battery commander he completed twenty overhead covers in various positions along the 155-mile front. He is a veteran of World War II and a 1945 graduate of Stanford University. He entered the Army in January, 1946.

while protection during a static war.

The 7th Division was withdrawn from the line before work could actually commence, however, and it was not until January 1953 when it returned to the line in the Old Baldy Sector, that the overhead cover program actually got under way.

WORKING against the handicaps of frozen ground and freezing weather, the artillerymen chipped and blasted holes for the uprights, and then constructed the frames of logs and heavy cut timber. The sides were made of planking, and the roof was covered with logs, sandbags and earth. When the sides were completed, earth was bulldozed against them as high as the roof to economize on sandbags and provide better protection and camouflage.

Although the overheads built by the batteries differed slightly in design, a typical model for a 105mm howitzer has a center frame about sixteen feet square supporting a roof over the howitzer while a wing on both sides provides room to shift the trails and to store ammo and section equipment. The front center is cut back a few feet to allow high-angle fire. While it was hoped to obtain 3200 mils traverse, the average bunker allowed only about 2800 mils. This normally provided enough traverse, however, to cover the division front.

THERE are advantages and disadvantages to the overhead cover. Veterans of World War II would probably scoff at it, but in a static war as in Korea, deviations from standard techniques often pay off.

One of the most obvious disadvantages is the limited traverse for both indirect and direct fire. In normal fluid-type war, this disadvantage would be prohibitive, but on the static front in Korea, there have been very few cases of a gun being "called out" because of the overhead. Any deep enemy penetration to the flank of the battery position would of course require the withdrawal of the howitzers from the bunkers and the occupation of alternate gun positions.

Not the least of the drawbacks is the expense involved in time and construction materials. The heavy uprights and the stringers supporting the roof must be constructed of twelve-inch by twelve-inch timbers or equivalent, and, as the engineers kept reminding the artillerymen, even sandbags run into money. By digging the gun pit down several feet and pushing earth on the walls, sand bags were saved.



Rotating bunker gate protects crews from bursts behind the housing. This gate can be opened in a few sconds if the piece must be removed.

The overhead covers have fulfilled their primary function and do protect gun crews and ammunition during enemy shelling. The bunker protects the cannoneers from fragments from the rear, sides, or directly overhead. The men are vulnerable only to bursts in front of or slightly above the firing aperture or to direct hits on the bunker by heavy caliber shells. It is estimated that the bunker could withstand the hit of a mortar or light artillery piece.

The storage space in the wings of the overhead practically eliminate the need for conventional ammunition bunkers. Two hundred rounds may be kept comfortably within the overhead, facilitating the handling and preparation of the rounds by the cannoneers.

Many artillerymen will stick with the requirements of 6400 mil traverse and decry the "Maginot Line" danger of static positions. The fact remains, though, that the overhead covers have permitted our guns, despite enemy shelling, to remain with their primary mission—that of timely and continuous fire support for the infantry.

Bunkers also provide cover for ammunition. This one holds 200 rounds.



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LET'S HARNESS THE WEATHER

LIEUTENANT COLONEL
FREDERICK G. WHITE

A LARGE amount of weather information is gathered by many separate agencies at different places in the combat zone, but up to now these data have never been fully integrated, coordinated, evaluated and disseminated for the joint use of all services. It is a job that could be done by the Air-Ground Weather Center which the Tactical Air Force sets up close to the Joint Operations Center.

It is the Joint Operations Center's job to integrate the air and ground effort. It has a fine communications network and so is in a good position to develop its weather activities farther for the advantage of all the services. In the past, divisions and lower units have received limited and often inaccurate weather forecasts through their intelligence channels.

There are more than twenty-five Army units scattered within the combat area of a field army that have weather equipment they use to get ballistic information for the correction of their own gunfire. Here are the types of units and their equipment:

(1) Meteorological sections of Field Artillery observation battalions; radio direction finder, radiosonde (radio sounding device), radiosonde receptor, barometer, psychrometer, theodolite, balloon, anemometer.

(2) Division artillery meteorological sections (pibal); theodolite, balloon, barometer, psychrometer.

(3) AAA groups; identical equipment to the artillery observation battalion's meteorological section.

(4) AAA brigades; two sections, identical to group, capable of obtaining weather information.

(5) Meteorological sections of infantry heavy mortar battalions; barometer, psychrometer, anemometer.

(6) Meteorological sections of smoke generator battalions; same as infantry heavy mortar battalion.

(7) Guided missiles battalions; weather equipment currently under study subject to change is believed to be barometer, psychrometer, anemometer and possibly theodoloite and balloon.

The barometers, of course, give the air pressure; the anemometers tell the surface wind speed and wind direction; the theodolite gives data on the winds



Launching a radiosonde. In the foreground are a Rawin set and a theodolite.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERICK G. WHITE, Infantry, is presently on duty at Fort Bragg, N. C., as G2 Air of XVIII Corps. A graduate of West Point, Class of 1940, Colonel White was first commissioned in the Coast Artillery Corps but transferred to the Infantry in 1944.

aloft; and the psychrometer shows air temperatures. The radio direction finder, radiosonde and radiosonde receptor are electronic equipment capable of giving the wind speed and direction, temperatures, pressures, and relative humidity at elevations up to one hundred thousand feet.

BUT it isn't good enough to make use of weather information at the big headquarters only. Weather information should be used to help the fighting man accomplish his mission.

Weather experts claim that if all information gathered in the combat area were integrated and evaluated properly, commanders could be given forecasts up to 90 percent accurate for a specific, limited area.

In World War II advantage was seldom taken of such forecasts. Communications channels were not clearly defined and the information came too late to be of value to divisions and their combat units. In Korea weather experts have been assigned as far forward as division. But they report that information is still gathered piecemeal and that all sources and communications channels are not used to full advantage. There are not enough trained forecasters to scatter even thinly across a front.


The chart on this page suggests a weather communications plan which takes advantage of a system that already exists. Without much strain it could handle brief coded weather reports from each station about four times daily.

If we put all our combat area weather equipment in single harness, all ground commanders would have details on fog, snow, hail, rain, low clouds, winds, visibility, and trafficability. And pilots flying close support missions would have the information they need on such things as low clouds, visibility and wind. Moreover, the data that ground units could provide to the Air Force weather center would be of great value since they would greatly improve weather forecasts.

Consolidated weather information would also be a help in forecasting ballistic information for gunfire correction. With long range guided missiles and guns of all different sizes including the 280mm atomic gun in the Army combat area there is need for the most accurate weather information possible. And radiological and bacteriological defense experts are likewise vitally interested in all types of weather information.

Sound weather information is of great interest to practically everybody.

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF A PROPOSED ARMY AREA WEATHER COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK FROM FRONT TO REAR



Data from the twenty-five units in a field army that have weather collecting equipment can be coordinated at the weather center at the JOC

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THIS IS TACTICS?

LIEUTENANT LEWIS F. VOLPE

This discourse on how and with what the Army fights won't enlighten civilians, but may startle the long-hairs at Leavenworth

WE hear and see constant reference these days to a mysterious and very awesome science called Tactics. Undoubtedly, some confusion exists about this word and its basic fundamentals. We shall eliminate that confusion in this article.

(It should be stated that the material contained herein is unclassified and is in no danger of being classified.) But before we can start we must outline the BIG PICTURE.

The basic purpose of the Army is to defend the country against attack. This it does with the aid of other services, dressed in various shades of blue. Among these are the Waves, the Air Force, the Navy and the Marines. These are collectively referred to as the United States Army Transportation Corps.

The Army is divided into a number of armies (not to be confused with Army). These and the number must always be spelled out (beginning with the First Army). Furthermore, these armies (not to be confused with Army) are sometimes grouped together for tactical reasons into army groups, which are larger armies (but not Army); army groups are also numbered, using Arabic numerals: 6th Army Group.

Since it requires much supplying and servicing to maintain an Army, a basic division of labor arose, and we have branches of service known as either Arms or Services.

The Arms are such branches as the Infantry, Artillery and Combat Graves Registration.

The Services are the supplying and technical branches such as Quartermaster Corps, Medical Corps and Ordnance (which makes laws, known as the Articles of War; when the Air Force was still united with the Army, these were known as the Articles of Confederation). In combat, the Services have the added responsibility of sending up second lieutenants with the daily rations.

THE popular mind recognizes three basic weapons, two of which are bazookas. This is highly untrue. The Army is faced with many different tactical situations in each of which a different weapon plays the primary role. For example, if we wish to kill young horses, we use the Colt .45. This is an amazingly efficient weapon, its effectiveness increasing until it becomes dangerous at arm's length.



. . . when we wish to kill young horses

The standard infantry weapon is the M1 rifle. The M1 is also known by another name, which is credited to a tearfully grateful French Ambassador during the last war, who remarked to an American general, "M'sieur, this is one ga'rand rifle." The weight of the rifle is 9.75 pounds. After 20 miles, the decimal point drops out.

The junior officer's weapon is the carbine. This is so there won't be too many senior officers.

American machine guns come in two calibers, .30 and .50. Furthermore, there are "heavies" and "lights." The caliber .50, although heavy, is not the "heavy"; the .30 is. But, the .30 is also the "light," the difference between the two .30s being that in some localities, water is more plentiful than air, and is therefore used as a cooling agent.

Mortars are high-trajectory weapons which are very useful in firing over such obstacles as hills, trees, buildings and friendly newsmen. As an alternative, in the latter case, we use a bazooka.

Artillery is classified as "heavy," "medium" or "light." These pieces are always fired by a man in a Piper Cub who pulls a long string.

Any combat action gains much of its shock and surprise from the expert use of tanks and similar armored vehicles. These come in two classes: the best in the world and the next best.

Modern science has made it possible for heavy firepower to be an organic (not a bad word as used here) part of the small infantry unit. The principle of the recoilless rifle has made it possible to have 57mm, 75mm and 105mm guns in the front lines where they can be moved swiftly if the tactical situation demands. An added advantage is that, when surrounded, we can fire in two directions at once.

The tactical groupings employed in combat, from smallest to largest are:

Squad
Section
Detachment
Platoon
Company
Detachment
Battalion
Detachment
Regiment
Detail
Regimental combat team
Division
Corps
Army (Not to be confused with Army)
Army Group

(There is also a tactical group known as a Task Force. It can consist of one man, armed or unarmed, or many thousands of men, armed or unarmed.



. . . artillery is always fired from a Piper cub

LIEUTENANT LEWIS F. VOLPE, Infantry, is on duty with the 5th Infantry Disivion, Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. He wrote this piece while enduring the tortures our civilization inflicts on young lieutenants of infantry at Fort Benning.

A SQUAD is commanded by a sergeant (except when commanded by someone else). Its purpose in the attack is to close with the enemy, and by skillful use of its bazookas, artillery pieces and atomic weapons, to destroy him. On the other hand, its purpose in the defense is to permit the enemy to close with it and then by skillful use of its bazookas, artillery pieces and atomic weapons, to destroy him.

The squad is a team, and as such, reaches its peak of effectiveness when each man masters his own job and works harmoniously with the rest. The squad, like all teams, has basic formations which it uses as conditions vary. Also, the squad works on a "field" in the sense that it is given a limited frontage in all actions. However, the frontage varies with the mission, the strength of the enemy (or rather his lack of weakness) and the type of terrain. But we can safely say that it rarely exceeds ten miles.

In one of these basic formations, the squad forms itself in a line parallel to the target and rushes it, firing from the hip, knee or ankle, depending on the man's height. This is referred to as "St. Peter's Express."

A variation of this formation, used in early morning or twilight attacks, employs trickery. The squad is aligned parallel to the target, but each man has his back toward it. Then, in the haziness of the weak light, the men slowly inch their way backward. The enemy, seeing this, thinks the squad is running away and becomes overconfident.

When advancing through defiles, valleys or jungles, the "Congo Line" formation is used. This consists of a column of men firing to alternate flanks on each fourth step.

Only in final-type actions, such as ending wars, destroying armies or taking cities, does the squad use a double envelopment. This consists of sending two highly mobile units of riflemen to opposite flanks and in circular motions around the enemy while a crushingly irresistible holding attack is mounted from the front.

The single envelopment is used in ending half a war, destroying half an army or capturing half a city.

In the defense the squad puts its tanks in foxholes, destroys bridges and dams, floods valleys, blows the top off mountains and in general attempts to make a nuisance of itself. But all the while, the squad leader, reading his manuals by the rockets' red glare, knows that the defense is mounted only temporarily when conditions force it upon



. . . the most dangerous man in the world

us, and that an attack will be launched at the earliest moment.

THE next larger unit is the platoon, commanded by the inevitable second lieutenant. He is absolutely necessary to the functioning of the Army, somewhat like an office boy to Wall Street. He is tall, young, brilliant, handsome and terribly confused. The most dangerous man in the world is a young lieutenant with a map.

The platoon, being approximately four times as large as a squad, naturally has within it greater capabilities of sustained firepower, and maneuverability in combat. Also, it has larger weapons than does the squad—especially its atomic weapons.

Platoons are particularly effective in the siege of towns and cities. The orthodox method of pursuing this business is:

(1) Pick a city located on a hill, because pictures of soldiers rushing up a hill are dramatic and make the front pages of newspapers.

(2) Surround the city on only three sides. This conserves strength and allows for greater concentration.

(3) Begin an air, ground and sea attack (the last may be omitted only if the city is landlocked and if permission is obtained in advance from the army commander [not to be confused with Army] who apologies in advance to the nearest Admiral-in-Chief for the omission; this is known as liaison which breeds unification). This—the air, ground and sea attack, not the Admiral—will divert the enemy.

(4) Send a patrol into the fourth, unguarded section of the city. This patrol will enter the railroad station and tear up all the tickets, thus preventing retreat, supply or reinforcements.

(5) Sit back and starve them out.

THE company is the smallest unit which carries on its own administration. This means it keeps its own records, feeds its men, and supplies and resupplies itself (this is known as perpetual motion).

The company in combat is usually commanded by a captain, but sometimes by a first lieutenant. A first lieutenant is a second lieutenant who bleached his bars.

Whatever else the company commander might do, he must make a daily phone call to the supply sergeant to order food, ammo and second lieutenants.

The company has a sizable reserve and with it can often launch and sustain a very aggressive attack. The reserve is kept behind during the initial phases of combat. It is the company commander's "ace-in-the-hole" which he uses to exploit weaknesses in the enemy line. When not needed by the company,



. . . S2 has 40 beautiful agents

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it is used to relieve any surrounded Marine division in the area.

NEXT in size is the battalion. The battalion has a staff. The staff consists of four sections, referred to (in numerical sequence) as S1; S2; S3; and S4. The duties of the men in these sections are to advise the commander, inform him of the situation, relieve him of details, and to carry out his orders in their respective fields, which are personnel, intelligence, operations and supply.

S2, the intelligence officer, has a special intelligence and reconnaissance platoon, consisting of forty beautiful blondes with mink coats and long cigarette holders, who infiltrate the enemy lines in brand-new station wagons.

The principal duty of the S4, supply officer, consists of screaming into a telephone, "No, we ain't got no white paint." Regimental S4 uses two telephones.

(These staffs are also present in all units larger than the battalion. The only exceptions to the description given above are that the number of officers of the special staff in division and higher the general staff sections are designated as G1, G2, G3 and G4. G2's eighty beautiful redheads wear ermine wraps and ride in luxurious limousines.)

A regiment which numbers more than 3,000 men (except when it numbers less than 3,000 men) is the perfect embodiment of speed, weight and punch needed for sustained actions.

Next in size we have the Regimental Combat Team. It is used to combat regiments.

THE strong right arm of the Army, the unit which can and does deliver the heavy final-type blow is the division. This is the smallest unit in which all arms and services are represented (not parliamentarily, it should be emphasized), and which can carry on a combat action and sustain itself in battles alone.

A corps is a tactical combination of two or more divisions. An army consists of two or more corps, and an army group is a grouping of armies (not to be confused with Army).

Our overseas armies are grouped into Theaters, such as the Asiatic Theater, which is responsible for entertainment in Japan, and the European Theater, which discovered Valli. The USO does not come under these Theaters, but is a subsidiary and independent organization.

Now you know all about the Army.



The Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) is a skilled recon outfit, not another armored combat command

COMBAT IS

COLONEL SHIPLEY THOMAS

IF we ever quit living in the military past, we may find that the Armored Cavalry Regiment (light), now an orphan child of the armor arm, can solve most of our reconnaissance problems of the future. This regiment is not armor, except in name and certain pieces of equipment, but is a Corps reconnaissance outfit. It may well be the Corps Commander's most useful tool in keeping constantly up to date on the enemy, the terrain and the other details he has to know before he can outline his plan of action to his G3. The greater dispersion that will be necessary in an atomic war will make this regiment and the photo-interpreters the principal reconnaissance tools of the Corps G2, and through him, of the infantry division G2. The training and methods of use of the Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) are therefore of vital importance.

With the recent release of the details of the 280mm gun, which is capable of firing high-explosive and atomic shells twenty miles or more, we must begin to discuss the effects this weapon will have on the tactics of all arms in land warfare of the future. We would be foolish not to assume that our enemies also have this weapon. Such a gun will force greater dispersal of any concentrations of troops. Each improvement in the range and effectiveness of artillery and the increased mobility of modern forces has resulted in widening the distance between opposing main bodies. This trend continues.

The possession of such a gun, guided missiles, modern bombers, and guerrilla action will all tend to decrease the effectiveness of mass action. The logistical support of great armies, such as were employed in Europe in both world wars, will become increasingly more difficult. Warfare of the future will hardly have a "static" front line with a

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great build-up of men and supplies in ear areas. Instead, the entire theater vill be the combat zone. Troops and upplies will either be underground in trongly defended "islands" or on the nove and widely dispersed. Greater eliance will be placed on small mobile orces capable of greatly increased fire ower. This will place an ever increasng burden on intelligence and reconaissance staff officers and an ever ncreasing demand for various reconaissance agencies both air and ground.

In this kind of warfare the G2 of an nfantry division will find it is imperaive to maintain constant patrols, sent s deeply as possible into the enemy utpost positions, to the division front, anks and even in the division's rear. deed would be the G2 who gave this outfit the mission of piercing the enemy's outpost, and developing the "who, what and where" of the enemy's main body and intervening terrain.

But can't the Reconnaissance Company be strengthened by the attachment of a flock of tanks and perhaps a motorized infantry battalion and some artillery? It won't work. The attachment of other troops to a highly trained reconnaissance unit is courting disaster. Of course, the problem of command can be handled through the wording of the order, but the ancient and utterly fallacious theory that every man who wears infantry insignia is a born "sneaker and peeker" isn't tenable. Skilled reconnaissance patrols, be it one man, three men, a squad, a platoon, a company, a battalion or even a regiment, must have tremendous and specific training together. No one is happy about going on a patrol unless he knows that every other man on that patrol is a trained and experienced member of the team. It is very much like mountain climbing. When you start up the precipice, you don't want any novices on the rope.

Personal preferences aren't decisive and men can be ordered to work together. However, on a deep reconnaissance through the enemy's screening force, with the mission of developing the enemy's positions, the study of the terrain, the location of the main body and the capture and interrogation of vitally important prisoners, mixed units untrained as a team are a liability. Deep reconnaissance requires teamwork of the highest quality.

There is a school of reconnaissance by fire. The theory is that you roll along firing at every possible spot where an enemy unit might be lurking, and, from its answering fire (if you have not destroyed it), you learn its position and strength. It may work on green troops, but experienced and disciplined troops pull in their necks, watch the patrol go by, and hit it in its vulnerable and not well-padded rear.

Thorough reconnaissance is not easy. It is one of the arts of war. Those who perform it successfully are masters of the battlefield. But those who look upon it as just another military duty to which any soldier may be detailed will be wondering why they failed and were relieved.

MORE THAN CHARGE

HOW, then, can the G2 of an infantry division get this absolutely vital information for his commander? Unless the commander knows the "who, what and where" of the enemy and the terrain, he is in for some very unpleasant surprises. The old maxim still holds true: "It is permissible to be defeated, but never to be surprised."

But the question comes up, how about all those attached specialist teams? The G2 has photo-interpreter, interrogator of prisoners of war, order of battle, military intelligence interpreter, translator and counterintelligence teams sitting around ready to put on their individual acts. Why not put them to work? They do all they can with the material they have. The photo-interpreters get their raw material from pictures taken from a plane. They produce a lot of valuable information. Valuable, that is, when it is considered with other information. All the other teams (with the exception of counterintelligence which by its nature produces more negative than positive intelligence) rely

There will be the constant threat of guerrilla bands, airborne assaults and long-range missile attacks.

THE answer to this patrol requirement seems simple. G2 has a Reconnaissance Company to do the deep reconaissance for the division. But is it strong enough? Can 170 officers and men, with seven light tanks, five armored vehicles, three mortars, six rocket launchers, three caliber .50 machine guns, nine caliber .30 machine guns and 124 rifles, wing their way through enemy-held areas safely, surely and usefully? They will need a lot more than the bullet-proof vest and panties to get them there and back. And if they don't get back they aren't useful. This any force would easily be gobbled up or obliterated by the first strong outpost position it encountered. Foolhardy in-

upon deep reconnaissance for the raw material on which to work. In World War II, as in World War I, and there is no indication that it will be different the next time, eighty-five percent of all information of the enemy came from captured prisoners and documents. The only source of this vital material is reconnaissance, deep reconnaissance that penetrates the enemy's power.

But the big question still remains: how will the G2 of an infantry division get the raw material for his specialist teams to work on to develop the information of the enemy and the terrain? One source is still available. Each corps and army has an Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) especially designed for this purpose. It is, or should be, trained to do the necessary deep reconnaissance for the two or three infantry divisions of the corps.

THE Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) is designed and made a part of each Corps purely to perform reconnaissance missions. It should have no other duties and, when properly trained and used, will have a full-time job in keeping division G2s and the Corps G2 supplied with the raw material from which the specialist teams can produce usable information of the enemy and the terrain.

But if this is an "armored" unit, shouldn't it be used with other armored units? No, definitely. Armor is "heavy cavalry" and these regiments are specifically labeled "light." The missions of the two are diametrically opposed. "Light cavalry," the Hussars and Light Dragoons of the English and the Uhlans of Germany, is lightly equipped for long and deep rides. Its mission is screening and reconnaissance. It is the cavalry of J. E. B. Stuart, particularly in the first Maryland campaign or around Richmond. Light cavalry, presumably, is habitually out on deep reconnaissance.

Armored divisions are the lineal descendants of the old heavy horse cavalry. The last recorded "charge" of heavy horse was at Soissons, late in the afternoon of 18 August 1918, the first day of that engagement, when the infantry by surprise attack had opened a hole in the German lines several miles wide. Two regiments of the finest French heavy cavalry were sent in to exploit this advantage, and deliver the *coup de grace* to the staggering and bewildered German army. As the trumpets sounded, and the columns fanned out at a gallop, German "trench strafing" planes, seemingly hundreds of them, tried in vain to rout that cavalry charge with machine-gun fire. They had little effect. But German motorized machine-gun units arrived just in time, unlimbered and did the trick. They decimated that wave of charging horsemen. That was the end of heavy horse cavalry.

Subsequently, in the U.S., two cavalrymen, Adna Chaffee and George Patton, developed the idea of a substitute for heavy horse cavalry, by using the English-invented tank. This gradually became the armored division. As such, armored divisions are usually held in corps reserve awaiting the breakthrough, to go in for the kill or else to swing wide on the flank and sever the life line. Chaffee and Patton received little support and had to improvise the "mechanized brigade," and also to suffer much quite ribald comment. Heinz Guderian, however, hopped on the band wagon. An infantryman himself, he had the vision, and developed the Panzer divisions in the German Army. In Poland, in 1939, he showed what they could do as the successors of the Napoleonic heavy cavalry, and Blitzkrieg became a household word.

THE armored division has its own reconnaissance battalion. It is a "light cavalry" unit designed to do the job for an armored division. But this battalion is not strong enough to go all the way and get the vital, strategic information necessary for a successful operation. The G2 of an armored division must rely on the corps G2 to get this to him. And it must be secured by the Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) which operates under the staff responsibility of the corps G2 for reconnaissance missions (Par. 79, F.M. 30-5).

The Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) is quite different from other "armored" units. The word "armored" in its title is there merely because, in the swallowing of the old cavalry corps, armor found that it had also some "light" cavalry units on its hands.

The following, from F.M. 17-95, dated September 1951, gives the basic doctrine on the employment of the Armored Cavalry Regiment (light). Paragraph 2 reads as follows:

> The primary role of the armored cavalry regiment is to engage in security, light combat and reconnaissance missions. The regiment is not designed to engage in combat with hostile armor or strongly organized defenses. The regiment is highly mobile and lightly armored; these characteristics primarily determine its combat role.

As the basic doctrine, it is difficult to understand the point of view of so many individuals in armor who quite openly deplore the above paragraph, and still insist that this unit must somehow be used as the fourth combat command of an armored division, because the word armor appears in its name. In their enthusiasm for the heavy cavalry role, they forget that many a corps will not have an armored division. There are not enough to go around.

THE thoughts of many of the armored people are quite clearly expressed by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas O. Rooney, Armor, former instructor at the Army Command and General Staff College, in an article, "Put the 'Combat' in Combat Reconnaissance," in the *Military Review* of February 1951. In his first premise, Colonel Rooney appears to confuse the idea of security. "Flank security" is not fighting on the flank. The proper meaning is protecting the flank from surprise. The "blurb" or "come on" of the article states: "*The reconnaissance unit used habitually for flank security or reconnaissance missions is a waste of power.*" In the article proper Colonel Rooney writes:

> Let us visualize such an operation [use of the armored regiment (light) as a delaying force]. The armored division, reinforced with corps medium artillery and one battalion of heavy tanks from the armored cavalry group, is the covering force in the corps zone, with a mission of delaying the advance of the enemy for five days.
>
> The armored cavalry regiment (light), reinforced with two battalions of light armored artillery and one battalion of heavy tanks from the armored cavalry group, maintains contact with the enemy and delays the advance of hostile forces until enemy action forces it to withdraw through the initial delaying position of the armored division.
>
> Initially, the regiment operates directly under corps control, providing the corps commander with information of the enemy's advance until such time as the regiment is driven back through the armored division's initial delaying position many miles in front of the corps selected defensive position. Direct communications and liaison between the regiment and the armored division ensure the necessary coordination between the force maintaining contact, and the covering force. The reinforced regiment, with its mobility and firepower, can certainly delay the rapid advance of the enemy even on a broad front, and provide the time required for the covering force to establish its initial delaying position. Upon passing through the initial delaying position of the armored division the regiment is attached to the armored division for continued combat.
>
> When the regiment is attached, the armored division commander may employ it to protect his flanks, but he should bear in mind the power and

combat capabilities of the regiment. He now has at his disposal the equivalent of a fourth combat command, which enables him to employ three commands on the line, and retain the fourth in reserve. Another formation might be adopted, so as to have two combat commands on the line, with the reserve command and the regiment deployed in subsequent positions to the rear, to ensure depth in his delaying action.

* * *

This example has been used to demonstrate how reconnaissance units can be employed profitably. The habitual use of such a combat unit only for flank security or reconnaissance missions is a waste of available power.

COLONEL ROONEY—and he is vocative of so many in armor—fails to remember that reconnaissance, continued day and night, is vital to the corps commander. This continuous action, conducted by his corps G2, can be the real difference between success and failure.

Surely, even the most ardent advocate of *charge,* that of committing everything to the attack, must consider, in his enthusiasm, that the retention of ten percent of the effective force in continuing reconnaissance and protection from surprise, is fully warranted. A corps commander has usually nine combat teams or combat commands, all relatively of the strength of an infantry regiment, and supporting artillery. In addition, he has one Armored Cavalry Regiment (light). The corps commander's strength, therefore, is nine heavy units and one light. His nine heavy units have been trained for heavy warfare. But one unit—one-tenth of his command—is trained and equipped for quite another kind of warfare. Indeed, the armored cavalry regiment (light) is specifically prohibited from heavy warfare.

Continuous reconnaissance, even during the most serious engagements (to protect the corps from surprise) is always necessary. There may be occasions when the corps commander may decide to throw all of his "heavy units" into the battle, but he must always remember about the possibility of surprise, and keep that vital ten percent of his command on its primary job of "sneaking and peeking" in all possible directions to prevent possible surprise from the front, the flanks and the rear. Only a foolhardy corps commander would commit his last ten percent, his trained reconnaissance troops, before his last command decision had been made.

It is reckless to advocate that this unit, specifically armed, equipped, and (it is hoped) trained for the deep reconnaissance so vital to the life of the whole corps, should be used as the "fourth combat command" of an armored division —except in *extremes.*

COMBAT is not all *charge.* In most actions, a skillful corps commander decides upon his tactics after he has studied his enemy. He does not use the same tactics on every enemy formation. If they are green, one thing goes; if they are experienced but tired, another thing goes; but if they are rested, first-class, experienced troops, then that is another matter. Put yourself in the position of the enemy general who found that he was facing General Joe Doaks, when he thought all the time he was facing Patton. He got off easy. But suppose he had based his decisions on the fact that he was facing old, dumb, stubborn General Joe, when it was really Patton!

Wars are not won except by a study of the personal peculiarities of each individual commander. A graphic example of this was a division in World War I. It was made up of Regular Army units. In its first battle, it ran away. The division commander was relieved, a new, tough, experienced old soldier was given command. In two weeks he rounded up the soldiers of the division and by dint of a tremendous personality, changed the 25,000 officers and men of that division into one of the finest fighting organizations in the history of our Army. You cannot fight wars by blueprints laid out in advance. Ovid said, many years before the Christian era, *Fas est ab hostia docere*—It is your duty to study your enemy. Ovid is just as right today as he was then. These "power" experts forget that brute force never won a battle. General Lee had a three-to-one numerical advantage on the first day at Gettysburg, but the lack of current information of the enemy (his cavalry was out doing some such job as Colonel Rooney advocates), left him practically blind on the battlefield, thereby losing his advantage. Had his information of the enemy been adequate, he could have been in Philadelphia on the day he was defeated at Gettysburg.

Of course the rules laid down in field manuals do not always govern. There may come a time when G2 must surrender his Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) to G3 to plug a hole in the line. When the time comes that the commanding general has decided that he knows the enemy's one and only capability and has no further use for information from his G2, and after he has sent his G3 to gather up all the cooks, kitchen police, band, clerks, stenographers, messengers, and "dog robbers" and lead them forward, arming themselves as they go across the field of battle, and has sent one aide to pack his bag preparatory for a long journey and the other aide to snatch a white sheet from his bed, just in case his guess as to the situation turned out to be correct—then the corps commander may be justified in using his Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) to plug a hole in the line.

THE Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) is neither an offensive nor a defensive unit. It is a reconnaissance unit. The regiment must be trained to avoid combat whenever possible. Its sole mission is to search for information—continuously. It is composed of three reconnaissance battalions, a headquarters company and a service company. Each battalion is capable of acting independently, or the regiment can act as a whole. Each battalion is composed of three reconnaissance companies, a medium tank company and an assault gun company. The battalion is, therefore, a well balanced force capable of working its way well forward, possibly in front of a division to keep the division G2 and the corps G2 constantly advised on the actions of the enemy's main body, and thus provide security from surprise. But, should the enemy outpost screen be too tough and too deep for a battalion to penetrate, then the whole Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) can get through. The regiment is strong enough, and is designed and equipped to perform such a reconnaissance mission. With 51 tanks, 18 assault guns, 72 light tanks, 97 armored vehicles and eight liaison planes, the 151 officers and 2,732 men are capable of brushing aside or slugging their way through any outpost position, protected from small arms fire or shell fragments.

All reconnaissance troops should be recognized as the "fourth" combat arm, equal with infantry, artillery and armor. Its tactics are different and its mission is totally different. A reconnaissance unit of any size seeks always, if possible, to fulfill its mission without being delayed by combat. Its mission is to get through, get the information and get back as quickly as possible. To do this, it may have to engage in light combat to push aside screening forces, but unless it is fully necessary in the performance of the mission, it always avoids unnecessary combat.

Let's never forget that J. E. B. Stuart's gay but useless chase of a wagon train before and during Gettysburg cost Lee that campaign.

The aim of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces is to create an understanding of problems involved in

MOBILIZATION OF TOTAL POWER

COLONEL BERNARD S. WATERMAN

AT the very top of the service schools system are two sister institutions: the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. The place and purpose of the first are quite well known and understood by men in uniform, but the second seldom seems to evoke much understanding from officers of the combat arms. The idea that soldiers, sailors and airmen should study the economic support of war strikes many of them as being a bit unworldly.

In pre-World War II days this attitude was understandable and tolerable. But today officers of the services should, and most of them do, realize that war is a clash of nations, and that armies and fleets and air forces are but the cutting edges of mighty organizations that gear a whole nation, or coalition of nations, to the task of winning a military victory.

The best evidence of the importance —and the successes—of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces lies in the successes of its graduates. One of the graduates of the old Army Industrial College (predecessor to the ICAF) is now the President of the United States. Another is Chief of Staff of the Army, and a third is a former Commandant of the Marine Corps. Recent graduates of ICAF are serving on the Army General Staff, on the staff of SHAPE, commanding a regiment in Korea, serving with the Standing Group of NATO, on the JCS joint staff, and on the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project.

Those who direct a war today must understand total power, which includes the capability of the nation to produce the weapons, munitions, machines and supplies that will be needed. Those who plan the military strategy cannot do so intelligently or meaningfully if they cannot mesh their plans with the nation's ability to produce the goods.

Military planners, as they progress in their education in strategy, find it hard to accept the restraints imposed on their strategic enthusiasm by economic limitations. Characteristically, they tend to produce solutions which blithely disregard limitations imposed by economic and logistic burdens—both in proposals for our own strategy and in the capabilities imputed to our potential enemies.

THE Industrial College conceives its proper function to be the creation of balance in the future high commands and staffs of the services. To do this it seeks to create an awareness of the unity of military power and economic support by educating its students in the meaning of economic strengths and weaknesses and how they affect the war potential of a nation, and the methods which must be used to convert economic potentials to military power.

The course begins with three basic study units designed to develop understanding of the fundamental sources of economic strength: Natural Resources, Manpower and Technological Progress. These studies implant the idea that the three wellsprings out of which an economy is created are raw materials, men and machines. They make the students aware of the kinds of materials needed to support an industrial civilization and of the world supply situation in the more important of these materials. They demonstrate the economic importance of man—both quantitatively and qualitatively. They illustrate the sig-



Industrial College students study production methods while on a field trip

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ificance of machines and the essentialy of constant progress in the developent of new and better machines.

When this basic foundation has been aid, the course turns to more direct ilitary application of economic power. he study of Requirements shows how rategic plans are translated into deands for products of the economy. ere the student sees the progression om a grand strategy to a troop list nd thence to a bill of equipment, supplies, transportation and manpower. ere he discovers the direct and imutable relationship between a plan r military operations and a demand n the economy to support that plan.

The next step is to examine the eans by which the material needs of e services are obtained from the econmy. This is the study of Procureent. But let me say that *this is not a ourse for training procurement officers,* s so many seem to think is the prinary purpose of ICAF. The study of rocurement is aimed at developing a road understanding of the problems hich arise when the uniformed services o into the market place with orders for rge amounts of goods. The effect of ese orders on the civilian economy reates problems which are of interest to oth military and civilian mobilizers. he procurement study includes therere a study of economic stabilization hich shows the nature of the stresses laced on the economic structure and e kinds of action which may be taken relieve these stresses.

ROM procurement the student at ICAF turns to Production. Here he earns something of the difficulties of onversion to the manufacture of war oods; the length of time required to roduce items after the initial concepion of their need; the delaying effect f changes in design; the scope of the apabilities of U.S. industry to produce e things the services want; and the roblems of reconversion of industry fter a war. This study develops an nderstanding of the limitations the ndustrial capabilities of a nation can ut on its strategy.

The academic year comes to a climax n the study of Economic Potential nd Mobilization—designed to summaize the meaning of previous studies in erms of total economic potential and e actions which must be taken to ealize it. In Economic Potential, the tudent examines briefly the economies f the various countries of the world nd analyzes the contributions which conomic strengths and weaknesses make toward the ability of nations to support a war effort.

In Mobilization, he considers the steps which must be taken to convert an economy to the support of a war effort. This study goes into the organizations which must be created and the powers which must be allocated to cause the conversion to take place and



to limit the disruption of the civilian economy.

WHAT does all this mean to the officer of the combat arms? There is ample evidence that its meaning is not as well understood as it should be. The best evidence is the still common misconception that the Industrial College of the Armed Forces is a school for technical service officers. It is true that most of the Army students have been technical service officers, but the 1952-53 class shows an increase in the proportion of officers from the combat arms. This trend should continue.

It is the function of the G1 and G4 sections of the General Staff to insure that the combat troops are properly supported. This can be accomplished effectively only if a substantial number of the officers in G1 and G4 are from the combat arms. This has long been appreciated and practiced. But these officers should also have knowledge of logistic problems and functions. It would be wholly insufficient for a combat arms officer to bring to the General Staff merely a knowledge of the logistic needs of the combat troops. To be a whole man in the job he must be able to match requirements and resources. Thus he needs what the ICAF teaches.

Higher commanders and strategic planners also need an understanding of the strictures that can be placed on military forces by economic, political and psychological conditions. They must be able to match requirements and resources.

We are experiencing forcible demonstrations of the impingement of the economy of scarcity on the task of the military leader. The utmost pressure is being applied to make the services cost-conscious and to compel commanders to apply principles of good business management. But it is not enough for a commander to know the price of a rifle, a typewriter or a pair of shoes. He must understand the basic economic facts that create those costs. He must know what kinds of economic resources may be used freely and what kinds must be used sparingly in the implementation of military strategy.

IN this article I have tried to indicate the kind of knowledge the U.S. public expects of its high military men. It is clearly necessary that military leaders and planners know how to integrate strategy and economy.

A superficial awareness of the maximum dollar strain which the economic structure can bear is not enough. This maximum will seldom be large enough to carry the full strategy we might like to adopt. It therefore is essential that we men in uniform understand the relative drains on the economy caused by the production of different kinds of firepower. If we do so understand we can then make decisions that will give us the maximum chance of obtaining our strategic objectives.

Most of our past and present high military leaders have come from the combat arms. It is highly probable that the large majority of our future leaders will come from those arms. But how are we to insure that these officers will have a sufficiently broad comprehension of all the aspects of national power? The Industrial College of the Armed Forces is the answer. It can broaden their comprehension of the demands on the economy which are created by military plans.

Officers of the combat arms should not miss the opportunity to gain knowledge that is so essential to successful high command. To be eligible you must have at least 18 and not more than 25 years of service and must have credit for the Armed Forces Staff College, or be a graduate of the Army War College, the Air War College or the senior course at the Naval War College.

Today, as never before, the motto of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces points up a vital truth. The future security of this nation may depend on a clear understanding of this truth by our military leaders: *"Industria et Defensio Inseparabiles."*

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A STANDARD COMBAT-IN-TOWNS COURSE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERICK WILKINS

Are you unhappy with the way we teach street fighting? Here's the solution of one officer who is.

DURING the last war we fought through clusters of grass huts, ancient walled towns and modern cities; regardless of what part of the world they were in, most of our troops had some experience in street fighting. In Korea we have had one major battle in a built-up area. Any future conflict would see large-scale fighting in towns. Obviously we cannot afford to neglect training in combat in towns.

If you accept this you have to ask: how is our training? Training, of course, has two parts: doctrine, and actual training methods and equipment. As for doctrine we are on pretty sound ground; we have decided how to fight in towns, based on past experience. Unfortunately, though, our teaching of this doctrine falls flat because of poor training methods and equipment. With a few rare exceptions the average soldier receives nothing but false impressions and bad habits when he goes through our so-called combat-in-towns course.

The average combat-in-towns course has as much resemblance to an actual town as a rural Chick Sale has to a Roman bath. Houses which are not houses are scattered along a street which could not possibly be mistaken for a street. As though this were not enough, each training site has a different "town" of different shape, size and variation. But all seem to be contesting for the best cartoon strip version of Tobacco Road.

A limited amount of firing from windows is possible in such a course; trainees get some idea of the sound of explosives going off, and they climb in and out of a lot of splintered 2 x 4 window frames. They also get a lot of bad habits and no idea at all of supporting weapons, use of flame throwers, actual use of WP and fragmentation grenades. The single-room shacks give no feeling of the maze inside a large building. How can a soldier learn how to fight inside a multi-storied structure unless he actually trains in a building with two or more floors?

WE have standard firing and infiltration courses; our staff work is the same everywhere in the Army (this is not an invitation for a debate). So why don't we train *all* our troops in the same combat-in-towns course? Why not set up a standard street fighting course? Despite the provisions of TC 14, we don't have such a course. The construction of this course should not be left to the whim of the individual post but should be designed so that troops receive definite instruction in all the techniques of street combat.

Here are the general specifications for such a course:

- It will be built of masonry and be realistic in appearance.
- It will provide necessary safety factors, yet permit the use of ball ammunition, rocket launchers, flame throwers, and other weapons.
- There will be a nearby area for briefing and concurrent training of troops.
- The "town" will be large enough for a platoon to fight through, thus providing some tactical training, as well as instruction in techniques.
- There will be at least two streets, so that trainees will get some idea of necessary tactical cooperation, plus the sounds of nearby battle.
- There will be at least one street crossing.
- Several of the buildings will have more than one story. The course will provide for at least one building to be cleared from the top down and another from the cellar up.
- The usual proportion of shops, dwellings, and such will be provided.
- Several of the buildings will have the usual arrangement of interior rooms, doors, hallways and closets.
- Some of the buildings will be ruined, or partially so.
- The buildings on the edge of the town will be ruined, as is often the case; the walls of these can be used for climbing tests.
- Various barricades will be placed in the streets and inside the buildings. There will be at least one barricaded and defended cellar strongpoint.
- Targets will be of the spring type, dropping out of sight when hit. Bayonet dummies will be placed in logical surprise positions.
- Maximum realism will be provided by the use of suitable signs, street markers, ruined furniture and vehicles.

This course will cost more than our jerry-built shack towns, but upkeep and repair will be less, even using live ammunition.

The use of concrete walls will permit rifle fire through doorways or windows. The trainee can approach a doorway, shoot it clear, throw in a live grenade, then mop up the room. Concrete will enable us to have cellar strongpoints that will withstand flame throwers, rockets and recoilless rifles. There will be a lot of smoke and a lot of dust flying, but our training area won't be destroyed. A wall can be patched up quickly and cheaply when it gets too many rocket holes.

The location and some other details can be left to the limitations of terrain and the skill of the local builders, but the above requirements are a minimum. All of the work can be done by soldiers. Much of the construction can be of concrete or cinder block. Floors and roofs can be built by anyone with a minimum of carpentry skill. Concrete walls can be poured in forms and the wooden forms later used for roofing, floors, window frames and target frames.

A COURSE to satisfy these requirements is shown on page 45. The use of the course could be as follows. Trainees report to the briefing area. They can either get instruction in the doctrines of street fighting or receive a review of previous instruction. Instructors demonstrate the proper way to fire from doorways and windows, how to throw grenades inside buildings, the use of grapnel hooks and scaling ropes; two- and three-man teams show how to scale

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alls. Then the trainees examine a model the town and go over the tactical methds used in reducing the enemy garrison. Within this area are mock-ups of windows, doors, walls and grenade targets; while one group is fighting in the town, another group can be receiving instruction or getting actual practice on individual skills. When the trainees are briefed, they move across the open ground to the edge of the town. Artillery is covering their advance, shelling the edge of the town. This is simulated by controlled explosive charges from a control tower. Under cover of their own machine guns and individual weapons they close on the ruined buildings at the edge of the town and take cover in the shell holes and rubble. These ruins are actually grenade courts, built in the form of walls, with windows for grenades. Rifle targets are shot down, then grenades are tossed inside the ruins. This is followed by a rush, bayoneting any dummies on the other side of the walls.

Depending on the tactical plan, machine guns and killer parties are set up to fire up the alley and rear of the houses, as well as cover the streets. The trainee teams use two- and three-man lifts to gain the roofs of AAA, which are flat-roofed ruins. They rush the two-story structures and gain entrances through second-story windows, clearing the buildings by working to the ground floor.

The walls of CCC have been prepared for mouseholing—prepared craters, with concrete blocks that can be smashed in and replaced for the next team. Gaining entrance through the walls, the interior of CCC, a large shop, is cleared by grenades and bayonet mop-up.

It is found that the walls of DDD are too stout for breaching with the tools at hand, and it is necessary to gain an en-

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trance through the street windows and doors. Using smoke grenades and covering fire the trainees rush into the street and smash into it. It is a three-room dwelling, with one of the rooms barricaded.

The street intersection is covered from cellar strongpoints of E-E-E. Direct fire weapons are used to fire the gun ports. Rocket launchers and machine guns keep the enemy down, while smoke blocks the cross street. Targets in the ruined buildings at E-1 are shot up and the buildings E-E-E rushed.

The cellars are given the grenade treatment, while the main building is cleared; then the cellar doorway is forced and the strongpoint mopped up. Once finished, entrance is forced through a passageway into F-F-F. This two story building is mopped up from the ground floor up.

At the conclusion of the exercise trainees are assembled and a critique held.

BY using various target arrangements, the course can be run time after time with new situations each time. It may be booby trapped or not booby trapped. The supporting weapons used may be more or less than the usual allotment, making allowances for reinforcement, or simulated losses.

Various other uses for this course are possible. First, since it is a street-fighting course, we can teach defensive combat. This is hardly possible in a flimsy shack, since no sane man would defend anything so easily burned. We can hold CPXs in realistic sites, using all our communication equipment as we would actually use it in the field. Aid stations and other medical installations can be established in our village, just as they would be in combat. Intelligence troops can search for documents amid realistic surroundings. Engineer and infantry troops can plant and clear mines. Scouting and patrolling problems can be held in the town. Military police units can practice traffic control amid a ruined village, or train in riot control against "mobs" of fellow soldiers.

There is no use pretending any of these supplementary uses are feasible in our present combat-in-towns courses. But the main advantage to such a standard course is the knowledge that when a man reports to your unit he knows how to fight in towns. Street fighting is over roofs and in cellars, through windows and down stairways, in the street and in alleys. That's why we need a standard course to teach these ways of combat. This course does it.

NIGHT RAID ON HILL 528

CAPTAIN BALLARD B. SMALL

This is combat: Somebody up high wanted a prisoner and for very good reasons doubtless, so the company made a carefully planned night raid that was successful, except that it didn't net a single prisoner, and the leader of the blocking platoon blocked some fire with his leg—and found himself on the way out of the war.

YOU are a rifle platoon leader in the 23d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division. It is late in the afternoon of 21 April 1952. You are in the vicinity of Kumhwa, North Korea. You have known for several days that your company will raid a finger on Hill 528 some 2000 yards farther north. Your mission is to capture prisoners.

The plan devised by the company commander specifies three groups in the composition of the raiding force. There will be two especially organized working platoons and the company command group. The first platoon will consist of two assault squads of riflemen only, plus a third squad composed of two BAR teams. The second platoon will consist of two assault squads alone. Each of the two platoons will be commanded by the regular platoon leaders. The company commander's group will consist of one rifle squad, one 57mm recoilless rifle with crew, the 4.2-inch mortar observers, and several men for radio operation and wire laying. The remainder of the company will remain on the MLR positions.

It is planned that the operations force will proceed from the company area at approximately 2030 hours, advancing in one body for approximately 1000 yards to a point where the force will split into two groups. At this point the first platoon consisting of the two squads and the BAR squad, will continue toward the objective in a zigzag manner from the southeast, moving northwest up the nose of the hill to within 200 yards of the first enemy positions. There the BAR squad will be established as a base through which the two assaulting squads will move in parallel thrusts on up into the Chinese positions atop the finger. After reaching their objective, these squads will get into the Chinese communication trenches and try to capture the defenders.

From the break-off point, the second platoon and the CP group will bear farther northward, *chogie* up the side of the finger so as to arrive several hundred yards behind the strongpoint which is the first platoon's objective. Slightly down from the crest, the company command group will stop, organize a little position with the security in whatever manner the ground seems to indicate, and direct the operation. The second platoon, consisting of the two rifle squads, will continue on up the hill to the crest. It will then turn south and lie down along the single chest-deep commo trench which connects the objective outpost with the enemy rear. The idea is to isolate the objective and to catch any CCF bug-outs as they pass back through the trench.

YOU draw the blocking force job. Your phase of the operation will take the most careful approach for you must cut in behind the outermost enemy positions, arriving there by moving up the east side of the finger in such a manner as to have enemy both to the south, north and east.

The time for departure is 2030 hours and the time set for return is posted back at Regiment as UCM—upon completion of mission, which probably means all night. The routes of approach have been marked out on overlays for the benefit of the map keepers in the rear, but you know without reference to any map where the CO wants you

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to go. You have looked out there all day long for weeks and already know every tree and gully. The slopes are steep and rocky. There are many trees and scattered heavy brush over most of the route, but the last four or five hundred yards is over bare and abruptly clear terrain, which is the sole enemy advantage after the explosion of hundreds of rounds of U.S. artillery fire.


Jump-off time nears; there remains only the usual interminable waiting until dark. There will be a check of personnel and equipment and later in the afternoon, a meeting of all patrol leaders, the mortar agents, and the artillery FO (who will remain on the MLR) for a final briefing. You clean your carbine, check your ammunition, pick up and lay aside in your bunker, six grenades, fragmentation. Then you spend the remainder day visiting your men, taking a reading on things, or just talking with them.


The day is soon gone and at that time of year dark has been gathering over an hour when you and the rest of the company form up at 1930 hours. You stand, sit and hunch in the trenches outside your bunkers for almost an hour before you get the word to move out. At 2032 hours it comes.

THE company commander starts the cautious descent from your hill down through the safe lane which leads through your wire, down 220 meters to the deserted valley floor over which you watch during the days. Across the valley to the foot of the enemy hills the movement gets progressively slower until the extended file seems to wait more than it moves.

At the foot of the objective hill, the first platoon splits off and begins the cautious zigzag ascent to face the enemy from the south. Everyone is much quieter, few men whisper though often head to toe when the slope gets steep. You rationalize that you are somewhat more fortunate. Your group is the strongest and is approaching from the side. Though there will be enemy on three sides, they will not be concentrated at the point where you will block.

At 0100 hours, the enemy detects the first platoon group while it is several hundred yards short of its assault positions. Far to your left you hear the z-i-i-p, s-z-i-i-p, z-i-i-p of the burp guns and the larger single concussions of grenades which burst with bright red flashes. The heavier ka-pows of the M1s overlap with the lighter enemy weapons as the fire fight builds up. Then all blend together in a steadily rising crackle. The explosions of the grenades are more frequent and you try to take advantage of the noise to move your group rapidly past the command group on up to the crest of the ridge, to your own position.





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Your blocking team does not get quite on top of the ridge when you begin to hear sharp reports above and around you. You also are receiving fire from the enemy, but no grenades yet. You get on top without much trouble except the annoying noise which has a retracting effect on the head and neck. You scramble around in the intermittent flashing darkness depositing your men for front and back protection astride the narrow communication trench.

At 0105 hours the heavy mortars and the 81mm mortars fire their prearranged concentrations on the northern reaches of the objective in front of you and on the hill masses behind you in accordance with the plan to inhibit any enemy reinforcement of the outpost.

At 0115 hours the word comes over the field line to the CP group to withdraw. You begin to send your men back down the hill. No enemy has moved either way through or by the trench. During the rapid action which was less frightening than the slow approach march, the enemy used small arms only in your direction. The first platoon received grenades in addition and possibly some light mortar; you are not certain.

BRIGHT red flashes of Chinese grenades burst down the hill below you and to the right as you hurry down. These are surely landing among the other platoon as it pulls back. At least twenty rounds of heavy mortar fire falls down the slope well behind the first platoon and you wonder why the Chinese fired there, not particularly thinking that they did not have the equal advantage of knowing the plans and routes of the friendly troops. Friendly artillery begins to clobber several points on Hill 528 and the enemy firing tapers off as it loses contact with the assaulting troops.

You get over half your men off the ridge and started down when you are surprised to find yourself knocked to the ground by a blow on the leg which felt like a hard-thrown rock. On the ground you first think in a flash that you had better be careful since you might get hurt exposing yourself. Then you feel the wetness and with a shock realize that you have been hit. When you try to move your leg you find it immobilized.

One of your men gets to you and before you know it can be done, you are on a litter at the CP location. You notice one of your sergeants is also wounded, but can walk. You remember now that someone has ripped your field jacket and fatigue jacket, saying something about "morphine," and you begin to stop worrying. The sound of firing from back up on the hill becomes intermittent.

THE company commander comes by in the darkness and says something which you recognize as friendly and not important, and then he moves away. You are picked up and borne off, jogging and swaying, and bumping through the air. You wonder if the men who are changing off as they get tired are annoyed at having to carry you home. You remind yourself to apologize. All your impressions, tripping men, cursing men carrying you, your litter, lights, faces, voices, noises . . . all blur together and you relax.

At 0200 hours the company patrol has assembled and by 0430 has closed completely into the company area. Later in the MASH, you learn that the first platoon reached its objective, actually getting into the trenches, but did not capture any prisoners. They estimated the enemy strength at approximately a platoon—stronger than was estimated before the patrol. It found the strongpoint trenches some places three meters deep with living holes opening off them.

The platoon planted a few antipersonnel mines in the trenches, set off some grenades in bunkers and left. Enemy losses could not be accurately determined. None was counted killed. Friendly losses totalled three.

Next day while waiting for word about the possibility of evacuation, one of the regimental medics comes in and passes on the grapevine word that the company commander is supposed to be recommending you for a Bronze Star, and though you wonder exactly what you did outstandingly, you feel good. There aren't any sheets on your cot and you wonder how far back you have to go to get them.



★ CEREBRATIONS ★

Our literate cocktail-hour tacticians stand to receive as much as $10.00 for their contributions to this department. However, the price for those "dashed off" with scant consideration for the rules of composition and rhetoric will be much less. Hold them to four or five hundred words and type them double-spaced.

Let 'em Go

THAT was an interesting and instructive story the newspapers had some months ago about Corporal Kuznick, the instructor at Fort Knox, who went AWOL and hitched a ride to Korea in order to get into combat. Upon discovery, his wrists were tapped with a ten dollar fine and at his own request he was returned to the combat outfit he had joined.

But several questions come up. Had Corporal Kuznick applied for Korean duty through channels before he took matters into his own hands? If so, what happened to his application? Was he in a "stabilized" assignment? Or was he told that "no replacement is available?" Were his superiors taken in by the age-old fallacy of the "indispensable man"—and Kuznick had done his work too well? We don't know the answer to these speculative questions but we do know that there are others who want Korean assignments and can't get them because of these reasons . . . or so they are told.

It has become fashionable in recent months to belittle the fighting qualities and patriotism of our American soldier. We read headlines that speak of "wholesale desertions" and there are investigations by committees, official and unofficial, and service journals carry articles on "What's Wrong with the U. S. Soldier?" But what about Corporal Kuznick? Is the Army yelling for help so loudly that it can't hear the cries of men and officers five or six echelons away?

I say that those of us who want to go to Korea should be permitted to go forthwith. Let us leave our stabilized assignments; the homesteaders will fill our places and be content. Replacements for Stateside duty and noncombat theaters can't be hard to find. Indispensable? There has been no such thing since Adam—the one indispensable man.

I do not believe that this policy of greasing the skids and let 'em go will disrupt the overall manpower plan. Kuznicks are rare and a company of them would be worth a battalion of ship jumpers and depot squatters.

What if I am wrong? What if my policy backfired and severely offset all manpower planning? All sorts of weird things could happen. It is possible to visualize long lines of Korea-bound troops griping because a storm at sea had detained them twenty-four hours; Stateside headquarters would appear ghostly, officered by retirees called in to fill the gaps and manned by amputees; a Wac corporal would fill Kuznick's shoes, complaining bitterly that she had been denied Korea service because of her asthma. Could this happen here? If anyone thought that it could, what's all the commotion about?

CAPT. JOHN A. HUGHES, JR.
Ex-Infantry

Head Protection

Now that we are seeking better individual protective equipment, it seems to me that this is a good time to get rid of the cumbersome, inefficient, rattling helmet.

A close-fitting helmet of the same flexible material as the vest could be devised that would protect the head, back of the neck, the throat, and all of the face except that part needed to be uncovered for seeing and breathing. This front part could be left open except when needed for protection. A visor to protect from fragments and glare would be very useful and would give more protection than the helmet for both purposes.

The winter pile liner could be worn beneath the helmet. When the protective helmet was not needed it could be thrown over the back similar to the hood, M-1943.

Fine for winter, you say; but what about hot weather? I suggest a frame similar to the one used in the helmet liner, made with a "housing" of canvas, duck or other tough fabric, suitable for wear as a hat when the protective covering is not worn. This would insure the free circulation of air, both with and without the protective helmet in place, and would give protection from the elements. A good visor should be provided for the "liner" for use when the helmet is not carried or when thrown back for comfort.

This would not only simplify present equipment, but would be lighter and more comfortable, both in summer and winter. For a change in season, merely substitute pile liner for summer liner, and the soldier is not only more comfortable, he is protected.

This type of head protection could be used by all arms, even the tankers and flyers, as it fits closely about the head and gives as nearly complete protection as can be had. Moreover, it permits the use of earphones.

Civilians are said to be rushing in to buy the protective vests, so perhaps there would even be a market for helmets for duck hunters.

DUCK HUNTER

Check Your Records

It snowed in Washington one morning late this spring and so buses carrying hundreds of workers, military and civilian, to the Pentagon were late. And among them was a personnel clerk who has your future in the palm of his or her hand. For convenience, we'll call the clerk a *him,* and label him John.

Poor John rolled in sometime after 0900 hours, a full sixty minutes late and already tired from the pushing and shoving he had received on the crowded bus. He also had a slight headache from a party he had enjoyed the night before. Lots of records were piled up in his IN basket, and John contemplated them with a sinking heart. "I'll never get through this day," he thought. But he was a conscientious fellow, and dug in.

The pile of records on John's desk gradually thinned out. But his headache got worse. His eyes burned, and he found his thoughts wandering. He looked at the clock. Time for coffee, maybe? Ah, yes, 1030. But first he would finish this one record.

And that record was one pertaining to *you.*

Now, it doesn't matter what the particular record was. Perhaps John was entering a change on your Form 66-1, down in Career Management. Maybe he was in the Assignments Branch, processing the records of the latest batch of "eligibles" for overseas duty. Wherever John was, whatever he was doing, his aching head and burning eyes and his impatience to get out to the coffee bar, caused him to make an error. One vital piece of information was omitted, or entered incorrectly.

So a month from now you are suddenly ordered to the Far East (you just

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returned, remember?) or you are passed over on the next promotion list (you *know* you are within the zone of consideration; eligible on all counts!), and you can't understand why.

On the other hand, to be fair about it, let's assume that our Pentagon clerk arrived feeling fresh and vigorous. He went through the day without making a single error. A good man, John. Can you say with complete assurance that the person in your own headquarters, who made out your last Form 66-A (a report of change, which eventually reaches John), did not feel like John of the storm when he racked it up? Are you positive that the Statement of Service, requested by (you name it), was extracted from your 66-1 correctly?

You can't be sure in any case, and you shouldn't be.

The fact is, while the majority of those who handle your records—locally and at the Department of the Army level—do so with care and conscience, there is always the chance of error. As proof I have personal knowledge of three instances during the past year, where data were entered incorrectly, or omitted. Any of these errors, undetected, could have affected the careers of good soldiers.

In one case, an officer dropped in to see his records and have a chat with the folks at Career Branch. This officer had spent a few months as platoon leader in Korea before being wounded, and several more months in a Stateside hospital. As far as Career Branch knew, however, while he had actually been panting up and down the Korean hills, he had merely been in an "Unknown hospital, Far East." For that was what his Form 66-1 showed. He had no credit for his months of combat.

This error was rectified, but months later the same officer discovered that his adjusted Form 66-1 contained a similar mistake. The first error had occurred on page four, where assignments are listed chronologically, the new one was an instance of omission on page one, where overseas duty is recorded. Duly noted were ETO service during World War II, and occupation duty in Japan; but of Korea there was no mention. "When we look through a 66-1 to see where an officer has been [in order to plan his next assignment], usually we check only that block," he was told. In other words, if the omission had not been picked up our officer would have been ripe for combat duty in Korea —again.

The third instance concerned an officer on EAD who was up for promotion in the Army Reserve. His basic branch was military intelligence, and the promotion board requested a statement of service from his headquarters. Now this officer had attended a military intelligence school during World War II, following which he was assigned to an MI officers pool to await further orders. His Form 66-1 showed this, but the person who made up the statement of service saw only the word "pool" evidently and, without checking the accompanying MOS, listed the officer as having been a *motor pool officer!* Whether this error detracted from his qualifications as a military intelligence officer is not known, but he was not promoted.

This is certainly not to say that you will invariably find your records messed up, either at the home station or at the Pentagon. You probably won't. But your future—your life, if you will—is in the hands of human beings with human failings. Mistakes can happen and do. Therefore you owe it to yourself to see that your records are current, correct and clear; both at the local level and topside. You should see your own personnel people and make sure that your personal history is correct in all details. And it will pay you in the long run to visit Washington every few years, if you possibly can. Even if your own headquarters personnel never make errors, other people can and do.

CAPT. ROBERT K. SAWYER
Infantry

Assault Under Friendly Fire

An infantry platoon that walks into and under its own artillery fires may sustain fewer casualties in taking its objective than it would if the fires lifted a hundred or even fifty yards from the objective.

This is essentially one of the points stressed by General James Van Fleet during a recent talk to the officers at The Infantry School. This is not a new idea, but to hear it reiterated by an officer of his professional stature is refreshing. What he said, however, does pose problems, serious problems, for the officers and noncoms who lead infantrymen into battle.

Imagine that you, a company or battalion commander, are briefing your junior leaders and giving them orders to attack.

"Lieutenant Jones, I want you to take your platoon in under our own artillery fire when you assault Hill 22. You'll take fewer casualties from our own stuff than from theirs, because the gooks will stay in their holes and not shoot you off the place. Got it?

"Let's see. I'll be in my OP. Any questions? Good luck!"

Lieutenant Jones may not have any questions for you, but it's a pretty tough order to swallow. All he has to do is take *his* men into his *own* fire and get a few of them killed by it. And *you* will be snug in your OP. Great! Sure, the Chinese do it, but they don't place much value on human life. Half of the men in Jones' platoon are married. All of them have parents, sweethearts, close friends. All are young. None of them wants to die on a stinking hill in a country that he couldn't care less about. Especially by his own fire. It's like ordering a man to commit suicide.

Only it isn't!

Maybe you have been on the receiving end of an attack like that. Damn few people willingly stand up, even in a nice cozy foxhole, when artillery is coming in on top of them. There is something a little disturbing about the idea. Even dangerous. And even if you don't give a hoot about your life, you would rather die doing something worthwhile than to toss it away uselessly. No, it's folly even to anticipate a man's standing up until the artillery lifts. But when it *does* lift you can expect him to pop up and start *aiming* his rifle or machine gun at the assaulting enemy. And by aiming his shots he can kill. The man coming up the hill doesn't have the odds that he had under indirect, un-aimed artillery fire. The man on the business end of an aimed shot is dead.

We say that a platoon will go to an assault position, call for its fires to lift or shift, and then assault by fire of rifles and tanks. It's a rare man who can hit much with a rifle while walking, and the enemy knows it. When our artillery stops coming in on him he pokes his head out and picks us off like so many ducks.

I think there may be an answer, and a simple one, to both the tactical and psychological difficulties in this. It lies in the answer to this question: When you are flat on your belly or huddled up in a foxhole during a barrage, as long as an artillery round does not hurt you do you *know* (or care, for that matter) whether it was fragmentation or concussion? I think not.

Isn't there a place and use for a non-fragmentation artillery shell, a shell which makes the same noise and scares the same hell out of people, but which wouldn't *kill* anybody who wasn't al-

most on top of it when it burst? I suggest that such a shell would serve the same purpose as a standard shell *in an assault*. It would keep the enemy down where he could not aim his weapons at us. And I suggest that our soldiers would be a great deal more willing to walk into a non-killing concentration than into the more lethal kind. We might then win our wars where they have to be won—at the squad and platoon level—with far less cost in blood.

There are certain obvious bugaboos, such as over-using such a weapon. But these are details that could be overcome by common sense and judgment. Anything that will help save our lives and at the same time help us clobber the enemy should be used—even if it is as materially inconsequential as a non-fragmentation artillery shell.

MAJ. JAMES S. DOUGLAS
Infantry

Volume of Fire

THE idea that bringing a tremendous volume of fire to bear on the enemy is more likely to defeat him than fewer shots that actually hit him, is apparently not new in our Army. Captain Samuel Fiske, of the 15th Connecticut Infantry Volunteers, relating his experiences at the Battle of Chancellorsville, said:

". . . The noise is deafening and confusing to the last degree. The impression gets around of a tremendous conflict going on. The trees in the vicinity suffer sorely, and the clouds a good deal. By and by the guns get heated and won't go off, and the cartridges begin to give out. . . . Meanwhile, the rebels, lying quietly a hundred yards or two in front, crouching on the ground or behind trees, answer our fire very leisurely, as they get a chance for a good aim (about one shot to our three hundred), hitting as many as we do, and waiting for the wild tornado of ammunition to pass over their heads. . . .

". . . In every possible way [I] would endeavor to banish the Chinese style of fighting, with a big noise and smoke, and imitate, rather, the backwoods style of our opponents." Samuel Fiske, (Dunn Browne, pseud.), *Experiences in the Army*. Boston: 1866.

It might be remarked that the author of this extract was a clergyman who volunteered for service in the Infantry. He was in actual combat in most of the major battles fought by the Army of the Potomac until the Battle of the Wilderness, when he was killed in action. He was no theorist.

COL. C. C. CLENDENEN
Armor



This is the terrain board showing bunkers, fire direction center, two howitzer positions and positions for machine guns and bazookas. Not shown is a terrain map which portrays more of the defensive setup.

Terrain Boards Used to Teach Security and Fortification of Artillery Positions

COMBAT lessons clearly indicate a general lack of knowledge on the part of artillery officers of the minimum requirements for establishing local security and the steps for progressive development of the battery position. So the Department of Combined Arms at the Artillery School has revised its methods of teaching the subject.

Cost, maintenance, portal-to-portal time, and the manpower shortage made it impractical to use actual field installations. So to put across classroom instruction, the Department of Training Publications and Aids with the help of the Department of Combined Arms, constructed a series of lifelike and detailed terrain boards showing the various phases of artillery security and fortification.

The area was limited to two 105mm howitzer positions, the battery executive post (battery fire direction center), and a personnel bunker to shelter men operating the installations (*see cut*). Beyond the confines of these boards but a necessary part of this instruction are the local security antitank and antipersonnel mine fields together with the barbed wire that would be around the perimeter of the defensive area. This is graphically illustrated by an eight foot by eight foot terrain map of the entire battery position. Additional terrain boards are now under construction to portray the positioning of bazookas, machine guns, and AA as well as blown-up cross sections of an FDC, a machine gun emplacement, and an observation post.

As a supplement to the classroom aids a complete monograph is being prepared for students. It will include all of the detail and information considered essential for the artilleryman as a guide to secure and develop his position.

This revised course will probably require four hours of resident instruction and will be started this fall.

FRONT AND CENTER

ARMY FIELD FORCES

USAR Schools

AFF's new directive on USAR schools makes it possible for students to be enrolled during any phase of any course except the Command and General Staff course.

It also imposes limitations on enrollment in USAR schools by officers whose age is such that the Army may not benefit from their enrollment. These limitations, which may not be applied retroactively, provide:

For enrollment in the C&GS course officers must be under 48 years of age; for enrollment in the advanced course they must be under 45; officers who have received actual or constructive credit for any course may not enroll for it; basic courses will be limited to company-grade officers, except in the cases of majors who may transfer from one branch to another and must qualify for a new MOS.

Mine Warfare Training

Four additional hours of training in mines and booby traps during the basic combat training period has been directed by AFF. The increase is from eight to twelve hours.

The additional time will be devoted to teaching the "functioning, arming and disarming of U.S. mines, fuses and firing devices; familiarization with allied and enemy mines and material; tactical employment of land mines to include types of minefields, setting of mine strips, marking, recording and reporting; drills for emplacement of antitank and antipersonnel mines; mine detection and breaching techniques, and familiarization with booby traps."

CBR Instruction

The 10 hours of instruction in chemical-biological-radiological subjects has been revised to make it more practical and to move it into the field of combat skills. Classes are now largely conducted outdoors and emphasis is placed on field recognition of CBR situations with protective actions rehearsed until they become nearly automatic. Academic description of CBR agents has been augmented by description of munitions in which they are placed, their appearance and action in the field, and first aid measures to be taken.

OCS and Branch Schools

Exclusive of the WAC OCS, Army officer candidate schools are expected to turn out 4,000 officers in fiscal 1954 at the rate of 1,000 each quarter. The anticipated output of each school is: Infantry School, 1,930; Artillery School, 1,070; Engineer School, 1,000.

On 1 July branch schools established a Branch Officer Basic Course for newly commissioned officers, except OCS graduates. The courses will be from eight to 15 weeks in length and will give the new officers a working knowledge of their duties and responsibilities. At the same time the regular branch company/battery officer courses and the associate branch company officer courses were limited to officers with from two to five years of service.

General Bradley Takes Research Position

MANY general officers with distinguished service to our country and Army have retired since the end of the Second World War. But the passing from active duty of General of the Army Omar N. Bradley has a poignancy of its own. He was called the "GI's General," but he was also more truly a professional soldier's soldier, an officer's officer. He was the first Army Group commander in U. S. history and the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These "firsts" were important milestones in his career and the Army's history, but they were only incidents in the thirty-eight-year career of a man who was always a soldier. His statement at the time of the announcement that he was taking on a new and important defense task was in keeping with his characteristic frank soldierliness:

"The Army and the country have been very good to me, and have given me many varied opportunities to serve. . . . For these assignments, and these opportunities, I am truly grateful."

He chose this important research and development job in the same spirit:

"For many years, I have been aware of the continuing need for close coordination and cooperation between our laboratories and the armed forces. Prior to World War II, I was in charge of the weapons section of the Infantry School where I developed a keen appreciation of the importance of linking research with practical military needs. Subsequently, in North Africa, Sicily, France, and Germany—and lately in Korea—I have seen dramatic results from this teamwork—advanced weapons which provide maximum effectiveness and vital protection for our American men in action.

"Therefore, my decision went to research and industry. I have chosen to work with a precision industry, the Bulova Research and Development Laboratories, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Bulova Watch Company. It has already contributed significantly to the development of new weapons, and is capable, in my opinion, of playing an important role in the future."

In his new job General Bradley will be serving his Army. So to him we say, not "good bye," but "good luck."



THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Target Effects Analysis

A general method for determining the effects produced by a given artillery weapon or group of weapons, firing on a given target is under study by the Combat Development Department, TAS. The amount of ammunition necessary to produce a given damage level is a prime consideration relative to the attack of any artillery target.

The completion of this project will provide tables to assist artillery S3s in choosing, assigning, and attacking targets in

more methodical, scientific manner than is possible at the present time. This will result in more intelligent expenditure of ammunition. These tables are expected to be in tabular or graphical form, giving amounts of ammunition versus expected fraction of casualties and/or other damage levels.

Instructors' Conference

The annual Artillery Instructors' Conference, 22-26 June, was attended by approximately 60 officers from other service schools, boards, and higher headquarters. This conference is held each year to present to the artillery officers serving as instructors at the service schools the latest developments in artillery matériel, tactical doctrine, and techniques. It further serves to familiarize these officers with the facilities of The Artillery School and to emphasize how these facilities can be used to assist them in the accomplishment of their mission.

Restrictive Fire Plans

Until recently TAS had been teaching the habitual use of restrictive fire plans (William, Victor, or Negat) for the suppression of artillery fires during air attacks. Recent relaxation by the USAF of the requirement for putting such plans into effect has resulted in reorientation of previous instruction. Current instruction indicates the existence of restrictive fire plans and teaches their implications and the procedures followed in their application, but emphasizes that the necessity of their routine application for *all* air attacks no longer exists. Two examples of instances when restrictive fire plans would be used are:

During air drops or large bombing formations in which air space may be highly saturated with aircraft and artillery shells.

When a large amount of fire is placed in a combined area; for example, a beachhead or air head during the pre-assault phase.

When normal amounts of aircraft and artillery are attacking the same targets, a requirement still exists for the artillery to shift from VT or time fire to fuze quick within 3,000 yards of the target *during* the actual attack run. The appropriate FSCC exercises the necessary coordination involved through the appropriate FS representatives therein.

Tactical Missions

The current edition of FM 6-101 in the hands of troops indicates the existence of three standard tactical missions for field artillery units and combinations thereof.

Studies are now under way to eliminate combination tactical missions defined in the present FM 6-101. Current thinking considers it desirable to have only three tactical missions (direct support, general support, and reinforcing) with definite responsibilities indicated. It is considered that modifications of these standard tactical missions can accomplish any required results better than combinations.

For example, when assigning the combination mission of GS/Reinf, it is necessary to delineate and explain to the commander the specific requirements of his mission as it applies to the current situation. Amplification of the reinforcing portion of his mission is required to cover the amount of ammunition to be expended, time of delivery of fires, and the fire planning responsibility. It is considered desirable in such an instance to assign the standard tactical mission that most closely approaches the desired mission to be assigned. Qualifications of this mission may then be made to reflect the desired effect and instructions to the commander.

Association Affairs

THE death on 25 June of Colonel Joseph I. Greene, Secretary-General Manager of the Association of the U. S. Army and Editor of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, required the Executive Council of the Association to appoint an interim management so that the affairs of the Association and the JOURNAL could be continued without serious interruption.

Because of this emergency the Executive Council met on Monday evening, 29 June. In the absence of General Decker, the meeting was in charge of General John E. Hull, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and Vice President of the Association.

The Council named Colonel Arthur Symons, Artillery-USAR, Acting Secretary-General Manager of the Association of the United States Army. Colonel Symons, who had been Colonel Greene's principal assistant since 1946, will be in full charge of the Association and publisher of the JOURNAL. Before coming to the *Infantry Journal,* Colonel Symons had been associate editor of the *Antiaircraft Journal.*

Colonel Symons appointed Mr. John B. Spore editor of the JOURNAL. He had been Colonel Greene's associate editor since 1941.

Colonel Robert F. Cocklin, Artillery-NGUS, was elected Assistant Secretary of the Association and will also serve as Colonel Symons' principal assistant.

Mr. N. J. Anthony, Colonel Greene's confidential secretary and editorial and business handyman of the Association for twenty-three years, was elected Assistant Treasurer of the Association.

Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, retired, who had been assisting Colonel Greene with the work the Association was performing for the State Department's overseas library programs, will continue with this work. The Association is fortunate to have a man of his broad experience at its disposal at this time.

The Council voted to name the Association library the "Joseph I. Greene Memorial Library." Colonel Greene took much interest in the library and over the years a number of valuable and rare military books have been added to it.

The Council authorized the President of the Association, Lieutenant General George H. Decker, to appoint a committee to recommend a permanent successor to the office of General Manager of the Association and editor of the JOURNAL.

Flak Suppression Fire

TAS now includes instruction in the planning and execution of flak suppression fires as an integral part of artillery fire planning. Recent combat tests have revealed that a marked decrease in aircraft losses due to ground fire results from the careful planning and delivery of artillery fire on AA positions protecting the area to be attacked and routes thereto. The planning and coordination of these flak suppression fires is a function and responsibility of the artillery element within the appropriate FSCC and is coordinated in application as to time and location with the air representative within the FSCC. Requirements for flak suppression fires may be announced by the Air Force through liaison representatives and will be considered by the artilleryman as a request for fire support to be evaluated and considered in the light of the overall fire support needs of the force and its supporting units.

Army Aviation

The Army Aviation School, recently organized at Fort Sill, anticipates 4,000 students during fiscal year 1954.

Of these, 1,650 will be striving for Army aviator's wings; 1,200 as fixed-wing pilots and 450 as cargo-helicopter pilots. The rest will be students of the Helicopter Aviation Tactics Course, Aviation Instrument Course, Aviation Instrument Examiner Course, Twin-Engine Pilot Course, Twin-Engine Mechanic Course, Helicopter Transport Mechanic Course, Helicopter Mechanic Transition Course, Aircraft Maintenance Officer Course, and the Airframe Mechanic Course.

Extension Courses

At the end of May, 7,009 students were active in the extension course program administered by TAS. This includes 1,609 USAR personnel and 3,997 National

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Guardsmen not on active duty and 1,403 members of the service on active duty.

The Artillery School has recently placed in administration the following additional extension course subcourses:

40-17, Self-Propelled Artillery, consisting of 4 lessons and an examination for which 14 credit hours are given.

40-22AAA, AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion, consisting of 6 lessons and an examination for which 20 credit hours are given.

50-6AAA, AAA Brigade and Group, consisting of 4 lessons and an examination for which 14 credit hours are given.

Soviet Field Artillery

Recently published Special Text 6-154 gives an explanation of Soviet field artillery weapons, ammunition, organization, tactics, and techniques.

Weapons from the light 76mm gun to the super-heavy 305mm howitzer are described; many excellent illustrations of their guns, mortars, and rocket launchers, together with a weapons characteristics table, are included.

Soviet artillery organization is covered from battalion through artillery division. The special text then shows how these units are organized for combat and explains their normal tactical missions. Their principles of employment, to include tactical disposition, control, observation, and communication, are described in some detail.

The final portion of the text is on Soviet gunnery techniques; it covers the personnel and methods involved in the conduct, control, and direction of fire.

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Instructors' Conference

The Infantry School held a five-day Infantry Instructors' Conference in June for Infantry instructors now assigned to various service schools. The 76 officers, ranking from first lieutenant to colonel, toured The Infantry School's training facilities, and received orientations and instructional material from the airborne, automotive, tactics, communication, ranger and staff departments.

The annual Infantry Instructors' Conference is designed to standardize infantry training, technique and doctrine at all Army service schools as well as provide a means for solving mutual instructional problems. The conference gives TIS an opportunity to present new trends and developments in equipment and doctrine to include lessons learned and verified in Korea.

Officer Advanced Course

A revised Infantry Officer Advanced Course with a capacity of 210 students starts on 8 September. The course, formerly nine months in length, has been cut to six months.

The Infantry Officer Advanced Course is the highest level class conducted at The Infantry School and is now offered twice a year. The second class begins 11 January 1954.

The course is designed to produce battalion commanders, regimental staff officers and regimental commanders who can perform these duties with appropriate on-the-job training. It provides the student with advanced training necessary to thoroughly ground him in the duties and responsibilities of field grade Infantry officers.

Prerequisites for the course:

(1) Must be a commissioned officer of the Regular Army or commissioned officer active in a Reserve component whose assignment, actual or anticipated, is to train and/or command infantry units.

(2) Must have a minimum of five years but not more than twelve years of commissioned service (including only promotion list service for RA officers).

(3) Must have credit for Infantry Company Officers Course (regular or associate).

(4) Security clearance to include Secret.

REUNIONS

1st Armored Division. 28-30 August. Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C. For details write: 1st Armored Division Assoc., 1529 18th St., N.W., Wash., D. C.

4th (Ivy) Division. 27-30 August. Philadelphia, Bellevue-Stratford Hotel. For details write: Silvio D'Anella, National President, 752 So. 8th St., Philadelphia.

24th Infantry Division. St. Louis. 14-16 August. For details write: J. Peyton, 131 N. Culver St., Baltimore.

25th Infantry Division. 7-9 August. Statler Hotel, Washington, D. C. For details write: 25th Infantry Division, Box 101, Arlington 1, Va.

27th Division. 9-10 October. Syracuse, N. Y. World Wars I and II. For details write: National Headquarters, 27th Div. Assoc., Box 1403, Albany, N. Y.

30th Infantry Division. 20-22 August. Raleigh, N. C. For details write: CWO James B. Liles, P.O. Box 791, Raleigh, N. C.

36th Division. 5-6 September. Gunter Hotel, San Antonio, Tex. For details write: 36th Division Assoc., Box 5068, West Austin Station, Austin 31, Tex.

37th Division. 5-7 Sept. Mayflower Hotel, Akron, Ohio. For details write: 37th Div. Headquarters, 21 West Broad Street, 1101 Wyandotte Building, Columbus 15, Ohio.

41st Infantry Division. 15-16 August. Olympian Hotel, Olympia, Wash. For details write: Box 96, Burien, Wash.

75th Infantry Division. Washington, D. C. 14-16 August. For details write: John D. McBurney, 5822 E. 14th St., Kansas City, Mo.

83rd Infantry Division. Hotel Hollenden, Cleveland. 20-22 August. For details write: Headquarters, 83d Inf. Div. Assoc., 1435 Clark Street, Pittsburgh 21.

104th Infantry Division. 5-7 September. Cleveland, O. For details write: Mr. Kristofik, National Timberwolf Assoc., 513 E. Columbus St., Columbus 6, O.

Third Dimension

TIS is employing 3-D in its instruction. The Tank Weapons Committee of The School's Weapons Department is now instructing infantry students in the use of range finders, the primary sight of the M47 tank, with a stereo projector that utilizes polarized light. The 3-D projector, with color terrain slides, gives the effect of picture depth. A sight reticle, superimposed on the screen, gives the student using polarized viewers the full effect of sitting in the tank and viewing the terrain through the gun sight.

Television at TIS

The Infantry School will study the feasibility of using television for instructional purposes when a Signal Corps mobile TV unit arrives on 31 August. The purpose of the study will be to determine the value of television as a training medium and to develop the methods and techniques for its employment in mass instruction at The Infantry School.

Summer Training

More than 4,500 Infantry ROTC cadets, National Guardsmen and Army Reservists, both officers and enlisted men, are expected to train at Fort Benning this summer. Activities to be conducted under guidance of The Infantry Center include the Infantry ROTC Summer Camp, the Infantry, Quartermaster, Chaplains, and Judge Advocates army area schools. In addition, National Guard units of Georgia Military District will conduct numerous periods of week-end training.

Irons in the Fire



Patton Tank Snubber

A technician of Chrysler Corporation's Ordnance Development Department drives home the pin connecting one of the big constant-friction snubbers originally designed by Chrysler engineers for use on railway trucks and now adopted for use in the new



Patton 48 tank. The new snubbers give much longer life and better performance in tank service than the hydraulic shock absorbers they replace.

Maintenance Shelters

A portable and extremely lightweight maintenance shelter for military vehicles has been developed for the Quartermaster Research and Development Division by the Evans Products Company, Plymouth, Michigan.

The new shelter, resembling a Quonset hut in shape, is 66 feet long, 21 feet wide and 15 feet high at its center. It consists of arched magnesium alloy frame sections over which is permanently fastened the canvas covering, complete with plastic skylights and portholes. The new shelter consists of five sections and each section folds down into a package 4 feet by 10 feet by 15 feet deep. Total packaged weight, including insulating blankets for use in sub-zero areas, is 4,100 pounds.

The new shelter can be moved by truck or plane from one field position to another. It is easy to put up, requiring only eight men eight hours to erect. It is lightweight—only one fourth the weight of the conventional shelter, yet provides 1,258 square feet of floor area. Without its insulating blanket, the shelter weighs only 2,620 pounds.

The shelter has "buggy top" doors, hinged so they open from the bottom. When open, they can accommodate the largest Army tank. The doors can be opened or closed in one minute by one man operating a small hand-pow-




ered winch built into the framework of the shelter. Because the ends of the shelter taper toward the ground, they offer less wind resistance than conventional rectangular shaped shelters. Wind tunnel tests run at the University of Michigan have proved the shelter can withstand wind velocity of 80 mph and gusts up to 100 mph, without failure.

Iron Powder Bands

A secret metal powder process developed during World War II is currently aiding the effectiveness of 90mm ammunition and saving strategic materials. Two oilite iron rotating bands, manufactured by the Chrysler Corporation, are placed around each 90mm shell and the rifling inside the gun barrel digs into them to give the projectile the spin necessary for range, accuracy and stability in flight. Originally, these bands were made of copper and gilding metal, but during World War II, Chrysler engineers in cooperation with Ordnance developed a superior iron metal powder rotating band.

The metal powder bands, like most other oilite parts, are porous and soak up lubricant which, under heat or pressure, oozes out to oil the inside of the gun barrel.



New Props for C-119

Sporting its recently-adopted Aeroproducts propellers, a new Fairchild C-119G Flying Boxcar executes a neat single-engine peel-off in flight tests over Hagerstown, Md. Blades of the prop on the left engine have been feathered for this maneuver, part of the normal testing program for all C-119s. The new Aeroproducts propellers especially designed for transport-type aircraft, give the Flying Boxcar additional safety and higher performance in military troop and cargo operations.

Arctic Cable

All-weather, rubber-jacketed electric power cable for Arctic use has been developed by the Engineer Research and Development Laboratories at Fort Belvoir, Va.

The new cable, which also operates successfully under tropic and temperate conditions, remains flexible at temperatures as low as minus 65 degrees Fahrenheit. Unlike standard commercial cables which tend to act like springs when frozen, it can be uncoiled with no danger of snapping back. It does not become brittle at low temperatures nor as stiff as commercial cable.

The low temperature cable was made possible by the development of Arctic rubbers at ERDL in conjunction with the Synthetic Rubber Division of the Reconstruction Finance Corp. This development was begun after investigation of commercially available cables and rubbers disclosed that none fully met military requirements.

★ BOOK REVIEWS ★

VINEGAR JOE IN CHINA

STILWELL'S MISSION TO CHINA. By Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C. 1953. 441 Pages; Maps; Charts; Tables; Illustrated; $5.00.

This is the first volume in *The U.S. Army in World War II* series to be devoted to the China-India-Burma theater. Its appearance is timely since, despite the current Communist peace offensive, many Americans fondly hope that the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek may someday invade the Chinese mainland and so recommend that we send additional military aid to Formosa. Since Chiang retains some of the same advisers who helped him waste the weapons we sent in Stilwell's time, this book should be required reading for all American policy makers.

Romanus and Sunderland are to be congratulated on their courage and judgment as well as upon their scholarship. They have cut a straight path through the jungle of legend and misrepresentation surrounding Stilwell's mission and the war in China. They have made four major contributions to an understanding of the war in its most confusing theater. First, they give a full account of the Allied defeat in Burma in 1941-42 and Stilwell's part in those operations. Secondly, they lay bare the basic causes for disagreement between Stilwell and the British commanders in India, Wavell and later Auchinleck. Thirdly, they show the reasons for conflict between Chiang, who was primarily interested in preserving the *status quo,* and Stilwell who tried hard to carry out his instructions to increase the combat effectiveness of the Chinese Army. Finally, they lay the groundwork for an understanding of why failure was to attend General Claire Chennault's promise to "knock Japan out of the war" with a small China-based Hump-fed air force.

Despite the fact that Japan surrendered in 1945 without an Allied campaign against her ground forces in China, it is important to remember that plans for the ultimate defeat of Japan envisaged such operations. In the dark days of 1942 it seemed very important to keep China in the war. Thus, in judging the actions of Stilwell and others in 1942-43, it is important to keep in mind the fact that in those days no one could foresee the course which the war in the Pacific would take from 1943-45.

Most of Stilwell's troubles in CBI stemmed from President Roosevelt's illusions about China's status as a great power and about Chiang's position as a "head of state." He insisted upon treating China as a great power and Chiang as if he were a head of state in the Western sense of the term. He seemed to believe the Chungking-inspired legend that China had somehow fought Japan to a standstill by December 1941. All these errors in judgment contributed to the crowning error of deciding to extend military aid and Lend-Lease to China without requesting assurance in return that the Chinese armies would be reformed. Stilwell was sent to CBI charged with the task of increasing the combat effectiveness of the Chinese Army, but was denied the only bargaining power which could have made his efforts successful.

The first thing the reader must understand is that after the summer of 1941 there was very little fighting in China. The Japanese were content to hold what they had previously taken and welcomed a *de facto* truce. After their conquest of Burma, the Japanese forces in that theater adopted a similar strategy. Not until Wingate's Chindits proved that armed forces could be supported far behind enemy lines by air drops, did the Japanese high command think seriously about invading India. This live-and-let-live policy appealed to Chiang who did not want to fight but merely to pile up American supplies for the inevitable day of political reckoning after the war. The do-nothing policy of Japan was also a great comfort to Wavell and the British forces in India. They did not wish to fight in Burma either. Naturally, Stilwell became unpopular both in Chungking and New Delhi with his repeated warnings that since the United Nations would someday have to use China as a base of air operations against Japan, some fighting would have to be done in Burma in order to open a land route to China. He became unpopular with some circles in Washington as well as Chungking when he insisted that there would be no easy way to victory in the Far East and that Chinese armies would have to be fully trained and well led if they were to assist in Allied landing operations on the China coast.

The President made Stilwell head of the China end of Lend-Lease but gave him only advisory authority. Consequently, whenever the Chinese failed to get what they wanted, Stilwell was blamed for the failure. His complicated command status led him into difficulties with the maladroit General Ho Ying-chin, whose baleful influence is reported as still operating on Formosa. He was the "other" Chief of Staff to Chiang and frequently thwarted Stilwell's plans and programs. Sometimes T. V. Soong seemed to be supporting Stilwell, and even, on rare occasions, the colorful Madame Chiang. But these episodes reflected changing aspects of the internal political situation in China and did not last long. The authors of this volume realize that Stilwell was not particularly easy to get along with in CBI. He spoke and wrote about Chinese and British leaders with a frankness that injured his program and himself. General Marshall was probably right in saying after the war that Stilwell was right about nearly everything he proposed during his tour in CBI but he was lacking in tact and too outspoken for his own good.

The Stilwell-Chennault controversy represents the classic difference of approach to strategic problems taken by a hard-bitten infantryman who knew something about the limitations of air power, and an aviation enthusiast who believed that his planes could not only "defeat Japan" but could also pin down her ground forces in China. This controversy also illustrates the fateful appeal that glib promises of easy victory have for statesmen who do not understand military realities. Both Chiang and Roosevelt were impressed by the assurances offered by Chennault.

In retrospect it is hard to imagine how any responsible leader could accept these promises. Chennault proposed in 1942 "to defeat Japan" if he were provided with 105 fighter planes, 30 medium and 12 heavy bombers. When pressed to explain how this mighty deed could be accomplished with so small a force, Chennault held forth on the aircraft warning net he had developed in China. By drawing the Japanese 3d Air Division into combat within this net, he proposed to destroy it. Once the Japanese air force in China was broken, Chennault's bombers could go after coastal shipping and finally Japanese industry. Because he misunderstood Japanese intentions and capabilities in 1942-43, he felt that Chiang's unreformed armies could stop the Japanese if they tried to overrun his advance air fields.

Stilwell believed none of this. He was certain that as soon as Chennault increased his air operations in China the Japanese would do the same. If Chennault really hurt the Japanese, Stilwell was sure that the Japanese would take his air fields from him. He did not believe that Chiang's pathetic armies could stop the Japanese if they were determined to destroy Chennault's bases. Unfortunately Stilwell, who could write the most colorful and caustic comments in his diary and notebooks, failed to get these convictions across to President Roosevelt in a conference arranged by Marshall and Stimson. Had Stilwell been a clever intriguer instead of a straight-shooting infantryman, he might have tripped Chennault up at an early stage by gently calling attention to the ab

sence of dependable logistics arrangements east of Kunming to support Chennault's intended operations. Instead, Stilwell merely restated his conviction that Chennault's plan would not work. Roosevelt thought it would and overruled Marshall and Stimson on this point.

By August of 1943 Stilwell concluded that his mission in China had failed and there was nothing more he could achieve in Chungking. His repeated requests for bargaining power over military supplies had been turned down. The President had forced the creation of the Fourteenth Air Force under Chennault and had given him authority to communicate directly with the White House without reference to Stilwell.

The only bright spot on the horizon was the progress being made by the Chinese divisions training at Ramgarh under American instructors. When the British and Chiang continued to hold back from an offensive in Burma all that remained for Stilwell was to lead the Ramgarh-trained Chinese divisions back through northern Burma to a junction on the old Burma Road. While Stilwell was doing this in the spring of 1944, Chennault was about to see his ambitious air plan nullified by the capture of his forward bases in China.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek paid the full price for his refusal to follow Stilwell's advice to reform his armies while that was still possible. The armed forces with which the Generalissimo tried to secure his political position in China after the war melted away. Unfortunately the American taxpayer also paid the full price for Roosevelt's decision to give arms to the nationalist regime without asking any assurance as to how they would be used in return. As General David Barr and others have pointed out, most of these weapons ultimately ended up in communist hands. We have had to recapture or destroy a great many of them in Korea.

This is an important book and should be widely read.—H. A. De Weerd

SOVIET PERSONS AND PEOPLES

THE SHADOW OF POWER. By Chingis Guirey. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 315 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; $4.00.

The publishers sum this book up as "a first-hand narrative account of daily experiences with Soviet individuals by an American who, speaking Russian fluently, served as Liaison Officer in the United States Army in Austria from 1945 to 1947, together with his illuminating conclusions about the Soviet mentality."

This, as far as it goes, is a completely accurate statement. The almost shocking thing to the American military reader is that it is perhaps more of a narrative account of daily experiences with Americans and includes some far from satisfying conclusions, by implication at least, about the mentality, education, morals and ethics of officers of the United States Army. The picture of swearing, drunken junior officers at Fort Benning is likely to remain with some American readers longer than the observations on Soviet mentality. One American lieutenant is quoted at considerable length on how he came back to the Army after a few months as a civilian, deserting his wife and child "after being drunk two or three days." "I've got," he says, "a mind just like mah feet; it likes to rove. I never had a real good eddication, but I reckon I can do near jest as well as most college men on some of these hyar tests we have here. The trouble with me is mah English . . ." *If* he and some of his companions are accurately described, the major trouble would seem to be more with the Army's standards in character requirements than with matters of grammar.


The author's detachment from the American viewpoint is not surprising if his background is considered. Although he is a product of Hotchkiss, Yale, and Stanford University, he was born in Instanbul of Circassian parents. His father, known to many older Army officers as one of the founders of the Boots and Saddles Riding School in New York City, commanded, as a colonel, a cavalry brigade against the Bolsheviks during the Russian revolution. Captain Guirey is a Moslem. He served as a U. S. officer in the 11th Armored Division and as Chief of the Russian Liaison Section of United States Forces in Austria. He attended the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

The value of this book to the American military reader stems from Captain Guirey's intimate knowledge of the Russian mentality, character and language. A point that he emphasizes is that the U.S.S.R. is not a Russian nation: "To misuse this terminology is to play into the hands of the Kremlin. There are a Muscovite people, a Tatar people, a Ukrainian people and language, but *Russia* is a metaphysical concept propagated by Muscovites to coalesce the many national strains in the Eurasian land mass in a drive for power."

He also clarifies some terms often misused: "*Byelo* (meaning White) *Russian* is an ethnic term referring to a Slavic people who comprise some three per cent of the population of the U.S.S.R. *Reds* or *Bolsheviks* are those who fought and defeated the *Whites* in the civil war which followed the fall of the czarist government in 1917. Among these *Whites,* as among the *Reds,* were representatives of every nationality in the present Soviet Union and from other countries which rose with the Revolution, such as Finland, which was formerly under Muscovite rule, Poland, the Baltic countries and the people of the Caucasus. Some of the defeated *Whites* fled to Europe, Asia, and the Americas, where erroneously they were often called *White Russians,* as if they were a race apart. They were *White Emigrés,* and *politically* they were the opposite of the

Walter Goerlitz's

HISTORY OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF



is the only *complete and comprehensive history* of what was once the most precise and powerful, the most technically competent and superbly organized director of military policies known to the Western world. This is the story of German generalship from 1657 to 1945, told with amazing, hardly known details in its proper economic, political and social setting. Most important for the professional reader is probably the story of the evolution of the modern General Staff and general staff methods, the development of total warfare with its economic and psychological aspects, and the story of the Second World War (over one half of the book deals with the inside story of German strategy in the West and the extremely detailed account of German operations against the Russians).

As Walter Millis states in his thoughtful introduction: "Its ultimate failure, like its early success, is a subject peculiarly worthy of study, now that we stand in an even more perilously militarized age, making even more imperious demands upon us to find answers for the basic problems of military command and military policy in a free society."

". . . this illumination of history so usefully and . . . brilliantly focused by Mr. Goerlitz . . . should be required reading in Washington, where the actions of some men in Government sometimes tend to support Hegel's gloomy cynicism that 'people and governments have never learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it.'"

Hanson Baldwin in the *New York Times*

". . . the finest book ever written on the rise and fall of the German general staff."
Houston Post

". . . probably the greatest compendium of its kind, designed primarily for the student of military history . . ."

John H. Thompson in the *Chicago Tribune*

". . . a very readable, factual and perceptive, always illuminating . . . brilliant narrative . . . important contribution to military and European history, filled with material of great interest to students of sociology and biography, and enjoyable and profitable reading . . ."

The Commonweal

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Reds, but *ethnically* they included Muscovites, Tatars, Ukrainians and a host of other kinds of people as different from one another as Chinamen and Greeks. The word *Russia*, then as now, was an invention of the Muscovite through which Moscow hoped to weld together all the nations of Eurasia under Muscovite hegemony."

Captain Guirey's book is, of course, written for the general public rather than for the military reader, but it is regrettable from the military point of view that his comments on Russian troops do not seem to have been as perceptive as those on civilians and on non-military features of Soviet life. He does make some points, not always supported by some of his experiences, about morale and discipline: "There was something consistent about these regular Soviet Army faces, seen for the first time in their own atmosphere. . . . They were all warriors; they were soldiers first and foremost, and proud of the fact. I doubt if they felt any apologetic reservations about killing. They looked happy, and their morale was good. Their relations with their enlisted men were free and easy, but disciplined as well."

Retirement privileges seem to be much more of an inducement to long service than in our Army. Captain Guirey tells of an officer just promoted to colonel after twenty-eight years' service who expected to be retired in a few months. He would automatically be upped a grade to brigadier general, get ninety per cent of a brigadier general's pay plus a house in the country with a garden. The pay basis or the quality of the real estate is not specified, but the author is definite about another privilege: "He (the brigadier) would have the right to wear his army officer's uniform with plain gold epaulets and would get his uniforms free."

The book is almost entirely free from humor, so much so that the author's comment on the expressed opinion of a Soviet colonel on the subject of one of our division commanders may be simply a statement of fact. The colonel called the American general "a good simple uncle, a good peasant."

Captain Guirey comments: "Our general's reaction was noncommittal."—Maj. Gen. H. W. Blakeley, Retired.

ROMMEL ON ROMMEL

THE ROMMEL PAPERS. Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. Harcourt, Brace & Co. 545 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $6.00.

The publisher's blurb says "this is the definitive military history of Rommel's campaigns . . ." It is not. No commander, especially one who has not had access to his enemy's documents, is prepared to write the definitive history of any campaign, and most certainly not his own.

The Rommel Papers is, however, a tremendously vital book and one that illuminates both the man and his enormously skillful conduct of his campaigns in a way we have not seen before, even in Brigadier Desmond Young's excellent biography. These are Rommel's notes largely as he wrote them or dictated them in the field, together with his letters to his wife. Where there are major gaps in the Africa narrative, they have been filled in by General Fritz Bayerlein, then Chief of Staff of the Afrika Korps; and Manfred Rommel, the Marshal's son, who has contributed a chapter on his father's death. Captain Liddell Hart has, of course, provided invaluable comment and added in the form of notes information that was not available to Rommel at the time he was writing.

The main facts of the battles in the Western Desert we already know. The valuable thing that Rommel has given us here is the commander's intention—his reasons for the actions he took at various times. These are almost impossible to know unless the commander sets them down as Rommel has done, and to that extent this book adds greatly to our knowledge of the battles that Rommel commanded.

But more important is the insight Rommel gives into his own character and into his methods of command. Not that we can imitate them, for Rommel, like most great leaders, was unique, but there is certainly much to be learned from them. Rommel violated quite deliberately a good many of the basic rules for commanders. He was a driving leader and a gambler. He took risks that many more orthodox men would have been appalled to call "calculated" risks. But they were calculated risks, often taken with remarkable knowledge of the enemy's strength and the enemy commander's weakness. Rommel seems to have understood the British commanders in the Western Desert almost better than they understood themselves. Often, too, Rommel undertook his operations with a fine contempt for normal standards of personnel and ordnance resupply, and brought them off by demanding—and getting—better performance from his troops than either he or his enemy had any right to expect.

Rommel had an almost incredible sense of time and timing, and an acute appreciation of the value of surprise. His sense of what was possible was also highly developed, although his ideas of what was possible logistically and what the quartermaster thought to be possible were usually poles apart. This sometimes led Rommel into untenable positions and unjustified risks and, we suspect, it also led his superiors and his Italian allies into promising him supplies they knew they could not deliver, just to get him off their backs.

It is interesting to note Rommel's development from the technically brilliant, immature division commander of 1939 to the man who could see, by 1942, the eventual end that the German reverses in Africa and Russia were leading to, and to the Rommel of 1944 whose work toward throwing the Normandy invasion back into

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AUTHORS come and go, but Julius Caesar goes on forever. Those of you who have struggled with "All Gaul is divided into three parts" in the original Latin will rejoice in a new translation of Caesar's *War Commentaries* by John Warrington (Everyman's Library, $1.65). The translation is superb, Warrington having caught the movement and vigor both of Caesar's campaigns and of his writing and put them into modern English. Caesar is permitted to speak in the first person rather than in the formal third person in which he wrote. Map locations are given their modern names, with the ancient names in a footnote, and units of money, weights and measures are given in their modern English equivalents.

WE recommend to those who have reason to delve into American history, whether for themselves or their school-age children, *The Encyclopedia of American History,* edited by Richard B. Morris (Harper, $6.00). All of the facts, dates and places of history are here so that you can find them easily, and there are excellent brief commentaries on the main events and figures of history from the beginning of American history. This is the best single reference book on the subject in print today and is an excellent place to start if you plan to dig deeper into a special phase of history.

LEON Uris' new novel, *Battle Cry* (Putnam, $3.75), is already well up on the best-seller lists, and deserves to be there. It is a novel about a Marine squad in World War II, and follows the men in the squad from the time they hit boot camp to the last battle (for the original men) on Saipan. Uris has caught very well the essential spirit of the Marine Corps, or for that matter of any good fighting outfit, and caught it better than other World War II novelists seem to have done. We've read enough and more than enough about the bad side of military service. Here's the good side —the building of a unit and the comradeship that men will die for if they must. As a literary effort *Battle Cry* isn't the best novel to come out of World War II, but it is more authentic in its treatment of war—the boredom as well as battle—than any other we've read.

VIRGINIA Cowles' biography of Sir Winston Churchill (Harper, $5.00) is the first serious work on his full career that has been attempted. Certainly it is not definitive; it will be many years before Sir Winston's impact on world events will be fully evaluated. But it is a sound and valuable book. The author is often critical of her subject, especially in his conduct of domestic affairs, and maintains her sense of perspective in the face of a subject so complex as to drive a biographer mad. We've found Sir Winston an endlessly fascinating subject, and Miss Cowles' books is a major contribution to the growing body of material about him.

WE commend to the domestic traveler George Stewart's *U. S. 40* (Houghton Mifflin, $5.00), a running, illustrated commentary on a great cross-country highway, a road that in various forms has been closely associated with many of the great events in our history, beginning with the days before the American Revolution. George Stewart, the *Storm* and *Fire* man, has a way of bringing inanimate things vividly to life and this book is no exception.

—O. C. S.

the sea was motivated by the hope that it might give himself and other leaders a talking point toward concluding a separate peace. Rommel was a master tactician from beginning to end and, when he had time for reflection, a surprisingly able strategist. He was, as his critics have always said, mercurial in temperament, but these pendulum swings from optimism to pessimism seem not to have affected his military judgment in that they impelled him to undue rashness or caution.

Whether, as Captain Liddell Hart seems to think he is, Rommel is entitled to be ranked with the "Great Captains" is an argument that could go on endlessly. Certainly he had many of the necessary qualifications—driving leadership and incredible personal energy, great tactical ability, a delicate and almost intuitive sense of timing, and sharp reasoning power that seemed to become greater in moments of crisis. In matters of logistics, he was weak, but not so weak as his critics would have us believe or he would not have accomplished so much in Africa with so little. In matters of strategy, who can say? On paper, and in retrospect, his strategic ideas look better than those of his superiors, but he had no chance to put them into operation. His concepts of mobile warfare will be with us for years to come and in that sense at least his place in history is secure, for he was the very apostle of mobility. Whether or not his beloved tanks survive the onslaught of the age of superweapons is questionable, but his concepts of mobility will be with us for a long time to come.

Captain Liddell Hart has done a superb job of assembling Rommel's material into coherent (in space and time) form, and the story of how it was done is most interesting. J. F. Trotter's maps are a great help in following the fluid action that was especially characteristic of the African battles.—O.C.S.

BOOKS RECEIVED

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THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Volume 6, May 1781 to March 1784. Edited by Julian P. Boyd. Princeton University Press. 686 Pages; Illustrated; $10.00.

VALIANT OCCASIONS. By J. E. Macdonnell. The Macmillan Company. 262 Pages; $3.00. Stirring stories of British naval actions in World War I.

THE MAN FROM MAIN STREET. Edited by Harry E. Maule and Melville H. Cane. Random House. 371 Pages; Index; $3.75. A Sinclair Lewis reader.

MAN'S SEARCH FOR HIMSELF. By Rollo May. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 281 Pages; Index; $3.50.

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
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FROM DOWN UNDER TO NIPPON

The Story of Sixth Army In World War II

by

General Walter Krueger



No United States army in World War II had a more difficult mission than Sixth Army, and none performed its mission with more distinction and less publicity. *From Down Under to Nippon* is the history of Sixth Army's operations, written by its commander. The book, like the army, reflects the personality of its commander—it is sound, accurate and professional. It is not General Krueger's autobiography; it is his tribute to the men who served with him.

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THE NEW CHIEF OF STAFF

ON COMMISSARIES AND PRODUCTIVITY

"Chuck 'im out, the brute!" . . . until "the guns begin to shoot"

YOUR Association is not a lobbying organization. We do not buttonhole congressmen, or testify at Congressional hearings. We are in no sense a "gimme" group.

We did, however, permit our blood pressure to rise a few notches when we learned that the Harden subcommittee was taking another hack at service commissaries, and headed for the Old House Office Building to observe the fireworks. There were no fireworks—not even floor discussion. The commissaries received their death blow almost in silence.

The hearings were postponed for some unannounced reason. We did meet a young man who was present to observe the hearings, before the same subcommittee, on another matter. He announced his business, and asked ours. A thirty-minute discussion followed, and then we returned to 18th Street in a very dark and discouraged frame of mind.

THE young man, from his wisdom and experience gained as an officer in World War II, let us in on a few "facts":

(1) Service people are overpaid.

(2) The perquisites of office, including palatial quarters, add to the overpayment.

(3) Tax exemption on allowances is the final straw.

(4) We do not have a fighting army because the military life is too plush.

(5) Very few military personnel work more than five hours a day.

(6) Retirement benefits should more than make up for the chipping away at commissary and post exchange benefits.

We countered his arguments to the best of our ability—it should have been easy, but here was a man on a crusade as fiery as our own. We made him back up at least part of the way on all his points, except, believe it or not, the plushiness of military life and the lack of fight in our Army. He had never heard of S. L. A. Marshall or converted barracks, and didn't care to, particularly.

His final argument was the clincher. Military people don't deserve to get pay anywhere equal to salaries in civilian life because their work isn't productive.

It was at this point we insulted a man who had been an entire stranger up to thirty minutes before and came back to the office in a mood that caused the help to tiptoe past our door.

If planning for, working for, and fighting for the safety of the United States isn't productive, what in the world is? Insurance executives make salaries that put the pay of a colonel to shame, and they do it in air-cooled offices, not foxholes or CPs. If there is any more important insurance than the armed might to stand off an aggressor, we have yet to hear of it.

Is it productive to teach a young man, or hundreds or thousands of young men, to live instead of die in battle?

Is it productive to belly through a rice paddy on a patrol?

Is it productive to figure firing data so a concentration lands on the enemy at a critical time?

Is it productive to design weapons that insure the country's survival?

Is it productive to plan troop movements so that the right men or the right matériel gets to the right place at the right time?

Is it productive to care for men who are wounded in battle, or sick?

Is it productive to direct traffic under artillery fire?

Is it productive to provide hot meals or even cold C rations to fighting men?

Is it productive to keep a man's records straight so he gets promoted or discharged on time?

This list could go on indefinitely. The answer is, of course, you're damn right it's productive. It's productive of the most important thing this country has—its integrity as a free and independent nation.

THE time has come for soldiers to come back into their own. It's time to reaffirm that soldiering is an honorable profession for the professionals, and an honorable activity for the nonprofessionals. It's time to let the people of our country know that we are productive, underpaid, have lost most of our perquisites to selfish pressure from commercial groups, that tax exemption on allowances doesn't begin to make up for the nomad life that requires the allowances, that our army is a fighting army and the military life is far from plush, that military personnel put in more hours a day than any other group except some self-employed, and that even retirement benefits have been chipped away in violation of the contract the older soldiers thought they were signing when they first took the oath.

There are dedicated soldiers who would serve regardless of how they are treated by a careless citizenry and a pressure-group oriented Congress. But are there enough of them to insure the economical victories the people and Congress demand? Can our country afford to see college seniors recruited directly by industry at higher pay than second lieutenants, for a five-day-week eight-hour-a-day-job? Can we afford to choke off commissary and post exchange benefits when department stores advertise for help using "20 per cent discount on all purchases" as bait? Can we afford to chisel at retirement benefits when even unskilled labor works under industrial retirement plans?

WE can't find anything in the stated missions of the armed forces that indicates part of their function is to add to the bank accounts of local merchants. We can find evidence that the major of 1930 had a much higher standard of living than the major of 1953; he has lost ground while the civilian in government, commerce and industry has gained ground.

Let's not make service life any more unattractive than it is, to pander to the cupidity of people who believe it is their right to make a living off the soldier who has little say in where he is stationed, and who in the next war may stay home to patronize the store in his home neighborhood if much more is taken away from him.

Soldiering and politics don't, or shouldn't, mix. Our three million or so votes will never be cast in a bloc; it would be a bad day for the country if they were. But the millions of service people, and their more millions of dependents, whether they vote or not, should receive at least the same consideration as some of the uninhibited pressure groups that are so short-sighted as to tamper with the country's future safety for a few dollars today.



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GENERAL MATTHEW BUNKER RIDGWAY, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Cover
ON COMMISSARIES AND PRODUCTIVITY Inside Front Cover
TO THE EDITORS 4
THE NEW CHIEF OF STAFF 8
SALUTE TO THE DEPARTING CHIEF 9
THE PROPER USE OF ARMOR. *Lt. Robert S. Harper* 10
TANKS AND INFANTRY. *Col. Edward L. Rowny* 11
TRUCE IN KOREA (Pictures) 15
WHEN JOSEPH "GOT IT" FROM THE NEW KING. *Lt. Col. E. N. Kirsten* 16
AND THEY MARCHED, EVERY ONE. *Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Randle* 18
COUNTERING COMMUNIST ARTILLERY. *Maj. Mark M. Boatner III* .. 24
TACTICS OF ATOMIC WAR. *Col. George C. Reinhardt and Lt. Col. W. R. Kintner* 26
CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE 34
BUILDING COMMUNITY RELATIONS. *Capt. Frederick Jenkins* 36
CEREBRATIONS 38
FRONT AND CENTER 40
BOOK REVIEWS 42

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
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★ To the Editors . . . ★

Efficiency Blots

To the Editors:

Like everyone else I have read about the dissatisfaction with the efficiency report system. Most recently I was again sold against it by several letters and one article in your June issue. As a result of all this very inspiring reading which I have done, I have come up with a solution to the problem which has the great virtue of simplicity.

There is in existence a series of standardized tests involving ink blots. Persons taking these tests indicate what particular ink blots bring to mind. My proposal is that the Army reproduce millions of these sheets and replace the efficiency report forms with them. Rating officers could then be instructed to select one ink blot for each officer to be rated. We could then hire psychiatrists and let them decide what the rating officer really thinks about the ratee. No fuss; no feathers.

What was it Mark Twain said about talking about the weather?

LT. J. R. BUETTNER

Box 23, TAS
Fort Bliss, Texas

What Would You Do?

To the Editors:

It seems to me that the reviewer of Walter Goerlitz's *History of the German General Staff,* in your July issue was influenced by a strong and not uncommon American prejudice against the German General Staff. His reference to why the German General Staff failed, to the General Staff involvement in politics, and to the failure of the German General Staff to reject Hitler seemed to fit a neat American conception but not a coherent and realistic appraisal of a body of men.

I have read the book and it seems to me your reviewer missed the two items of greatest significance for the American military reader.

First, there was the General Staff appraisal of German weakness when Hitler first marched. Their estimate for the reoccupation of the Rhineland, for the move against Austria, and for the move against Czechoslovakia was that the French and British power superiority was so great that Germany would be quickly defeated. Hitler made a better appraisal of the democracies' will to fight, and this was decisive. Only after they had lost positions in the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia, which greatly strengthened the German position in Central Europe, did Britain and France realize that this issue could not be resolved without a readiness to fight if necessary. It may be of some interest to recall western appraisals of German strength in these early crises and judge whether western military men served their diplomats well. It is also a question of some current interest whether democracies characteristically underestimate their power and thereby sacrifice their sound positions in foreign affairs.

The second issue, and this is the main drama of the book, is the General Staff struggle with Hitler. The situation was unprecedented since General Staff training never conceived any but complete loyalty to the Chief of State. General Staff officers with broad unanimity appraised Hitler's plans and policies as ruinous to the German State; yet only a handful went on to the step of plotting political revolt. American officers who are sworn to defend the Constitution might well ask what they would do in a similar situation. If a political opportunist at the head of a gangster organization should obtain the leadership of a national party and control of the Federal government, and should then proceed to circumvent the Constitution with wide popular support to perpetuate itself in office, what would you do? This is the drama which Walter Goerlitz unfolds, using material from the Nuremberg trials to support much of his story.

The conspirators failed. These men, trained to thoroughness in planning and to vigorous execution of plans, were amateurs at conspiracy. Their planning was not thorough and their execution was poorly coordinated. Perhaps these signs indicate the deep inner struggle which continued even in those men who decided that Hitler must be destroyed.

COL. T. A. LANE

Washington, D. C.

Inflation of Rank

To the Editors:

There isn't any record of small unit leaders being increased in rank when gunpowder was introduced into warfare. Captains commanded companies when the repeating Springfield was adopted and when machine guns were added. These weapons supposedly revolutionized warfare, even to the point of making war such a horrible mass slaughter that man would be forced to find more peaceful means of settling his differences.

The argument that a combat company commander should be a major partly because he must employ such a diversity of technically advanced weapons is no more valid today than it was in the time of Genghis Khan.

I believe too many people and agencies are trying to keep rank abreast of technological advancement and that a re-examination of our whole attitude towards rank and job-rating relationship should be considered.

Grandfathers of some years back were not required or even interested in piloting an automobile. Today grandfathers do pilot automobiles. The overall status of grandfathers has not changed but their environment has. So in order to stay even he is required to advance with the forward movement of progress.

The axiom that one either advances or retrogresses applies to soldiers as well as grandfathers. Majors, captains, master sergeants and corporals must keep abreast of rapid advances in order to barely stay even.

I do not agree with the idea of using rank and grade as a pay grade—and that is exactly how rank and grade is being exploited today. If certain jobs or assignments are to carry additional monetary consideration for some specific reason, then I say provide a system of bonuses or assignment compensation to take care of it. Don't increase the categorical rank of the job or the assignment!

If we are not alert to what is happening we will be faced with the necessity of creating super officer rank and super noncommissioned officer grades in order to have the Indians we need to assist all the chiefs.

Has anyone ever thought of reclassifying some of the division, regimental and battalion level staff and command jobs with an eye to reducing the rank-job-rating relationship? Has anyone considered returning to the concept of one-grade advance in rank for each successive higher echelon of command? Has anyone considered deflation instead of inflation as a solution to our problem of top-heavy rank condition?

An officer and a noncommissioned officer in today's Army just has to know more than his former counterpart, that's all!

CAPT. DONALD E. ZIEG

Hq, 135th Inf
47th Inf Div
Camp Rucker, Ala.

To the Editors:

I found the article, "Combat Company Commanders Should Be Majors" interesting, but unacceptable. The article was logical in its presentation, but logic is based upon the acceptance of certain truths beforehand. This is where I must disagree with Major Crecelius. I cannot accept certain of his suppositions. It is true that the organization of a rifle company and the duties of its commander become more complex, but this is only relative as all warfare has become more complex. An infantry regiment or division is much more complex and equipped heavier than before, but this doesn't mean that every regiment must be should be commanded by a brigadier general or a division by a five star general.

The Major says that the the company commander should be on a par with everyone else on the battalion staff. Raising the rank wouldn't accomplish anything but a chain reaction of promotions which would leave the situation just where we started

imagine battalion and regimental commanders suffer by taking guff from above, o.

They abolished the old buck sergeant in der to enhance the rank of corporal, but corporal has no prestige or more power, ad the sergeant does not have the standing staff sergeant used to have. So a buck rgeant replaced the corporal as squad ader and the staff took over from there. don't think we have better squad leaders ad the system hurt the noncoms' prestige.

2D LT. ROBERT CEDER
q & Svc Co. 198th Tk Bn
amp Atterbury, Ind.

achine Guns

o the Editors:

Lieutenant Gobus's article on machine ns (April issue) was, he stated, the prodt of a great deal of interest and thinking that important matter.

But Lieutenant Gobus did not include in s work a few more needed improvements at many who have used the weapons hen the chips were down" think we ed.

First of all let's set things straight on e weight of our machine gun. Most en can easily lift and carry a burden at weighs as much as the machine gun f it is in a convenient shape. I believe provement in shape is more important an in weight. Further weight is a factor accuracy.

Then there is head space. Improper ad space setting accounts for most of the nming and misfires that occur in our 17 vintage machine gun. The gunsmith at makes and sells a gun with a more olproof headage adjustment than we now ve will have made a buddy of every machine gunner who temporarily lost his reion while seeking a tool to turn the rrel six or eight clicks or who had to dismantle a hot gun to get a jammed tridge out of the chamber or those of with a short memory who can't remember from time to time if it was eight or hteen clicks on "this one."

SGT. WARREN A. GARROTT
Guard Co. USDB
rt Leavenworth, Kan.

ption Writing

the Editors:

Congratulations on printing "The Red od" in the July issue. Information conning our enemy is as vitally important keeping informed on our own armed ces. Here's hoping I will see more such icles in the JOURNAL in the future.

However, after reading it I was a bit mayed at the caption to the photograph page twelve which began, "In the days fore Hitler's madness unleashed the Red od . . ." In the first place, that the Soviet ny was given the opportunity to occupy ge parts of Europe was probably the lt of Hitler's optimism (and his General Staff's), not of any insanity on his rt. I gather this from my reading of



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Heinz Guderian's *Panzer Leader* and he seems to have been in a position to know more about it than your caption writer.

Regardless of whether it was madness or optimism on Hitler's part, the dismaying thing is the implication. After reading Dr. Rosinski's article, to me Red Flood is synonymous with the wanton savagery unleased during the Russian offensive, not with the offensive itself. Thus the caption is saying that Russian barbarism was excusable in lieu of Hitler's bad deeds.

JAMES W. MITCHELL, JR.
6403 West Grace St.,
Richmond, Va.

● Our feeling is that Mr. Mitchell has read something into the caption that few other readers read and certainly not what the caption writer intended. We take the criticism in good spirit and thank Mr. Mitchell. It is never out of order to remind an editor that written words are powerful and sometimes deceptive.

FSCC

To the Editors:

I would like to comment on "FSCC—Battlefield Teamwork" by Captains Powers and Wallace in the May issue. I feel that there is a need for clarification of certain matters dealing with personnel, operational procedure, and location of the Fire Support Coordination Center.

It would appear that the authors have to some extent lost sight of the purpose of fire support coordination. Basically, there is nothing in the principles of the FSCC that has not been done for many years by successful commanders. The FSCC was established to relieve the commander of the burden of personally handling the details of coordinated fire support.

For years many units have prepared fire plans for supporting weapons. Too frequently a separate fire plan has been prepared for field artillery, mortars, air support and direct fire weapons, with little or no connection between them. To carry fire support coordination to its logical climax, I feel that the commander should visualize where fire will probably be needed to support his plan of operation and have all weapons, organic, attached and supporting, prepare to fire on all of these areas.

The draft training circular, "Coordination of Fire Support," published by The Artillery School, 1 April 1953, may not have been available to the authors when their article was written. In the foreword of that circular this statement appears: "This coordination [of fire support] is effected without adversely affecting any of the present methods used in the rapid delivery of fires essential to the support of operations." To me this means that requests for fire on targets of opportunity will be handled in exactly the same manner as now. The mortar or artillery forward observer will forward a fire request directly to the appropriate fire direction center and the FDC must forward all information concerning these targets to the FSCC, but must not delay the fire requested until a decision is made by the FSCC; nor can all fire requests be forwarded through the successive FSCC's until it reaches a fire direction center.

An FSCC is primarily a planning agency during the planning phase of an operation and handles the interchange of information between organic, attached and supporting fire support means during the operation; and at the same time planning for the subsequent needs of the supported unit. The fire support coordinator and the representatives of the other fire support means handle the details of coordination, based on the supported unit commander's combat orders, policies, priorities, or individual decisions. The responsibility for fire support coordination still rests with the supported unit commander.

The article also makes no mention of the role in the FSCC of the Regimental S3 Air, other than a brief comment in passing. Nowhere in their discussion of the operation of the FSCC or in the example of "a day in the FSCC" do the authors mention the S3 Air by name as being a part of the FSCC.

Yet Training Circular 23, "Coordination of Fire Support," and proposed changes to it, all cited in the article as the basis for fire support coordination doctrine, state clearly that the S3 Air of the supported unit is one of the key links in the coordination which goes on within the FSCC, with certain designated and specific responsibilities including, but not limited to: preparation of the offensive air support plan and assist in integrating it into the fire support plan; initiating and processing requests for air support; maintaining liaison with G3 and S3 Air officers at higher and subordinate echelons on matters pertaining to tactical air support; coordination of air missions with other supporting fires; arranging with other members of the FSCC for flak suppression fires, target marking for artillery or naval gunfire, and suppression of friendly fires as necessary.

It is not that the authors have delegated these duties by name to anyone else, but by ignoring what I feel is the important role of the S3 Air in the operations of the FSCC, they lead the reader to conclude that air support matters are handled directly by the fire support coordinator or the artillery S3.

As to the location of the FSCC, the article states that, "the FSCC can be located at either the artillery headquarters or the supported force headquarters. It may or may not include the artillery fire direction center (FDC)." Now, TC 23 originally specified that the FSCC would be the FDC of the organic supporting artillery echelon augmented by liaison representatives of naval gunfire and close support agencies. But it further stated that "the FSCC usually should be located adjacent to the supported unit command post in accordance with artillery doctrine . . ." However, proposed changes to TC 23 state that

l echelons where an FSCC is established, is desirable that it be located within or mmediately adjacent to the command post the command for which fire support is ovided." With relation to the FDC of e supporting artillery, it states that the imary requirement for its locations is at it be able to control the fires of its bordinate units. "When the individual quirements of the FSCC and the artillery DC do not conflict, insofar as locations are ncerned, they may be located together in the same general vicinity. When ese requirements do conflict, the FSCC d FDC should be separated."

This can be interpreted that the FSCC nains at the supported unit headquar- s. If the FDC can effectively operate the same place, well and good, but if t, then the FDC must be located where can control the fires of its subordinate its (at the artillery battalion headquar- s or wherever the situation dictates). I not agree that the FSCC would be lo- ed at the artillery battalion command st in any case, unless, of course, the illery CP and the supported regiment ' were at one and the same place. Yet article states that the FSCC can be ated at either place (when the two head- arters are separate). This appears to be trary to established doctrine.

The article also states that one of the mbers of the FSCC staff is the forward controller (FAC) from the supporting ctical Air Force. I cannot see how the C could carry out his function of direct- close air support strikes in support of nt line units if he were located, as the hors state, in an FSCC located at artil- y battalion headquarters. Actually, while may be consulted as to the suitability targets for air strike, and in an advisory acity on the employment of tactical air, FAC's job during daylight hours is control tactical aircraft supporting the und elements, and while he should intain contact with FSCC, he will be nding most of his time in observation sts where he can actually see the targets direct planes onto them. But he is rmally attached to the infantry unit, and uld have no business back at artillery talion headquarters, if the supported d supporting units had two separate com- nd posts.

This is no attempt to belittle the role yed by the artillery coordinator in the CC or his artillery S3, nor should it be erpreted as an argument that the Artil- y S3 is not normally the man who deter- nes what available supporting weapon ll be used on any given target. But his is more one of coordinating than tiating, as far as close air support is con- ned, and current directives clearly in- ate that it is the infantry commander r his delegated staff representative) who responsible for initiating, planning and ocessing tactical air support, coordinating efforts at applicable levels with repre- ntatives of the Tactical Air Force and the supporting artillery echelon. The FSCC is the installation where such coordination is carried out.

COL. CHARLES F. MUDGETT, JR.

The Infantry School
Fort Benning, Ga.

The Authors Answer

To the Editors:

We appreciated your forwarding to us the letter from Colonel Mudgett. Many of his comments are in agreement with our article. I would like to say first that our article was an attempt to sell fire support coordination and to fill in the gaps in the training circular on the subject. We certainly did not want to rehash the many arguments and fixed policies that have already been set forth in numerous publications on the subject. We wanted to give the artilleryman and infantryman a feel for the business.

I would like to comment on four of Colonel Mudgett's points.

Fire request channels. Yes, the TC was available to us. Since the FDC and the FSCC were together in our article, there would be no delay in handling the fire requests.

S3 Air omitted. We should have included more on the function of the S3 Air, an infantryman. That was an unfortunate omission in the main discussion although we did mention him later on in connection with the combat example of an FSCC. It seems we were too concerned with the artillery aspect of the picture.

Location of the FSCC. The draft training circular on fire support coordination dated 1 Apr 53 in par 9a (2) states that the FSCC can be anywhere the force commander wants it. It may be desirable to locate it at the infantry CP but we think it can be worked out to better advantage at the FDC. This was the experience of the 187th Regiment Combat Team.


TACP at the FSCC. Since there are four TACPs with each regiment, where are you going to put the fourth? We said at the FSCC where he can put his communications and professional knowledge to the best use. Again, this worked well in combat.

We thank Colonel Mudgett for his excellent comments. Through such discussion these problems can be solved.

CAPT. PATRICK W. POWERS

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Fort Bliss, Tex.

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THE NEW CHIEF OF STAFF

He is a soldier who knows his trade and the ways of men who practice it



General and Mrs. Ridgway are greeted by Secretary Stevens

WHEN the late Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker was killed in a jeep accident in December 1950, the Eighth Army was approaching a crisis. Terribly hurt by the disasters that had piled in on it following the Chinese intervention, Eighth Army had become so beset by calamity, so tired in body and spirit, that its future was uncertain. What could move Eighth Army out of the state of despair into which it was drifting?

It is easy to see now that what was done and said was the right thing to do and say, but it wasn't easy to see it then. If Eighth Army was going to snap out of it, it would be because it was given an incentive that made sense out of the situation that existed at the moment. And so it is to General Matthew Bunker Ridgway's credit that he flew out from Washington, took a business-like look about, and gave it to Eighth Army straight from the shoulder: "The job is to kill Chinese," he said.

This made sense to Eighth Army. This was Old Pro talk; soldier talk. To Eighth Army the blunt, forthright words meant survival: kill enough hordes and we survive. Survival is something an army understands, for one of its axioms is security, which is but another way of saying an army must survive.

So Eighth Army was turned around and went about its grim business with such dispatch that experts have since said that it became the finest army the United States has ever fielded.

That the blunt words of General Ridgway became one of the imperishable lines of prose from the Korean Conflict is less important than the immediate effect they wrought. But it must be added that the words (and the photographs showing the General going about Korea with grenades strapped to his chest and an automatic on his hip) made the American people conscious that Eighth Army was an army created and held together by the pros, young and old, wearing from three stripes to four stars.

Words were only part of the cure. General Ridgway is remembered by thousands of men who saw him in the front lines, on the outposts, at the regimental, battalion, and even company headquarters—talking to the men, encouraging them, correcting faulty tactics, praising ingenuity and daring. He was in the depots, and in the ration dumps; he was at the construction jobs and in the gun pits—and the impact of his personal leadership was the tonic that started the Eighth Army on the way to what it became under the equally great leadership of General Van Fleet.

IT was natural for General Ridgway to appeal to Eighth Army in soldier words. For all six feet, 200 pounds, and fifty-eight years of him are professional. He was born into the Army at Fort Monroe, grew up an Army brat, and made his soldier-life official as soon as he could by entering West Point when he was seventeen.

None of this is unusual. For many sons of professional soldiers have lived out full and useful lives as professional



He huffed and puffed up the Kore hills—and Eighth Army respond to his inspiring presence

ldiers, content and proud and unanting any other life. Nor is General idgway the first Army brat to become hief of Staff. And this is not peculiar the military profession: all professions e familiar with sons who follow in the otsteps of their fathers and sometimes ess their own steps deeper and larger history as General Ridgway is doing. Chiefs of Staff are invariably men of eat professional competence. A few them have been little more than mpetent soldiers and a few of them ve been much more—big men whose mpetence was enlarged by knowledge d understanding that ranged far beond professionalism.

To speculate as to whether General dgway will emerge as one of the great iefs of Staff would be preposterous. eatness is relative and can be meased only against the backdrop of hisy yet to be undraped. But this much n be said. All the evidence suggests t General Ridgway has a great deal re than professional competence go for him. His record as a field solr—an early paratrooper and first comnder of a U.S. airborne division to gage in an airborne assault, and his perb command of Eighth Army—are highlights. He was also a highly mpetent staff officer at all levels; he t the Pentagon where he was Deputy ief of Staff for Operations and Adnistration to take over Eighth Army.

The record also shows that General dgway is as adept at subtle and complex diplomacy as he is at throwing grenades. Since 1927 he has mixed conventional command and staff duties with duty on special military-diplomatic missions in all parts of the world.

He was a member of the commission appointed in 1929 to reconcile the Bolivian-Paraguayan boundary dispute.

He was liaison officer to the Insular Government, Philippine Islands, 1932-33.

He was Senior U.S. Army representative, Military Staff Committee, United Nations, 1946-47. This committee wrote an eighty-page report on how an international military force could be organized for the use of the United Nations.

He was Chairman, Inter-American Defense Boards, 1946-48, and in 1950.

On his last two assignments, in Tokyo and Paris, he combined his talents for command and international counsel. As Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan, and as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe, General Ridgway worked closely with civilian and military representatives of allied governments and always in the larger interests of the United States and the world.

The report on the U.N. security force was hailed by one observer as "the first, albeit faltering, step towards an international police force." General Ridgway himself publicly stated at the time that while we could not then place our security in the hands of the United Nations, such "is our hope and objective for the future."

A few years later in the same vein but more affirmatively and in nobler language, he was to tell Eighth Army:

"The real issues are whether or not the power of western civilization, as God has permitted it to flower in our own beloved lands, shall defy and defeat Communism; whether the rule of men who shoot their prisoners, enslave their citizens, and deride the dignity of man shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual and his individual right are sacred; whether we are to survive with God's hand to guide and lead us, or to perish in the dead existence of a Godless world.

* * *

"These are the things for which we fight. Never have members of any military command had a greater challenge than we, or a finer opportunity to show ourselves and our people at their best and thus be an honor to the profession of arms, and a credit to those who bred us."

THE truce in Korea is new and uncertain as General Ridgway takes over as Chief of Staff of the Army. History is at the crossroads and whatever direction it may take, the next few years cannot be easier than the last few. As an Old Pro, General Ridgway will know how to draw sustenance from the roots of the Army and at the same time give it back greater strength through forceful and wise direction.

SALUTE TO THE FORMER CHIEF

A DETACHED look at the last four years will suggest that General J. Lawton Collins deserves the thanks of the nation, not for the condition of the Army as he left the chieftainship, but that there was an army to leave. Certainly some of the tasks imposed on the Army during the past few years would have destroyed it had they not been met capably and with heads-up vigor.

The Army's greatest progress under General Collins has been in weapons and equipment. The new family of tanks went into production because General Collins insisted on it. He backed the atomic gun. He gave his support to the guided-missile developers and saw the NIKE missile become a usable surface-to-air weapon. A new family of improved radios went into production, the helicopter became a most useful combat and logistical tool, and new trucks and personnel carriers came out of the testing grounds.



GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS

General Collins had less success in establishing firm and effective policies that would get the Army the manpower it needs quantitatively and qualitatively. Not that he didn't see the problem and not that he didn't try. The failure is the failure of the citizens of this nation—who, on the record, are unwilling to ask their sons to serve longer even though their chances to escape being maimed or killed in battle is proportionate to the amount of training they receive. This same attitude is largely responsible for the emergence of a seldom-heard thing: outspoken criticism of their lot by Regulars of all ranks.

In his new assignment as the representative of our Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Committee and Standing Group of NATO, the Army wishes General Collins its best, happy that his counsel will still be used.

"Tanks used to support infantry should be organic to the field army"

THE PROPER USE OF ARMOR

LIEUTENANT ROBERT S. HARPER

AS an armored soldier I have watched the Korean campaign test the present infantry division tank organization under combat conditions. My findings are that we are fortunate to have made the test against an army poorly equipped and trained for armored warfare. These conditions spared us losses that might have resulted from the misuse of small units of armor by commanders inexperienced in the use of tanks. Contrary to popular opinion, this situation is not correctable by the simple expedient of more armor training for all infantry commanders. Training will correct tactical deficiencies; however, the infantry division tank units are the victims of deficiencies that can be corrected only by reorganization.

So it is my firm belief that tanks used to support infantry should be organic to the field army, not to individual regiments. It is obvious that an infantryman cannot survive on ground where tanks can roam. In such areas the tank is and will remain the pivot of effective defense and the point of decisive offense.

Infantrymen and tankers will agree on the need of effective antitank protection. However, there is a serious, perhaps fatal, divergence of opinion about how this protection is to be provided. Infantrymen believe that most tankers will not fight. Consequently, they are convinced that any attempt to modify the present command relationship between the two forces is a flimsy excuse to avoid duty. Many infantry commanders believe that tanks will seldom be seen forward of the

(Continued on page 13)

LIEUTENANT ROBERT S. HARPER, Armor, has served two tours of duty in Korea with the 72d Tank Battalion. He is presently the commander of Company B, 325th Tank Battalion, Camp Irwin, California.

Caption on this official U. S. Army photograph, release on 21 March 1951: "Crewmen clamber to safety as an M-



'The infantry-artillery team is now the infantry-artillery-tank team"

TANKS *AND* INFANTRY

COLONEL EDWARD L. ROWNY

nk hits antitank mine. Infantrymen rush to the scene
, the tankmen make a break for it somewhere in Korea."



THE increased tempo of "shop talk" makes it clear that we soldiers need to do more thinking about how we use armor. There appears to be too much talk of tanks *versus* infantry and too little of tanks *and* infantry.

After analyzing World War II experience the European Board of General Officers concluded that proper tank support for infantry made it mandatory that tanks become an organic part of the infantry division. As a result the Army placed a tank company in each infantry regiment and a tank battalion in each infantry division. Since that time we have had ample experience in training in the United States and Europe and in combat in Korea to warrant a re-evaluation of that recommendation.

We are constrained to ask: What have training and combat experience taught us? Is the tank, in fact, essential to the infantryman's mission?

The overwhelming bulk of training and combat reports say that the desirability of having tanks work closely with infantry has been demonstrated. These reports imply, and in some instances state outright, that the tank has become a vital weapon. The former infantry-artillery team is now the infantry-artillery-tank team.

THERE are three critical phases in most attacks. The first is the breaching of the enemy's outposts. The second—and most important phase—is the assault on the enemy's holding force. The third is the consolidation of the newly-won position. The execution of this first phase

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almost always requires a special effort to break through the security echelon. Once this penetration has been accomplished the going is usually easier until the outskirts of the enemy's main defenses are reached. It is from this point on, during the critical advance across those last fifty yards, that attacks stall and fail.

Indirect supporting fires can advance the foot soldier, if he is well-trained, well-led, and "leans into his fires," to the very edge of the enemy's positions. But then these heavier fires must shift to deeper targets. The outcome of the battle from that moment on depends upon the violence and speed of the assault and upon the effectiveness of direct-fire weapons. It is significant that the tank is the only non-portable weapon which can accompany the infantry and participate in this final assault. The accuracy of the weapon, its mobility and armor protection allow the tank to assist the infantry in this, the most critical phase. Infantry and tanks, working together, are the most effective method yet found for killing or capturing a determined enemy force.

Once the enemy's position is overrun, the third phase occurs: that of staying on the position in the face of local counterattacks. Tanks form the centers of resistance of tank-infantry teams that are able to repel these attacks.

What about the defense? Here again, we find that infantry-artillery-tank combination is the most capable team for doing the job. The tank is well-armed, well-protected, and easily placed in position. As some have said, this is an expensive way to use tanks. But continued enemy pressure and the lack of time often make the tank the *only available* "bunker." Further, it is a redoubt which can be moved to become a defensive installation elsewhere. Then again, it is an ever-present weapon, capable of assisting the infantryman in a counterattack or in an attack to gain a more favorable defensive position.

We should not forget that the tank is still our best antitank weapon. At the present time the tank appears to be the only weapon which is consistently effective against enemy armor at ranges beyond 1000 yards. Until a more effective is proven, tanks must protect our infantryman from the attacks of enemy armor. The Russians, in their attack against the Germans in World War II, used tanks to assist their infantry. The North Koreans used what tanks the Russians gave them in the same way.

Readers of military history may form various opinions of the validity of use of tanks in mass. Few, however, will be able to deny that the Russians defeated the Germans time after time through their use of infantry-tank teams. To be sure, the West Germans have not allowed this lesson to go unheeded. Believing that they will have to bear the brunt of the first Russian blows, they are organizing "tank-accompanying" units.

WHAT is the proper place within the infantry division for these tanks which are to fight with the infantry: at regimental or at division level? What are the advantages of tanks organic to the infantry regiment? There are two. First, it makes the tanks immediately available to the front-line soldier at all times; and secondly, it permits and fosters an intimate relationship between the tanker and the infantryman. Even with the best intelligence, the speed of infantry-tank assaults by the enemy is such that by the time the tanks can arrive from central locations within the division to forestall an enemy attack, the chances are that our unit will have been overrun. Furthermore, the need for tanks for defense against enemy armor becomes even greater when atomic weapons are used tactically. This calls for dispersion of battalions, not individual soldiers. As a consequence, this increase in distance between units increases the time it will take to get tanks to a threatened area. And finally the continuity of action afforded elements integrated within the same fighting unit is a great advantage. The team can attack, then defend, and then attack again, each move proceeding quickly and efficiently from the former.

The second argument for keeping the tanks within the infantry regiment is that it builds an intimate relationship between the tanker and the infantryman. This is the more significant of the two arguments. Attacks succeed when there is *esprit de corps* and mutual confidence among the parts of the team.

It may be that most of the disappointments connected with World War II experience can be attributed to the inadequate—or improper—training of tankers with infantrymen or infantrymen with tankers. Be that as it may, several infantry-tank attacks within infantry divisions in Europe in 1944 and 1945 with which I am familiar ended in failure. In Korea, not a single combat action of the 38th Infantry during my tour with it failed to be enhanced by the action of its organic tank company. I mention this personal experience not as conclusive evidence but to show that some experience—although limited—lies behind these otherwise theoretical arguments.

SO much for the reasons for keeping the tanks within the regiment. But what if these regimental tanks were centralized in a second battalion at the division level? Does this type of organization offer any advantages? The answer is yes, certain advantages would accrue from such a move. Centralization would simplify the problems of technical training and would make maintenance more efficient. It would make it easier to mass tanks for operations where a heavier proportion of tanks is desired.

But while technical training would be simplified, the more important and more difficult type of training—tank-infantry training—would be made more complicated. So it comes to this: Is centralization of the regimental tank companies for technical training preferable to the decentralization necessary to accomplish the job of training the infantry and tanks to fight together? Is centralized maintenance so very much more efficient and economical? What is the cost of maintaining the tanks if they are kept within the regiment? Do we save so many men that we can justifiably ignore the better training and superior combat performance of our units?

A thorough study of these questions cannot be resolved beyond the admission that theoretically the maintenance at the battalion should be cheaper—and probably is. But the question becomes: is this too much to pay for the advantages which accrue? A conviction, shared by a great many regimental and division commanders in Korea, is that the extra cost of regimental tanks is a very reasonable price to pay for the benefits we get from them.

This opinion does not contradict the fact that keeping the tanks at division level offers the opportunity of having two or three companies of tanks available to work with infantry units that need them. But this alternative becomes prohibitive, if it means stripping the regiments of tanks. I realize that such an argument can be interpreted as being narrow and one which pleads the case of the regimental commander against the broader view of the division commander. The alert and aggressive division commander, it can be argued, with access to more intelligence, can see the "bigger picture" and can anticipate the situation. He can train the tanks with a regiment and place them with the units in time to be fully effective. Practically all arguments on organization can be pleaded in this manner, many of them leading to absurd conclusions. The point

o be resolved here is where in an infan-ry division is the tank most efficiently nd usefully employed. It is my convic-ion that this level is the regiment. Even vith the best training the tanks supplied o a regiment by division would not ght as effectively as those tanks which ne regimental commander commands. Also if a division commander were given vo battalions of tanks he would invari-bly attach one company to a regiment hus forming tank-infantry teams as a ormal, habitual rule. This he would o because it is in the companies that ne need for tanks exists.

The infantry-tank-artillery team is here to stay. I do not question the value of massed armor as used by armored divisions. But I do believe in our new three-unit team, too. I believe that tanks within an infantry division will be used most often—and in more important roles —as decentralized teams. I further believe that any teamwork short of full-time close association of tankers and infantrymen will cause the teams to come out second-best.

Finally I believe that if the number of tanks to be produced falls short of total requirements the infantry regiment should be the last unit to be denied the organic tanks it needs.

THE PROPER USE OF ARMOR

(Continued from page 10)

Division CP unless tank companies re-ain as organic elements of infantry giments. These sincere soldiers seem bsessed with the conviction that only rganic armor will obey orders. What uarantee, they ask, do we have that the nkers won't pull out at the first round? hey have none. Nor do we tankers ave any guarantee that the infantry will ot panic. Cowards don't read tables of rganization.

ET'S look at this more calmly. Military science isn't pure theory. Battle is the st tube of armies and the final arbiter tactics, training and organization. The esent divisional tank organization has iled its initial test in battle.

In October, 1950, a board of armor ficers from the 2d Infantry Division nvened to evaluate the combat lessons arned up to that time in Korea. One their first recommendations was to re-ganize the regimental tank company, rming a second tank battalion organic the infantry division. The reasons r this recommendation are not hard to nderstand. In most cases the tank com-any commander was the only officer in the regiment with any practical knowledge of tanks. Therefore, the standards of discipline and training were established by the individual tank company commanders with little competent supervision from regimental headquarters. In those rare instances where the companies were commanded by exceptionally well qualified officers, the tank companies were unusually good. However, we must admit that not all armor officers in those assignments were capable of maintaining acceptable standards without command supervision or technical assistance. In many cases, unfortunately, the regimental commanders relieved armor officers who commanded tank companies and replaced them with infantrymen, because they found that infantry officers with no preconceived ideas of the proper employment of armor were capable of a higher degree of cooperation in the misuse of tanks than were armor officers. Since neither the regimental commander nor the tank company commander understood the proper use of armor, it inevitably occurred that these companies were reduced to the status of infantry units, with tanks instead of M1s as their basic weapon. The full capabilities of the tanks were never realized.

The armor soldier assigned to a divisional tank unit finds that he has left behind the tanker's concept of the offensive in which the only safety lies forward, and has entered a world dominated by the caliber .30 bullet. It often seems that it is a world of baseless, abject fear until he witnesses the effect of a concentrated mortar barrage and observes that a caliber .30 round will penetrate a fatigue jacket. No infantry commander can ignore these brutal facts. For him the spectacle of an M32 dragging away a blackened, inanimate armored object does not hold the same emotional impact as the sight of a muddy litter jeep evacuating the broken bodies of beloved infantrymen. Regardless of the amount of armor training he gets, he will expend every force, including his tank company, to prevent the loss of Baker Company. He could not react otherwise and be an infantry commander.

WE cannot challenge this attitude. But we can plead that the indiscriminate misuse of armor, the decisive instrument of ground warfare, will insure tactical suicide on a future battlefield.

By today's T/O&E, the eighty-nine infantry divisions activated during World War II would require more than 12,000 tanks. The futility of such a force becomes apparent when we consider that none of these tanks can be used in units larger than battalions. Half of them will be reserved for separate companies that are committed at the discretion of individual infantry commanders.

In May 1940 the French Army committed its infantry divisions and their organic tank battalions against the advancing Germans. They were destroyed piecemeal. The German Panzers were numerically inferior to the combined strength of the French armored formations, but General Guderian concen-



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trated his armor into one powerful force. This organizational superiority was the key to victory in the West.

When the Russian tank armies began their offensives against the Germans, Hitler disbanded some of his Panzer divisions, distributing the tank companies to infantry units in an effort to capitalize on the beneficial morale effect of apparent local tank superiority. He discovered, as had the French, that small groups of tanks operating independently to exploit their psychological effect on friendly infantry were no match for enemy tanks employed in mass.

It is dangerous to ignore these lessons.

I DON'T propose that armor cast off its traditional responsibility of protecting infantry units, crank up all its tanks and go smoking over the far horizon in hot pursuit of some mythical enemy. But I do say that infantry commanders must realize that our responsibilities for protecting their units can often be accomplished better by massing all tanks organic to the infantry division and engaging the enemy in his assembly areas before he can bring fire on our infantry.

The tank requirements of an infantry unit do not remain constant, but vary according to the type of terrain in which that unit is operating. But under the present organization we can provide effective support in terrain where attack by enemy armor is unlikely. However, as the regiment moves forward into open terrain, our ability to repel tank attack decreases as the chance of receiving such an attack increases. The infantry regiment may have a frontage of as little as 2400 yards when occupying broken, heavily wooded terrain. However, when occupying battle positions in flat, open terrain favorable for enemy armored assault, the regiment may be assigned a frontage of 10,000 yards. A tank company is incapable of providing antitank protection to an infantry regiment along such a frontage.

The limited tank strength available to defend a regimental sector doesn't allow armor to attack. Instead we surrender the initiative to the enemy and let him choose the time, place and strength of the assault. In tank warfare this is sometimes embarrassing to a defending force and usually fatal.

We will not always be fighting swarms of enemy tanks, nor will our actions be limited to platoon size raids. Our objective must be to organize the separate armor units organic to the infantry division so that they can be used as one powerful, cohesive force and still be flexible enough to detach small units that can support infantry and conduct minor antitank missions.

This is not a radical departure in military organizations. Infantry squads become infantry divisions which in turn are organized into field armies. Tanks operating in support of infantry elements must be capable of combining in the same manner. The tanks in the infantry division should be organized in a tank regiment. At corps the tank regiments can combine to form a tank brigade which in turn would be part of a tank division at Army.

THE composition of the tank force organic to the field army should follow these general principles. The tank regiment would become the basic tactical unit to provide antitank protection for an infantry division. It would become the headquarters in which the technical, administrative and tactical matters were coordinated for the three battalions serving in direct support of the infantry regiments. It is at the infantry division level that competent armor advice is most desperately needed. During the planning phase of an action while the operational details are still under consideration, a tank regimental commander would be in a position to recommend the best way to use the available tanks. At corps the tank brigade headquarters would be a tactical group charged with the antitank defense of the corps sector. The tank brigade commander would have the three tank regiments under his direct command. It is at this echelon of command that the advantages of such an organization become apparent. A corps commander would have at his disposal three regiments of tanks which could be committed as one force under the command of his tank brigade commander. There are many situations in which such a force could be usefully employed. For instance in the case of a dangerous enemy armored threat along the boundary of two divisions, it is likely that the two tank regiments serving in direct support of these units would be committed to meet the attack. It is conceivable that should one of the three infantry divisions be in reserve at such a time the tank regiment normally used to support this unit would also be committed to reinforce the strength of the front-line tank regiments. This is the type operation that is now precluded by the present organization.

At Army a major general, serving as tank division commander, would be responsible for the antitank protection of the Army front.

It is not likely that all tanks organic to a field army would be committed a one force. The point is that they coul be if it became necessary. The tank di vision headquarters would serve princi pally in a planning, administrative an supervisory capacity. In times of peac such an organization would provide method of training armor officers in th command of large tank formations.

WHERE does all this leave the embat tled infantry commander? Must h be content with sending frantic request through channels for the support of tank platoon while his outposts are bein driven in? Then, if by chance, a tan platoon should arrive, must he engag a sullen, defiant armor commander i tactical debate while his regiment being eaten up by enemy tanks? Th is the frightening specter that haun the infantry commander. He feels that tank company at hand, regardless of ho ill trained or clumsily employed, is be ter than three tank regiments at corps.

But I believe the infantry regiment commander would profit most by th proposed reorganization. Ordinarily, h will have a tank battalion in direct su port of his regiment. He will be assure of competent advice and effective su port. The problems of training, emplo ment, and supply of organic tanks wou be eliminated. This additional equi ment would also permit limited objecti attacks by mounted infantry.

The number of tanks available f the close support of the infantry re ment would be increased. The tank would be more proficient because would get concentrated training und highly specialized armor instructors. addition to more effective close suppo of the infantry, he would be organiz and trained to wage mobile tank wa fare. To restrict tanks to a defensive ro against a mobile, aggressive enemy tragic. Our infantry troops as well our tanks would surely be destroyed.

A new period of tank-infantry operation would result, with a true spi of cooperation based on mutual respe and confidence; not, as at present, the enforced subordination of armor.

Would the infantryman have no course but to accept the decisions of supporting armor commander on qu tions of tank employment? He wou always have the normal chann through which to challenge the tanke

Like the infantry, armor decorates commander if he is brave. If he is competent we relieve him. If he is cc ardly we court-martial him.

Armor will not betray its trust. will fight because we, too, are soldier




Infantrymen move out of fortified positions and back to new positions that must be fortified and manned for no one knows how long.

tripped to his unzippered armored
est a combat man totes a box of
ammunition rearward.



Three years and thirty-two days of war,
Two years and seventeen days of talk, then

TRUCE COMES IN KOREA



The white area between the two black lines is the two and one-half-mile wide demilitarized zone behind which opposing armies withdrew under terms of the armistice agreement. The demarcation line, in the center of the demilitarized zone, was based on battle positions when the truce agreement was reached.

WHEN JOSEPH "GOT IT" FROM THE NEW KING

LIEUTENANT COLONEL E. N. KIRSTEN

The pattern of military management goes clear back to the Book of Exodus

I AM fond of the Book of Exodus. For one thing it contains the moment in history that I am most sorry to have missed. I would give much to have seen the expression on Pharaoh's face when his daughter presented him with the baby Moses and said "Believe it or not, Daddy, I found him in the bulrushes."

Mostly though, I like the book of Exodus because one short verse in it is the complete story of one of the more unpleasant, but all-too-frequent episodes in the life of a military man. "Now, there arose a new king over Egypt, who knew not Joseph."

Leadership is fine and essential and the Army very properly spends a great deal of time and effort in teaching young officers the principles and patterns of leadership. Sooner or later, however, the officer is confronted with the situation where military leadership merges into military management; where "Follow me, men" or "Any questions? Move out" are no longer appropriate. Unfortunately, there is little specific advice on how to be a military manager and so many an officer who was a good leader of men has to learn some new techniques the hard way.

Military management is the management of activities of the Army which do not deal directly with combat. Or stated in reverse, it is management by the Army of activities which, though part of the military establishment, have civilian counterparts. Thus military management differs from straight high-echelon military command on the one hand, and normal executive management as it is found in business and industry on the other.

Being neither completely military nor completely civilian, military management is usually encountered in the area of overlap between these two spheres of activity. It is found in the technical services, for example, in the manufacturing arsenals, laboratories, and the procurement offices, even in their field operations. It is found in higher echelon G4 sections, where the exploitation of the resources of either the zone of interior, the communication zone, or even army rear, requires military supervision of civilian activities. It is found in most aspects of military government.

Management of the activity is not an end in itself. It is an adjunct to a strictly military operation some place else. The manager is not a sun, but a satellite. This means that the aims, methods, and values of management must be interpreted in terms of the military mission assigned instead of the normal commercial terms of profit and loss.

WHAT are some of these patterns of military management? Let us go back to Exodus, eighth verse of the first chapter: "Now there arose a new king over Egypt, who knew not Joseph."

Just picture the situation. Egypt had just been through seven years of famine, precisely as Joseph had predicted. By careful management Joseph's organization had managed to weather the storm and though the fields were stripped, the herds gone, and the population reduced almost to slavery, Joe considered himself a successful man. He had anticipated the problem, worked out the solution, made himself top dog. And now had quite a local reputation as a supply man. He probably had considerable plans for reconstruction of the country, too.

In stamps the new CO. I don't know where he had been during the famine, but apparently not in Egypt. He takes one look at the stripped fields, the decimated herds and the ragged people, and screams, "Who in the hell is G4 of this outfit?" Everybody points to Joe. Joe snaps to attention, ready to give his class-A spiel and take the new CO on the five-dollar tour. The new CO has one comment.

"You've had it! Scram!"

Can't you just hear Joe trying to bleat, "But sir . . . !"

"Scram!"

"May I make a statement?"

"No! Any man who would let a country get into this condition . . ."

Actually this didn't happen. Joseph was dead when the new king "rose up." However, that doesn't affect the moral and from it we can deduce our first rule of management. In an unsatisfactory situation, don't blame the personnel until you are sure of the circumstances. The Navy has a saying, which, now that we are integrated, I presume it is permissible to use. "The new Officer of the Deck shall not change sail for one bell." In other words, as the new Officer of the Deck takes over his watch he is supposed to assume that the previous Officer of the Deck had good reason for having set any particular sail and the new one must wait one bell, or half an hour, to be sure that he understands the circumstances sufficiently before he changes the instructions of the previous Officer of the Deck.

There is no wiser rule in management. Often a CO, being dissatisfied with a given situation, will fire officer A and install officer B in charge of the operation. In doing so, however, he gives officer B instructions, additional means and sufficient power and authority to get the job done. Officer A could have done it too had he been so supported. You are in far less danger of having the operation go completely to pot with someone familiar with the problem than risking the dangerous enthusiasm of a newcomer who comes to the job aware that the operation has been unsatisfactory and therefore has a tendency to make changes entirely for the sake of making changes without adequate knowledge or evaluation. Be sure that it is the people who are unsatisfactory before you make a sweeping change.

IN taking over an existing organization it is quite normal to take over an old fight. When you do, the important thing to remember is that loyalty to your new organization must start at full torque. You walk into your new office and in comes the CO of the organization who has been feuding with your predecessor.

You are forced to sit down and listen to a series of complaints concerning operations about which you know nothing

LIEUTENANT COLONEL E. N. KIRSTEN, Ordnance Corps, is now on duty at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, after a tour at The AA&GM School, Fort Bliss, Texas. He is a graduate of the Military Academy, Class of 1937, and was first commissioned in Field Artillery. He transferred to Ordnance Corps in 1947.

n which errors whose significance is nknown to you have been made by a ot of stupid people—all of them yours. The first thing you do is call in your ubordinates for assistance. Right here s the crucial point. Make it clear to the ther commander in the presence of our people that you think maybe there s some foundation to his argument but hat you are sure you have not yet eard the whole story; that you feel you ave a number of perfectly competent eople working for you; that if there is nything wrong you will find it out but , as you suspect, the situation turns ut that his organization is as much at ault as your new organization, he will et cooperation but not surrender. The ne of opposition must be drawn beween you and the opposing organization, ot between you and your subordinates. Don't sell your own organization short, nd don't promise your shirt to the pposition until you are sure he is entled to it.

It may happen, however, that your ssignment in military management calls or you to create a new organization, ood old point number one of the "estiate of the situation" is still the starting oint: "What is my mission?" Obviously ou can't organize to meet a problem if ou don't know what the problem is. Having determined your mission and rganized to meet it, the next most imortant action is the delegation of auhority. There are a couple of appropriate erses in the eighteenth chapter of Exdus:

"And Moses chose able men out of l Israel, and made heads over people, lers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, lers of fifties, and rulers of tens.

"And they judged the people at all asons: The hard causes they brought nto Moses, but every small matter they dged themselves."

In delegating authority, be sure you o so completely and honestly. Don't sign a subordinate section a mission, en establish in your own office a secon of approximately the same size to upervise" the operation of the subdinate section. In other words, delete authority, don't merely establish ditional supervisory layers.

There is one characteristic of establshments under military management, owever, which merits a word of caution out delegation of authority. Such esblishments are chronically overloaded ith work and sooner or later, the addion of one more project on the top eans that something has to drop off e bottom. The responsibility which you have no right to delegate is that of determining which project shall be dropped. The natural tendency, because it is the easiest for a commander, is to just keep piling on the projects and then use "delegation of authority" as an excuse for making the subordinate choose —and hold the bag for—the activities he will pursue or suspend. The military tradition that you don't tell a subordinate "how" to do a job is very fine—and especially convenient when the job is impossible. But if your subordinate is asking you what you want done, that comes under definition of the objective and is your business. It is both odd and distressing, but no matter how crisply you issue the command, nor how promptly you relieve the subordinate, a one-quart pail won't hold three pints and a sixty-cycle induction motor won't even try to run faster than its rated speed.

IN delegating authority, an administrative pattern sometimes develops which will call for considerable tact on your part. It happens when you have a strong, aggressive commander in charge of a minor operation reporting to a major operation. It might be when you are chief of staff dealing with a theater commander or when you are a company commander dealing with a leader of a detached platoon. It comes up this way. The subordinate commander can spend all his time on two or three projects and wants you to spend all your time on those same two or three projects, without realizing that those two or three projects which are important to him are only a small part of your operation. It



is very right and proper of the subordinate commander to take his problem seriously. It is very wrong and improper for you to permit him to monopolize your time, which should be spent on your entire job.


The secret is to avoid personal correspondence on official matters with the subordinate commander. The best way of indicating your interest in his problems is adequate instructions and prompt and effective official action on his official requests. If you let the situation develop in personal letters between you and the commander you will soon find yourself spending more time on his problems than your job will permit, but with no way of getting out of that situation without antagonizing the other commander.

If personal correspondence is to be limited, technical correspondence is to be encouraged, in order to keep the command channel from becoming cluttered up. The crucial point here revolves around what appears to be a minor problem, the simple administrative matter of routing the action papers in a headquarters. The ideal in any headquarters is to have a single person of sufficient background, seniority and authority to know the full problem, see, route, and follow up all action correspondence. As soon as the command channel is so cluttered up with technical "information" correspondence that it becomes necessary to reduce the routing to a mere clerical operation or to establish several echelons of routing, your administration begins to suffer. Obviously there must be continuous screening of important from unimportant papers in the various echelons of the headquarters up to the few policy papers which are seen by the commander himself. However, if you can start that screening process by separating the command papers from the technical papers before they even get into your headquarters, a considerable step has already been taken.

General J. L. Holman, under whom I served several instructive years in the Pacific during World War II, used to say there are three ways a man can get crossed up. First is by the enemy. This is bad but sometimes excusable since the enemy is spending all his time and efforts trying to do just that and he is bound to be successful occasionally. Another way is by your own troops. This is inexcusable and is direct and conclusive evidence of your unfitness for command. The third way is by the Old Man and there is nothing you can do about it. This appears to be an exclusively military statement of the situation, but if you will substitute the ideas of "problem" or "situation" for "enemy," and "subordinate activities" or "people" for "troops" where appropriate it will apply to military management.

You have noted that I chose to write about how to manage. I would hate to have to discuss the theory of being managed. For example, I don't know just what Joe should have said or what attitude he could have assumed that would have helped when the new king came screaming for the G4. But that is another story.

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AND THE

And they shall march every one on his ways, and they shall not break ranks. — *Joel 2:7*

BRIGADIER GENERAL EDWIN H. RANDLE

THE command-car moved cautiously through the traffic of lumbering carts, jaywalking Arabs, and girls on bicycles with attractive lengths of leg showing. There must have been some men and boys on bicycles, too, but the Colonel and his driver and orderly saw only the girls. They had not seen any for two months. And all the girls riding bicycles in Casablanca that day seemed very pretty, indeed.

"Hancock," the Colonel said, "keep your eyes on all the traffic. The Arabs, too."

Hancock made no reply but drove the awkward vehicle a little more carefully than usual. He was a Florida country boy and no conversationalist. But he could find his way over strange roads in blackouts without the Colonel having to watch every turn.

"The French are very proud of this town," the Colonel said. "They developed it from a little Arab village."

"It's sure different from Newark," Cull said.

Hancock stopped to ask directions of an American soldier and the command-car moved on again.

"Colonel, sir," Cull said, "we took Safi three weeks ago. How long are we going to stay there?"

"That's what I've come up here to find out. Since November 8th, when the 47th Combat Team landed in the dark and captured Safi, I've heard from General Patton exactly three times. But he has been pretty busy. It's a sort of a compliment, too, not bothering about us."

"We did pretty good, didn't we, Colonel?" Cull, like the whole Combat Team, was intensely proud of his outfit.

"Better than pretty good. And don't let anyone ever tell you we had no opposition, either. Our fifteen dead and fifty wounded weren't casualties because we fired on ourselves."

Busting illusions, the Colonel thought, is not my trade. To these boys the Safi operation was the biggest adventure in their lives. But very little of it will ever get written up in the history books. It was a side show. And the Combat Team and the Navy operated so smoothly, it looked easy in the reports. Guess I should have messed it up a little to make it look desperate.

Just then Hancock pulled up in front of the Shell Oil Building, General Patton's headquarters. The Colonel got out and stretched. He went up in the elevator and found the G3, who said, after the usual preliminaries, "Your division will concentrate at Port Lyautey, about eighty-five miles north of here. You are to move your Combat Team—less one battalion—by rail. Figure how many trains you need and let me know."

"You haven't enough locomotives to haul my outfit, without slowing supply hauling." The Colonel paused to let that sink in. "Let me march it. Division Headquarters and a lot of odds and ends have to come over from the States. It will be wonderful training in march techniques."

The G3 had to put it up to the General. In a few minutes he returned with a grin. "The General says you can march. You can start when you are ready, and take any route you want. Just let us know where you are every day."

After a little haggling over 2½-ton trucks and ambulances, the Colonel hurried down the stairs, not waiting for the elevator, jumped into the back seat of the command-car and said, "Let's roll."

Hancock drove back through the city with more assurance. Cull, beside him, was quiet, too, enjoying the sights and thinking of Newark and girls, all at the same time.

STRANGE, the Colonel thought, nobody questions the time-tested two-and-one-half miles an hour marching rate for infantry until a war comes along. Then some cavalry or field artillery joker gets command of an infantry division and wants to improve on Nature. The idea, someone should explain, is to get the troops to their destination in shape to fight when they get there.

"Cull, did you bring along anything to eat?" the Colonel asked.

"Yes sir. I put some K-rations in the back."

"Well, let's pull up in the shade of that eucalyptus tree and eat."

The K-rations with their tasteless biscuits and potted meat stopped that gnawing in the stomach, but contributed no pleasure in doing it.

I've been a doughboy, the Colonel thought, for about twenty-six years—a captain for sixteen of them—and marched all over France to get to fight in World War I, and then all over Texas and Arizona for years. Not riding horses, either. Always a footslogger commanding rifle companies. A man can swing along mile after mile at 88 yards, or 106 thirty-inch steps a minute, provided he gets his full rest periods. He'll end up tired, of course, but in good shape and able to fight if he must. But step the rate up to three miles an hour, or more, and his endurance comes down disproportionately fast. He thought of the general who, on a twenty-mile hike, ordered the infantry to march three-and-one-half miles an hour under a blazing sun. From the second halt on, men were dropping out right and left. The small percentage that reached the bivouac in formation were completely exhausted.

"If one of my battalion commanders

BRIGADIER GENERAL EDWIN H. RANDLE, retired, commanded the 47th Infantry Combat Team in North Africa, and later served in the Pacific theater. This is his second appearance in these columns in recent months, the earlier one being a penetrating analysis of the need for more training of small units as teams.

MARCHED, EVERY ONÉ

n a march like that I'd reclassify him st as sure as hell," the Colonel mut-red.

"Sir?" said Cull.

"Nothing, Cull. Were you on that arch the regiment made when Ser-ant Ellis and his pioneer section built log footbridge over the creek?"

"You mean, sir, the one where we arched fifteen miles, rested in the pine oods for three hours, and came on in two downs?"

"Yes. How did you feel when you t in?"

"Well, sir, there's no use kidding any-dy. I was tired, but I wasn't all in. ith a little rest I could have done an-ner two downs, if I'd had to."

I ran that march, the Colonel thought, exactly as prescribed in the march graph in the Staff Officers' Notebook for a twenty-mile march. And the regiment got in without a single man falling out. A lot of officers haven't learned yet what has been in FSR for years: a forced march is not going faster, but marching longer hours. The young male machine has a good motor, but also has its limitations. You can overheat it and you can burn out the bearings. And by stupidly conducting marches you can breed an intense hatred for marching, and for the infantry which does it.

When they reached the gates of the command post it was dark. Two helmeted sentinels presented arms as the Colonel stepped down. Their heels and gun slings popped. The CP was in the El Marhaba Hotel. It was beautifully situated in a walled garden on a hillside overlooking the tow of Safi, and the ocean. The Colonel passed through the wide doors and entered the circular Moorish lobby with its pillars and arches decorated with intricate designs in green and red and gold. He was met by his executive.

"Hello, Rumbaugh. As soon as I grab a bite I want to see Fred and Herman. And tomorrow at nine I want a meeting here of all the staff, battalion and special and attached unit commanders." The Colonel went down the steps to the dining room.




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AT 0900 the next day the officers assembled in the little theater just off the lobby. As the Colonel came down the aisle all stood at attention. He was intensely proud of his Combat Team. He had joined the regiment as a battalion commander in 1940 and had had a major hand in developing these youngsters.

"Rest. Be seated." He thought of his first Colonel. An apoplectic old bastard who deeply resented being officered with "ninety-day wonders." The only advice he ever gave was, "You're confined to camp for three months," and "Did you ever hear of Army Regulations? Well, God damn it, go look it up." The only people we could approach for advice were the old noncoms who had been made lieutenants and captains. Not a one ever turned us down or hazed us.

"Gentlemen," the Colonel said, "our Combat Team—less the 2d Battalion—moves day after tomorrow, December 1st, by marching, to Port Lyautey where our division will concentrate." He paused. The only sounds were pencils writing and notebook leaves turning.

"The march order will be out this afternoon. Tomorrow morning, after you have studied the order, we will again assemble here. Save your questions until then. It is about 220 miles to Port Lyautey. We will make it in easy marches, about fifteen miles a day. Sundays we will rest. The rate of march will be the standard two-and-one-half miles an hour for foot troops and 25 for transportation.



Two-and-a-half miles an hour is 88 yards a minute, or 106 thirty-inch steps a minute.

"As you know, we landed here with a minimum of transportation. Western Task Force can give us only seventeen 2½-ton trucks with trailers, for kitchens and blanket-rolls. That means the artillery, which was equipped for this operation with pack howitzers towed by half-ton trucks, will have to march on foot, as will the engineers and others. They will make it and take pride in it. Of that I am sure.

"Units will be rotated each day. Thus, every unit, regardless of branch, will get its turn leading its battalion, and the Combat Team. The road is blacktop but there are good dirt footpaths, made by the Arabs and their donkeys, on both sides of it. The formation will be column of twos with a file on the path on either side of the road. Keep the pavement clear for traffic.

"There will be a distance of 100 yards between battalions, 50 yards between companies, and 25 between platoons. Battalion commanders will, on the exact second, signal the hourly halts. Files will fall out on their respective sides of the road and stay there. That includes officers. Fall out marching and fall in marching. Troops must have every second of their rest periods for rest.

"There will be no more than seven men, besides the driver, on kitchen trucks: the mess sergeant, four cooks and two KPs." The Colonel looked up from his notes. "Major Roberts, where will you place your ambulances?"


"Colonel, sir, I don't have any ambulances, except jeeps."

The Colonel grinned. "I saw six new ambulances swung over the side of a ship a couple of days ago. Liberate them."

"Yes, sir. Well, in that case I will put one ambulance in the rear of each battalion and keep the rest with me at the tail of the column."

"No. That creates too great a temp





tion. Keep them all with you and have
iem move by bounds."
"Lieutenant Sawyer."
"Yes, sir."
"You and Lieutenant Speer, and two
rgeants you will select, will be the
rovost Guard. Do you know the duties
a Provost Guard?"
"Well, only vaguely, sir."
"The Provost Guard marches just be-
ind the last unit in the column. If you
e a man who has fallen out, ignore
im."
"Ignore him, sir? I thought . . . "
"Yes, ignore him. The Surgeon will
e right behind you. He will examine
ie soldier and decide whether he should
de or continue marching. If the latter,
e will turn the man over to you. He
ill march with you the rest of the day.
"Now should the Surgeon find the
an is sick, or for some other reason
ould not march, he will put him in
ne of his ambulances. Is that clear,
Iajor?"
The Major nodded that it was.
"Each platoon," the Colonel continued,
vill select a pace-setter. They should
e men of average height who naturally
ke a thirty-inch step. Get them watches
ith second hands. The pace-setter will
arch in front of his unit, and alone.
a man marches alongside another he
ill engage in conversation and forget
bout the pace. Too, the natural incli-
ation of men marching abreast is to
nform to each other's length of step
id cadence. But caution them that
hen tired, or going uphill, a man tends
shorten his step as well as slow it
own. When going downhill the reverse
true. By continually checking his 106
eps with the second hand of his watch
or 53 in half a minute—the cadence
in be maintained. But unless the pace-
tter is alert, during the last part of the
march his step is likely to be only twenty-five inches instead of thirty. Then you get the accordion action which is so exasperating; men bumping into those in front. The pace must be a uniform 106 thirty-inch steps to the minute uphill, downhill, and on the level.

"As for marching in step, that is optional with company commanders. Some think it makes marching easier. If the men think so then it very likely does. Try it and see. Now none of these ideas is new. Soldiers have been marching over the world for a great many centuries. That is all for now." The Colonel grinned and the serious expressions relaxed a little as the officers stood at attention.

Walking up the aisle, he thought, they call me *The Bear*. I guess I do growl a good deal, but I love them all. Even so, *The Bear* is a little more dignified than the nickname my Negro soldiers of A Company, 25th Infantry, gave me years ago. He smiled as he thought of it. *Aggravatin' Papa*. I loved them, too.



AFTER breakfast the next morning the Colonel sat at his desk under one of the arches in the lobby, and made notes. Shortly before nine the officers entered the little theater, and exactly on the hour he followed and took his place at the foot of the center aisle facing them. Large lithographs of Marshal Petain flanked the movie screen behind him. The Nazis, he thought, would have pulled them down and substituted Hitler. I wasn't issued pictures of FDR.

"Gentlemen, the march order lists the items of uniform to be worn. Among them are steel helmets and leggins. The light pack is prescribed. Raincoats are always part of the light pack. Two things look particularly sloppy: raincoats draped over the cartridge belt and dragging at a man's heels; and part of a unit wearing them and others not. Battalion commanders will decide when raincoats are to be worn, and removed. They will be worn by all, including officers, and likewise removed by all and placed in the pack or musette bag.

"Every officer and man will shave every day. You may think this a little overly nice. It is not. If we are a thousand miles from civilization, I will see you and you will see each other. We are going to look like the smart outfit of first-class troops we are. When a soldier begins to look like a bum, he begins to feel like one. And then it isn't very long until he begins to act like a bum. Your men will growl at some of these things, but watch when they see other troops. They will sneer at them for not doing the things they themselves growled about. That is soldier nature.

"Captain Schmidt."

"Yes, sir."

"Among your many duties as S1 is billeting officer. This afternoon take a guide from each battalion and separate unit and select tomorrow's bivouac. There is plenty of space. I want large areas. Each platoon is to have an acre of ground and its own straddle trench. Each day, Captain, you and your guides will leave the bivouac first. Go to the

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next one and guide in the transportation and foot troops when they arrive. Then, each afternoon, you with your guides will select the bivouac for the next day.

"The march order states there will be 100 yards distance between all vehicles on the road. They must never be bunched, not even when entering or leaving bivouac areas. Especially not then. Move them off the road and into the areas without stopping, losing distance or jumping the road. It can be done. Flow them in at as many points as possible. Transportation is divided into march units and sections. That will facilitate control.

"In bivouac no vehicle must be parked closer to any other than 50 yards. When parked, all must be headed out, that is, toward the highway. Then, should you have to get them out in a hurry they will not have to be turned around. When leaving the bivouac each morning the exits must not be jammed. Every driver must know his place in the column—the vehicle he is to follow—and not move until that vehicle has gained the required distance. To do this and not stretch out the column on the road, the lead vehicle of each march-unit will keep to 15 miles an hour until all its vehicles are clear of the bivouac. It will then gradually increase speed to 25 miles an hour.

"You have noted that the foot column moves out first each day. The transportation column is timed to pass the foot troops during the first rest period. There are other ways the two could be coordinated but this, I think, will be most advantageous for all of us. The IP and the times the columns reach it will be announced each afternoon by the S3.

"Colonel Rumbaugh, each day when the transportation has cleared, you and the Surgeon will make a sanitary inspection and later report to me the police of areas, latrines, and sumps. That completed, Colonel Rumbaugh will move to the new bivouac and organize it. The Surgeon will take his post at the tail of the foot column.

"Captain Murphy. We will base on Safi until halfway to Casablanca, and thereafter on that city. Maintain march discipline and 100 yards between vehicles in your supply convoy.

"Now, let's have the questions." There were surprisingly few and the meeting was soon ended.

EARLY the next morning, December 1 1942, the Colonel's command-car approached the IP a few minutes before the head of the first unit reached it. The weather was clear and cool. The sun promised increased warmth later. Gathered there was a little group come to say *au revoir*. When he had shaken hands all around, the Colonel said: "I'm changing to the jeep, Cull. Remain and check the timing at the IP. When the transportation has cleared, go to the new bivouac and help Rumbaugh."

The Colonel, with his jeep driver, pulled ahead to the top of the cliffs. A little beyond they turned off on the side of the road and waited. As the foot column neared he dismounted and stood just off the road. He watched the entire column pass. The climb up the winding road was strenuous, but the pace was good and spirits were high. A change always boosts morale, he thought.

Day after day during the entire march the Colonel followed the same routine: precede the troops half a mile, pull off to the side and, as the column approached, dismount and stand until its tail had passed. Then his jeep would move between the files to a new post and again he would review the column. It was not that they needed constant supervision. He had a deep-rooted feeling that his place was with the troops all the time.

Sometimes it was amusing. As men caught sight of him they would straighten up a little, cover-off better, or in a jump quickly regain a few inches distance they had somehow lost. Some would pretend not to see him and go marching past with head and eyes to the front. Some, engaged in soldier talk, did not see him. A few would turn their heads and grin. One, he found himself watching for. He was short. Thirty inches was long for him but he had learned to roll his hips with each step to keep up. His helmet was too big and always over on his left ear. Each time he passed he looked up with an infectious grin. He was not trying to attract attention or bootlick. He was just a likable kid being natural.

The Colonel was the last one in, each day. When the Provost Guard and the Surgeon had cleared, Cull was there to guide him to his tent. His steel helmet came off first. But as long as he made the men wear helmets, he wore his. The first day when Rumbaugh came up he said, "I don't like the kitchens."

The kitchen crews had taken the easy

way and had prepared dinner on the trucks.

"Hereafter have the field ranges unloaded, kitchen flies pitched, kitchen trucks lined up alongside, supplies stacked uniformly, and company and battery guidons displayed. You decide the arrangement, but make it uniform. The men are hungry, and when at last they near the bivouac they want to see well organized kitchens that look capable of turning out a good meal. Also, units are too bunched. We must get them used to spreading out, in bivouac as well as in combat."

THE third morning the Colonel waited to watch the tank company and the transportation move out. They did it very well. But he saw one kitchen truck with too many men on it. "Those of you who are not cooks or KPs, dismount and line up." Nine men slid to the ground with the appearance of patient suffering.

"Why were you on the truck?" he asked the first.

"Sir, I've got a terribly sore foot. I can't make it today."

"And you?"

"Colonel, sir, I had cramps all night. I'm too weak to march."

Each had an excellent reason for waiting and climbing on the kitchen truck at the last minute. The Surgeon joined the group. He had the faculty for showing up when he was wanted.

"Major Roberts, these men say they can't march today. If they are not in condition to march they ride in your ambulances, not kitchen trucks."

That afternoon at dinner the Colonel asked, "Roberts, how are those nine men from K Company?"

"Colonel, sir, they are all right. They made the march."

"All of them?"

"Yes, sir, every one. There wasn't a thing the matter with any of them."

After the first few days word got around that between the Surgeon and the Provost Guard it was useless to try to put something over. A man might as well march with his own company. Thereafter when the Colonel saw a man beside the road, which was very rare, he felt confident that the soldier really needed attention.

It became a pleasure to watch the transportation column move into a bivouac area. There was no jamming on the road as guides met their sections and march-units and got them off the highway, headed out and parked. Everyone knew his job and proceeded to do it. It was like a circus coming to town. Things got done well, and quickly, and quietly.

It was on Friday that the Combat Team bivouacked on the outskirts of Casablanca. It stayed over and paraded in the city with French troops Sunday afternoon; troops, transportation, guns, tanks and all. Before daylight Monday morning it started on the last eighty-five miles of its march. At the second down a messenger handed the Colonel a letter from General Keyes. It was a commendation for the Combat Team for its appearance and marching in the parade, and for the conduct of its officers and men during the three days they had been given passes to the city.

On December 19 the troops marched through Port Lyautey to a bivouac area in a cork forest a few miles north. Discipline and morale had been superior. The field artillery, engineers and other attached units had taken their turns leading the infantry. They would have much preferred to ride, of course, but they marched, every one. And they did not feel sorry for themselves. Quite the reverse. The entire Combat Team was very cocky and looked down on all other troops as sloppy, undisciplined panty-waists. "Gangplank soldiers," they called them.

Envoi

IN February, 1943, the 47th Combat Team, by a combination of marching and shuttling, covered the 175 miles between Oran and Arba south of Algiers. It made 30 miles a day. From Arba to Tunisia it moved by motor about 775 miles and participated in the actions at El Guettar and the Sedjenane Valley. As the African campaign closed it captured Bizerte. Three days later it left by motor for Mascara, Algeria; covering the 950 miles in five days.

The Colonel will always wonder what became of the lad with the outsize helmet, the rolling gait, and the likable grin. He never saw him again.



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LESSON FROM KOREA

COUNTERING COMMUNIST ARTILLERY

MAJOR MARK M. BOATNER III



Early World War II version of a Soviet mortar. The Reds are firm believers in mortars and have many of much larger caliber than this 82mm job.

MANY of the things we "learned" in Korea have been known since the beginning of warfare: that you shouldn't expose yourself on the skyline, that you should always have all-around security, that the junior officers and noncoms need more training, and so on endlessly until the non-thinkers tell you that there is really nothing to be learned from Korea because it was not a "real war."

But there is something very significant we have encountered in Korea. It's the Soviet concept of artillery employment as practiced by their disciples, the Chinese and the North Koreans.

How does Soviet artillery ("artillery" in the sense we will discuss it here includes mortars, tanks and rockets) doctrine differ from our own? The basic and most significant difference is that the Russians, and hence, those of their Red satellites we fought in Korea, do not consider artillery to be a supporting arm exclusively. They maintain that their artillery can be massed in sufficient quantity to give it the capability of capturing and holding ground!

This is entirely foreign to our own ideas. But the Russians evidently feel that their World War II experiences bear out the correctness of their doctrine.

For the moment let's not get into a big hassle as to the relative merits of the two conflicting doctrines. Instead let's look at the Soviet doctrine as practiced in Korea.

MAJOR MARK M. BOATNER III, Infantry, an occasional contributor to these columns, is now on duty in AFFE. He is a 1943 graduate of the Military Academy.

In Korea our troops have encountered enemy artillery fires of an intensity few veterans of World War II ever experienced. It is a forewarning of what we undoubtedly will encounter on a far greater scale in World War III.

There have already been instances in Korea of American troops being driven out of defensive positions *by fire power alone*. American troops in Korea have had counterattacks stopped short of their objectives and driven back by *fire power alone*. We should not lose the real significance of these facts by resorting to such clichés as "They didn't have the guts to stay or to go back"; or "The planning was no good." It's not that simple.

Let's be sensible enough to recognize a different doctrine when we get hit over the head with it, even if it runs counter to what we have been teaching in our own service schools.

What have we done in Korea to counteract the tremendous volume of fire laid down by the Reds? For one thing we have given them a taste of massed artillery fires, American style. But we should not forget that we are firing ammunition in Korea at a rate which we would probably not be able to afford in a large-scale war. The ratio of artillery tubes to infantry units is higher in Korea than we can expect to have in a large-scale war.

In Korea we have also relearned much about field fortifications. Certainly a large part of the answer to the threat of Soviet massed artillery lies in proper overhead cover and strong bunkers for key automatic weapons and observation posts. We have much to learn about this business of trench warfare and the construction of proper bunkers. But that's another story.

IN searching for an answer to the challenge presented by this different use of artillery, wouldn't it be smart to take a look at how the Russian himself believes in setting up and conducting a defensive operation?

His idea of how to defend a given piece of terrain differs from ours in two respects. First, he digs a hell of a lot deeper than we do. A Communist defensive position in Korea is organized like a prairie dog colony. Most of the defenders are well underground and a few lookouts remain on the surface in covered positions to weather the artillery preparations and to signal for the rest to come running up from their deep shelters in time to meet the advancing enemy infantry.

But the most significant difference is that every unit in a Russian defensive setup is not required to hold his position "at all costs." They organize much as we do with "two up and one back." But if things get too hot for one platoon it is not required to stay in position and be destroyed by fire; on the order of the company commander it can drop back and set up in the company strongpoint. Presumably, a company or battalion that seems to be in a position where it is being destroyed by fire can be ordered back to the battalion or regimental strongpoint. The communists concede that guts and tenacity are not always a match for massed artillery.

So far I have deliberately avoided the question of who is "right" in this matter of artillery doctrine. Taking the long range point of view, we can say with

considerable justification that the American system is superior to the Russian. Ours is more flexible. It is, quite properly, based on our technological and industrial superiority over the Communists. It has many other advantages.

The Russians contemplate massing many artillery units opposite a section of our lines where they intend to make a breakthrough—moving new artillery units in from other sections of the front in order to build up an overwhelming advantage. These huge concentrations of artillery take a long time to build up and are excellent targets for our air and our artillery. Our intelligence should learn about them in time for us to lower the boom on them.

But if war with Russia should start next week will we be any more prepared for it as a result of our lessons in Korea? Or will we march into battle chanting "our doctrine is fundamentally sound," set up a standard forward slope defense, tell all units to hold every position at all costs and just dare the enemy to prove he can blast a hole through our lines with fire power alone?

NOT being from Missouri, I would not like to wait until the opening phases of World War III to be shown that he can do it. I have seen enough in Korea to be convinced that we have been given a preview of a technique that can hurt us badly unless we are prepared to combat it with better techniques of our own.

The threat does not call for any revolutionary changes in our doctrine. But it does call for a little thought and some shifting of emphasis on our part. It is a matter for concern to infantrymen, artillerymen and combat engineers.

The infantryman must recognize the merits of the enemy's strongpoint system of defense. We must have more flexibility. This will require well disciplined troops and will put a greater burden of leadership on the shoulders of all commanders. "Hold at all costs" is a simple order to issue and is a simple one for a brave man to obey, but much more judgment, initiative and better communications are required of a commander who is given the prerogative of withdrawing certain of his units, if he feels he can strengthen his position by so doing.

The infantryman must look for opportunities to set up his defenses on the reverse slope to minimize the damage that will be done when the enemy moves his tanks, SPs and recoilless rifles well forward in the opening rounds of the attack. He must study Communist methods of digging in a defensive position. He must master the fundamentals of field engineering: how to build bunkers that will not collapse of their own weight, trenches that drain properly, communications trenches that will take his men from one part of the position to another safely. He must learn how to dig in his telephone wires so that lines won't go out during the artillery barrage.

The artilleryman must learn how to put in OPs that won't be knocked out the first time some direct fire weapon wants to take the trouble to try. Rather than one large OP built on the geographical crest of the highest point of the sector (just where the enemy expects it to be) several OPs to cover any given area should be built. The artilleryman must become clever at putting OPs in places where the enemy can't pick them up the day they are built. To do this he must sacrifice some comfort and not expect to get 180 degrees of observation from every OP.

The artilleryman must be prepared to fire defensive barrages fast and close. Time and again Communist troops in Korea have overrun UN positions before friendly defensive fires could be called for. Attacking Chinese and North Korean assault troops do not follow their preparatory fires closely: they advance in their own fires! You can count on that!

The artilleryman has also got to hit enemy mortars.

THE engineer must become more of a pioneer and sapper. Our engineers are magnificent when it comes to building roads and bridges. But when it comes to pioneer work—building key OPs in forward positions, using field expedients to move dozers and power equipment into forward positions to speed up the construction of large troop shelters, the digging of deep trenches in rock and hard soil, the expediting of armor well forward—they have something to learn.


The separation of duties under the headings of infantry, artillery and engineers is, of course, highly academic. During the conduct of a well integrated and coordinated defense the infantryman is also an engineer and often an artilleryman. The engineer is an infantryman also and may adjust artillery fires. The artilleryman must be an engineer and an infantryman. All must work closely together.

Some wit once observed that you don't have to eat a whole hog to know what pork tastes like. In Korea we've been given a taste of "Soviet artillery." We should not have to wait until we are confronted with the whole hog before we finally recognize what it is and know what to do about it.

A medical aid station bunker in the 32d Infantry's sector of Korea. The nature of the Korean conflict has led us to "relearn" a great deal about field fortifications.



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Tactics of Atomic War

Colonel George C. Reinhardt and Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Kintner

ATTACK: Is Fire Power Now King?

The frontal attack may become the cheapest way (in lives and treasure) to defeat the enemy

THE classic concept of fire and movement for seeking a tactical decision on the battlefield began with the revolutionary armies of the French Republic, flowered under Napoleon, and has been unchallenged since its exposition by the German tactician, von Clausewitz. Invariably the shock effect obtainable by maneuver has dictated all schemes for battle. The fire plan was devised to support the movement, to which it was subordinated; hence the common phrases "base of fire," "support fires," and the like.

But now the tremendous concentration of firepower in a single package, brought about by atomic weapons, suggests that a new look be taken at the classic concept. In numerous situations maneuver will still determine the operations plan, which atomic firepower will crown with success. Yet cases may arise in which the unusual potency of that firepower will dictate the adoption of a particular maneuver. A frontal assault, always tempting as the most direct route to the enemy's vitals, but cast aside as a bloody insanity with conventional weapons, may now become the cheapest route with atomic weapons opening the way. Instead of searching out his weakest point for assault, the army equipped with atomic missiles may deliberately strike at the foe's strongest force. When it is destroyed exploiting columns of armor and infantry can do the rest.


FOR the present an attack with atomic weapons presents all the difficulties that are inherent in any new and untried instrument of warfare. For one thing, much essential factual data are still incomplete, and in some instances is contradictory. For another, the psychological reactions to mass destruction by atomic weapons are entirely unpredictable. Conceivably they could be more catastrophic than the physical damage. Panic and mental confusion have won perhaps as many battles as have bullets.

It can be reasonably assumed that in the near future all our soldiers will have acquired a sound, unexaggerated view of the threat of atomic weapons.

THE tasks assigned to atomic weapons in the scheme of maneuver will be primarily those which cannot be performed effectively by conventional weapons.

Both the limited number of atomic missiles and the principle of economy of force make sound target selection a problem of vital importance. It is probable, therefore, that authority to select the target will not be delegated lower than the level of the corps commander if, indeed, it is not retained by the army commander. The decision may depend upon the number of missiles available in the theater and the degree of control that it is practicable for army group and army to maintain over corps operations.

When aircraft are used to deliver atomic missiles, targets probably will be finally determined and missions ordered at army level where coordination is effected with tactical aviation. However, target location and identification by divisional reconnaissance will often be a fruitful source of intelligence, particularly for targets of a transitory nature. Divisional agencies, such as patrols and prompt, effective POW interrogation, may indicate transitory targets which would otherwise escape corps or army headquarters. Tactical and reconnaissance aviation will be another important source of this kind of information. Targets which by their nature can be located through map study or aerial photography —such as defiles, fortified localities, com-



BREAKTHROUGH

Concentrations of enemy barring our advance may become the best target for attack by atomic weapons—followed by exploitation by forces of combined arms.

COLONEL GEORGE C. REINHARDT, Corps of Engineers, was an early student of the effects of atomic weapons on the ground battlefield. He is a graduate of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and has been in the Army since 1924. He is now on duty at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM R. KINTNER, Infantry, collaborates with COLONEL REINHARDT in his writing and has also written extensively on his own account. He is a graduate of the Military Academy and earned his Master's degree at Georgetown University. He is now on duty in Korea.

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munications junctions—will probably be corps or army responsibilities. But because there are transitory targets it is vitally important that all reconnaissance and intelligence elements of the division be educated to recognize potential atomic targets.

The ultimate selection of targets for atomic weapons must remain the responsibility of the commanders designated by the theater commander to authorize the use of such weapons.

With information about the enemy in hand, the process of choosing begins. In a particular situation, the atomic staff adviser must consider all possibilities.

After weighing the pros and cons he may recommend—with apologies to an ungrammatical but effective cavalry leader—"hitting the mostest with the mostest," rather than hitting the enemy where he is thinnest. The capabilities of the new weapon quickly confirm the wisdom of this recommendation. What may appear, at first glance, as a violation of accepted principles is actually a careful application of those principles. If the enemy either inadvertently or by enforced reaction to our maneuver risks a large number of men and equipment in a relatively small area, the casualties and destruction an atomic attack might inflict could be sufficient to throw the survivors into a state of demoralization, making them easy victims to swift, exploiting armored columns. The remaining enemy concentrations could be dealt with by conventional means. The principles of war—economy of force, surprise, objective (whether it be destruction of the enemy's will to fight, or the less likely but often discussed destruction of the enemy)—have all been ably served.

Of course, in another situation the choice might go the other way. Normally, preliminary planning for both the commander's existing scheme of maneuver and for the modifications introduced by the use of atomic weapons should progress simultaneously, until time and the general course of events narrow the field. It is at this point that division staffs are most likely to be involved. Then any on-the-spot information which a division can add to the higher echelon's knowledge of battlefield conditions becomes important.



COUNTERATTACK

A hostile penetration is hit by atomic weapons that destroy its prongs and the reserves entering the salient. Defensive forces then exploit the strike.

DESPITE certain similarities in firepower, it is wrong to consider the use of tactical atomic weapons as artillery, although in broad aspect both preparatory and counterbattery fires may be performed by atomic weapons. But atomic weapons will likely be too limited in supply and too valuable for expenditure on area targets or blanket interdiction. Except in instances of emergency, and then only when authorized by proper authority, atomic missiles should be delivered against well-located targets of reasonably well-known composition.

While units capable of delivering atomic weapons will seldom be assigned to divisions or receive fire missions from division commanders, limitations of range may make it necessary for them to occupy positions within the rear limits of the division area. In order to be prepared for this eventuality, division commanders and their staffs must be familiar with the procedures and techniques of their security, including deception measures to conceal firing positions. Divisions must be familiar with the transportation problems of atomic weapons and missiles. Obviously, they must also be completely informed on the time and nature of all fire missions ordered by higher authority, since these may affect the security of the divisional area.

WHEN atomic artillery, guided missiles, and free rockets become available to the field forces, there will be artillery battalions and firing batteries equipped with the new weapons and organized in many respects like conventional artillery, but with appreciable points of difference both in organization and procedure. An exception may be made in the case of extremely long-range guided missiles. These may turn out to be Air Force weapons, complementing the Air Force's strategic bombing mission. In general, however, atomic guns, guided missiles, and rockets will be Army unit weapons. Their tremendous power calls for closer control by commanders authorized to dispatch atomic missiles. Battalions organized to fire these weapons will need both security and logistical support greatly in excess of that furnished today's artillery.

To wrestle with the new and complex problems created by atomic weapons two kinds of staff specialists will be needed.

First, technical specialists will be required on all staffs whose commanders are delegated authority to use atomic weapons. They will be trained to advise commanders on the weapon's potential, the choice of fuze settings, the height of burst, the desired bomb power, and the mode of delivery which will accomplish the mission with the least expenditure of fissionable materials. These atomic specialists will fully understand the logistical problems involved in each means of target delivery and will advise commanders on the logistical feasibility of a proposed weapon's use. As an add

tional task, they will make recommendations on the locality, with regard to time and distance, in which several atomic missiles may be exploded. For the principle of concentration implies that atomic missiles will not be expended singly, but rather that an opportunity will be sought for a decisive blow through their concentrated use.

At the beginning of the atomic operations planning, advice on how many weapons to use and on selection of targets will be the function of specially trained general staff officers—the second class of atomic specialists. Once instruction in the tactical use of atomic weapons becomes widespread, such knowledge will be part of the training of all general staff officers. Thorough knowledge of tactical atomic capabilities and limitations will permit these general staff officers to advise commanders on the integration of atomic weapons into their operations.

Much of the pattern for protecting our own troops is worked out by the coordination of infantry plans with artillery, tactical air, or naval gunfire support. Prior to dropping atomic missiles in front of friendly troops, front-line units must be prepared to exploit the resulting damage to the enemy. All units, including reserves, must be alerted for swift movement into the target area. Friendly air must be so accurately advised of the location and time of explosions that it will avoid the danger space. If the target is so close that its destruction might endanger unsheltered friendly troops, the warning must be precise enough to insure the use of foxholes and other cover at the moment of detonation. Rapid, yet secure dissemination of such information must become second nature to all staffs. Provisions for handling atomic plans must be included in all SOPs to include the regiment.

ATOMIC weapons used offensively will not be delivered for their destructive power alone but in conjunction with other means of accomplishing the mission. The disorganization of the enemy's command structure and communications and the psychological stress of atomic explosions, must be exploited to the fullest before the enemy has time to pull himself together.

Fortunately for the quick follow-up, no radiation danger exists for our troops when penetrating as swiftly as possible in the wake of an atomic air burst.

After-explosion conditions, for ground and underground bursts, have not yet been released for publication. Even in such explosions, casualty causing residual radiation should be of relatively brief duration (hours rather than days) outside the radius of the clearly discernible crater effect (the lip-mound as well as the hole itself).

Immediate exploitation may be impeded by fires and debris. Some roads may be blocked; thick, dry brush may be ablaze, but in country open enough to permit normal troop movement, no serious obstacles are likely. Future atomic tests will doubtless furnish valuable information on these points. Meanwhile plans should be made for rapid movement with complete disregard of the hitherto exaggerated radiation hazard. Contingency plans should assure cross-country mobility in case roads are blocked, and should provide engineer assistance to clear blocks.

A possiblity in atomic warfare is the hostile use of mines, atomic or conventional, to block an area where our advance is anticipated. The effect of atomic explosions on buried mines, atomic or conventional, has not yet been announced.

Even if atomic explosions fail to destroy conventional enemy mines, the delaying effect of these mines will be minimized if we cut channels through mine fields while hostile covering fire is still silenced because of our atomic attack. This applies to all forms of obstacles, natural or artificial, which may be encountered in the advance. The adage that "an obstacle not covered by fire becomes only a nuisance" is truer than most. Division plans for exploitation should emphasize the urgency of passing all obstacles while the enemy is shaken and unable to fight back.

The importance of accurate, timely information of the enemy can scarcely be overrated by the commander planning an atomic attack. Not only its significance to higher command echelons, but also its bearing upon the actions and orders of the division commander call for greatly improved intelligence procedures and techniques.

Division G2s must devote more attention to their "essential elements of enemy information" (the EEI of textbooks) before shunting off the burden to unit commanders' patrols and observers. Units must be told what to look for and the conditions which will lead to the discovery of possible atomic targets. They must also be told what specific items logically hint at enemy intent to use atomic weapons. The G2 staff must get well forward to assist the combat units.

Staff atomic advisers will have to spend much time with G2 sections in the division. The problem will be accentuated as long as atomic weapons remain a mystery to the soldier who goes out on patrol or who furnishes the point of every advancing column.

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DEFENSE: Can Atomic Weapons Plug the Dike?

Atomic weapons may be the "equalizer" between manpower-rich and small, highly trained armies

IN the late summer of 1951 in discussing the defense of Western Europe, General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said: "The atomic bomb will make a formidable defensive weapon" if the aggressor is compelled, by terrain and by the efforts of ground troops, to "channel his attack along the natural routes of march."

The place to hit an aggressor with atomic explosives is the spearhead of his marching armies. This threat to the forward portion of an aggressor's military forces can be made very real, as General Bradley stated. At this turning point in military development, tactical employment of atomic weapons may weigh quite as heavily as their strategic potential in the over all defense plans of the Western World.

The use of atomic weapons against land forces is militarily sound. The tactical tasks for which they are eminently suited range from destruction of enemy communications, supply, and transport centers to shattering his field formations massing for attack, or neutralizing his supporting airfields.

If we have atomic weapons for tactical use, there will be a limit to the number of divisions a foe can concentrate in a given area without exposing

them to crippling losses. The huge logistical concentrations near the front, essential to massed attacks, are likewise vulnerable to this most powerful weapon. Thus an aggressor army's steamroller tactics can be severely penalized in two ways. If the steam roller's logistics (its motive power) break down, the Western armies' superior mobility and control can be made to pay off. If atomic weapons can diminish enemy troop density in combat, either by inflicting casualties or by close interdiction, the security of the West can be more easily assured.

Whether or not both sides plan to use atomic weapons against armies and their supporting services, it certainly will be to our advantage to do so. This is one field in which our superiority—in numbers and varieties of atomic weapons—is not likely to be neutralized. If the atomic bomb, by supplementing our smaller armies and their supporting sea and tactical air forces, can swing the tide of land battle to the side of the West, then our greatest problem—the lack of vast numbers of trained and equipped divisions—will not be a binding handicap.

In short, the atomic bomb makes it possible for the West to resist aggression with a relatively smaller number of divisions. But there must be alert, highly trained fighting men, equipped with the most effective means of modern war. Yet we must remember: the tactical employment of atomic weapons is no simple, cheap, easy solution to our vital security responsibility. The United States and its allies will still need many divisions, backed by adequate tactical air power.



The atomic gun is an artillery piece but tactical atomic weapons may be too limited in supply and too valuable to be used on area targets or blanket interdiction missions.

THE use of atomic weapons by defending armies requires special conditions for success. Concentrations, either of enemy troops or matériel, are required; otherwise, the dispatch of atomic missiles would not be justified. Consequently an opponent must be compelled to concentrate on or near the battlefield—by the strength of our defense, by stratagem, by maneuver or by a combination of these. Reliance upon building up defensive strength through sheer mass alone will leave an army wide open to hostile atomic missiles. Thus efforts to make the enemy concentrate cannot also result in the concentration of our forces.

The atomic-age commander whose army, confronted by superior forces, must assume the defensive, has the difficult task of disposing his troops so that their strength is great enough to compel the attacker to mass if he would advance, yet they remain sufficiently dispersed to preclude destruction or fatal damage by the atomic missiles which will probably precede the enemy's assault. These contradictory tasks cannot be accomplished by sedentary defense. Von Leeb's "liberty of action," attainable only by swift, brilliant maneuver, will be as essential to defending commanders facing and employing atomic weapons as it was to Von Hindenburg at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes. The increased range and striking power of new weapons invariably open wider vistas for the genius of military leadership.

In the aftermath of World War II, many writers concluded that, because of the increased mechanization of armies and the immense logistical arrangements required to support them, field commanders were losing their personal influence over the conflict. The general's role, so we were told, had become that of a corporation board chairman. If that conclusion had been even remotely true, the entrance of the tactical atomic bomb on the battlefield would kill it. Atomic warfare will tax generalship as never before by vastly enhancing the price paid for each failure; or conversely, by holding out unbelievable rewards for "outgeneraling" the enemy.

THE defending commander will desperately need swift, accurate intelligence—reliable estimates of enemy atomic capabilities and intentions, spot reconnaissance of weapons which could deliver atomic missiles, and locating targets of opportunity for his own missiles. Since his adversary has the initiative, timely

nformation will be more difficult to ob-
ain. But even should he possess that
nowledge, the defending leader has
arely begun the estimate which leads
o his decision. The information will
nquestionably aid him in disposing his
wn troops, but it will not tell him how
ne enemy's superior strength can be re-
uced to the level where a successful
ounterattack can be launched.


This "uncertainty of battle," as Von
lausewitz called it more than a cen-
ry ago, has not diminished; it has, on
ne contrary, become more complex. The
aps into which the defender would
eguile his attacker are no longer sunken
ads, enfilading canister, or concealed
valry charging an exposed flank. They
ow have become situations where he
ay use atomic missiles against the un-
ary foe. The classic example of Han-
bal destroying a superior Roman army
Cannae still typifies the ultimate in
ctical art. Only the nature of the en-
cement and the method of the kill will
ke on new forms.

Defensive campaigns in atomic war-
re must be based, fundamentally, on
sound appreciation of the enemy's
omic capabilities and his probable mis-
on; for once developed, these will have
impact on the defender's assigned
ission.

Whatever his orders, the commander
ust adjust his plan of maneuver so as
st to meet the attacker's presumed ob-
ctive and his combined atomic-conven-
nal capability. Calculated risks must
taken. That term cannot be per-
itted to cloak ignorance of the risks
volved but should emulate the careful
ckoning of a Lee on defense at Cul-
per, detaching his "right arm," Jack-
n, to seize Manassas Junction while
deceived Pope's Yankee host with a
fraction of the Confederate Army.

Some portion of the atomic age com-
nander's defending force, including his
ne of communications, will almost inev-
bly be more concentrated than will be
fe. Those portions must be concealed,
made too mobile to be dangerously
t, or so deeply dug in that their mass is
duced in terms of atomic attack. The
spersion cure-all, for protection against
e new weapon, is utterly meaningless
til analyzed and applied to a specific
of conditions.

NEW weapons have never eliminated the basic tactical advantage that ac-
ues to the defender. Digging in is still
e soldier's best safeguard—providing
does not succumb to the psychology
t often plagues "fortress" troops as-



ENVELOPMENT

The swift follow-up to an atomic strike must always be directed at the area of the hit to take advantage of the shock to the enemy and the destructive effects of the weapon.

signed too long to defensive positions: voluntary abandonment of his freedom of maneuver. Deep foxholes decrease appreciably the ranges at which atomic explosions are lethal. A rule of thumb may be derived from study of World War II formations on numerous battlefields: an American division, deployed for defense, can be terribly shaken by two correctly placed 20 KT (nominal) atomic missiles. This "rule" does not allow for the greater protection afforded by digging deeper into the ground than was usually done in the last war. Nor does it deprecate the enemy's difficulties of "correctly placing" two A-bombs. An evaluation of divisional deployment for attack in the same campaign indicates they were almost twice as vulnerable as on defense. Like all "rules," its value lies in comparing atomic capabilities with conventional weapons.

Foxholes with the head of the occupant three feet below earth's surface buy safety from a nominal bomb's blast and flash heat unless extremely close to ground zero—around 700 yards for the normal bomb. Gamma radiation will be sufficiently absorbed by the intervening earth and no worse than a delayed sickness dose will result.

Three feet of solid earth above the occupant require foxholes about six feet deep, for men squatting in them; or four feet deep for men in prone positions. That means more work than American soldiers usually devote to the task. In rocky soil such digging is impossible on any widespread basis. In sand, revetting to prevent cave-ins somewhat compensates for the easier excavation.

While getting men and equipment below the ground surface is the chief consideration, there are other complementary means of avoiding the enemy's deadly blast. Revival of the neglected art of camouflage and greater use of natural concealment are musts in troop training. Until a target is definitely located it will not draw atomic fire, except in special instances where key terrain features are occupied. Atomic weapons will be much too scarce to expend in the searching or interdiction fires of conventional artillery.

Mobility is also a protective measure, especially when the bomb is delivered by airplane. The time has not yet arrived when planes will be aloft, armed with atomic bombs, waiting for targets of opportunity. There must be a time lag—perhaps of hours—despite the efforts of intelligence, high command, and air force to reduce the interval between the reporting of a target and the bomb's delivery by plane. If movement is not detected and if new instructions are not swiftly given the plane, an invaluable missile will be wasted on empty terrain which the "target" has evacuated.

The effect of thick weather slightly favors the defender. If the attacker exploits fog to conceal his advance and lessen the heat effect of atomic missiles on his exposed troops—and heat is the greatest personnel destroyer—he also re-

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duces his chance of atomic attack on the defender's reserves. These latter can move by a choice of routes while any offensive penetration must traverse ground already registered by defense artillery and radar controlled bombers. Only when the attacker is short on atomic missiles but relatively rich in manpower will heavily overcast skies benefit him.

The configuration of the terrain selected for the defense will affect bomb power relatively little, according to current data and assuming nominal missiles. It will decrease if larger "caliber" missiles are used. Trees will certainly be blown over and in dry seasons fires will be kindled. Until more reliable information is available, commanders should look with disfavor on small wooded areas. However, expanses of forest large enough to require a number of bombs to entirely cover them, may be valuable as hiding places for reserves and as assembly areas.

ARTILLERY positions, quickly located by sound and radar ranging devices, will no longer enjoy the comparative safety they did in the last war. After front lines have been outlined by patrol action and a few batteries spotted, the deployment of divisional and corps artillery can be sketched with an accuracy sufficient for an attacker's atomic weapons. Present-day dispersion between batteries and battalions is governed by considerations of conventional weapon power, counterbattery and fire and air strikes. An atomic missile exploding near the center of a divisional artillery area could cause severe losses of crews and fire control equipment although damage to the guns and ammunition would in all probability be less critical. The approximately five square miles throughout which the nominal bomb causes casualties to troops in the open can easily include supporting artillery.

Defenders' artillery is a more advantageous target for pre-assault atomic strikes than infantry in foxholes. Crews must remain at their guns and are therefore more exposed than foxholed infantry. Accuracy limitations of atomic missiles involve the ability to hurt targets spread rather uniformly over a large area rather than the more linear deployment of infantry. Also attacks in these behind-the-line areas reduce the risk of misdirected bombs hitting the attacker's forward elements.

Countermeasures can and must be devised. The traditional artillery expedient of alternative positions will not work. For one thing an atomic blow can fall too suddenly to permit a move. For another, the displacement practicable from one position to another will be meaningless in the face of atomic threats. Ranges of direct support artillery, no less than movement time required, will not permit such violent dislocation.

Foresighted gunners are, therefore, suggesting that gun crews be smaller and the men be relieved at short intervals by other gunners resting in nearby foxholes. This reduces the number of troops exposed and, if the shelters are deep enough, provides replacements ready to resume fire with guns undamaged by atomic blasts. Guns themselves can be partially dug in and the spoil heaped up in thick flat revetments to increase the protection. Bulldozers to speed these semi-underground firing positions may have to be added to standard battery equipment, further burdening the logistical support. The mobility of self-propelled guns furnishes another argument for their proponents, expensive though they are, since their tenancy of a position could be brief. However, their crews are little better shielded from atomic blast than those of ordinary artillery.

Radar and electronic fire-control equipment does not possess the rugged qualities of the guns. Command posts and control stations must be dug deep indeed as well as furnished fire-resistant canvas cover (against flash heat) to the maximum possible. Stratagem and ingenuity must explore means of siting artillery support in new patterns, as unlike recognized standards as wit can make them. Camouflage is of little value as long as the artillery mass can be adequately located by its relation to overall defensive formations.

THE road net gains importance in atomic combat. With numerous usable routes, allowing rapid concentration on call, troops and transportation can be more fully disposed in linear arrangements, which make less remunerative targets than area ones. Where roads are few and far between, as in Korea, concentrations along them become hazardous, yet difficult to avoid without detriment to essential mobility. Engineer road building and maintenance demands will increase in order to speed the maneuver of reserve striking forces.

Warning can play a vital part in atomic defense, locally as well as in the broad scheme of things. Troops cannot always stay in deep foxholes. Artillerymen must come out of protective emplacements occasionally. Tank crews can't stay buttoned up indefinitely. Even in reserve some men must be on watch, gathering in mess lines, relaxing—all exposing themselves. Defense SOPs must include swift code warnings to threatened localities, if advantage is to be taken of available cover.

THE timeworn aphorism, "troops committed to combat are on their own," was never more true than in atomic warfare. Commanders and their staffs must foresee and provide against atomic disaster, not hopefully expect to overcome it after the blow falls. This will call for continuous estimates of the atomic situation of the division. Just how vulnerable is the division now? What steps can be taken to reduce that vulnerability? What changes in the situation will tomorrow bring? How to prepare for them?

Sound, detailed plans, always ready to become emergency orders, must provide for the division's reaction to atomic attack in various portions of the sector. The action needed to rally from an attack on the divisional artillery will differ radically from that needed if the reserve is hit. These plans also must include the conduct of the division if adjacent units are pounded but the division itself is unhurt. Broad directives on these eventualities will be furnished by corps (or army) but their translation into emergency plans and troop rehearsal of those plans will be the task of the division commander and his staff. Always prompt effective action to counter the inevitable hostile exploitation must be the guiding principle. Atomic missiles can perhaps cripple an army; the exploitation which follows their blast may well destroy it.

Whenever possible, units unfavorably deployed should be quickly relocated. Each new position occupied under the stress of combat must be staff-examined to make sure that it fits into the over-all defense of the division.

Divisional trains and service areas should be located for the best possible protection against infiltration and placed at the maximum possible distance from artillery and reserve positions to decrease the attractiveness of the target they offer.

In defense the dispersion of supplies is relatively easier, since the distance they must be moved forward to reach the troops is either fixed or is being reduced—not continually increasing, as in an advance. Yet here, also, defensibility from ground attack makes a counter-demand. Terrain permitting, night move-

ment for supplies as well as for troops should be stressed. Combat trains should be kept stocked and mobile. Small, concealed stocks of rations, ammunition and possibly gasoline should be placed conveniently to the rear of regimental combat teams. Building up stocks within the division area should be forbidden, except in position defense where the area is to be held even though encircled. Helicopter evacuation of casualties can be combined with the delivery of small-package, critical supplies, direct from corps or army dumps.

As a general rule, mobility must be preserved, at the cost of supply build-up, by all echelons. Maneuver is as vital to the defense as it is to the attack.

IT is probable that division commanders and their staffs will have a greater hand in target determination on the defense than on the offense. Planning prearranged atomic fires, to protect a possible corridor into our main defensive positions, will be vastly more important than planning a prearranged artillery barrage is now. No one knows better than the division commander when the integrity of his force is seriously threatened. Confronted with an overpowering enemy thrust, he may call for tactical atomic fire power to be delivered by rocket, very heavy artillery, or tactical air.

Delivery of atomic missiles by airplane involves comparatively slight changes, except in degree, to the familiar tac-air support of ground forces. But targets must be far more carefully evaluated, to avoid wasting so valuable a missile. Safety measures for the division's own troops cannot be left to a take-a-chance attitude.

Several typical missions may be assigned the defender's atomic weapons: (1) weaken the enemy prior to our counterattack; (2) destroy hostile concentrations (men and matériel) which might otherwise soon arrive on the battlefield; (3) curtain the withdrawal of a hard-pressed element of our forces.

The second and third are not subject to detailed pre-planning, although some preparations may be made to meet their emergencies. But the first must be integrated into every appropriate counterattack scheme. Not only will feasible locations for enemy massing after a penetration into our lines be precisely covered by "on call" fires of atomic weapons, but locations which might conceivably become objectives of sorties out in front of our main defensive lines must be the subject of comprehensive counterattack orders.

If weapons capable of delivering the atomic missile should be attached to the division, additional responsibility must be assumed at the divisional level. Although this is not likely now, it may occur in the not too distant future. Restrictions on targets, time of fire, and other matters will doubtless be quite different from the restrictions placed on attached conventional weapons.

Numerous tactical and logistical burdens will fall to the division commander. He will become vitally concerned with the selection of positions, with measures for detection, and with the security of both atomic weapons and nuclear components of missiles as soon as they enter his area. He will also have a much larger share in target analysis and selection. Furthermore, the movement of weapons, the transportation of atomic missiles and nuclear components, and the special measures required to support atomic batteries will put an added strain on the division G4. Finally, it will be up to the division to evaluate and report the effects of its missiles after delivery on the target—a task involving technical aspects as well as special intelligence from forward elements. In these instances, the division staff will benefit particularly from the aid of the atomic advisors and technicians.

UNTIL the day when atomic weapons are just another awful aspect of the battlefield, their psychological impact cannot be given too much attention. The debilitating effect of fear is always present. And of all fears, dread of the unknown is the most difficult to conquer.

The key to a successful defense is a counterattack. Therefore, all troops must be thoroughly informed about the terrifying phenomena they will experience in an atomic counterattack. Only if they have complete confidence in the results, will they exploit the break-through with the impetuosity that is vital to success. False notions of radiation dangers and alleged contamination—through enemy casualties, terrain or equipment—must be dispelled by instruction which the troops understand.

Unit commanders should be shown that the risk of hostile atomic counteraction resembles, on a disproportionate scale, the risk of enemy artillery counteraction. Exposure of immobilized units to enemy observation will invite destruction; therefore success lies in launching swift pursuit action against the disorganized foe. Strict though decentralized control of subordinates and rapid organization of new positions will be the best protection.

Soldiers below field grade who have participated in maneuvers where the atomic bomb was actually exploded should be given opportunities to recount their experiences to soldier audiences. The personal note—with the tendency of veterans to favorably exaggerate past experiences—would convince many who might be skeptical of scientific information.



The fast exploitation of an atomic strike will be rewarded with prisoners and relatively undamaged weapons and equipment. These weapons were in the area of burst of a test atomic explosion on Frenchman Flats.

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CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

AS the combat arms soldier surveys his present condition and future prospects, he wonders if Career Management Division is capable of giving him the helping hand he needs to make his career as a soldier meaningful. He hears talk of "career manglement." He hears that officers of the administrative and technical services get a better break because they have a Chief in Washington to represent them. And he hears older officers talk of the days when the offices of chiefs of combat arms "really took care of us."

It is perfectly obvious that if Career Management is doing its job, such comments as these are based on a lack of an understanding of how Career Management works and its difficulties in cold and hot wars.

Recognizing this, Major General James C. Fry, the Chief of Career Management, and his staff are preparing a series of articles on career management and how it works. These comments will appear in future issues of this magazine.

General Fry had this to say about the mission of Career Management and the need for a full understanding by all officers of its policies and methods:

"Our Career Management goal is to rotate officers through different assignments in order to develop to the utmost the inherent abilities, aptitudes, skills and accumulated knowledge of a maximum number of officers.

"When conflicts between our Career Management Program and the combat requirements of the Army occur, Career Management assignments must of necessity be interrupted. As a matter of fact, the basic concept of Career Management was that the program was intended to apply solely to the peacetime development of officers and this fact needs more thorough recognition.

"There are no mysteries or secrets about assignment policies and I hope to have published detailed information about how CMD assigns officers and the procedures it uses in selecting officers to attend military schools.

"There are good assignments and there are others that offer no particular professional advantages or other attraction. But all assignments must be filled, and the officer who has a satisfying assignment this year should realize that he is moving into a category that makes him eligible for a less desirable assignment."

The editors hope that our readers will tell us whether they think the series is useful. We shall also welcome questions about Career Management and shall endeavor, with General Fry's assistance, to answer them as clearly and fully as possible.

Who Goes to School?

THE Army's military education program follows two general patterns. One progressively develops the overall potentialities of an officer and the other teaches specialization in particular fields.

Specialist education is taught at branch schools, the Army General School, the Army Language School and other similar institutions. The various courses offered by these schools are listed in the Army School Catalogue, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-21, which is published annually. Attendance is by application or selection on a quota basis to meet the requirements of the Army in each particular field.

Career-type education begins with the basic courses in the branch schools and extends on an increasingly selective basis to the Army War College which is the apex of the Army's military educational system for officers.

The new second lieutenant attends the basic course at his branch school. After several years of troop duty but before finishing twelve years of service each Regular officer and a quota of Reserve officers will attend the regular advanced courses of their arm or service. All other Reserve officers on extended active duty, and a percentage of Reserve officers not on active duty, attend the associate advanced courses. At the a

vanced courses, officers receive instruction peculiar to their arm or service that fits them for duties above the company or battery level. They also receive generalized instruction that prepares them for staff assignments on higher levels.

Following the advanced courses of the branch schools, career education becomes competitive.

The Command and General Staff College is the first school where attendance is on a selective basis. It conducts an annual course for Regular officers and two associate courses each year for Reserve officers. Each branch has an annual quota based on mobilization requirements, in proportion to its authorized strength and prescribed mission. Based on current student quotas approximately fifty percent of all Regular officers will attend the Command and General Staff College.

The Army War College is the next higher school. Since the authorized enrollment for the 1953-54 course is only 200 officers, you can see that attendance is on a high selective basis. Graduation from the Army War College represents completion of the Army's formal education requirement for the assumption of high-level positions in the Army and the Department of Defense, and those which the Army might be called upon to fill with other governmental agencies.

The joint colleges parallel the Army's education system. These are the Armed Forces Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the National War College. Due to limited quotas attendance has been confined to Regular officers.

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force colleges invite the Army to send officers to their colleges. Quotas are limited and attendance is by competitive selection. A number of foreign colleges also extend invitations to a limited number of Army officers. Each foreign college is considered on a comparable level with one of our own colleges, and graduates are given the same consideration in selection for further schooling as graduates from the corresponding United States college. The foreign colleges presently extending invitations are listed below, together with the comparable level United States college.

National War College or Army War College Level

British Imperial Defence College
Canadian National Defense College
French Ecole Superieure de Guerre

Armed Forces Staff College Level

United Kingdom Joint Services Staff College

Command and General Staff College Level

Australian Staff College
British Staff College
Canadian Staff College
French Ecole Major d'Etat
Indian Defense Services Staff College
Italian Army War College
Pakistan Staff College

Graduate level schooling in the physical and social sciences under the Army civil schooling program has increasing importance. A subsequent article will cover this program in detail.

COMPETITIVE selection is not widely understood if the number of inquiries received by the Career Management Division is representative. It means simply that all officers of a branch, in the zone of consideration established by the prerequisites for attendance at a college, are considered competitively within each branch.

The mechanics of it require that the names of all officers in the zone of consideration be arranged in order of merit according to existing records. Factors used in developing this list include: command and staff experience; combat duty; experience on school staffs and faculties; previous military education, civilian components and assignments; duty with military missions, as military attaché, and duty with joint staffs or other services; promotions, demotions, and disciplinary actions; efficiency ratings; and age and years of service.

Selection methods. A detailed explanation of actual methods of selection would be extremely difficult. Records of all officers in the eligible groups are studied by mature and unbiased officers. Qualifications of each are checked off on work sheets. Great weight is given to command experience and demonstrated leadership. The broad pattern of an officer's experience is considered and the degree to which officers have met demands that would seem to index this future potential are evaluated carefully. The officer's overall efficiency index for the past five years of service, as determined from efficiency reports, carries great weight. But this is not the sole deciding factor. The method can be summed up as careful, unbiased selection based upon best available information, weighing carefully the qualifications and interests of the individual officer and the requirements of the Army.



It is not necessary for an officer to submit an application to attend one of the service colleges. Officers are considered by their arm or service automatically from the time they become eligible until they pass out of the zone of consideration. Moreover, selection is without regard to geographical location or assignment. However, officers desiring to attend an Air, Navy or foreign college in preference to an Army college, should indicate such a desire on their annual preference cards.

Eligibility prerequisites for Army and joint colleges may be found in SR 350-20-1, SR 350-195-1, and DA Pamphlet 20-21. Prerequisites for the Air, Navy and foreign colleges are similar to Army colleges of comparable level. An outstanding officer may be considered and selected for a service college although he does not meet all the prerequisites for that college.

Due to limited quotas, many officers will never attend a high level service college. But this is no barrier to his career progress. As in the past, outstanding leaders will be developed through on-the-job training and a diversity of career broadening assignments.

This last facet of career development deserves more emphasis. All officers cannot expect to attend our top military schools and it is evident that some of those selected will not necessarily prove to be our ablest officers in time of emergency. So, many officers who were not selected for higher schooling may make their way into the select group of general officers who guide our armies in time of war. A most striking example of this from the relatively recent past is the career of General James A. Van Fleet whose abilities lifted him to high and distinguished command, despite his lack of formal military education above the advanced course of his basic arm.

[Next month: *How your assignments are made.*]

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Building Community Relations

Captain Frederick Jenkins

THE creation and maintenance of good community relations is a most difficult task fo commanders of large training centers where thousands of young soldiers in a few shor weeks go through new experiences that subject them to tensions that are completely foreign to their previous ways of life.

The problem is twofold: to make the transition from home and civilian life to the life of a soldier as easy and painless as possible, and to create in the surrounding community an interest in and respect for these American boys, who though they come from home several hundred miles away are not unlike the native youth of the community.

Many commanders have wrestled with these problems and solved them in ways satisfactory to the local situation or in ways satisfactory to their own ways of doing things. There cannot be any hard and fast rules—if there were they would have been reduced to official doctrine in the dry language of regulations long ago.

Before it was closed down recently, the 5th Infantry Division at Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, commanded by Major General George B. Barth, had worked out a most effective program that is worthy of attention.

COMMUNITY programs successfully practiced by the 5th Infantry Division included three-day open houses for parents of trainees in the seventh week of training, with "foster parents" from surrounding Pennsylvania communities invited to participate; adoption of training battalions by cities and hamlets near the post; and visits of farm-bred trainees to farms in the region over week ends.

A further development of these programs resulted in the "adoption" of a number of orphans by trainees of one battalion.

Each of the programs had a minimum of Army direction and every effort was made to let communities and families direct their own activities. The Division planted the seed of the idea in the minds of potential participants, and except for occasional behind-the-scene watering and weeding sat back and watched it grow.

In the belief that recruits make better soldiers if their families are given a first-hand taste of Army life, battalion commanders wrote to each soldier's parents shortly after his arrival for training. This letter told the parents about pass rules, why trainees could not have their own cars on the reservation, the need for cheerful letters, and how parents could help their sons avoid going AWOL. The letter also invited the parents to the Open House the battalion held at the end of the seventh week of training.

The letter listed approved hotels and motels in the area and stated that the Army was unable to assume any of the expense of parents during the visit.

THE first Parents' Open House was typical of all of them. It began on Saturday afternoon with about 300 parents of trainees in the 46th Field Artillery Battalion assembling at a service club where they met their sons and were given a helping hand in finding lodging for the week end.

The first event was a dance at the service club. The commanding general, regimental and battalion commanders



Mom looks on while big brother shows kid sister how to fire the 60mm. mo tar. Mrs. Julia Renni and daughter travelled from Milwaukee to Indiantow Gap to visit Private Robert Renni during the 19th Field Artillery Battalion "Parents' Open House" at the end of the seventh week of training.

CAPTAIN FREDERICK JENKINS, Infantry, was the Public Information officer, 5th Infantry Division.

and their wives attended and talked with as many parents as possible. This get-together gave a parent a chance to talk with his son's immediate commander and with other officers in charge of his training and well-being. Mothers were especially interested in talking to wives of officers.

Junior officers and their wives supported the program and many of the young wives served as unofficial welcoming committees, greeting parents and making them feel at home.

Dance partners were USO junior hostesses from nearby communities. At the end of the dance, parents departed for their overnight accommodations and trainees returned to barracks.

The next morning the parents attended an all-trainee battalion parade. Fathers who were veterans were asked to judge drill competition. After seeing a display of all the weapons and training aids used in the 16-week cycle, parents and sons visited company officers, noncoms, and fellow soldiers.

After the noon meal in the battalion mess hall trainees were given special passes, good until reveille Monday. This gave them the rest of the week end with their parents. It is worth remarking that some trainees accompanied their parents to the post chapel for Sunday morning services.

One of the chief objections raised when the Parents' Open House program was first suggested was the matter of housing. Some senior staff members were afraid that some parents would arrive at the post, say, "Here I am. You take care of me," and overtax housing facilities. But not a single such case occurred. The furnishing of a list of approved motels and hotels in the area in the letter the battalion commanders mailed out made it clear that the Army could not furnish quarters.

Distance was no barrier to participation. Parents came from as far as a thousand miles to be with their sons.



Two Red Diamond trainees are Sunday guests of a family living in a nearby community. These "foster parents" affairs were highly successful.

THE community "adoption" program began when delegates of the Lebanon (Pennsylvania) USO Council asked General Barth if they could invite a battalion of trainees to Lebanon homes for Easter Sunday dinner.

General Barth believed that if one community wanted to entertain men in their homes, other communities probably felt the same way. A few discreet inquiries proved this was true. Letters requesting the opportunity to entertain trainees "just as we'd like our own sons in the service to be invited into the homes of other families," began to flow into the headquarters.

Certain specifications were established. When a large number of community residents had shown a desire to adopt a battalion, a delegation of civic leaders from that community was invited to visit the post and invite the assembled trainees to be their guests on the Sunday following their third week of training.

The timing of the battalion visit to a community was particularly important. It was desirable that the event be held before trainees became eligible for their first passes. That was why the third week end was selected.

Local sponsors—chambers of commerce, USO Councils, or other civic groups—listed the names and addresses of families who would entertain one or more soldiers and assigned soldiers to them. The Army provided transportation to and from a central point in the town.

Families that "adopted" a soldier were invited to be guests at the Parents' Week End Open House at the end of the seventh week and meet the soldiers' real parents. They were also honor guests at the graduation exercises at the end of the training period. Many firm friendships between "foster parents" and real parents developed.

Host families took their "new sons" home for a family dinner, visited with them for a few hours, and then accompanied them to a special program of entertainment or dance sponsored by a civic group.

Local newspaper editorials have praised the adoption program as an "exciting adventure in hospitality" and a "tribute to the American spirit of neighborliness."

This "foster community" plan has given more than 5,000 trainees from the 5th Infantry Division a "home away from home." Sunday dinners and warm hospitality have created many friendships between local citizens and trainees, many of whom were away from their own homes for the first time in their lives.

THE Chamber of Commerce of one of the smaller towns requested the privilege of adopting a battalion, then reported they needed help in "selling the idea" to townspeople. It seemed that during World War II, troops processing through Indiantown had created trouble in the town and some citizens still had a distaste for men in uniform. This was a real challenge.

A special brochure was prepared for Chamber officials. Included were favorable clippings of new stories and editorials from newspapers of other towns that had taken part in the program as

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well as letters from mayors, clergymen, trainees, and hosts all praising the program. With fingers crossed, the once-bitten townsfolk agreed to go along with the Chamber and invited a battalion to be their guests. The Army now has an unblemished reputation in that community.

Battalion officers were encouraged to write "thank you" notes to the committees responsible for planning and executing the program. Individual soldiers seldom needed to be reminded of their duty in thanking their hosts and hostesses.

AN outgrowth of the Training Battalion Adoption Program was the "adoption" of an entire orphanage in Harrisburg by the trainees of the 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry, which had been entertained only a few weeks before by the citizens of that city.

Again, the "spontaneous" approach was used. The idea was casually broached to the Battalion's Privates Council by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur C. Blanton, the battalion commander. The council went for it enthusiastically. Again the main problem was to slow down the enthusiasm of the sponsors—this time, soldiers. More than a thousand dollars were contributed in less than three weeks by the trainees.

Three television sets were given to the Orphanage. Groups of orphans were taken on tours of the post, where they enjoyed athletic contests, ate in mess halls and saw movies in Army theaters. Many of the children were taken on outings to amusement parks and movies by the trainees.

The perennial trainee problem of what to do on a free week end was solved. They'd visit the orphanage, teach the kids how to play baseball, or just talk.

The graduation of the battalion spelled the end of the orphan adoption. It would have been carried on by other battalions had not the inactivation of the division been in the works.

THE program for farm-bred soldiers was sponsored by the agricultural committee of the Lebanon County Chamber of Commerce, the Grange, farm women's groups, and individual farmers.

On succeeding week ends, groups of trainees were met at the Lebanon Farm Bureau Office by farm families. Each family would take one or two farm-bred soldiers home for the full week end. The men would shed their uniforms and don the clothes they'd thought they'd not be wearing until their term of service was over. Comments from host farmers have been good, and men interviewed upon their return have expressed admiration for the Pennsylvania Dutch farmer and his methods. Farm boys from Minnesota and other states have thus learned something of the farming methods of their hosts.

From these programs, the 5th Division has learned a simple formula for successful parent and community relations:

Tell a few civic-minded citizens in the communities what needs to be done for the men of your command. Then sit back and watch those communities go to work. All they want is to be told what the needs are. The commander may have to encourage the workers at times, but he never does it publicly. The natural expansive heart of the "informed" American citizen does the job for the Army.

A Pennsylvania Dutch farm family show off their herd to two Midwest farm boys in training at Indiantown Gap.



★ CEREBRATIONS ★

Our literate cocktail-hour tacticians stand to receive as much as $10.00 for their contributions to this department. However, the price for those "dashed off" with scant consideration for the rules of composition and rhetoric will be much less. Hold them to four or five hundred words and type them double-spaced.

Rate the Rater

Efficiency reports are the means by which an officer's excellence is measured, and his advancement, schooling and assignments to a large degree determined. All agree that efficiency reports are necessary, but not all agree that they are properly evaluated.

Regardless of what form the efficiency report takes, or how the officer's efficiency is measured, the answer is still given by the individual doing the rating. He may be a "high" rater or a "low" rater, and unless this fact is taken into account the efficiency reports submitted by him have little meaning. It is common knowledge that a particular officer may get "straight 7.0" under one rater for a time, and yet under another rater he can get only 4.2. It is also known that certain types of duty carry 7.0 ratings and others fall in the 4.2 bracket. But these ratings can be rectified and correlated if a rater's "mean rating" is determined, and the difference between his "mean" and the mean of all ratings is applied to each of his ratings.

For instance, a high rater submits twenty efficiency reports, with a mean or average rating of 6.4. Assume that the general mean or average rating is 5.4. Every rating submitted by this high rater should be reduced by 1.0 to account for the fact that all his ratings are 1.0 above the ratings given by all other raters on the average.

By the same token, if a low rater submits twenty efficiency reports with a mean of 4.6, all his ratings should be raised by 0.8 to bring them in line with all ratings submitted.

Does this do an injustice to an officer who has received a 7.0 rating from the high rater? While his rating has been reduced to 6.0, he has done as well as the officer who received a 5.2 rating from the low rater, and his rating is 0.6 above the average which still puts him in the high excellent or superior category.

Is this method of correlating efficiency reports feasible of administering? All efficiency reports find their way eventually to a central office of record in Washington. The efficiency report form may be modified to include the number of officers rated, and the mean rating, both of which would be accomplished by the rating officer. The rectification of the ratings should then be done in the final office of record.

Unless some method is used to correlate the efficiency reports of individual raters, and ratings that inevitably accompany certain types of duty, the plums will always go to those who can manage to keep themselves on the gravy train.

COL. D. C. LITTLE
Artillery

Commo to the Signal Corps

If, as a commander, you have ever watched a firefight on a Korean outpost at night, communications is a very important personal subject. Suppose the fight is only 600 yards from where you stand on the MLR. You ought to be able to follow it blow by blow, but as far as knowing what is going on out there, you might as well be on the moon.

Joe Chink is pounding the path connecting the outpost with the MLR with mortar and artillery. The land wire you had laid was knocked out before the close-in action on the outpost started. Joe is jabbering away on your radio net. You suspect the operator on the OP is sending like mad but you can't read him. He's probably too excited to shift to the alternate battalion frequency—if he remembers it. Flares are popping off all around like Roman candles and these with other battle pyrotechnics make visual signalling of any kind impossible.

Something's going on for sure, but what? Frankly, you don't know. You're missing the information without which a commander cannot act intelligently. You can't let that outpost go, so you order a platoon forward from the MLR knowing the only route out is zeroed-in with Chink mortar fire. Blind reaction is more often the rule than the exception in the position-type night warfare. Such communication troubles at the battalion and lower tactical levels have been one of the most serious handicaps confronting the Eighth Army.

Communications are one thing that most of us take for granted until they go out. Indispensable as they are to the sound discharge of command, the status accorded "communications" in the infantry is that of a poor relation. Vast sums of money have been devoted to the development and procurement of advanced communication equipment for our fighting men. Not enough attention has been paid to ensuring that this equipment is operated by competent, interested, trained soldiers.

Not enough prestige and weight is assigned to the men whose job it is to see that communications work at the point where the fighting is. The relatively low rank which commo men hold in the infantry is revealing. The commo chief in a rifle company holds the same rank as the first cook, but rates below every squad leader in the outfit. There are almost 300 commo men in a rifle regiment. As a group, these men hold lower ratings than their skill should justify.

A young infantry officer who gets tagged with the commo label is taking a chance with his career. It's unfortunate, but generally true, that in the infantry commo is a dead-end street for officers and to a lesser extent for enlisted men.



When we turn over the operation of expensive and complicated signal equipment to men who regard commo as a hindrance toward advancement, we can't expect perfect results. The record shows that we don't get them.

One thing that has not been tried is to make the Signal Corps responsible for the communications down to and including company headquarters. Pushing the Signal Corps responsibility downward would automatically in-

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crease the career and professional interest of men responsible for infantry communications. It will not in itself solve all problems but it will fix responsibility for communications on the one group best able to deliver the goods.

This idea is not new. It has so much merit that it seems worth while to restate its advantages. The level at which various specialist functions are taken over and performed by a specialized arm or service is not fixed or immutable. As engineers, quartermasters and signalmen have developed in response to the needs of war, they have been married with the basic combat arms at company, regimental, division, or higher levels. Many of these specialized functions were once performed entirely by the infantry, and in rudimentary form, are still carried on at company level.

Today we find medical aidmen attached to rifle platoons, artillery forward observers with companies, engineer platoons with battalions, artillery battalions working with regiments, and signal and other special units with divisions. It would be just as logical to have the Signal Corps perform the communications function for our infantry companies as it is for the medics to provide company aidmen.

If the Signal Corps was given the communications mission, our communications would be handled by signal men, not converted riflemen, hastily trained. The senior noncoms and officers responsible for infantry communications would be professionally interested in commo. They would be serving in their main interest, not in a side line. Most important, the Signal Corps would gain from more intimate association with the infantry at the combat level. And the operation, design, and maintenance of signal equipment would inevitably improve.

The chief argument against moving Signal Corps responsibility for communications down to company level is the persistent phobia that the unit commander should own all of his resources outright. This principle continues to have adherents in a day when only the theater commander even approaches possessing command control over all units needed for the discharge of a mission. Lower echelons are daily and even hourly dependent upon many other arms and services for their very military survival.

Aren't we taking too great a risk to permit semi-trained men to handle the first prerequisite of effective command —communications?

LT. COL. WILLIAM R. KINTNER
Infantry

FRONT AND CENTER

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Battlefield Illumination Division

In line with continuing efforts to improve target acquisition, instruction in illumination has been centralized at TAS in a Battlefield Illumination Division of the Department of Observation.

The four officers and eleven men in the division have the mission of organizing and presenting an instructional program in the use of searchlights. In addition, it is responsible for other visible and invisibile (e.g., infrared) illumination research, doctrine, and instruction, as well as the development of techniques for the employment of searchlights.

A course of instruction for the field illumination crewman (MOS 1763) will start on or about 1 September. Three weeks long, the course will cover operation, maintenance, and employment of the truck-mounted, 60-inch searchlight. Additional courses for the section chief and for maintenance personnel are now in the planning stage. The division will also present illumination instruction in such general resident courses as ABOC and AOAC.

Crater Analysis

A new POI has been adopted for all classes on crater and fragment analysis. Of particular import is the fact that increased time has been allotted for both conference and practical field work.

The increased time allocated field work is, in a sense, a return to the system previously employed at TAS; it calls for "live shoots" that enable each student crater analysis team to study fresh craters much as they would in combat. Attempts in the past to utilize service practice craters were found unsatisfactory; variety of types was lacking, and distinguishing features were virtually eliminated after one class had tramped the ground.

As an adjunct to conference work, TF 6-1686, "Crater Analysis," recently completed, has been included. TM 30-240, "Soviet Projectile Identification Guide," has been received in sufficient quantity to be made available to students as a training aid.

Technique of Attack

A new class in artillery tactics—"Basic Considerations in Application of Artillery Fire in the Attack of Targets"—is now in the process of preparation. It will instruct artillery men in the determination of the amount of ammunition necessary to produce a given effect on a target of a given nature. The mathematics involved will be reduced to graphical form and will provide S3s a general guide for matching a minimum expenditure of ammunition with desired effect on a target. The Combat Development Department is providing the statistical data.

It is anticipated the instruction will be included in various POIs in October of this year.

Large Angle "T"

When a large angle "T" (over 800 mils) exists, many of the deviations right or left of the "OT" line seen by the observer are actually caused by normal range dispersion. Observers with limited firing experience frequently have unnecessarily expended ammunition and frustrated themselves in an effort to bring these wandering rounds to the line. TAS is now processing a change to FM 6-40 which emphasizes this vagary of large angle "T" missions.

The change instructs the observer that, in effecting his adjustment, he should take advantage of terrain sensings for range and not try to correct small deviations to the "OT" line.

FDC is also affected in that the HCO is given an additional duty: Required to measure the angle "T" after announcing the range for the initial plot of each mission, he announces that angle to the closest 100 mils if it exceeds 800 mils; this information is then transmitted to the observer immediately after the on-the-way for the first volley; e.g., "On the way. Angle 'T' (so many) mils." This procedure insures that the observer is aware of the large angle "T."

Decentralized Fire Direction

TAS is conducting tests of the concept of decentralized fire direction. This concept places the battalion FDC in a supervisory position and makes the battery FDC the working agency that actually determines the commands to be sent to the guns. Special Text 6-40-1, prepared at TAS, covers the system as now developed; this text will not be available for purchase or for distribution to other than students being trained in the decentralized system for testing purposes.

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

1953 Army Pistol Team

TIS was host in July to fifty-four of the Army's best pistol shots. The twenty best shooters were selected to represent the Army in the West Georgia pistol matches, Fort Benning, El Paso, Texas, and the Far Southwestern Regional matches, the National Pistol matches, Camp Perry, Ohio.

Marksmanship

Several instructors from TIS conducted a course in rifle marksmanship training in August at Camp Perry, Ohio. The course was designed to foster a uniform civilian-military method of M1 instruction.

Rifle instructors from the regular Army,

reserve components of all services, and instructors of the National Rifle Association clubs were shown the latest rifle instructional techniques taught at TIS.

Arctic Warfare Schooling

To keep TIS abreast of the latest Arctic warfare technique, eleven officers attended the one-month Army Indoctrination Field Exercise at Big Delta, Alaska. It stressed the problems confronted during an Arctic summer, and included survival, types of food and methods of travel.

Field Expedients

TIS is placing greater emphasis on the use of field-expedient training aids. The aim is to teach students how to construct and use teaching aids made from materials readily available in the field. It is believed this will aid instructors and raise the standard of Infantry instruction.

Extension Course Revision

The Infantry Army Extension Course program has been revised to parallel the resident instruction now offered at TIS.

Many new sub-courses have been added, some deleted or changed, and a few of the older ones have been retained. The twenty series of the overhauled program is now available for issue to students. The others are expected to be ready on or about the following dates: Thirty series, 1 October 1953; Forty series, 1 April 1954; Fifty series, 1 January 1954.

Prior to the above dates, the sub-courses for the thirty, forty and fifty series, as listed in the Extension Course Program's 1952 catalog, will remain in effect. The present sixty series distributed by the Infantry School will be integrated with the fifty series. An entirely new sixty series is now available from the Command and General Staff College.

USAR School Examinations

TIS has mailed its comprehensive yearly examinations to cover subjects presented by Infantry branches of USAR Schools. These examinations were sent to the schools on 30 June 1953 to cover the training period ending 31 August 1953. Examinations included four one-hour tests to be administered and returned to TIS by 15 August.

Material for use with the classroom phase of USAR instruction for 1953-54 was mailed in July. This material included a catalog of instruction and training material necessary for effective presentation.


Reorganization of The Artillery Center

The new organization of The Artillery Center is shown in the chart below. In consolidating and streamlining the operations of the school, the reorganization placed heavy emphasis on the reduction of overhead activities.

All instructional departments will now operate under the newly created Office of the Deputy Assistant Commandant. Combined in this one office are the previously separate functions of the Supervisor of Resident Instruction and the Supervisor of Non-Resident Instruction. Airborne and Special Operations (ABSOP), formerly handled by the Department of General Subjects, have been switched to the Department of Combined Arms. The Department of Training Publications and Aids has dropped its training aids responsibilities; with its old designation going into limbo, the remainder of its functions have been consolidated with those of the Department of Extension Courses in the new Department of Publications and Non-Resident Instruction.

On the administrative side of the ledger, the Secretary of TAS is now responsible for the Training Aids Shop, the Army Field Printing Plant, the Book Department, TAS Supply, the Library, and the Registrar's Office.

Another important change at TAS was the discontinuance of the Department of Air Training and its re-establishment here on 1 July as the Army Aviation School.



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★ BOOK REVIEWS ★

BRILLIANT EXPOSITION OF SOVIET STRATEGY

A CENTURY OF CONFLICT. By Stefan T. Possony. Henry Regnery Company, 1953. 439 Pages; Index; $7.50.

Here's a book that is not for burning—at least not in countries this side of the Iron Curtain. For it is a much needed exploration of the formidable and devious Soviet pattern of conquest in all its manifestations. This pattern is extremely complex, for simplicity in strategic plans is not a fetish in Moscow. The Russian Communists understand thoroughly that warfare is never limited to conflict on the battlefield. They know that war will always be fought on diplomatic, psychological, economic, technological, as well as on military fronts. Russian strategy in the world conflict today is designed to use all these forces separately or concurrently, in varying degrees of relative intensity.

This country and its associates in the democratic world have paid an exorbitant price for their disregard of the all-embracing theory and practice of Russian grand strategy, and for their ignorance of Soviet intentions and techniques. Ignorance is no longer an excuse, for in this book Soviet strategy and intentions are disclosed thoroughly and effectively. Dr. Possony's analysis of the written and spoken words of Communist leaders and of the history of Communist action in Russia, China, and other countries, leaves no doubt as to past methods. From the record of the past, Dr. Possony deduces the principles of action that will inevitably animate the Russian leaders in their present conflict with the United States. Through his pages we begin to know our enemy better.

Dr. Possony is well equipped to explain Soviet strategic doctrine. He has a Ph.D. from the University of Vienna, and in the United States he has been associated with the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton and with Georgetown University, where he is at present Professor of International Relations. As a recognized authority on geopolitics and military history, he has lectured at many of the Armed Forces colleges.

Under his guidance, we can avoid some of the mistakes that we have made in the past, due to our failure to appreciate the political and social aspects of modern war. The Russian military and political leaders are well aware of these factors and this has resulted in a unification of military and political strategy, to which they can certainly attribute much of their success.

According to Dr. Possony, Von Clausewitz is a major prophet in the Soviet religion of violence. Never for a moment do the Russians forget his famous dictum that, "War is the continuation of politics." Americans would do well to weigh carefully the author's comments on a book published in 1948 by Marshal Bulganin. Referring to the Marshal, Dr. Possony writes,

> ". . . the principal mistake of bourgeois military leaders lies in their overstress of the strictly military aspects of war; at best, they are able to extend their thinking to a consideration of war potentials. Actually, according to him, war planning must cover the military, the economic, and the psychological fields, and operations must be correspondingly undertaken in all three spheres.
>
> "Bulganin is in favor of replacing the ill-defined German concept of total war with that of the politico-military war. Modern war, he believes, is both a national and a social conflict. Propaganda is a weapon as effective as conventional military measures. Political techniques can paralyze an army through destructive propaganda aiming at the annulment (rather than the annihilation) of hostile forces. Psychological warfare can be the major factor leading to the overthrow of the defeated nation's government and its replacement by a new regime socially and politically acceptable to the victor."

This book undoubtedly oversimplifies the strategic and political principles of Marx and Engels, but it is noteworthy in showing how profoundly these laymen influenced the development of Communist strategy and revolutionary tactics. Lenin's theory of conquest and expansion is based on these initial Communistic principles, but shows important modifications of his own. Although we are accustomed to thinking of Communists as materialists, there is much evidence to show that Lenin never underestimated spiritual forces. He was, however, always seeking superior manpower as an indispensable element in Communist success, and for that reason a Communist revolution in the Orient was essential. In China this is a *fait accompli*, but Lenin's goal also contemplated a Communist India.

Stalin, according to Dr. Possony, "was one of the greatest military captains of history. This is a matter of record and the Western nations must recognise this fact." The reasons for this high estimate of Stalin's ability in war are well documented. Dr. Possony's analysis of Stalin's victory in the Danube Basin and the Balkans attributes much of that success to the skillful employment by Stalin of diplomatic and psychological warfare.


Revolutionary and strategic theory in Communist China are of particular interest to the United States. In considering Mao's military doctrine, Dr. Possony discovers that like Stalin, the Chinese leader counts on making war lucrative. The greatest novelty in Mao's teaching is the idea that war should be a paying business and that one should not hesitate to fight wars of attrition against superior forces. "This is a philosophy of guts which sometimes seems to have disappeared from western military and political thinking. If Mao or one of his disciples were to influence strongly the leadership of international Communism, the world could witness the boldest and most ambitious aggression of history. This aggression would not be launched for the sake of agrarian reform, but for world domination."

The final chapter of the book should be required reading for all senior officers. In it Dr. Possony summarizes in an ingenious and brilliant synthesis the Soviet doctrine of conquest. It defines the fundamentals of the broadened concept of warfare that are so important for us to understand. There is particular interest for all military personnel in the changes the Russians have apparently made in the standard principles of war and the additions that they have devised to supplement them. It is extremely important that we understand the theory and practice of Soviet organization. We must bear in mind that the Soviet weapons of violence include fire power, infiltration, deception, and other devices. These revelations of the mind of our enemy will forearm us and will teach us the vital lesson that the military leaders of this nation will neglect the social forces of our time only at the greatest peril to our national security.—BRIG GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG.

STILL WANTED: A MODERN TEXT ON MILITARY LAW

MILITARY JUSTICE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE By James Snedeker, Brigadier General United States Marine Corps, Retired. Boston Little, Brown and Company, 1953. 105 Pages; $15.00.

When the second and last edition o Colonel William Winthrop's *Military Law and Precedents* was published, in 1896 the total number of officers and enliste men in the Army, including those on th retired list, did not exceed 30,000 an they were governed by a set of Article of War that, except for some patchwor amendments reflecting the needs of th Civil War, and a renumbering when th Revised Statutes were adopted in 187 had not been changed since 1806. Sinc then the United States has fought fou major conflicts and the number of perso subject to military law at any given tim has risen to more than twelve millio The disciplinary laws governing the Arm have been rewritten no less than four time more drastically each time, the final or being the Uniform Code of Military Ju tice. That Code, with its extended a pellate process capped by a civilian Cou of Military Appeals, went into effect 31 May 1951. And yet, until just th other day, Winthrop's second edition r mained the only available text on milita



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
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law. In the opinion of General Bethel, a former Judge Advocate General of the Army, Winthrop was too far obsolete even after the 1920 changes for mere revision and amendment; it was already a classic by that time. And Winthrop will certainly not be replaced by General Snedeker's *Military Justice Under the Uniform Code.*

This work is spotty, inaccurate, and consequently disappointing. To dismiss it as being of little value would be easy, and quite accurate. But since it is the first substantial text on military law for over half a century, since it comes from the pen of a retired general officer and bears the imprint of a distinguished law publisher, the service is entitled to at least a partial bill of particulars—within space limitations—to supplement the foregoing indictment.

(1) General Snedeker had a splendid opportunity to assemble the pre-Uniform Code precedents of the three services, particularly the ones interpreting the punitive articles. Those precedents are still important today because of the extent to which the punitive articles of the UCMJ were taken directly from the AWs. Those precedents are in consequence still cited by the Court of Military Appeals. And yet they are largely inaccessible, and are practically unavailable outside of the largest headquarters. Snedeker, therefore, could have codified the law as to military offenses as it stood prior to 1951, but his book does not do this. It cites only scattered Army and Navy rulings, and none from the Air Force. General Snedeker did not research the hundred and forty-odd volumes of Board of Review opinions. A spot check reveals that he took most, and sometimes all, of his citations from the first edition of Philos, *Manual of Court-Martial Law*—and where Philos was completely wrong, Snedeker dutifully repeats the error. Philos, relying on rulings in the ETO, says that it is not misbehavior before the enemy for an airman to refuse to take off for a target many hundreds of miles away. Snedeker simply copies, citations and all. The reader of either book will not learn that The Judge Advocate General, when given the opportunity, disagreed with ETO, and held that such conduct *was* misbehavior.

(2) Snedeker is particularly weak in his extensive treatment of the general articles —old AW 95 and AW 96, now articles 133 and 134, UCMJ. This is a consequence of his failure to appreciate that before the Army was specifically given jurisdiction over peacetime felonies by AW 93 of 1916 and thereafter, it regularly prosecuted such offenses under the old general article, AW 62 of 1874. That practice was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of the sentry who fired at the assassin of President Garfield. Snedeker does not cite that case, and in consequence makes several incorrect statements as to the Army's pre-1916 jurisdiction to try civil felonies.

(3) There are strong libertarian overtones in the book, which would be less troubling if General Snedeker had been willing to share with the reader the facts of the decisions he discusses at length.

Reasonable men can differ with the Supreme Court's view of double jeopardy expresed in *Wade* v. *Hunter,* 336 U.S. 684. But there can be only one conclusion from the circumstance that, although critical of the case, General Snedeker nowhere sets forth its controlling facts, namely, that the charges were withdrawn from the first court-martial because, after an adjournment to enable the TJA to produce witnesses requested by the court, the division to which the personnel of the court belonged started on its final advance into Germany. Failure to mention these circumstances, despite frequent references to the decision, is, it is submitted, something less than candid.

(4) It is in his chapter on Constitutional Guarantees, however, that General Snedeker really lets himself go. He says:

"As late as 1911, it was quite generally denied by the executive branch of our government that the personal guarantees found in the Federal Constitution were applicable to our men in uniform. Subsequent to that time, it has been admitted that some of the guarantees are applicable. Since 1943, the judicial attitude of our federal courts towards the exercise of jurisdiction by courts-martial has become more parental, and some of the fundamental privileges of the man in uniform are being respected by the more enlightened jurists. . . . This somewhat more liberal attitude on the part of the courts has had the unfortunate effect, however, of delaying the day when Congress would be inclined to give to the armed forces a definitive set of guarantees applicable to the individuals of those forces. . . ."

This quotation furnishes a fine starting point for a long and learned discussion. It will be sufficient, however, to point out that the applicability or otherwise of the Bill of Rights to military trials is hardly an issue of militarists versus civilian judges. The Court of Military Appeals has already twice held that the soldier's protection is statutory rather than constitutional, and the Supreme Court just the other day (*Burns* v. *Wilson,* decided 15 June 1953) arrived at the same conclusion. On this point, therefore, the highest civilian courts are as one with Colonel Winthrop and against General Snedeker.

(5) When a volume as large and expensive as the present one is offered as authority, it is the duty of reviewers to list demonstrable errors:

Snedeker says: "There seems a tendency of court-martial reviewing authorities to discount the influences, short of torture, at work in compelling confessions from subordinates." I checked this and quickly found five rulings, taken virtually at random, directly to the contrary. I could cite them if space were available. It is enough to say that there is simply no excuse for any such charge in a professional treatise. It was clearly the author's duty to check the authorities.

Snedeker says: "The Army, during the last half of the nineteenth century, circumvented the operation of a statute prohibiting Regular Army officers from sitting in courts-martial for the trial of United States Volunteers by giving such officers an indefinite leave of absence from the Regular Army, and investing them with a commission in the Volunteers. This practice was condemned as clearly illegal [by the Courts]." Here the author betrays his ignorance of Army organizational history.

First, there were no Volunteers on duty in the Army between the end of the Civil War and the outbreak of the Spanish War. Next, when Volunteers were authorized during and after the latter war, Volunteer commissions were available for Regular officers. *McClaughry* v. *Deming,* 186 U. S. 49, settled the proposition that Regulars holding no other commission could not try Volunteers, but not until *United States* v. *Brown,* 206 U. S. 240—which went unargued for the Government—was it made clear that the disability attached to any officer of Volunteers who held a Regular commission in a lower grade. Finally, in 1908, far from being shocked by what the Army thought it had the right to do, Congress first permitted minority Regular membership on courts-martial for the trial of militiamen; and the next—and last—Volunteer legislation, in 1914, made any officer of any component eligible to sit in judgment on an accused of any component. And that has been the law ever since.

Is it unfair to suggest that an author should be on sounder ground before imputing ignoble motives to an entire armed force?

Snedeker says: "A command by a superior officer to an enlisted man to wash on table at an officers' mess is in contravention of [a law] which provides that 'no officer shall use an enlisted man as a servant in any case whatsoever.' This law is for the protection of the rights of enlisted men, and the command is illegal," citing a JAG opinion.

But the Judge Advocate General subsequently ruled that "it does not follow that compulsory KP duty in an officers' mess is at all times and under all circumstances violative of the statute. . . . The test to be applied . . . is . . . whether the services were to be performed in the capacity of a private servant to accomplish a necessary military purpose. At a remote island in the Pacific it may be as much an essential military need that officers be fed as that gasoline be placed in airplanes and tanks, or that enlisted men be fed." *Held,* therefore, a lawful order to a soldier to serve on KP duty in an officers' mess. General Snedeker does not cite the later ruling.

And that isn't all. There are cases cited that had been reversed within the period covered by the book. There are many other little mistakes too detailed to be listed here. Some of them were pointed out by The JAG of the Air Force in the Februa

953 issue of the *Vanderbilt Law Review.* listed others in the June 1953 issue of ne *Journal of Legal Education,* in a re-iew on which a member of a service JAG chool faculty—a genuinely learned mili-ary lawyer—commented as follows: "I ould not conceive of a book of this type eing so completely and thoroughly inac-urate. It annoyed me." And he proceeded o list nine additional errors.

Finally, it is to be noted that in all of General Snedeker's eleven hundred pages n *Military Justice Under the Uniform Code* the complete text of the Code nowhere appears.

Military law, therefore, awaits a 20th Century Winthrop. The field is open—wide open.—Col. Frederick Bernays Wiener.

EXCELLENT BATTLE NOVEL

ATROL. By Fred Majdalany. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953. 149 Pages; $2.00.

Major Tim Sheldon, the central figure f *Patrol,* is British, and an infantry major. Ie commands a company, in defensive po-tion in North Africa, at the time of the ovel. At twenty-four he is an old man. Ie has been in combat too long, has borne ie weight of command too long, has been ounded once, and seen too many men ie.

Patrol covers only twenty-four hours, nd in the first hour or so of the twenty-our Sheldon is ordered to furnish a patrol om his company to investigate a hot G2 p that one of the main German positions n front of the battalion has been evacu-ted. Because one of his officers has led atrols the last two nights and the other as joined from a replacement pool in ngland, Sheldon decides to lead the patrol imself. (His company, you have prob-bly gathered by now, is understrength.)

It is not particularly important to the ction that the hot G2 tip is a figment of ie imagination of an idiotic assistant G2 t division. However, Mr. Majdalany does ive the impression that most patrols are milarly conceived although he probably oesn't mean to. Patrolling, as any com-hander knows, is a necessary, though dif-cult and dangerous part of ground war-are. On Mr. Majdalany's side, though, et it be said that far too many patrols are onceived in misinterpretation of evidence nd dedicated to the proposition that it is ustifiable to go to any length to keep roops in defensive positions from getting efensive minded.

It is pretty much in this frame of mind hat Sheldon makes his reconnaissance, ets up the patrol plan, organizes the patrol nd gets ready to lead it out. While he is oing this he is letting his mind run and ou follow his army career—with a little rewar civilian life thrown in—pretty much n soliloquy form. This sort of thing can et out of hand, but Mr. Majdalany has ad the wisdom to put in no more than he eeds to fill in Sheldon's character and how you how he got to be a good officer n the thin edge of cracking up.

Sheldon leads his patrol out, draws fire from at least a battalion in the "abandoned" position, loses two men, is hit in the leg himself, and brings his patrol in with his information. On the way from battalion to brigade in the ambulance he dies, probably from shock, of a wound that probably wouldn't have bothered a man who wasn't completely used up.

Patrol is a tightly written novel by a man who is a full-time writer and critic, and who was a wartime combat infantryman. The combination is a particularly happy one. From a purely military point of view, he has given us as excellent and accurate an account of a patrol action as there is in military writing, whether fact or fiction. If that were all he had accomplished this would still be a valuable book.

But he has gone a great deal beyond reporting. Mr. Majdalany is one of a bare handful of contemporary writers who can get inside the soldier's mind and then write sensibly about what he finds there. Command in battle, whether of a squad or of an army, is one of the loneliest positions on earth, and seldom is the weight of command felt more heavily than by the man who must lead other men on a pitch black night to a spot he has seen only at a distance, discover what he has been sent to discover without wasting the lives of the men he leads, and then bring his patrol back as safely as the chance of war will allow.

Such a man is Tim Sheldon, and the fact that Mr. Majdalany has successfully illuminated for us the workings of his mind and the limitations of his endurance mark him as both a novelist of the first rank and a student of leadership and command whose opinions deserve careful study. *Patrol,* in short, deserves a place in the permanent literature of war.—Orville C. Shirey.

HISTORY OF HIGH PLANNING

STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE, 1941-1942. By Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. 398 Pages; Illustrated; Charts; Index; $3.25.

This eighteenth volume in the Army's official history of World War II hardly sounds like the kind of a book that even the most dedicated professional soldier would select to take with him on a late-summer vacation. Nevertheless it has a certain fascination because here is what the authors call "organized information" on the development of our national strategic planning in the period when this country went from planning primarily for the defense of the Western Hemisphere to coalition warfare all over the world and then on to the beginnings of our present definite global commitments.

It is not necessary to belabor in a military journal the ever-present frustration of planners at all levels who must work long hours under pressure to have a plan ready in case various possible events take place, often to have a new command decision make all the effort valueless. As is clearly brought out in this volume the War Department General Staff had of necessity to plan for many eventualities, including the world-wide operations which finally developed, even as public opinion polls, statements of the President, and votes in Congress indicated the unwillingness of the nation to be drawn into another European war or even to prepare for such action if it should be forced upon us.

It is indicative of the experience now available in strategic planning at the top level that President Eisenhower and Generals Ridgway, Twining, and Hull appear, in more subordinate rolls than their present ones, in this book. Without sure knowledge of enemy intentions or indeed of American decisions under the pressure of future events, there was inevitably much disagreement among the planners. Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Chief of Military History at the time this book was prepared (he has been succeeded by Maj. Gen Albert Cowper Smith), says a valid word of warning in the foreword: "It may seem to the reader that controversy and differences of opinion are stressed and that agreement and cooperative endeavor are slighted. Since planners are occupied with unsettled problems, their work necessarily involves differences of opinion. It is only when all sides of an issue are forcefully presented and the various solutions thereof closely scrutinized that the final plan has any validity. The reader must bear in mind that the differences related herein are those among comrades in arms who in the end always made the adjustments required of the members of a team engaged in a common enterprise."

That the final major decisions came, in accordance with American tradition and law, from the President is emphasized by a sentence in a memorandum from General Marshall to Mr. Roosevelt in the case of "Pacific Theater versus Bolero" (Bolero was the build-up of U.S. forces and supplies in the United Kingdom for the cross-Channel attack): "I present this question to you as Commander-in-Chief, and request that you discuss this matter with Admiral King, General Arnold and me, and give us a formal directive for our future guidance."

Another point that comes out clearly is the importance and difficulty of deciding when to make a decision. The problem is a major one at all levels from the Joint Chiefs down to an infantry squad. The Army's schools have long recognized this fact in the type of problem which has no stated requirements, but only presents a sequence of situations which the student must deal with not only as he sees fit but when he sees fit.

At the international level there is additional evidence, if any is needed, that decisions and plans cannot be solely based on military considerations; political, economic, and sentimental factors were always important, sometimes governing.

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There are some dramatic incidents recorded. In April, 1941, the question of America's early entry into the war came up on the basis of General Marshall having to be prepared to recommend to the President what he should do, and the equally important question of whether or not the President should make a decision at that time. In a meeting with the planners, Marshall required each of the officers present to express his opinion. Colonel McNarney (later General McNarney) answered ". . . that anything that would tend to cause the fall of the British Isles would tend to put the whole load on the United States. That it is important that we start reducing the war-making ability of Germany. We do have a Navy in being and we can do something. If we wait we will end up standing alone and internal disturbances may bring on communism. I may be called a fire-eater, but something must be done." Others present concurred in varying degrees, but Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick strongly disagreed. During the summer, the Army staffs undoubtedly influenced by the German attack on the Soviet Union, came around to General Embick's view. Pearl Harbor, of course, put the matter beyond any necessity for decision.

The reports and recommendations of Colonel (now Brigadier General) Bonner Fellers during the period covered are of particular interest in view of his recent controversial book, *Wings for Peace*. Fellers, in his capacity as U. S. military attaché in Cairo, "held a low opinion of British leadership and slight hopes of British prospects in the war in the desert . . ." His reputation as an observer was high enough to result in his being granted an interview with the President when he was recalled from Cairo. Earlier General Marshall had commented in a memorandum to the President: ". . . Fellers is a very valuable observer but his responsibilities are not those of a strategist and his views are in opposition to mine and those of the entire Operations Division."

This volume is a companion volume to *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, and a third volume, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944*, is in preparation. It is up to the usual high standard of the official Army histories. As a minor criticism, it might be stated that it is rather surprising that the authors go along with less qualified writers in using the term *Afrika Korps* as synonymous with the various designations which were actually assigned to the entire Italian-German force in the North African desert.—MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY.

HOW TO CARRY AMMO

THE POWDER FLASK BOOK. By Ray Riling. Robert Halter, Publisher. 496 Pages; Illustrated; $25.

The words "monumental" and "exhaustive" are adjectives which book reviewers use with extreme caution as accolades not lightly to be granted. In the case of *The Powder Flask Book* by Ray Riling, however, there is no choice. It is both a monumental undertaking and an exhaustive treatment of the subject.

Very soon after the development of really portable firearms about the middle of the fifteenth century, man began to seek some means of conveniently carrying his ammunition upon his person. Many methods were tried. Buckets, bags and pockets were experimented with and abandoned along with other even less probable devices. Gradually there developed a container specifically designed for holding gunpowder. It was made of hard materials for convenient use, and it was tightly stopped to prevent the accidental firing of its contents. This was the powder flask, which was to remain in use for over 400 years until finally supplanted by the self-contained cartridge.

As the years wore on, the materials used for the construction of these flasks increased in variety. There was wood, jacked leather, horn, ivory, bone, gourds or nuts, and metals, both precious and base. Devices were added for measuring the proper charges of powder, and on the finer specimens, the surface decoration reached the realm of the fine arts.

These are the objects with which Mr. Riling has concerned himself in his giant volume. All types are adequately covered although his primary emphasis is placed on the die-stamped metal flasks of the nineteenth century. Every aspect of the flask is considered, its history, its use, the methods of its manufacture. There are chapters on the men who made flasks and on the various patents that have been taken out with reference to them. As an indication of the detail which is contained here, it might be mentioned there is an abridgement of every patent of which there is a record and, if they still exist, the original patent drawings are reproduced. Also all the known early catalogs of flask manufacturers are reprinted in their entirety, which is a great service to students since some of these rare books are known through only one existing copy.

For the collector as well as the student there are special features. The care and repair of flasks is discussed at some length with special drawings of tools and the methods of using them. There is a chapter on flask photography and there are many useful hints and much good advice on keeping records and on general procedures gained from many years of experience by the author. Also to the delight of the collector is a listing of the comparative values of over 1600 individual flasks, every one of which is illustrated in the book.

In addition to the material on powder flasks themselves, there is also much information on associated objects. One especially interesting and amusing section entitled "Caveat Emptor" discusses items which are frequently mistaken for powder flasks and which (although the author doesn't mention it), have even been exhibited as such in leading museums. These

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include snuff bottles, patent oilers, sanders, dram flasks, and purely decorative objects. Then there are sections on related appendages such as shot pouches, chargers, and bullet moulds. And finally a chapter on the cartridge which supplanted the flask and rendered it completely obsolete.

This volume is beautifully designed and printed. The plates, which number several hundred in all, are clear and sharp. The original drawings made especially for the book by John Kerr are excellent and so much in keeping with the other illustrations in the sections in which they appear that they are frequently mistaken for reproductions of contemporary drawings.

It should be said that this reviewer prepared the first chapter, "The Flask Through the Ages," and that therefore all comment on it is omitted here. He had nothing whatsoever to do with the rest of the book, however, and, in fact, did not see it until it appeared in print.—HAROLD L. PETERSON.

FLAG BOOKS

FLAGS OF THE WORLD. Edited by H. Gresham Carr, F.R.G.S. With 300 flags in colour and numerous text drawings. Frederick Warne & Co. Ltd., London and New York, 1953. 209 Pages; $10.00.

THE BOOK OF FLAGS. By Vice-Admiral Gordon Campbell, U.C., D.S.O., and I. O. Evans, F.R.G.S. Second Edition. Geoffrey Cumberlege: Oxford University Press, 1953. 116 Pages; $3.50.

So far as the flag enthusist is concerned, books about flags are like bottles of whiskey: all are good, but some are better than others.

These two recent works are both in the "very good" class, for coverage, illustrations, and up-to-dateness. Written and published in England, British flags are naturally emphasized, with full treatment of government flags and of the Royal Standard through its mutations over the centuries. The same approach is doubtless responsible for the few slips concerning American flags which have crept into both volumes.

Mr. Carr's book has a few more colored pictures, but the scope of each is about the same, so that dollar for dollar the smaller work by Admiral Campbell and Mr. Evans is probably the better buy.

What this reviewer would like to see, frankly, would be a more comprehensive work, on the order of the *National Geographic Magazine's* flag numbers of 1917 and 1934, but expanded to show every Army flag now included in SR 840-10-1 (successor to our old friend, AR 260-10), plus every Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard flag as well. That would be a real flag book!—F. B. W.

GUNFIGHTERS CLASSIC

TRIGGERNOMETRY: A Gallery of Gunfighters. By Eugene Cunningham. The Caxton Printers Ltd. 441 Pages; Illustrated; $5.00.

This is the sixth printing of a book that first appeared in 1941, and it's not at all difficult to see why it has become a standard item of Western Americana.

It may be hard to believe that the men whose short biographies appear here were actual people. There are stories of cold courage, blood lust and human endurance that make Chicago gangster stories seem pale in comparison. John Wesley Hardin, a youth with forty notches on his pistol, was as different from Ranger Captain John R. Hughes as any two men could be—but they both made their fame with handguns. Dallas Stoudenmire was a courageous and efficient town marshal; he could handle any number of wild gunmen but he was not nearly as efficient when he met a bottle of the local red-eye.

There are seventeen biographies in the book, all of Western "bad men" and "good men," to steal a phrase from the neighborhood television fans, except General Lee Christmas's story. Christmas performed his deeds in Central America. It is not too easy, in a few of Mr. Cunningham's chapters, to decide whether the subjects were "bad" or "good," and several others seemed to fit both categories at different times.

For something different than the usual, or even the unusual, Western story, try this literate recounting of stirring history.—A.S.

LIZZIE'S GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY

FORD AT FIFTY. Simon & Schuster. 108 Pages; Illustrated in color; $2.95.

As a commemorative of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Ford Motor Company, the company determined to produce a pictorial history of the Ford Motor Company. The result is a beautiful, short volume of high interest. About two-thirds of the book is devoted to excellent photographs, many in full color, and the remaining third is descriptive text. Obviously no expense has been spared to make this book worthy of the occasion for which it was issued.

The story of the company's start and development under Henry Ford is briefly told and well-illustrated. Quite properly, the main emphasis focuses on the present day operations of the firm. This is in no sense a fancy report for stockholders but really a book of merit in its own right.

The graphic descriptions of the intricacies of the production line are excellent and sure to absorb the interest of any car owner. Likewise, the experimental models will catch the eye of gadget-loving Americans.

The Ford Motor Company, as one of the foremost of our industrial giants, occupies a special niche in Americana partially because of the well-known Horatio Alger story of its founder. There's ample evidence in this handsome volume that the company is continuing its progress under the current generation in the same fine tradition.—R.F.C.

BOOKS RECEIVED

MINERALS—A KEY TO SOVIET POWER. By Demitri B. Shimkin. Harvard University Press. 452 Pages; Index; $8.00. A systematic survey of the mineral resources, production and consumption position of the U.S.S.R.

ALWAYS THE YOUNG STRANGERS. By Carl Sandburg. Harcourt, Brace and Company. 445 Pages; Index; $5.00. The story of Carl Sandburg's interesting life.

MAPS AND DIAGRAMS: Their Compilation and Construction. By F. J. Monkhouse and H. R. Wilkinson. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 330 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.00.

THE OBSERVER'S BOOK OF SHIPS. By Frank E. Dodman. 192 Pages.

THE OBSERVER'S BOOK OF AIRCRAFT. By William Greene & Gerald Pollinger. Frederick Warne & Co., Inc. 280 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $1.25 each.
Pocket-sized books published in England giving identification data and other information on their subjects.

THE WONDERFUL WORLD OF INSECTS. By Albro Gaul. Rinehart & Company, Inc. 291 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.00.

THE STONES OF THE HOUSE. By Theodore Morrison. The Viking Press, Inc. 375 Pages; $3.50.

WHAT TO DO WHEN. By Jennifer Colton. Harper & Brothers. 234 Pages; $3.00. Practical and entertaining answers to awkward everyday problems.

THE RUSSIAN MIND: From Peter the Great Through the Enlightenment. By Stuart Ramsay Tompkins. The University of Oklahoma Press. 291 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.00.

BACK DOWN THE RIDGE. By W. L. White. Harcourt, Brace and Company. 182 Pages; $3.00. Tracing the wounded from Korea to recovery.

OUR LOVE AFFAIR WITH GERMANY. By Hans Habe. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 247 Pages; $3.00.

THE NEW FORCE. By Ralph E. Lapp; Foreword by Stewart Alsop. Harper & Brothers. 238 Pages; Index; $3.00. A look at the atom from the non-scientific point of view by the author of *Must We Hide.*

THE AMERICAN THESAURUS OF SLANG, new edition. By Lester V. Berrey and Melvin Van den Bark. Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1272 Pages; $6.95. A second edition of what is now a standard book.

ARCTIC SOLITUDES. By Admiral Lord Mountevans. Philosophical Library, Inc. 143 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.50. A concise history of the expeditions, from Davis and Hudson to the present.

THE ATOM STORY. By J. G. Feinberg. Philosophical Library, Inc. 243 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.75. A layman's book on the atom.

GENERALS AND ADMIRALS: The Story of Amphibious Command. By Capt. John Creswell, R.N. Longmans Green and Co., Inc. 192 Pages; Maps; Index; $4.00. Amphibious commands of the last 250 years.

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
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
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By Lieutenant Colonel Eben F. Swift

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Vol. 4, No. 3 — **October 195**

CITY HALL HAS ITS HAND OUT, TOO 1

TO THE EDITORS 1

DIVISION OBJECTIVE. *Lt. Col. Eben F. Swift* 1

FRAME-UP, COMMUNIST STYLE. *Lt. Gough G. Reinhardt* 3

OUR POWs ARE NOT TRAITORS. *Edward Hunter* 3

THE NEW OFFICERS' EFFFICIENCY REPORT.
Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin 3

WHAT THE RUSSIANS SAY ABOUT HOW WE FIGHT.
Capt. Garrett Underhill 4

CEREBRATIONS 4

CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE.
Rotation of Assignments 4

FRONT AND CENTER 4

BOOK REVIEWS 5

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AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



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INTERNATIONAL SERVICE—Sabena Belgian Airlines i August opened the first scheduled international helicopte passenger service, supplementing its regular airline servic to all of Europe, the Near East and Africa. Using bi Sikorsky S-55s, helicopter flights will serve cities i Belgium, Holland, France, Germany and Luxemburg.



FAST SERVICE—With Sikorsky S-55 helicopters, the first regularly scheduled U. S. helicopter passenger service has been opened by New York Airways. In July, regular passenger flights began between LaGuardia, New York International, and Newark Airports in the New York City area. Only minutes are needed for inter-airport trips, which once took hours by surface vehicle.

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WE knew our readers would like "Give Us Back Our Pride" when we published it in the August issue and we are glad so many of you have written us saying so. Most of you who wrote us called it an "editorial," as did Mr. Hanson Baldwin, who wrote a couple of columns on it in *The New York Times*. It wasn't a staff editorial but an article, strongly editorial in tone, by an Army colonel who didn't want his name on it. We thought we had made this clear in the line that read: "An old-timer says . . ." We are proud to have published it even though it advocated some things that are not necessarily believed in by the JOURNAL. This, as you know, follows the JOURNAL's practice of publishing opinions that "may be at variance" with those held by the Association's officers and the editors, as the statement on our contents page puts it each month.

YOU also liked—and this was an editorial—"On Commissaries and Productivity" in the September issue. The JOURNAL intends to continue to hit hard at all selfish and unwarranted attacks on professional service men and women. And we also intend to publish lucid, hard-hitting articles, such as the one by the "old-timer," that suggest ways for the Army itself to improve the lot of its officers and men and make the Army better able to fulfill its vital mission.

CITY HALL HAS ITS HAND OUT, TOO

YOU can add City Hall and the State Capitol to your list of special interests that want to put their hands in the service man's pocket and extract some of his hard-earned dollars. Representative Joel T. Broyhill of Virginia has introduced a bill which would require members of the armed forces to pay local personal property taxes and state income taxes in communities and states in which they are stationed.

The service family appreciates living in a pleasant, comfortable community with good schools, safe streets, public libraries, adequate parks and playgrounds, and an alert and progressive local government. It may appreciate them more than the permanent residents of such communities, for most service families have experienced living in communities that were not comfortable, pleasant, clean or progressive. The service family also knows that these things have to be paid for and that Americans pay for them because they are a part of what makes our standard of living the highest the world has ever known.


BUT the service family is without choice as to where it shall live and without influence in civic affairs. The service man is a "captive" resident and it is therefore unfair and unreasonable to so tax him. The federal government has long recognized this, by indirection at least. Schools are by far the most costly item in the local budget and the federal government pays local school boards a fair share of the cost of educating students of service families (and other defense workers) in any community that has a heavy influx of such families. And the federal government also contributes financially to the school building programs of such communities.

This is a sound principle, generally recognized and followed by the business world. When a business firm temporarily transfers a man it customarily pays all of his extraordinary expenses; and certainly all service assignments are temporary. If City Hall finds that the cost of local government is unduly burden some because of the large number o service families in the community, i should appeal to the federal governmen for assistance, rather than ask for a law that will let it tax the "captive" servic families within its midst.

SERVICE families do not want to b and aren't "free loaders." They hav heavy expenses that never appear in th budgets of permanently located families Their pay does not keep up with th cost-of-living index and they are cor stantly finding that they must now pa for services that formerly were consic ered part of their rights.

Prices in post exchanges have gon up. Commissaries are threatened wit extinction. Medical services for depen ents are being reduced and may b entirely eliminated. Expense allowance no longer pay full expenses. And so goes. Add to all this the grasping finge of the local tax collector and the burde becomes well-nigh intolerable.

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6. Reducing oil intake
7. Eliminating engine cooling problems

These improvements will materially simplify the maintenance and supply problems of ground crews who must service planes in inaccessible combat areas.


Development of the new XL-19B gas turbine powered observation plane is one of many military projects now in operation at Cessna plants in Wichita, Prospect and Hutchinson, Kansas.

Others include production of bomber and fighter plane parts for the Air Force, a helicopter for the Navy, more L-19s for the Army, Marines and National Guard and experimentation on Boundary Layer Control which shortens the landing and take-off of high-speed aircraft.

CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, WICHITA, KANSAS

IN OBSERVATION PLANES AND BOUNDARY LAYER CONTROL





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MEETING ENGAGEMENT

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Invasion Jeopardized

Brig. Gen. Paschal N. Strong tells a "now it can be told" story of how the success of the invasion of Normandy in 1944 was thrown into danger by sudden changes of plan that made months of careful planning worthless and drove members of an overworked planning section into the hospitals.

The Infantry Division: Triangular or Square?

Brig. Gen. George E. Lynch argues persuasively and to the point in advocating formation of a square division that eliminates the brigade headquarters. He says it will bring self-restorative powers to the division and give regimental and division commanders more flexibility.

Promotion System in Transition

Lieut. Col. E. N. Kirsten says that the Army is in a state of change from a policy of promotion by seniority to promotion by selection and that the problem of adjustment leaves few officers happy. The big question is whether the system will produce the kind of army we must have.

Self-Propelled Artillery in Positional Warfare

Lieut. Col. Jerry F. Dunn tells how a highly mobile 155mm SP battalion adjusted itself to the stalemate of the Korean conflict.

★ To the Editors . . . ★

Renewal and Criticism

To the Editors:

Enclosed are my membership dues. However, now that I am in good graces again, I feel free to make a criticism of our JOURNAL. Not of content, but only that there is not enough content. I realize the present high cost of publishing such an excellent magazine. I do, however, believe the cost could be reduced by less artistic covers, and the use of less expensive paper. I believe there to be many like myself, who would appreciate and treasure the CFJ if it were printed on wrapping paper, if the content were increased.

In the future, I would appreciate information of foreign armies. Not only of potentially aggressor nations, but of our allies.

EDMUND T. BROHMAN
1517 E. 54th St.
Chicago 15, Ill.

● Thanks for the renewal and the suggestion. Our paper and cover costs are not excessive and cheaper paper would not save enough to add more pages—which is our desire as well as yours.

Error?

To the Editors:

Your usually excellent magazine has committed a most horrible editorial error. You printed an article [called] "This Is Tactics?" in your August issue.

Better change the words of your policy statement from "stimulate thought and promote discussion," to "stimulate thought and/or promote discussion."

CAPT. P. MCGROTTY
U.S.M.C.
405 Linden Circle
Huntington, W. Va.

● In the opinion of the editors the stimulation of thought and the promotion of discussion does not preclude an occasional escape to humor that may also prick a few of our cherished conceits—so long as the pricking is without malice or intent to do lasting harm.

Community Traditions

To the Editors:

Your July, 1953 JOURNAL contained two articles that I must write about and in some way try to convey to you how happy I am that you have published them.

The first, by Brig. Gen. George E. Lynch, "Where Is the Regimental Commander?" is a masterful study of regimental command. I have been overwhelmed in the past with hot-shot regimental commanders who spent their time at the front commanding platoons and being so intent on impressing us with their personal heroic conduct that it is very refreshing to read a practical study on the correct way to command a regiment in combat. You can tell General Lynch he knows his business.

Then of course "Give Us Back Our Pride" has been long overdue. Just one thing is missing—in addition to giving back to the soldiers a unit to be proud of you certainly should never miss on giving the citizen soldier his sectional or geographic groupings. At the bare mention of this I can already hear the pitiful peepings of those who will cry "high casualty rates in one community" but with never a thought to the high morale factor involved. As a matter of fact, our studies of those communities that had large National Guard casualties show that they were always first in war bond drives and related activities, that the "high casualty rate" was reduced when the PWs returned, that percentagewise those communities ran no higher in casualties than other like communities of comparable size, and finally, without exception those communities demanded the return of those units upon reorganization. I think you will agree that is high morale.

We will never win the next war with those faceless things that G1 calls "bodies" —we must have units that know their traditions and will die for them.

MAJ. GEN. BUTLER B. MILTONBERGER
Retired
North Platte, Nebr.

● Thanks for a fine letter from a former National Guardsman who served with distinction as a regimental and assistant division commander in Europe in 1944-45.

Unit Pride

To the Editors:

Not often do I write letters to editors but the current issue of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL published "Give Us Back Our Pride" which must not go unnoticed.

As an intelligence officer in the 386th Bombardment Group in the European Theater during World War II, I had a certain pride in "belonging" to that group although the majority of people who ask me in which unit I served never heard of it. Having served in the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps in World War I, I seldom recall my unit . . . therefore I am always glad to read the sound comments you publish in COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. I believe we have become too interested in "parades" and not enough concerned with field operations and eventual combat results.

Your effort to give the soldier a deep sense of pride in himself, his unit and his branch of service is vitally important to our survival as a free people. After World War I, I was convinced that we were all fighting to *stay alive*, to preserve the individual and unit spirit which always results in a good job, well done. I have a feeling of deep sympathy for all our men who

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
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MAJ. C. E. MCKINNEY
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Erie, Pa.

"Fish or Cut Bait"

To the Editors:

Down this way we enjoyed "Fish or Cut Bait" [August issue] a lot. A kick in the teeth was indicated—and in the proper choppers. You did that good. Too often complainants blame the Reserve officers. I contend that *even National Guard officers* couldn't make the Reserve program (?) work—which means it can't be made to do business.

BRIG. GEN. CHARLES G. SAGE
The Adjutant General
Santa Fe, New Mexico

To the Editors:

Please accept my heartiest congratulations on "Fish or Cut Bait." . . . I read this today and I find it is most timely and directly to the point. I only hope that responsible individuals in the Department of Defense and the congressional committees place the proper degree of importance on what you have written.

BRIG. GEN. GERARD W. KELLEY
Hq. New York Nat. Guard
270 Broadway, N.Y., N.Y.

1 1 1

To the Editors:

I have enjoyed reading your very interesting article "Fish or Cut Bait." It is not often that the status of the National Guard is so clearly and accurately recorded in service publications. Its wide distribution will be very beneficial.

There is one more thought that I hope, at your leisure, you may explore and discuss:

"Why should Selective Service induct bona fide officers and men who are already in the armed forces, receiving Federal training and subject to the immediate call of the President?"

MAJ. GEN. S. GARDNER WALLER
Virginia National Guard
Richmond 19, Va.

1 1 1

To the Editors:

"Fish or Cut Bait" is well written, your facts hold water and your logic is clear. I concur completely with your thinking and I congratulate you not only upon the article, but upon your courage in publishing a piece that is somewhat controversial.


We have been enjoying the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL for some time, and in the old days, of course, *The Field Artillery Journal,* since I am an artilleryman, even though I wear the GS insignia.

COL. HARLAN D. BYNELL
Adj. Gen. Office
St. Paul, Minn.

1 1 1

To the Editors:

Surely enjoyed "Fish or Cut Bait." It really is well written. Someday maybe



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there can be a good program developed for the Organized Reserves instead of having them try to enter into the field which, I feel, should be exclusively that of the National Guard. There are many ways that officers of the ORC could be trained adequately but, so far, no one seems to want to use these methods.

MAJ. GEN. RAYMOND H. FLEMING
The Adjutant General
Louisiana National Guard,
New Orleans 12, La.

To the Editors:

Colonel Robert Cocklin's "Fish or Cut Bait" in the August issue was extremely thought-provoking. As a noncom in a National Guard unit I am very much interested in any idea that would better the Guard and at the same time strengthen our country's defenses.

Probably the best method of strengthening an organization is to instill a strong feeling of pride in the individual man. Pride not only in his unit, but in himself and the job he is doing. The question is, how can this best be accomplished?

First of all a man has pride in his job when he is sure he is doing it well and that he is necessary. This confidence in himself can only be developed by thorough training. As for the feeling of being needed, that will come almost naturally if the National Guard unit holds the esteem of the citizens of the community and provided his superiors follow it up by emphasizing the importance of the individual as a part of the team.

The problem then is to see that the individual Guardsman receives the proper training in his specialty to enable him to do a good job. Naturally my opinion is biased; but I feel that along with this the man who must be forced by law into serving his country should get the short end of the stick.

A possible method might be based on the present draft age of 18½ and the present enlistment age of 17. Between the ages of 17 and 17½ the individual would be permitted to enlist in the National Guard for a period of four years with the provision that two years of this hitch would be spent on active duty in his National Guard specialty, either with a Regular Army unit or at one of the Army service schools. If when eligible he desires to attend one of the OCS courses this should be counted as part of his active duty time.

A Guardsman would not go on active duty until he had completed at least one year of orientation training in his National Guard unit and specialty. Upon completion of his tour of duty he would be returned to the same unit. When he does leave for active service, however, he should have the minimum rank of private E and preferably private first class, or possibly even corporal, if he is exceptionally well qualified.

The draftees, on the other hand, would be used as fillers to allow the Guardsmen on active duty to get the greatest value out of the training. Of course the draftee would have approximately the same opportunities as the Guardsman, but would be at a definite disadvantage because of the Guardsman's one year of training.

At the end of his two years active duty the draftee would be given his choice of two additional years EAD or of enlisting in a Class A reserve unit with the understanding that if his record was not satisfactory he would complete the two years in active service.

The present system of selecting officers of the Guard is satisfactory in that it allows the individual Guardsman to come up through the ranks either by taking extra time at home to complete the Series 10 Extension Course or by attending an OCS.

JAMES F. MCGILLIVRAY
6938 S. Cregier Ave.
Chicago 49, Ill.

To the Editors:

Just a few lines about Colonel Cocklin's "Fish or Cut Bait." It would have been a far better day if instead of baiting the ORC, the good Colonel had gone fishing. One of the most disturbing things about this one-sided article is that if it isn't JOURNAL policy, as such, the writer, holding the job he does with the JOURNAL, is somewhat closer to headquarters than the average JOURNAL contributor.

Colonel Cocklin doesn't appear to be too much of a team man. He seems to think that the Guard has done great things with no help from anyone. This is far from the case. Every National Guard division down through the years in the test of getting ready for combat (which is what we exist for) has drawn its real strength from the outside. Colonel Cocklin knows this and yet in trying to make the National Guard look so ready and self-sufficient and helpful he went far out of his way to kick the ORC. Many truthful statistics could be quoted which might slightly tarnish the luster of Colonel Cocklin's picture. Possibly some of these "unpretty" facts should be printed, but our theory is that we don't build ourselves up by trying to tear someone else down.

Colonel Cocklin possibly intended for his "satellite unit" suggestion to be the most galling and degrading point in his whole article. It would probably surprise him to know that many Reserve officers, especially those in ORC combat units now, would be glad to take him up on the suggestion. Maybe we could have a little competition and a policy that, if the unit was better led by the ORC officers, the National Guard officers would become the satellites. From what I have seen in my years in the NG and at the present time in the ORC I know where my money would be.

This Army of ours is a three-horse team working abreast, and if all of us, the Regulars, Guardsmen and Reservists, do not real

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ize that we are mutually supporting and pulling-forward-horses, there will surely come an unhappy day for our national defense.

COL. NORBORNE P. BEVILLE
3536 S. Wakefield St.
Arlington, Va.

● "Fish or Cut Bait" was not an expression of JOURNAL policy. As the statement on page 2 says, it is JOURNAL policy "to print articles . . . [that] stimulate thought and promote discussion . . . regardless of the fact that some of the opinions advanced may be at variance with those held by the officers of the Association . . . and editors."

Infantry Song

To the Editors:

I doubt if Hollywood realizes it but it seems to have come up with a song for the Infantry.

The title is "Take the High Ground," from a picture of the same name. I heard it played by a local disc jockey several weeks ago and promptly purchased a copy.

The tune is the catchiest I have ever heard for an infantry song and the lyrics are to the point, mentioning various battles, the sacrifices and finally the whole reason for an infantry, "the fight to make men free."

Only one sore point, is the complete omission of the name of any World War II battles; plenty of the Revolutionary and Korean, but none from World War II. The tune being as catchy as it is, it wouldn't take much to write some additional lyrics incorporating more battle names.

I'm not plugging the picture, just suggesting that the Infantry may finally have a song.

JAMES P. CAHILL
5817 Riviera Drive
Coral Gables, Fla.

Recon Company

To the Editors:

I enclose remittance for the renewal of my subscription to COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. Also to express a desire for information or an article on what gives today with the Division Reconnaissance Company.

I served four years with First Reconnaissance Troop, later redesignated First Reconnaissance Company, 1st Infantry Division. I have been wondering how these Recon companies function today? Have tactics changed, been revised, TO&Es changed? Of course, company reconnaissance is not on the same scale as regiment or squadron reconnaissance tactics.

It seems to me that an article on the recon company might also be of interest to others. I realize that I am only one of many who read and admire the JOURNAL. It surely must be a headache to try and satisfy each and every one of your readers. I not only like the JOURNAL, I appreciate it.

I enjoyed "Get a Prisoner," in the June issue. It was a well executed operation. In my four years, 1940-1944, I can't remember when our missions weren't fully explained and everyone understanding fully what was expected from the mission. Map reading is a must for everyone, regardless of rank.

Sometimes I believe the JOURNAL almost as good as a refresher lecture, only easier to understand.

FRANCIS W. LAVERTUE
Concord, N. H.

● Thanks. We'll try to get something good about the reconnaissance company. Actually it hasn't changed a great deal.

Leadership and Rank

To the Editors:

I have read with interest your articles and the letters to the editor for some time. I am not the letter-writing type, but some of the ideas that you have been printing are just too much for me. I would like to express my comments on one or two.

One of your letter-to-the-editor writers wrote: "One of the biggest and greatest problems we have in the Army today is the lack of leadership among junior officers." He says in the same letter that company commanders should be majors, battalion commanders, colonels, and so on. If that is a solution, I'll stand on my head in front of the flagpole at high noon. You can not make a leader out of a man by hanging more rank on him. That is like the general who heard that troops with high morale sang while they marched. So, he issued an order that all troops on the march would sing, thus attaining high morale. The reason that we do not have better leadership among our junior officers (or senior officers for that matter) is that we have gotten away from the old idea of: (1) give a man a job (2) give him the stuff, and (3) get the hell away from him and let him do it. There is no problem in leadership that cannot be cured by inspiration from the top, instead of interference from the top. Give the company back to the company commander and he will make out all right.

I do not believe that it is necessary to promote the company commander to major, either. The company commander is the company commander. He is the same man regardless of how many times you promote him. The job is just as complex, and if he is worth a damn he won't take any guff from the battalion staff. If the point is that it takes a mature, experienced man to command a company, I agree. But I fail to see how the arbitrary promotion of a bunch of "kid" captains and lieutenants to major will give them maturity and experience. I commanded a company as a second lieutenant. I had my problems, but I am sure that if I had been promoted to major on the spot, my problems would have been just as great. I learned the hard way, the only way—through experience.

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
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
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He Was the Last Man



Pfc. Hector A. Cafferata Jr.,
USMCR
Medal of Honor



IT WAS DURING the Chosin reservoir fighting. Against F Company's hill position. Reds were attacking in regimental strength. The last of Private Cafferata's fire team-mates had just become a casualty, leaving a gap in the defense line. If the enemy could exploit it, they could smash the entire perimeter.

Exposing himself to devastating fire, Private Cafferata maneuvered along the line. Alone, he killed fifteen Chinese, routed the rest, and held till reinforcements plugged the hole.

The Reds hit again. A grenade fell into a gully full of wounded. Private Cafferata hurled it back, saving the men but suffering severe wounds. Ignoring intense pain, he still fought on until a sniper got him.

"If we really want to protect ourselves from the Commies," says Private Cafferata, now retired because of wounds, "we've got to go all out. And one thing all of us at home can do—*should do*—is invest in our country's U. S. Defense Bonds. Sure, Defense Bonds are our personal savings for a rainy day. But they're more—they're muscle behind our G.I.s' bayonets, too!"

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One final point, the ballooning of officer rank is not in the best interest of the service. One of the major reasons why so many enlisted men are leaving the service is that high enlisted rank has become so commonplace that there is no incentive to become a senior NCO. Why not? Because practically everyone is a sergeant. A man gains no prestige by attaining that rank. He is still one of many. The same thing could happen to the officer corps.

MAJ. CHARLES S. STOUGH, JR.
Staff Commander, Amphib. Tng Comd
U.S. Naval Amphibious Base
Coronado, Calif.

Replacement Training

To the Editors:

One of the gravest problems in the entire Army today is the system of replacement training. When a new soldier is inducted into the Army he begins his four months of basic training. He is then given his post-basic leave and assigned to a unit. To get to his unit, particularly if it is overseas, often takes longer than a month.

Hence the new soldier after four months of basic must spend half again that time processing and travelling to reach his unit. During this period of time, the new soldier receives no training and is subject to the loosest form of discipline, in many cases actually approaching an absence of discipline.

When the new soldier arrives at his unit, he is assigned a job and expected to produce. But he has forgotten a lot that he was taught in training and is inclined to disregard his officers and noncoms.

It is this type of replacement, moreover, who is often killed in action shortly after reaching his unit, or, worse yet, who causes his unit to fail in its objective.

Possibly the present truce will allow for some repair of the damage done earlier, both as to discipline and team training.

Basically, the solution to much of the problem lies in abolishing the present system of replacement training and substituting for it a system of unit training.

I am certain that regiments and battalions could be trained as units, and transferred as bodies to overseas divisions. The Army is not so small that we could not efficiently return to the unit training system of earlier times.

It will only be when officers have a chance to mold their units into a team and to subject their men to constant and continuous discipline and training, that we can expect any material improvement to be made.

PVT. DONALD E. CLOSE
235th FA Obn. Bn.
APO 264, c/o PM
San Francisco, Calif.

● A change in the method of sending replacements to Korea was begun before the truce was signed. It provided for small groups of men who had trained together to travel together to Korea.



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When the first American passed the eleventh tree, Private Mueller slowly squeezed the trigger



Division Objective

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EBEN F. SWIFT

ILLUSTRATIONS BY MAJOR LACHLAN M. FIELD

That the Big Red One was ever stopped by a lone enemy rifleman is fiction . . . but it could be true and if we are wise we'll never forget it



"Let George Do It"

EORGE COMPANY was the advance guard again. "Let George do it" had een the cynical comment of the men s they started out from Seckenheim at 600 on Friday, 26 April 1945. Seckeneim was a small German village twenty iles east of the Rhine. The outfit had ulled in behind E Company about 1900 ie night before. So George Company ed out the next morning, hoping that is day would be as easy for George Company as the preceding day had been or Easy Company.

It looked good. Schweinheim, three ilometers east, had been cautiously approached and warily entered; no resistnce. On to Hofberg, two kilometers ore; no resistance. Tauf, Weinheim, irchheim—the same story. Tenseness egan to disappear from the stubbled aces of George Company. Rifles went from high port to sling arms. Packs and equipment became lighter, the steps got swingier. Had the Krauts finally had it? Are they folding up? Maybe for a day or two. Not many infantrymen thought beyond that.

Rifleman Joe Rivera was thinking beyond that. He was thinking for the first time in many weeks that he might safely get back to Mamacita. I won't have to be lead scout any more once we get into Grosheim whose yellow sign was up the road about 250 yards away. Maybe now, finally, it won't be so tough any more. Maybe the astounding luck that had carried him through the Bulge, across the Rhine, and up to here without a scratch, would hold out just a few more weeks. The war couldn't last much longer than that. Joe Rivera was only thinking this with part of his mind. Lead scouts have other things to think about; he was still at high port, moving his head and eyes from side to side, not looking for the enemy as you might think, but for possible cover to take after the enemy fired his first shot. Joe Rivera had been a scout long enough to know that you just didn't see the enemy until after that first shot; you were lucky if you saw him then. He eyed the evenly spaced trees, growing with Teutonic precision on each side of the road, and thought: if there are any Krauts in that town they would have fired by now. Only a few more yards and he could start breathing easier. Then he stopped thinking altogether, because he had nothing left to think with. His brains spattered out of the back of his head, partly in his helmet, which had a small round hole in the front and a large jagged one in the back, and partly on the brick road, on which he had slumped forward. His rifle made two distinct



Only a few more yards, thought lead scout Joe Rivera . . . then his brains oozed out of a hole in his helmet and he stopped thinking altogether

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clacks as it hit the road, butt first. It was 1400 hours.

GEORGE COMPANY was surprised. This is the one unpardonable military sin, but in this case it was quite pardonable; in fact, it was inevitable. George Company was no green outfit; it was George Company of the 18th Infantry, 1st Division. Up to this time it had been everything an advance guard should be; aggressive, alert, fast moving, the spearhead of a seasoned outfit. George Company had taken fifteen per cent casualties in two days at Gela and had continued advancing to take its objective. It had taken thirty-seven per cent casualties at Omaha Beach in a matter of hours and had continued on to its objective. It had taken twenty-two per cent casualties in three days at the Bulge, but had held its position. It had two unit citations, it had damned good officers and damned good men—only the good ones were left. If Corporal Rivera had been killed in an earlier engagement, there would have been little effect on the men of the company. They probably wouldn't have noticed his loss until hours after the battle had died down. But they noticed it now. George Company was temporarily paralyzed. Nothing like this had ever happened to it before.

Here they had been marching down the road on a fine spring day with the Krauts on the run when suddenly a single shot rings out and a man is dead in the road—like a cheap murder mystery. The men went to the ground, of course, at the crack of that first shot. Some seconds later a few of them poked cautious heads around the bases of the trees along the road and over the furrows of the plowed fields beyond the trees. Nothing was to be seen. The men waited for the enemy to open fire so they could at least get this scrap started if there was going to be a scrap. Nobody fired. It was eerie. Men started talking in whispers, then in loud, strident voices. "What the hell's going on?" "Why ain't we moving?" "Why don't somebody do something?" A radio started crackling. "Yeah, about 250 yards out of Grosheim . . . right through the head . . . I don't know why the hell they're not shooting. I'm going up now to find out . . . how about some mortars . . . dammit, that's a hell of a place for them. Why the hell don't those boys ever get that stuff off vehicles . . . I know they're heavy —yeah, my 60s are going into position now . . . artillery . . . you were in to them a while ago. Sure, I know they did a good job back there but I need it now. O.K., O.K., I'll let you know. Over and out."

Captain Stevens, CO of George Company, moved forward, first by running from tree to tree and then by crawling in a small depression by the side of the road. His radio man sweated behind him.

Sergeant Leonard Rynowski, squad leader of Joe Rivera's squad, finally came to his senses. He, like many other George Company men, had been peeping cautiously into Grosheim, hoping to catch a glimpse of this mysterious sniper who had knocked off his best scout, or any other sign of enemy activity. He suddenly realized he wasn't going to see anything. So he bellowed:

"All right, you guys, start shooting. What's the matter with you? Buncha recruits? C'mon fire, goddammit, whatta ya think you're here for? Get going. Decker, you heard me, didn'tcha. Get that rifle on your shoulder and shoot. Go ahead." Decker blinked at this simple command as if it were entirely new. Although battle-experienced, he had that curious reluctance of a soldier to fire his rifle. "Where at, sarge? I can't see nothing." "In the town, dammit, the Krauts are in there; aren't they? Just shoot." Finally Decker's M1 barked. George Company's first shot was fired at 1423. Other rifles began to crack, then the BARs and TMGs chimed in. By 1432 60s were coughing and ker-blamming in Grosheim. So far as anyone knew, not a shot had been fired in return. Sergeant Rynowski decided it was time to move. He crawled to his second-in-command, Sergeant James Raymond. "Ray," he said, "I'm going up to check on Joe, maybe he's still alive. I've seen guys get half their head blown off and still live. You round up the rest of the men, and when I give you the signal take 'em up to that clump of bushes over there; I'll meet you there; then we're going into that . . . ing town. You got that?" Raymond nodded. "O.K., but don't let 'em bunch up," Sgt. Rynowski growled and began to crawl toward the road. When he got within ten yards of Rivera's body he stood up and walked in a slow crouch to the body. He never covered the last five yards. At 1447 a single bullet went right through his heart.

Captain Stevens raged and fumed in-



COLONEL SWIFT

Lieutenant Colonel Eben F. Swift, Infantry, is an occasional contributor to this magazine and one of those officers who were encouraged to write by Colonel Greene, the late editor of this magazine. You will see why when you read "Division Objective." Colonel Swift himself says that a large part of his purpose in writing "is to be the spokesman for the 'forgotten man' in the Army: the great middle class of the officer corps, the field grade officer." Colonel Swift wants to give a knockout punch to the notion that the work of our field grade officers is "generally mediocre" and that what the field grade officer "thinks and does is of no interest and of not much importance." Colonel Swift has been a field grade officer himself since 1943. He entered the Army as an enlisted man in 1933, attended the Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1940, and is also a graduate of The Infantry School and the Command and General Staff College. During the Second World War he commanded a battalion of the 27th Infantry, 25th Division, in Luzon, and also served on division and higher staffs in the Pacific theaters. From 1949 to 1952 he served in Europe on the EUCOM staff, as a battalion commander in the 18th Infantry, 1st Division, and on the staff of Seventh Army. He is now on duty at The Infantry School. It should be unnecessary to add that the characters in "Division Objective" are all products of Colonel Swift's creative imagination and no one should attempt to connect them in any way with any actual persons, living or dead.

The artist who illustrated "Division Objective," **Major Lachlan M. Field,** Artillery-USAR, now at The Artillery School, has illustrated occasional pieces for this magazine and its predecessors for many years. During the Second World War he served in Europe with a corps' artillery outfit, and he recently completed another tour of duty in the same theater.

wardly. He was able to get the facts from Lieutenant Hagood, the 2d Platoon leader, by 1452. He had lost one of his best scouts and his best squad leader within the hour. Stevens didn't like the situation. He didn't know whether there were two Krauts or two hundred in that town. Ordinarily, they either fired a lot more than they had here, or they got the hell out. He couldn't understand it.

He had reported to the battalion CO that he was receiving intense fire from Grosheim. He felt a few qualms about that; nobody knew for sure whether there were more than two shots fired from there. But any fire that is fired at you is intense, particularly when it kills two men. Colonel Keats was coming up. He was to meet him along the road 500 meters from Grosheim, near where the Colonel had an OP.

"Well, Steve, did you run into a bear trap up there? I thought things were going a little too well to last. Sorry to hear of your loss of those two men. Can you get moving again now?"

"Colonel, I don't want to go barging in there until I know more about it. If I could get some mortars and artillery to work it over first, it'll help."

"O.K. Our mortars are getting set now. Artillery said they could give me a battalion three rounds in about a half hour. You get set to move at 1600. I'll have your prep fires set up for five minutes before 1600. What time have you got now?"

"1503."

"Set your watch ahead two minutes. Take me on up to your front, will you? Maybe I can see something up there. But don't get me shot—not on purpose, anyway. I have all the Purple Hearts I want—none." "Get that dope out, will you, Buck," he said to his S3. Then to Stevens, "O.K., let's go."

Colonel Keats got a good look at the town and the ground around it, but saw no enemy activity. Plans for the attack went on. The firing gradually died down. Movement in George Company became discernible. Weapons moved into position. Lieutenant Hagood called his squad leaders behind a small clump of bushes to the left of the road to issue his orders. He was here and at exactly 1547 that disaster again struck George Company. The first burst from the enemy machine gun raked the clump of bushes and Hagood and one squad leader were killed. The platoon sergeant and another squad leader were severely wounded. The gun shifted its fire to a light machine gun going into position at the base of one of the trees by the road. The

George Company was no green outfit . . . it was aggressive, alert, fast-moving, could take casualties and keep on going



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General Appleton stared in disbelief at a reddening hole in the right shoulder of his blouse

gunner and his assistant were killed. An ammunition bearer was wounded. Several more bursts were fired along the front of the two assault squads of the 2d Platoon, and one squad of the 3d which had deployed for the attack. The men had a little time to take cover after the first bursts were fired, but still one man was killed and six were wounded in the three squads.

The enemy machine gun went silent as the mortar and artillery preparation went off exactly as scheduled. It landed right on target. Great clouds of smoke and dust rose from Grosheim, and no living thing there could have failed to have been jarred to the teeth by the explosions. But at the completion of the preparation George Company did not move.

COLONEL KEATS called at 1617 to find out why. He was not casual now. "Steve, I want to let you fight your own battle without harassing you, but I don't like the way things look from here. Are you moving? And if not, why not?"

Stevens was one of those rare commanders who weren't afraid to tell their superiors things were going wrong when they were going wrong. This was to his credit. It was also to the credit of Colonel Keats that he was able to listen to his subordinate's adverse report without getting upset. Both of these traits are more unusual in combat commanders than one might think. Stevens was a little excited. He blurted out:

"No, Colonel, we are *not* moving. Those Krauts are looking right down our throats. They've knocked off all my key men. They must have some new kind of telescope or something in there. They seem to know every move we make. That machine gun stopped us before we even got started. I've been down there trying to get 'em going, but they just stare at me. I don't understand it. I've never seen 'em like that before. Hagood's dead. So are McClosky and Haines. I need litters. I've got wounded that have to be evacuated right now. I don't know how many yet, but I think six litters are enough."


"O.K., O.K., Steve, take it easy now. We'll get you your litters. Stop worrying about that. Now, listen, I've just been talking to the Old Man. The pressure is on. Division wants that town. I don't know why, but evidently it is a lot more important than you or I thought it was. The Old Man is coming up to my OP with the general in forty-five minutes, and I've got to have something to tell him. Do you think you can get into that town before dark?"

"Colonel, frankly, I don't see how the hell I can replace those leaders, get my casualties out, get these men reorganized, and mount up another attack before dark. I want that town as badly as you do. It's cold out here, but I'd like to dig in for tonight and hit it again in the morning. My men have started digging already."

"Well, all right, I'll recommend that to them. They won't like to hear it and the Old Man is not going to like *me* but as you and I know, you're a hero one day and a bum the next in this racket. I think I can get you the extra time. But I want you to get a patrol in the town tonight and get some information. I am not at all sure the Krauts are there in force in spite of the number of our casualties. And I'm not sure that they won't pull out tonight. If they do, we'll both look awfully silly. I have enough confidence in you and in your men to believe that you'll get 'em back on the stick by tomorrow morning. I plan to move Easy Company abreast of you on your right tonight. I'm going to ask the Old Man for some tanks, all the division artillery, and an air strike in the morning. That's all, I better not keep th

general waiting. You'll get further details later. So long."

At 1600 General Appleton, CG, 1st Division, was deep in his map. George Company had not known it, but it was the advance guard, not only of the 2d Battalion, not only of the 18th Infantry, but of the entire Big Red One. As a rule General Appleton was far too wise and experienced to put all his eggs in one basket by moving his division in a single column, but this situation, like most situations, was not a normal one. The divison had broken out of the Rhine bridgehead on a very narrow front. Resistance had been lighter than expected, and one very good road ran east from the bridgehead area. Progress along this road had been rapid. In the division zone to the north there was defensive high ground with a poor road net; to the south the Siegnitz River ran diagonally northwest across the division zone and made a bend just south of Grosheim to the southwest before running into the Rhine. The east-west road net was good in the southern portion of the division zone, but all crossed the Siegnitz, and up to now General Appleton's engineers had reported all bridges across the Siegnitz blown. On General Appleton's map, the situation looked like this:



In addition, G2 had reported that the enemy was withdrawing to the high ground in the north of the 1st Division sector. General Appleton, therefore, had decided to move his entire division along the Grosheim road. After he had seized Grosheim and the two road junctions immediately to the east, he would fan out in three columns and continue the advance, but he had a lot of heavy stuff to get through Grosheim first. Initially, it looked as though his calculated risk had paid off. But now things were beginning to look a little different. He might have known the Germans could see the importance of Grosheim as well as he could. He had three lines of action open to him. He could shift his weight to the north and send the 16th RCT to take the high ground up there and then by-pass Grosheim; he could bridge the Siegnitz and send the 26th across to the south; or he could continue to try to break through Grosheim. The trouble with the first two plans was that they both would take time, and with the Germans on the run it was of tremendous importance to keep after them. If he could get through Grosheim within the next twenty-four hours, he would be all set. He tentatively decided to continue the attack on Grosheim. He would make up his mind finally after talking to John Galloway, CO of the 18th. He handed his map to his aide and motioned to his jeep driver. "Take me up to the 18th," he said.

THE conference at the 2d Battalion OP with General Appleton, Colonel Galloway, and Lieutenant Colonel Keats had been going on for five minutes. Keats had been right when he had said the Old Man wouldn't like the recommendation to postpone the attack until the next day. Colonel Galloway was a forceful and determined commander, but not a patient one. By 1700, however, Colonel Galloway was convinced, and he informed the General of his plan to attack at 0600, 27 April. General Appleton was less concerned about the time of the attack than he was about the projected air strike.

"I've just checked with my air people," he said, "and Scrappy Nolan's got all the air tied up in his sector until noon tomorrow. That means if we give you that strike it will postpone the attack six valuable hours. I am inclined to think it's not worth it. If we put all that air in there, plus the artillery, plus the tanks, and then find that they have evacuated Grosheim, I'm going to look like an awful monkey. I don't care about that if we save lives by that air strike, but we've got to think of the time factor, too. John, what do you say we call off the air strike?"

"General, if you say to attack without the strike, we'll do it. I'm convinced that the Germans are in Grosheim to stay, though, and it's going to take a lot of pounding to get 'em out. The strike would help a lot, but if you say so we'll take Grosheim without it."

"In that case then, we'll attack at . . ."

General Appleton never finished the sentence. With the crack of a rifle bullet hitting its mark there appeared a slowly reddening hole in the general's blouse at his right shoulder. He looked at it in disbelief. For the next few minutes, although he became very white, the General was the calmest person at the OP. Everyone scurried around until a medic arrived and nervously dressed the wound. A litter was brought up, but the General refused it saying he could walk to his jeep. As he turned to leave, he smiled at Galloway, "All right, John," he said, "you've convinced me. You'll get your air strike at 1200 tomorrow. See you later."

George Company dug in thoroughly. Easy Company prepared to move up abreast of George after dark. Also, Colonel Galloway planned to move the entire 3d Battalion up abreast of George Company on the left of the 2d Battalion during the night. Its mission was to envelope Grosheim from the north and to seize and hold the road junctions east of that city. At 2100 this movement started. Also at 2100, George and Easy Companies sent patrols into Grosheim. At 2143 a flurry of shots was heard. Shortly thereafter George's patrol leader called Captain Stevens and said that one member of his patrol had been killed and another wounded. He requested permission to return with the wounded man. Permission was granted. The patrol returned at 2231. Colonel Keats and Captain Stevens both interviewed the patrol leader. He was quite excited and unable to furnish much information except that the patrol had run into a German outpost to the left of the main road, and that one of his men had been killed before he knew where it was. The patrol had opened up on the outpost, but he did not know if the fire had any results. So the Germans had not as yet pulled out of Grosheim. This was confirmed by the report of the Easy Company patrol which returned at 2350. It had checked all the roads leading out of Grosheim including the main one to the east, and saw no movement in or out of the town. Another patrol from Fox Company that went out in the early hours of morning checked these same roads and reported the same thing as of 0430. It was therefore assumed that the Germans were still in Grosheim.

THOSE critics of the energy, forcefulness, decisiveness, and effectiveness of American leadership should have heard the verbal orders passed down the chain of command in the 1st Division. Of course, written orders complete with overlays were issued consecutively from division, regiment, and battalion by 0900, but the verbal conversations indicate more thoroughly the spirit and drive of the 1st Division as of 27 April.

General Appleton to Colonel Galloway: "John, you understand the importance I place on getting that town today.

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George Company's other prisoner was a dirty, terrified nonentity with a runny nose and a swollen eye. He gave George Gompany its first good laugh in days

The movement of the entire division depends upon it. I've got a squadron of P-47s, all the division artillery, and a company of tanks for you. I'll give you all the help I can, but you've got to get Grosheim by 1600 or our whole plan will have to be revised. If you get it by 1600 there may be a star in it for you. Go to it. I'm counting on you."

Colonel Galloway to Colonel Keats: "Keats, you have done a good job up until now, but I didn't like the way you handled this thing yesterday. I believe you are a little inclined to listen to your subordinates too much. If Stevens had been pushed yesterday he might have got in there. You've got to get in there today, or I'll have to find somebody who can. I want you on your objective by 1500, understand?"

Colonel Keats to Captain Stevens: "Steve, I stuck my neck out for you yesterday, and I'll do it again, but the Old Man is hopping mad about this thing, and we've got to get in there today or neither of our military reputations will be worth a plugged nickel. You've got the toughest job in this attack, and I'm going down there with you personally to see that you do it. You and I have always been friends, but friendship has nothing to do with this. You've got to get in that town by 1430. I think you've known me long enough to know that I mean what I say."

Captain Stevens to his platoon leaders: "All right, listen to this: The pressure is on. Most of you are new at this job, and you may be a little uncertain as to what your job is. Well, I'll tell you. Your job is to lead your platoons into that town or die trying. It's simple enough. I don't ordinarily get this dramatic, but this is not an ordinary mission. You've got to get in that town by 1400 or I don't want to see any of you alive again. I probably won't be alive mysel I'm serious, does everyone understan that?"

In all cases the answer was identica and delivered through clenched teeth "Yessir."

THE morning of the 27th was amazin ly quiet. Occasional mortar and artille rounds, registering in, dropped in on th town, but there was no small-arms fi at all. Toward 1200 the tension mounte A couple of minutes before twelve th P-47s droned toward Grosheim. Eac plane circled deliberately over the targe then peeled off and came roaring dow in a shallow dive toward the town. Th two 500-pounders from each plane cou be seen as they dropped, followed b earth-shaking explosions which could b felt for thousands of yards around Gro heim. Then the strafing started, th flaming guns spewed their tracers in Grosheim and pulled up out of the dives, accompanied by the deep throate bop-bop-bop of the caliber .50 machi guns. This went on for twelve minute When the P-47s turned their blunt nos homeward, Grosheim was almost o scured by great columns of smoke, but inhabitants had no respite. At exact 1215 a division artillery TOT crashe in Grosheim, making it alive with flam and flying wreckage. Shells poured in Grosheim for fifteen more minutes.

Meanwhile tanks lumbered up towa George and Easy Companies' positio At exactly 1230 the artillery lifted, a the doughboys pulled out of their ho and moved forward with the tanks. Ri fire from the enemy was mostly wild, b some of it was effective, killing three a wounding four in G Company. A r chine gun, possibly the one that h caused all the trouble in George Co pany the day before, opened up, killi two men and wounding seven in Geo Company, and caused the attack to st momentarily. But the men soon start forward again. This time George Co pany was not to be stopped. The m chine gun was silenced. One tank w disabled by a mine, but the rest c tinued on and entered the town. M chine gun and sporadic rifle fire opene up in Easy Company's sector but the were no casualties. After that the was not much to it. Both compan started cleaning out what was left of houses. Easy Company had five casu ties, George Company six more in final stages of the attack. Captain S vens had distinguished himself dur these last stages of the fighting. He suddenly encountered a big strapp German sergeant in the ruins of one

the houses. The sergeant sent the first shot from his Luger whistling over Stevens' head. The second caught the advancing Stevens on the left side of his shoulder just below the collarbone. Stevens clubbed his carbine in his right hand and shattered it over the sergeant's head, knocking him out. The sergeant revived shortly thereafter, however, and became the second of George Company's two prisoners. Easy Company, meanwhile, had captured fifteen. The other George Company prisoner was a ridiculous looking little fellow captured by Private First Class Manuel Flores, a very good friend of Corporal Rivera's. Flores might have walked right by the German without noticing him because the man was pretending to be dead. But he had furtively reached out to his rifle, beside him and Flores saw the motion. He lifted the German to his feet. The little fellow was terrified. The flaps of his Wehrmacht cap were pulled down over his ears; he had a large, runny nose. One eye was partly closed. His stubbled face was caked with dirt. His ill-fitting uniform was ragged and greasy, and he looked as if he hadn't eaten for days. For some reason or other, though, he clung to his rifle when Flores tried to take it away from him. Flores tore it from his grasp and shoved him toward the rear along the road where Rivera had been killed. The little man started blabbering and shambling to the road. Flores took a few menacing steps toward him to speed him on his way. The man cast a scared look over his shoulder at Flores and started to run in an awkward gait down the road. This afforded the men of George Company the first good laugh they had had in days. The man looked so ludicrous, like Charlie Chaplin, as he scrambled along the road, and many barked at him as he went by, terrifying him even more. Finally, the man fell exhausted and lay there gasping and sobbing in the roadway. The laughing subsided and smiles disappeared from the American faces. Most of them turned away, for no matter how tough most Americans get, they don't like to see living creatures suffer when they are helpless. Finally, a wireman got to his feet. "I've got to get back to battalion anyway, I'll take the miserable little bastard with me," he said, gruffly.

The big German sergeant who had just resumed consciousness and recovered his dignity was a witness to this ordid little drama. If the little fellow could be said to symbolize the dissolution of the Wehrmacht, the sergeant could be said to symbolize its fanatical stubbornness and ingrained efficiency. He stood very straight, looking disdainfully at his captors. He had long blond hair, a well-tailored uniform, which though somewhat tattered and dirty, retained a good measure of its military dash. He answered all question of the Americans' intelligence sergeant in curt monosyllables. When he saw the sorry spectacle of the little German soldier, he spat contemptuously, obviously disgusted with the disgraceful behavior of his former comrade in arms. He, at least, would show that all honor was not lost in the German Army. He strode off with his dishevelled armed guard as if he were parading down the Tiergarten.

Captain Stevens also witnessed the scene as the medics dressed his wound. No wonder we had such a tough time taking this town with characters like that sergeant around, he thought. Looked like an S.S. man. Well, it was all over now. The general had his town and—by golly, in all the excitement he had forgotten to report to battalion. He called his radio operator, and told him to get battalion. He couldn't resist reporting personally on this one. He pressed on the butterfly switch and stated matter-of-factly, "This is Banjo-major. George Company secured its objective as of 1353. Out."



Colonel Keats received this report at his battalion aid station. He had been shot through the fleshy part of his leg just above the knee during the first stages of the attack. Stevens had come over to see what the trouble was, but Keats had waved him on. "Get the hell in that town, Steve, this is only a flesh wound. They need you up there. The medics will take care of me." And Steve had gone on. Gone all the way, in fact, and Keats was glad to hear it. Glad also to report it to Colonel Galloway, who stated that he was coming right down to see Keats as soon as he reported to division. When Colonel Galloway arrived he wasn't the same man that had talked to Keats that morning.

"Ed," it had been some time since the Colonel had called him Ed, "I've got a present here for you. It's not a medal. I know you have all those you want. It's a bottle of bonded bourbon. You did a grand job taking that town, boy, and this is not much of a reward, but it's the best I've got right now." Keats smiled and mumbled his thanks. He did have all the medals he wanted, including now the one that he hadn't wanted, the Purple Heart, and he appreciated the bourbon, but most of all he was happy that he had regained the Old Man's confidence in his ability to command.

Later, when he saw Steve in the clearing station he said, "I got the facts on your exploit in Grosheim, Steve, and I think it's worth a DSC. That's what we are recommending, anyway. I know you always thought Easy Company got all the gravy. It did seem to work out that way, but there is no question in my mind that it was your leadership of George Company that got us into that town and I appreciate it."

GENERAL APPLETON was on the telephone talking to Colonel Galloway: "All objectives taken, eh, John? Those road junctions, too? That's fine. I'm going to send the engineers with bulldozers up to Grosheim to clear the rubble out of the road. Then I'm going to pass the 16th and the 26th through you.

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Sergeant Schulenberg was slim-hipped, barrel-chested, a stickler for regulations, a master of unessential detail, and an arrogant bully who ruled through fear

and have you revert to division reserve. Yes, the first part of 'em should be up through there in about an hour. That road is not badly damaged, is it? No, I didn't think so. Well, I'm glad we've got it, I expect we'll have clear sailing for a while, but you never can tell. The arm? Oh, it's OK. The doc wanted to send me to the rear with it, but I talked him out of it. It's just a scratch, but I have to wear a sling with it. The staff and all the people around here regard me with awe now, as if I were a hero. The last time I was wounded was in the Argonne in the first war, but nobody paid much attention to it; now people seem to make quite a big thing of it. Guess generals don't get shot too often any more, not with small arms, anyhow. . . . No, don't worry about that. It was my fault for exposing myself; I should have known better, but I thought we were out of range, to tell the truth. That fellow was a pretty good shot, unless he was just lucky. Did you ever find him or his rifle? No, I suppose not. Well, John, I have this recommendation for your star here on my desk, I'm sending it in right away. Not at all, you deserve it. I've been thinking so for a long time. Tell your people they've done a fine job. They're a grand regiment. That's all. Thank you. Good-bye, John."

General Appleton hung up the re ceiver and chuckled softly. John Gallo way had sounded awfully happy. Well he meant it. He was proud of John Galloway and his regiment. In fact, he was proud of his entire division. Tha was a well planned attack, perfectly timed, precisely executed. He rapped his pipe sharply on his field desk. It was exactly 1400 hours, 27 April 1945.

GENERAL APPLETON might no have been so proud, Colonel Gallo way might not have been recommended for his star, Lieutenant Colonel Keat might not have been given his bottle o bourbon, and Captain Stevens migh never have received his D.S.C. had on simple but amazing fact been known *The entire 1st Division had been stopped for a period of twenty-four hours by on man and only one man!* And was thi individual a military genius armed wit a super secret weapon? He was not; h was just a simple rifleman. The big handsome, soldierly sergeant who s proudly and arrogantly faced his Amer can captors? No, not him. Incredibly it was that pitiful, abject, skinny litt creature, who afforded the G Compan men such a laugh. He was the man wh stopped the 1st Division—all by himsel Impossible? Ridiculous? Fantastic? Li ten to this—

The Ordeal of Private Hans Mueller

HANS MUELLER was what is known in the American Army as an eight-ball. German noncommissioned officers and junior officers were far less tolerant of what they considered inefficient eight-balls than their American counterparts, and their American counterparts were not so tolerant, either. Therefore, Hans Mueller was, to put it mildly, in hot water most all the time. However, Hans tried hard not only because one had to try hard in the German Army or suffer pretty drastic punishment, but because it was natural for him to try. But it didn't do him much good. In the first place, he was sloppy. Hans Mueller was the type of soldier who could come out for inspection with his shoes and brass shined, his clothes clean and well pressed, well shaven and with a haircut, every separate detail of his personal equipment in perfect order—and still look sloppy. Some people are that way. Hans was absent-minded. That is, he had a single-tracked mind; if he was thinking of one particular thing, his mind would automatically exclude most everything else. Since it was quite inevitable that Hans would dislike many things military, and equally inevitable that a man thinks most about things he likes, Hans gave the impression of being extremely forgetful. That didn't go over so big.

It wasn't that Hans disliked everything about the Army—far from it. Actually the Army in general disliked him more than he disliked the Army. The main reason, however, that Hans did not get along in the German Army was a reason that never made much difference one way or another in the American Army, despite what certain popular post-war novelists who have written about the American Army would have you believe—he looked Jewish. That is, he looked like the German conception of a Jew, which had the same effect. He had dark curly hair, a large nose, a rath

inched sharp face, and protruding ears. ctually, he was more German than ıost Germans, and if he had a drop of ewish blood in him it's hard to see how got there. His ancestors had lived in ıe same small town in Western Ger- any for centuries. They had worked ıe same farm, lived in the same house, equented the same gasthaus, and ıought the same provincial thoughts for l those centuries. As anyone knew, no wish man, woman, or child had ever ved in that town, and believe me, if any ıd, the town would have known it.

Hans obviously didn't fit into military ciety, and anyone who did not fit into e German military society was the ob- ct of considerable brutality. This did ot make him defiant, or melancholy, or ychoneurotic. He became more ob- quious and subservient—a sort of Teu- nic Uriah Heep. He became quite ıstered when anyone over the grade corporal spoke to him, giving an im- ession of complete imbecility when, tually, Hans was not dumb at all.

As a result of his environment, Hans veloped two very important military tues which were to aid him im- easurably in his finest hours. He ırned to survive and he developed a ıd of craftiness, a wily cunning that ıde him stay alive and healthy through most trying combat conditions. A ore subtle and indirect result of the ıls and tribulations of Hans' military was his love of weapons, particularly rifle. Since the normal friendships d comradeship of his brothers-in-arms re generally denied to him, Hans veloped a possessive affection for his e. He cared for it meticulously, aned it, oiled it, protected it from the ments, and made certain that it func- ned perfectly always. Although he d been punished for almost every er military delinquency, nobody, not n Sergeant Schulenberg, could ever d fault with Hans' rifle. Another le known fact about Hans was that could shoot and shoot well.

RGEANT SCHULENBERG was everything that Private Mueller was . He was tall, barrel chested and slim ped. His uniforms fitted him perfect- his boots were always shined; even in ıbat the sheen was visible through d and dust; he was able to appear ın shaven throughout a heavy cam- gn. He had a very good memory for ulations and an eagle eye, especially the delinquencies of his subordinates. geant Schulenberg's destiny was ped by the Nazi system and he was de for it. He loved the pageantry, the torchlight parades of massed thousands. He liked to beat up people, too, and Hitler had given him the legal opportunity to do it quite often. It was quite natural that he should gravitate to an SS outfit in the early days of the war and also quite natural that he should be a huge success there.

He found that he could dominate officers quite well, particularly the young and inexperienced ones. He was always tactful and respectful about it: "Ja, lieutenant, we can do it that way if you so desire. Of course, regulations state —or the captain usually likes it done this way." Almost invariably it ended up being done Sergeant Schulenberg's way. Sergeant Schulenberg did have the ability to make people do things, and that was what counted. This leadership ability was based upon fear—a principle which we in the U.S. Army frown upon—but in the German Army it got things done.

As time went on, he became a more and more influential member of his company, until on the 6th of April he was practically running the company. On that day, a series of circumstances occurred in the town of Grosheim which made him the company commander in name as well as in fact. B Company had lost communications with battalion. The company commander explained to Schulenberg that he and the only other officer left in the company were going to take the Volkswagen to try to find battalion and request further orders. Sergeant Schulenberg was to take over B Company and defend Grosheim until they returned or until the arrival of further orders. Actually neither officer had an intention of returning to B Company. The Wehrmacht was *kaput,* and everybody knew it. Sergeant Schulenberg rather suspected that the captain and his friend were deserting, but that suited him fine. He had grown sick of this retreat, retreat, retreat. He felt that he could whip these inferior troops into line with some SS discipline. Sergeant Schulenberg made his authority effective by putting out a very simple order stating that anyone apprehended leaving Grosheim without authority would be shot.

As may be imagined, Private Mueller was not a favorite of Sergeant Schulenberg's. Thus, it was hardly a coincidence that Private Mueller was on outpost duty some fifty yards southwest of the first building in Grosheim with observation of the road to the west shortly before 1400 on 26 April. Sergeant Schulenberg had put Hans Mueller out there with the hope and expectation that if anyone of his sorry garrison of Grosheim were to be shot, Mueller would be the first.

Hans had learned enough of the art of self-preservation during his non-illustrious military career to dig himself a good position. This position was on the bank of a small canal that flowed odoriferously from the town. It afforded Hans observation, an excellent field of fire, and more important to Hans, superior protection and concealment, and an escape route up through the canal bed. Hans was in position there, his eyes on the road to the West while a strange metamorphosis was taking place in his mind. Since his first day of combat on the beach when he had been too paralyzed with fear even to fire his rifle, Hans Mueller had not had any desire to fight. All during the retreat Hans had been concerned only with staying alive. He had learned how to live with fear; he feared Sergeant Schulenberg as much or more than American shot and shell.

But now for the first time he was actually beginning to want to do something to protect his loved ones—his own home was only about twenty or thirty kilometers southeast—to want to fight and hurl back the enemy from the sacred soil of the Fatherland. His Frau, Frieda, and his nine-year-old son, Johann, and his own little five-acre farm were close by. In his dull, slow way Hans was determined to protect his loved ones. The war at last had become quite a personal thing to Hans.

He fought down his first feeling of panic as he watched them come—column of twos, one column on each side of the road. He thought of rushing to Sergeant Schulenberg with the information, but he quickly rejected the idea. Sergeant Schulenberg would just slap him down for leaving his post. Then he became calmly analytical. On the march into Grosheim he had amused himself by counting the number of steps between the trees lining the side of the road. They had averaged about twenty-five paces, or about twenty meters. He counted up the line of trees, one, two, three, up to the eleventh tree, deliberately set his sight at 200 meters, and with his rifle at his shoulder, waited. When the first American passed the eleventh tree he aligned his sights with the American's head resting just on the tip of the front sight, and holding his breath, he slowly squeezed the trigger. Hans felt the shock of the recoil and ducked into his hole. A few seconds later he cautiously raised his head to look. A wave of exultation swept over him. The American lay on the road,

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motionless, between the ten and eleventh tree. Why, it was easy! In those few seconds Hans Mueller had become a killer. He cautiously and quietly opened his bolt, ejected the spent cartridge and slowly threw another round into the chamber. He expected a hail of fire to come any moment, but nothing happened. The Americans had disappeared from sight.

He looked down the bed of the canal. Sergeant Schulenberg was approaching at a crouch, his face set in a snarl, which was the way Hans usually saw him. "Dumbkopf, what are you firing for? At your shadow again? Haven't I told you to hold your fire until you have a target?" he whispered harshly.

Hans waited until Sergeant Schulenberg came to his position and wordlessly pointed to the dead body. Sergeant Schulenberg squinted intently at the road.

"Ah, das ist gut, das ist gut, but be very careful. Do not disclose your position." That was all Sergeant Schulenberg said. He crawled back up the canal and disappeared into the town.

Then the Americans finally started to fire. Most of the fire was high and into the town. It didn't bother Hans much; he knew that the Americans still had no idea where he was. He kept watching the road, and then he detected movement there. Another American was moving toward the dead one on the road. Again Hans raised his rifle. Again he took careful aim, this time aiming lower: the American was crouching. He squeezed the trigger until he felt the jar of the recoil. When he raised his head to look, the other American lay sprawled on the road. Surely, the Americans must have located his position by now. But their shots were no closer; their rate of fire had not increased. Perhaps little Hans had put one over on them after all. When Sergeant Schulenberg reappeared again he did not look so grim. Hans wordlessly pointed down to the road. Sergeant Schulenberg looked, and actually smiled. He patted Hans on the shoulder and said, "Good shooting, Mueller, keep it up." Hans grinned foolishly and said nothing. Perhaps Sergeant Schulenberg was not such a bad fellow after all.

HE returned again to his vigil. At first, he could detect no movement at all. But then here and there he saw the slight movement of a branch, a bit of dirt fly up, a portion of a man's body flash by a tree. He started to raise his rifle on two or three occasions when he saw these things but checked himself. He could not fire many more times without being located, and he could not afford to shoot at anything that was not a sure target. He knew Americans. Once they even thought they had you spotted they would throw everything at you. Machine guns, mortars, artillery —everything. They didn't have to worry about saving ammunition. Then Hans had an inspiration. Franz Beuchner had a light machine gun position up in the cellar of the house just by the canal about seventy-five yards away. Franz would be in the biggest hole he could find, paying no attention to the gun at all. If he could get the machine gun,



give the Americans a few accurate bursts, maybe he could break up the attack that was surely coming. Hans rushed through the canal bed to the gun position. Sure enough, the gun was deserted. He got into position. There was more movement in the bush. Some weapon, probably a machine gun, was going into position by that tree. Men were moving up. He planned his fire carefully, taking aim first at each of his targets before he fired. Then he opened up in short staccato bursts. First, the bush; then the tree; then the line where he had seen the man moving. He was still firing when he felt an angry tap on his shoulder. It was Sergeant Schulenberg, and he was furious. "You fool. What are you trying to do? Who told you to fire that machine gun? Don't you know the Americans will open up with everything on us now?"

"But I thought . . ." Hans tried to break in.

"You thought. You thought. You're not paid to think. I'll do the thinking around here. You see? They have started already." The American artillery preparation had begun. He slapped Hans sharply across the mouth. "Now get back to your position. They wil probably attack after this."

Hans wiped his hand across his mout where a small trickle of blood ha started. He crept back to his hol Actually, Fate was kinder to Hans tha he knew. The building which he an Sergeant Schulenberg just left suffere direct hits from both artillery and mo tars. Franz Beuchner, who indeed ha found the deepest hole in the building was buried underneath a pile of rubbl and debris.

When the American preparatory fir subsided Hans waited expectantly f the attack, but it never came. He wo dered why.

Later he saw Americans moving on small rise about 500 meters away ne the road. He counted up his trees agai twenty-three, twenty-four, twenty-fiv There was quite a group of America there now. He marvelled at how th had the nerve to stand around talkir in the open like that. Encouraged b his former successes, he decided to sho one shot at the group. One man in pa ticular caught his attention. He a peared to be the center of attractio Perhaps he was the leader. Hans car fully set his sight. He settled into solid, comfortable firing position an taking his sight picture, which was qui indistinct this time, he even more slow than before squeezed the trigger. Wh he looked for the results of his work th time he saw nothing except that th Americans had cleared out from th rise. He suddenly thought of Sergea Schulenberg. What would he tell hi this time. Sure enough the sergea came down the canal bed looking unpleasant as ever. Hans could thi of nothing to tell him except the trut The Sergeant's response was typical what Hans had learned to expect.

"You never learn, do you Muell How did you ever expect to hit an thing at that range? But since you a so anxious to fight you will man a liste ing post out there by the road tonight— night, you understand? You will ha ten rounds of rifle ammunition and tw grenades; that is all." Sergeant Schule berg left, taking all Hans' ammuniti except the ten rounds of rifle and t two grenades. Hans shrugged phi sophically. Oh, well, perhaps he cou dig up a little more ammunition som where. He managed to find and hi away about thirty more rounds of ri ammunition, three grenades, and abo five land mines that someone had h in one of the buildings. After repo ing to Sergeant Schulenberg and rece ing the usual instructions, he was al

to sneak the ammunition to his post down near the road. This type of duty usually terrified Hans. It was lonely and frightening out there by yourself listening for the stealthy approach of the enemy, but this night somehow he didn't care. It was a very deadly German soldier that the American patrol met that night. He waited until he had the first shadowy figure exactly in his sights, before he blasted away. Then he thought he hit another one before the figures melted into the darkness. Later on in the night Hans thought he heard the rumble of tank motors. That made him remember the land mines. He crawled out and laid them by the road near a small culvert which had been blown, two on one side, three on the other. He dug a little hole with his bayonet for each mine and covered it carefully. Then he went back to his hole and slept fitfully for the rest of the night. Fortunately for Hans, Sergeant Schulenberg did not catch him sleeping or he would have been shot.



THE German garrison of Grosheim, held there by the iron will of Sergeant Schulenberg, waited all morning for the impending attack. When it did not come, many of the men even began to become a little cheerful, despite the bad food and the lack of any kind of fire support. Perhaps the Americans would by-pass Grosheim. Perhaps help would come. Then someone, listening intently, discerned a familiar and dreaded sound. "Jabos," he said. Shortly thereafter the entire town of Grosheim seemed to have been blown from under their feet. At the completion of the artillery preparation there were few Germans in Grosheim who were able or willing to serve their weapons. After the tanks and infantry had started to move the final few yards into Grosheim, there were only two who could and would fire at all: Sergeant Schulenberg and Private Mueller.

Hans had again escaped the major effects of the American air and artillery preparation. His position on the outskirts of the town was far enough away from the center of impact of most of the bombs and shells for him to be physically unharmed, although he was thoroughly shaken up. He was not so shaken up, however, that he couldn't fire his rifle when the American attack started. He fired it steadily and saw three or four Americans drop, but he was far too busy to evaluate the results of every shot. When it was obvious that the Americans were not going to be stopped, he dashed back up the canal bed to the old machine gun position now in a pile of rubble. A soldier Hans did not know was manning the gun, but he seemed dazed; he wasn't even firing the gun, just looking at it as if he had never seen one before. Hans pushed him roughly aside and started to shoot. He had a glimpse of Sergeant Schulenberg yelling like a madman and brandishing his pistol at a group of cowering, bedraggled looking soldiers behind another rubble pile. But Hans was too intent upon the job at hand to worry about Sergeant Schulenberg. He fired the gun in short, accurate bursts at the infantry accompanying the tanks. Eventually, the infantry stopped advancing; and then the tanks. Hans exulted. "We've stopped them again; we've done it again;" but his exultation was short-lived. The Americans started forward once more. He kept firing his gun at the fleeting targets, but still they kept coming. Suddenly, Hans realized that they were not going to be stopped. Bullets were kicking up dust in front of his position now; it was a miracle he wasn't hit. Two bullets went through his tunic, one through the sleeve, one through the side, grazing his skin. The machine gun itself was hit several times. It was unbearable. Hans dived for his rifle at the bottom of his hole. He couldn't even surrender. He knew now that if he stood up at all he would be cut in two. He decided to play dead. He could hear the Americans shouting. He felt that there was someone in the remains of this very building! Instinctively he reached for his rifle, not to use it, but more for the reassurance that only his rifle could give him. He felt the rough, strong grasp of the American jerking him to his feet. Then the American—he was an Indian—was trying to take his rifle. Hans was dazed, stricken. Not his rifle! It was the only friend he had. He didn't want to shoot anybody any more. He just wanted to keep the rifle. But the American tore it from his grasp. Hans went completely to pieces then. All the tension of the past twenty-four hours, the bad food, the fear, the lack of rest, the shock, hit Hans all at once. He started to blubber and beg for mercy; he reverted to his old self; he babbled incessantly although nobody could understand him. Finally, when the Indian jumped at him he became terrified. He had seen Western movies where the Indians chased people in order to scalp them. The Indian was going to scalp him. He started to run blindly, wildly. If only they would just shoot him and get it over with. But not take his fine, curly hair. When he finally collapsed, a snivelling, shaking heap on the road—there he was, that pitiful subhuman creature—*the man who had stopped the 1st Division.*

Private John Mueller, U.S.A.

HANS MUELLER never knew the results or effects of his military exploits. Nobody did. He was rather ashamed of his capture and his breakdown afterwards, but after a hot meal, bath and a good rest he completely recovered. He was interrogated, but his interrogators were quickly convinced that he knew little of military value.

Hans did not stay a prisoner very long. He stayed long enough, however, to learn a little English, and to hear quite a bit about America. He liked what he heard. He never got there as a prisoner of war; the war ended too soon, but decided he would like to go there. He and Frieda had an opportunity to work for an American official in the State Department as butler and maid, and they took it. Two years later the American said he could arrange for them to emigrate to the U. S.

Hans, Frieda and Johann arrived in America in the spring of 1948. He got a job as a waiter in a German restaurant in New York. He finally found an apartment on the East Side. It was not a tenement, but it was not a fashionable place, either. Frieda kept it very clean.

In the spring of 1953, young Johann, now called John, received his draft notice. John was the exact replica of his

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father, having the same dark curly hair, the large nose, the protruding ears. He was somewhat taller and heavier than Hans, a tribute perhaps to the more substantial diet he had in the United States, but he had many of the same personal characteristics as Hans. He was sloppy and he had a single-tracked mind. He did well in school in the subjects he liked, but ignored the others.

John had gone to a summer camp in the summer of 1951. One of the boys had a .22 rifle. He loaned it to John on one or two occasions, and John became quite attached to it; so attached to it, in fact, that he traded the boy some of his prized possessions for it, as boys will. He brought it home to show his father. Hans looked at it very carefully, peering in the chamber and down the bore, lining up the sights. John thought his father was quite pleased, but much to John's amazement Hans suddenly handed it back to him and said: "Get rid of it; it will only get you into trouble." John, like most people, never quite understood his father. He put the rifle away, and his father never saw it again.

John was not as apprehensive about his approaching career in the Army as his father. He liked America and in a vague way desired to do something for it, but like most of the youngsters he knew, nothing that would interfere too much with his personal life. He didn't expect to like the Army. Any day now, though, he will report to a training division, never dreaming that he is the son of a man who performed one of the greatest individual exploits of the war against the country whose uniform he will soon be wearing.

It Could Happen Here

UP to now, this story has been entirely fictional. From now on, I don't intend that there shall be anything fictional about what I have to say. Good or bad, logical or illogical, true or untrue, the story brings out some very important military principles. The first of these is the importance of the individual soldier in combat.

Here was a man who stopped an entire division for twenty-four hours with nothing except his rifle, a few other weapons he happened to pick up on the battlefield, and a will and determination and knowledge or instinct that just seemed to occur to him for some reason or other at that particular time and place. Under the given circumstances and conditions, probably nothing short of an atomic bomb could have stopped that division—and maybe not even an atomic bomb. Well, you might say, those conditions and circumstances were tailor-made by the author to bring out certain points; you can prove anything that way. That is true. But it is an unfortunate characteristic of infantry combat that it is extremely difficult to separate fact from fiction. Airplanes bring back pictures from gun cameras of enemy airplanes disintegrating in the air, of entire industrial plants being blown sky high. The Navy has photographic proof of the enemy's ships it sinks. But only the infantryman knows the paralyzing effect upon himself and his comrades of having a man drop not ten feet away with a bullet through his head, of having his leaders and his friends suddenly carried away feet first as a result of something he can hear but cannot see. And he doesn't even know that much about the effect of his fire on the enemy; he can only guess and hope, and maybe count



the bodies when he gets on the objective.

According to the story, of the forty-one casualties inflicted on George Company, Hans Mueller was directly responsible for forty. The other American casualty was Captain Stevens, wounded by Sergeant Schulenberg. Even the tank was knocked out by a mine laid by Hans Mueller. Anyone who has served with a combat infantry company knows that these are quite a few casualties for a company to suffer in twenty-four hours. I have used the 1st Infantry Divison in my story because it was the kind of division that could take such casualties and still accomplish its mission. I believe it was representative of our best divisions; no better than yours or mine perhaps, but certainly a fine division by most standards. Whether it was twenty or 280 miles east of the Rhine on 26 April I do not know; I was on the other side of the world fighting the Japanese at the time. I do believe, however, that this could have happened to any U. S. division, in World War II. It was unusual, but not unique that one company should be the advance guard for a division. It was unusual, but not unique, that a small town or road center like Grosheim should assume the strategical or tactical importance that it did. It was neither unusual nor unique that a good company like George Company could be stopped the same way George Company was. The unique point of this story was that this feat was accomplished by one man, and even that may not have been unique. Who can say that one man could not have stopped his outfit for twenty-four hours under the circumstances and conditions that the 1st Division encountered that day?

BEFORE I entered combat I used to say, "This or that happened here in the problem today, but it could not have happened in combat." I don't say that any more, because I've learned that almost anything can happen in infantry combat. I should have said it could not have logically happened in combat, but it is the unfortunate lot of the soldier that he must fight the illogical as well as the logical. He is lucky or smart or both if he can figure out which is which. If the combat situation I have invented was indeed unique, can you name a real one which was not unique? The same is true of the character of Hans Mueller. In any case, I believe my story is one that could have happened, and in some shape or form possibly did.

It seems almost certain, however, that even if something like this did happen nobody would know about it. Poor Hans as well as many of his real-life counterparts is destined to live in oblivion, probably convinced that he was a failure as a soldier.

Had George Company known one man was the only effective fighting force opposing them they would have been in Grosheim within minutes after Corporal Rivera's death. Had Captain Stevens and Colonel Keats known that Sergeant Schulenberg had completely destroyed the German effectiveness as a fighting force by driving Hans away from the machine gun, George Company would have moved into Grosheim in less

than a few minutes—and without casualties. If General Appleton had not been hit, the division would probably have been on its objective six hours earlier. Perhaps most amazing of all, if Sergeant Schulenberg had sent every German soldier out of Grosheim except Hans Mueller, the Germans would have accomplished the same results with the loss of only one man. As it was, the presence of the demoralized and ineffective group saved the military reputation of an American division. Certainly there were plenty of dead bodies in Grosheim that day, the visible evidence, positive indentifications and POW reports that Grosheim was occupied by a battalion, which was true and was so stated in the division history. But the division objective was taken when they captured Hans Mueller.

So you see, so many things about infantry combat are unknown or misinterpreted or misunderstood that you are practically forced to resort to fiction to prove a point. Most accounts of actual battles turn out to be mostly that anyhow.

Whether one man could have achieved the results achieved by our mythical Hans Mueller is beside the point. If it took three or four like Hans, or a dozen, or even a hundred, to do the job he did that day, it must be admitted that such people are extremely valuable. Divisions are not stopped by airplanes or battleships or totally even by artillery; they are stopped by men, mainly riflemen. With all the divisions we have to stop, we are going to need a lot of riflemen, a lot of damn good riflemen. They all won't be fortunate—or unfortunate—enough to find themselves in the same situation as Hans Mueller, but it stands to reason that if we have enough good riflemen, there may be a few who will find themselves in similar situations and be able to do what he did, even though we may never know about it.

ANOTHER military point which this story illustrates is leadership, good and bad. Sergeant Schulenberg, for example, was one of the leaders in the story. He was a sergeant that most officers, German and American, would give their eye teeth to have. Yet it is hard to see how there could have been a more ineffective leader than Sergeant Schulenberg on the battlefield. Private Mueller was effective despite Sergeant Schulenberg rather than because of him. This is a pretty severe condemnation of any leader, since the objective of a leader is to make all of his men effective fighters. Why did he fail? His men's morale was low; according to his standards they were a pretty poor bunch of men, anyhow. Was it his fault he failed? *You can bet your life it was.*

You'll remember that a good bit of Schulenberg's leadership was based on fear—fear of Sergeant Schulenberg. We Americans don't subscribe to the theory of leadership through fear. We say that a leader should be fair, considerate of his men, courageous in the face of danger, loyal, determined, and so on, just as we say a scout is trustworthy, loyal, cheerful, helpful, friendly. . . . All very true. I'm all for it, just as I'm against sin. But why is leadership based on fear faulty? A man who gets things done by having his men scared not to do them because of fear of him still accomplishes his mission, doesn't he? And in most cases whether we admit it or not he gets it done more thoroughly, more quickly, and more efficiently than by other methods. We have leaders in our Army, commissioned and non-commissioned, who will frankly tell you that the way



to run an outfit is to get 'em scared to death of you. So why isn't leadership based on fear of the leader generally sound? Sergeant Schulenberg's failure tells us why it isn't.

He had a bunch of scared men under his command in Grosheim. There are hardly any other men than scared men in battle and these men had more reason to be scared than most. In addition to the terrifying air and artillery concentrations they had Sergeant Schulenberg to be scared of.

We have seen how ineffective all this was. Only one man fought. Sergeant Schulenberg ignored or didn't know that: *You can lead a soldier to battle but you can't make him fight.* Very scared men do not fight as well as only partially scared men. When the normal fears and strains of battle are compounded by the fear of the leader, men's battle efficiency must be correspondingly reduced. That is why Sergeant Schulenberg failed. That is why leadership based on fear is not a sound principle. But do you read that in our field manuals or in our doctrine on leadership? You do not. And as long as you don't tell 'em a good sound reason for rejecting it there are going to be leaders who, while possibly giving lip service otherwise, are going to deliberately apply leadership through fear. I think we should tell 'em why it will fail them when the chips are down.

Sergeant Schulenberg was a master of unessential details. There are people in our Army who will thunder at this. There are no unessential details in the Army! All details are important! Minute attention to detail is one of the most important characteristics of good leadership! I agree, but it must be admitted, I think, that some details are more important than others. And it also must be admitted that a good leader must be able to discern between the essential and the unessential, or if you will, between the essential and the more essential. Most of us have had the experience of working for someone who is such a stickler for detail that nothing ever gets done. Usually these people are found on a staff. I say this, not because I have anything against staff officers generally, but because details are important in staff work.

Sergeant Schulenberg never realized that Hans Mueller, since he was sloppy, couldn't remember things, looked and acted servile and shifty, could be, and in fact proved himself to be, a good soldier on the battlefield. Although the Sergeant was after Hans constantly about other details, he missed completely the all important fact that Hans had somehow learned how, when, and where to fire his rifle and other weapons effectively. That is something he should have known about Hans had he forgotten every other detail about him. Perhaps what Sergeant Schulenberg really lacked was a basic understanding of human nature. But he was interested in efficiency, not human nature. In his determined efforts to get this efficiency he forgot the main element that makes military efficiency: the human being. A lot of reasons have been advanced for Germany's defeat. Not the least of these, in my opinion, was because they had too many Schulenbergs and not enough Muellers.

But perhaps we should not be too

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critical of Sergeant Schulenberg unless we are sure we can do better ourselves. American leadership as illustrated in this story was not bad. It was not intended to be, anyway. I think it was fairly typical of American military leadership in World War II. I don't believe that a leader whose solution to every military problem in combat is to give his subordinates hell every time they are held up is a good leader. Colonel Galloway was the closest approach to this type in the story. But he had the redeeming grace of rewarding his battalion commander who took the objective with a token of his confidence and appreciation. Providing he was as fair with all his battalion commanders, I believe they would be willing to swear by him despite occasional bursts of temper or impatience. Often good leadership manifests itself after a battle as well as before and during it. I hope the story brings this out, too. But we can always improve the standards of our leadership: let there be no doubt about that.




What Can We Do About It?

WE now have the problem of Hans' son, John Mueller. We will have to handle him better than the Germans did Hans, because it is not likely that John, being Americanized, will overcome all the obstacles Hans did to become a good soldier. John, too, will be sloppy, forgetful, a little slow about some things, apparently not too interested in anything military except his rifle. Will we give him the "eight-ball" treatment? Will we have a sergeant who will tell his platoon leader: "Private Mueller came out to inspection today without his shoes shined; the other day he forgot his insignia; he's always doing something like that. But I'd like to keep him in my squad, sir; he's trying. And I think we can make a soldier out of him. Somehow I think that boy is going to be all right in combat."

I'm not so sure our sergeant is going to take that attitude. I'm not so sure I would, either. I don't like sloppy soldiers, and I don't like forgetful ones. Contrary to any impression I may have created, I am not of the namby-pamby school of leadership. We could use noncommissioned officers with some of the characteristics of Sergeant Schulenberg and even some of his methods, including the use of force, providing it is controlled. For example, if the sergeant finds Private Mueller drunk in public, orders him back to barracks, and finally has to give him a black eye or beat him up to get him back there, the sergeant should be backed up and no questions asked. But if the sergeant decides to "take Mueller behind the barracks" because Mueller dirtied the barracks or his bed wasn't made properly the sergeant should be busted, court-martialed, and railroaded out of the outfit; beating a man up is not a reasonable punishment for the delinquency. I realize it would be difficult for an officer to find out how Mueller got his black eye, but both officers and non-commissioned officers should understand the difference in leadership methods. One thing they have got to understand is that their job is to get Private Mueller with his weapon on the battlefield, and that Private Mueller will be willing and able to use that weapon properly. Private Mueller can do it if we don't 368 him first, if we don't spoil him by bad leadership; if we have the proper sense of leadership values when we lead him into combat through combat, and after combat. I don't think our leadership training tells us this. We are given a number of vague generalities, heretofore mentioned, about qualities of a leader, but we don't tell the young leader how to understand Private Mueller or how to get the most out of him. He doesn't need a course in psychology. He doesn't need lectures or manuals or even the new code of military justice. He just needs some sound guidance, a thorough knowledge of his mission, and a lot of practice in practical leadership out from behind the desk. We should see that he gets all of these. I'm not sure we are doing it.

THE final point illustrated by my story is that training in the care and use of weapons and in the development of combat initiative is all important. There is nothing more essential than teaching a soldier how to use his weapon and instilling in him the will and initiative to use it. We know this, of course, and try to teach him, but we try to teach him so many other things these two vital subjects are often lost in the shuffle. Some of our finest minds have figured out that so many training hours should be devoted to rifle marksmanship, so many hours to squad tactics, so many hours to I&E, and so on. But do these people know how long it will take Private Mueller to learn to shoot? An infantryman should be taught to shoot whether it takes eight hours or eighty or even more.

How would you find the time? Here is one way to solve that problem. At the Infantry School, in teaching new instructors they show a chart which is simply an ordinary target like this:




They tell the instructor, in preparing his subject to be sure to include the points in the bull's-eye in his presentation. Then if there is time, include the "should know" points, and then if more time is available, the "nice to know" points. Why don't we follow this principle in our training? Put rifle marksmanship, appropriately enough, right in the center of the bull's eye. Put subjects like TI&E, C-B-R warfare, the Chaplain's hour, orderly room hour, in the outside ring—"nice to know." Until the soldier reached a desired standard, say sharpshooter, on the rifle range and an equivalent standard on the transition range and other "need to know" subjects, he would not spend any time on the "nice to know" subjects at all. When he did reach those standards, in the "need to know" and "should know" subjects,

will take a required number of hours in the "nice to know" subjects, and if possible, more if he so desires. To the TI&E people who may object, I would ask: What is the use of teaching a man why he fights, if he doesn't know how to fight? To the C-B-R people I would say: There is nothing a soldier absolutely needs to know about chemical warfare except to put on and take off his gas mask, and he can do that on the way to and from the rifle range. I would tell the chaplains that the best one of them I ever saw was one who instead of requesting more of the men's scheduled time, went out in the field, on the range, or anywhere else a group of men were assembled, talked to them there, and incidentally, participated in their training, too. To the "Orderly Room Hour" enthusiasts, I would tell them what one of my former company commanders said: "My men know that my door is open or I am available at my CP or even at home if they want to see me. They don't need a special hour for it." I realize that this would spoil a lot of pretty training charts in a lot of headquarters, but such a system would improve our training and give our young commanders some responsibilities and an opportunity to use some judgment and initiative in training their men. They have little enough at the present time.

In rifle marksmanship training, all "dry" work would be done on the range itself. When a man learned his sight picture, sling adjustment, and trigger squeeze, and a few fundamentals about positions, and thought he was ready to shoot, he would shoot. There would be no such thing as "instructional practice" and record practice." He would learn to zero his rifle and then he would fire a regular course. Every time he fired, it would be for record. When he reached the desired standard, he would coach, or be ready for a "should know" subject.

You say: "Well, anyone could make expert that way." But isn't that exactly what we want? We are trying to teach as many infantrymen as possible to learn to shoot, not make it tough for them to earn a marksmanship medal. To supply economy experts who claim we can't afford that much ammunition, I would say, cancel a few USO shows, or give us the money saved from a flight of airplanes being scratched because of weather, and we can buy that ammunition. It doesn't take so much money compared to a lot of things we spend money for, and the results are worth it if we can produce infantrymen who can hit what they are aiming at.

ALL this is getting a little far away from our story of Hans and John Mueller, except that, you remember, both Hans and John liked to shoot and liked rifles. John liked his own rifle, that is. Most American soldiers in this day and age, unfortunately, think of their rifles and other weapons as just pieces of hardware —until they get into combat. In the old Indian-fighting days a scout had a pet name for his rifle and talked to it like a human being. Those days are gone forever. In the Army it may be good riddance, but that love of a man for his weapon could well be retained; we haven't got it now and our military system doesn't encourage it. We give a man a rifle, probably full of cosmoline, possibly already pitted from improper care, tell him it belongs to the government, costs $80. You clean it, we tell him, and if you lose it, you pay for it; if it doesn't work, bring it back and we'll give you another one. The man cleans it for inspections; but no inspection, no clean rifle. If you don't believe it, inspect your outfit's rifles some Saturday morning after a week on the range, when many of the men are on pass. The rifles you inspect in ranks will be clean, but get a few from the racks assigned to those who went on pass. You will find a lot of men who shouldn't go on pass again for a long time. When we issue a man a rifle it should be in perfect condition, preferably a new one. We should give him that rifle, and tell him he owns it. If he stays in the infantry he'll keep it. If he is honorably discharged he can take it with him, or he can sell it back to the government. It is his badge as an infantryman, the one item of equipment that belongs to him, not the government.



The government will teach him how to shoot it, and how to care for it, but from then on the responsibility is his. There'll be no price tag on this weapon. It may be worth his life some day. If it doesn't function, it is not worth a plugged nickel. If it is found dirty or neglected, it will be taken away from him for a time. That will be his punishment. If necessary he can carry something heavier in the meantime, but if it has to be taken away permanently he is unworthy to be an infantryman. Those who are assigned to crew-served weapons can turn in their rifles and store them, but they can draw them out again any time. I believe this would restore our infantrymen's respect for rifles and for themselves. I believe John Mueller would respond to such a system nobly.

IF soldiers have confidence in their weapons and their ability to use those weapons they should have the initiative to use them properly on the battlefield. They should, but they don't—at least a large portion of them don't, according to S. L. A. Marshall. The American soldier is assumed to have more initiative than other soldiers, because he is brought up in a free country, is accustomed to exercising his own free will and determining his own destiny. This may be true with regard to some of his military activities but not necessarily on the battlefield. Combat initiative is what makes the individual soldier close with the enemy and destroy him. Frequently this impetus is provided by junior officers and non-commissioned officers. Occasionally individual infantrymen catch the spark and transmit it to an entire outfit. But these are exceptional instances. Mostly our soldiers demonstrate initiative by figuring out how to make their work easier. I do not say this sarcastically,

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because it is certainly militarily advantageous to save energy for major efforts. But I think we deceive ourselves if we believe that they display much combat initiative in the very elemental business of hunting down the enemy and destroying him with their individual weapons. I also think it is a fallacy to believe that our training is best conceived to accomplish this purpose.

WE can train a great many people quickly and more or less efficiently, but we train them as a mass, using mass production methods. In modern combat soldiers do not operate in a mass. If they do, they suffer excessive casualties. If their leaders attempt to eliminate mass formations but still attempt to control their men the same as they would mass formations, the leaders suffer excessive casualties. I think Korea has re-emphasized this fact. The solution, of course, is to instill in the individual soldier the initiative and will to accomplish his mission in extended formations more or less free of the control of his leader. But obvious as this solution is, it just won't happen automatically and the type of training necessary to achieve it is not simple. To say that I have the complete solution would be self-deluded conceit. But I have some suggestions which I think would help.

First, we should remember the principle which Sergeant Schulenberg never knew and wouldn't have believed anyway: *You can lead a soldier to battle, but you can't make him fight.* Tell the soldier that. On the battlefield the occasions are exceptional when he can be told when or where to shoot, and except in a very general way, when and where to move. He supposedly has learned how to move and shoot. The rest is up to him. This appears simple, but in combat it gets complicated. If he is in doubt about when and where to shoot, which is normal on the battlefield, the time to shoot is usually when he gets shot at by small arms. The place to shoot at is where he would be if he were the enemy shooting back. His best position is where he can best shoot and stay protected at the same time. If he shoots well enough so that the enemy can't shoot back, he needs less protection: the more he shoots, the safer he is, providing he shoots well enough to keep the enemy from shooting back; the closer he is to the enemy, the more chances he has to hit the target. So it is usually best to move toward the enemy. There, in a few simple words, is nearly all the individual soldier needs to know about fire and movement and tactics. I think we should keep telling him something like this, send him through tactical exercises with a minimum of control to show him how it works. Surely, the enemy should be enveloped when possible and attacked from the flank or the rear, but that is usually a problem of his leaders, not his. Almost invariably, when he attacks, he will attack frontally because the enemy he attacks has nothing more to do than turn himself and his weapon in his tracks. On his own initiative the rifleman must be the sole judge of how, when, and where to fire his weapon and where to move to do it. We should train him to do this.

After the soldier has learned how to fire his weapon his responsibility for the safety of himself and his comrades should be emphasized. In our system of training, from the time a man puts the first round in his rifle until he finally enters combat, there is a safety officer hovering over him to see that his bolt is open, his rifle is pointed the right way, or his safety is on. I hope our high regard for human life never changes, and I believe every precaution should be taken to protect each soldier. But we emphasize safety in our training to such an extent that many of our soldiers are more afraid of our own fire than that of the enemy. In my opinion, many of our safety precautions are entirely unnecessary. I don't have the complete solution to this problem, but some time in the final stages of his training before entering combat, the soldier should go through a firing problem in which he and the other members of his unit are the only safety control officials. There are no safety officers on the battlefield.

HANS MUELLER did not have the benefits of this type of training. He wasn't even a citizen of a free country. But he was a success in battle, at least in one battle. Certain qualities existed in Hans Mueller which made him a good soldier. On the surface, Hans was pretty hopeless, but probably nowhere is it more difficult to dig beneath the superficial in a man's character and discover and develop his true value than in the infantry. It is difficult in training because soldiers in training never are tested as they are in combat. It is difficult in combat because everyone is too busy or excited to realize how other men react to the test of combat. I regret to say I do not know whether there were any Hans Muellers in my own outfit during the war. I had to resort to fiction to find him. Yet he is very real to me now and I am sure he exists—or existed. I am equally sure that his son, John, is entering our Army today, or thousands just like him are entering it, and we must develop the military potentialities of John Mueller to the maximum.

We should not forget the story of Hans Mueller, who alone with his infantry weapons stopped the 1st Division for twenty-four hours. Nor should we forget that properly trained, equipped and led, his son will do as well as his father. We should not let the American people forget it. But above all, we should not let *him* forget it.





The first repatriated Americans arrive at Freedom Village

The first newspaper stories about American prisoners who had turned against their comrades in arms and had joined the Communist cause were chilling in the deliberate matter-of-factness with which the repatriated Americans made the charges and the press reported them. But within a matter of hours there were second thoughts and fuller reporting. The press began to dig behind the news, and the possibility that all this was another example of the evil methods the Communists use to turn son against father, friend against friend, and nation against nation, began to appear in the newspapers. The report of Lieutenant Gough C. Reinhardt is followed and supported by Edward Hunter, the author of Brain Washing in Red China. *Lieutenant Reinhardt's thoughtful reflections of a young officer on the spot, and Mr. Hunter's clear explanation of what the Communists are up to give us an understanding of the meaning of the tragic stories that came from Freedom Village.*

Letter from Freedom Village

Frame-Up, Communist Style

LIEUTENANT GOUGH C. REINHARDT

The following is excerpted from a letter of a soldier-son to his soldier-father, Colonel George C. Reinhardt.

WHEN the truce came I turned my counter-battery radar set over to a new lieutenant and joined Operation Big Switch at Freedom Village. My job consists of supervising an identification section in the processing of returning prisoners. We have cards prepared and personal data sheets on known POWs and MIAs—even fingerprint cards in case there's any doubt about identities.

It's a very satisfying job, watching men come alive and believe they're free again. A few almost break down. Others refuse to believe they are free at first. They've had so many disappointments they won't let themselves accept it. They think there must be a catch somewhere.

Unusual reactions are not as marked among the Americans as the poor ROKs. Whole shipments of these lads get off the trucks begging permission to send a last message to their families before we shoot them for having been taken prisoner. When we convince 'em they are free, and returning heroes, these impassive Orientals break down completely.

The majority of those being repatriated look pretty good, especially when we compare them to pictures of men coming back from Japanese POW camps in 1945. The evidence seems to point to harsher treatment by the North Koreans and in the early days of the Chinese participation. Some men show evidence of beatings and poorly treated wounds. But for the last six months or so things were better. Except for old

First Lieutenant Gough C. Reinhardt, Artillery, was an enlisted man from 1945 to 1947. He then attended Purdue University, from which he graduated in 1950. He was commissioned in the Regular Army in June of the same year.

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scars of past mistreatment among the men who survived, and the certain knowledge that only God knows how many did not, there isn't too much to complain about now. The Commies have been preparing for Big Switch in their own fashion.

It's on the mental side that the Reds have shown their unbelievably clever cruelty. They played their hands so well that accounts of Communist brutality are almost crowded out of the news by charges, among our own people, running from collaboration to treachery. I can imagine the headlines in the papers back home: "treason, informers, collaborators" and that sort of sensational stuff. Makes priceless publicity for the Reds' smartest, and dirtiest, propaganda since the Korean mess started.

LET me show you how it looks over here. Suppose I had been a prisoner. The Chinks said I had joined up with them. Would you believe it?

Right! They had that figured. But suppose my buddies accused me of ratting on them and going Red. What would you think then?

Let's make it worse. Suppose I didn't come back at all. The returnees report I'd stayed behind from choice. No doubt of my guilt in their minds. How would *that* hit you?

From what I've seen in my little corner of Big Switch there may be quite a few families in the U.S.A. facing exactly that brand of hell, the vast majority of them victims of a damnable frame-up. More serious to our country, though less personally tragic, is the loss of faith and our distrust in the ability of American soldiers to resist Red ideology.

Yet the whole thing is mainly lies; clever lies. For example, the bulk of the stories we hear first hand (NOT through the newspapers) prove that prisoners from one camp are convinced that men *in another camp* were all collaborators. Every little group was strictly isolated. Negroes were segregated from their white comrades. All received a steady diet of "party line" and false "news of the world."

Those men believe what they tell us about "squealers." Why not? The Reds beat 'em up and gave them a rough time. Then the sly insinuation: "Remember Joe Blow? He told us all about your food stealing, your escape plans. We put him in a luxury camp where you could be too if you'd cooperate."

Maybe that won the Chinks an occasional convert, some poor sick devil who couldn't take it any longer. If so, it was sheer bonus. The real pay-off they worked for—and the newspapers are the innocent paymasters—was spreading hatred and distrust among our own people.

Who really knows, except some stinking commissar and his goons, what really happened to poor Joe Blow? Wasn't he shot in the back of his head and tossed into a ditch; no more a traitor than you or I? Even if he survived to appear in another group of returnees, what proof have his buddies that he ratted? Only the "sacred" word of a Communist official. Are you beginning to get the possibilities?

I remember our months together in Berlin. The Reds over here are the same type of animal we watched operate in the Soviet Zone. You'll remember how they turned kidnapped German technicians into "volunteer" workers for the Eastern zone. They even produced the men, without a mark on 'em, to verify their signatures on the "contracts." Sure they did. The Reds had his wife and kids and he knew what that meant. Sure, he'd verify his signature.

That was clever work in a dirty way. We've just had a new lesson in their cleverness over here. The Nazis were amateurs by comparison. They bought collaborators. The Reds frame theirs.

That's the only way the picture makes sense. All the history books I've read told me about only two American traitors, Benedict Arnold and *The Man Without a Country*. Why should we suddenly be afflicted with a whole batch of traitors out of a few hundred sick, crippled, and undernourished ex-prisoners?

During World War II the Japs were at least as brutal as the Reds. Yet th Japanese managed to win a bare handfu of collaborators from many times th number of prisoners to work on. How then, could the Commies do it?

THE answer is simple. They didn't They staged a super frame-up. And w seem to have fallen for it. Reminds m of my basic course in military justice ". . . rape is a most detestable crime . . but it must be remembered that it is a accusation easy to be made, hard to b proved, but *harder to be defended b the party accused, though innocent.*"

Maybe when the proper officials hav a chance to interview the GIs wh "chose" to stay on the Red side of th fence, we'll come closer to honest an swers. But in every case where the a leged "traitor" isn't alive to be questione I'll be damned if we should convict hi in absentia or whatever the legal ter may be.

As for those very few who have com back to be *specifically* accused by the buddies . . . well, that *is* serious; lik the rape charge. But the same book o military justice requires a thorough i vestigation by a competent, unbiased o ficer before a case can come to trial. know the Army hasn't tried anybody even put in charges so far as I kno

The whole thing is so disturbing tha we almost forget the good side of th picture. Processing runs pretty smooth and fast. One returnee claimed to h his best friend instead of himself. Schi oid tendency, said the medic. We g him straightened out with the same kin ly doc's help.

By the author of "Brain Washing in Red China"

Our POWs Are Not Traitors

EDWARD HUNTER

This article is reprinted by permission from The New Leader *of 24 August 1953.*

CHALK up another big success for international Communism's propaganda apparatus. As American soldiers have returned from captivity in Korean prison camps, the people of America and other free countries have been stunned to hear many of them accused by their comrades of turning informers, of betraying their country. The Communists have be broadcasting every detail of these accu tions to their subject peoples as a war ing not to get "dangerous thoughts" a then expect help from the "decade American imperialists."

But the shocking part of all this not what happened in the POW cam Rather, what is so frightening is the w in which the explanation of these even has failed to reach the American publ

The truth of the matter is that,



. S. soldiers in Communist prison camp. This photograph was made by Asso-ated Press photographer Frank Noel in 1952 when he was a Communist captive.

pt for a small percentage who acted om purely opportunistic motives, these -called "progressives" are to be pitied sick men, not condemned as traitors. or the Chinese Communists operated e prisoner-of -war camps as huge brain-ashing centers, applying the sinister talitarian technique based on advanced ethods of psychiatry, evangelism and doctrination combined with physical olence, both subtle and crude.

No human brain can resist such a ind-control strategy indefinitely. We ould have realized this as long ago as 36, when former Russian Communist aders abjectly confessed to the most ntastic crimes in the first Moscow rge trials. And anyone not convinced en should have had any further doubts moved by such postwar examples as ardinal Mindszenty, Robert Vogeler d the Maryknoll Father who escaped m Red China to tell how, under the essure of brain-washing, he had literal-begun to doubt that he was actually priest.

Surely no one deserved to be given these facts more than did the Ameri-n soldiers who, if captured, faced ex-sure to the Communist techniques. t, the first these men knew of brain-shing was when it was inflicted on em. They had no way of recognizing and, as a result, were led like sheep the slaughter.

AMERICAN newsmen and Govern-ment officials have referred to this mind pressure by any number of terms. They have called it persuasion, propaganda, indoctrination—everything but brain-washing. This has meant misleading the public. There are many words used to describe normal efforts to make a person change his point of view or accept a fact—for example, education, public relations, psychology, propaganda. Brain-washing, however, constitutes no single one of these, but a combination of all, combined with the most refined physical and moral pressure.

The returning American POWs should be told that the only difference between themselves and those they are denouncing as traitors is that the latter had less mental stamina or, perhaps, were singled out by the Communists for more intensive pressure. Most of those who succumbed to brain-washing are ill men and should be treated as such. Their comrades should regard them as they would any other victims of so-called "battle fatigue."

WHAT made brain-washing so insidious in its effects on the wholly unprepared American prisoners was the manner in which the Communists initiated it in the guise of normal military interrogation. The captured soldier expected to be interrogated, and he suspected nothing when the questions began. What he was undergoing, however, was a screening process. The Communists were sounding out the likes and dislikes, the past experiences and present prejudices of the men in order to determine the types of minds with which they had to deal.

Our knowledge of brain washing techniques as employed in China itself, whether to extract "confessions" or to convert the victim, enables us to list some of the standard features. One is the use of hunger, perhaps merely in the form of a calculated diet deficiency. Another is the inducing of fatigue by forcing the individual to overtax his strength in something he might ordinarily enjoy doing, such as sports. And, of course, all this takes place in an atmosphere of complete uncertainty—as to why one is held, what one's fate is to be and what is occurring in the outside world—coupled with a measured dosage of threats and frequently, violence.

Goebbels had a trick that consisted in making certain that every piece of propaganda he put out contained nine-tenths truth. Camouflaged in this manner, the vital one-tenth lie stood a better chance of gaining acceptance. The Communist brain-washers have greatly improved this technique. They see to it that all the details are true; the trick is to rearrange these details in a new pattern so that they seem to add up to a preconceived conclusion that is totally false. By this time, the hungry, weary, bewildered victim—as the Rev. John D. Hayes, who underwent brain-washing, has explained it to me—has lost the capacity to distinguish fact from fancy and is prepared to accept almost anything his tormentors tell him.

WHEN the word "brain-washing" first appeared in this country and its techniques were disclosed, the Communist reaction was most curious. Instead of a barrage of attacks and attempts at refutation, there was utter silence. The Communists had good reason for this. Knowledge of brain-washing and how it is inflicted serves as a preventive. Had our soldiers known of it before their capture, they could have resisted the Communist pressures or else made their captors' task so difficult that they would have abandoned it in most cases as not worth the effort. Hence, the Communists were interested not in discrediting the brain-washing revelations but in hushing them up; any discussion, favorable or unfavorable, was damaging to their cause.

Continued silence and confusion on the subject of brain-washing only serves the Communists' ends. It is time the full story was told of this ultimate refinement of totalitarian contempt for the individual.

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THE NEW OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORT

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM E. BERGIN

ON 31 October 1953 a new Officer Efficiency Report, DA Form 67-3, is scheduled to replace Form 67-2 as the instrument for rating all officers of the Army.

Both sides of the new Form 67-3 are shown on following pages. It was developed with the assistance of thousands of officers representing every branch and grade of the officer corps, including all general officers on active duty.

Before the first postwar efficiency report, Form 67-1, was adopted in 1947, it had extensive technical pretesting. Its technical effectiveness had been checked; the ratings produced were found to be statistically sound. Unfortunately, however, Form 67-1 had a serious shortcoming: most officers didn't like it.

Objections were raised on a number of counts, especially to the forced-choice section which required the rater to choose among the particular descriptive alternatives offered. In 1950 it was replaced with one containing no forced-choice section. This was Form 67-2, then in process of development, and when adopted, intended only for interim use.

IN developing our newest efficiency report the first consideration was that we should profit as much as possible from the experience and thinking of the officers in the field and still retain the necessary degree of technical adequacy. Consequently, a questionnaire was prepared and sent out. Replies were received from about 1300 officers at seven major Army headquarters. These officers, representing each branch of the Army and in all grades from warrant officer to colonel, completed the questionnaire; the great majority of them, however, were captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels.

What were the responses of the officers to the questionnaire, and to what use was this information put?

Of the four rating scales used in Form 67-2, three were preferred over suggested alternatives covering the same content. These three were therefore proposed for the new Form 67-3 in substantially the same form as in 67-2: *Desirability in Various Capacities, Performance of Duty,* and *Overall Value to the Service.* A new scale was developed to cover the topic of promotability.

Several capacities were listed in Form 67-2 under *Desirability in Various Capacities* (Section II of Form 67-3). The commenting officers approved each of these by percentages ranging from 54 to 93. A number of recommendations, however, were made. Some wanted a new capacity, "Represent your headquarters in joint boards and other services, civilian agencies, or allied forces"; this was added to the new Form 67-3. Others recommended that "Teach in a classroom situation" be made more general; this heading was changed to "Conduct military instruction." The suggestion "Serve as your deputy" was added to assignment H so that the new heading reads, "Make decisions and take action in your name during your absence, e.g., act as your deputy."

On Form 67-2, desirability in each capacity was rated in terms of five step levels: "not want him," "take a chance on him," "happy to have him," "prefer him to most," and "particularly desire to have him."

This set of levels was offered in the questionnaire for comparison with four alternative sets. The set used in Form 67-2 was by far the preferred of the five sets. It was therefore retained in the new form with some modifications. "Take a chance on him" was changed to "would prefer others"; "happy to have him" became "pleased to have him."

IN general, scales with step levels in descriptive terms, such as the set just discussed, were preferred over numerical scales. Officers also offered suggestions for equalizing the intervals between adjacent step levels in several of the scales.

The *promotability* scale of Form 67-1 was the only one the officers questioned did not favor over alternate scales presented with it. But none of the alternate promotability scales was generally approved either. The most acceptable alternate was favored by less than half of the commenting officers. As a result all five scales were discarded, and an entirely new promotability scale was developed incorporating the suggestions and comments made by the officers.

Obviously, not all the recommendations of the responding officers could be incorporated in the new Form 67-3. Some desires were in conflict with other more deeply felt needs. A few were contrary to Army policy.

A TENTATIVE form of the new efficiency report, based largely on information from the questionnaire, was given field tryouts to check its technical adequacy, to find out if it were statistically sound. The proposed form was used at six field installations to rate officers on the job. These ratings were then compared with independent research measures of performance of the same officers. The agreement was close, indicating that the new form is a effective instrument for rating the efficiency of officers.

SINCE there were changes made as a result of the field trials, it was decided to check officer reaction again in a follow-up questionnaire. A questionnaire was prepared and sent to every general officer on active duty at the time (May 1952). General officers were asked to comment because their extensive experience would effectively supplement the earlier judgments of the officers in the lower grades. The follow-up questionnaire contained the same scales and questions that appeared in the earlier one. It also presented a summary of the information gained from the earlier survey. Each general officer was asked to comment on the several scales or to propose alternate scales.

There was no one section of the efficiency report singled out by the general officers for criticism or recommended changes. Rather there was consistent agreement on the overall acceptability of the rating scales. All of them were approved, outright or with minor changes, by close to 90 per cent of the general officers.

It was then adopted.

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM E. BERGIN, a former infantryman, is The Adjutant General of the Army.

FIRST PAGE OF THE NEW EFFICIENCY REPORT. THE SECOND (REVERSE) PAGE IS REPRODUCED ON THE NEXT PAGE

OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORT

(AR 600-185 and SR 600-185-1)

SECTION I

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL	2. SERVICE NO.	3. GRADE	4. BRANCH	5. COMPONENT
6. UNIT, ORGANIZATION, AND STATION OF RATED OFFICER	7. PERIOD OF REPORT			
	FROM *(Da, mo, yr)*	TO *(Da, mo, yr)*	DUTY DAYS	OTHER DAYS

8. REASON FOR REPORT

☐ Annual ☐ Change duty rated officer ☐ PCS rated officer ☐ Change duty rating officer ☐ PCS rating officer ☐ Other *(Specify)*

9. BASIS FOR RATING OFFICER'S ENTRIES

☐ Close daily contact ☐ Infrequent observation ☐ Frequent observation ☐ Reports and records

10. DUTIES ACTUALLY PERFORMED ON PRESENT JOB ASSIGNMENT *(Give his duty MOS , job assignment, and briefly describe major additional duties).*

11. OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS

	RATER			INDORSER		
	UNKNOWN	UNSATIS-FACTORY	SATIS-FACTORY	UNKNOWN	UNSATIS-FACTORY	SATIS-FACTORY
a. How effective is this officer in the maintenance of supply discipline?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. How effective is this officer in utilization of personnel?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c. FOR RATER ONLY - Does this officer possess the physical, mental, and moral qualities expected for his grade, branch, ond length of commissioned service?	UNKNOWN ☐	NO ☐	YES ☐	If *UNKNOWN* or *NO* explain in detail in item 12a.		
d. FOR RATER ONLY - Could this officer be expected to serve adequately in any normal branch assignment commensurate with his grade?	☐	☐	☐	If *UNKNOWN* or *NO* explain in detail in item 12a.		

12. DESCRIPTION OF RATED OFFICER AND COMMENTS. Remarks should cover any special strengths or weaknesses affecting performance of duty or ability to perform other types of assignments. If officer served in combat during period, state number of days (*days)* and discuss strengths and weaknesses exhibited in combat.

a. Comments of rating officer

b. Comments of indorsing officer

☐ I do not know the rated officer well enough to complete the reverse side of this report.

13. RATING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT	14. INDORSING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT
I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 600-185 AND SR 600-185-1.	I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 600-185 AND SR 600-185-1.
DATE / SIGNATURE	DATE / SIGNATURE
15. THIS REPORT HAS INCLOSURES. *(Insert "0" if appropriate).*	16. DATE ENTERED ON DA FORM 66 PERSONNEL OFFICER'S INITIALS

DA FORM 1 OCT 53 67-3 REPLACES DA AGO FORM 67-2, 1 SEP 50, WHICH WILL BE OBSOLETE 31 OCT 53.

CTOBER, 1953

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THIS IS THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE NEW OFFFICERS' EFFICIENCY REPORT

RATED OFFICER'S NAME AND SERVICE NUMBER

SECTION II ESTIMATED DESIRABILITY IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES

Indicate the extent to which you would desire the rated officer to serve under you in each type of duty described below. Place an X in the proper box. Consider each item in terms appropriate to rated officer's grade and branch. Use the *UNKNOWN* column only if the nature of your contacts makes it impracticable for you to make an estimate of his probable usefulness in a particular assignment. Marking *UNKNOWN* does not penalize the rated officer.

	RATER						INDORSER					
	UNKNOWN	1 NOT WANT HIM	2	3	4	5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM	UNKNOWN	1 NOT WANT HIM	2 WOULD PREFER OTHERS	3 PLEASED TO HAVE HIM	4 PREFER HIM TO MOST	5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM
A Command* a unit.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
B Serve as a staff officer. Specify:	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
C Work as a specialist, professional person, or technician. Specify:	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
D Conduct military instruction.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
E Serve in a capacity involving contacts with other services, allied forces, or civilians - e.g., joint boards, contract negotiations, reserve components, etc.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
F Carry out an assignment involving mostly administrative duties.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
G Represent your viewpoint in liaison activities.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
H Make decisions and take action in your name during your absence - e.g., act as your deputy.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I Be responsible in an emergency requiring forceful leadership.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
J Other. Specify:	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Comment on and/or clarify above ratings if necessary

For technical and administrative services, or staff, interpret this to mean managerial responsibilities commensurate with command.

SECTION III PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

Considering only officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, rate the officer on performance of his duty assignment. Read all descriptions and place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
7. Excels any other officer I know in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
6. Outstanding performance of this duty found in very few officers.	☐	☐
5. Very fine performance of such a nature that this officer is a distinct asset to the service.	☐	☐
4. Perfarms this duty in a competent, dependable manner.	☐	☐
3. Performs this duty acceptably.	☐	☐
2. Barely adequate in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
1. Inadequate in performance of this duty.	☐	☐

SECTION IV PROMOTION POTENTIAL

Considering officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, what is your opinon of this officer's promotion potential? Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
6. One af the few exceptional officers who should be considered for more rapid promotion than his contemporaries.	☐	☐
5. Should give an outstanding performance when promoted to next higher grade.	☐	☐
4. Should give a competent and dependable performance when promoted to next higher grade.	☐	☐
3. Should give a fairly adequate performance of duty when promoted to next higher grade.	☐	☐
2. Has not yet demonstrated potential for promotion to next higher grade. Needs more time in present grade.	☐	☐
1. Has reached the highest grade level at which satisfactory performance should be expected. Should not be promoted.	☐	☐

SECTION V OVER-ALL VALUE

What is your estimate of the rated officer's over-all value to the service? Compare him with officers of the same grade, branch, and about the same time in grade. Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
8. The most outstanding officer I know.	☐	☐
7. One of the few highly outstanding officers I know.	☐	☐
6. A very fine officer who is a great asset to the service.	☐	☐
5. A competent, dependable officer of distinct value to the service.	☐	☐
4. A typically effective officer.	☐	☐
3. An acceptable officer whose value is limited in some respects.	☐	☐
2. An officer who performs acceptably in a limited range of assignments, but who could easily be replaced.	☐	☐
1. An officer who is not of the caliber that one should reasonably expect in an officer.	☐	☐

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Soviet officers' club heard a lecture on the theme: "The American Army is an army of pillage, murder and enslavement."

WHAT THE RUSSIANS SAY ABOUT HOW WE FIGHT

Soviet propagandists don't have to be ordered to distort history; they've got it all twisted up already

CAPTAIN GARRETT UNDERHILL

HE lies about America that are spouted by Radio Moscow and published in *Pravda* and the rest of the Communist press are so fantastic that Americans refuse to believe that any part of the rest of the world could accept them as truth, or that the Communists themselves believe what they are saying about each other.

We are beginning to learn though, incredible as it may be, that some people in some parts of the world do accept the word from Moscow. Having learned this in a most painful and costly way, maybe we ought to look into the possibility that the Communists believe what they say about us.

A good starting place is to see what the Soviet military leaders have to say about our methods of waging war. This is a rewarding field because we soldiers can square what they say about our strategical and tactical doctrines against our books. And we can also put what they say up against their own doctrines, providing we know what those doctrines are.

The Soviets have said a lot about our methods of fighting a war and most of it is critical of our adherence to strong air and sea forces, as our sole possession (at the time) of atomic weapons, at the alleged unwillingness of the average American to mix it up and play rough on the ground battlefield, and at our military leadership.

CAPTAIN GARRETT UNDERHILL, MI-USAR, is a magazine writer who has served several tours of active duty.

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Everyone must know by now that the Russians insist the Red Army defeated the Germans and that Allied sea, air and ground power had little to do with the final result.

For example, the voluminous factual reports of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey have been dismissed in the Soviet military press as "falsification of history" right down to the squad and ship level "to prove at all costs the 'chief' role of the U.S. Navy and Air Force in the defeat of Japan." And similarly a Soviet Air Force general said in 1948 that U.S. air attacks on German cities were made because it "accorded with the interests of American monopolies not to complete the military destruction of Germany."

OUR appreciation of sea power is incomprehensible to the Russians. In their view Mahan's theory of sea command is one of the "obviously obsolete theoretical positions" to which U.S. naval authorities obstinately cling. In Soviet theory this has been replaced with a concept called "the Zone of Naval Superiority." Writing in a top-level Soviet organ back in 1946 Admiral Alafuzov "demonstrated" that the days of "independent" sea power were over. Control of the seas was best exercised by a power controlling a great land mass with great depth, he wrote.

Soviet military leaders have been consistently critical of what they call America's emphasis on "air-atomic power." In 1946 a General Galaktionov warned that "the idea that power politics can be founded on air mastery is a delusion." On Red Army Day in 1951 Marshal Sokolovsky (the present Soviet Chief of Armed Forces Staff), then Deputy War Minister, condemned America's "thoroughly adventurous doctrines of atomic war." The next year the then Chief of Staff Shetemenko inveighed against America's "theories of atomic blitzkriegs and lightning air wars," which he called "sensationally false."

Engineer Captain Khoholov, the Soviet naval observer at the 1946 Bikini tests, wrote that the tests "disenchanted millions" who had believed in the atomic bomb's "awful destruction." Another military authority then wrote that Bikini offers further confirmation of the fact that the atomic bomb, for all its destructive effect against peaceful cities, cannot by any means decide the outcome of a war.

Stalin himself voiced his views for the Soviet forces and the world in just these terms. Just before his death he acknowledged that strategic air power —using atomic weapons—could wipe out both Moscow and New York, but added that it was not a "decisive force."

In the Soviet view, America's military leaders have had good reasons for falsifying history and giving a build-up to wonder ways of war.

Since the American people were tired of war after V-J Day, "a noisy campaign was started to convince simple-minded persons that the [atomic] bomb would put an end to militarism, and that its invention did away with the necessity of maintaining a costly army and navy." Thus at the beginning the "new militarism" was sold on the basis of no trouble and low cost. "In a word," wrote a Soviet general late in 1946 (who used twenty-eight) "the militarists are trying to prove that their program, unlike previous programs is a cheap one: all that is needed is bases, aircraft, and atomic bombs—nothing more."

THE Soviets have detected a campaign in America to "kindle war hysteria." The Soviet Navy was told in 1951, that in the U.S. "facts indicating the peaceful development of the Soviet economy . . . are hushed up in all possible ways; the aggressive measures of the Anglo-American are ludicrously represented as 'defensive' ones."

U.S. forces have been thoroughly indoctrinated in this, the Soviets say.



"The number of hours which the American command allocates to ideological treatment of its West Point audiences, for example, amount at the present time to forty per cent of the instruction period," reported the Soviet Army and Air Force newspaper *Red Star* in 1951. The principal content of this "instruction" can be guessed from a 1950 report which baldly asserts: "A significant phase of the system of political training of the American Navy is that of anti-Soviet propaganda, directed toward the kindling of hatred and enmity toward the Soviet Union."

By the use of such methods, the American "warmongers" have been able to secure support for the build-up of vast numerical superiority over Red Forces. "The armed forces of the U.S., Britain, and France are now more than double the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. and are rapidly increasing," the then Deputy War Minister announced to the Soviet forces in 1951.

The Soviet leaders not only warned their forces that America was "warmongering" but they also reassured them with the news that "reactionaries in the Anglo-American bloc" have continued to "allow their military science to be permeated by a hazardous spirit."

To the Soviets, a "hazardous" or "adventurous" military policy or doctrine is one such as the Nazis followed. Admiral Yumashev put it this way: "While frightening the people by innovations in military technology, they shouted in their propaganda that modern warfare would be waged only by the air force, tanks, or small professional forces, that it would be swift as lightning."

Of course—for the Reds—"the course of [World War II] events dispelled all of Germany's pre-war theories, and proved the complete superiority of Stalin's military science." But the "Anglo-American militarists" cannot do otherwise than follow in Hitler's footsteps, the Russians say, because they are "deprived of the support of the people." That is why American leaders "vaunt as a means of easy victory in a blitz war such weapons as the atomic bomb.

THE Communist leaders say that American "imperialists" have no real appreciation of the need for popular support. We Americans have missed the human factor—particularly moral building matters, they say. This was demonstrated to the Russians satisfaction by our failure to push Chiang Kai-shek on to victory over the Reds after V-J Day. "On the side of Chiang only a year ago there was numerical superio

ity and advantages of military equipment," *Red Star* said in 1949. "There were American military advisers and experts. There was everything. Only one thing was missing—the soldier. The man was missing."

We Americans finally woke up to the importance of individual human beings when we could no longer escape the truth that World War II was won by the Soviet soldier and Red "victories in China" by Chinese soldiers. But our awakening was accompanied by a great fear, said *Red Star*. We became "frightened to death to speak of the human factor in war. Speaking of this would mean admission of their own weakness. Therefore the haphazardous warmongers . . . continue to babble about the atomic bomb and are helplessly silent about the soldier—the man." The Chief of the Soviet Navy summed it up in 1949 when he said: "the bourgeois are afraid of mass land armies."

Events in Korea proved the validity of these views, the Communists say. A Chinese summary of what happened when they intervened in 1951 noted: "Everybody knows that the American troops had good modern arms and a great quantity of aircraft, tanks and artillery; while the Chinese People's Volunteers did not have tanks and earlier did not have aircraft. They had at their disposal only a small amount of artillery and light infantry arms. However, the enemy did not beat them. On the contrary, they beat the enemy." In mid-1951, the Chinese gave as the reasons for their "victory," "the fact that the political quality of the American soldiers who use these superior weapons, is very different from ours."

Official Red publications paint a dreadful picture of the American fighting man. He's tainted with cowardice, laziness, irresponsibility, lack of training and education, drunkenness, and debauchery, sex and sadism, venality and corruption. According to the Reds, the American command doesn't want him different, for then he wouldn't fight the "peace-loving" Communists. U.S. imperialists, says one Soviet publication, want to turn U.S. soldiers "into submissive robots."

THE Reds also tell their forces that our officer personnel is venal and incompetent. The Reds say that the U.S. forces are "in no way remarkable with regard to talented strategists and military technicians." Which is one reason, they say, why we have been anxious to get the Germans and Japanese into our fold; the military leaders of the defeated enemies are, in the Red view, superior to our own. A Captain Doidzhasvili in *Red Fleet* told fellow Soviet sailors of the "limited mental capacity of the majority of the midshipmen" at Annapolis, and the Red Chinese have told their troops that "generally there are very few [U.S.] officers" who have "an open mind and progressive thought."

For Soviet and Chinese forces, the limited operations during the Korean Truce talks were pictured as attempts to open up the war—which the Reds frustrated. Typical of this is Colonel Bozhenko's briefing of the Soviet Army on the fighting which included Heartbreak Hill and Bloody Ridge:

"Van Fleet hoped his large number of troops would break through . . . then mobile units would have been thrown in and penetrated into North Korea and developed the offensive to the North . . . Van Fleet tried to conceal his usual failure by depicting the offensive he had organized as a limited action." A foolish claim, the Colonel noted, "judging from the number of troops brought up to take part."

Americans may be surprised to learn that they have satellites, but the Reds tell each other that a "victory formula" which is popular among the American militarists, is the method of getting others to fight their wars. *Red Star* observed that without satellites America would lack the manpower masses deemed necessary by her policy.

However, *Red Star* says that U.S. authorities have begun to question this and other "victory formulas," such as the air-atomic one. ". . . the protagonists of the various types of blitzkriegs, compelled by the inexorable facts and events, are now trying to establish compromise theories . . ." Among them is "notably the so-called 'air bridge' doctrine whereby the rapid deployment of troops to points where needed will be carried out by the Air Force." Another authority notes that events and the too-apparent facts of history have "impelled the American militarists to renounce a number of the obviously obsolete theoretical positions," although these are "of a fundamentally technical character."

THE Reds are critical of U.S. armored warfare doctrine—as they interpret it. In the Reds' view Americans don't like the tank because it's an arm of close ground combat, requiring big backing by the "human factor"; and because it's not in line with the post V-J Day U.S. air-sea-atomic power policy. On Tankist's Day last year, a General Poluboyarov said that American soldiers don't like tanks because they aren't fast enough to flee in and that U.S. tankers abandon their armor and withdraw in faster trucks. But now U.S. authorities are ruing their neglect of armor, the Soviets say.

The Reds say that in Korea American forces "have suffered unparalleled military defeat" despite "colossal superiority in weapons, and vast naval and air armadas." This, they say, has caused an acute crisis in American military affairs. "The myth of the supremacy of American's weapons, which has been extolled by the admirers of American imperialism, has been dispersed like smoke when faced by reality." Now, the Reds say, we are talking big and making a lot of "noise about fantastic super-weapons and their unequalled power . . ."

But behind all this bombast the Americans are beginning to face up to military realities, the Reds warn their forces. The Reds have been asserting for some time now that ". . . along with the current strengthening of the Navy and Air Force of the U.S.A. measures are being taken for the formation of a mass land army."

In short, we Americans are now supposed to agree that the Red's doctrines of war were the correct ones all of the time.

IT is wrong, I believe, to conclude that the strange things the Reds have to say about American military methods are propaganda. History tells us that military forces can get very wrong slants on each other for a variety of good reasons. Distorted opinions are likely to develop when opposing forces derive from very different types of civilizations. They're most likely to develop when their leaders lack outside contacts, as the Red Russian and Chinese leaders do. Thus the chief of the Foreign Forces West section of German Army Intelligence told the British after World War II: "We were always amazed at the old-line generals' completely illogical underestimation of the American forces." Hitler told his generals in a 1943 briefing: "America hasn't got much. . . . There is no spirit, no inner strength."

Out-and-out jingoism also plays a part in the development of distorted views of a foreign power. The Japanese had plenty of that in their Imperial forces. The Russians are patriotic; eleven years of intensive Soviet propaganda have magnified this. So it is only natural that they should be jingoistic.

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Russian propagandists don't have to be ordered to distort history; they've got it twisted to begin with.

Also we Americans should remember that other peoples are not trained to see things our way. In point of fact the Soviets' military doctrine is German-based and differs widely from our own. Naturally their attitudes towards our forces are based on their own doctrines.

This is a vital fact in the cold war. It means that we can only impress the Soviets with our defense preparations and military actions if we explain them in terms that can be understood by Soviet military men. This will not be easy to do in any event because thirty years of militarism have made the Soviet nation so conscious of military methods—Soviet methods—that they possess nothing but contempt for ways of fighting other than their own.

In fact, few people in the West have any idea of the deluge of indoctrination on U.S. forces the Reds give their own forces. In the Soviet Army, the "political officer system" puts an I&E officer in every company; he and others dispense their poison a minimum of thirty minutes daily, except on the two weekdays when they get two hours. Officers have to discuss and report on certain allied topics. For example a Soviet publication reported: "The library of the Officers Club of the Lvov Military District recently held a conference on the theme: 'The American Army is an army of Pillage, Murder, and Enslavement.'"

This then is the problem that faces us: whether as the Russians (and the Red Chinese) become less and less impressed with American technological might they may be tempted to start a war. There can be little doubt that if a potential aggressor comes to believe that his enemy's doctrine is poor and his manpower low-grade, he would be tempted to attack. The Russians did that in Finland in 1940.

If a way could be found to disabuse the Communists of their misconceptions a war might be averted. We should try to find a way.

The first step towards a solution is to gain a thorough understanding of Soviet military doctrine and system. At present most Americans are quite ignorant of these matters. But once we grasp their ideas and methods we can talk to them in ways they can understand. And perhaps then, they may feel the chill of horror that we feel when we contemplate the dangers of a third world war. And realizing the horror they may be dissuaded from seeking a solution by force of arms.

★ CEREBRATIONS ★

Our literate cocktail-hour tacticians stand to receive as much as $10.00 for their contributions to this department. However, the price for those "dashed off" with scant consideration for the rules of composition and rhetoric will be much less. Hold them to four or five hundred words and type them double-spaced.

Why a Round Bull's-Eye?

A field representative of the Special Devices Center in explaining the difficulty of designing the electrically-controlled target asked why the bull's-eye had to be round. Everybody, young and old, answered: "Don't know. They've always been round."

That "always" is common. "We've always done it this way, so why change?"

Rifle shooting, or rather training for combat with the rifle, is an example. Infantrymen have always learned rifle shooting by spending long hours on known distance ranges. Recently, we have added transition ranges to the known distance range prior to combat firing ranges. But why not combat firing to start with?

In talks with scores of sergeants and lieutenants of infantry, many of them combat decorated in World War II and/or Korea, I've yet to find one who remembers a squad or platoon firing at an enemy farther than 350 yards away. With few exceptions, and all of them well taken care of by specially-trained snipers, the infantryman uses only the battle sight in combat.

The enemy is rarely seen at ranges greater than 350 yards and elevation and windage adjustments are seldom made in combat. Yet we use 82 hours teaching sight adjustment, precise positions and wind estimation.

If we want an infantryman who will fire on command whether or not the enemy is actually in sight, then let's train him to fire on command into a designated area.

I know one man with two DSCs earned in one war, Sergeant, now Captain, John D. Shelby of the 16th Infantry, who has many times said: "When I'm in a hole and bullets are flying around me I don't have to be hit to keep down."

General S. L. A. Marshall reports that fewer infantrymen fire when the chips are down. I believe our system of rifle qualification is responsible for this.

We take a green kid, talk trigger squeeze, sight alignment and wind velocity for 82 hours. Then, by publishing his name in conjunction with an arbitrary number we brand him as a poor rifle shot. The number or score may be the result of any number of mistakes, including typographical, but it matters not. The soldier is stigmatized as being less qualified than his buddies.

Comes the time when his sergeant signals "come on" and it's easy for him to compromise with his conscience. It has been quite thoroughly established that the last hurdle for the malingerer in combat is the one of letting his buddies down. We've made it easier by convincing the shirker, away back in training center, that his buddies won't miss him and his fire.

The psychology of the combat infantrymen aside, 82 hours, 376 rounds of ammunition per trainee, and four weeks out of sixteen in the ATP for rifle marksmanship is too much during mobilization. Too much when one considers how close we were to the man power barrel bottom in World War II and the fact that there are no bull's-eyes in combat.

A solution? As they say in the QMC try this for size:

Doctor Richard S. Hirsch of Tuft College has, in his study of rifle marksmanship, worked out a six-hour course of self instruction which apparently can replace our present preliminary rifle instruction. Using six sets of training film looped to continue on and on, he has taught thousands of trainees how to load and unload, how to adjust a sling, assume a prone position and fire upon command using the battle sight.

An infantry lieutenant with ten non-commissioned assistants can take 200 trainees who have finished Dr. Hirsch's six-hour PRI to a hillside and in two days make competent combat riflemen out of the great majority of them. No a grade firing line with white sand shelter halves and sandbags, but just plain grass, sticks, stones and trees. The lieutenant lines his 200 trainees up so that no man is behind another and tells them something like this:

"In a moment I'll blow a whistle and you will see enemy out in front of you

hoot until I blow the whistle again. ehind you there is ammunition. Take me now and get back to your positions ut do not load. OK, everyone lock our rifle and load."

At the whistle various sizes and shapes f silhouettes appear at varying ranges om 75 to 350 yards. The Special Deices Center has electrically-controlled rgets that can be raised and lowered om a central control point. After most the trainees have changed clips—beg human some of them will have taken ndfuls of ammunition, others a clip two—the whistle is blown again and e trainees are told to lock their pieces d the noncoms check the lockings.

Again we must call on the ingenuity d mechanical know-how of the Spel Devices Center. For we will need me means of quickly and accurately unting the hits and transmitting the formation to the lieutenant on the ing line. Given the information he n announce:

"The first ten men on the right on the e have hit __ enemy. Some were more than once and since one hit is ough, only the first hit is counted. he second ten men hit __, the next __. Any questions?"

I maintain that there will be a soldier one of the groups that had the least mber of hits who will ask: "How ne?" And there will be one in the up having the greatest number, eager reply. The reply should be a pretty d description of how to look where is hitting and how to fire by indirect ning.

By allowing the discussion to conue, the lieutenant should see leaders velop or emerge from each group and nee helping trainee understand the steries of "Kentucky windage." When talk and demonstrations are at their ght the lieutenant should announce: Let's try it again and settle the argunts. Get some more ammunition and e back to your positions. Do not ock your rifles until the whistle ws."

'll wager a yen or two that the trainwill pick up more ammunition than y did the first time, that they will sooner and more rapidly after the stle blows, and that as a group they get more hits.

again blowing the second whistle r the majority have changed clips at t once, the scores are announced and n-minute break is given. The non-s, meanwhile, although primarily ching for safety violations, should observing their sectors of fire and tally cataloging the firers. During the break, if I know the trainee as well as I think I do, the talk will be of the rifle and how to get more hits. The NCOs should remain with their own groups during the break so that they can be consulted by trainees.

Following the break (and if the lieutenant is wise, he will not use a watch to determine when the break should end) an announcement is made generally as follows:

"Let's try it again but this time it's for keeps. After the firing, the noncoms will select the best shots for designation as EXPERT RIFLEMEN. The men selected will be given expert badges and will be announced in orders as expert riflemen. They will have the rest of the day off and will get a theater pass good on this post as long as they are trainees. Take a few minutes to talk it over and when you are ready one man in each group will hold up his hand. All right, lock your rifles, get as much ammunition as you think you will need and get back to your positions. Do not fire until I blow the whistle and cease firing when I blow the whistle the second time."

When the firing is completed this third time, and enough fire must be allowed to give the noncoms an opportunity to study each trainee, ten per cent or so of the entire group should be selected by the noncoms and given expert badges on the spot. A mechanic can recognize another by the way the wrench is picked up and adjusted and a butcher can tell another by the way a quarter of beef is cut. By the same token, an experienced rifleman can pick out the man who has either fired a rifle before or has a natural gift for marksmanship. Selection of experts by observation is no more haphazard than the present system of chance and collusion. And, after all, what difference is it if a mistake is made and one or two poor (?) shots are selected?

During the next two or three days the experts should be scheduled for a range with the best individual coaches. They should be issued telescopic sights and given free rein to fire as long as and how they wish. Targets should be various types of silhouettes set out at ranges up to 1000 yards. Here is the place for learning the refinements.

The men not selected as experts continue firing in the same way but with one difference. Since there are fewer men on the line, the noncoms may help those who need the least correction. As the men get the knack of field firing they may be excused and returned to the garrison. Eventually, and I feel after only two days of firing, only 20 or 30 men out of the original 200 who do not understand the mechanics of shooting the M1 at field targets will be with you.

What to do with these men is a problem for G1. As a long-time infantryman, I say they belong in common specialist schools, but I'll back up for the loud dissenters and train them for weapons platoons. I will insist, however, that they should not, as they do today, take the very best of the coaches away from the trainee who holds more promise.

The present Army Training Programs, 7-600-1 and 7-601-1, Light and Heavy Weapons Infantryman, respectively, are sound and thorough but they require sixteen weeks to complete. Under the plan described here, competent combat riflemen can be trained in one week of the ATP rather than the three and a half we now use. Within 24 training hours we can separate the sheep from the goats, as it were, and still leave time for firing Tables VII and VIII of FM 23-5 in the first week of training. From the second week on we can start where the fifth week is in the ATP at present and still get graduate trainees qualified in MOS 1745.

CWO ALEX N. MRAZ

Napalm

I realize that my humble attempts to edify the Army by dispelling its admitted confusion concerning napalm will most likely be deemed "Fly-Boy" impudence and interservice subversive activities. However, as a civilian-in-uniform who has served with the Army, Navy and the Marines and since I am now an Air Force officer, I cannot let interservice sensitivity deprive your readers of the reason why burning napalm accelerates in flight.

The puzzle pointed out as such by Major General Bullene in his very interesting article "Wonder Weapon" in your November 1952 issue can easily be explained. It can even be easily understood by those able to grasp the fundamentals of the Monroe Effect which is the basis for the cone-charge in the bazooka, the age-old action and reaction law, a little bit of vector geometry, and arithmetic.

The Monroe Effect states that an exploding force expands with equal force in all directions perpendicular to the surface of the explosive. Monroe went farther than that but that is far enough for this problem.


I will not insult you by explaining that for every action there is an equal

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DIAGRAM SHOWING WHY IGNITED NAPALM GOES FARTHER AND FASTER THAN UNIGNITED NAPALM



Unignited. Each blob of napalm goes at same constant speed carried by its own inertia and push of blobs behind it.



Ignited. Each blob adds its expanding force to the speed of itself and every blob in front of it. Each blob has the sum total of the explosive horizontal forces (both plus and minus forces) of the blobs behind it

and opposite reaction, or that the direction and magnitude of forces can be expressed as vectors which by using the most specific of all specific mathematics, namely, arithmetic, can be added or subtracted in whole or in trigonometrically calculated part according to their magnitudes and directions. I merely present my attached diagram which explains all.

In addition to the diagram, I point out that if the napalm stream is discontinued, the problem changes but not the basic fundamentals to solve the new and slightly different problem.

Incidentally, a cross wind breaks up the continuous flow—a chemical to make it more sticky might stop that—and therefore reduces the sum of the horizontal forces. This, naturally, reduces acceleration. An ignited flame-thrower shot in small spurts would not have the accelerating effect.

This is somewhat the same as why a ramjet can go faster if it does go faster. That is, the faster a ramjet goes the faster it can go. Or easier yet: it cannot go faster unless it goes fast or how much faster it can go depends upon how fast it is going. Clear?

Now of course all I have said about napalm is only theory—I think in all fairness to me that it should hereafter be called "Bert's Burning Blob Belief" and I would not stake my professional reputation on it because I am void of professional reputation in these fields. I am just a downtrodden Air Force communications officer doing what I usually do for the armed forces, that is, seeing that the right information, knowledge, and messages get to the proper people. As well you know, and as Clausewitz so cleverly noted, Congress can make a general but it takes communications to have a Commanding General commanding commands.

MAJOR BERT DECKER
Air Force

Armor Is Mobile

Mobility today means "the ability to move fast while under fire in a combat situation" together with the ability to fire effectively during movement and/or immediately upon halting. This is 20th Century battlefield mobility, and in this century armor possesses a battlefield mobility far superior to any other arm.

It is this type of mobility that enables armored formations to pierce through and/or swing around the enemy; to cut deep into and shatter his communication zone; to achieve decision. While it is true that armor, more often than not, receives assistance during the initial stages of its breakthrough, the fact remains that no other arm has the ability to "cash in" on the potentialities created by sudden, violent, deep penetrations, pursuit, and exploitation.

Whether or not the United States can build enough armored outfits to defeat the enemy while continuing to provide our infantry divisions with the equivalent tank strength of two batttalions, is beyond my knowledge. However, should it be decided that it isn't possible then the present infantry division tank strength should be reduced in order to form more armored units. Tank units, and especially regimental tank companies, of the infantry division are chained to the infantryman and consequently lose most of armor's tactical mobility and all of its strategic mobility.

Time and science may make the tank as obsolete as horse cavalry. If so, science will have succeeded in destroying true battlefield mobility, for the fact is, that no other form of motorized moveme can exist in combat where tanks canno In other words, weapons which co pletely eliminate the tank would do t same to all other battle vehicles.

If battlefield mobility is thus destroy what is to prevent the return of sta warfare and its senseless destructi without decision?

Should "large-scale airborne ope tions" be the answer, shouldn't we gi the enemy credit for developing guid missiles at least as good as ours befo he starts a major war? The answ like it or not, has to be affirmati With his air force, and guided missi (as well as long-range missiles w atomic war heads) can anyone belie that "large-scale airborne operations" a sound gamble?

Regardless of how airborne troops rive for battle, they can only fight a win battles on the ground. Also, vict is insured by ground forces holding e my territory. This brings us once m to mobility on the ground, a mobi which no longer will be possible if tank is indeed obsolescent.

Shouldn't we all have the greatest terest in not only how science plan destroy battlefield mobility but m more in what is being done to prese it?

Let's all encourage our best scien and industrial minds to produce new better antitank, and antimobility w ons. But antitank-antimobility weap are defensive in essence and a war yet to be won defensively. So let's "take counsel of our fears" but ins charge our scientists with the task o venting means for *preserving and proving* battlefield mobility.

CAPT. E. R. BRIG
Armor

CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

THIS is the second in the series of articles on Career Management and how it works. If you have any comment or questions on this series please feel entirely free to write the editors or Career Management Division.

Rotation of Assignments

HE peacetime mission of the Army is o prepare for war. So it is imperative t the Army train and develop an of-r corps that is qualified and prepared serve effectively in any emergency der any conditions. The best way to this is by rotation of assignments.

Generally speaking, rotation of assignnts is the responsibility of the Career nagement Division, The Adjutant neral's Office, and the commanders in field. CMD assigns officers and proes opportunity for schooling; howr, Career Management cannot alone elop a proficient officer corps. Sucful development of an outstanding er corps depends primarily on the iative, willingness and ability of comnders to rotate officers in various types luties.

Our complex Army has many fields n for an officer who desires to speize. But it must be remembered that officer of the combat arms is basically fundamentally a fighting man. For reason, branch material assignments ld continue until an officer has comed the branch advanced course and ully branch qualified. However, in ain individual cases upon completion hree years of service, officers may r certain specialization programs. Afan officer indicates a desire to speze, he may expect at least one full in the selected field in order that Army may get full value from its stment. Additional tours may be ated by requirements. Where pos, assignments to specialized duties alternated with branch assignments hat the officer will remain fully ch qualified.

REER Management assigns the newy commissioned lieutenant to the apriate branch school for basic training is branch. Upon graduation, he is ned to troop duty for the first few s of his service; it is during this d that the commander has the reisibility of teaching the young officer to successfully lead troops and inducing him to such troop duties as command, supply, vehicular maintenance and teaching.

CMD controls the assignment of officers when they graduate from branch advanced course. Consistent with military needs, an officer can expect to be assigned to one of four broad fields: additional troop duty, staff, civilian components or specialization.

The "directed and recommended MOS," one of the most effective tools of Career Management, was suspended shortly after the outbreak of the Korean conflict. If either or both are reinstated more officers will be qualified to serve in more fields.

CAREER Management, following closely the officer's development, determines the type of assignment that will meet requirements of the Army and will be most beneficial to the officer.

An officer who has not attained full benefit from his previous troop duty, due either to poor local assignments or unfortunate circumstances, may be reassigned for additional troop duty in order to become fully branch qualified. Then again there may be an urgent requirement for experienced troop officers in some particular unit.

Generally, an officer upon completion of the branch advanced course has obtained the necessary schooling and experience to qualify him for staff or civilian component duty. To the staff, the officer brings his knowledege of troops, their problems and their viewpoint. From the staff he learns the planning, coordination, and the operations necessary in a higher command for the successful employment of troops on the battlefield. To the civilian component he brings his background and knowledge of the professional soldier and imparts this knowledge in the training of our citizen soldiers.

The ensuing years to the grade of lieutenant colonel are served in any combination of the several fields. Successive tours on the staff should not be in the same staff activity. Commanders should strive to assign officers to allied duties such as placing the officer with a supply background in G3 and the personnel man in G4. It is the duty of all of us who are responsible for assignments to avoid too frequent repetition of the same type of staff duty.

Command positions are relatively few at the battalion level and an officer may have to wait several years for the opportunity to lead troops. But he should have this opportunity, and the earlier the better. It is here again that the divisional and large installation commanders can assist Career Management Division in giving an officer the kind of duty that will broaden his experience.

THE importance of rotative assignments lessens considerably for officers who reach the grade of colonel, provided their earlier years have been monitored properly. At this stage of his career, the able officer will be qualified to perform in many different fields. There are, however, a few young colonels, who have not had the proper rotation of assignments in the past. Here's an example.

Colonel "A" is an outstanding officer. During his earlier years he had many various duties up to the grade of captain. At the outbreak of World War II he was on staff duty. Because he was an outstanding staff officer commanders kept him on staff duties. Now he needs command duty as soon as possible. Career Management, with the assistance of commanders in the field, will give Colonel "A" the duty he needs to round out his career.

The principles of rotative assignment applied with common sense will avoid the two major pitfalls which confront us, the production of the professional staff man and the perennial commander.

Career Management tries to make it possible for each officer to have the experience that will permit him to overcome any emergency or obstacle that may come up. It is the responsibility of each commander to assist CMD in this task.

[Next month: *Selection for foreign service*]

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FRONT AND CENTER

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

M500 Series Fuze Adopted

The Artillery is now using the M500 series fuze (mechanical time—superquick) as a standard item, the Department of Matériel, TAS, reports.

The new fuze is far superior to both the M55 and the M67. Temperature frequently causes erratic functioning of the time element (*i.e.*, powder train) in the M55. But the M500 is not affected by temperature, and its maximum time setting is increased to 57 seconds as compared with the 25-second limit of the M55. The new fuze differs from the M67 only in that it has a point detonating element to cause superquick action in the event of time mechanism failure. But this latter feature stands in sharp contrast with the M67, which, containing no such element, becomes a dud when the time mechanism fails to operate.

In addition, the M500 series fuze comes in two models for field artillery use: the M500 for standard projectiles; the M501 for base ejection type projectiles. The old M67 requires Ordnance modification to be employed with base ejection shells.

Revised FA Battery Test

The new ATT 6-1, a revision prepared by TAS, has been printed and distributed by Department of the Army. The test is designed to ascertain the proficiency of field artillery howitzer or gun batteries, except 8-inch gun, 240mm howitzer, and 280mm gun units.

Certain things in the new test are considered improvements over the 28 February 1951 version of ATT 6-1. Changes of note are—

- The test has incorporated a check list for umpires; this will serve two purposes: *One,* grading will be more uniform throughout the Army; *two,* units to be tested can see exactly what Army Field Forces expects of them in the way of performance by a study of the weights assigned the various activities. This is particularly true with regard to communication requirements.
- The test recommends that a battery not having a stabilized strength of 90 per cent of its authorized strength not be tested. If the battery is below that strength and the test is directed, the new publication requires that the chief umpire analyze the distribution of personnel within the battery and make appropriate modifications in the test.
- The test provides for more specific grading of the various activities that are included in the rendezvous, march forward, and occupation and organization of the position.
- The test provides for some arbitrary grade cuts for failure to organize installations tactically, for serious violations of artillery procedures, and for rounds falling within friendly front lines.

Reading Improvement Program

All personnel at Fort Sill have the opportunity to participate in a revised reading improvement course offered free. Members of the 1952-53 Artillery Officers' Advanced Class who took the course had an average increase of 107 words a minute in reading rate and an 11 per cent increase in comprehension. Another example is that of a recent course graduate who was able to increase his reading rate from 500 to 1,500 words a minute and to comprehend 90 per cent of the material he covered. In striking contrast, statistics reveal that the *average* American adult reads only 300 words a minute and comprehends only 85 per cent.

The reading improvement program, begun in 1948 as a function of the Department of General Subjects, has undergone a complete revision this year: A new series of tests is being used to determine the individual's progress in reading rate and comprehension throughout the course. New tachistoscopes have been installed in the laboratory; these machines show timed exposures of numbers to help the individual increase his visual acuity and widen eye span. Another device is a reading rate controller, which causes the student to read at accelerated rates, thus forming better reading habits and increasing reading rate and comprehension. Purchase of two diagnostic machines for the reading laboratory has been approved: One machine is an ophthalmograph, which photographs the student's eyes during reading and thereby allows both the student and the supervisor to review the eye action to detect improper eye movements that adversely affect the reading rate and comprehension. The second device is a sight screener; it diagnoses muscular deficiencies of the optical area.

This year for the first time, the Artillery Officer Advanced Class will be so scheduled that the laboratory will accommodate the entire class concurrently.

Terminology

In furtherance of the SOLOG program, representatives from TAS recently attended a conference at The Royal Canadian School of Artillery, Camp Shilo, Canada; the senior TAS representative acted as senior U. S. representative. The objective of the conference was to reach final agreement on standardization of artillery terminology and procedures for use by the armies of the three countries concerned—the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Preliminary work and conferences on this project have been conducted during the past two years. Final agreement was reached by the conferees within the following specific areas:

- Standard method of adjustment artillery fire by the forward observer a air observer.
- Standard field artillery terminolo

An interim agreement was reached or standard form for artillery meteorologi messages; whereas, standardization of form for firing tables for similar ty weapons was suspended.

It is expected that OCAFF will acc and publish the terms of the agreement the near future.

New Training Hq

On 1 August, the Office of the Dep Commanding General, TAC, was est lished with Brig. Gen. James F. Britti ham—formerly Assistant Commanda TAS—assuming its duties. With functi similar to those of a brigade command the Deputy CG is in command of all g eral reserve and continental operat units, except military police, at TA While his responsibilities center prima around training, he is also concerned w disciplinary, maintenance, and housek ing standards. When USAR and NG u are in training here, he will assume sim responsibilities for them.

On the same date, Brig. Gen. Tho M. Watlington became Assistant C mandant, TAS.

Summer Camps End

Fort Sill's biggest summer camp sea in recent years has ended. Nearly 4,5 members of various reserve compone participated in the June-August traini while operations were handled by five arate camps. Artillery training was dominant, but other branches were represented.

Two USAR unit camps were held, e for a two-week period. Representing s twenty-five reserve organizations, they a combined personnel strength of appr mately 900. A senior reserve officer was each case, appointed Deputy Camp C mander.

The Fort Sill USAR Schools Can different in concept from the two camps—opened on 12 July and ran 26 July. Students and instructors drawn from all USAR Schools in Fourth Army area. Three schools, op ing concurrently, were incorporated in one camp: an artillery school, a s school, and a C&GS school.

The longest and largest of the ca was that of the ROTC, running fro June to 31 July. Its attendance passed 2,000 mark. Some eighty higher sc were represented.

The National Guard encampment b on 16 August. The camp was heade

XLI Corps Artillery, and participating rdsmen came from Arkansas and Texas.

E INFANTRY SCHOOL

icer Candidate School

TIS has graduated its last all-Infantry cer Candidate class. The new classes composed of candidates for all branches pt artillery and engineer.

Inder the new program all new second enants, except those commissioned in ntry, will attend their respective branch ice schools upon graduation from the nty-two week Infantry OCS.

AR Training

ctive duty training for reservists from ntry, Quartermaster, Judge Advocate eral, Medical and Chaplain Corps ches, within the Third Army Area, conducted at TIC during July and ust.

his instruction was designed to provide er and enlisted reservists with summer training to supplement their respective reserve units and schools. It also pro- l a means of keeping abreast of the t developments in military organization operations.

he Judge Advocate General and Chap- s Schools provided on-the-job training ose fields.

v Book Catalog

he 1953-54 edition of the Catalog of uctional Material from TIS is now able. The new catalog lists lesson s, problems representative of the map lems presented at The Infantry School, al texts, and pamphlets varying from lets to one-page statistical compilations, ell as maps and military books. The Infantry Field Manuals are also avail- As a convenience and service to its g customers the Book Department makes available school and training lies. For the new 1953-54 catalog : The Book Department, The Infan- chool, Fort Benning, Georgia.

anced Leaders School

C started an Advanced Leaders School s own senior noncommissioned officers September 1953.

ie three-week course is designed to ase the leadership ability of Fort Ben- s noncommissioned officers and poten- oncommissioned officers possessing the red technical knowledge.

struction emphasizes methods of in- tion, drill and command and leader-

ning Areas Named

C has named eleven new training for Congressional Medal of Honor Distinguished Service Cross Winners orld War II and Korea.

ie new assault and attack course and ranges honor six officers and five en-

listed men posthumously awarded the nation's two highest decorations.

Included in the list was Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who lost his life in France during World War II; Capt. Robert E. Roeder, Italy, 1944; Cpl. Clair Goodblood, Korea, 1951; Capt. Edward C. Krzyzowki, Korea, 1951; 2d Lt. Darwin K. Kyle, Korea, 1951; Sgt. William G. Fournier, Solomon Islands, 1943; Sgt. John R. Ruth, Korea, 1951; SFC Robert E. Dare, Korea, 1950; Cpl. Charles W. Sherwood, Korea, 1951; 2d Lt. Alfred P. Dianda, Korea, 1950; and Col. Harry A. Flint, Sicily, 1943.

USAR Orientation Course

The Infantry School held a one-week orientation course in August for fifty USAR instructors, Infantry branch directors and USAR school commandants.

The purpose of the course was to familiarize USAR personnel with instructional material furnished the schools by TIS, recommended methods of presenting the instructional material, new technical developments, and changes in doctrine.

ARMY-WIDE

Research. Many scientists in and out of government have voiced concern over the tendency to reduce the amount of money devoted to scientific research and development for defense. In his *Saturday Evening Post* articles, Gen. Bradley joined with them by suggesting that civilian scientists and engineers participate in strategic planning by the staff of the JCS.

Nicknames. Official designation of the 25th Infantry Division as the 25th "Tropic Lightning" Infantry Division may open the way for other divisions with famous nicknames to have them officially recognized. In some cases there could be controversy. The 2d Infantry Division, for example, is called the "Indianhead" Division by some and "Second to None" by others. There was the Southern soldier assigned to the 26th "Yankee" Division during World War II who went home on leave wearing the "YD" patch on his left shoulder. Questioned by his unreconstructed father as to the meaning of the initials, the lad thought fast and replied: "Yeah, Dixie."

General officer assignments. From *acting* Chief of Army Field Forces, Lt. Gen. John E. Dahlquist became Chief of AFF. . . . Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, Chief of Army Information, to CG, 2d Army. . . . Maj. Gen. Albert Pierson, Chief of Joint MAG, Philippines, to Director, Joint Airborne Troop Board, Fort Bragg. . . . Maj. Gen. William N. Gillmore, Director, JATB, to Chief, MAAG, Thailand. . . . Maj. Gen. Joseph S. Bradley, Dep. Dir. of strategic planning for the JCS, to Europe, specific assignment unannounced. . . .

Duty tours. *Far East.* Effective 1 Oct. fixed tours of duty in the Far East will range from 16 months in Korea to 20-30 months in Okinawa, 24 months in the Philippines, and 24-36 months in Japan. Constructive credit earned before 1 Oct. will be counted by converting the credits to months served on a fixed tour. Marines plan 14-month tour in Korea by March 1954 and will gradually extend it to 16 months if "extension of Korean service proves necessary." . . .

ZI. RA enlisted men returning from normal overseas tour will serve at least 18 months in ZI before becoming qualified for overseas assignment again.

Rifle matches. At Camp Lejeune, N. C., scene of the Southeastern Regional High Power Rifle Matches, the Army rifle team made the highest score of any team using the service rifle, scoring 965 out of a possible 1,000, the highest rifle score ever recorded in competition. The team, coached by Lt. Col. William G. White, represented the Army at the National Matches at Camp Perry, O., 31 Aug. to Sept. 7. . . . At Wildflecken, Germany, a 19-man team from the 2d Bn., 102d Inf., 43d Div., represented VII Corps and won the Prix General LeClerc international small-arms shooting match. Seven nations competed; the British team was second and The Netherlands third. Weapons used were M1, BAR and caliber .45 pistol.

Regular officer resignations. Circular 58, dated 10 Aug., tells RA officers the Army will accept resignations for "compassionate reasons" and other valid reasons, such as hardship, health and safety. However, resignations will not be accepted from officers who have not completed mandatory periods of service or have other obligations requiring extended service.

Survivor benefits. The new law making it possible for service personnel to share their retired pay with their survivors will go into effect 1 Nov. and joint regulations setting forth the requirements and the machinery to put the law into effect will be published by DOD before that date.

Exchanges. The subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that looked into complaints and charges, say the American Retail Federation found that they were "reckless and heedless" and that the principal sources of criticism "seem to be gossip, boasting, and inferences by careless people." The subcommittee said the PX system was essential, competently managed, and obeying the law.

Commissaries. Because the 1954 defense appropriation act requires the Secretary of Defense to certify that each commissary is necessary or it must be closed, the Secretary has ordered a survey to be completed before 1 Nov. of all commissaries. The survey must consider prices, facilities, and convenience of all commercial establishments in each area; there must be at least two commercial facilities in each area to provide "free and open competition."

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★ BOOK REVIEWS ★

WELCOME, INDEED

ATOMIC WEAPONS IN LAND COMBAT. By Colonel George C. Reinhardt and Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Kintner. Military Service Publishing Co. $3.95.

"I welcome this study of atomic weapons in land combat as a first step in widespread discussion of, and education in, a matter vital to America's security," Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy wrote in the foreword of this book.

I wholeheartedly second General Eddy's welcome to this book, and particularly for military readers and regardless of their rank or length of service. Security considerations have necessarily limited to a trickle, relatively speaking, the amount of unclassified official doctrine on atomic weapons. The unfortunate result is that only a very few of us have enough sound information to really study the use of atomic weapons on the battlefield. Timely indeed is this book which "explores the implications of atomic warfare on or near the battlefield and gives a forecast of what atomic warfare may mean to all combat rank . . ."

The author of this review was the Commanding Officer of the Artillery Group that fired the first atomic shell from the 280mm gun. He is now a student at the Army War College.

Fortunately, moreover, the substantiality of *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat* is enhanced by the fact that the authors wrote it while serving together in the Department of Analysis and Research of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Although they are careful to note that the book in no way reflects the official views of the Department of the Army, the reader cannot be unmindful of the fact that the Command and General Staff College is a primary source spring for the development of tactical doctrine for the target level of this book—namely, ". . . the problems which atomic warfare poses to division, regimental and battalion commanders . . ."

Atomic Weapons in Land Combat is exceptionally readable and, equally important, is in language readily understandable to all readers, civilian or military. In addition to an index, the book includes an appendix into which are gathered certain useful definitions, charts and tables.

The authors adhere to the thesis, now generally accepted, that the advent of the atomic era has not altered the fundamental principles of war. It is only their application that has changed.

Following a brief historical review of earlier "absolute" weapons, a reasoned debunking of some of the "scare" stories on radiation effects, and a brief discussion of the several means of delivering atomic weapons, the authors launch into their analysis of the use of atomic weapons in various types of land operations. JOURNAL readers got a taste of the book from the lengthy excerpt published in the September issue.

Tactics for the offensive and defensive to include airborne, amphibious, and certain special operations are examined. Logically and interestingly they raise and discuss the question "Is firepower now king?" suggesting that a new look must be taken at the "classic concept" of fire and movement. They point out that maneuver will in the future most certainly be strongly influenced by the capabilities of atomic weapons. Traditionally, artillery and other supporting fires have been planned to fit into and to support a maneuver concept, this concept being designed, ideally and if possible, to hit the enemy with overwhelming power at his weakest point. Mindful of the awesome lethality of atomic weapons, the authors suggest that future commanders may find it preferable (and I borrow their words) to "hit the mostest with the biggest," with the scheme of maneuver being built to maximize the exploitation possibilities created by the atomic weapons fire plan.

The chapter on training—the authors label it "The Indispensable Ingredient"—is solidly down-to-earth and easy to read and understand. Command leadership is discussed, to include the authors' ideas of the staff organization that will be required, both in the early stages (that is, from the present time until there exists a broad base of understanding of the capabilities of atomic weapons) and after we have grown mature in their employment. They belittle the need for an atomic special staff section, as such, but give emphasis to the requirement for training experienced general staff officers in all aspects of atomic warfare. Heavy emphasis is given—and properly in this writer's view—to the impelling need for all experienced leaders to erase from memory the basically undisciplined practices that were frequently condoned during World War II—security, supply economy, camouflage and concealment, discipline, mobility, communications and other fundamentals are analyzed against the anticipated character of land combat of the future. Also presented are the authors' views on probable organizational trends; specifically, they anticipate that "atomic warfare campaigns may witness divisions of half a dozen brigades, each fully capable of directing the combat destinies of six to eight relatively self-sufficient battalions."

The authors admit in conclusion that "the advent of atomic weapons on the battlefield is horrible to contemplate," but hasten to add that "none save romanticists have ever discovered a battlefield lacking in horror, whether its weapons have bee tomahawks or machines." And their fin note is one of confidence that the fr world will not "suffer in numbers or scie tific development" and will, if forced t "use them with a skill and determinatio that cannot be overcome."

It will come as no surprise, and least all no doubt to the authors, that any mi tarily mature reader of *Atomic Weapons Land Warfare* will find himself placi question marks on the page margins o posite certain statements and ideas. Ho ever, and as already suggested, this is t most valuable purpose this timely book w serve—to stimulate the forward projecti of reader thinking. Will any logical mi question that other than the thin surfa of the potentialities of atomic weapons the battlefield has thus far been scratche

Artillerymen (and this writer happens be one) will be disappointed, to use a ve mild term, at what they will construe an apparent lack of appreciation that f support is the artilleryman's battle bu ness. The enviable artillery *esprit* rests its proud record as the greatest killer the battlefield; and artillery officers ha coordinated the fire support (artillery, and naval) for the greatest military ope tions in our nation's history. Apparent however, these authors would have t general staff carve out and take over t heart of the artillery battle business. "Th ough knowledge of atomic tactical ca bilities and limitations," they say, "w permit these general staff officers to adv commanders on the integration of ato weapons into their operations." And a f lines later: "Although a tendency to reg tactical atomic weapons as just another fo of artillery must not be exaggerated, th is indeed a similarity in the fire plans both types of weapons." These stateme are unsatisfying to artillerymen.


Properly, and throughout the book, authors emphasize the reasons why, a make suggestions how, our intelligence pabilities must be improved in order capitalize on atomic weapons capabilit And, relatedly, they emphasize and c tion us that the number of atomic weap made available for tactical purposes may limited. Projecting one's thinking forw (and this writer, like the authors, has information concerning present or plan stockpiles of atomic weapons) these r weapons are here and, unquestionably, h to stay and, again unquestionably, will improved at the maximum rate possible our remarkable American genius for te nological advance. Should, then, our ward thinking be bounded by a conc or framework of limited weapon availal ty? And, again relatedly, should our ward thinking not include an attempt correlate traditional concepts and requ ments for accuracy against the vastly

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
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
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
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creased lethality of atomic weapons? With national survival the possible if not the probable stake, surely a relative plenty of atomic weapons for land combat must be our goal. We military men must not be caught short in our forward thinking.

Despite the foregoing "haymaker" on artillery, honestly swung, this review ends with the thought on which it opened. Welcome indeed is this timely and stimulating book. It richly deserves a wide reader audience.—COLONEL DEVERE ARMSTRONG.

WASHINGTON, THE MAN

THE GREAT MAN. By Howard Swiggett. Doubleday & Company, Inc., New York, 1953. 491 Pages; Index; $5.00.

Like Minerva, who sprang full grown and in full armor from the head of Zeus, George Washington makes his entrance on page one of this book, aged forty-three, to command the Continental Army at Cambridge. His career before that is prologue that does not concern Mr. Swiggett, who is bent on making Washington a human being instead of a monument. Mr. Swiggett's unacademic approach to biography and history results in a vivid picture of the head of the Revolutionary Army, of Washington the President, and of the final years of the Father of his Country. More than that, it brings to life Washington's important contemporaries and the events of the war and of the early days of the Republic. Tactical details of battles are almost completely omitted, but this is advantageous in revealing Washington "as a complex but comprehensible human being." Mr. Swiggett's skillful use of the critical episode, the illuminating anecdote, the essential fact of history in letters, diaries, memoirs and records of the time maintains the reader's interest throughout at a high level. The book is a fascinating study of Washington's leadership and of the American soldiers and politicians in the war that established our independence.—BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD ARMSTRONG

HAIG

HAIG: MASTER OF THE FIELD. By Major General Sir John Davidson. British Book Centre, New York, 1953. 158 Pages; $4.50.

THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF DOUGLAS HAIG 1914-1919. Edited by Robert Blake. British Book Centre, 1952. 383 Pages.

Field Marshal Haig, who led the British Expeditionary Force in France from December 1915 to the end of World War I, was a controversial figure. Early writers such as Duff Cooper, Charteris, and Boraston have presented him as soldier of unshakable tenacity and incorruptible integrity. To their way of thinking Haig ranked with the greatest soldiers of British history. His professionally "sound" program of concentrating all military resources on the Western Front was contrasted favorably with the "amateur" strategy which sought to attack the enemy coalition on its weakest front. In Haig's advocacy of a strategy of concentric attacks against the German lines of communication in 1918 these writers saw the mark of a great commander. They failed, however, to get the estimate of Haig across to the British public, a failure which was attributed to the wickedness of "politicians" like Lloyd George.

Haig's critics, on the other hand, complained that he wasted his men on an unproductive front for four years simply because he could not think of anything else to do. They pointed to his misuse of the tank in 1916 and to his stubborn adherence to failing offensives on the Somme and Passchendaele as proof of his mediocrity. Haig's less scrupulous critics accused headquarters of "doctoring" military reports to deceive the government. Certainly the relations between British soldiers and their civilian superiors reached a low ebb in World War I.

Haig took no part in the controversy which raged about his command in France. Though he kept a voluminous diary through the war years, no writer except Duff Cooper was allowed to quote from it. Haig discouraged his friends from rushing to his defense with books and articles and was content to let time vindicate his record in France. His heirs have at last permitted excerpts of his diary to be published and General Davidson, his former operations officer, has written a defense of his command decisions from 1917-1918.

Both Mr. Blake, the editor of the Haig papers, and General Davidson feel that the military weakness of France from 1917-1918 was one of the most important unknown facts about World War I. It was concealed from the world at large by Haig's offensive program in 1917 which alone made the Allied victory possible. Haig concealed his first knowledge of the mutinies in the French Army in 1917 from the Cabinet. His alleged reason for doing so, that it was given to him in confidence by General Petain's chief of staff, can hardly be credited. One does not keep that kind of information from his government simply because it was given in confidence by headquarters which specialized in breaking promises. Haig's real reason was he feared that this gloomy news would encourage Lloyd George to call a halt to offensive operations on the Western Front. In that case Haig believed the Germans would win the war by default.

It will strike many readers as amazing that Haig and Davidson thought it praiseworthy for a British general to conceal the state of the French Army from his own government for fear that it would not act wisely on this information. Granting that Lloyd George was a scoundrel, it seems hard to sanction such conduct simply because military leaders could not trust civilian leaders to act in the nation's interest.

If Haig is to receive credit for keeping Britain and France in the war from 1917-1918, which was after all a political act, he cannot escape responsibility for the effects of the action he inspired. To judge from his diary he had no conception of what the victory was going to *cost* the Brit-

mpire or of the relation of this cost to ıe *value* of the victory. No doubt Haig ersonally detested bloodshed and would ave been glad to see the war end, but ıere is no hint anywhere in the published ersion of his diary that he would have nsidered a settlement on less than vic-rious terms. The British and French peo-e found it a bit difficult, after the war, reconcile the value of the victory with s cost—no matter what Haig thought. The neral apathy with which the French and itish people went to war in 1939 and e ineffective way in which at least the ench fought, was not entirely due to eakness brought about by the losses suf-red in 1914-1918 so much as it was to e widely-held suspicion that the leader-ip of 1939 was not only prepared to peat the methods of 1914-1918 but was ain doggedly prepared to pay the costs.

The Private Papers of Haig make pos-le a new estimation of Haig the man, they do not permit a radically new view be taken of him as a soldier. However rticulate he might be in speech, Haig s by no means a fumbling writer. He d a surprising sense of humor as well as keen appreciation of the weaknesses of s fellow soldiers. One page of his diary ll give the details of a sermon he heard Sunday; the next will recount Joffre's e opinion of the kilt as the military iform: "Pour l'amour, oui, mais pour la erre, non." Haig's diary shows that he ld turn a deft trick in the field of in-gue—if necessary.

American readers will be amused at the vincialism of Haig which permitted him write on his first meeting with Pershing: was much struck with his [Pershing's] iet, gentlemanly bearing—so unusual for American. . . . His AG [Alvord] and G.S. [Harbord] are men of less quality, d are quite ignorant of the problems of dern war. The C.G.S. is a kindly, soft king fellow with the face of a punchinel-. . ." Again, but still in a surprised vein, wrote to Lady Haig: "I have been see-a good deal of Americans lately, and ust say, speaking from my own experi-e, our ideas of what American men are e was quite wrong. Those we are work-with are quiet, unassuming, practical lows. Entirely unlike the fashionable nkees we used to see in London . . ." ater, however, when Pershing refused amalgamate our troops with the British l French armies Haig described him as ry obstinate and stupid." In his opinion was "ridiculous" to think that an Ameri-army could function without French British staff assistance "in less than two rs." In his eagerness to discredit the erican staff performance in the Meuse-gonne, Haig repeated without confirma-the legend that American troops were lly starving" because our supply ar-gements had broken down.

Certainly Haig's refusal to accept honors n the British government until the nded and sick members of the BEF were provided for marks him as a great man. Nothing in the diary, however, shows that he was aware that the combination of the entrenched machine gun and barbed wire had created a condition from 1914-1918 in which his traditional solutions were inappropriate. It was his misfortune not to have lived at a time when tenacity and minor improvements in infantry tactics were all that was required of a great commander. No one has, I think, put the case of Haig's professional narrowness with more charity than Lord Tweedsmuir: "He was first and foremost a highly competent professional soldier. Now, a soldier's professionalism differs from that of other crafts. He acquires a body of knowledge which may be varied and enlarged by new conditions, such as new weapons and new modes of transport, but which in essence is a closed technique . . . a powerful mind might work brilliantly inside its limits with little impulse to alter the fundamentals. Change and expansion were consequently in the nature of a revolution, and were brought about either by a great genius, or —slowly and grudgingly—by some cataclysmic pressure of facts. Hence the more competent and better trained a soldier was, the more averse he would be to alter his creed till its failure had been proved with utter finality." Nothing in these two books alters the weight of that opinion.—H. A. DeWeerd

MORE MICHENER

THE BRIDGES AT TOKO-RI. By James A. Michener. Random House, Inc., 1953. 147 Pages; $2.50.

In this fine novel Mr. Michener has restated with considerable artistry the fundamental reason why free men will accept the risk of wounds and death, sometimes at incredible odds, in battle against their country's enemies.

He puts it this way: ". . . almost without knowing it he uttered the tricky words that bind a man to duty, those simple words that send men in jet planes against overwhelmingly protected bridges: 'If Cag can fly that flak, so can I.' That was what kept the Navy system working. You could weasel out any time, but within the essence of your conscience lived the memory of other men no less afraid than you who were willing to tackle the dirty jobs. So you stuck."

This is, to some extent, an oversimplification of a complex problem in psychology, but it is fundamentally true—as true for the infantryman, the artilleryman, the tanker, the sailor, for any man who fights, as it is for Mr. Michener's pilots. It is something that military men have known for a number of years, and that many non-military writers about the military have largely ignored or distorted.

Briefly, *The Bridges at Toko-ri* is the story of a carrier task force operating off Korea. The title is also the name of the target its pilots have been after for many months—perhaps the toughest target in Korea—four vital bridges in a deep valley with

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the only approaches at either end, guarded along its length by a complex of around two hundred antiaircraft guns.

The people of the novel—the people who are concerned with blowing up the bridges—are never fully developed, but Mr. Michener is very good at sketching in background with a few words or an incident from the past so that we can understand his characters even though we do not see them as entirely whole people.

This is a short novel and a deceptively simple one. The things Mr. Michener says are things the fighting man already knows, but he has gone a long way toward explaining to the earthbound soldier the feel of the air and of the men who must fly and fight there. He has done this better than anybody who has written about it since St. Exupery gave us *Night Flight*. He has also explained skillfully, simply and dramatically the operations of a task force and the mechanics, themselves often dramatic, of getting the jets on and off the carriers.

Mr. Michener is trying, in short, to show the American people the cost of the war in Korea, in men and in suffering, because, as Admiral Tarrant puts it, "If we refuse to acknowledge what we're involved in, terrible consequences sometimes follow." Let us hope he succeeds where others have failed.—O.C.S.

THE UKRAINE

UKRAINE UNDER THE SOVIETS. By Clarence A. Manning. Bookman Associates, New York, 1953. 223 Pages; $3.50.

This excellent and concise history of the Ukraine between 1917 and 1950 ought to be read by every student of modern Eastern Europe. The recent history of the Ukraine is a *terra incognita* for most of us. While heretofore there always has been the handy excuse that it was most difficult to get at the facts, Professor Manning now has filled the gap in our literature: His book must be considered as a standard work which, for the first time, familiarizes the American reader with the essential knowledge about modern Ukrainian life.

The customary disregard of the Ukrainian question derives from a widespread opinion that, while the Ukrainians undoubtedly form a nation, their development to full-fledged and mature nationhood is only in its early beginning and that the Ukrainian nationality is more in the nature of a literary idea than of a political reality. The essential point is that the development of the Ukrainian nation has progressed very rapidly during the past 40 years. As time goes by, the Ukrainian question will become increasingly more important. If only by implication, Professor Manning's book drives home the point that it is no longer safe to ignore the Ukrainian problem which, in one way or another, bids fair to become one of the crucial issues of our time.

The book describes in detail Communist policies which officially protect and stimulate national cultural life and which allegedly uphold national independence. No nation is culturally and linguistically more closely related to the Russians than the Ukrainians. In no case would it be more reasonable to expect the Soviet Russians to live up to their own principles. The facts are, however, that from the very start the Moscow communists have made every effort to undermine and destroy Ukrainian nationhood.

Even the most knowledgeable expert in matters of Soviet tricks and tactics will find described in this book a weapon of which he never heard before; the dictionary. Believe it or not, they adopted a policy aiming at the disintegration of the Ukrainian language from within. This disintegration is accomplished by issuing dictionaries which suppress Ukrainian terms and which put forward, especially in the technical fields, Russian expressions. The official theory is that "thanks to the Russian language, the Ukrainian has been able to acquire the capacity to respond to the needs of socialist construction." The purpose is to force "Ukrainian to become a dead language and by an inverted purism . . . to compel the Ukrainians to recognize that Russian and Russian alone is in a position to grow and develop."

Two minor criticisms must be made. Professor Manning claims that the concept of spreading the Bolshevik revolution by armed force "collapsed with the defeat of the Red army at Warsaw in 1920 and . . . was then condemned by Lenin himself." This is entirely incorrect as I think I was able to show in my own *A Century of Conflict*. Moreover, it is a most dangerous illusion to perpetuate. My second criticism is as follows: Professor Manning produces figures concerning the human toll of the various famines in the Ukraine. I do not quarrel with the author about his refusal to print even a single footnote in the entire book; in fact, I applaud this bold attempt. But I do think that he should have indicated how he arrived at his figures. Without proof or calculation the reader cannot know whether the human toll run into the millions or not. As long as no documentation is given, such figures, however correct they may be, must be treated as mere assertions.

Professor Manning's study is based upon a series of detailed studies prepared by a group of Ukrainian DP scholars. This is one of the first efforts to make intelligent use of such people. It is certainly an indication of how valuable DP scholars could be to the cause of the free world if they only were allowed to produce in their fields of knowledge and interest. After all in the absence of documentary materials personal experience is one of the few sources at our disposal with which we can study events behind the Iron Curtain.—STEFAN T. POSSONY

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By Warren Eyster. Random House. 37[illegible] Pages; $3.75. A novel of men on a U.S. destroyer.

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
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
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FAST THINKING AND GUTS

Private Jesus R. Hernandez never lost his wits or his courage

EACH war we get involved in produces its surprises, some big and some little. Korea was no exception, and one of the small but annoying surprises was how seldom Americans escaped or evaded capture. No reason for this was ever established, only the fact was noted. Perhaps our training lacked something, or perhaps our indoctrination was faulty. That escape and evasion could be accomplished by fast thinking and guts was occasionally demonstrated.

This is the story of Private Jesus R. Hernandez, Company G, 7th Infantry.

On 1 June 1953 Hernandez's platoon was occupying a part of the MLR in the higher hill area. Shortly after dark, Hernandez, as part of a six-man outpost group, moved out onto the forward slope of the ridge, where it occupied camouflaged foxholes.

This outpost position had excellent observation and fields of fire towards the enemy, but visibility to the rear was blocked by brush and scrub growing fifteen or twenty yards back.

After midnight, while Hernandez and the corporal commanding the outpost were on alert, Hernandez reported three times that he heard movement in the brush. He suggested reversing the BAR, but the corporal decided to leave it covering the front approaches.

Hernandez was right, for immediately after his third warning, six enemy soldiers attacked from the rear of the outpost. Hernandez and the corporal promptly threw hand grenades, driving them back into the brush, but the action drew enemy artillery fire which destroyed the outpost. Hernandez was hit in both legs and both feet, two men were killed and the remaining three were so seriously wounded that they could not move.

As the artillery fire lifted, five or six enemy soldiers moved in from the rear, firing submachine guns. Hernandez threw a grenade and attempted to reverse the BAR, but the shelling had knocked down camouflage netting and entangled the weapon so that he could not free it. He jumped to cover in a nearby fold of the ground.

He saw the enemy go through the outpost position, shooting both the dead and the wounded. They took one body by the heels and began to drag it towards their own lines. This brought them towards Hernandez and he was discovered. He played dead, with his arms outstretched and a hand grenade cupped loosely in his right hand. One of the enemy took the hand grenade while another grabbed him by the feet and began to drag him towards the enemy lines.

To his horror, Hernandez discovered that the enemy was dragging him and the man through a friendly mine field. He thought seriously about attempting to tell the enemy that they were in the mine field, but remembering how the enemy had shot the dead and wounded a few minutes earlier, he believed he would be shot immediately if he showed any sign of life. He decided that if he was going to die, a mine explosion would be quick and take a few enemy along with him. Luckily, they got through the mine field without mishap.

After dragging the two about a mile, the soldiers stopped on top of a small but steep hill. Here, one of them kicked Hernandez viciously about the body and in the side. After about a dozen kicks, Hernandez managed to roll himself down the steep slope, stopping at the bottom of the hill, about forty yards away from the enemy.

One of the soldiers came running down the hill after him. The man had a submachine gun slung around his neck with the weapon dangling free in front of him. As he reached Hernandez, he leaned over to pick him up, but Hernandez seized the weapon, turned the muzzle into the enemy's face and fired a burst, killing him instantly.

The enemy soldiers on top of the hill started firing in his direction. But Hernandez, with considerable effort, managed to point his newly acquired weapon towards the crest of the hill, held the trigger down and emptied the drum. This drove the enemy back under cover. Hernandez staggered to his feet and was able to run about fifty yards to some heavy brush where he hid.

After a few minutes of excited talk the enemy soldiers began to search the area around the bottom of the hill. However Hernandez had run partly up the hill and had concealed himself so well that the enemy gave up their search after fifteen minutes.

HERNANDEZ waited another fifteen minutes, until he was sure the enemy had gone, and then began to crawl in the general direction of our lines. His wounds were bleeding and he was so weak that he was forced to stop every few yards to rest. Finally he reached the top of the hill, where he saw enemy artillery fire bursting on the forward slope of a ridge about a mile away. He assumed that the shelling was directed against our outposts, and was soon able to confirm this by spotting the muzzle blast from a tank in the same vicinity. After resting for about ten minutes he continued his crawl until he came to the edge of a mine field which he recognized. It took him another ten minutes to find a safe lane through the field.

Once through the field he saw some men on the skyline and crawled towards them. He felt sure that only Americans would be so exposed. He was right and he was soon challenged, recognized, and picked up.


Private Hernandez had done about everything that could be expected of a soldier. Although painfully crippled, he never lost his wits nor his courage. He defended his position as long as he could, and only afterwards did he seek his own safety. He took prompt advantage of the first opportunity afforded him to escape and was quick and bold enough to be completely successful. Most important, he never lost his determination to "survive" and escape from a fanatic enemy.

THE AUTHOR of this article requested anonymity as he said he had nothing to do with it except to write it. He is a colonel of twenty-five years of service in Armor and has contributed to this magazine previously.

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SPECIFICATIONS:


R-F Power Output: Adjustable from −7 to −85 dbm (decibels relative to one milliwatt).

R-F Power Input: From +7 to +30 dbm.

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
SPECIFICATIONS:

Range Markers: 200 to 50,000 yds. depending on delay line
Accuracy: ± 5 yards
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Vol. 4, No. 4 — **November 1953**

FAST THINKING AND GUTS Inside front cover
THE MONTH'S MAIL 4
THE INFANTRY DIVISION: Triangular or Square?
Brig. Gen. George E. Lynch 9
PICTURES OF THE MONTH 13
SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY IN POSITIONAL WARFARE.
Lieut. Col. Jerry F. Dunn 14
PROMOTION SYSTEM IN TRANSITION. *Lieut. Col. E. N. Kirsten* 21
NIGHT FIGHTING. *Lieut. Edward L. Murphy, Jr.* 18
TARGET ATTACK 23
THE ELECTRONIC GUN DATA COMPUTER, T-29.
Lieut. Col. Robert E. Arn 27
AN INVASION IS JEOPARDIZED. *Brig. Gen. Paschal N. Strong* 29
THE MONTH'S COMMENT 34
TARGET-CAR RAILROAD 35
CEREBRATIONS 36
THE MONTH'S NEWS 37
THE MONTH'S READING 38
IRONS IN THE FIRE 39
CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE.
Selection for Overseas Service 40
THE MONTH'S BOOKS 42

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The Month's Mail

New Efficiency Report

To the Editors:

Your article by General Bergin on the new officer efficiency report [October issue] was of great interest. However, on close study, I fail to see where any extensive improvements have been made. Sections 11 a and b are pure eyewash. Even so the report isn't bad if they will only adopt a page from the Marine Corps and provide a space for the officer being rated to sign the report indicating that he has read it and give him an opportunity to rebut rat ings he believes to be unfair. Such statements from the officer being rated might give a better insight into the officer's fitness than a whole file of opinion reports.

COL. REDLEG

Washington, D. C.

Best Years of Our Lives

To the Editors:

I have never had a desire to write a letter to an editor but since reading your August issue I must congratulate the author of the fine article, "Give Us Back Our Pride." It tells those of us who want to know just what really is wrong with the Army. Many of us Regulars are fed up with the way we have been pushed around.

I have more than eleven years of service; I am proud of the service which I hope to make a career but I doubt if I shall if things keep up as they are. I would be better off getting out and taking a civil service job than trying to make the Army a career.

I don't think that all the glory should be given us, but when little respect or interest is shown those of us who have given the best years of our lives to the service and we are deprived of those things we have enjoyed for many years, it is about time for us Regulars to holler real loudly. This seems to be a married men's army and I think we ought to appreciate the hardships that fall on married service families.

Still the service can't be beat.

SGT. GERALD A. SMITH
7729 Special Service Group
APO 696-A, c/o PM
New York, New York

No Discipline

To the Editors:

Of late there has been considerable discussion on the subject of why so few young men want a Regular commission. But I seldom see mentioned a factor which I believe serves to keep many men from going RA—the discipline the service demands.

A great number of Americans reaching maturity are strangers to discipline. During childhood and the teens they were seldom subjected to it. This is due largely to the thinking of many "modern" educators and "experts" on child care, who hold that discipline is an evil to be avoided.

Whether these educators are right or wrong is a very broad question. But there is no denying the fact that this theory, in varying degrees, is widely held, and has influenced the upbringing of many Americans in recent decades.

Small wonder that young men brought up in such a manner find the Service unattractive!

LIEUT. F. L. YOUNG, JR.
Hq & Hq Co, 5th Cav Regt
APO 201, c/o PM
San Francisco, Calif.

Commissaries

To the Editors:

I have just read "On Commissaries and Productivity" [September issue]. As a member of one of the civilian components, some of the current problems of Regulars do not come to my attention. I was familiar with the curtailment of post exchange functions, but had not known about the elimination or curtailment of commissary service. I would greatly appreciate any information which you might give me as to the status of any legislative bill affecting this service.

I heartily concur in what you have ha to say. I would like to interest myself, my small and feeble way, as an individu citizen, in stopping further curtailment commissary and similar privileges.

I have no personal interest in this ma ter, as I am not privileged to purcha from post exchanges and commissaries e cepting when on active duty, but th constant chipping away at service righ by small civilian pressure groups mak my blood boil.

BRIG. GEN. GEORGE W. TROUSDAI
39th Inf. Div.
La. Nat. Gd.
Monroe, La.

To the Editors:

"Commissaries and Productivity" promp me to suggest that perhaps the Associati should become a lobbying organization.

I can appreciate the impressive arg ments against such a course. But if t Association, representing the best interes of our Army in a non-official sense, doesn go about securing such advantages for t Army as it may deem advisable, who, I a forced to ask, will do it?

There is nothing intrinsically wro with lobbying. And military organizatio in this country, through their civili "auxiliaries," long have engaged in it. Lo at what to our jaundiced eyes have becor the spectacular results achieved throu work of the various National Guard, M rine and Navy interests.

THIS MONTH'S JOURNAL

In these pages there is a lot of varied reading for soldiers with varied interests.

If you like to tinker with the organization of combat outfits you'll dig right into **The Infantry Division: Triangular or Square?**

If you're scientific- or engineer-minded you'll whip over to **Target Attack** to take a reading on the artillery's new gun data computer.

If you are a logistics officer or a critic of the logisticians you won't pass up **An Invasion is Jeopardized.** Nor will you pass it up if you were anywhere near Omaha or Utah beaches on 6 June 1944.

The tactical minded will want to see what Lt. Edward L. Murphy, Jr., has to say about **Night Fighting.**

And every reader will "expertize" Col. E. N. Kirsten's **Promotion System in Transition.**

These are just a few of the highlights. In addition there are a couple of helpful "gadget" pieces, letters from readers who have something to sound off about, and book reviews that will give you a broadened view of the world and your profession.

NEXT MONTH'S JOURNAL

Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg isn't advisi you to be rebellious or subversive in **Blo Up Your Commander.** On the contra he urges you to get in good with the O Man by showing a bit of imagination devising realistic training problems. H packs his message full of all kinds helpful hints that will give you an irresis ble impulse to outdo him.

Operation Touchdown by Lt. C Virgil E. Craven tells the story of an fantry-tank attack on bloody Heartbre Ridge in Korea by the 2d Infantry Di sion.

In **Gridding the Single Vertical Ph tograph,** Lt. Col. John C. Remy sho us a fast and simple method of restituti points from a map to a photograph.

Can infantry and armor successfu team together in preplanned night tacks? In **Tanks and Infantry at Nig** Capt. Harlan G. Koch gives the resu of a study of an Armored School co mittee that interviewed many experienc commanders.

Plus all this there will be our otl regular departments: Cerebrations, Bo Reviews, the Month's Comment, and t Month's Mail.

Congressmen and others in government erstand the functions of lobbying, and ntimes it seems to be the only way to y through a program. If we in the ny are to rely on traditional means of ying our story to the Congress and the ernment we are going to continue to behind in what has deplorably become orm of "competition" with the other nches of the service, and our nation's interests may perhaps not be served by slow downward slide of the Army.

The problems associated with "Commis-rs and Productivity" are symptoms of a per evil, a misunderstanding on the part Congress and others as to the functions role of the Army. This we should ehow set out to correct. And if it re-es lobbying, then we must do it. Cer-ly that is a form of our duty as much as hing else we do.

NAME WITHHELD BY REQUEST

the Editors:

On Commissaries and Productivity" t be commended. It is really time that eone spoke out frankly in favor of the serviceman who has little to say . . .

My blood ran high when I read that a ld War II officer had the boldness and acity to say that we are overpaid and are productive. . . . What gave that ex-er the opinion that military life is so h? Military life is much more rigid we are subject to numerous rules and lations.

ctually, the serviceman isn't paid as quately as his civilian counterpart. He s many hours overtime and is not re-erated with double time or time and a

ats off to the author for such a mag-ent article.

SGT. EARL P. POWELL

isional Co. 2827
872, c/o PM
York, N. Y.

mmissaries and PXs

the Editors:

regard to your truth-packed article ommissaries, Amen!

ould arrangements be made for re-ts for benefit of the general public via magazines as *Coronet, Reader's Di-* and other publications? The mili-(and military-minded) people who this article will know it to be the n; let's place the facts before the "bar ublic opinion" and attempt to "kill off" e who would attempt to pass harmful lation against enlisted men and wom-and officers.

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I'll be looking for "On Commissaries and Productivity" in one or more civilian publications.

CPL. DONALD F. MACLEAN
6103 ASU, Det #3
Br. U.S.D.B.
Lompoc, Calif.

• We wish the big magazines would take an interest, but unfortunately they don't.

Chamber of Commerce Support

To the Editors:

I read the very pertinent editorial "On Commissaries and Productivity" and I feel compelled to comment on this latest maneuver against the services.

I live with my family on the Fort Ord reservation, and use the commissary there. It is currently being investigated for the House subcommittee. I am enclosing a headline from the front page of our local paper—the *Monterey Peninsula Herald (see cut)*. It is all quite self-explanatory and should prove of considerable interest.

Several front page editorials in this paper indicate a rather unique attitude on the part of the local people—and quite refreshing, don't you think? Unfortunately, however, as we all know too well, the outlook of some of our legislators is somewhat different. But then, as you say, "soldiering and politics don't mix," and so perhaps I had better stop here before saying something regrettable.

CAPT. R. B. ELLIOTT
Box 124
Presidio of Monterey, Calif.

To the Editors:

We old reservists and retired personnel, who have seen service in sundry wars and studied during the interim, are viewing with apprehension the present attitude towards the purchase of rations at commissaries and saddle soap at the PX. It is astounding but apparently true. The one ray of light is that people stationed in fairly remote posts or bases may still be able to purchase daily necessities.

There is a large commissary at Fairchild AFB, twenty-two miles west of this city; but there are thousands of people stationed there with married quarters, as well as men on duty who live in town. I go out there two or three times a year to get some good cured meats, cheese and issue groceries. When the AAF was served by the QMC in commissaries the store was open from eight until noon for authorized purchasers. Most of the civilian opposition is directed, or has been, towards the post exchange system, for self-centered reasons, and this has been agitated for years.

There is a meeting tonight of the Disabled Emergency Officers of the World Wars; we are not strong, but I will take it up with them and urge those present to write their congressmen to urge the continuance of the commissary and the post-exchange systems.

Yes, as Rudyard Kipling wrote about "Tommy Atkins"—"Chuck 'im out, the brute! until the guns begin to shoot"—And then he's called a "thin red line of heroes".—

CAPT. ALBERT H. SUNDAHL
Retired
W. 2515 Boone Ave.
Spokane, Wash.

Fly 'em in in Pieces

To the Editors:

We have been hearing a lot of talk in the past few years about air transportability for all ground combat units. Airborne enthusiasts have been whooping it up for truly strategic airheads of field army size, completely supplied by air. But despite all the enthusiasm, and despite the tremendous developments in heavy drop techniques, there remains one large question. How can we get a medium tank into the air, let alone into the airhead?

If you consider the size of the plane needed to lift a 2½-ton truck, you can imagine the giant that would be required to lift the medium tank. Supposing for a moment that such a plane could be built, the cost of lifting a battalion of medium tanks into the airhead would be all but ridiculous.

The idea of developing a special light (under-gunned and under-armored) tank for airborne use is really no solution at all. The need remains for a medium tank in the airhead.

Why can't American ingenuity design a medium tank that could be broken down into three or four loads, which could be quickly and easily reassembled in the field? The loads might consist, for example, of the turret assembly (including the gun),

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eninsula C of C Supports Fort Ord Commissary

ER FORECAST
rey Bay Area — Fog night rning but otherwise fair ay; little temperature high Wednesday 66-76; low 9-54; high yesterday (Mon-y); low last night 55.

Monterey Peninsula Herald

TIDES, SUN AND MOON (From Coast and Geodetic Survey)

	LOW		HIGH	
9	5:41 am	0.8 ft	12:05 pm	4.1 ft
	9:10 pm	1.0 ft		
	HIGH		LOW	
10	12:30 am	4.2 ft	6:07 am	1.3 ft
	12:27 pm	4.1 ft	6:42 pm	0.7 ft

	Sunrise	Sunset	Moonrise	Moonset
9	6:46 am	7:28 pm	9:06 am	7:49 pm
10	6:47 am	7:26 pm	9:03 am	8:14 pm

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the engine, possibly some of the armor, and the remaining hull and suspension system. These loads could be carried in present type assault transports, or possibly could be landed by the use of the heavy-drop technique.

Considering the inherent payload limitations of the helicopter, such a breakdown of the tank seems to offer the only hope for the future tactical use of helicopters in operations involving units larger than the battalion.

ROBERT W. O'BRIEN

75 Fayerweather St.
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Ask the Old-Timers

To the Editors:

My attention was particularly drawn to your reprint of General Bradley's memo to the Secretary of Defense [June issue] because I am one of those long-timers with almost twenty years of service who are leaving.

I believe that the board appointed to find out the cause of why all these men are leaving will not learn much unless and until they get down to the men themselves. I suggest that all those with long terms of service be called to Washington as they leave and asked to state their reasons. The Pentagon is not so busy that someone could not give these men ten minutes of time to hear some of the stories.

Perhaps this could be done by the Chief of Staff or someone on a level near the top.

Or as an alternative the records could be sifted through and all those with say more than ten or fifteen years service could be circularized and asked why they are leaving the service, if they are.

My suggestions may sound too simple to some but it certainly would not cost much to say.

WOJG

Solution?

To the Editors:

Major Crecelius makes a splendid presentation in his article, "Combat Company Commanders Should Be Majors" [July issue]. However, how about getting started on this one step at a time? Let's take some of the companies away from the lieutenants who are now commanding ninety per cent of the companies in Korea and give them to the captains who are sitting in staff jobs or in rear areas just dying to take over a combat company.

CAPTAIN X CORPS

APO 909, c/o PM
San Francisco, Calif.

Coast Watchers Memorial

To the Editors:


I am writing to bring before your notice the fact that an appeal has been launched by a Coast Watchers Memorial Committee to obtain funds for the erection on a site to be selected in New Guinea of a memorial to those Coast Watchers operating in the South Pacific and South West Pacific Areas who lost their lives in the Second World War.

The volume of intelligence transmitted by the Coast Watchers concerning the movements of enemy war vessels and aircraft from jungle hide-outs, was a most substantial one. Not only did they transmit information which led to the sinking of enemy war vessels, but they were able to give timely warning of impending air attacks, particularly during the critical stage

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
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of the Pacific campaign and notably a Guadalcanal. Also they were successfu in retrieving, and later bringing back t safety, many Allied airmen who had bee shot down over enemy-occupied territory

As the enemy forces extended their gri over the various islands they occupied, th work of the Coast Watchers became eve more hazardous. Enemy patrols were con stantly on their trail and in the transpor of their equipment they were largely de pendent upon the small parties of native who remained loyal to them. It was lonel work, demanding the exercise of muc courage and physical endurance.

Donations may be sent to the Honorar Treasurer, Coast Watchers Memorial Com mittee, c/o Naval Intelligence Divisio Navy Office, Melbourne, Victoria, Au tralia.

I might add that most substantial don tions to the Coast Watchers Memori Fund have been received from Fleet Ad miral William F. Halsey and from th First Marine Division Association, Inc.

In all probability the Memorial will tak the form of a navigational light mounte on a structure of a suitably commemorati character and which would be known a "The Coast Watchers Light."

W. H. Brooksbank
Honorary Secreta
Melbourne.

Commo

To the Editors:

I just finished reading Lt. Col. Willia R. Kintner's "Commo to the Sign Corps" [September issue]. As a compar grade Signal Corps officer I have been e tremely interested in this problem, ar have had some slight experience in Kor with front-line units. Colonel Kintne report is the best analysis of the proble that I have seen, and I would very muc like to know his address to contact hi further on this subject.

Lt. Louis F. Dixo
Apt. 3A, Bldg 2058
Fort Monmouth, N. J.

9th Infantry Division Association

To the Editors:

I read your article by General Edw H. Randle, "And They Marched Eve One" [September issue]. Fortunately was one of the foot soldiers of his 47 Regiment and it brings back happy mem ries of Africa, Fort Bragg, and our Eu pean tour of duty in World War II. I a now a member of the 9th Infantry Di sion Association. Our headquarters is B 428, Jersey City, N. J.

I would like to have your permission return mail for reprinting this article our monthly paper the *Octofoil* as it wou reach the homes and hospitals where o members reside.


Wilton M. Tayl
Stop 6, Star Route
Lost Hills, Calif.

• Permission granted with pleasure.

The Infantry Division

△ OR □

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE E. LYNCH



ARMY ORGANIZATION, IT IS DANGEROUS TO MIS-
KE A MOMENTARY CONDITION FOR A PERMANENT
NE, AND TO OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT AN ARMY
GANIZATION IS A LIVING ORGANISM WHICH IN
RM AND SPIRIT MUST KEEP STEP WITH THE TIMES.
General Hans Von Seeckt

IE passage of time has an effect on the way armies fight and
eir organization for fighting. Weapons, methods and organiza-
s go through slow processes of evolution. A simple example
be found in field artillery. Until the end of World War II,
l artillery batteries (except in armored divisions) included only
r cannon. Possibly the best explanation for settling on the
nber four was advanced by the late Major General Harry G.
op (then a captain), who wrote that four pieces was the great-
number the officer giving firing orders could reach with his
e. At any rate the traditional four pieces remained with the
ery long past the day when technical improvements had made
ossible to direct the fire of six pieces with ease, and only be-
dly, after World War II, did our artillery adopt the six-piece
ery organization.

he retention of forms beyond the existence of the reason for
ir origin can be found almost anywhere. I hope this justifies an
mination of the form of our infantry division and some conclu-

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sions as to its suitability and function today and tomorrow. Whatever answer may be found, it is certain that it will only fit the circumstances for a matter of a few years when time and good judgment will demand that it be looked at again.

The last time that the principles of infantry divisional organization were given a complete overhaul was in the summer of 1946 at the Infantry Conference at Fort Benning. Many valuable changes were adopted. These changes reflected experience gained in fighting the armies of Germany in an almost entirely offensive war against a weakening foe which had lost the ability to mass forces or resources against the land and air forces of a powerful coalition of allies.

Since our current divisional organization represents in most respects lessons learned in World War II, the need is urgent for a further review.

WE remember the square division of two brigades of two regiments each which prevailed at the outbreak of World War II, and the conversion of these square formations to triangular ones, which followed extensive tests of the "Provisional Infantry Division" conducted by Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair. Basically the reasons for adopting the triangular formation had existed and had been clearly recognized since the end of World War I. Briefly the two functional reasons were, first, that the brigade organization, interposed between divisional and regimental headquarters, caused a loss of time in the transmission and execution of battle orders which the value of the brigade headquarters could not justify; and second, that formations consisting of two parts were simply not adaptable to modern combat. A division reserve was essential, such a reserve could be created only in one of two ways. The commander could constitute a full brigade as division reserve which meant that the power of half of the division was initially unexploited—this it was thought could not be accepted in most situations. The second alternative was to detach one regiment for divisional reserve, which left one regiment available to the brigade. Since the brigade must usually have a reserve, its commander necessarily held one battalion as brigade reserve leaving the regimental commander only two battalions, and this commander found himself in even poorer shape to enter the action than his brigade commander. The fault, of course, lay in the failure of the organization to fit the function attached to it, which was readily recognized and partially corrected in our divisions which fought in World War II.

THE most frequently heard criticism of our World War II division was that it was too light. It did prove flexible, but for sustained operations it did not possess self-restorative powers, and this, in company with our World War II policy of requiring continuous active operations of divisions without rest or relief, combined to wear the divisions down to a fraction of their designed effectiveness. The reorganization which followed World War II attempted to remedy the "lightness" of the division by the addition of weapons and weapons units. This unquestionably increased the momentary power and shock potential of the division, but it did not add to its sustaining powers, endurance or flexibility.

We should also examine what will be expected of our division in the event of a war against the USSR.

Soviet tactics and methods as presented by General Augustin Guillaume of the French Army, Colonel Louis B. Ely, of our own Army, and by the German generals who have expressed their reflections and experiences in fighting with the Red Army, can be summarized briefly as follows:

(1) A slow and heavy build-up prior to launching an offensive.

(2) Emphasis on depth in both offense and defense.

(3) A heavy reliance on massive concentrations of artillery.

(4) Successive assaults by successive organizations until the enemy battle area is completely penetrated, with subsequent envelopment and destruction of the broken enemy.

(5) Relatively low ability to continue heavy assaults when the action has progressed beyond Soviet logistic and artillery capabilities.


There are other characteristics, but these seem to form the framework of Soviet tactics. While Communist Chinese tactics in Korea cannot be accepted as a guide to Soviet capabilities, they have seemed to follow this pattern so far as their equipment and weapons allowed.

TO be prepared to meet Soviet tactics and to exploit our own potentialities, we must decide what each infantry echelon is to do and what tools each needs to do its job, whether attacking or defending. Since the division is our largest infantry combat organization, and since it is composed of several infantry echelons, let us examine it, starting with the basic small unit, the platoon. This unit, now triangular with three rifle squads, can organize a position defense and hold its own in such a defense for a limited time. It should not care if enemy passes it by—it remains an anchor on which other elements can maneuver and later re-form the front.

In attack, this same platoon can adopt a variety of formations, generally triangular in form, capable of maneuvering on another base of fire, or of acting as a base of fire, or of maneuvering one or two of its squads while the remainder of the platoon furnishes the base of fire. The platoon is well designed for its function in attack or defense—no change of structure is suggested.

Much the same thing can be said for the rifle company as for the rifle platoon. Its job and its capabilities are of the same functional order, therefore no structural change is suggested.

The infantry battalion job is of a broader nature than that of the rifle company, though not so inclusive as those of the regiment and division which we shall look at a little later. The battalion should possess the endurance and ability to maintain the offensive for possibly thirty-six to forty-eight hours. However, because of its triangular formation and the fact that men tire and use up their physical and spiritual resources when pressing an attack with all possible vigor, it can not *effectively* conduct offensive operations for longer periods. In Europe, battalions were required to continue to attack for longer



The Square Infantry Regiment

BRIGADER GENERAL GEORGE E. LYNCH, an occasional contributor to this magazine, is presently the Assistant Division Commander of the 43d Infantry Division, stationed in Germany.

iods without rest or time for recu-ation, but effectiveness dropped off reciably after about forty-eight hours. n defense, the infantry battalion loying in much the same fashion as cribed above for the platoon, con-ning its few administrative units hin its position, can maintain the egrity of its position and protect its nerable non-fighting activities against vy attack for periods up to forty-nt hours or so without resupply, and varying greater periods under less ere operations. At the same time, an a or positional defense of this nature itly maintained will allow other di-onal forces to deal with enemy ele-nts which by-pass the battalion po-on during a powerful attack. If the ck is a probing or weak effort, the talion can and should use its third company or a portion of it to ma-ver and to counterattack. But, if the my effort appears to be great, the talion should anchor itself and allow ment or division to eject the pene-ion or infiltration which may have ed around it to the rear.

or these general cases of the battal-action, its present triangular form is sfactory.

E battalion could be made a unit of stained offensive power and of deep nsive ability if it became an admin-ative echelon and if it received a rth rifle company. However, that is here suggested as a profitable change view of the relation of the battalion ther organizations in the division, so possibilities will be left without fur-development.

Considering the regiment, we find a erent set of purposes to be satisfied. m our experience in World War II in anticipation of the kind of action e expected in combat against enemy es, it seems certain that the regi-nt must:


1) Form a regimental combat zone great depth, probably in the order of 0 yards.

2) Be capable of including and pro-ing within its battle area its admin-ative and combat support elements.

3) Be capable of counterattacking restoring the position if penetrated.

4) Be capable of seeking out and roying enemy penetrations of the di-onal battle area in its own vicinity gh not within its position.

5) Possess self-restorative powers ility to rest, re-equip, resupply, and ganize units of the regiment out of tact with the enemy but within the mental battle position).



The Square Infantry Division

(6) Be capable of a sustained offen-sive drive at maximum effectiveness for periods up to about ten days.

THE present triangular regiment does few of these things well. In defense, it must generally use two battalions in contact and one as a reserve and ma-neuver element, rotate battalions in such a way that none can be rested or restored to high effectiveness. The third battalion, if used for counteroffensive or maneuver, leaves the battle position shallow and easily infiltrated or pene-trated. Administrative and combat sup-port elements cannot be securely in-cluded in the area when the third battalion moves into a counterattack, or even when it merely assumes a rear po-sitional defense. This has generally resulted in the practice of placing sup-port elements a sufficient distance to the rear so that slight penetrations did not disrupt support operations. The history of operations in Korea has demonstrated the weakness and inadequacy of this arrangement.

Another situation which will likely occur in the defensive is that the power of an enemy attack may promise to be so great that a planned withdrawal to a second prepared battle position, so as to dissipate and disorganize the attack, would be the most profitable course to follow. In this case, the triangular regi-ment is handicapped in that if it mans its first battle position with only one battalion, using the other two to pre-pare the second position and withdraw to it when ordered, the weakness of the front may be perceived and the enemy's main blow will be reserved for the ex-pected second position. In such an event we lose the defensive advantage of invit-ing a main effort for the purpose of dissi-pating it and having it founder and be destroyed on a second battle position and then counterattacking to restore original positions.

In an attack, one triangular regiment, good for the initial assault up to about seven days, soon exhausts itself and must continue at reduced effectiveness or be passed through by another regi-ment of the division or by another di-vision. Since the division has but three regiments, in two to three weeks it may exhaust its vitality and have to be relieved or to continue at remarkably reduced effectiveness. The second meth-od, of relief by a fresh division, is clumsy, time-consuming and riddled with diffi-culties of intelligence and logistics and other administrative obstacles.

THE basic reason for the weaknesses in the regiment is its triangularity. It is flexible, but lacks self-restorative powers, cannot protect its supports, has only shallow defensive capabilities and cannot sustain the offensive effectively for long.

If the regiment were increased by one battalion, depth of battle position could be created when on the defensive, coun-terattack potential would be more flexi-ble, administrative echelons would be-come more secure, and defense in first or second battle positions would be equally adaptable. In an attack the regiment could always fight two battal-ions, while the remaining two served as maneuver and reserve elements, at the same time restoring themselves. Diffi-cult divisional reliefs would be made unnecessary except for infrequent peri-odic restoration periods. Since the usual action would find only two battalions with enemy contact, the combat support elements should require no increase, and the administrative support elements would require only strengthening rather than the addition of new administrative units. This, incidentally, should greatly reduce the proportions of non-fighting to fighting personnel, a current condition which has been so roundly criticized by many military commentators.

How many World War II division commanders have said or thought that they could and should have had four infantry regiments in their divisions? In fact, by attachments of regiments, many divisions did operate four regiments without appreciably adding to the tasks of staff, command and support elements.

MUCH the same reasoning advanced in the case of the regiment applies to the division, whose structure should be changed from triangular to square —and a true square, not the incorrectly labelled square of our old brigaded di-visions which in fact were dual and not square. With two regiments on the

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front, each in depth, the division has reserves, maneuver capabilities, security in depth, and an offensive staying power which should enable it to remain in action almost indefinitely. It could, by relief of individuals, rest those who needed rest; it could by rotation of units within itself continue those regenerative processes without which any organism eventually wears out, and above all, properly resupplied it could hold a position or conduct an attack for months.

The supply of the regiment or division which has chosen to hold its position even though the enemy has penetrated or infiltrated around it to the rear is a large subject of its own. It is inherent in the concept of this type of defense that, before supplies on the position have been expended, the unit must resupply, or withdraw or surrender. The experiences of Major General Orde C. Wingate, the British Special Force commander in Burma during World War II, are significant. His divisional force, completely supplied by air for periods as long as three months, while operating two to three hundred miles in rear of the Japanese front, furnishes good evidence of the feasibility of supplying regiments and divisions whose communications have been cut. Even more recently, the aerial supply of the 1st Marine Division and elements of the 7th Infantry Division in North Korea points to the tactical possibilities of a firm defense of a threatened front area.

IF our divisions in Korea had had the four-regiment organization, and if aerial resupply had been used, there is a very good probability that Chinese and North Korean infiltrations and penetrations would have been destroyed or would have themselves withered away after having consumed their man-packed expendables, without having forced a dislodgment and withdrawal of our forward combat and administrative forces. It should be quite clear that the use of atomic weapons against land combat forces will require changes in organization, deployment and tactical concepts. Among the implications is this—certainly atomic weapons offer the attacker the means to create a local vacuum in the enemy's front or to destroy the enemy's immediate reserves. The attacker will pour in forces to fill and to exploit the vacuum. Having the initiative, the attacker is assured of a handsome advantage of time if his opponent has placed his reserves at conventional distances behind the line of contact. The defender must therefore dispose his local reserves sufficiently close to the front that they may be rapidly moved to block or destroy the attacker's exploitation before it has gained momentum. Addition of a fourth regiment to the infantry division, followed by wise deployment of forces is one effective counter to the advantages of atomic weapons in the hands of an attacking land force.

It might be countered that squaring of the division and of the regiment induces duplications and possibly excesses. The situations of battle, being so various, would have to be explored one by one to establish that no duplication or excess would result. Even then it could not be said that there would be no duplication, for duplication is always present until the last reserve is committed.

The recuperative processes which this simultaneous squaring is intended to serve are not quite the same in the regiment and in the division. The variable of durability and the periodic need for regeneration are satisfied in infantry units by reliefs of different sorts. Frequent short pauses which can be provided in a square regiment must, if the division is to engage in sustained combat, be supplemented by occasional longer periods for more extensive recuperation. This can be provided in a square division.

THE preceding discussion emphasizes the restorative possibilities of the four-regiment division. It must be kept in mind that, though necessary from that point of view, these benefits are not a sole objective, but rather an important one, inevitably connected to the strengthening of the division, with the increase of flexibility, deepening of the battle position and creation of sustained offensive power sought for in this proposal.

The impact of an increase in infantry battalions and regiments will require a detailed technical study of the mass of administrative and technical units and installations necessary to the operation of a theater. This abbreviated examination cannot even commence such an evaluation. However, several governing principles appear immediately. Combat support units need to be increased only where they normally function as combat team elements. This would require the addition of a light artillery battalion and an engineer company in the division. Both additions can be made without increase of headquarters overhead. Service support units which contribute directly to the maintenance of the added units, in such ways as supplying food, fuel and other expendables, might require an increase in proportion to th increase of the combat elements. How ever, the many units which suppo *organizations* rather than the *personne* of the organizations should require n increase, since their functions are de pendent on the numbers of organiza tions to be served rather than th strengths of the organizations; this woul include many army and corps units suc as signal and military police battalion to name only two in echelons above th division.


The overall effect would be to in crease greatly the proportion of comba troops to service troops in the theate and would thus reduce the swolle "division slice."

SINCE this article charges the three regiment divisions with certain in adequacies, and since the four-regimen division is proposed as the more effectiv form, it might well be asked, "why no a five-regiment division and a five battalion regiment?" Briefly, the basi reasons seem to be: (1) In both div sion and regiment, where communica tions are subject to interruption an personal contact between commande is frequently difficult to achieve and a best is time-consuming, five units ar too many for the commander to operat and supervise effectively; and (2) th divisional front would be so wide tha the division would lose one of its mo powerful capabilities, that of massin the bulk of its artillery at any point o its front.


The terms rest, recuperation and re generation have been used so frequentl in this examination, that the reade could reason it as an effort to secure fo the infantry a more leisurely, comfo table life. But my purpose is to make possible for infantry to fight bette longer and more effectively. My reason ing in many ways parallels that of th U.S. Air Force wherein we find tha war allowances provide double the num ber of pilots required for the numbe of aircraft in the unit in peacetime. Th purpose is to exact from the machine th maximum it can give, to use operatin personnel most effectively and to g full use out of overhead personnel an organizations.

This country is gearing itself to a wa against aggression, and designing wea ons, machines, aircraft and naval cra that will excel the potential enem But we should also look to our infantr organization, which will carry such a large share of the action, and give those powers which will let it comple its grim part successfully.

PICTURES OF THE MONTH



WEAPON OF THE MONTH. The 280mm "atomic" gun, here being loaded on a landing craft during tests, is going to Europe o bolster NATO's defenses. The 868th FA Battalion will be the first of several 280 outfits to join the Seventh Army.



OLDIER OF THE MONTH. Maj. Gen. Wil-am F. Dean, Medal of Honor, repatriated fter three years in a Communist prison camp.



GADGET OF THE MONTH. The 508th "Red Devil" Airborne Combat Team adopts a regimental tie to be worn informally. The tie of dark blue silk has alternating diagonal rows of white parachutes and red devil heads. All present and past members of the 508th can wear the ties. They may be obtained from the commander of the 508th, Col. George O. Pearson, Fort Benning, Ga.

EHICLE OF THE MONTH. Piasecki's twin-engine YH-16 transport helicopter is going through tests before final acceptance. he big "Transporter" will carry 40 men or three jeeps. Bulky loads, such as guns, can be carried in slings under the fuselage.



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Self-Propelled Artillery in Positional Warfare

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JERRY F. DUNN

How a 155mm SP outfit adjusted itself to the stalemate that made the last months of the Korean conflict an artilleryman's war



AT the outset of the third winter in Korea, ground action had developed largely into a stalemate and an artilleryman's war. Thus, a battalion of heavy artillery had to refine its techniques so as to increase the range and accuracy of fire, improve its mobility, and regain its offensive spirit.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JERRY F. DUNN, Artillery, commanded the 937th Field Artillery Battalion in Korea. During the Second World War he served in the artillery section of Third Army and commanded the 174th FA Battalion, also a 155 SP outfit. He graduated from the Command and General Staff College in 1952.

Our battalion—the 937th FA, armed with 155 SP guns—worked out two methods that helped a lot.

First, rapid occupation of battery positions located well forward and quick delivery of a large volume of fire on deep targets followed by early withdrawal became commonplace. Second, use of the self-propelled gun on assault missions also became common practice.

Deliberate construction, occupation and organization of positions took us two months during which each battery occupied positions close by. The battalion was closely grouped to minimize problems of communication and control, and to let us mass our fires fast. Other than an occasional short-term loan of heavy equipment by the engineers, all the construction work was performed by the battalion.

In selecting battery positions, particular attention was given to enemy observation, existence of a major river obstacle dividing the area, and the desirability of placing the batteries of the battalion well forward to gain maximum range advantage, the latter being in opposition to the doctrine of defense in depth. After reaching a decision based on these factors, clearance was obtained from the infantry regiment having area responsibility. Then planning and construction commenced.

The bunker of the battalion fire direction center. Rails and timbers support a roof covered by four to eight feet of earth





Self-propelled gun position with a field of fire of 2700 mils

[INCE it takes only a short time to learn to respect the gunnery of the hinese, our planning concentrated on ding ways to construct firing battery sitions that would withstand heavy unterbattery fires and still be able to liver fire without interruption. Our nstruction standards followed these neral requirements:

(1) Each gun pit was to permit approximately 2700 mils traverse, so we uld fire on the MLR, left or right, at aximum ranges; the actual traverse reired depended on the distance from e battery to the MLR (varying from 00 to 8000 meters). Since the 155 n, self-propelled, M40, has a 638-mil -carriage traverse, this wide-front dection coverage was accomplished by ecting five principal azimuths of fire r each gun pit.

(2) Gun pits were revetted with sandgs and earth fill to a height of eleven et. Being 40 feet wide and 50 feet ng, each revetment required more than 00 sandbags.


(3) Extremely rugged terrain magnid the minimum elevation problem ever esent with "Long Toms." Minimum evation cards were developed for each n and composite fire-capability overys for each battery were prepared.

(4) Each gun pit was designed to rmit ready entrance and exit over an clined ramp. One battery position was signed with ramps in the front end of e pit while two batteries placed ramps the rear. The latter proved more tisfactory since ammunition trucks can ter the pits without interrupting the n crew when firing, and there is more protection for gun and cannoneers.


(5) Projectile pits, powder pits, covered revetments for tools, fuzes and spare parts were built into the side of the revetments and placed conveniently for any azimuth of fire. These pits were built with overhead cover, stand-up height, and capable of withstanding direct hits by medium artillery (this capability has been amply proven).

(6) All telephone lines necessary to control fire of the guns were installed overhead at first but later we dug them 18 inches underground.

(7) Gun positions were separated from the administrative element of each battery, depending on availability of cover, circulation and control considerations. While living quarters (tents or bunkers) were located in the administrative area of each battery, each gun squad constructed a heavy bunker close by that



Projectile pit with projectiles and fuzes segregated



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Another view of the FDC bunker showing B and C computers and radio operator

gave it cover during enemy counterbattery fires and for protection from the cold weather.

(8) The FDC provided living and working space for the battery executive, chief of firing battery, radio operator and computer. Each FDC was centrally located in the position area for reasons of security, control and accessibility.

THE battalion FDC bunker was designed to withstand direct hits by all but heaviest calibers. The entire bunker was dug into the reverse slope of a hillside and roofed with 12-inch beams supporting a layer of railroad rails supporting, in turn, a layer of 4-inch timbers. This bunker was covered by earth fill four to eight feet in depth. The overall dimension was 17 x 57 feet, and the bunker accommodated an FDC room, operations room and S2 room. The walls were 4-inch timber and the floor cement. An 18-inch horizontal aperture, facing south, provided illumination and solar heat. Illumination was improved by whitewashing wall surfaces and ceiling.

STATIC warfare usually requires far more communication than other types of situations. Since artillery must have continuous communications regardless of enemy action, multiple lines were laid over different routes to each battery and outpost. We got flexibility by a liberal number of lateral lines to adjacent units, both from the battalion board and from each battery. The battalion board used three BD72 switchboards in parallel and the battalion FDC was equipped with one BD72. Each battery required one BD72 switchboard, occasionally supplemented by the six additional drops of a BD71. Battalion FDC, in addition to two direct lines to each battery FDC, had a cable of ten spare lines that terminated at handy locations. These spares were a great time saver in the rapid displacement of a battery, for quick wire communications with a unit moving into the area, and for other emergencies. All lines essential to the conduct of fire were buried underground in the immediate CP area.

Radio communications were used constantly. In fact, telephone silence was imposed one day each week and all traffic was handled by radio. Each battery FDC operated an SCR 603 with one receiver on the battalion fire direction net and the other on the battalion command net. Battalion FDC has two 603 sets each rigged with a fourpoint counterpoise antenna atop a mast 58 feet high. This station maintained one receiver in the battalion fire direction net and one in the Corps artillery fire direction net. In case both failed a remote control unit equipped with loud-speaker was installed in the FDC for ready use with a radio vehicle located outside the bunker.

An adequate supply of 12-volt power for dismounted radios located in bunkers is a problem. The best solution we found was a bank of six 12-volt vehicle batteries wired in parallel circuit. This battery bank was charged by one of these methods: A 120-volt generator; a 12-volt generator powered by a skid-mounted jeep motor; power generated by a PE210 or a Rectifier, RA83-A. Occasionally, all four sources became inoperative and a truck had to be immobilized to maintain the battery bank.

Other radio communication with higher headquarters was maintained by a voice ANG/RC9 net and a CW ANG/RC9 net. Soft music of the latest ballads was provided by the AAAIS warning net received over an SCR 593.

Missions peculiar to the self-propelled guns of this battalion, such as assault fire missions and roving gun shoots, introduced a requirement for a special battalion radio net having long-range capabilities. This net used an ANG/RC9 in the battalion commander's vehicle and another in the battalion executive's vehicle. The base set of this net was a third ANG/RC9 located at the battalion FDC. This net was a "must" for units operating on a wide front.

MAINTAINING combat efficiency while rotating high-point personnel, receiving green replacements and retreading noncoms of other arms and specialties under combat conditions, became a fascinating process. At one time our most competent chief of firing battery had been a mess steward with ten years of service as a cook. Training had to receive our constant attention. The battalion had a complete turnover of manpower at least every twelve months.

One of the biggest problems was keeping our mobility. Units quickly become static unless training stresses loading plans, reduction in the quantity of non-essential equipment, and mobility of individual gear. To maintain mobility each battery moved at least two times each month on some type of RSOP. These movements were usually incorporated into the H&I program in which the battery that moved occupied a position well forward, delivered deep fires, then moved to another position before the enemy could come in with effective counterbattery. Non-shooting RSOPs to the rear also helped us maintain mobility.

We watched the proficiency of our gunners carefully. This usually took the form of AFF battery tests, frequent massing of the battalion's fire without warning and close surveillance by battalion commander and S3 of destruction missions, to mention a few.

A FEW words about assault fire are in order. This battalion performed a number of assault-fire missions in varied situations and gained experience to supplement the little doctrine that we ca

nd in our current training publications.
Once the mission was assigned, it was anslated into definite courses of action; ., attack and destroy (or neutralize) rtain specific targets, at a given time nd in a stated priority. Next, reconissance was made and positions were lected as far forward as possible, usual- on the MLR or OPLR. Several posions were selected so that if driven from ne, the assault gun could proceed to ccessive alternate positions. Coordinan with infantry and other arms covered rangements for mutual fire support to clude, when possible, mortar suppresn fires. It was highly desirable to ve a tank nearby to take under fire y enemy SP guns that tried to get o the act. The position was occupied darkness, if possible, after thorough connaissance by the battery commandchief of section and gun driver. Fire s conducted by an observer adjacent the gun. This permitted an axial set- having an r/R factor of one, and duced problems of control and comunications. A reference point, located the center of the zone of fire, was ected, on which the gun was laid and observer's instrument was zeroed. At s laying, aiming stakes equipped with nil board were set out at any conient deflection. Thereafter, initial a were computed by observer instrunt readings which were converted to lections by a computer located with observer. Subsequent commands re "Left or Right ___ mils, Up or wn ___ mils." These were translated p deflections and quadrant elevations the computer and transmitted to the chief of section by phone or voice. Instrument readings to each target were measured before the assault gun occupied the position in order to reduce the amount of time the gun was exposed. Conduct of fire was expedited by the fact that the 155mm projectile may clearly be seen by the eye for several hundred yards before impact, thus permitting accurate sensing on rounds.

Assault fire with the 155mm gun is expensive in equipment and manpower, and commanders should weigh carefully all factors before committing this weapon to an assault mission. While the gun is extremely effective and produces a remarkably high degree of battle morale among combat troops, it is nonetheless a sitting duck. The only protections are armored vests (borrowed) and foxholes. The armor of the SP gun is of no practical value. The gasoline-powered engine is vulnerable to burning by hits from even light mortars. The high silhouette, great muzzle blast, flash and noise quickly focus the attention of all on the weapon. The issue is usually resolved by getting your mission done in the shortest time and getting out before the enemy can react.

ASIDE from the state of training of gun squads, accuracy of the 155mm gun in Korea was mostly affected by tube wear and ammunition.

Although Ordnance calibration teams appeared at infrequent intervals, the results of their efforts were short-lived, due to frequent arrival of new tubes. The high rate of ammunition expenditures caused rapid tube deterioration. Each battery attempted to equalize velocity error from tube wear among its four guns by firing destruction missions and H&I fires from those tubes having the least tube wear. Normally, however, tube wear between guns of the same battery is so pronounced that individual VE corrections are necessary. This correction, on occasion, has been as large as plus 92 foot seconds which amounts to a plus 780 yards correction at 20,000 yards. Considering that this battalion has fired through 145 new tubes during the Korean War, the expenditure rate is obviously significant.

Ammunition resupply procedures had a direct effect on accuracy. At one time a single battery of this battalion had 31 different powder lots in its battery position, each having distinctly different ballistic characteristics. To correct this we adopted these procedures.

First, cooperation of the ASP was enlisted and every effort made at that point to issue large quantities of the same powder lot number and square weight projectile rather than random issues of several different ones. The battalion ammunition dump was organized so as to provide separate stacks for each powder lot and square weight projectile, and a chart was kept that showed the current storage situation. This chart let us issue to batteries all the powder available of a single lot. Ideally, each battery's basic load consists of not more than three or four separate powder lots. Additionally, each battery usually had a quantity of mixed lots for use on H&I missions. The chief of firing battery maintained a chart reflecting current storage in the battery ammunition dump and in each gun pit. The powder pit at each gun emplacement was divided into four bins. Each bin, uniformly in each battery, contained the same powder lot.

This system of ammunition storage permitted each battery FDC to designate for each fire mission the powder bin to be expended and thus we got uniform ammunition performance.

The FDC bunker has three rooms: FDC, Operations, and S2



A WIT of little standing observed of the Korean conflict that "it isn't much of a war, but it's the only one we've got." Actually, the Korean War offered a great deal in the way of training and experience. The problems of rotation, training, cold-weather operations, operation and maintenance of worn-out matériel, individual morale and unit esprit, each could (and should) fill a textbook. However, running through any experience gained here is the very real necessity for flexibility: Flexibility as to doctrine and techniques.

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NIGHT FIGHTING

LIEUTENANT EDWARD L. MURPHY, JR.

NIGHT fighting often terrifies and bewilders even the most seasoned veterans of daylight actions.

We learn to "be afraid of the dark" in childhood and many of us never get over it. Usually it is a matter for jesting—you whistle as you pass the cemetery—but in combat it can be a very serious matter.

In reality the hood of darkness should be a blessing to the combat infantryman. For with darkness comes almost unrestricted freedom of movement, freedom from observed small-arms, artillery and mortar fire and protection from air observation and attack.

The importance of night movement and the feeling of security at night has never been more apparent than in Korea where a stabilized situation has restricted daytime activity, and many patrols and attacks are limited to the hours of darkness.

The infantryman is rarely in a more advantageous position in defense than he is at night. For, depending on the brightness of the moon or artificial illumination, one soldier at night in a stationary position can see and hear from ten to thirty yards or more. The travel of sound at night, the security of a stationary defensive position, and the fact that the enemy has to do the moving make night defense agai heavy odds quite possible.

But confidence in himself and c fidence in his unit is necessary befor soldier will stay in a position at ni and fight. And this confidence co only through experience in a good o fit or through excellent training.

Several instances of excellent night fense were recorded during the first f months of 1951 by Company F, 1 Infantry.

DURING most of that first year it almost SOP for us to attack and trol during daylight hours while enemy limited his attacks to the h of darkness. The advantage we enjo in this night defense was outstand

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Our casualties at night were rare while enemy losses were always high.

There was one example on the Hungnam perimeter on 19 December 1950 when a five-man machine-gun squad from the first platoon of our company remained on an OPLR fighting off an enemy battalion in the darkness for more than two hours.

When their ammunition was gone and the squad withdrew, artillery was dropped onto the position. When the position was retaken at dawn, 102 enemy bodies, killed by either artillery or machine-gun fire, were found on the position. All five Americans got back.

In the case of defense of the main positions there were many examples during the rapid attack north by the United Nations in February, March and April, 1951, when counterattacks by the enemy somewhere in the regimental sector were an almost nightly occurrence.

When the 17th Infantry started its thirty-five-mile drive on 5 April from

The company CP was about twenty yards below a point where two ridgelines junctioned. One of these ridgelines, on which the battalion was organized, ran across our front, while the other ridgeline extended at right angles to it, running towards the enemy positions. We had taken this position the day before and had organized with George Company on the left and Easy on our right. Our first platoon was extended for about a hundred yards along the ridgeline that ran toward the enemy. The platoon was dug in on both sides and at the farthest point of advance we had placed the platoon machine gun, along with an attached section of two lights from H Company's machine-gun platoon.

The first platoon was led by then Master Sergeant (now First Lieutenant) Mineo Inuzuka, who had started with the company as a corporal and assistant squad leader. Sergeant "Min," as we all affectionately knew him, was an outstanding combat leader and became one of the most decorated heroes in Korea.

portant at night, even as humor in the daytime aids in relieving tension, and it came naturally to these youngsters. But even though they joked with me they were gazing and listening intently to their front.

Such queries as "What do you think about night baseball?" "Are they using live ammo tonight, Lieutenant?" and "Is the hot chow on the way up?" were typical. I checked in at the first platoon CP which was just another defensive position along the ridge, into which commo wire had been strung. The little platoon medic, probably the gamest individual in the platoon, Corporal Gerald Schnurr, was on the telephone keeping in contact with the squads via the sound-power telephones. He told me that Sergeant Min was checking positions and that SFC McDaniel, the assistant platoon sergeant, was back at the company CP for ammunition. Knowing the location of leaders is important at night, just as in daytime.

The ill-trained soldier who lacks confidence in himself, his comrades, and the tactics he was supposedly taught is a poor night fighter. Successful night fighting comes from confidence acquired painfully in training or bloodily in combat.

fteen miles south of the 38th parallel a position twenty miles north of that rallel, Company F was hit eight times twelve nights. All of these were minor obing attacks.

An excellent example of these attacks as the last one in the operation on 17 pril. I will relate it in detail, although should be remembered that this is ly a typical example of something that ppened nightly along the entire Eighth my front.

It was 0200 on that cool April morng when Lieutenant Walter McIlwain ook me out of a deep sleep. "Murph, ey're hitting the first platoon. Better on out and I'll get the FO out as soon he gets illumination on the way." ter six months with the first platoon, ad been pulled back to company as c and weapons platoon leader for a st," but Mac knew they were still my ys.

As I started tugging on my boots while king the sleep from my head, I ought of the defensive organization of ground.

AS I started towards the machine-gun section, which I could hear firing, I hoped that the artillery illumination would soon be on its way and that our own 60mm mortars could fill in with their few illumination shells. It was mandatory that we get as much illumination over the area as soon as possible. Even surer than well-aimed machine-gun fire in stopping night attacks was illumination—the answer to an infantryman's prayer during a night attack.

Enemy small-arms and automatic fire raked over the ridgeline as I moved up. The enemy artillery attack, which had completely missed our positions and gone over the ridgeline, had ceased. This was the first night the enemy had used artillery to "soften" us up prior to their assault.

As I moved along the ridge I checked the positions on each side of it. The dogfaces were bantering back and forth as I moved. This light attitude was im-

On the way toward the machine guns I found the OPs for the attached 4.2-inch and 81mm mortar observers. They were already adjusting fire to within 100 yards of our forward location, attempting to "interdict" the area, sealing off the assaulting enemy from any reinforcements or reserves. Our own 60-mortar section leader had already fired the emergency illumination shells he carried and had brought his HE fire in close to our positions.

I arrived at "machine-gun point" just as a blinding explosion hit. I jumped into the nearest hole amid the rattle of burp guns, carbines and machine guns.

A concussion grenade had temporarily stunned the machine-gun section leader. "Welcome to the party. We're having a hell of a good time, Lieutenant Murphy." And he meant it.

A machine gun was on our left, one on our front and one on our right, and the M1s and BARs of the first platoon were in position on each side of the ridgeline.

Everything under control, I settled

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down to enjoy my role as an observer. Sergeant Min slipped into our hole with the observer from the 4.2-inch mortar outfit, who said he moved up because he couldn't see too well from his OP and wanted to know just where I wanted his fire. I immediately directed it to our left front where he was already registered. This was a dead space because of the hill mask for artillery but it was made to order for our heavy mortars.

I ask the section leader how close they had come on the first assault. "Pretty close," he said, and pointed to a still dark form between two of the machine guns, six feet in front of us.

When the first artillery illumination went off, we were all too busy firing at the dark forms to our front, but on the second shell I could see several bodies in the semicircle around us and I knew what "pretty close" was.

Sergeant Min left during a lapse in the firing to check his positions again. The two-man holes were from twenty to forty yards apart all around the point we were on and he was worried about those empty spaces in between. We always felt it was better to keep two men together rather than have the holes closer together through the use of one-man positions.

LATER found out that earlier in the attack, Min had discovered two men moving along the ridgeline towards the rear.

"Who is it?" he called.

A couple of brand new replacements answered. When asked what had happened, one replied:

"There must have been a hundred of them coming all around us, so we escaped while we could." And the other in excited breath chimed in: "We better all run for our lives." This was a display of fear of night combat that happens even to veterans. It is a spark that must be quelled to maintain the position.

Sergeant Min talked calmly for a few minutes and the new men were led back by their platoon leader to their automatic rifle.

When dawn broke some three hours later these two replacements, only thirty-six hours in the platoon, were still coolly holding their position, their BAR barrel hot, and three dead gooks within spitting distance. Thus a pair of cool, cocky veterans were made overnight by the calm assurance of a fine leader. However, never again were two replacements placed in the same position when that platoon dug in for the night. So a lesson was learned.

With the first lapse in the attack, a winded artillery lieutenant with his radio strapped on his back, walked upright to our position at the machine gun asking how far forward were the front lines. Our answer quickly added another occupant to our hole.

Now with all the offensive fires controlled from one point and a coordinated ring of fire placed around the platoon position, we felt secure and ready. Already a load of hand grenades had come up from the rest of the company.

We waited for the next assault. As long as it was dark the enemy would keep trying and only until a few minutes before dawn could we be certain the firefight was over.

Not a GI had been touched. Carbine ammunition, which was what most of the ammo bearers were firing, was running out, so we called for more from the first platoon CP, where the message was relayed to company. All riflemen in the company carried a basic load in their belts plus four bandoliers so there was always plenty of M1 ammunition. In addition it was SOP to stock a supply of carbine, machine-gun ammo and grenades at the forward company CP when a new position was being organized.

About 0330, almost an hour after the initial attack had subsided, much yelling and noise were heard down the slope to our right front, and we knew we were ready for more action. With fifteen illumination flares an hour from the artillery we could see pretty well. However, the activity on the right front indicated just the opposite—that we would probably get hit some place else.

Sure enough, a few minutes later, a warning shout came from the left, and two enemy grenades burst outside our positions. The machine guns opened up again, our mortar and artillery was increased and we were able to pull our own 60s in within fifty yards. This attack was short-lived and we decided that the mission that time had been to carry out their wounded and dead.

WITH the first inkling of dawn came the count of seven enemy dead within a body's length of our positions on "machine-gun point." The men climbed from their positions to retrieve enemy equipment in the close vicinity. It was a happy carefree mood that is found only in a group of combat infantrymen when they realize they have done a good job.

When an enemy automatic rifle suddenly opened fire it was a dive back to our holes. A wounded gook with an AR was located and our two Koreans in the platoon called for him to surrender but all he did was curse and fire. He was silenced with a well-aimed grenade and the platoon started its search for enemy weapons, documents and the count of the dead.


Thirty-four bodies were counted. Apparently all the wounded and possibly some of the dead had been dragged back as the marks of dragged bodies were found along the trail.

This was just one minor action of many such actions that occurred nightly all along the Eighth Army front. But the fitting in of all defensive fires, the excellent coordination between units and the attitude of the men make it a good example.

It was during and after such actions as this one, though, that you can find the very heart of the spirit of the American infantryman. It is in such actions as this one that the infantryman finds confidence in his weapons, his leaders, his unit and most of all himself.

I think that after a few night actions a combat soldier becomes used to fighting at night, but it is in these first actions that we have been seriously harmed. A lot of ground has been given up and a lot of lives lost because somebody pushed the "panic button." I think most of us in Korea have heard a variation of that dreaded call at night: "Run for your lives. There's a thousand of them."

Confidence in night fighting must be developed in training, for only confidence at night will bring success at night



PROMOTION SYSTEM IN TRANSITION

LIEUTENANT COLONEL E. N. KIRSTEN

e had the Old Army, len the New Army, and ow we have this (what is) Army!

a remarkably cogent little piece ritten as she finished her tour in the ce of the Secretary of Defense, Mrs. na Rosenberg listed as the Number o cause for the low morale in the ny: "Loss of faith in the promotion em . . ."

he statement intrigued me for sev- reasons. First, because the more I ected, the more I realized how wide- ad and bitter has been this loss of h. Second, because as a morale- royer I would place it even ahead ner Number One cause: failure of tary pay to keep up with the cost of ng. And third, because of all the es listed, this one seemed most in the power of the Army itself to something about.

omewhere between the fourth and bottles of reflection, the light ned, the pieces fitted together, the ern became clear, or however you er to describe my realization of what rong with the promotional system, why.

he answer is quite simple. The y is about midway in its transition veen two completely and basically rent philosophies of promotion. A in amount of group stress and indi- al discomfort during such a transi- is inevitable.

efore we were unified into three ices instead of two, the Army and y approached the problem of pro- on from opposite directions. The y promoted on seniority with a pro- re for selecting and eliminating the t. The Navy based its system on ting and promoting the fit, leaving unfit to fall by the wayside as pass- s. It would appear that the two ms would meet on the common nd of having promoted all the de- serving and having eliminated all the undeserving. In practice, however, it didn't work out that way. Each system had its evils and both systems fell short of their goals.

The evil of the Army system lay in the difficulty of actually eliminating the unfit, so that a certain amount of deadwood was carried along. The evil of the Navy system lay in the likelihood of passing over a competent, or even outstanding, officer, based on a single unfortunate relationship with a given superior.

I think the Army system was preferable to the Navy system on a long-term *peacetime* basis, for a number of reasons—at least, preferable for the *Army*. For one thing, the ratio of Army expansion is about 10-1 in war time, as opposed to the Navy 2-1, so that most of the deadwood shows up as pretty sound timber under mobilization standards. Also, the sources of Army officers are a lot more varied than the Navy sources, so that it is harder to reduce officers to a common basis for comparison and selection. My basic reason for preferring the old Army system, however, is far more fundamental to a system of management. This reason is that while promotion by seniority does not necessarily *stimulate* initiative, aggressiveness, and even personal integrity, at least it does not *penalize* those qualities. While theoretically the selection system is intended to promote the best officers, in practice it puts a much higher premium on "keeping your nose clean" than does the seniority system, because the latter provides far less chance of single mistakes ruining a man's entire career. In peacetime, when there are limited opportunities to demonstrate one's capacity for command and where results are normally less apparent than methods, there is little chance to establish a batting average. Hence, under the selection system, there is more of a tendency for the officer to play the situation by the book (or merely pretend to play it; or not play it at all) rather than risk the chance of an error on his own initiative. Similarly with other desirable qualities. It is a fundamental characteristic of human nature that if you ask a man to choose between right and wrong, he will normally choose right. Force him to choose between right and himself, however, and right has a much greater chance of coming off second best.

THE law which went into effect in 1948 and established the rules under which we are supposed to be operating, tried to combine the best features of both systems by providing promotion by seniority in the lower grades and by selection in the higher. However, the present policy of temporary promotions means that for all practical purposes the Army is on a system of promotion entirely by selection. Nor is the fact that the pass-over is only in temporary rank, instead of permanent rank, much consolation to the man who must resign himself to being one, two, or five years behind contemporaries. Anyone comparing the atmosphere of pleasurable anticipation as promotion dates approached in the "good old days" with the present atmosphere as officers sweat out the action of a selection board in anxiety, uncertainty, and the feeling that promotions are even more a matter of luck or the caprice of the fortunes of individual assignments now than during the war, cannot help but feel that Mrs. Rosenberg put it all quite mildly. Add to this the even more distressing symptoms such as the avid search for "safe" assignments instead of challenging ones, the frantic scurry to transfer out from under "hard" superiors, the change in incentive from doing a good job to getting a good score, and finally, the number of the best officers who are thinking of leaving the Army, and you have the situation so bewildering and disheartening to the career officer who began his service under the old rules.

Of course, eventually we will adjust. The Navy has lived under the system for a long time—just how successfully I am not prepared to say, but certainly without the loss of morale presently being experienced by the Army.

There are two aspects to this adjustment, the change in attitude of the raters and the change in attitude of the rated. In other words, rating officers, becoming more aware of the possible effects of their reports, will be more meticulous in making out the report, less to express their honest opinion than to attain the desired positive or negative effect on the career of the officer being rated. The officers to be rated, of course, being even more poignantly aware of

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the possible effects of a bad report, will be even more meticulous about not giving cause for a bad report. Whether the over-all effect will eventually be constructive, and how soon, in view of the present maladjustments, remains to be seen.

The problem of adjustment has of course been aggravated by a number of unfortunate factors, of which the expansion complication resulting from the Korean situation is only one. Second only to the general lack of awareness as to the implications of the change in philosophy, the most serious handicap to an early and smooth adjustment was the inadequacy of the efficiency report in use in 1948. In a system which demands precise knowledge on the part of the rater of just how his report will affect the officer rated, the rater not only did not know what effect any given score would have, he did not even know whether his report was favorable or unfavorable! While this particular report form was discarded shortly thereafter, there are a great many surprised and remorseful raters who discovered that instead of the pat on the back, or the mild criticism they had intended, they had actually delivered a near-fatal kick in the teeth—and that nothing they could do or say later could undo this unknowing damage.

EVEN the present form leaves a great deal to be desired in permitting the rater to know exactly what he is doing to the officer he rates, although raters are gradually learning that the various phrases on the form have special meanings not readily apparent. Unfortunately, even less apparent are the special meanings attached to various descriptive adjectives, so that it is still possible for the rater to think he has been complimentary or merely explicit, and actually have the comment scored as unfavorable.

However, sometimes even favorable reports are not enough. While case histories, examples, and "frinstances" are perhaps superfluous, since every officer has personal knowledge of as good examples as any I have, and in more detail than I can give here, there is one I consider too fascinating to omit. This concerns an officer who had two reports from the same superior. As you read the reports, it is obvious that the second was intended to be better than the first—the narrative is more eloquent and the Xs are farther to the right. However, the second was scored lower than the first, indicating a drop in efficiency. The explanation given the officer was that the scores are not finally assigned on the basis of the report itself but on the relationship of that report to the reports of all other officers. Therefore, while his individual efficiency had admittedly gone up, the over-all efficiency of the Army had increased so much during the same period that his individual gain showed up as a relative loss. Whether this second derivative effect was the result of a basic fallacy in the system, just an error in computation, a general inflation of all efficiency reports because of the increasing awareness of the implications of promotion by selection, or whether in fact the over-all efficiency of the Army is improving rapidly, I have only an opinion. However, I do know the effect on the attitude of the officer involved when he was not selected for temporary promotion, *apparently* on the basis of the "downward curve" of his efficiency index. (I say *apparently* because no one really seems to know these answers.)

AS I said, we are about midway through the adjustment period. At least we have reached an awareness of the problem. In general, however, things should improve over the next few years as more and more people realize the implications of the present system—as raters exercise more care in a fuller knowledge of their power, as more older officers raised under (and still tending to mark under) the old system leave the Army, as more officers who have been stung under the change reach positions of power and influence (and sit on selection boards) and as a new set of unwritten rules, tacit understandings and conventions regarding marking reports are evolved.

But the conclusion still tends to be unpalatable, for what adjustment can we recommend for the younger officer? What encouragement and advice can we offer the man whose career is stymied under the actual or potential domination of a single unfavorable report, whether undeserved, unknowing, inadvertent, or malicious. What can we *conscientiously* and *realistically* say to him other than "Keep your nose clean, fella!"?

Will that produce the kind of Army we want?



GIL WALKER

TARGET ATTACK

With the help of the Field Artillery Branch of The Artillery School, COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is able to introduce artillerymen to the new electronic Gun Data Computer, T-29.



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THE reputation U. S. field artillery won between 1941 and 1945 is well deserved but it shouldn't stand on its laurels. We artillerymen know that we will lose our crown of championship if we are smug and rest on our record. We know how dangerous it would be for us to assume that we have developed the "perfect" technique. We know that if we are to retain our role of "killer on the battlefield" we must continuously improve our weapons, techniques and equipment.

The adoption of the target grid method of fire vastly improved observer technique. No longer is the observer burdened with the factors or gimmicks that made artillery mysterious. But the burden removed from the observer has been transferred to the fire direction center. The observer is more efficient, but complications harass and delay the fire direction team.

The ultimate goal of field artillery is to be able to deliver surprise fire on every target it attacks. This is why we develop new techniques and equipment.

SURPRISE fires may be delivered when certain conditions are met. First there is the problem of the location of the target with respect to the guns. This is not new. But we do not have a new device to help us solve it. There have been improvements: countermortar and counterbattery radar, for example, but for targets other than hostile weapons, we have made no appreciable improvement since 1945. Nor do we have one in the works. However, the system we have will locate some targets accurately.

Second of the conditions we must have if we are to deliver surprise fires is the proper application of all ballistic corrections to chart data. This a fertile field for improvement and one in which we have a solution.

As in World War II, we teach and practice that the best corrections are obtained from registration. This statement will always be true because it includes all elements of the system of fire—from oddities of the gun tubes and fire control equipment, to errors in location of the battery with respect to the target area. Yet we know that our application of registration corrections within transfer limits is a good approximation. More accuracy would result in delay.

Our system of applying registration corrections shows to its greatest disadvantage when firing unobserved fires. When our technique should be at its best, we find our standard system at its worst. Let's analyze a set of conditions and determine the magnitude of errors introduced at transfer limits by the percentage range approximation we use.

An artilleryman would find it ideal if the corrections determined by registration would apply to all of the other targets he wanted to engage. But this isn't the case. It would be advantageous if the corrections so determined could be applied to all other targets in the form of a proportion to the range to the target. This is exactly what we do as long as we stay within transfer limits.

Proportion is the simplest way of deriving firing data. All we have to do is determine its value at the registration point and apply it to other targets. This certainly is an ideal solution to be set up on a logarithmic rule as we do with the GFT.

However, this method has several limitations. For example, transfer limits seriously limit the flexibility of our firing. Those of you who have been in Korea know only too well that when you must fire not only to your front, but to both flanks, and possibly to your rear, that the corrections for one point do not work for all directions and ranges.

We know that if our front is wide and we intend to place surprise fire with any degree of accuracy on targets all along this front, we must register several check points in order to have corrections throughout our sector. When we fire several registrations and keep the corrections up to date, we expend a good deal of ammunition and complicate our method of keeping corrections.



LET'S look at some of the factors that affect the trajectory of a shell. As surely as death and taxes, weather, weapons and ammunition confront us every time we fire a round. Each of these contributes its own idiosyncrasy to our firing.

The only way we can at present transfer fire from one target to another, based on a proportion and achieve maximum accuracy, is to have normal weather. But weather is never normal. Here are the results of a survey taken in various parts of the world between latitude 35 and 50 degrees north, which shows the variations from normal that we may expect.

Element	*Deviation from Standard*
Air Density	5%
Air Temperature	20 degrees
Range Wind (rear)	30 mph in line 2 32 mph in line 3 35 mph in line 4 37 mph in line 5

These are not maximum deviations larger variations are possible.

To handle these elements when we want to transfer fire, we measure the deviation from normal from the metro message, multiply this deviation by the unit effect in the firing table at the range to the registration point, and apply a proportion of the correction so determined to all other targets.

There are other factors that are handled at the same time. These are:

Element	*Deviation from Standard*
Weight of projectile	One square
Powder temperature	20° (10 ft/sec
Muzzle velocity error	10 ft/sec

These three elements are handled exactly as we handle the weather—and similar errors are an end result.

The chart below combines all elements and the errors that we obtain from them, if we have the expected deviation from normal. In the chart the errors have been carried to the nearest tenth of a yard and it shows only the errors that occur at transfer limits when the direction of fire is not changed from the direction of the registration point.

Element	*−1500 yards*	*+150 yard*
Weight of projectile	−6.0	+8.(
Powder temperature	+6.2	−6.1
Muzzle velocity error	+6.2	−6.1
Air density	+3.7	−3.8
Air temperature	−14.6	+14.(
Range wind	−38.4	+41.
Total error	−42.9	+48.

These are small deviations. We frequently find much larger ones and, of course, as the deviations grow larger the error increases. Also note how easily the errors could become cumulative instead of compensating as in this example.

These errors are real: at each transfer limit we are more than two probable errors away from our target center. And you will notice that the greatest error is caused by wind. This wind error becomes important when we attempt transfer within transfer limits but in directions other than to the registering point.

When we move our direction rig




Figure 1. How we correct for wind

r left of our initial line of fire, all of ur factors that contribute to error re- ain constant with the exception of ind. Wind has the nasty habit of hanging from head or tail to cross wind.

This phenomenon is best explained by he predicament of the young lady on the receding page. The high wind affects er trajectory, but as long as she con- inues in the same direction, she is able o overcome most of the difficulties. No- ice though that the moment she changes irection, although she continues to ap- ly the same correction for wind, the ross wind effects that she was com- ensating for, have changed now and re giving what we might refer to as a ail wind effect.

The same thing takes place in our ring. We correct for wind only in the irection of our registration point and hen transfer right or left 400 mils vithout worrying about its change of nagnitude. Figure 1 shows this clearly.

SO far we have discussed what might be called "known errors" or those that ve can actually account for in the firing ables. There are other errors more dif- icult to define. These are: ammunition, veapons, and survey.

All of us are familiar with the lot to ot variation in propellants. We are glad to report that a recent survey con- ducted by Ordnance Corps reveals that he lot to lot variation in the new dual- gran propellant for the 105 howitzer auses very little more error than the ound variation within a lot. But what causes round to round variation? To begin with, the propellant itself may vary a slight amount and cause a small error. A small variation in shell finish or rotating band can cause an error. The position of the propellant in the cham- ber or the shell case can vary the time of burning and therefore the muzzle velocity. Also, although we account for the variation in weight of projectiles by applying a factor for one square differ- ence in weight, the allowable tolerance for the 105mm per square is .6 pounds. This can cause a round to round varia- tion of as much as one range probable error within the same weight zone.

Errors caused by the weapon itself are primarily in the individuality of each tube, variation of jump, and errors caused by on-carriage fire control equip- ment.

Assuming that our survey has been properly performed and computation has been by use of five-place log tables, our instruments still make us susceptible to errors of one part in 500. We can't improve upon that with our present equipment. But the one part in 500 error due to instrumentation may prove to be a compensating error and is seldom that bad if we use the proper techniques.

These last three errors are of small magnitude when compared to the six errors we discussed first. They also re- main more or less constant and we can easily devise methods of compensating for them.

On the other hand, the proportional errors due to weight of projectile, powder temperature, muzzle velocity and weath er are large and can easily destroy a great deal of the effectiveness of unob- served fires when we use our present techniques. Improved techniques are the answer.

APPRECIABLE improvements in tech- nique may be made when the sources of our information and equipment are improved. And there *have* been improve- ments since World War II.

Meteorological Data: The Rawin set AN/GMD-1 is the new meteorological sounding equipment which has recent- ly been introduced and service tested. When used in conjunction with an automatic meteorological computer we can expect much greater accuracies than we have had in the past.

Several studies on the accuracies of meteorological data have been accom- plished. It seems to be agreed that a great portion of the inaccuracy of meteorological information as applied to our firing problem results from stale in- formation. Signal Corps is experiment- ing with rapid-rising balloons to reduce time of flight. An improvement in com- munication, coupled with improvement in meteorological sounding and comput- ing equipment, should provide us with more accurate and more frequent data.

Velocity Errors Determination. Our techniques and procedures in the past have considered everything other than meteorological corrections as the respon- sibility of the individual registering gun. We have kept records of our VEs and have attempted to predict fires on this basis. But we know now that we must separate the effects of a worn gun tube and propellant variations from other er- rors (such as errors in survey) if we are to improve our application of corrections. A field-type chronograph would permit us to determine the personality of the gun tube with a far better degree of predictability than the comparative cali- bration system we use now. The chrono- graph would help us to determine the actual shooting power of each weapon so that proper unit effects may be ap- plied.

Ammunition. There have been im- provements in ammunition that will result in great benefit to us. In the direct- support weapon—105mm howitzer—we find a smaller range probable error with our new dualgran ammunition. This may be attributed not only to an im- proved burning rate of the propellant but also to an improved shell finish and a better method of fitting and rotating bands.

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Firing Tables. As we all know, both the tabular and graphical firing tables that we use today are approximations to the true ballistic solution. These approximations are tolerated for the sake of simplicity in computation. They have proven reasonably successful in both World War II and Korea. However, they are not the best solution.

Our firing tables are based upon a standard trajectory. Note the time of flight tick marks. As shown on this chart, there are many combinations of range and height that will reproduce points on the same trajectory. The difference being the time of flight of the projectile to each of the points selected.

The application of second order effects is the second point in our analysis. The unit effects, or second order effects,




Figure 2. Standard trajectory

series of trajectories that pass through a target at the same height as the guns. These trajectory data are based upon firing table standard conditions. Consider some of the effects on our firing table ballistic solution when we deviate from the conditions upon which the firing tables are based.

To assist in this analysis, divide the problem into two phases: (1) consideration of the basic trajectory, and (2) the application of second order effects such as muzzle velocity error, weight of projectile, and the meteorological elements of air temperature, air density, and wind.

The Basic Trajectory as presented in the firing tables is true when the target is at the same height as the gun and when conditions are standard according to the assumptions as stated in the firing tables. In our use of the tables we assume *rigidity* of the trajectory to derive elevation corresponding to chart—or horizontal—range between guns and target. Yet we acknowledge *non*-rigidity of the trajectory when we correct for differences in height between the target and the guns by our application of the "complementary angle of site." The old method of applying a composite factor is not correct when angles of site exceed 20 mils; however we can derive the true correction through use of the site tables contained in the new 105 H-4 tabular firing tables. This procedure requires double interpolation of the site tables but does provide a better solution.

The fuze times shown in the firing tables are correct only when firing table conditions are duplicated.

A more straightforward solution to the derivation of quadrant elevation and fuze time would be arguments of horizontal range and height. Figure 2 shows a columns of our firing tables are based upon two assumptions: That the target is *always* at the same height as the guns, therefore the time of flight of the projectile behaves in a predictable manner; and *that each* variation from standard conditions is the *only* variation to be considered and therefore may be applied directly to the *basic* trajectory.

The first assumption—that the target is at the same height as the guns and therefore the time of flight is the same—was shown to be fallacious in Figure 2. The unit effects tables are based upon the theory that the projectile is exposed to non-standard conditions over a period of time corresponding to the time of flight of the projectile and a double sampling of the air above the gun—that is, on the ascending branch of the trajectory to the maximum ordinate—then the descending branch of the trajectory to the gun height. Since the projectile is known to have a lower terminal velocity than muzzle velocity, this must be considered in determining the effects of non-standard conditions on the flight of the projectile during the descending branch of the trajectory. It is readily seen that an interruption of the descending trajectory—either above or below the target—will cause a variation from the firing table assumption and therefore will introduce an error in the unit effect column of the firing tables. This error will be small when there are small angles of site but it should be considered. I can amount to an error of over 100 yard when the angle of site is large.

THE second assumption that consider each variation from standard as an ir dependent variation provides much larg er errors. In actual fact there is a cros effect between each of the second orde effects. Each element that varies fror the firing table standard condition wi have an effect on other elements tha vary from standard. Figure 3 is a simpl illustration of this point.

So we see that when a trajectory i warped because of one of the non-stanc ard elements, any attempt to correct th standard trajectory for other non-stanc ard elements makes for errors in th ultimate solution.

Although firing tables could be de veloped that would give us accurat considerations, they would be too com plicated to use efficiently with hand com putation. Any computing device that adopted would have to take these erro into consideration and give us the be solution to the ballistics problem.

Based upon the information discusse thus far, it may be concluded that ou trends in development should follow th priority:

(1) More and better target locatio devices and techniques.

(2) Improved techniques for more a curate ballistic solution to the field arti lery problem.

(3) Improved fire direction cente equipment to reduce probability of hu man error in—and improve the accurac of—computation of firing data.

Shortcomings in our techniques pr vent us from achieving our second go of correctly applying ballistic correction Analysis shows that there are seve primary technical shortcomings that d crease efficiency:

(1) Human error and fatigue
(2) Loss of effect
(3) Registration
(4) Transfer Limits
 (a) Range
 (b) Deflection
(5) Failure to segregate errors
(6) Incorrect ballistic solution of th trajectory
(7) Logistical burden



Figure 3. Standard trajectory and trajectory warped by headwind

In 1949, Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Arn and Lieutenant Colonel William I. King developed an electronic computer for the fire direction center that would achieve the third goal: reduce error and improve accuracy. Working with technicians at Frankford Arsenal and electronics experts of the Belock Instrument Corporation of New York, additional refinements to the original model have been made so that in its current stage of development we have an electronic gun data computer that is rugged, easy to learn to operate, simple to maintain and at the same time measurably speeds up and improves our fire direction technique. Unfortunately, it is impossible to use either a photograph or a drawing of the Computer, T-29, but the following description will give readers a good idea of its functions and uses.

The Electronic Gun Data Computer, T-29

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Arn

IF you visited a fire direction center equipped with the T-29 Computer, you would see three of the instruments in operation—one for each firing battery. And each of the instruments would have an operator wearing a head and chest radio set equipped with a two-position toggle switch; one position for talking to the observer and the other for talking to the firing battery.

A trailer provides the power. It is cabled into the fire direction center by means of a flexible multi-conductor cable.

The gunnery officer would be seated at his console containing a fire direction switchboard which permits direct communication between the observer and any of the computer operators. Also contained in the gunnery officer's console are a series of selector switches which will permit visual transmission of commands to any of the computers as desired, eliminating some of the cross talk presently found in our fire direction center.

A tactical map hangs behind the gunnery officer. It provides a visual presentation of output data of any of the computers at the option of the gunnery officer. Basically the output data of the computer appear as a small red pip of light on the tactical map, giving the gunnery officer an indication of where the developed firing data will hit. This is not a luxury item. In addition to providing instant information of computer output for a graphic check as to no-fire lines or proximity to friendly troops, it also serves two other purposes. It provides a means of a rapid system check to insure proper functioning of the system. It also assists in developing a chart that may be used as a conventional firing chart in event of emergency.

Let us see how a fire mission might be handled.

THROUGH unit SOP, the gunnery officer will place each of the computer operators on all incoming calls. After the request for fire is received from the observer and recorded on the face of the computer, the gunnery officer may check the plot on the tactical map and—based on information available to him—allocate his weapons and ammunition. Let us assume that he elects to fire one battery on the target. The other two battery computers are removed from the party line. The gunnery officer may remain in the communications net as a monitor or may elect to have the computer operator work directly between the observer and the firing battery.

Upon completion of the missions, the computer operator can signify termination of the mission to the gunnery officer who then may draw a circle with a template around the pip of light on the tactical map and label the concentration. After replot coordinates are derived by the computer operator, tick marks may be placed within this circle designating the exact target location. By this procedure it may be seen that we develop a firing chart for use with auxiliary equipment if required.

The system of three computers and the gunnery officer's console being interconnected permits one computer operator to follow the adjustment phase on a target and automatically transmits the adjusted target location to the non-adjusting computers for comparison with their gun data. This means that when a target location is set in on any one of the computers, it permits simultaneous computation by non-adjusting computers with each computer applying its own battery connections. This should permit us to fire battalion volleys in fire for effect. We will not have to replot or recompute before the non-adjusting batteries may fire.

The back of the computer contains the meteorological element. Each line of the met message requires four inputs —wind speed and direction inserted by two knobs, air temperature on a third knob and air density on a fourth. This panel can use our current 10 line message.

For each combination of range and deflection, the computer automatically selects the correct line number and applies the appropriate unit effects.

The met panel is removable through use of quick release screws so that a new met message—previously set up on a spare met panel—may be inserted into the computer with a minimum of time out for action. This operation should require no more than ten seconds.

Three units on the left of the meteorological panel are parallax correction units. Without going into detail, these three elements permit us to have the common target reception on all three computers.

The bottom half of the computer contains the amplifiers.

The developed firing data appear in three windows at the front of the computer. They show deflection, fuze time, and quadrant elevation.

Here's how it works. First we will take a coordinate mission. The target coordinates are inserted in three panels, easting, northing and height. They are inserted through use of a handle which turns a counter comparable to the odometer in your car. After these data are inserted, the firing data are read: deflection, fuze time and quadrant elevation.

As a matter of interest, speed tests on this type of mission have been run and it was found that from the announcement of the command "Fire Mission," as it would be received from division artillery until the quadrant elevation was commanded by the computer operator to the battery, a total time of 25 seconds elapsed.

For a second type mission, assume that radar has given us a location. In this case we would insert the coordinates of radar and azimuth, distance, the vertical angle to the target, and read deflection,

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fuze time, if appropriate, and quadrant elevation.

The third type problem would be one involving the target grid procedure in which case the coordinates of reference point would be inserted in the coordinate panels. The observer's azimuth to the target and target grid spot corrections of left or right, down or up, drop or add. Again the deflection, fuze time and quadrant elevation may be read.

The dials on the target grid correction panels may be slipped to zero. This is designed as an aid to the computer operator so that he need not perform mental calculations between volleys during an adjustment.

Any of the three systems of target location, that is coordinates, polar plot, or target grid, may be combined. For example, initial data may be given as coordinates with an azimuth, and subsequent corrections may be applied by the target grid procedure.

THIS covers the three systems of target location that we use today. The remainder of the computer is that portion from which we derive the maximum benefit. In the upper right hand panel there is a high and low angle selector switch which enables us to select the type trajectories desired for the attack of the target. There is a switch which permits us to correct for the weight of the projectile being fired. Beneath the weight of projectile switch there is a muzzle velocity error dial. These switches are positioned automatically to insert corrections for deviation from standard conditions of these elements.

This single panel, plus the meteorological insertion in the rear of the computer, opens up an entirely new concept of computation of firing data. With the ability to instantaneously apply the corrections for muzzle velocity error of the battery combined with the corrections of projectile weight and meteorological information, we now possess the ability to fire *accurate unobserved surprise* fires on any target whose location is known and that lies within the range of the weapon. There are not limitations imposed by transfer limits.

The command panel is at the bottom center of the computer. Here we find a couple of design features which are unique. There are three selector switches —each containing a translucent blue disk in the pointer. Surrounding each of these selector switches there are a series of yellow lights that may be activated by the gunnery officer's console. This area of the computer is less desirable because of the eye level. Therefore we use this panel to receive certain elements of the gunnery officer's commands and to facilitate the movement of the computer operator through use of visual aids. The right selector switch indicates range spread. For example, if the gunnery officer elects to fire "center range," through a switch position on his console, a bright yellow light appears on the computer operator's panel. When the computer operator covers this bright yellow light with the blue translucent disk, he gets the green light. By positioning the selector switch he has automatically applied the desired command.

The second selector switch is choice of fuze, with time, point detonating, and VT choices. Should the gunnery officer elect to fire time fuze, when the computer operator converts the yellow light to green, he automatically has added 20 yards to the height of the initial target location.

The third selector switch is called the fire mission switch. It has an adjusting battery position which indicates the battery is to fire the mission. It also has a battalion mission position. If the computer operator is in battalion mission, the target location as set up by another computer operator will automatically be forwarded to his computer—he need only read his output data. This selector switch also has other uses. It provides a method of stripping all corrections to our basic ballistic solution so that we may determine replot coordinates. When used in conjunction with the three panels on the left of the computer you can derive the surveyed easting, northing and height coordinates of the target. An example of this operation—when the selector switch is turned to the easting position, the computer operator centers the needle in the replot dial through use of the hand wheel in the easting unit. When the needle is centered, the easting value of the coordinate appears on the counter. Similarly, northing and height are derived.

Although not a design feature, the replot element provides a bonus effect in that it will compute survey traverse notes to an accuracy of 1/3000.


Above the replot elements, we find the charge selection switch. This permits the computer operator to select a charge that will give him a desirable quadrant elevation. As we know, the most accurate fire is obtained between 200 and 500 mils of elevation. Therefore, the computer operator can select a quadrant elevation within the best usable portion by manipulating his charge selector switch. For example, the computer operator is firing with charge 3. A quick glance at the quadrant elevation dial tells him that his elevation exceeds 500 mils. This indicates that he should change to a higher charge. He simply manipulates the charge selection switch to a charge that lowers his trajectory to less than 500 mils. The computer takes care of the difference in ballistics for different charges with no effort on the part of the computer operator other than reading and turning dials.

Included in the upper left portion of the center panel at the top of the computer is a percentage range correction input. If adjusted data differ from computed data, the quadrant elevation counter is made to agree with adjusted data by turning this knob. It is hoped that this knob will remain at zero.

On the right side of the panel there is a percentage fuze correction element. With our current fuzes there is no proven way to correct fuze functioning for variations from standard conditions. Therefore, it is visualized that we must rely for the time being on the percentage fuze correction system as used today.

THE computer T-29 is built to permit the automatic transmission of data from the computer to the firing battery in the event automatic data transmission is desired. One contractor has a design of a transmission system with wire or wireless which will transmit five separate elements per second with complete check back. This may prove to be worthy of investigation at a later date.

The face of the computer was engineered so as to permit ease in operator training. It is realized that we may experience the same difficulty in obtaining the high caliber personnel for fire direction that we all experienced in World War II. As a matter of interest, nine men were introduced to the first model of the computer at Fort Bragg. Four of these were civilians and five were artillery basic soldiers. They were all highly intelligent but with the exception of two of the soldiers, none had received training in artillery fire direction techniques. They were briefed as to the artillery problem, and as to the general theory of the computation employed by the T-29. All could operate the computer after an hour of instruction. Of course, they were not proficient in this time, but it does give an indication of the design and "complexity" of operation. It is estimated that eight hours of training would completely qualify an average man in the operation of the computer in performing all fire direction problems as compared with the most favorable estimate of 40 hours with today's system.



D minus a day or so an artillery outfit rolls on the hards of a South England port and finds landing ships awaiting it —thanks to hours of careful planning by staff officers of the Service Forces.

An Invasion Is Jeopardized

BRIGADIER GENERAL PASCHAL N. STRONG

On the eve of Normandy's D-Day the order of priority of troop build-up was suddenly changed, throwing into discard months of painstaking planning by logistical staffs. What then happened is a lesson for all combat commanders.

HE invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 was successful, and is so recorded. less likely to be recorded was the ve jeopardy to it caused by confusion unting to chaos in the invasion ports Southern England right after D-Day. ny thousands of officers and men saw confusion and knew of it. But only a it handful knew of the reasons for it.

GADIER GENERAL PASCHAL N. STRONG as graduated from the Military Academy in 1922 and commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. During the Second World War, as this article makes clear, e was intimately and actively engaged i the planning and execution of the gistical effort that made possible the ivasion of Europe. He is now Division ngineer of the Ohio River Division ith offices at Cincinnati.

I was a minor actor in the great invasion drama, yet deeply involved in the near catastrophe.

The seaborne invasion of such a hostile, well defended shore as that of Normandy is—as we all have been told and know—the toughest tactical operation in the book. But such a mammoth operation, one that involves a million men, together with their vast tonnages of armament, vehicles, equipment and supplies, creates a logistical problem that dwarfs the tactical operations. The complexity of the utterly essential staff work required to funnel thousands of men and tons of equipment through a very limited number of seaports and load them into the right ships in a very short time is beyond belief. Just one misdirected unit plan can clog the spout like wadding crammed into a funnel.

Twelve months went into the planning of OVERLORD—twelve months of hard work by innumerable staffs at every level. By November of 1943 the broad concept was set. Most of the first wave would take off from Plymouth, Portland, Southampton, and Portsmouth, all on the southern coast of England. Only American troops would take off from Plymouth; American and British from Portland and Southampton; and British only from Portsmouth. These were the initial assault troops.

After that the build-up would be chiefly through Southampton. This build-up would be principally American, for the British would have few troops left after the initial wave departed.

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Invasion money printed, counted, sorted and finally distributed to combat soldiers was only a tiny part of the tremendous logistical effort that preceded and followed the invasion of Europe.

The planners assumed—correctly, it turned out—that the first landings would be successful. From there, they figured, it would be a race between the build-up of our reinforcements and the arrival of the main force of German defenders. If the enemy got there first with the most, we could easily be thrown back into the sea. So, a tremendous amount of planning and effort went into insuring the success of the build-up. The railroad network of England and the water distance to the beaches dictated the use of just one main port—Southampton. The whole success of the invasion, it was indeed likely, would depend on the swift and continuous orderly flow of men and equipment through that place.

For command purposes the southern coast of England was organized into two districts of Southern Base Section, the XVIII and the XIX Districts. The XVIII District consisted of the seaports and rear areas between Portland, Southampton and Portsmouth, inclusive. The XIX District lay to the west with Plymouth as its chief port. Both districts had similar missions for the initial D-Day operation, but the XVIII District had the further responsibility of the build-up. Both accomplished their D-Day missions successfully. My story here tells of the travails and woes of the XVIII District during the vital build-up time.

In March 1944 the Commanding General designated me as the new American commander of the XVIII District, and I set up an advance command post at Southampton. To understand what developed further, I must now briefly describe the organization and physical installations of the XVIII District.

ALL told, my District had about 40,000 American troops of all categories assigned to it for construction of many kinds and operation of hospitals and depots, and for running the camps. The headquarters paralleled an expanded divisional headquarters, with amplified special staff sections such as Engineer, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Military Police, and Transportation. You will hear more later of the Transportation Section, for it was the physical and mental breakdown of this section that gravely endangered the invasion. In addition to our American troops, there were British troops under a British co-commander for the British side of the operation.

The physical installation of the XVIII District consisted of several field hospitals, many supply depots, and some thirty-odd camps of battalion to regimental size. A few of the camps were permanent British installations and the rest were built to house troops in just before D-Day or to take care of transient troops en route to embarkation. A system of dual command existed in thes camps, with American and British co commanders; when American troop were occupying a camp, the America would be the camp commander and th British his deputy. When the Britis passed through the same camp, the re verse was true.

This dual command system extende right to the top, and my opposite num ber was a British major general. But a this level neither of us alternated a deputy to the other, we each had ou own independent staff to plan for th movements of our own troops. Whe movements had to be reconciled to pre vent collision in time and space, the tw staffs coordinated their efforts.

This system of dual command, abon inable enough in theory, worked almo perfectly in practice. This was mostl because all major decisions were plan ning decisions and there was plenty o time to iron out our differences. Whe the clouds of chaos gathered around u soon after D-Day, most of the Britis troops were already across the Channe and the operation within my Distric was the American build-up purely, wit which the British co-commander wa not concerned. Also we were lucky t speak a common tongue, we shared common danger, and had a Supreme Commander who would tolerate no offi cer, British or American, who could no work as a member of the team.

MY spotlight must now focus on group of five officers that forme the Planning and Movement Group o my Transportation Section. Theirs wa a heavy responsibility. They had to tak hundreds of ships, hundreds of thou sands of men, and millions of tons o supplies and equipment—dump the all into a planning hopper—turn a cran and grind out plans for a steady flow o men and material from the interior o England to the seaports; then the mar riage of units with their equipment t the seaports, and the loading of uni with their equipment on ships adequa for each cargo.

Here is what this planning meant you commanded a unit stationed i Northern England. One day you got secret order directing you to be ready move on a six-hour alert after a certai date. From where you stood this cou be another rehearsal, another groupin of forces in England, or a damn fo order issued just to annoy you. Or could be the real thing. Some days lat the order came to move out. You four just the right number of trains and fla cars waiting for your unit and th

eapons and equipment you had with ou. You were told the rest of your quipment and heavy weapons would in up with you at your destination. So you loaded your outfit and the ain started out—to where? You never new whether just your unit was mov-ng, or if you were one of hundreds of nits put into motion. In time you ar-ived at a camp in rear of some south-rn seaport. The camp was manned by camp commander and troops and, be-old! there were hot meals ready in the ess hall for your men, and cots and edding all made up for their comfort. No housekeeping for you, but plenty lse to do—a mimeographed list of sev-ral pages.

All vehicles must be waterproofed for etting them from vessel to shore hrough surf. You must fill out your hortages of weapons and equipment. You must issue orders that no man ould leave camp for any reason what-oever (you note that the camp is sur-ounded by barbed wire and is guarded). There are a dozen more things to do, nd in the camp there are detachments rom Ordnance, Engineer, Signal and Quartermaster to help you get them lone.


And of course the big question is in very mind. Is this the real thing? Your unit has been through this before—and ended up in a mock battle on Slapton Sands. You wonder why no maps are issued.

The next day there's something new. Invasion currency, French currency for the men to use in order to avoid pilferage in France. And you get orders to move out at a certain time, along a certain route, and arrive at a certain control point at a certain hour. MPs come to escort you—to make sure you don't gum the works and cause a traffic jam. Now you realize that the whole of Southern England is alive with movement.

And now you move out with your TO&E equipment, complete to the last item. And soon you find yourself at a dockside, Portland or Southampton. The harbor is jammed with ships of every type. Control parties direct you and your equipment to a dockside. You march on board, your equipment is loaded in the hold. Other units arrive and come on board, and when the ship moves out to its anchorage, you note the date on the board. It is 3 June 1944. You get maps—of the French coast. A heavy curtain is pulled from wall space and there are the beaches of Normandy. The battle plan unfolds, and now you see, in great detail, what part your unit is to have. It goes through your mind that a lot of people have done a lot of planning for that first-day attack. You hardly have time to think of the much more detailed and extensive planning that went into your simple movements from Northern England to your ship, movements multiplied by those of a thousand other units. It wouldn't interest you much if you did think of these things. You're a combat man, properly scornful of the logistics of an operation.

What I have just related is the fruition of successful planning—planning that took six months of concentrated work on the part of those anonymous officers of our Planning and Movement Group. Their planning involved, not only the D-Day operation, but the several rehearsals preceding it and the vital build-up movements to follow. And all this planning worked out with clocklike precision up to and including the D-Day operation.

WE wanted the enemy to think that our main effort would be on the coast of the Pas-de-Calais. An independent planning staff had been set up, concerned only with perfecting plans for the invasion of the Pas-de-Calais. Not even the members of that staff knew they were cast in the role of decoy. But



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by some strange happenstance, the security measures protecting this staff were not as complete as those protecting other staffs. Somehow, we had reason to hope, the enemy's agents had gotten wind of this particular planning agency. To reinforce his erroneous beliefs, a fleet of dummy landing craft had been constructed out of floats and canvas, and it was gathering on the eastern coast of England. To anyone observing them from the shore, even with glasses, they resembled the genuine article. A system of Q lights was installed on these craft in early June, lights that flickered occasionally in the dark, and that resembled the careless lighting of cigarettes by the notoriously careless American troops. And toward the end of May, enemy photographic planes detected bodies of troops marching down toward these dummy craft. What they didn't detect was the return of those troops to their camps by night.

ONE day late in May, I was told by the scrambler telephone to report to London for a routine conference on the 5th of June. I acknowledged the message with what I hoped was a casual tone which did not betray the fact that this was the prearranged method of informing me of the exact date of D-Day.

On D minus 4 the movement of units began. By D minus 1 the invasion fleet was loaded. During those three days I watched tens of thousands of American boys go aboard their ships quietly, soberly, the light jokes and laughter strangely missing. I saw the Portland harbor so jammed with ships that an enemy plane could drop a torpedo at random and not fail to strike. Our protective air cover circled overhead as they had during rehearsals. We could not believe our good fortune when day after day went by and we were unmolested.

And then, in the course of those three days, a bombshell fell. It came in the form of an order from the ground commander of the American Forces. He —or more likely, his G3—wished the order of priority of the build-up troops substantially changed. Units that had been scheduled to leave right after D-Day were relegated to a later date; other units were correspondingly pushed up.

To the ground commander's staff the order must have seemed a simple thing. To me and my staff, it meant the scrapping of actual *months* of detailed planning that involved units, rail transportation and ship scheduling. In a word, we were asked to do in two or three days what had taken us months to do previously. And the only ones who could do it were the small cadre of our Planning and Movement Group. No one else had the very special know-how to make the complex changes.

I went into a huddle with this group on D minus 1. Even before I broke the news to them they were haggard, tense, worn to a razor's edge from the long hours they had put in during the weeks just past. They listened to what I said in a stunned silence. When I had finished I heard someone whisper hoarsely, "My God, some of those units are moving from the north already!" The leader of the group said to me, "Colonel, do they know what this involves?" "I doubt it," I said. He went on to explain in detail what it did involve. The section leader prophesied a traffic jam on a truly cosmic scale.

I listened and picked up the scrambler telephone. I reached my immediate superior, the Commanding General of the Southern Base Section, and laid the facts before him. Very reluctantly, for any good soldier hates to admit he can't carry out his orders, he agreed to transmit the facts to the logistical commander, and ask him to confer with the ground commander. I returned to the harbor to watch operations, having first instructed my group to get to work on the changes in the plans.

In a few hours the answer came back. The logistical commander would not tell the ground commander we were risking chaos. "Tell Strong," he said, "it is our job to carry out the wishes of the ground commander." That was that.

I returned to my Planning Group. Was there a reasonable chance, I asked them, that we could do what was asked? If not, I would risk my official neck, go over the heads of my superiors, and talk to the ground commander myself.

THEY were a loyal group. They knew that such an action on my part would bring disciplinary measures. They conferred with each other, and decided, unwisely as it turned out, that they could do it. I accepted their decision, and in this I was wrong. If I had possessed at that time a more complete understanding of the tremendous amount of paper work involved, I would have realized the sheer impossibility of the task. But a commander of any major operation must, in many things, be guided by the recommendations of the experts on his staff. If they come a cropper the responsibility is his and rightly so, for the selection of a competent staff is one of the most important elements of the function of command.

I returned to my command post. The harbors were empty. The fleet was a sea. Overhead, low scurrying clouds wer threatening vile weather, heavy seas, an an impossible surf on the Normand beaches. I called for the secret weathe reports. The news was bad for the nex two days. And delay beyond that dat would mean a two weeks' postponemer because of the tides.

Before dark that day we learned tha D-Day had been postponed one da possibly more. The conference the nex day, held by the Supreme Commande with the air, sea and ground commanc ers, is now history. Air wanted to pos pone. Navy was undecided. Arm wanted to go through with it. Eiser hower, a lonely, historic figure, made th final decision. Hit the beaches!

At daybreak on the morning of Jun 6 I was awakened by the thunderou roar of hundreds of planes. I rushed t the window. The wind-torn clouds wer pressing close to earth, and under them hardly clearing the bomb-ravaged build ings of Southampton, I saw the shadow blurs of our transport planes, each towin one or more troop-filled gliders. Th tapestry of history was being woven a I watched. I thought of my weary, sleep less Planning Group, through whos fingers passed some of the vital threads c the tapestry, and wondered what patter would emerge.

The next day was one of conflictin reports from Normandy. Things wer going well on Utah Beach. But ou troops had, by ill chance, encountered a enemy division maneuvering near Oma ha Beach, and were fighting grimly t maintain their toehold. Soon the tran port ships and landing craft began stag gering back for new shipments. Man of them showed jagged holes in the grey topsides. On that day we manage to load them, not with the units origina ly planned, but with units called fo under the new plan. Only an occasiona slip occurred—a unit here or there fo which no shipping space was provide a ship here or there that had to depa with less than a full load. But this wa a sign of things to come. I kept close t my Planning Group, watching the pore over the deck and storage plans c ships, troop tables, unit locators, trai locators. Occasionally one of the grou would fall asleep at his desk, and hav to be awakened and dosed with mor caffeine. They had now been workin seventy-two hours with no sleep. I de tailed a medical officer to stay with them There were no trained replacements fo them.

The next day the mistakes multiplie The camps in rear of Southampton we

mmed with 50,000 troops, and each our brought more from the north. But ie outflow from these camps to the ips shrank hourly, while the ships aited in the harbor for their loads. he orders for the troop movements con-nued to flow from my Planning Group, it more and more of these orders be-me meaningless. They called for units at had not reached the camps. And its which were there in the camps t orders for railway movements they d completed two days ago. Desperate-urgent messages reached me from ormandy. Where were the reinforce-ents? Why were ships held up? Or spatched half empty? The main Ger-an counterattack was expected daily. here were the fresh troops to repel it? was summoned to the Supreme Com-nder's Headquarters, but I needed no monition to realize the gravity of the uation.

The next day the climax of chaos was ched when, with the camps bursting the seams, my medical officer reported at every man in my Planning Group d suffered a nervous and physical eakdown and had to be taken to the spital. I went to SHAEF, the Supreme adquarters, and laid my sorry cards the table. All previous plans, I in-med SHAEF, must be instantly aban-ned. I must be allowed to empty the mps of units any way I could, without gard to priorities or the necessary paper rk that would inform the beach com-nders what troops to expect and when. HAEF had no alternative but to accept. ready the enemy, by an unexpected sitancy to commit their main body to e Normandy beachheads, had given us re grace than we could have dared to pect. But the next two days would be tical.

I returned to my command post again d gathered a new planning staff of sh officers. Rapidly we worked out a new and simple plan to empty the camps and load the ships. I doubt if I was of much help in this; I had now been seventy-two hours without sleep myself. At any rate, a simple plan of inflow and outflow was prepared, an MP battalion was assigned to keeping routes open and units moving, and before the day was over the Southampton area was again alive with movement.

THE effect of the new plan was more drastic than the layman can appreciate. For the commanders on the far beaches, it meant the abandonment of a system which would assure them an orderly receipt of reinforcements in the proper proportion of infantry, artillery, engineers, signal, and so forth. No longer could they plan their battle knowing what units would arrive and when. Now they were forced to take whatever the ships unloaded on the beaches. Nor did they know more than an hour or so in advance what units to expect. For the best we could do was to load ships with the units most quickly available, hoping that their guns and equipment would somehow fit into the ships' holds, and when the ship was dispatched, send an invoice by plane to the beach where the ship was to sail. To the beach commanders those ships must have resembled gigantic grab bags, into which they reached hoping for the best. It was unsatisfactory and hectic, but it had the grand merit of simplicity. And it got reinforcements to the beaches and in the very nick of time.

For by this time, several days after D-Day, the German high command had finally decided that the Normandy invasion was not a threat, but the real thing. Rommel, who had been given but limited forces initially, and had had to commit them piecemeal, now had the entire enemy reserve at his disposal. He rushed them to the beachheads as fast as damaged roads and bridges permitted. His mission was to hurl the invader into the sea. Had the German high command not hesitated during those fateful days; had they not remembered their intelligence reports on the Pas-de-Calais invasion plans; had they not paid so much attention to the Allied broadcasts on D plus 1, warning French fishermen to stay away from the Pas-de-Calais, our weary troops, lacking reinforcements, would have faced grave risks of destruction.

As it was, when Rommel was able to counterattack in force, the Allied reinforcements had arrived, and the rest is history.

IN retrospect it is proper to ask why, considering the fluid nature of war, we adopted a logistical planning system so rigid as to prevent last-moment changes. The answer lies in a concession to our British allies. That rigid system was theirs. And as the XVIII District was mounting both British and American troops, the use of two different systems was impractical. Early in the game the British method of embarkation planning was adopted for both the XVIII and XIX Districts. Later, when the inflexibility of the system became apparent, the XIX District changed to a more elastic method. It could do so, for no British troops were involved there. The British staff work usually did produce more inflexible plans than ours, and those plans were seldom changed to meet changing conditions. Hence, what they gained in superior execution of staff work they sometimes lost in a lack of fluidity to meet unexpected happenings.

Once again history had demonstrated that a battle is won by the commander who makes the least serious mistakes. And the mistake of changing one's mind, dangerous though it might have been, was more than cancelled by the enemy's delay in committing his troops.



mmunition for Eisenhower's Crusade would never have arrived at forward dumps had not hard-working planning groups efully plotted the involved course of its movement from depots in England to the hungry guns on the Cotentin Peninsula.

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The Month's Comment

Slogans

WORD is out that one Pentagon solution for officer and noncommissioned officer dissatisfactions may be a "bill of rights" that would permanently assert that the so-called benefits and privileges under attack by the selfish, the vicious, or the ignorant, were indeed a part and parcel of the emoluments of the profession.

We are all for anything that will stop the corroding effects of these attacks on professional soldiers, sailors and airmen, but we fear that a "bill of rights" may establish an improper perspective on these matters. We say this because we must insist that commissaries, post exchanges, medical care of dependents, and decent housing are no more "rights," benefits or privileges than the pay check. We ought always to identify them for what they actually are: services furnished by the government in kind rather than in money, because experience and common sense show that it is to the benefit of the government to so furnish them. If a slogan is needed it ought to be based on "The laborer is worthy of his hire," and not on any hint of government largesse.

Decision

ON the eve of the new football season, Cadet Benjamin F. Schemmer of the Military Academy paid us a visit, during which he made a proposal that put the editors to a full test of their editorship. Identifying himself as the head cheerleader of the Corps of Cadets, Mr. Schemmer said that he and his fellows were convinced that the Military Academy's football team would be aroused to herculean heights if the JOURNAL would blatantly announce in black type that the Army should beat Navy come 28 November. Being a most unusual request, the editors said they would give thought to the suggestion.

Obviously there was more here than met the eye. What effect would an Army victory have on Unification? Would NATO, SACLANT and other combined commands be imperilled? Is football over-emphasized? Would it be wise for the editors to put the JOURNAL's neck on the block with a firm stand on such a controversial subject? If Navy beat Army would the Association be harmed by the derision of sailors and marines?

The editors wrestled. They decided.

YEA, ARMY! BEAT NAVY!

CREEPING DANGER

IN digging into the background of the attack of the AMA on milita medical service for dependents of servicemen, we were struck by tw aspects of the situation that we would like to pass on for you to mu over.

First a historical note. We wager the AMA lobbyists were real surprised and grieved when they discovered that "socialized" medici had crept into a War Department appropriations act way back in 18 and stayed there, unseen and boring from within, for sixty-nine yea The malignancy is not as deceptive as you might think; the words a very plain: "That the medical officers of the Army and contract su geons shall, wherever practicable, attend the families of officers a soldiers free of charge."

In extenuation of those rugged individualists of the 48th Congress t must be said that they knew exactly what they were doing. Chester Arthur, President of the United States, George F. Edmunds of V mont, President pro tem of the Senate, and John G. Carlisle of Ke tucky, Speaker of the House, had never heard of "creeping socialism" Being hard-headed, practical men, not given to succumbing to ide istic and emotional appeals, they and their colleagues adopted the pla language in order that the tiny U.S. Army would be more efficie They had sense enough to see that a soldier who knew the governme would take care of his dependents when they were sick would be a better soldier. The intent of Congress was that simple.


And now, a current aspect. We have noticed with interest th the AMA lobbyists do not attack the quality of military medici They call the practice of treating dependents "creeping, socialized medicine" but nowhere do they call it "inferior" medicine. This is significant, because the most cogent and persuasive argument they u a few years ago against the Truman administration's National Hea Plan was that it would result in a lowering of the quality of medi service in the country. This argument of the AMA convinced ma citizens at the time. That the AMA doesn't use the same argum against the military medical services re-affirms the knowledge that m military medical services are indeed first rate.

The AMA has been pretty violent in its opposition to medical se ices for dependents of service personnel; indeed one of its resoluti went so far as to propose that military men themselves be required use civilian doctors and hospitals "whenever and wherever feasib We doubt if more than a small minority of the AMA members really favor this. Most of them must know that the causes of m great triumphs of military medicine on the battlefields of World Wa and Korea go right back to the military medical schools, training stallations, and hospitals in the United States, just as the battlef victories can be attributed to the military and naval schools and train camps in this country. No better way of destroying military medi could be devised than to deny medical officers the opportunity to p tice, study and experiment in military medical institutions in tim peace. This is so apparent that we can scarcely believe that the A is conscious of what it proposes. Can it be that the AMA has suc frantic fear of "socialized" medicine that it cannot see the effects o crusade? The tragedy is that innocent persons may suffer and security of the nation may be weakened. It is that serious.

Recoilless Rifle Range Has

TARGET-CAR RAILROAD

That Saves Manpower and Speeds Training



This target-mounted car is ready for its journey across the 75mm recoilless rifle range at Camp Roberts, California. The weapons have a sub-caliber device for firing caliber .30 rounds.

HE target-car railroad pictured on this age has made twenty-four soldiers victims of technological unemploy-nt, leaving them free to pursue the ic training that is their principal y. It also is a lot more efficient than old hand-operated windlass type of ving target because it is easier to trol and moves across the range nly without the fits and starts of a nd-operated device.


Major General Robert F. Sink, the mmander of the 7th Armored Divi-n at Camp Roberts, California, says target train and track, built by the Division, saves the services of twenty-four windlass operators. He estimates this saving at 192 man-hours every day the recoilless range is in operation.

The electrically-driven train uses a 300-foot track and obtains its power from a boxed trolley wire. The tow car has a one-half horsepower motor, and a reversing transmission which causes the train to change directions when it reaches the end of the track. A throttling valve on the transmission can be set to regulate the speed between ten and 300 feet per minute. It is operated by a switch in the control tower.


The driving mechanism is equipped with anti-friction bearings and requires only monthly lubrication. The target tow car mechanism, including motor and hydraulic transmission, is enclosed in aluminum housing with a locked service cover.

In field tests the tow car has moved the target train of twelve cars back and forth over the 300-foot course continuously for ten hours.

The Division's G3 staff, Ordnance officers, and instructors of the weapons committee combined their ideas, and designed and built the train target.



e train rolls over 300 feet of rail and then automatically reverses its direction



The electric motor gets its power from a third rail. Speed is uniform, but can be adjusted from 10 to 300 feet per minute.

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★ CEREBRATIONS ★

Our literate cocktail-hour tacticians stand to receive as much as $10.00 for their contributions to this department. However, the price for those "dashed off" with scant consideration for the rules of composition and rhetoric will be much less. Hold them to four or five hundred words and type them double-spaced.

Tank Identification for Training

When the 70th Tank Battalion returned to the Island of Hokkaido in Japan from Korea we found that some of the methods used in combat for tank identification could not be used in training because our training area was fairly even, rolling ground with very few OPs and vantage points.

OPs are not so necessary when training sections or platoons where short distances and limited objectives are used, but in the training of units of company and battalion size OPs are needed for proper control of each platoon and company. Therefore, we resorted to the use of light aircraft and towers for OPs. Then tank identification from the air and long distances became the problem.

It is, of course, quite necessary in training and combat to be able to identify each individual tank as to platoon and company, so as to be sure they are in the right position and carrying out their part of the attack or problem.

Many systems of identification have been suggested but we believe the system we are using is simple, foolproof and provides the maximum possibilities for the training of tank crew and officers.

We tried to keep our marking system simple so all men could understand it. Also a simple system can be passed on rapidly to infantry in tank-infantry tactics and problems.

The identifying designs are painted on each side of the tank turret and are a circle sixteen inches in diameter w these designs:

Identification of companies is by col Red for Able Company, Blue for Bal Company, Yellow for Charlie Compa and Green for H & S Company.


Identification of platoon within a co pany is by a design on a white cir background: Circle for 1st Platoon, Cr for 2d Platoon, Triangle for 3d Platoo and Diamond for 4th Platoon.


Identification of tanks in each plato is by number in the middle of the sign, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 being the numb of the tank in the platoon.

The company commander's tank marked with a circle of appropriate co *without a number.*

The company executive officer's ta is marked with a cross, without a nu ber.

These designs and colors can be se from long distances and picked up w field glasses from liaison aircraft, and useful to the company commander, platoon leader and the battalion co mander in controlling units. The co mander knows immediately which ta is straggling or out of position and c change the situation by radio message





The fifth tank, 4th Platoon.

← The second tank, 1st Platoon. Design painted on co mander's hatch indicates the tank belongs to the first tion of the platoon; if it was painted on the load's hatch it would indicate the second section.



The third tank, 3d Platoon.



The third tank, 2d Platoon.

For better control from the air, hatches re painted on the inside with the same esign, or the designation of a section vithin a platoon. If the tank command- r's hatch is painted it indicates a first ection tank in the platoon. If the load- r's hatch is painted it indicates a second ection tank within the platoon.

In combat the hatches can be closed r the markings covered to prevent iden- fication by the enemy.

This system of identification has been sted by the 70th Tank Battalion in aining. It has facilitated control on CT problems and BCT tests. Not only oes it make control easier for the tank nit commander, but it also aids the in- ntry commander in rapid identification the speeifie tanks which are to support m. Dust and mud rapidly obscure mpany numbers on the hull, but the entifieation markings on the turret are ways clear.

Lt. Col. Victor B. Fox
Armor

conomical Fire Power

The Congressional investigation of the nmunition situation raised two ques- ons of signifieanee to the military serv- es.

(1) Can the poliey of lavish expendi- re of artillery ammunition bankrupt e nation?

(2) Do we, by this poliey, coddle our fantrymen and sap their will to fight?

The problems raised by these questions have several parts: statistical, psychological, and national survival. I am going to confine myself to the statistical.

The magnitude of the problem is apparent when we are told that in two months the 10th Field Artillery Battalion, 3d Infantry Division, fired more than a million rounds of ammunition, valued at approximately four and one-half million dollars! (This is based on the cost of a complete 105mm howitzer shell of $48, and not considering the cost to transport it to Korea.)

On the morning of the fourth day of a heavy Chinese assault on the 3d Division a lieutenant colonel said to me: "Young, last night the 10th Field fired approximately 2,200 rounds in support of one company. Do you realize that this was almost $100,000 worth of ammunition? Can you justify this expenditure of the taxpayer's money?"

We sat down with peneil and paper and diseussed the problem from a strictly statistieal point of view *(see chart)*. In the action, B Company held the hill with a loss of only two killed and six wounded. The figures concerning the result if B Company had been driven from the hill were based on experiences in Korea in cases where men were forced to leave their holes and fight the Chinese hordes above ground during withdrawal. The cost of eaeh individual killed in aetion was based merely on the flat $10,000 indemnity which the government

(Continued on page 39)

The Cost of Fire Power

Under a battalion size CCF attack:

"B" Co Holds Hill —
Result: 2 Killed In Action
6 Wounded In Action

"B" Co Is Driven From Hill —
Result: 12 Killed In Action
5 Missing In Action
36 Wounded In Action

COST:

Killed In Action:	**12-2 X**	**$10,000 =**	**$100,000**
Missing In Action:	**5 X**	**10,000 =**	**50,000**
Wounded In Action:	**36-6 X**	**5,000 =**	**150,000**
Partial Cost of Defeat			**$300,000**

6,250 shells

Cost of One 105mm Shell: $48.00* 48 / 300,000

***Complete Round**

The Month's News

NCO Grade Structure

The Army, never certain about what to call and how to rate its needed specialists, is veering back towards pre-World War II practice and is planning to call its specialists "Specialists."

Revision of T/O&Es is in the works and the new structure will probably go into effect next year. It will separate all present noncoms who have command responsibilities from their specialist eounterparts. Pay grades will remain the same and it is possible that the two top grades of specialists will be entitled to the respect and privileges of noncommissioned officers.

These are the new ranks:

Pay Grade	*NCO Grade*	*Specialist Grade*
E-7	M/Sgt.	Senior Speeialist
E-6	Sfc.	First Class Specialist
E-5	Sgt.	Second Class Specialist
E-4	Cpl.	Third Class Speeialist

The Army has been carrying approximately 62 percent of its enlisted strength in the NCO category. Under the new plan, only 18 percent of the enlisted personnel will be noncoms.

Designs for speeialist rates are being studied. Six have been approved by the Heraldic Branch, OQMG, and QM procurement officials.

It is estimated it will take six months from the time of the design's approval to the time the stripes reach the field, but interim arrangements are being worked out.

The special regulation governing the sweeping change is expeeted to be in G-1 hands by Oet. 15 for staffing.

Here is how the new system will work out percentagewise:

Pay Grade	*NCO %*	*Specialist %*
E-7	95	5
E-6	70	30
E-5	25	75
E-4	5	95

In Short

Gen. Charles L. Bolte announced that more family housing will be constructed in Europe for married soldiers. . . . There's less paper work in getting advance travel pay since the Finance Corps has eliminated the need for presentation of vouehers in advanee. . . . The tank modification depot under eonstruction at Chrysler's Delaware Tank Plant will be completed and used for storage of machine tools.

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The Month's Reading

Paragraphs of significance gleaned from current books, magazines and speeches

America in Europe

THEODORE H. WHITE
Fire in the Ashes
William Sloane Associates, 1953

. . . America is finally more intimately involved in European affairs than ever before in our national history. This is not a theoretical involvement, either. A quarter of a million American soldiers, drafted from home in time of peace, are sprawled across Europe in bivouac and barrack. One hundred thousand of the finest men in America's army are strung out between the Rhine and the Thuringian ridges, on the alert day and night. They sleep with combat packs beside them, helmets by their pillows, rifles and ammunition stacked in company quarters, their tanks, guns, trucks, ammunition carriers ready to roll on an hour's notice. Each of them knows what he must do—what bridges his company must blow up over what strange foreign streams as he falls back, what roadblocks must go in where, what ridge of what strange German *kreis* will probably hold his foxhole. Even in sleep, his ear is cocked for the sound of the siren that tells him Europe's peace is disturbed and he must fight.

These men are the flesh of America's pledge that Europe's destiny is ours, the sacrament of the great structure of diplomacy that guards the peace of the world. If a Russian soldier moves to cross the border of Norway, if a Bulgarian fires a shot across the borders of Turkey, if an East German platoon raids a county in West Germany, then every one of these men is committed to battle. With them are committed not only those who dwell in Western Europe, but 150,000,000 Americans wherever they sleep, or work, or play between the Atlantic and Pacific. A diplomatic revolution has twined them all together in indissoluble alliance.

Loyalty, Cliques, Criticism

GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY
At his first staff conference after becoming Chief of Staff

Loyalty. The necessity for this basic military essential is so clear that you scarcely ever hear it mentioned. Yet it is not automatic, and it is not always present—up, down, and laterally in equal degree—as it must be. This is not so much through design as through failure to cultivate it and to recognize its eternal importance. . . .

I shall expect the officers of this staff to present their own honest views, fearlessly, forthrightly, but objectively in the light of their own conclusions as to what best serves the Army's over-all interests. The most dangerous adviser to have around is a "yes man," and the most useless is one who thinks of self instead of service. I shall also expect at a levels, that having expressed his opinions and having hear the decision, his entire support will then be put behind th execution of that decision, regardless of what his views ha been.

Cliques. I have not the slightest knowledge of the exis ence of any cliques within this headquarters. I pray the are none, but I want to say in unequivocal terms that I wi not tolerate such vicious elements if it is within my power t eliminate them.

Criticism. Indulgence in criticism is an ever-present tem tation. If yielded to it can quickly become a vice difficult break. In the civilian field it is of lesser importance. I military organizations it is of vital importance. . . . I am n talking of honest differences of opinion, least of all at tho times when issues are being debated. I am talking of th practice of vicious "crabbing" about the official actions proper authority.

A Kill in MIG Alley

COLONEL HARRISON R. THYNG
Air University Quarterly Review
Summer 1953

For you [an F-86 pilot] combat has become an individu "dogfight." Flight integrity has been lost, but your wing m is still with you, widely separated but close enough for y to know that you are covered. Suddenly you go into a ste turn. Your Mach drops off. The MIG turns with you, a you let him gradually creep up and outturn you. At t critical moment you reverse your turn. The hydraulic co trols work beautifully. The MIG cannot turn as readily you and is slung out to the side. When you pop your spe brakes, the MIG flashes by you. Quickly closing the brak you slide onto his tail and hammer him with your "50 Pieces fly off the MIG, but he won't burn or explode at th high altitude. He twists and turns and attempts to d away, but you will not be denied. Your "50s" have hit h in the engine and slowed him up enough so that he can get away from you. His canopy suddenly blows and t pilot catapults out, barely missing your airplane. Now yo wing man is whooping it up over the radio, and you flash home very low on fuel. At this point your engine is runni very rough. Parts of the ripped MIG have been suc into your engine scoop, and the possibility of its flaming is very likely. Desperately climbing for altitude you fin reach forty thousand feet. With home base now but eig miles away, you can lean back and sigh with relief for y know you can glide your ship back and land, gear do even if your engine quits right now. . . .

CEREBRATIONS

(Continued from page 37)

st pay, without considering the cost his training, transportation to the bat-ield or the grave registration cost. nilarly, the cost of each man missing action was taken as ten thousand dol-; which surely would be the least ount which the government would expected to spend on such casualties. arbitrarily assigned a cost of $5,000 ach wounded soldier.

From this you can see that we could, aking strictly from a cold-blooded istical point of view, have justified expenditure of over 6,250 shells or ost three times the number we ac-lly fired.

But here, the Colonel wasn't satisfied: is is all very well and true, but the difficulty there was that some of the ntrymen did not fire their weapons. coddled them with expensive artil-fire."

n my reply I pointed out that in order et the infantry weapons within range he enemy in eighty-five per cent of Korean terrain, it is necessary to e the roads and manhandle the weap-and ammunition up steep slopes. nce, the value of the ammunition eases until the infantryman treats ike gold and expends it most reluc-tly. But artillery is usually able to into position in the vicinity of roads. ough the ammunition turn-around ing this April battle was thirty-eight es, we were able to bring the am-nition from the dumps to the battle-l near the 38th parallel in one truck out transloading. I personally felt the infantrymen's policy of shooting llery ammunition first was correct. It ed the strain on our trucks and guns, er than on our meager manpower or hard-pressed Korean "Chiggy" bear-

This makes sense to me. Should we put the maximum stress and strain re it can best be borne—upon the ductive resources of the United es; upon the rail, truck, and ocean sportation facilities of our nation? s policy of spending shells and sav-lives gives us maximum use of our ger manpower resources and gives individual rifleman the best chance victory and survival.

hope it should be clear now that did not "coddle" our infantrymen in ea and that the artillery ammunition cies of the Eighth Army under Gen-Van Fleet represented a most impor-signpost.

MAJOR MASON J. YOUNG, JR.
Artillery

Irons in the Fire

Dock Barge

A new dock barge *(cut below)* designed for the Transportation Corps by the DeLong Engineering and Construction Company can be floated to job site—sometimes thousands of miles away. They carry the big tubes, or caissons, and the air jacks seen here around each caisson at deck level. The jacks pump the hull up the caisson to pier height, where it is secured and ready to serve as a dock. The jacks are built in two sections, the upper fastened to the deck by tie-rods. Each half is lined with rubber tire-like tubes, with similar tubes circling the caisson between the sections. The upper and lower halves function similarly to the arms and legs of a boy climbing a tree. At a position six inches above the deck, tubes in the lower half are inflated and it grips the caisson. Then air is pumped into the tubes between the sections. This forces the top up six inches. The top tubes are inflated, clamping it to the caisson and holding the barge at that level while the lower grip is released as its tubes are deflated. The center tubes are then deflated and the retraction pulls the lower half back up to meet the top where it is again clamped and the operation is repeated. A highly successful DeLong Dock is in operation supporting construction work at the Air Force's base at Thule, Greenland. Two are en route to Alaska to replace docks that were destroyed in a fire. The one pictured here was built by U. S. Steel's Orange, Texas, fabricating center.

Air Force Rescue Craft

A 94-foot experimental rescue craft, recently completed in Detroit, has three 1,500 horsepower V-12 Packard gasoline engine. The craft is 94′ x 22′ 4″ x 5′ 8″. It will accommodate two officers and 14 men and has space for 12 litters in the sick bay. Communications equipment includes radar and radio equipment. The galley has electrical refrigeration, range and deep freeze. A transom gate 12 feet wide is fitted with a guard the width of the gate to prevent anyone from being swept under the gate and as an aid in boarding.




Aviator's Knee Board

This pilot's knee board for use in small cockpits may be of interest to Army aviators. The board is equipped with two pencil storage compartments, a coil spring pencil rest, and a built-in pencil sharpener. Chart cards are held firmly in place by an upper and a lower spring clip. The board is made of solid black molded material and although it weighs but nine ounces, it is strong, sturdy, and extremely durable. An adjustable quick release strap holds the board securely to the leg.

Liaison Aerial Camera

A new aerial camera designed for front-line aerial reconnaissance in light liaison aircraft has been developed by the Air Force's Air Research and Development Command and is under Army test. Using fifty-foot rolls of five-inch film, the hand-held Fairchild K-44 camera uses six- or twelve-inch lens.



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CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

THIS is the third in the series of articles on Career Management and how it works. If y have any comment or questions on this series please feel entirely free to write the editors Career Management Division.

Selection for Overseas Service

Officers ask: *"What about my overseas service? I've spent forty-eight months overseas since World War II and returned from Korea in December 1951 after fourteen months of combat duty. Today I received orders for shipment to Europe. I know there are other officers of my grade who have been enjoying the same ZI assignment for years."*

THE Army's fundamental policy in making overseas assignment is that all officers will share equitably in foreign service. But some deviations are necessary. Certain CONUS assignments require either specialized training and indoctrination, a relatively long period of on-the-job familiarization, or extended continuity of effort. Examples of such assignments are: Special projects, technical specialization, high level staff positions, civilian component duty, service school instructors and Army Field Forces boards. It would not be efficient or economical to assign officers to these duties for relatively short periods of time. Therefore, such assignments are "stabilized." That is, the man in a stabilized spot completes a full assignment even though by length of time since his last overseas duty he may be immediately due for foreign service. He will go overseas when his "stabilized" tour is ended. This situation is under study in an effort to provide longer stays in the CONUS for a greater number of officers.

Many officers ask: *"Is there really a system of selection?"*

EACH career branch maintains a vulnerability roster, divided by grade, from which selections are made for f eign service. Each grade is arrang according to the actual or adjusted d of arrival from foreign service and th officers with the earliest date of retu are listed first.

Before an officer is selected for forei service, however, he must be eligi under established criteria and POR qu fied in accordance with the minim training requirements contained in pa graph 17, SR 600-175-20. In the lat instance, the Chief, Career Managem Division, has authority to waive cert of these minimum training requiremei Current eligibility criteria are sum rized as follows:

Nine months minimum period of tive service remaining as of schedu date of arrival at the POE or APC.

Officers must have twelve months more remaining service before reach statutory retirement age.

Officers and warrant officers who turn from any overseas theater, exc AFFE, will not be sent overseas ag until they have served in CONUS or ritory of residence at least six mont Those from AFFE will not be sent o seas again until they have served at l nine months.

There is a possibility of change in current regulations to increase the m mum tour in the CONUS to twe months.

The main considerations in selec for overseas shipment are grade, N date of return from last overseas ass ment, theater from which returned, existing overseas requirements.

An officer writes: *"I'm a comman and want troop duty. How do t*

ick MOS and will any attention be aid to it when I get overseas?"

'HE MOS assigned in overseas orders is understandably of importance and ncern to each individual and may, in me cases, not be in line with the one wants. This is necessary to meet the quirements of the overseas commander. nce 1950 the use of the directed and commended MOS has been suspended d no assurance can be given that the os which appears in orders will be that which the individual will serve after rival in the overseas theater. However, hen selection is made in Career Man- ement Division, a careful evaluation each officer's abilities, skills, and physi- l capabilities is made so that he can be signed to a particular position which es his qualifications to the maximum tent.

Another officer asks: *"Why am I dered overseas when other officers no returned with me from the last erseas assignment are not on or- rs and not stabilized?"*

VERSEAS criteria differ by branch, as well as by grade, and it is entirely pos- le that an infantry or artillery officer no returned from foreign service dur- g June 1952 might be selected for a w foreign service tour before a quar- master or ordnance officer who re- ned from his last assignment during 51. Criteria are established in each nch and service and are based entirely overseas demand.

Korea has had a decided influence on teria. It is Army policy to give every ssible officer an opportunity to serve Korea in order to avoid, or at least lay, sending individuals back to rea for the second time. Therefore, effect, two pools of officers have en established.

Those officers who have served a tour in Korea subsequent to 25 June 1950 (this pool is used to fill other theater requirements).

Officers without Korean combat experience are used to meet the Far East requirements. This explains why officers who have served one tour in AFFE before 25 June 1950, or even in Japan or Okinawa since 25 June 1950, are being ordered back for another tour.

This system is fair. In some cases, wever, it will result in overseas move- nt of officers who are less vulnerable overseas assignment than are other cers. A returnee from a noncombat- theater may expect less time in CONUS assignments than may returnees from a combatant theater. This results from the heavier officer requirements of the combatant theater and from the policy of not returning an officer to a combatant theater. Exceptions to this policy will be made because of compassionate reasons and interests of the service but each case will be treated on a basis of individual merit. Officers may anticipate that the Korean truce will affect requirements of AFFE to the extent that returnees from noncombatant theaters will have more stability in CONUS than that experienced since 25 June 1950.

A worried officer writes: *"We are going to have an increase in our family. Will they let me stay until the baby is born?"*

NORMALLY no; however, if an overseas assignment will provide undue hardship on an officer due to illness in the family, financial difficulty, or complicated pregnancy, he may make application, through channels, for deferment. Various periods of deferment can be requested. CONUS army commanders have authority to approve deferments for ninety days or less and requests in excess of ninety days are forwarded to the Department of the Army for approval. The Adjutant General handles all such applications and all receive uniform treatment. Each case is forwarded to the pertinent career branch for final decision. This system of centralized processing insures fair and impartial handling of cases submitted by officers from different branches of the service.

An officer writes: *"I'd certainly like to go back to Trieste."*



AN officer may volunteer for foreign service by writing through channels (See AR 600-175), and may state his preference of station. Insofar as practicable, assignments will be made according to stated preferences. However, it would be patently unfair to assign officers repeatedly to the most desirable area simply on the basis of individual preference. Here again the general policy of equitable foreign service must be tempered by the needs of the Army and justice to the individual. Officers on the volunteer list who are not assigned according to their choice before they become available for foreign service in their normal turn, automatically lose their volunteer status and are placed on the regular roster for an overseas assignment.

Another officer says: *"I speak Spanish and desire an assignment in the attaché system or to a mission."*

REQUIREMENTS for officers in the attaché system are published periodically in Department of the Army circulars. These assignments are highly competitive and are made on an individual basis. Officers must apply in writing (see SR 600-147-1). Assignments to Military Missions and Military Assistance Advisory Groups are made as vacancies occur and according to qualifications.

Another officer: *"When can I expect my next overseas assignment?"*

CAREER Management Division recognizes the undesirable effects of frequent assignment changes and constantly strives to improve the situation so that each officer can be assured of more stability in CONUS assignments. It must be emphasized, however, that Career Management Division has direct assignment control over combat arms officers only.

The chiefs of the technical and administrative services control the assignments of their officers. Each branch and service, however, is guided by Department of the Army assignment policies.

Specific queries or requests concerning assignments by officers in those arms and branches should be addressed to the Chiefs of the technical and administrative services. Officers of the combat arms should address the Chief of the (Infantry, Artillery or Armor) Branch, Career Management Division, TAGO, Washington 25, D. C.

The present CMD branch chiefs are:

Infantry: Colonel Richard P. Ovenshine
Artillery: Colonel Darwin D. Martin
Armor: Colonel George G. Lowe

[Next month: *Assignment of officers returning from overseas*]

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The Month's Books

- *Gen. Krueger's Story of the Sixth Army*
- *Navy version of "Smith vs. Smith"*
- *Retirement Is a Journey*
- *Biography of Phil Sheridan*

SOLDIERLY STORY

FROM DOWN UNDER TO NIPPON: The Story of Sixth Army in World War II. By General Walter Krueger, United States Army, Retired. Combat Forces Press, 1953. 408 Pages; Index; Maps; Illustrated; $6.50.

Before considering General Krueger's history of the Sixth Army, it may be of interest to look at the current score as to the publication of the memoirs of the United States Army commanders who were in the top positions at the end of World War II. The Chief of Staff, General of the Army Marshall, has not published a book and says that he will not. At the theater-commander level, the score is a tie with a "yes" for Eisenhower and a "no" for MacArthur. Of the army group commanders, Generals Bradley and Clark have had their say; General Devers is reported to have declined to write his story. The commanders of overseas armies, including General Krueger, score, in one form or another, five affirmatives; Patton (Third Army), Krueger (Sixth), Eichelberger (Eighth), Stilwell (Tenth), and Brereton (First Allied Airborne). The five who have not published memoirs are Hodges (First), Truscott (Fifth), Patch (Seventh), Simpson (Ninth) and Gerow (Fifteenth). Of these commanders, General Patch is dead.

General Krueger might well question that he should be included among those who have written their memoirs. He states, in his introduction, that "instead of publishing my personal reminiscences of the events in which I participated, I decided to write the story of the Sixth Army." The book is, he says, "an unadorned narrative" of the long struggle of the Sixth Army against fanatical resistance as it fought its way from Australia to Japan. And that is exactly what it is. As a factual record of the operations of a major military unit the volume has rarely, if ever, been equalled.

There can be no question but that the author has done well what he set out to do. Incidentally, the book is the last volume, except for a forthcoming history of the 32d Infantry Division, to have the advantage of the expert editing of the late Colonel Joseph I. Greene, and it is physically an attractive book in spite of the handicap of rather small type size, presumably made necessary by costs.

The regrettable thing is that General Krueger stuck to his self-imposed mission in such a soldierly way. Rarely does he include anything which makes his officers and men come to life or gives the reader an insight into the personalities of the well-known officers in his story. Not only do General MacArthur and other senior commanders get simple factual treatment as to what they ordered or did, but so do two officers who served successively as his chief of staff when he was in command of the Third Army in the States. One was Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower and the other a Lieutenant Colonel Gruenther. Admittedly, they never served in the Sixth Army, but the reader would like to hear a little more about them as they moved into assignments which led to general officer rank.

Neither is General Krueger quite fair to himself in not giving the reader a little more of his own background. He does say that "being practically sixty-two" early in January of 1943, the orders he received at that time to go on active overseas service were unexpected. He does say that he had forty-four years of service behind him both as a commander and as a staff officer. But he does not say that he had been born in Germany, and served over two years as a private and noncommissioned officer in the 12th Infantry before he was commissioned from the ranks in 1901. Nor does he mention that he was a graduate, in spite of the handicaps under which he must have labored in achieving selection as a student, of the Army War College and the Naval War College.

Veterans of the Sixth Army's operations in New Guinea, Morotai, Leyte, Mindoro, and Luzon will find this book to be a valuable record of their experiences and there is much of professional value in General Krueger's statements of his reasons for decisions, and in his comments on staff procedures. He writes with clarity and no evasions. For example: "All clerical work at my headquarters was performed by warrant officers and enlisted men. I invariably declined the offers repeatedly made by USAFFE to furnish Wacs to my headquarters. Without disparaging the value of Wacs in rear areas, I felt that their use at my headquarters was not warranted under the conditions under which we had to operate. I also felt that, in any case, the labor entailed in providing accommodations for them would have been out of all proportion to their usefulness as clerks."

General Krueger emphasizes the unusual conditions which prevailed in the Southwest Pacific Area. Except to a limited extent on Luzon, his army never fought with roads and railroads behind it as a line of communications for supply, movement of reserves, replacements, and evacuation. The island-hopping also resulted in each major headquarters being echeloned in great depth with resultant complications in handling staff matters ordinarily resolved by conferences and personal contacts. It does seem that headquarters organizations and channels of command were needlessly complicated by the practice of setting up various task force headquarters instead of giving a particular mission to an established Table of Organization headquarters and attaching or detaching troops from the command to fit the situation. General Krueger speculates on this matter, and indicates that at army level it was sometimes a device to permit putting of the task force directly under the operational control of General MacArthur, thus obviating the placing of the army under General Blamey of the Australian Army who was the CG, Allied Land Forces. Actually, most of the Sixth Army missions were conducted by General Krueger as CG, Alamo Force. "The reasons," says Krueger, "for creating Alamo Force and having it, rather than Sixth Army, conduct operations, were not divulged to me." At lower levels, in any case, there seems to have been less reason for the creation of task force headquarters in the manner which was customary throughout the Southwest Pacific campaign.

Civilian reviewers have occasionally been hypercritical of some senior officers' memoirs and emphasized what they regarded as the advantage taken of hindsight to justify decisions or excuse errors. They will find nothing of that sort in this book. General Krueger has told a straightforward story of what his command did, with no excuses. Take it or leave it.—MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

FINEST DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF 1940-41

THE UNDECLARED WAR 1940-41: The World Crisis and American Foreign Policy. By William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason. Harper New York, 1953. 963 Pages; $10.00.

For some years William L. Langer, professor of history at Harvard, and S. Everett Gleason of Amherst, now with the National Security Council, have been working on a study of American foreign policy in the period before and during World War II

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
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
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Last year they published a massive volume entitled: *The Challenge to Isolationism*, which covered the period from Roosevelt's famous "quarantine speech" in 1937 to the fall of France in 1940. That volume was by far the most effective answer ever made to the Beard, Morgenstern, Tansill, Barnes school of writers who have tried to convince Americans that President Roosevelt's foreign policy was something developed "in secret" and sprung upon the nation by trickery.

The present equally substantial volume carries the story from the fall of France to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Like its predecessor, this book is in a class by itself as far as the width of its coverage, the thoroughness of its documentation, and the objectivity of its authors are concerned. This is another way of saying that this is about the finest piece of writing in the field of recent diplomatic history turned out anywhere. Its appearance is a real credit to American scholarship and to the American Council on Foreign Relations which financed the effort.

In normal times it would not be necessary to produce a 900 page book in order to prove that the President of the United States in 1941 was not a complete scoundrel. But partisanship and later-day isolationism have been so intense about Mr. Roosevelt's administration, that this is essentially the case regarding the events of 1941. It is therefore a reassuring thing to find these two distinguished scholars concluding that whatever the record may show it "provides no evidence whatsoever to support the thesis that the President or any other responsible American official courted a Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbor base in order to enable them to lead the country into the European war by the back door."

A careful reading of this book enables one to draw a new picture of the all around effectiveness of the American diplomatic service in the year 1940-41. Despite the fact that we were surprised in 1941 at Pearl Harbor, it should be pointed out that all the great powers were surprised by something in that year. In general it would seem that the State Department acquired more accurate information about what was going on in the world, including what went on behind the Axis battle fronts, than British and Russian foreign offices, and that aside from making a tragic mistake about where the Japanese blow was to fall, it had amazingly good information on what they were doing. The stereotype of the American foreign service officer as a kind of babe-in-the-woods dies hard in certain quarters, but a reading of this volume should convince any fair-minded person that this image did not fit the situation in 1940-41. One can only hope that our harassed and much-maligned foreign service officers are doing equally well today. This book is not recommended for light reading but is indispensable for a knowledge of what preceded our entrance into World War II.—H. A. DeWeerd.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

LINES FROM A NEW BOOK

It takes no great exercise of imagination to visualize little Phil Sheridan as an officer of the United States Army today; he would reorient himself, one feels, in a few weeks. It is much more difficult to imagine Robert E. Lee jumping out of a transport plane at the head of a parachute division, Sherman's angry face popping out of a tank, Jeb Stuart without braid or fancy feathers leading a heavy bomber strike from an Okinawa airfield, or a beardless George H. Thomas peering down from an L-5 observation plane over an infantry division on maneuvers.

Sheridan the Inevitable
RICHARD O'CONNOR

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

NAVY WAR—VOLUME VIII

NEW GUINEA AND THE MARIANAS: March 1944-August 1944. Volume VIII of the History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. By Samuel Eliot Morison. Little, Brown and Company. 458 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $6.00.

Samuel Eliot Morison, Jonathan Trumbull Professor of American History at Harvard and Rear Admiral, USNR, holds course and speed as he finishes another of his excellent volumes (fourteen are planned) on the history of the United States Navy in World War II.

From the Army viewpoint the major interest in the current volume lies with Morison's version of the Smith *versus* Smith controversy involving the 27th Infantry Division under Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith and the acts and opinions of Lt. Gen. H. M. ("Howling Mad") Smith, USMC.

There is also mention of the Army's I, XI, and XXIV Corps, and of the 6th, 24th, 32d, 41st, 43d, and 77th Infantry Divisions, and, of course, much about General MacArthur. And any military man—soldier, sailor, or airman—will find interest in the story of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the greatest carrier battle of the war. Air Force men will not, however, be likely to agree with Admiral Morison's verdict: "The battle . . . illustrates the inadequacy of land-based aircraft, even when Navy-trained, as compared with carrier-based bombing."

Admiral Morison is emphatic about the Smith *versus* Smith controversy: "This writer entertains no doubt that General Holland Smith was right. The real trouble with the 27th Division was that it had never been overhauled and the incompetent and overage company commanders relieved. It should never have been included in the same attack force with Marines." This opinion goes along with the Marine General Smith's dictum in his book *Coral and Brass:* "The trouble with Twenty-seventh Division was, if I may coin a word, 'militia-itis.' . . . Employer-noncommissioned officers in the 27th were sometimes commanded, if that is the word, by employee-officers." This reviewer doubts that civil life relationships had much weight during June of 1944 in a division which had been called to active duty in October of 1940. The whole subject is covered in detail in *The 27th Infantry Division in World War II* by Captain Edmund G. Love. Captain Love's opinions are quite different from those of the writers quoted above.

It is pertinent perhaps to quote the conclusions of the Army board which investigated the affair: (1) Holland Smith had full authority to relieve Ralph Smith from command; (2) Holland Smith was not fully informed regarding conditions in the zone of the 27th Division when he issued orders relieving Ralph Smith; (3) The relief of Ralph Smith was not justified by facts; (4) Ralph Smith's official record or future commands should not be adversely affected by his relief.

It is evident that the affair was truly controversial and that Marine and Army prejudices will always enter into its discussion, but the Marine Smith does pay the Army Smith some tributes in his book "I always regarded Ralph Smith as a likable and professionally knowledgeable man . . his testimony [at the Army investigation was the most fair-minded of the lot . . adversity, I think became him well."

It is a fact, completely unrelated to the controversy, that Ralph Smith should never have been sent to the Pacific. He was among the best informed of all Army officers on matters relating to western Europe. He was a graduate of the French *École Supérieure de Guerre*, had served as a military attaché in Europe, and had had considerable intelligence experience of European armies. Why he should have been used to command a division in the Pacific at the exact time of the Normandy invasion might with reason puzzle either a marine or a soldier.

And regretfully we have to add Admiral Morison to our list of people who think that "shrapnel" means shell fragments.—Maj. Gen. H. W. Blakeley, Retired.

AFTER 30 YEARS—THIS

THE RETIREMENT HANDBOOK: A Complete Planning Guide to Your Future. By Joseph Buckley. Harper & Brothers, 1953. 340 Pages; $3.95.

"Retirement," says Mr. Buckley, "approached from the constructive side, based on the concept that people retire to a new way of living rather than *from* the present way of life. Retirement is a journey, not a destination."

The author might have gone further and been more emphatic to point out that retirement should be, particularly for members of the armed forces, a pleasant and even profitable journey.

Mr. Buckley aims his book not only at relatively young people who are interested in long-range planning for both financial and psychological security, but also at the

who are retired or about to retire, and even o the family of a prospective "retiree"—a ew word, incidentally, to this reviewer.

"The harvest years" is the term the au- ior uses, with some justification, to the ears spent in retirement. To assure the retiree" that those years are really a pe- od of satisfaction, Mr. Buckley discusses ealth and how to grow old happily, in- ome planning for financing retirement liv- ng, leisure-time activities with a view to eir value in later years, the often disas- ous projects of after-retirement running f a small business or a farm, the impor- nce of a good climate, and an analysis of me of the conditions existing in such pular areas as California, Florida, Geor- a, North Carolina, South Carolina, the ulf Coast, and the Southwest. The book, ritten primarily for civilians, ignores the e outstanding advantage of Washington a place for retirement of military people: u'll never have a dull moment.

This is a good book. Its greatest value ould be for some thirty-five-year-old offi- r or career noncom. But perhaps it is rtunate that at thirty-five you expect to e forever, and to have no problems in ur old age.—H.W.B.

USEFUL U.S. HISTORY

E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A History. By Henry Bamford Parkes. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1953. 773 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $7.50.

American history made easy, understand- le, and useful to the American people is r. Parkes's admirable achievement in this ok. It is made easy through a felicitous erary style that avoids dullness and ad- res to accuracy and objectivity. It is his- ry that is understandable because its rity and vigorous movement carry the der from the first colonial settlements to esident Eisenhower's inauguration, with remarkable degree of unity and propor- n. It is history that is all-embracing, for r. Parkes agrees with Voltaire that the cial, moral and artistic aspects of the past st be considered with the political, eco- mic and military events if the past is to understood.

Undoubtedly the author's search for iversality will not satisfy the specialist. r example, a student of military or eco- mic history will inevitably complain of ersimplification in his specialty. On the ier hand this bulky, but easy to handle lume will illuminate the relationship of at he knows best to all the other aspects history with which he is less familiar. ithout undue neglect of our political his- y, of military and naval policy, or of the litary campaigns of our wars, Mr. Parkes els in defining "the movement of beliefs d ideas, and the expression of the Ameri- spirit in literature and the arts."

The numerous maps and illustrations are eptionally helpful. Anyone desiring a gle volume general history of the United tes that is politically impartial, well bal- ed in space and emphasis allotted to ry phase of our past, cannot do better than to add this book to his library.—Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong.

GLOUCESTERS IN KOREA

NOW THRIVE THE ARMOURERS. By Robert O. Holles. British Book Centre, 1953. 176 Pages; Illustrated; Map; $2.75.

This interesting little book concerns the battle experiences of a British platoon from the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, a unit of the 29th Brigade. Lieutenant Parkington (a fictitious name, like all others in the book) landed his platoon in Korea in November 1950. They fought up to Hills 327 and 235 and wound up in the Imjin battle, after which they were rotated home following severe losses in casualties and prisoners. The Gloucesters are a stout outfit, as many Americans found. They fought and lived close by our own troops, and except for certain differences in expression, this story might well have been told of American troops. Sergeant Holles, a Gloucestershire regular and Imjin veteran, writes a straight story of what the infantryman's war was like in Korea.—N.J.A.

SOUNDLY PARTISAN BIOGRAPHY

SHERIDAN THE INEVITABLE. By Richard O'Connor. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 400 Pages; Illustrated; $4.50.

In this biography of Sheridan, as in his study of General Thomas, Richard O'Connor is directing attention to men whose careers were of great significance but who have not received the attention their stature justifies.

Although the author is understandably partisan to Sheridan, he conscientiously pictures a human being with human faults. This is especially true of the chapters on Sheridan's early career. We see a young man suffering from a "runt complex"; the young Sheridan must have been difficult to endure in the close-knit society of the isolated frontier posts.

In his treatment of Sheridan's Civil War career, the author successfully establishes his subject as one of the ablest Union commanders. Unfortunately, by failing sometimes to present the full background of events, O'Connor makes some of Sheridan's achievements loom larger than is perhaps justified. For example, the importance of the early reorganization of the Army of the Potomac's Cavalry Corps to its eventual success under Sheridan could be more clearly indicated. Also, Sheridan's victories over Early in the Valley would gain perspective if the fatigue and attrition suffered by the Confederates by that time were more clearly shown.

The book is marred by occasional generalizations which are not always completely true. O'Connor asserts that Sheridan was the youngest senior commander on either side in the war—in fact, Hood was the same age, Stuart two years younger and Jackson only a few years older.

While this is of minor importance, O'Connor's eagerness to glorify Sheridan leads him to gloss over several matters

NEW TITLES OF NOTE

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By Winston Churchill (prepub.) . $5.00
(After 30 Nov.) . $6.00

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By General Walter Krueger $6.50

Stanton
By Fletcher Pratt $5.95

How to be a Consistent Winner At Most Popular Card Games
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By Walter Goerlitz $7.50

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which cannot easily be ignored. Sheridan's almost insubordinate behavior toward Meade, his senior commander, is freely condoned. Again, O'Connor's version of Sheridan's removal of General George Crook from command during the Apache campaign is completely one-sided.

It is regrettable that a more detailed account of Sheridan's postwar career is not given. Sheridan commanded the forces whose presence in Texas contributed to Maximilian's downfall; he commanded the Department of Missouri during the peak of the Indian campaigns; and he was General-in-Chief of the Army during much of the period of America's greatest public apathy toward military matters. All are extremely significant in American military history, and Sheridan's role in them deserves more thorough analysis.

It is only fair to say that while this book is occasionally controversial both in substance and emphasis, it is an important addition to the literature on the Civil War. —Lt. Col. John B. B. Trussell, Jr.

THE NEGRO IN THE CIVIL WAR. By Benjamin Quarles. Little, Brown & Co., 1953. 379 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00.

Both Southern and Northern Negroes were far more active in the Civil War than is commonly realized. Negroes served as soldiers, sailors, scouts, spies and propagandists, doctors, nurses, chaplains, abolitionist crusaders and Underground Railroad workers.

Professor Quarles places proper emphasis on the military effort by the people of his race. We learn that nearly 180,000 former slaves were accepted in the Union Army, more than 29,000 in the Navy. U. S. Colored Troops, as they were designated, were organized into 166 regiments —145 infantry, seven cavalry, twelve heavy artillery, one light artillery, one engineer. There was considerable doubt among the Union brass as to how the former slave would conduct himself in battle, but he proved himself in fifty-two engagements. Five of these were major actions: Fort Wagner, Port Hudson, Milliken's Bend, Nashville, and Petersburg. Fourteen Negroes were awarded the Army's Medal of Honor. The Confederates intended using Negro soldiers too, on the recommendation of General Pat Cleburne. Several units were actually inducted, but too late to get into action.

A few errors have crept into the work, the most notable being the perpetuation of the yarn of the burial alive of Negro soldiers by Confederates during the "Fort Pillow massacre." Despite these slips, Dr. Quarles's history belongs on every Civil War shelf.—N.J.A.

U.S.S.R.—TODAY AND TOMORROW

RUSSIA—WHAT NEXT? By Isaac Deutscher. Oxford University Press, New York, 1953. 230 Pages; $3.00.

IMPERIAL COMMUNISM. By Anthony T. Bouscaren. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1953. 256 Pages; Bibliography; Index; $3.75.

Of the many books on Russia there seems to be no end. Isaac Deutscher, a competent specialist in Russian affairs, has written a quickie on what Russia will do after Stalin's death. Malenkov, he believes, will soften Russian tactics and try to get along with the West. This in turn will strongly affect the theory and practice of communism both in Russia and in other countries. In short, things are going to change in Russia—but which way, neither Mr. Deutscher, nor probably Malenkov, can say with certainty. If you are an ardent Russian reader you will want this book. If you are not, it will interest you as much and as long as today's headlines.

Imperial Communism is a sort of almanac on what Russia has done and is doing in various parts of the world. The major countries are treated separately, the minor ones are lumped geographically. The ambitious scope of this book reduces the surveys to thumbnail sketches. The author differs somewhat from Deutscher in his opinion of Russian policy. Bouscaren believes every Russian move is logically plotted, whereas Deutscher points out how much improvisation is involved. *Imperial Communism* is a useful reference book on the past and present actions of world communism, despite almost inevitable errors of fact in a fact-crammed work, and a certain amount of coloring due to leaning heavily on newspapers for current events.—Richard Gordon McCloskey.

MORE CIANO

CIANO'S HIDDEN DIARY 1937-1938. Translated by Andreas Mayor with an Introduction by Malcolm Muggeridge. Dutton, New York, 1953. 220 Pages; $4.00.

As many American readers know, Count Galeazzo Ciano, son-in-law of Mussolini and Italian foreign minister from 1937-1942, kept a voluminous diary. After he fell from power in 1942, Count Ciano used this diary to protect himself; and, when the Fascist regime collapsed in 1943, it was employed as a bargaining piece by both Edda Ciano and the Nazis. The diary did not save its author; Ciano was shot in the back by a Fascist firing squad, but Edda managed to smuggle part of the manuscript out of Italy. This part covering the years 1939-42 was published shortly after the end of the war. The remainder, that covering the years 1937-1938, fell into the hands of the Germans who used it to keep Mussolini in line.

Like so many other blackmail documents, this part of the diary survived the collapse of both Fascism and Naziism and it was published in Italy in 1948. It is now made available to American readers. There is no question about the authenticity of this diary.

In the end both Ciano and his master destroyed themselves in their relentless struggle for power. Mussolini used to boast that he wanted only one sentence carved on his tomb: "Here lies the smartest animal that ever lived." These pages show that he was just smart enough to see where his dangerous course was leading Italy but not wis enough to draw back before it was too late He was in addition stupid enough to er courage Ciano to put all his folly on pape —H. A. DeWeerd

BOOKS RECEIVED

THE NAKED ISLAND. By Russell Bra don. Doubleday & Company, Inc. 28 Pages; $3.50. A personal experienc story by an Australian who was capture by the Japanese.

WHO SPEAKS FOR MAN? By Norma Cousins. The Macmillan Company. 31 Pages; $3.50.

POPULAR MECHANICS ALBUM C AVIATION. By Edward L. Thro and James S. Crenshaw. Popular M chanics. 192 Pages; Illustrated; Inde $3.00. A history of famous flights a flyers.

CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN GO ERNMENTS, Third Edition. By He man Beukema and Associates. Rin hart & Company, Inc. 610 Pages; Ma Charts; Index; $5.50.

THE AMERICAN EMPIRE. By Robe R. McCormick. Chicago Tribune. 1 Pages; Maps; Index; $2.50.

THE UNITED STATES AND ME ICO. By Howard F. Cline. Harva University Press. 452 Pages; Ma Index; $6.00.

CAN RUSSIA SURVIVE? By F. Czarnomski. Philosophical Library. 1 Pages; Index; $2.75. The author s the answer is "No."

RIVER ON THE RAMPAGE. By Ke neth S. Davis. Doubleday & Compa Inc. 217 Pages; $3.00. The story of t Kaw River basin by the author of *Sold of Democracy*.

THE IMPACT OF RUSSIAN CU TURE ON SOVIET COMMUNIS By Dinko Tomasic. The Free Press. 2 Pages; Index; $4.50.

AMERICA REBELS. By Richard M. D son. Pantheon Books, Inc. 347 Pa Illustrated; $5.00. Narratives by th who participated in the American Re lution.

MIDDLE EAST DILEMMAS. By F. Hurewitz. For Council on Foreign lations by Harper & Brothers, 49 E 33d St., NYC 16. A Council on Fore Relations book.

THE GREAT MAN: George Washing as a Human Being. By Howard Sv gett. Doubleday & Company, Inc. Pages; Index; $5.00.

MAP INTERPRETATION. By G. Drury. The British Book Centre, 203 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.25.

THE MAPMAKER'S ART. By Edw Lynam. The British Book Centre, 140 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.50.

THE SCRIBNER TREASURY. Cha Scribner's Sons. 689 Pages; $5 Twenty-two classic short stories origi ly published by *Scribners* between 1 and 1932.

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
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The Story of Sixth Army in World War II by

Gen. Walter Krueger



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TANKS AND INFANTRY AT NIGHT

Salute to the

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND



New official insignia of the Strategic Air Command . . . the long-range air arm of our nation. The shield depicts through the mailed fist a powerful potential for defense, at the same time stressing the olive branch of peace. The clouds and field of blue sky symbolize the global capabilities of this mighty striking force.

The insignia which identifies the Strategic Air Command's F-84 Thunderjet fighters serves as a definite symbol of U. S. Air Force might, for aircraft such as the Thunderjets have established their role as an integral and versatile part of strategic air power. Group flights on the same day, such as from the U.S.-to-England and from U.S.-to-Africa, both non-stop . . . using in-flight refueling, emphasize the valuable role the F-84 is playing in SAC as a strategic jet fighter airplane with amazing mobility. ➢➢*

For these accomplishments and other assuring demonstrations of our air power, credit must fall to the laudable teamwork of each individual in the Strategic Air Command, and to their Commander, General Curtis E. LeMay.

*AUGUST 20, 1953.
TURNER A.F.B., GEORGIA TO NOUASSEUR, AFRICA. (31ST STRATEGIC FIGHTER WING)
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Bulldozing — Hydraulic torque converter lets Allis-Chalmers HD-20 take full advantage of available horsepower, roll bigger loads, tackle tougher dozing jobs. With full control at the throttle, operator can work safely and efficiently, regardless of terrain.

N ALLIS-CHALMERS REPORT

How hydraulic torque converter drive improves big tractor performance — assures longer life

Smooth, cushioning action of hydraulic torque converter drive on the Allis-Chalmers HD-20 greatly reduces strain and shock to both the tractor and its allied equipment under all operating conditions.

Whatever the job, whether pushing, pulling or dozing, the operator need merely make contact with the load and then open the throttle. As the load requirements change, the hydraulic torque converter *automatically* matches the conditions with exactly the right combination of speed and pull.

This eliminates most shifting . . . leads to far more work done in a continuous work cycle . . . far longer equipment life.

Hydraulic torque converter drive, exclusive as standard equipment with Allis-Chalmers, is just one of many reasons why the HD-20 assures higher output with less upkeep.

WEIGHT — 41,000 LB. • 175 NET HP. AT FLYWHEEL

ALLIS-CHALMERS
TRACTOR DIVISION — MILWAUKEE 1, U. S. A.



Pulling — Hydraulic torque converter drive actually multiplies torque up to four and one-half times . . . develops tremendous drawbar pull to start the load smoothly . . . and automatically accelerates to the highest speed that conditions permit, in either high or low range.



Pushing — Operator just makes contact, then opens the throttle and relaxes. The HD-20 automatically matches speed to that of pushed equipment, maintains steady contact while loading, sends load off to the fill at higher speed.

Digging and Loading — With the HD-20G, the operator crowds surely and steadily, using only throttle and bucket levers. With full horsepower always available even at creeping speed, he can work effectively in mud, on hillsides or edges of banks.



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TRIBUTES TO SOME PEOPLE WE ALL LIKE:

WAGING PEACE IS

This is an especial salute for the men and women in the "enlisted ranks" of Uncle Sam's armed forces. Whether serving at home or overseas, these people have elected to put 10, or 20, or 30 years of their lives against the essential job of holding a hard core of trained personnel ready to man the implements of national defense.

As a nation, we live a long cry from that day in April, 1775, when a handful of rugged Colonists lifted their muskets from their mantel-pieces and went to meet the enemy at Concord.

Amazing as this country's ability has been to turn its people and its production swiftly from needs of peace to those of emergency, it is also grimly clear that a man cannot come home from the office and



DEADLY ACRID FLAMES spurt from a white phosphorus grenade as Corporal Henry W. Roark signals his flame thrower into action for the final assault on an "enemy" pillbox. Corporal Roark, fire team leader of a rifle squad at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va., will see no enemy during this problem, is prepared for the real thing in time of war.

by EDGAR A. GUEST

They are the strength of freedom's wall,
The men and women, one and all,
Who serve by land and sea and sky
That liberty shall never die:
Sworn all to keep our country free
From every threat of tyranny.

Army, and Navy and Marine!
All that life holds for us they mean.
Those Air Force lads who hasten by
Are valiant guardians of the sky,
And those who stand at lonely posts
Are brave defenders of our coasts.

G.I.'s or Gobs or Leather Necks!
The humblest boy who swabs the decks,
The Wacs and Waves, at work or ease,
For us are freedom's guarantees.
All are our stalwart, steadfast friends.
On them our way of life depends.

Brave youth! Draftee or Volunteer
It matters not. When foes appear
Who would destroy our glorious land,
Behind the wall you build we stand,
Assured that freedom, by your worth,
Shall never perish from the earth.

If you would like a reprint of this poem, suitable for framing, write Chrysler Corp., Dept. RS3, 341 Massachusetts Ave., Detroit, Mich.

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40 MM TWIN MOUNT SCOWLS DEFIANTLY from the after-island gun tub of the U.S.S. Tarawa as AB 3/c John Robertson mans the No. 1 loader during general quarters. John enlisted in the Navy in 1950, spent 6 months in special schools after boot camp. Unmarried, John plans to see the world as he furthers his own career in the Navy.

This advertisement appears in **LIFE** *December 7, 1953*

ENLISTED WOMEN of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines are represented by this color guard quartet. All voluntary enlistments, these four typify the loyalty to country of 46,000 women currently serving in the armed forces.



THEIR CAREER . . .

take down a 75 mm howitzer, or a 46-ton tank, or a jet plane, or a snorkel-breathing submarine, or a sky-sweeping radarscope, or a 16-inch gunned battlewagon, and just step forth to meet the foe.

Highly technical modern fighting equipment is both vital and hard to handle. The people who man and serve these devices must be trained long and hard and well. In times of peace, especially, there will not be much glory for the folks who take on this job.

But, peace or war, there can be only gratitude in the hearts of their civilian neighbors for the diligence with which they dedicate the good years of their lives to these jobs.


Yes, the people of Chrysler Corporation are proud to tip their hats deep to those people in the enlisted ranks of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard.

Without them standing by, armed might would not be very mighty.

This message about people we all like is presented by your PLYMOUTH—DODGE—DE SOTO—CHRYSLER—DODGE "JOB-RATED" TRUCK dealers, and

CHRYSLER CORPORATION

Enjoy "Medallion Theatre" . . . dramatic entertainment for all the family . . . every week. CBS-TV. See local paper for time and station.



THE NATION'S ONLY NAVY from 1790 to 1798, the U.S. Coast Guard is still making history in pioneering new developments of sea rescue and coastal defense. Here, a helicopter, unaided, dips a lone crash survivor from the sea. Under the Navy in war, the Coast Guard is now controlled by the Treasury Dept.

PHOTOS BY PHILIPPE HALSMAN



THIRSTY WING TANK rapidly consumes 230 gallons as S/Sgt. Robert Dieffenderfer refuels his T-33 jet trainer at the end of a routine flight. Attached to the 5th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at McGuire Air Force Base, N.J., Crew Chief Dieffenderfer, a skilled technician at only 26, has sole responsibility for maintenance and upkeep of $100,000 plane.



RUGGED TRAINING for rugged soldiers is all part of Army life, as M/Sgt. James Matthews shows two recruits the ropes at Ft. Dix, N. J. Only 29, Matthews is top sergeant over 234 men in the 60th infantry regiment. A typical career man, Matthews is married, has two children, plans to "try for 20 years, then buy a place at the shore and just fish."

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something to think about

Peace in our time depends upon plenty of *this* sort of thing:

"We were given a map," said the man from Martin, "and a target to be destroyed. Problem was to produce the hardware—the optimum weapons system to destroy that target."

That's as far as he would go. Except to say this:

It looks like nothing ever flown by man. Pilotless. Can be launched from a pad of scorched earth. A team of Martin scientists and engineers in five branches of aeronautical engineering produced this thing in a matter of months from problem to proving ground.

Today at Martin an entirely new concept, known as Martin Systems Engineering, is resulting in the production of new aircraft, guided missiles and electronics weapons designed not as yesterday's flying vehicles but as the coordinated and controlled spaceborne systems of tomorrow.

The principle of Martin Systems Engineering now makes possible developments in airpower that may change the shape of things to come—our way!

You'll hear more about Martin.

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THE GLENN L. MARTIN COMPANY
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The Month's Mail

'Division Objective"

To the Editors:

I would very much appreciate your sending me a dozen reprints, or magazines if ou have no reprints available, of the)ctober issue story, "Division Objective" y Colonel Swift. This story is one of the nest I have ever read.

I think it should be picked up by some f the big papers. . . .

M. M. Johnson, Jr.

)lin Industries, Inc.
Jew Haven, Conn.

* * *

'o the Editors:

It gave me extreme pleasure to read that ne article, "Division Objective," in the)ctober issue. Colonel Swift "hits the nail n the head" when he writes, and I quote: What is the use of teaching a man why e fights, if he doesn't know how to fight," nquote. I can recall back in 1948, while signed to a training division, we devoted hours to TI&E, character guidance, and the essential but not *more essential* subjects. However, we did not teach the use of the bayonet. In September 1950 I assumed command of a rifle company in Korea that had no bayonets. When we finally were issued bayonets it was necessary to teach my men how to use them.

I have also observed that too many chaplains bivouac in their offices and let the men come to the chaplain; the chaplain should go to the men.

We devote too many hours to classroom instruction and not enough time to field training. Leadership, individual training and discipline cannot be developed in the classroom.

Capt. William S. McCutcheon

Baton Rouge, La.

* * *

To the Editors:

Before proceeding to the point of this letter I would first like to explain that I am not a subscriber to your fine publication. However, I have the privilege of reading your entire Journal each month, as I work for a lieutenant colonel who does get it.

Upon reading "Division Objective" by Lieutenant Colonel E. F. Swift I could no longer resist writing to you.

I have never come across a short story that moved me emotionally so completely as did "Division Objective." My sincere congratulations to Colonel Swift for being the author (for whatever they are worth to him) and more especially to you for having chosen it for publication.

Patsy Jean Manley

HQ Fifth Army
Chicago 15, Ill.

* * *

To the Editors:

As an ex-platoon leader and battalion staff officer of the 16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, I read with more than usual interest Colonel Swift's story in your October issue. Right off I want to warn you to start ducking the storm of brickbats which will be winged your way by irate Red-One types who will see in Colonel Swift's literary *tour de force* a slap at their old outfit.

I thought the piece was excellent and I only wish more students of war were as articulate and imaginative as Colonel Swift.

John F. Loosbrock

Air Force Magazine
Washington, D. C.

● Our thanks to a former *Infantry Journal* associate editor who is still loyal to the infantry.

* * *

To the Editors:

As a former infantry officer of the 1st Division, I wonder why you thought much was to be gained by publishing "Division Objective" by Lt. Col. Eben F. Swift in your October issue. I doubt if the 1st Division was ever that dumb, and specifically I should like to ask four questions.

(1) When the whole division was in column in pursuit of the enemy, why was the Div. Recon. Co. not out in front doing the recon? What was the G2 doing? He is the staff officer for recon.

(2) Since when have infantry patrols marched up a tree lined road towards an enemy-held village?

(3) Why was there no intelligence from the MII, IPW, PI, CI, or OB teams?

(4) Why (with the G2 absent, the Recon Co. absent, and the intelligence zero) did the division commander expose himself, the regimental commander and the battalion commander, standing up on the sky line within demonstrated rifle range of a town now known to be occupied by the enemy, for "five minutes"? Any decent sergeant of the 1st Division would have yelled: "Lie down, you son of a bitch."

I am sure the officers and men of the 1st Division are not the roadbound fools Colonel Swift depicts them. Everyone who ever fought in Europe knows those evenly

(Continued on page 8)

THIS MONTH'S JOURNAL

It was inevitable that some soldier ould take exception to Colonel Swift's e of the 1st Division in his fictionalized count of how one enemy soldier stopped American division, as told in the Octo- r Journal. As it happens the objector as an old Journal friend—Colonel ipley Thomas—who also put some good estions to Colonel Swift. In this month's ail *(beginning on this page)* you'll find olonel Thomas' letter and Colonel vift's reply, along with other letters comenting on the article.

We are not quite certain of all the tails that brought it about but we do ow that we are indebted to Maj. Gen. bert Young for Colonel Craven's story Operation Touchdown *(page 24)*. It 't often that we get a battle narrative at describes the teamwork of the comned arms of a division as vividly as this ry does.

Actually the knowledge and experience retired general officers of the Army are ed more extensively than is implied in article by Col. Jack Jeffrey *(page 34)*. r example, we know one general officer o is writing a field manual on mine rfare. Also some of them lecture quite gularly at the service schools and still ers serve on official committees and ards. We are happy to use the article ause Colonel Jeffrey's college dean does ke some good points that should make think. It is always helpful to catch glimpse of how other professions view

NEXT MONTH'S JOURNAL

In "On the Hill" Lieutenant Jim Kyle and Corporal Richard Smith of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion don't advocate any new tactics or techniques for forward observers, but they do tell a tingling story of life on a forward-observer team.

An anonymous "Colonel Shillelagh" hits hard in arguing that "lip service to civilian control has permitted it to be used to defend decisions and actions which it cannot justify." The sound principle of civilian control is in danger, not from the military, but from civilians who are usurping military authority, he says.

A generation ago the name of Peter B. Kyne was known from coast to coast as the author of short stories and novels that had millions of readers. During that time he contributed an occasional piece to the *Field Artillery Journal,* a magazine he had much affection for. Now he has contributed still another piece. In "The Test of Gentility" he tells an unforgettable story of our Army in the Philippines.

Many years ago—on the eve of World War II—the *Infantry Journal* published a series of articles under the heading of "Around the Bases" which described the geography, the peoples and the flora and fauna of the then new places where the U. S. Army was stationed. Since then the Army has become even more widely scattered and it seems time to have a new go at travelling "Around the Bases." The first article in the series, on Alaska, will appear next month. We have high hopes that you will like it.

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CONGO 'COPTER—Health authorities of the Belgian Congo have won a battle against dread disease-carrying insects. Sikorsky S-51 helicopters spray insecticides on vast breeding areas inaccessible to other aircraft or spray equipment. Leopoldville residents are reported now to be as safe from carrier insects as are New Yorkers.


AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



"DRY RUN" RESCUE—Here a Navy HO3S Sikorsky helicopter awaits the loading of a "wounded" man carried on a stretcher improvised of poles and Navy jackets. This pickup was part of a practice operation for search and rescue helicopters and survival parties. The HO3S Sikorsky is specially equipped to carry litter patients.



UNUSUAL CARGO—This crashed Army L-19 liaison plane was salvaged with ease in Korea by an Army Sikorsky H-19 helicopter. Two trips were needed to fly the damaged wings, engine and fuselage (above, in cargo sling) to a repair depot. Army Sikorsky helicopters are now solving hundreds of tough, unusual transportation problems.



PECIAL AIRLIFT—A wounded veteran, after nonths in a North Korean PW camp, is carried from an Army Sikorsky H-19 helicopter o a South Korean hospital in Seoul. As in arlier prisoner exchange activities, Army ikorsky helicopters played a big part in the ost-truce prisoner exchange, providing airlift or repatriated soldiers and other personnel.

SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT

BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT

One of the Four Divisions of United Aircraft Corporation

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The Month's Mail

(Continued from page 5)

spaced trees along the crowned highways are a marksman's dream.

I realize that Colonel Swift had a totally different object in mind when he wrote the article, but why he chose the famous 1st Division to be held up to ridicule and why you published it, is more than I can understand. This article does not do anything but make a laughingstock of the best division in the U. S. Army and thus tends to tear down the morale of the Army.

COL. SHIPLEY THOMAS
Retired.

High Orchard, Pa.

● We referred Colonel Thomas' letter to Colonel Swift, who replies:

To the Editors:

In bringing up the intelligence angle of "Division Objective," Colonel Thomas has opened an extremely interesting subject, one that I am glad to discuss with him either personally over a few beers or in the pages of the JOURNAL.

First of all, we are on the same team. Although my experience in intelligence work is limited compared to his, I have spent three and a half years in intelligence assignments and share his interest in it and his belief in its importance. Furthermore, coincidentally, we were classmates at Leavenworth, where they impressed upon us —R.T.P.: Read the problem. Now, it happened even there and it has evidently happened here that some of the readers of this problem arrived at far different conclusions than the writer of the problem intended. Colonel Thomas and I are both protagonists of the 1st Division. He says it is the best division in the U.S. Army. When I was in it I thought so, too. However, at the time of this story, I can only say that it may well have been the second best division in the U.S. Army, and I am sure that farther than that no 1945 members of any other fighting division in the U.S. Army would ever go. If they did the Army would really have gone to hell in 1945 instead of to Rome, Tokyo, and Berlin where it did go.

Specifically, however, let me defend my 1st Division of the story.

As to intelligence and reconnaissance, I maintain it was damned good. General Appleton had the information that the bridges were out along the Siegnitz. He knew that the road net was good to the south but that didn't help him if he couldn't cross the river. He knew the road net was not so good to the north and that the Germans were retreating to the high ground in that vicinity. He knew that the Germans were on the run in the 18th Infantry sector and that resistance had been light along the road where the 18th was moving. He received this information from his G2, who had been an extremely busy man the past twenty-four hours—as always in a break-through. G2 had been collecting this information by reports from his Order of Battle Teams, his photo interpreters, his interrogators of POWs, his CIC agents and his division reconnaissance company. This particular company, accompanied by reconnaissance officers from the division engineers, had detachments checking the Siegnitz, others the road net to the north and east. They, of course, had checked the roads east and west of Grosheim, but they had learned through bitter experience not to barge through those little German towns, which with their narrow, winding streets and their heavy, stone buildings, were ideal sites for ambushes, particularly of thin-skinned vehicles with which Division Reconnaissance was equipped. They may have left their vehicles in concealment, sent a foot patrol into Grosheim, and reported finding a few Germans there, but that was twenty-four hours before George Company's point arrived, and that information was as cold as a cucumber by the time Corporal Rivera was shot. Since, however, the division was moving so fast, the detachment from the Recon Co had simply bypassed Grosheim and gone about their business of long-range reconnaissance at a distance of about one day's march from the forward elements. In short, it was operating exactly as it should have operated, but it did not furnish complete information of the situation at Grosheim as of 1400 26 April 1945 and neither the CG or the Division G2 expected it to.

G2 knew that his reports from his intelligence teams would take time to collect, collate, evaluate, and disseminate. In view of the fast-moving situation, he knew that most of his "hot" information would be coming from not only his Recon Co. but also the regimental I and R platoons and especially from the forward elements—in this case, good old George Company. The reports from George Company left nothing to be desired until 1400 26 April, when for a while the splendid intelligence net that had been set up got a little confused. G2, instead of confusing the situation further by sending frantic requests for information to the 18th Infantry, went calmly about his business and waited for the situation to develop. Meanwhile, he prepared his intelligence estimates, and planned his intelligence annex for the attack order he knew was coming, leaving space for late patrol reports when they came in. When the town was taken, his estimates proved to be amazingly accurate. I say he was doing his job and doing it well.

However, if he were the omniscient individual that Col. Thomas seems to think he should have been, and had determined immediately that the Germans intended to defend Grosheim and had their positions all pin-pointed, their strength, types of weapons, and unit designations definitely confirmed and established, and all this disseminated to the forward elements in a matter of minutes, he certainly would have been a great G2. But even then, he would not have been able to save the division a the time and the casualties it took to tak its objective unless he had by some occu power determined that the key to the Ge man defense of Grosheim was Privat Mueller, and just where Private Muell was and what he was doing at 1400 2 April. Furthermore, if he had told his C that one man had the capability of sto ping the 1st for twenty-four hours, a cap bility which I still believe was entire possible in this situation, the Gener would probably have had his G2 committe to the psycho ward. So, if I have held t 1st Division up for ridicule in this stor please do not blame my G2 or his agencie I claim they did all that could be expect of them—and more.


As for George Company's advance dow the tree-lined road, I would like to kno if there was any infantry outfit, in Euro or anywhere else, contact with the enem having been temporarily broken, that d not advance in a double column, one each side of the road, as George Compa did. If they had snooped and peeped th way clear across the European countrysi under these conditions, they would there yet. George was not roadbound af that first shot was fired, but if it had r moved along the roads when it could, would have been stupid. Remember, al George Company had moved and mov fast, for several hours and several mi before it was driven off that road. Now, all the infantry outfits had decided abandon the roads and advance across cou try, a time-consuming maneuver, but c which I admit is sometimes necessary, w was going to clear the roads for the artill and the division trains? I know of no b ter way to lose vehicles than to allow th to advance down a road not previou cleared by infantry. And after the loss those vehicles somebody is going to y loudly for some infantry outfit to red the roadblock, anyway, so they might well clear it in the first place.


As for General Appleton's decision advance in a column of regiments do the road, I have already explained his r sons for this—speed. He knew the G mans were ugly customers when they h time to get set, but if he knifed throu on a narrow front and fanned out in th rear area, a lot of Germans would kn they had been licked, and when the G man knows he is licked he gives up. division was delayed twenty-four hours, his information of the situation indica that he would have lost at least that m time in constructing bridges to the so or in attempting to move through highly defensible high ground to the no I claim my division commander was ju fied in his decision, but I realize I a little presumptuous to set myself up as authority on how to run a division would appreciate it if any experienced vision commanding reader, past or pres would come to my rescue on this, straighten me out if I'm wrong.

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165A, 166A	Waveguide Tee
406	Magic Tee
150, 246	Termination
146, 178	Transformer

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I am perfectly willing to agree that General Appleton was wrong in exposing himself at the battalion OP as the General himself admitted. General Washington had a few horses shot out from under him while campaigning with Braddock; General Lee was ordered to the rear by his men in the Wilderness. More recently General Buckner was killed at an OP on Okinawa, and an incident of which I have more direct knowledge, General MacArthur strolled unconcernedly around a sniper-infested area in the vicinity of the small village, San Manuel, on Luzon in 1945, but nobody seems to have criticized their ability or competence as commanders for these errors. Generals have conferred at OPs nearer than 500 meters from the enemy before without being shot. I can remember at least one occasion in which I conferred with a general at my own battalion OP under these circumstances. I hope they continue to do so. If this be dumbness then we have a lot of dumb generals who have reputations of being otherwise. I am inclined to admire such generals rather than condemn them.

I hope this answers Colonel Thomas' questions. I believe they could have possibly been answered more to his satisfaction by some straight talking over those beers because both questions and answers seem to be more blunt when they appear in print, but maybe some day we will have that opportunity to talk it over. If he can convince me that the 1st Division G2 had complete and accurate information about every town it went through, that it moved as fast and as far across country as it did along the roads, that its commanders were always effective but never exposed themselves, I'll admit that the 1st Division was by far the best in the U.S. Army in 1945 —better than mine. On the other hand if I can't convince him that I have not made the 1st Division the object of ridicule in "Division Objective" I'll buy those beers.

LT. COL. EBEN F. SWIFT
Fort Benning, Ga.

Impressed

To the Editors:

This seems like an appropriate time to mention how much I have become impressed with the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, copies of which have only recently been brought to my attention.

Could you forward a copy of your July, 1953 issue, which seemed particularly good, and bill me for same?

In any case, I'd like to suggest that you feel free to forward press releases, advance issues or any other material you feel you'd like us to publicize so that we might join you in drawing public attention to the JOURNAL and demonstrating how great it really is.

Again with congratulations for a wonderful job.

WILLIAM DONALD MCMAHON
WCAU Television
Philadelphia 31, Pa.

Experience

To the Editors:

Some of the best articles and comments on articles that I've ever read are those published in COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, and often after reading them, I wish I could congratulate the writers of the same. The one by General Lynch on "Where is the Regimental Commander?" and "Give Us Back Our Pride" are only two that should be read by everyone wearing the uniform. That goes for the last two paragraphs of comments by Major General Butler B. Miltonberger, in the October issue.

But if there is one man who knows his Army, and hits the nail on the head when it comes to expressing himself, it's Major Charles S. Stough, Jr., Coronado, California, who certainly knows what is wrong with this Army of today. His comments in the October issue should be framed and presented to General Ridgway and General Young.

It's clear that a high rate of pay will not keep either an officer or enlisted man in the service. Nor will rapid promotion hold good men, or men with a lot of service, and rank. If pay and promotion are not what's wrong with the Army then what is? The trouble lies in youth and inexperience, at all levels of command. It takes seasoned leadership, and since 1942 no man has held a rank or grade long enough to qualify as a seasoned and experienced leader in one grade before he was promoted to a higher grade. The wors part of the whole situation is that few hav made any effort to qualify themselves t fit into the higher rank once they got it Attending all the high level service school or civilian institutions of learning adds t one's value in the service, but it neve takes the place of experience.

I hope we hear from others who hav given this subject serious consideration, fo articles like Major Stough's should be great help to the parties charged with find ing a solution to our problems.

LT. COL. P. L. RODGER
Denver Finance Office
Denver 2, Colo.

Correction

To the Editors:

I have read my article, "Economical Fi Power," in the November issue and u fortunateliy an error crept into it.

It should read: "The magnitude of t problem is apparent when we are told th in two months the 10th Field Artille Battalion, 3d Infantry Division fired mo than one hundred thousand rounds ammunition valued at four and one-ha million dollars!", instead of "one millio rounds."

Any artilleryman will realize that o battalion could not fire a million roun in two months.

MAJ. MASON J. YOUNG, JR.
Dept. of Tactics
U. S. Military Academy
West Point, New York

• It was a slip in typing that the edito and proofreaders missed. Sorry.

Communications

To the Editors:

The Cerebration by Colonel Kintner September suggests what he considers new idea; namely, that a Signal Corps u be given responsibility for interior co munications within an infantry regime down to and including company headqu ters. But it isn't new; in World War each division had its "Field Signal Batt ion," which was charged with the ve tasks he enumerates. Apparently the W Department found that experience did r bear out the merits of Colonel Kintne solution.

The casualty rate in Field Signal B talions was unduly high, because, I a told, infantry commanders considered sig personnel as expendable as the dry b teries in a field telephone.

The Infantry tells the Signal Co what it wants in the way of communi tions equipment. Once that equipment designed, produced, and turned over to t Infantry, Signal Corps technicians are more required to operate it than are O nance Corps personnel needed to oper the more complex weapons of modern fantrymen. Communications is a weap so why not teach all infantrymen how use it? Every infantryman should be tau the field wire splice; know how to conn

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an ordinary field telephone to a field wire line; and learn the simple basic voice procedures for radiotelephone work. On top of that, proper care of communications equipment must be taught to every last man in the regiment. I still remember the SCR-536 handie-talkie used by a Doughboy to pound tent-pegs into the ground!

In regard to maintenance of signal equipment, I'll go right along with Colonel Kintner—as far as regimental level. The division signal officer and his maintenance officer could then assume the responsibility for keeping working the communications equipment of infantry and artillery users. The infantry communications officer would no longer be expected to be a technical supervisor, but would be responsible for operations only.

GEORGE H. GOLDSTONE
Detroit 26, Mich.

Thanks

To the Editors:

Enclosed is $5 for another year of good publishing and timely coverage of my job and the jobs of others.

Your magazine has improved to a much better place since you've taken the advice of many of your readers.

But you know, in all the time I have seen your magazine, you have flirted around the engineers. Let's see an article about the combat engineers and some good material on new models of bridges, explosives, demolition parties, truck and truck maintenance, road and road maintenance, amphibious landings, mines, mine laying patterns, new engineer bridges, designs, on air fields, and a complete coverage of engineers in combat.

PFC. JOHN HAMMERSLEY
Fort Belvoir, Va.

● We're looking for just such material but it must also be of interest to non-engineers.

37th Division

To the Editors:

Since the end of World War II, the 37th Division Veterans Association has been trying to locate the next of kin of men killed in action who served with the 37th Division, so that we may furnish them with a history of the Division.

We would appreciate it if you would publish this fact and our address.

FRANK P. WALKER
37th Division Veterans Association
5620 Brinsted Ave.
Dayton 9, Ohio

"Fish or Cut Bait"

To the Editors:

Colonel Cocklin's article, "Fish or Cut Bait," in the August JOURNAL and the comments it aroused have served an admirable purpose in bringing out into the open a major intra-service controversy.

The letters of the various adjutants general and individual Guardsmen indicate, I think, how solidly the Guard as a whole stands behind the Colonel's viewpoint.

It is most unfortunate that the lone letter of criticism should have started out by charging the JOURNAL with bias. The article was phrased unmistakably as an expression of personal opinion. How anyone could interpret that as an expression of JOURNAL policy or a misuse by Colonel Cocklin of his editorial position is a mystery to me.

Regardless of the context of the article, the important point is whether the statements, charges and recommendations contained in it are true or false, useful or worthless.

Colonel Cocklin's critic gives us no satisfaction in this regard.

There is no better method known to human experience of "tearing someone else down" than the use of a vague, whispered charge, hinting that something dark and sinister lies in the other fellow's closet.

If there are "truthful statistics" that can prove the National Guard is not what it claims to be, then let's get them into print where we can all look at them. If the National Guard is leading the people of this nation astray by claiming to be something it isn't then let's do something about it before the rascals grab another dollar of appropriations.

I do not believe that those "statistics" exist. I believe that Colonel Cocklin spoke the truth and that the poverty of the arguments used against him proves it.

LT. WILLIAM V. KENNEDY
ANG
Limestone Air Force Base
Limestone, Me.

Commissaries

To the Editors:

It is time someone nailed the retailer lobby for that thinly veiled threat to oppose a GI pay raise unless they shut their mouths about the destroying of the PX and commissary.

Everyone has been too polite. Instead of yelling, "Let me fill my pockets first and I won't oppose a GI pay raise," the retailers' federation should levy on its members to build a store on every military establishment, fill it with furniture, fixtures and clerks, and sell everything from razor blades to automobiles to the soldier, his widow and other survivors.

There is no obligation for the soldier to fight and die unless there exists a corresponding obligation on the American people in their turn to back him with whatever is necessary: their profits, comforts, and lives if necessary.

Right now most of the American people just don't give a damn—beyond giving the soldier or his survivors a medal and a lot of windy praise.

CAPT. EUGENE R. GUN
Retired
Glenwood Springs, Colo.

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
Guided Missiles Division, Wyandanch, L. I., N. Y.
Engine Division, Farmingdale, L. I., N. Y.

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The Month's Pictures



Eighth Army stays on its toes. The cease fire in Korea was the signal for a vigorous training program—along and behind the post-armistice defense line. Here Company M, 7th Infantry, is refreshed in the operation of the 75mm recoilless rifle.




Soldier of the Month. Maj. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols took off his uniform to become General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission. General Nichols has been one of the Army's best informed atomic energy experts.



Berlin horse-platoon. The Army's only mounted military police platoon is on duty in Belin where it guards the American-Soviet border and is prepared to put down Communist-inspired demonstrations.

Vehicle of the Month. The Army's newest recovery vehicle—the T-51—consists of an M-48 tank body carrying a power boom that can lift thirty tons. It was designed so that a tank crew under fire can be rescued along with the tank. It is powered by 1000-hp Ordnance-Continental air-cooled motor.







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U. S. ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

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OUTPOST DUTY IN KOREA. Department of Defense photo by Signal Corps combat cameraman. Front Cover
THE MONTH'S MAIL 5
THE MONTH'S PICTURES 14
LETTER FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF 17
BLOW UP YOUR COMMANDER. *Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg* 18
DIVISION AVIATION COMPANY: To Be Or Not to Be? *Capt. Weyman S. Carver* 23
OPERATION TOUCHDOWN WON HEARTBREAK RIDGE. *Lt. Col. Virgil E. Craven* 24
GRIDDING THE SINGLE VERTICAL PHOTOGRAPH. *Lt. Col. John P. Remy* 30
'FAIR PLAY AND RESTORATION OF PRESTIGE.' *Rep. Dewey Short* 33
LET'S USE OUR BRAINS. *Lt. Col. Jack C. Jeffrey* 34
TANKS AND INFANTRY AT NIGHT. *Capt. Harlan G. Koch* 35
THE MONTH'S READING 38
CEREBRATIONS 40
THE MONTH'S COMMENT 45
CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE. Assignment of Overseas Returnees 46
IRONS IN THE FIRE 47
FRONT AND CENTER 48
THE MONTH'S BOOKS 50

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UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

October 23, 1953

Lieutenant General G. H. Decker
President, Association of the U. S. Army
1529 Eighteenth Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.

Dear General Decker:

The demands on my time in these early months of my duty as Chief of Staff have prevented my expressing to you and to the Executive Council of the Association my personal views on the importance of the work in which the Association is engaged and notably the publication of its professional military magazine -- the Combat Forces Journal.

As you know, I have been a member and supporter of the Association for many years. I look forward to receiving each issue of the Journal because I find it to be stimulating to thought and exceedingly informative. As a meeting place of the minds of all our officers -- Regular, National Guard, and Reserve -- it performs unique and useful functions that can be performed by no other agency, official or unofficial.

As a military magazine dedicated to the advancement of our profession, the Combat Forces Journal deserves the fullest support of all of us. We should all be conscious that the Journal's opportunities for service are limited only by the support we give it.

The Executive Council and the staff are to be congratulated for their continuing efforts to maintain the high standards which make the Journal respected all over the world. You can be assured that I shall always support the Association and the magazine.

Sincerely,

M. B. RIDGWAY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

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MAKE IT LOOK REAL
AND YOU, TOO, CAN

BLOW U

LIEUTENANT COLONEL
ROBERT B. RIGG

I HAD hardly intended to blow a tree down on my squadron commander, but the one tree he chose for cover was loaded with TNT and the five-minute fuze was burning when I decided it was better to take the consequences than to interrupt the realism of my problem. Results count! My commander was not happy over the immediate result of the TNT in a treetop, but he raked me over the coals because my sewer-pipe mortars (w/TNT charge and gravel output) blew apart, scattering real metal and endangering men. His words were always encouraging when there was more realism; discouraging when I exceeded the bounds of safety.

My mortars were creations out of Li'l Abner: Iron pipe with sturdy metal caps screwed in the bottom and wooden base plates. The TNT charges were chipped off half-pound blocks with a hatchet. The system was simple. We loaded them by dropping in the fuze, lighted TNT charge (15 seconds delay), poured in a pail of gravel "grape shot"—and sought cover. "Whoosh" and the stuff was "on the way" for a good seventy-five yards of realism. There was just one gimmick not tested to full extent: while we had gravel-pit tested the makeshift mortars, we had not contemplated metal crystallization!

But flying crystallized sewer pipe was not all that frightened officers and men that night. When the opposing force came down the military crest of a big hill, the entire hillside was lit up with fire. From a ravine my men spread long strip paths of gasoline-soaked straw a

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT B. RIGG Armor, a regular contributor to these columns, is now on duty in Germany.

Play it like Hollywood . . . let your imagination run riot and your ingenuity work overtime . . . your training will be livelier and your men will learn more

OUR COMMANDER

hey withdrew. Then they waited for he enemy to appear, and when he did, hey lit the straw strips and the flames aced uphill to light up the enemy while ny machine guns and mortars on the pposite slope had a field night "shoot- ng" up the illuminated figures. The mpires assessed forty percent "enemy" asualties but later restored all "enemy" roops to the problem. As the enemy en- ered the ravine we lit smoke pots, and rom the coughing we could pick up very patrol. We then set off TNT harges in the hill cliffs and small ra- ines, blasting sand and gravel down pon the "enemy" as we gradually gave round toward our fortified area. There had all the treetops TNT charged to mulate artillery fire (the fire that lasted my commander). The fortified rea was a nightmare of real combat irprises.

This was a realistic training problem. didn't require much terrain space but did take preparation. It paid in re- ılts.

Since that night in 1942 I have con- ıcted many combat-realistic, small-unit roblems, and it is my purpose here to ggest some useful and practical ideas the subject. These ideas take a little oop labor, they do not require large eas, and they are easy to use.

ay it like Hollywood

To conduct realistic training an offi- r must place himself in the position a movie script writer and Hollywood rector. He must dream up props, situa- ns, cast his Aggressors properly, build s training "set" to embrace at least the lse fronts of realism and stage-manage s problem throughout. He'll need a ecklist for props, explosives, and such, d another one for sequence of events: plan of problem organization in order achieve the training objective. He'll o need assistant directors, call them pires. His Aggressors, the important rt of the cast, may need to rehearse. is better to spend two days preparing a realistic exercise and one day conduct- ing it than to rush through unrealistic exercises.

Appeal to the Senses

Use plenty of smoke to appeal to the sense of smell. Throw in all the noise you can. Load your problem with wire and obstacles to give men the touch of war. You might appeal to taste by is- suing a certain type of rations, but the best method is to encourage soldiers to capture a kitchen so as to get some extra chow and hot coffee. I have found that an attack or offensive problem goes faster when the attacker's kitchen truck is a top priority objective. I recall how some raiders caught a tank company with its guard down one night. The raiders got inside the perimeter and made straight for the kitchen which served them coffee at midnight. The raiders then departed to raise hell within the bivouac. Appeal to sight must be achieved by using sizeable Aggressor units—not just a few posted men. Give your troops a real maneuver enemy, and try to make the landscape alive with props of combat. Make everything grim. As in Hollywood: "This is IT, men!"

Challenge their Minds

I like the "What would you do?" type of training for perfecting crew or individual techniques. Set up a series of situations in a county fair or pro- ficiency test sequence. Then "production line" your men, individually or in crews or squads, through the course. It may take you a day or even a week to set up some realistic situations, but when you pass your men through them you will at least have provoked their thinking and gained some idea about their state of training and general quality.

Intelligence and Scouting

Make a dummy. Attach a borrowed parachute and unfurl it—or use rope and target cloth for the parachute.

Booby-trap another dummy and put a few worthwhile intelligence documents in its clothes.

A wrecked enemy vehicle. Use one of your own and take a wheel or track off. Scatter a few bodies and bury a few "unexploded" mines in a regular pat- tern. Two bottles of ketchup will sup- ply the blood for the dummies.

A crashed airplane. The rear end of a fuselage will do. Two men can make one in four days. Scatter debris about. Set some of it afire and use a smoke pot.

"Bloody up" three of your men and dress them as guerrillas. Let them wait at the bend of a road and offer to sur- render for food and medical aid.

Construct an Asiatic type bunker or CP. Make it interesting outside and in, with the debris of a quickly departing enemy scattered about: chopsticks, doc- uments, broken crockery, some old

Action on the Riggfried line at Fort Knox. This fortified line was made with scrap materials. Old tank hulls are on fire, to simulate the grimness of combat.



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clothing, smashed ammo cases with enemy markings.

Now send your men out as individual scouts, giving them a reconnoitering mission. The "What would you do" element can be tested by having each soldier write a descriptive message on a field message blank and on the back of it describe his actions. Not only will this test his message-writing ability, but his intelligence and overall training, common sense, and practical application. Does he search the exhibits for information? Does he exercise caution and search for booby traps? Is he prepared for ambush? Does he look for or report mines? Does he report accurately?

Vehicle Drivers

Such situations as these along a short stretch of road, can exemplify future combat troubles:

Oil barrels and gas cans in barricade. Booby-trap a few to explode minor charges when moved.

A mine field in a regular pattern followed by another in an irregular pattern. Make a third one and booby-trap some of the mines (TNT blocks set to explode several yards ahead) with pull igniters to explode when lifted out. Work for variety in obstacles.

A burning ammunition truck blocks the road. Its driver lies dead beside the road. This situation can be made by placing a smoke pot in the truck bed. Stack and brace your empty ammo boxes so as to give the truck the appearance of a full load. Place the smoke pot in a box of wet sand because it gets hot. Let your men *act* in this situation, not just answer what they would do. A few M-8 firecrackers near the smoke pot can add to the tension.

A badly ditched mess truck or other vehicle can create another situation. How to extract it?

A road block with an Aggressor-manned ambush alongside will test and teach drivers to grip a gun as well as a wheel.

Place an umpire-observer near each exhibit.

Infantry Squads

You can develop a variety of situations as regards weapons, tactics and terrain. For example:

Lay out a machine gun or mortar and disarrange the sights, ammunition, MG headspacing, firing position, and such and then pose the problem of "what would you do to fire this weapon on such and such target?"

A variety of slit trenches and foxholes can give you material for such queries as "Which one would you jump into if you saw the fireball of an atomic bomb?" (the deepest one, naturally). "Which one would you use to fire a BAR from at that [specify] target?" "Which one would you choose to be in if a tank came at you?"

Station twelve men at 300 yards and



Booby-trap the "Coke"

have them fire and move about, in some cover and concealment, then ask the squad you are test-training to estimate the size of the "enemy." This test can be repeated in a variety of ways and is very productive. It is hard to estimate enemy strength at all accurately.

An enemy supply dump of old ammo cases, gas cans, and miscellaneous items can offer interest and variety of questions (or action if defended by Aggressors). Booby-trap some "souvenirs" like candy bars, and a case of Coke!

Mortar crews, when they cannot fire live ammo, get a dull workout on small-unit maneuvers. They set up, sight, and go through the motions of firing—but no boom! Try using TNT or grenade simulators on the target. What you need is a telephone line from your crew to your target where one NCO "umpire" can toss out the exploding shells (TNT) after receiving word over the field telephone that the mortars are firing. The NCO can start "short" of the target and the mortar can "adjust."

Tanker Training

A tank company commander can get in some good tank-infantry training even where infantry is not available. He can dismount one platoon of tankers and let them act as infantry, rotating the dismounted job among platoons. Of course, this "infantry" does not have weapons organic to real infantry, but this substitute combination can teach elementary coordination and work out problems of where tanks lead versus where infantry leads, or where infantry is used as a base of fire.

A lot of fighting and slugging can take place in a boxing ring and that area is anything but large. Where you only have a capsule of terrain you can still train tank crews effectively. Separate two platoons in opposite corners of your area. Sound the gong and let them come out slugging, with blanks in main guns. Score them on which tanks fire first, the time element between return fire, are turrets aiming the guns properly, which side mounts attack piecemeal [wrong] or in unison, which maneuvers best and shoots faster.

Tank-versus-tank situations are simple to arrange and you can use raw TNT in large quantities.

Arrange a good infantry ambush for tanks. Tankers need training in how to extricate themselves from such. Throw up some real log-and-dirt obstacles and see if your tankers have the will and skill to smash over, through or around one. Men in armor plate must learn to smash and dash. Tank drivers should not be timid or unskilled men when it comes to obstacles. Don't be afraid to let them knock over trees or smash through a dummy building now and then.

Tankers should end up in a position where they have to select alternate positions and make range cards. Concentrate on good range cards and enliven the situation with explosive charges that will actually show impact of fire.

While commanding the 15th Constabulary Squadron last year I lacked blank ammunition for the 37mm guns in the M8 armored cars. However, I had the car commanders carry rifles so as to launch flares and star cluster pyrotechnics horizontally, thereby marking main-gun fire. There was some risk. A crewman might have been hit—but it served to make them operate buttoned up. Knowledge of when a particular weapon fires is an essential in deciding who knocks out whom. Local tactical issues may rest heavily on this factor. Umpires find it hard to hear caliber .50 machine guns. Therefore, I like the use of pyrotechnics to mark main-gun fire. I still use it for 3.5-inch rocket launcher fire. The range is almost real too!

With tankers you can use a combination of exhibits and situations but toss in a hostile tank or two and measure crew reaction and action re quickness of return fire and maneuver.

Catch 'em and Keep 'em

The prisoner made to take off his shoes and walk home isn't going to get captured again if he can help it. He learns a lesson. Efforts should be made to capture PWs on small-unit problems and maneuvers and they should be held for a good period—not quickly released

t takes skill to get in close tactically and grab a batch of PWs and it promotes aggressiveness and self-confidence to let oldiers do this. There is often an argunent as to who captured whom, and here an umpire is needed. But I have ound that where umpires are not presnt the wills of the more aggressive men revail. Some men learn that others nore persuasive or authoritarian (comnand voices often prevail) can win the ocal issue. Both sides learn, although empers may flare. Soldiers who get mad t their opponents in an exercise develop eal aggressiveness.

Captors learn lessons too, especially they get careless, for they are often mbushed. Captors too often drop their uard amid the intoxication of local sucess. They also stand to learn how to ove their PWs away quickly. Aggresve PWs who manage to escape (and ey should try) give lessons to remember.

immicks of the Trade

Once in a while I find imaginative mpires. Most of the time they are a ll sort given to pessimism and ill desions (for your side!). This summer was projecting an armored reconnaisnce company through its annual tacal test and the company was advancg rapidly on a basis of fine aggressiveess and audacious assault. My C Comny, commanded by Lieutenant Paul che, was "mixing" the tactical probm and pushing the Aggressors all ound when the umpires began pulling bbits out of the hat. I suppose it was alism in a sense but actually it was a ntrol measure. I'll never forget the umres digging into their map cases and pulling out red paper "land mines" the size of cocktail napkins and scattering them about with much abandon in a high wind while my men were chasing the mines so as to stab them with bayonets and pin them to the ground. When we pinioned them and subsequently removed them properly, the umpires "blew a crater" in a defile. There was only one thing lacking—realism. I recommend that all umpires carry flour sacks with which to outline blown craters so that fill-in engineers and other troops can estimate the cubic feet of soil necessary to fill the holes.

Men seek and adhere to tangibles!

There is one place I like an umpire to be mean and arbitrary and that is around a mess. Here an umpire can teach realism. Overconcentrate a tactical mess, and I say let the umpire arbitrarily assess casualties after letting go a smoke pot to simulate artillery fire. The same thing goes for an overcrowded road intersection.

An imaginative umpire has been known to collect a small horde of infantry from one side and then send it forth voluntarily to surrender just to see what the startled commander on the other side would do. There is nothing like upsetting the equilibrium of a commander with a large batch of PWs.

It is well for an umpire to tag a fair portion of a unit as casualties and then see how the rest fight. Men must reckon with casualties.

Cause Casualties

It makes men remember their mistakes when you take out a squad leader, tank commander or platoon commander and force leadership on subordinates. I have applied this to where corporals have commanded platoons for short periods. It makes subordinates appreciate that they might have to assume greater responsibilities and it acquaints them with the burdens of higher command.

To simulate "casualties" before a prepared position, string strong wire twelve inches off the ground. Crisscross it well at various angles and string tight. Men in the assault will drop like flies and squad leaders will actually see their men fall, if *they* don't too!

To simulate realistic artillery fire set TNT or other explosive charges high in trees and on the ground. Those placed in trees can be lit by pull igniters with long fuzes or fired electrically. It takes a little work but it's well worth it.

Land mines can be created in a variety of ways: by light explosive charges buried in the ground; by log sections sawed off, painted, and tied into real charges three yards ahead.

You don't have to rob your mess to make flour hand grenades. You are authorized to draw separate amounts of flour and sacks with which to make these and they leave no doubt as to hits on man or vehicle. Just don't put rocks in them. Night patrols that want to get into bivouacs and mark vehicles they destroy find shoe polish cans full of yellow paint are useful. It gives the other side something to work on afterward and remember!

Build a Battlefield

Every military post should have a tailor-made battlefield as a permanent



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installation. Here's how. Collect some old tanks, halftracks or other wrecked and obsolete vehicles—civilian vehicles can be used, so raid a junk yard. Scatter the wrecks into a ruined column in order to create a shot-up convoy. Your men will learn by sight, not by words, that a nasty mess results from a closed column in combat.

Collect all available debris and scatter it over the battlefield. Don't be timid or selective; the more grotesque, awful and repulsive the debris the finer for realism. Old shacks, houses, shoes, wrecked airplanes, railway cars, bones, broken glass, rusty metal, shell cases, clothing—debris of any sort will do. Just get it. Then scatter it to make the region grim.

You must have a village, even if you have to build it. Go Hollywood and build a false front set of two-sided houses, at least. Make it complete with clotheslines, lamp posts, telephone poles and wire, street signs, billboards, fences and old wagons. Shell boxes make nice big "bricks" with which to construct houses. Raid the salvage dump for old plumbing, scrap metal, old stoves, etc., with which to equip your houses. They must have all elements of realism and not be mere shells. They must have the "lived in once" look. Build your village so that it looks ruined in parts. Then reserve other portions to be ruined by fire and explosives as you train. Pile as much lumber into your village as possible—if you can't build with it you can burn it up during problems. Men must get used to fighting through burning villages.

You have built a village and have the battered wreck of a convoy, too. What else do you need? Hostile defenses, of course, so construct a fortified area—pillboxes, multiple bands of barbed wire fences, dragon teeth, fallen trees, dugouts, mine fields and all conceivable obstructions. Blast and blow up the ground to create shell holes. Dig trenches and tank traps. Make it a real, formidable barrier; make it nasty. Whether you are training armor or infantry you will establish some nasty roadblocks, for all troops will need to learn how to reduce them. Scatter a few old tanks or vehicles near these roadblocks as symbols of war and ruin.

Arrange your area to fit the ground and your training needs. Load your area with props and build your atmosphere up to appeal to the senses. The medics will scream and torment you with sanitary reports, but don't be afraid to scatter some old animal carcasses around your area—and let them rot! Realism is an appeal to the senses of sight, smell, touch, taste and hearing.

Dummies lend atmosphere and are easy to make. Get old clothing and stuff it with newspapers or straw, and the like—the more of these the better. Strew them about. Hang them on barbed wire. Let them drape out of wrecked vehicles. Create an atmosphere of death. That is what the soldier must work amidst.



Walk PWs barefoot

Collect some truck loads of old rubber tires, shell cases, and ammo boxes. The day before your problem comes off load this inflammable debris into your ruined tanks, vehicles, buildings and landscape. Then before your problem starts set everything afire and let the flames pour out the grim realism of death and destruction.

Once you have your combat scenery created you can plan and project multiple problems over your battlefield. You can have your village defended and your fortified area manned. You should load up your area with explosives and mines. Let your men actually breach barbed wire with those nice-sounding and highly effective bangalore torpedoes. We did this recently in the 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Our only "casualty" was a German civilian who for no purpose except curiosity got too close. He was a casualty only in the sense that an explosion cracked the upper plate to his false teeth!

Intelligence

Teach and test proper location of enemy strength. You can talk intelligence until you are blue in the face—and get nowhere. But in the field you can teach the value of it to a platoon or company. Set up one Aggressor site in a defensive position. On a map or aerial photo chart the gun and defensive positions. Require the other side to scout out and determine the strength and exact locations of the defenders on the same map. Make the commander of the attacking side record this information completely and do not let him attack until he has very good knowledge of the defenders. He may "champ at the bit" but as umpire or controller your map or photo will show exact defender positions and strength. Check the attacking commander's map against yours. Later use both maps in a critique. The facts of actual positions may be in contrast to the combat intelligence gathered. It's a good exercise for one day or less.

Ideas for the Future

Some day a smart staff officer with power in the Pentagon should invent and then sell to the Army wax or rubber "bullets" that can be fired by rifles, carbines and caliber .30 machine guns for a distance of 300 yards. These could be used on all exercises and maneuvers and fired by soldiers at soldiers, all of whom are wearing protective goggles. There will be some faces slightly scarred, some clothing punctured, but soldiers will, at the cost of minor scratches, learn things which will later save their dog tags from being separated.

There is a serious ammunition shortage in the Army that Congress didn't discover. It is blank ammunition in all calibers. It deserves serious attention for the tactical training of all our troops is suffering greatly from this deficiency.

For effective training we need more blank ammo and more realism in our problems and exercises.

Training for cameramen, too. A daring Signal Corps lens snapper crawled up close to get this picture of a tank (left) that had just smashed through one of the houses in Colonel Rigg's village built by the 1st Battalion, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment, in Germany.



THE AVIATION COMPANY: *to be or not to be?*

Captain Weyman S. Carver

WHAT has happened to the two observation planes and two pilots I used to have? Where are my aircraft mechanics? In fact, what has happened to my battalion aviation section?"

At times division artillery commanders have decided that their units' combat effectiveness would be increased by pooling the aircraft of the artillery battalions in their command. Battalion commanders began asking these questions. And now up at division artillery headquarters, the division artillery commander, with a scowl on his face, is asking, "What's this talk of centralizing division aviation into some sort of aviation company?"

Commanders of other units that have aircraft also have questions—and scowls when they hear talk of a division aviation company. Nevertheless there are division commanders in Korea who seriously believe that the aviation company is a step in the right direction.

Those who favor a division aviation company say that putting all the aircraft in the division into one organization, the aviation company, is actually nothing more than the artillery commander did when he pooled all the division artillery aircraft and set up a Divarty aviation section.

"There's a lot of difference," the Divarty commander may rightfully reply. "The aviation company will remove from me direct control and operation, aerial observation, which seriously affects the combat effectiveness of his command. One of the most important tools which I uses will be taken away from him.

"No it won't," is the reply. "The company would not take any of the aircraft support from division artillery. In fact, the company will be able to increase Divarty aircraft support. Further, it will make the Divarty observation systems more efficient and it will increase the use of all aviation equipment in the division, simplify supply problems, get more work out of highly skilled aircraft technicians, and make special type aircraft and helicopters available for emergency use."

THESE are big claims, but first let's find out why there may be a need for a division aircraft company.

In order to perform Army Aviation's many jobs, better aircraft, pilots, maintenance equipment, and more skilled mechanics are required. Further, aircraft have been assigned to eleven different organizations within a division and this eleven-way split has sometimes resulted in the setting up of eleven separate air sections, each requisitioning its own supplies, handling its own refueling, operating its own base radio communications system, its own operations office, and, in many cases, establishing its own airstrip. It is easy to see that if all the units were combined under one organization and all the administrative and logistical support peculiar to aircraft were centralized, a much more efficient operation could result.

For example, some equipment is common to all Army aircraft. A pre-starting heater, a very expensive piece of equipment used to circulate hot air around the engine in cold weather in order to heat it prior to starting, is typical.

Fuller use of skilled manpower would result too. For example, aircraft technical inspectors, who, in the interest of safety, are required to inspect each aircraft following any maintenance performed on the aircraft by mechanics which involves flight safety, would be more readily available.

ALL this sounds eminently sensible, but there is still a big question unanswered: Will units needing aircraft be able to get them when and where they need them?

Those who favor a division aviation company say it will provide more support when maximum effort is required by a unit. For example, under the decentralized system, a Divarty commander might need all his aircraft for a maximum effort, but not be able to use all of them because some are under repair. Under the company setup, aircraft which are not being used to support one of the other units could easily be diverted to the use of the Divarty commander. It is true that this could also be done, with a little more coordination, under the other system, except that the aviators might not be trained to fly artillery missions. The same is true of other type units borrowing aircraft and personnel to support them.

Under the decentralized system Divarty pilots fly all the artillery observation missions, division headquarters and headquarters company pilots fly the administrative, G2 or intelligence gathering missions and photo missions, regimental pilots fly the reconnaissance missions, and the signal company pilots fly that company's reconnaissance missions.

These assignments result in an unequal work load and an unequal amount of combat flying time. Aviators assigned to Divarty fly much more combat time than other pilots in the division because they must keep the front under observation during all daylight hours. On the other hand, those who fly photo missions have the most dangerous job. They are a good enemy target while flying low over a straight and level course. Also the reconnaissance missions, while not as dangerous as photo missions, are more hazardous than the observation type mission.

An aviation company would correct these conditions. Pilots would be trained for all types of missions. All pilots would be placed on the same roster and each pilot would take his turn flying the different type missions. This would result in an equalization of the work load and combat risk involved. Combat flying time of Divarty pilots would be reduced, thus reducing flying fatigue and increasing the efficiency of the pilot.

Perhaps the biggest problem for those favoring centralization is coordination. If units can readily be furnished aircraft support and if what has thus far been theorized concerning increased administrative efficiency, better use of equipment and manpower, and actually better aircraft support can be proven in practical demonstration, the division aviation company will probably become a part of every division.

CAPTAIN WEYMAN S. CARVER, Artillery, now on duty with Headquarters, Eighth Army, is an Army Aviator who recently completed a tour of duty with the 7th Infantry Division during which he flew 247 combat missions.

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THE INFANTRY-ARTILLERY-ARMOR-ENGINEER TEAM DID IT

Operation Touchdown Won He

LIEUTENANT COLONEL VIRGIL E. CRAVEN

LIEUTENANT COLONEL VIRGIL E. CRAVEN, Infantry, was, as he makes clear in this article, the commander of the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, during Operation Touchdown. Now on duty in the Pentagon, Colonel Craven entered the Army in 1941 from the ROTC unit of Kansas State College. During the Second World War he was a company commander in the 34th Infantry Division in Africa and Italy. Integrated into the Regular Army in 1946, he was an instructor in night operations at The Infantry School before going to Korea in July 1951.

I WATCHED the last major Uni Nations offensive in Korea from top of Heartbreak Ridge. From the 30 foot elevation of Hill 931, I was able follow the dramatic climax of Operat Touchdown—and Heartbreak Ridge a part of this operation. What I from Friday, 5 October, to Monday,



eak Ridge

ctober 1951, was a hard-hitting infan-
-armor team, given time to master its
nals and get set, successfully drive five
gged miles against a ferocious Red de-
nse which had advantages of terrain
d heavy reserves.

Touchdown was the culmination of al-
ost 100 days of continuous combat by
e 2d Infantry Division. The Korean
r did not end on 15 October when
eartbreak was won, but all of us in the

Division will always think it more than a coincidence that the enemy's loss of this strategic position had something to do with his sudden desire to resume the suspended truce talks.

Unfortunately grueling months of fighting remained. But in all that time, the main line of Eighth Army in that sector remained exactly where Operation Touchdown put it. Local fights for outposts and favorable hills occurred during the two years of "peace talks," but no decisive action was undertaken.

To understand fully the significance of Touchdown, a brief blackboard drill is essential.

IN the spring of 1951, the enemy, his squads heavy with what had been hidden reserves, shoved the Eighth Army south. By late summer and fall, the grudging forces of the United Nations had braced, stopped the enemy drive and launched a vigorous counterattack.

During September, the 2d Infantry Division made sporadic limited objective attacks—never larger than battalion strength—in the rock and rubble environs of Hills 931 and 851, as these summits are designated on battle maps.

Repeated efforts to secure these and neighboring objectives by means of scrimmage-like, short, head-on jolts and end runs were repulsed. The stronger and cagey enemy held the heights. He hid in his elaborate bunkers and caves, some of which could hold an entire 1000-man North Korean regiment. When our

Some tanks were knocked out—but the armor went through



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supporting artillery fire and air attacks were lifted to let our forces advance, the Reds would rush from their safe bunkers to positions that were carefully contrived and frequently changed, from which they could rake our men with small-arms fire, mortars and grenades as we clawed our way, utterly exposed, up the last 300 or 400 yards of naked peaks.

Surprise was lost to our numerically inferior forces. Our limited objective attacks could be kept under constant and concentrated enemy surveillance. A dangerous stalemate threatened. But pressure was mounting at Eighth Army and X Corps for a strong "winter line." Focal points were the Heartbreak and Punchbowl Ridge complexes. The latter was already in our hands. We wanted Heartbreak.

LATE in September, Major General Robert N. Young became the Division's commander. He met with his staff and this is what they told him.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Mallon, Division G3, pointed to an operations map (*see map*) which showed the 9th Infantry under Colonel John M. Lynch on the left. The 23d Infantry under Colonel James Y. Adams, bolstered by the battalion of French Volunteer Forces in Korea, was in the center. The 38th Infantry under Colonel Frank T. Mildren was in reserve. (A word about the French commander, Lieutenant General Monteclair. He took a voluntary bust in rank to lieutenant colonel in order to command the French forces in Korea. However all of us called him "general.")

In his briefing, Colonel Mallon explained that the 9th and 38th had most recently come through hard fighting at Bloody Ridge and Punchbowl. Consequently, the fresher 23d had been assigned primary responsibility for the key objectives—Hills 931 and 851, which dominate the strategic Mundung-ni Valley to the left and Satae-ri Valley to the right.

Lieutenant Colonel Albert W. Aykroyd, Division G2, reported that the Division was confronted by a force of at least 36,000 Communists organized into two corps. He told the General that any map or words he could use would bear poor witness to the ruggedness and complexity of the terrain. The G2 told how the ridge line—894 to 931 to 851, a narrow, rocky, mountainous mass running north and south—dominates the Mundung-ni Valley to the west and Satae-ri Valley to the east. In the Mundung-ni Valley, the enemy was using an old mine to hide his troops by day. Through the Satae-ri Valley, supplies and replacements also were being funneled to the Heartbreak defenders.

The G2 briefing told how in repeated instances direct artillery hits had simply bounced off the sturdy rock and dirt bunkers built by the Reds. It was apparent that the enemy would have to be blasted, burned, bayoneted and finally dragged out of his bunkers.

After the briefing General Young visited the frontline units. He made several reconnaissance flights in an L-19, studying the terrain from every angle. He had been told that the terrain would not permit the effective use of armor—the one major possible surprise element.

General Young called in his engineer officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Love. Could the unimproved road, if it could be called even that, along the Suipchon River to the east be made passable for M4 tanks? Not just a few tanks, the General emphasized, but the full striking force of the Division's 72d Tank Battalion.

Give him a few days to size up the situation, Love requested. A few days later he reported that though it would be a major engineering effort, it could be done if he were given sufficient time and adequate fire cover.

Determined to break the developing stalemate, General Young outlined a plan to the X Corps commander, Major General Clovis Byers. The 2d Division would launch a simultaneous attack by all three of its infantry regiments, supported by the entire Division artillery, and closely coordinated with what the Reds would least expect—a tank-infantry drive up the Mundung-ni Valley, spearheaded by the 72d Tank Battalion, and a complementary tank-infantry advance up the Satae-ri Valley by a special task force.

General Byers approved the plan. What would it be called? The fall day had a snap to it. Operation Touchdown, said General Young. When can you get it under way? The answer: 5 October. H-hour was set for 2100.

On 1 October, after what had appeared to be a routine staff briefing, General Young gave the order for Touchdown. The 9th Infantry would move along the Division's left boundary to seize Hills 867, 666, 1005 and 1040. The 38th Infantry, in reserve, would shift into an unbalanced line to seize Hills 485 and 728, and be prepared to attack Hills 636, 605, 905, 974, 841 and 1220 (Kim Il Sung Ridge). Simultaneously, with what a battlefield spotter with football experience could call a "division in motion" stratagem, the 23d Infantry's four battalions would attack and seize Hills 931 and 851. Hill 894 was already ours, having been seized earlier by the 9th Infantry.

THEN General Young put in the "kicker." In addition to the infantry attacks, the attack would employ the full Division tank strength.

Colonel Love and his engineers were told to get the road to Mundung-ni ready for the M4s. Where the road was too narrow, they were to widen it or change it. Where there was no road, they were to make one. (The Reds didn't think this could be done. Still, to play it safe they had laid antitank mines three deep. This precaution taken, the enemy returned to his bunkers, sweated out our artillery, and waited for another line plunge at Heartbreak.)

General Young told his commanders why he thought the plan would work. The simultaneous advance of the three regiments would erase the enemy's chances of concentrating fire, particularly mortar fire. And once the attack was under way, the enemy would be unable to move reinforcements from one threatened sector to another.

The answer to the enemy's ability to cringe safely in bunkers until the attackers struck for the peaks was armor.

On the right flank, over a relatively good road, the 23d Infantry organized Task Force Sturman, a special tank-infantry force named after its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Sturman. Beginning 3 October, this task force would make "softening up" raids in the Satae-ri Valley. The mission of Sturman's tankers would be to destroy by tank fire the formidable enemy bunkers located on the reverse side of the slopes west of Satae-ri and, when the infantry attacks came, to keep the Reds pinned down.

On the opposite end of the line, the advance of the infantry, notably the 38th, would provide cover for Love's engineers building the tank track to Mundung-ni. When the engineers finished their job, the 72d Tank Battalion would duplicate Sturman's mission and give a helping hand to the 38th and 9th.

GENERAL YOUNG gave his commanders five days to get ready. The Division as a unit and its soldiers as individuals needed this time. The five days delay saved scores of lives, won the ground.

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Cornelson, Division G4, mustered every available truck and a three-day level of supplies was stockpiled. The stuff that counted—45,000 rounds of artillery ammunition

,000 rations and 20,000 gallons of gas was in place by sunset of the 5th. Dur- g Touchdown, using only vehicles rmanently assigned to it, the 2d moved 00 truckloads of ammunition a dis- nce of sixteen miles, one-third of the ute over a one-way defile.

The amazing feat of Love and his en- neers in building the tank track merits pecial and technical report of its own. turned out that our engineers were rking the most heavily mined and tered road the Division had ever en- ntered in Korea.

Time would not permit Love to get of the road in shape. Parts had to by-passed, to be rebuilt and widened r. The detour was the stream bed lf, where great boulders and even a ll waterfall at the northern end com- ated the job.

Having assured the commanders time get ready, General Young demanded t each battalion commander submit him a detailed fire plan which would w the use to be made of all weap- available to the battalion, including s.

Colonel Adams of the 23d assigned battalions the mission of securing 931—for which the regiment had contesting for 22 days. The 1st Bat- n, commanded by Lieutenant Colo- George Williams, in position north east of the objective, would put di- ionary pressure on Hill 851. The ch Battalion, located on a short ridge ing to the north knob of Hill 931, ld draw the enemy's attention by a s of feints, but would be prepared unch an attack at first light of 6 ber to secure the north knob of the ctive. The 2d Battalion, command- by Lieutenant Colonel Henry F. iels, in position on the ridge line h of the objective, would plan and ute the attack on the south knob. battalion, the 3d, was in reserve, but ld move up to the vicinity of Hill in time for the attack at the sched- hour.

olonel Adams, as had General ng, kept his instructions simple and t. They remained that way through- Touchdown.

N it was our job to prepare the oops. Fortunately, my men were stomed to night operations, although was, of course, the problem of the replacements and the psychological tment to an all-out effort, rather the limited objective actions of the nonth.

lonel Daniels said: "To know that night owl outfit like yours will be



Each Chinese Red position was a fortress of logs, rocks and dirt from which direct artillery hits sometimes bounced harmlessly. Each was attacked by fire support teams armed with every effective infantry weapon. To protect these teams tanks fired on neighboring positions, forcing the enemy to keep his head down.



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up on that hill gives me the certain feeling we'll be eating breakfast in the Gooks' bunkers when the sun comes up." We were a little late for breakfast, but we made it in time for brunch.

After I had explained the plan of attack in detail to my officers, I told them that they were to devote the rest of that day, which was Wednesday, that night and the next day, which was D minus 1, to organizing their companies and making a dry run, in exact battle order, on the hills in the area.

These dry runs were possible because we had been given time. As a result, each man knew who was to be in front of him, who behind. Whatever it may do in other places, familiarity bred confidence on the hillsides of Korea.

On 4 October I went out with an overstrength reconnaissance party to select an attack position. Explicit assignments were made to the two companies slated for the attack. Company commanders picked out possible enemy bunkers. Sketches of the terrain were made and carried back for study and to use in briefing the troops.

We checked the time and measured where the shadows would fall. This was important because the narrow ridge line would force the battalion to string out possibly 600 yards. Each company was to coil to its attack position with the setting sun.

The companies completed their practice night attack. Every platoon leader, officer and noncom reported that he thoroughly understood the plan of attack and that the plan had been made known to all men.

Thus, by the evening of Friday, 5 October, every man was ready. This time it would be different. The entire Division would hit together hard—and with armor, Sturman's gang to the right and what the men called our "hidden ball" outfit, the 72d Tank Battalion in the center.

As H-hour approached, the lid on artillery expenditure went off and Marine Corps Corsairs napalmed, rocketed and machine-gunned enemy positions.

The sun set. It got dark. It was 2100.

I CALLED Daniels to tell him my battalion, the last to move, was in gear. So was the rest of the Division, except for Sturman, waiting daylight and his fourth day of raids, and the 72d, impatiently awaiting the resolute engineers.

The 9th Infantry moved out to attack Hill 867. The 38th Infantry, which had stolen Hill 485 just before H-hour, occupied Hill 728 without opposition. The 38th was on its way to Kim Il Sung Ridge and now had taken positions from which effective cover could be given to the engineers. The gate was beginning to swing open for the tank drive up the valley, if only the road could be readied. The engineers worked on.



Where the track up the valley of the Mundung-ni was cratered, the engineer by-passed the armor through the stream-bed.

At 2100, L and K Companies of the 23d started to uncoil. The night now was full of the noise of machine-gun chatter and burp-gun fire.

Things were going fine. At 2300, the final checkpoint still had not been reached, but the reports, made every 30 minutes, were good. The enemy was busy with artillery, small arms and grenades, but he had to keep his fire scattered against the movements across his entire front.

At 2345, K Company reached the ridge line and cut left, exactly as planned. This was a blocking position to thwart an attack from the rear. L Company reached the ridge line moments later, turned right toward the objective.

Shortly after midnight, K Company startled an enemy unit and immediately was in the midst of a tremendous fire fight. Love Company commander asked permission to go for the peak. Daniels' lead company reported it was poised and ready to jump. I made the decision. L Company was ordered to press the attack to a previously designated terrain beyond which it was not to advance. A 0130 Daniels got the signal to mov with his lead company.

At 0200, flamethrowers of G Com pany were in action. This light gave Company's commander a fix on the lea element of George Company. He pushe on into the blackness.

By 0300, the south knob of Hill 9 was ours.

As we caught our breath on the t of the south knob of 931, we knew was now our turn to see if we cou switch to the defense. For the first tin in more than three weeks, we held important new summit and it was t Reds' turn to counterattack. They car and we rolled them back, down the sou side of the saddle. And at daylight r battalion and the French Battali moved forward to the north knob of H 931. I moved my OP to the top of 93

WHEN Daniels joined me, the sun ready was high in the sky, but t meal we ate we called breakfast. T North Korean commander's bunker b came our CP. We showed it off like real estate agent on Sunday afterno when Brigadier General Haydon Boatner, assistant division command arrived about noon.

We watched the enemy scattering

cover, and knew that we would be fighting them again for 851.

From our heights I watched the 9th Infantry's 3d Battalion fight for Hill 867 and the next morning through my field glasses I saw a red panel to warn friendly aircraft, which meant 867 was ours. To the left, I saw troops on Hill 728, which had been assigned to the 38th Infantry.

On the right, Sturman's tanks pounded away at the enemy, particularly those on Hill 851.

On the road to Mundung-ni, we could see and hear Love and his engineers at work and noted how the advance of Colonel Mildren's 38th eased the enemy pressure on the engineers. Meantime, back beyond our view, the 72d Tank Battalion was warming up.

From Hill 931, I saw the 9th Infantry's 2d Battalion move through the 8th ROK Division to secure Hill 1024, thereby safeguarding the Division's left flank. The 9th then attacked and secured Hill 1005 after a relentless bayonet assault. The 1st Battalion moved into position southwest of Hill 1040 and, with assistance of supporting fire, took it.

Now the 38th was ready to move against 636 and 605.

Their entire frontline positions having been hit, the Reds fretted and tried to figure out what they might do to stop the infantry and Task Force Sturman. Soon, they would have another worry: the 72d's tanks.

On Wednesday, 10 October, without benefit of a ribbon-cutting ceremony, Colonel Love opened the road to Mundung-ni for tank traffic. As the fog lifted about 0830, the green light went on and we saw the 72d move out. What a sight those tanks were! They moved ever so cautiously at first, but then shifted to speedier gear as they realized that the Communists were caught flat-footed.

AS our battalion and other units of the 23d prepared for the coming attack on 851, we kept watch on the 72d's tanks. Carrying L Company of the 38th and a platoon of engineers, the tanks lugged forward. The abandoned mine, which had been turned into an active supply point and which was alive with enemy replacements, was brought under fire and set ablaze. The tanks walloped the area with volcanic vengeance. Scores of enemy were killed.

The tanks did not stop with the mine. They rolled on, although by now the Communists were able to bring artillery and mortar fire into action against the tanks. We saw that there was an area about 50 yards wide and 200 yards long where the enemy fire was heaviest. Later, we learned that a mortar shell had gone straight into the hatch of one of the lead tanks, killing three of the tankers and wounding the other two.

If any one single thing convinced my battalion that we would go all the way—right to the top of 851—it was the sight of those tanks operating where the Reds had been certain no tanks could come.

As darkness began to fall on the 10th, the 72d, leaving L Company at previously designated objectives, moved back of our line, while on the other end Sturman wound up a week's work.

THAT night, the Communists slipped down and again heavily mined the Mundung-ni expressway and on the 11th pounded away with artillery and mortar at the marauding tanks. But the tankers, with support from the infantry in the hills, rolled on and the 72d sent some of its tanks as far as four miles beyond Mundung-ni. They were without infantry but each tank was overwatched by another about 100 yards behind it. They went so far forward they got out of our sight. Then they came back to help. Targets of opportunity were diminishing for the tanks. As Colonel Mildren led the 38th further to the left towards Kim Il Sung Ridge, the tanks, lacking any semblance of a road, were forced to return to the Mundung-ni Valley. But they maintained pressure on the enemy and helped all of us.

Now it was the infantry's responsibility to keep the drive moving.

On Thursday, 12 October, the 38th to our left moved slowly but systematically from hill knob to hill knob in their grim approach to Hill 1200.

The 38th's three battalions, plus the Dutch battalion which had moved up from reserve to join them, used the devastating effectiveness of its fire support teams to move in daylight. A typical team consisted of six or eight weapons, including mortars, machine guns, rifles and automatic weapons. Each group was controlled by an officer or noncom at the site and a control officer or noncom with the attacking unit. At predetermined emplacement sites, ammunition would be stocked. It took extra time to set these fire support teams up, but the additional fire power it gave the assaulting elements made the preparations worth while.

As the 38th moved forward, we felt the enemy resistance stiffening in our sector. All day and all night of Thursday, the 12th, the struggle persisted from bunker to bunker. There were not many prisoners, but some of them were Chinese Reds, proof that the North Koreans had been hurt so badly by Touchdown that help had been summoned.

At the break of day on the 13th, the French Battalion launched a final assault on Hill 851. At 0630 it reached the peak. After thirty days and twenty-nine nights of battle, Heartbreak Ridge belonged to the Eighth Army. It still did when the truce came two years later.

The next day the 1st Battalion of the 38th jumped off to attack Hill 1220. By early afternoon, the battalion lacked only a few hundred yards of the peak. Darkness prevented the final attack. The next morning, the last day of Touchdown, the 38th's 3d Battalion passed through the 1st Battalion and took it.

THE vital statistics: Operation Touchdown cost the 2d Infantry Division 1,657 casualties in the fighting for Heartbreak; the enemy lost 9,547. It cost the 2d Infantry Division 1,524 casualties for Kim Il Sung Ridge (Hill 1220); the enemy lost 11,781, including more than 500 to the tanks of the 72d Tank Battalion. We fired 229,724 rounds of artillery at Heartbreak and 266,857 rounds at Kim Il Sung Ridge.

The 7th Infantry Division moved up to relieve us. The enemy called for resumption of truce talks and the men of the Indianhead Division met in "skull sessions" to review the lessons learned in Touchdown. Here are some of them from the viewpoint of a battalion commander.

Touchdown proved that no matter how complicated the overall plan, it can and must be presented to individual commanders in simple terms.

Each unit must be given a single objective at a time and, given this, must be permitted freedom of action to carry out its assignment.

Operation Touchdown demonstrated that battalion commanders can function best when they are not frequently subjected to interruptions or modifications in the basic plan.

Wherever possible, the division as a whole and individual units should be given adequate time to get ready. The 2d had those precious five days at the beginning, and during the operation commanders knew that they could take time to organize attacking units.

Taboos against night attacks are out of date. Touchdown showed repeatedly that successful night attacks can be carried out by infantry.

The operation pointed to the need for developing the closest possible interplay between the tanks and infantry, and to the tremendous hitting power of a properly prepared and coordinated tank-infantry force.

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Figure 1



Figure 2

Gridding the Single Vertical Photograph

SINGLE vertical photographs are much more useful if they are tied into the battlemap of the area they picture. In the past, on being tossed a photograph, we located a target on it by inspection and then, by restitution, located the spot on a battlemap or grid sheet. This was a slow and awkward preparatory process for the delivery of artillery or mortar fire. Because of the inefficiency of the technique, it was and is unpopular, and little used in combat.

But disregarding the time element involved, the fact is that we have been restituting points from photos to maps or other charts by one or more methods, and accurately. However, we have overlooked the fact that restitution goes two ways: If we can restitute from photo to map, why can't we restitute points from map to photo? The answer is that we can.

What do we want on the photo that will tie it to our map, and what value will this tie-in have? If grid lines ap-

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Figure 3

Here's a way to transfer map coordinates to vertical photographs accurately and rapidly. Any good intelligence sergeant can learn to do it and the result can be surprise fire delivered quickly.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN P. REMY

earing on the battlemap were superposed on the photo in their correct elative position, we could then read hoto coordinates to be plotted directly the firing chart without delay. Such perimposition can be achieved by stituting map grid lines to the photo.

RIDDING the single vertical is not difficult. The simplest and fastest method of performing restitution is the proportional divider method: with the dividers opened in the form of an X, the legs and pivot are moved until the distance between tips at one end equals the distance between two selected points on the photo, and the distance between tips at the other end simultaneously is equal to the distance between those same points on the map. After locating two points suitable as restitution points and common to both the map and photograph, set up the proportional divider ratio as shown in Figures 1 and 2. With the ratio thus established, restitute the grid line intersections to the photo and draw the grid lines in ink as shown in Figure 3; number the grid lines the same as the corresponding grid lines on the battlemap. A photo gridded to match

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


Figure 4

the map or firing chart has now been obtained.

SOME of you may be wondering about the technical aspects of this system. First, a fundamental of other systems is true here; namely, it is desirable that no tilt occur during photography, but satisfactory restitution can be obtained where tilt exists up to three degrees. Second, the proportional divider method of restitution—admittedly not as accurate as radial line restitution—is sufficiently so for the use described here. Also it is fast and simple. Third, grid lines would, of course, not be parallel if absolute control were achieved; but they should be parallel when established by the proportional divider method. Yet even with absolute control, their divergence would be small and of little importance; for we are locating points according to their relative position within one grid square. Remember, too, that a large error on a 1/25,000 scale becomes noticeably smaller when "blown up" to the 1/5,000-1/12,000 scales typical of our photos.

What about the practical aspects? This method of placing the Universal Transverse Mercator Grid Reference System (UTMGRS) on single vertical photos has been used at The Artillery School, Fort Sill, with great success, especially in the field of aerial observation. In one class of officers, all inexperienced aerial observers, the initial target locations determined from a gridded photograph were accurate enough (i.e., within fifty yards) in seventy percent of the cases for delivery of effectiv surprise fire without adjustment. Thes observers were being flown in L-19s a an altitude of 6,000 feet, parallel to an slightly in rear of a simulated front lin In another instance, an observer, wh was actually piloting his F-80 jet, su cessfully completed eight firing missior in twenty-four minutes—primarily b cause of the accurate target coordinate derived from a photo gridded to matc the firing chart. Use of such photo permitted direct plots without the tim loss involved in target restitution.

Being easy to read, the gridded ph tograph can also be used to great a vantage by survey officers to elimina any gross error that may have been i troduced. Officers on reconnaissanc find its use invaluable. And the S2 problem of photo filing is simplifie because of the numbered grid lines.

BECAUSE most photo scales va from accepted standards, a hanc device to facilitate reading coordinat on the gridded photo is a plastic tem plate, custom-made to fit the grid square (This template is shown overprintin the photograph in Figure 4.) Each c vision on the template represents a 10 meter square. Coordinates to the nea est ten meters can be read for init target location. The template is also valuable aid when firing on an auxilia adjusting point quite distant from t area where fire for effect is to be d livered: once the observer visualizes t O-T line (when on the ground) or t G-T line (when in the air) and orie his template along that line on t photo, he can make adjustments auxiliary points and transfer his fire effect to targets up to 1,000 meters aw (Figure 4). Vertical control must b obtained from a battlemap.

You ask, "Who is to perform t restitution, and who is to construct th templates?" With a little practice a good intelligence sergeant can do e job in ten minutes. Every division a lery headquarters and field artillery b talion has the necessary equipment. the S2 or S3 can swing it, it is desira to have the photos gridded and nu bered at the photo reproduction cen duplication of work is thus elimina and identical photos are gridded u formly.

Rapid, effective surprise fire from c curate, quickly obtained photo coo nates sells this process to all who us

'FAIR PLAY AND RESTORATION OF PRESTIGE'

REPRESENTATIVE DEWEY SHORT

I HAVE said in the past, and I am sure that I will again say in the future, that this nation has been most fortunate in its military leaders. In the 1930s we had an Army of only 165,000 men, but out of that Army we produced men like Eisenhower, Wainwright, Ridgway, MacArthur, Patton, Collins, Arnold, Hodges, Twining, Bradley, Kenney, Vandenberg, and a host of others. . . . It could only have been due to an extreme devotion to this nation and a prophetic insight of things to come that led such men to continue their military careers. For promotion in these days, as I am sure many of you here vividly recall, was a very slow, painful and evolutionary process. The pay was low, but there were certain prerequisites, and there was prestige and dignity attached to the word "officer" and "noncommissioned officer." But today I am very worried about the future of our armed forces for I greatly fear that through a constant whittling away of minor benefits and through the development of an inexplicable philosophy possessed by some people in this country, we are going to attract as the future leaders of our armed forces men of mediocre ability. It is this trend toward mediocrity which alarms me. We are not getting young men to enter our armed forces today of the caliber and in sufficient quantity to give us the type of leaders that were developed prior to the outbreak of World War II. And we are not getting these young men because Congress, and to some extent, the people, are making the military career less and less attractive.

Pay is not the most important item in this problem by any stretch of the imagination. Actually, the pay of our service personnel is fairly consistent with that received in industry for comparable responsibility. So I do not think that pay is the answer. But I do think that fair play and a restoration of the dignity and prestige once enjoyed by officers and noncommissioned officers is the answer.

IN the last Appropriations Act the Congress adopted a legislative rider aimed at closing commissaries located in the United States if there were commercial facilities available. Now this may not seem like a very important matter but if you could read the mail that comes into my office every day about this one subject, I think you would appreciate more and more the importance of these commissaries to service personnel. The savings are not great, but in some cases, and particularly for the junior officers and enlisted men with families, it may make the difference between a reasonable standard of living and a low standard of living.

Then there is the question of the limitation on weight allowances for the shipment of household effects. This seriously affects the officer with a large family who, succumbing to the higher standard of living requirements of our time, has acquired a freezer and perhaps a television set. And woe to the man in the military service who is musically inclined and has been foolish enough to purchase a piano, for he will pay for the shipment of that piano many times over its original cost before he is through. . . . And even if this limitation is removed, I can assure you, although most of you need no such assurance, that every time an officer or an enlisted man is transferred from one station to the next with his family, there are expenses involved for which there is no reimbursement from the Government. There are new draperies to buy, perhaps a bucket of paint and a new screen door; there are always food products that must be purchased, and many other little items which are necessary when moving into a new home. Perhaps it is time for us to recognize the financial loss involved when a family moves in the military services and provide a flat allowance in addition to the shipment of household effects.

Then there is the question of the retirement of regular officers. There was a time before Korea when a regular officer, after thirty years of service, could apply for retirement . . . [but, after Korea he was faced] with a legislative rider which precluded his voluntary retirement. There was justification for this action when the war in Korea started, for it did not seem to make sense to involuntarily recall a reserve officer or a National Guard unit, and at the same time permit regular officers to retire. But for the life of me I can see no justification for continuing this restriction in the last Appropriations Act. Yet it is there, modified to some extent, but still a restriction and one which every young man, eyeing the possibility of making the armed services his career, has noted and has noted well.

FINALLY, there is the "needling" habit which many people in public life as well as those in private life, are apt to engage in when they lose their tempers. I am speaking now of the popular pastime of berating the brass. Every time a mistake is made by our Army, Navy, Air Force or Marine Corps someone is bound to apply the epithet "the brass." You would think from some of the letters I receive, and some of the articles I have read, that every general is a tyrant, a martinet, and of Prussian ancestry. There are probably a few who possess these characteristics, but I think it is time that the American people were told about some of their generals. I think it is time that the newspaper editors, radio commentators, and members of Congress, call the roll of the general officers in our armed forces to ascertain what sacrifices they have made in this latest war for freedom. When that roll is called they may realize that war strikes home in many high places.

REPRESENTATIVE DEWEY SHORT of Missouri is Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. He is a veteran of the First World War and has been a member of Congress for 19 years. The paragraphs that appear here are from an address he made at the National Guard Conference at San Diego in October.

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LET'S USE OUR BRAINS

A college Dean thinks we should use our Generals Emeritu

Lt. Col. Jack C. Jeffrey

I WAS just leaving a faculty meeting which had voted "not to renew the Rose Bowl contract." All of us who teach ROTC voted to renew. But when they added our votes to those of the athletic department and a few others there just weren't enough.

As I walked across the campus my neighbor, Dean Chester Wisdom, put his hand on my shoulder and said, "Come on over for a brandy after supper; I'd like to talk to you about a valuable asset which is being neglected by the armed forces."

"What do you mean, Chet?"

"We don't have time to discuss it now. You can come over can't you?" We had reached his front steps.

I said, "Sure, Chet, glad to," because I always am glad to. The Dean is wise in many ways, including the selection of beverages. But what I also enjoy is his conversation.

After supper I listened to the news. Then I went next door to see the Dean.

I walked in the back door and up to his study. He had my B&B all ready. "Hi, Chet," I said, as I picked up the glass, and sat down.

"Jack, you know about my assignment to a D/A commission, don't you?"

"I heard a rumor that you were going to teach us how to live."

"That's not quite it. I have accepted assignment to a commission to study living conditions in the armed forces. Of course, we will make recommendations."

"Chet, with your service as a battalion commander, and your academic background, I am not surprised at all. I only hope that your recommendations are acted upon."

"The thing is, there are men much better qualified than I am. And they are available to the Department of Defense. They are the neglected assets I mentioned."

"Who do you mean?"

"Your retired officers. Your 'professors emeritus.' Surely from them you can get a superior recommendation for practically every military problem. And from my knowledge, you don't use their brains at all."

"I think you've got something there, Doctor. Why, General Krueger could just walk through a regimental area and come up with both diagnosis and prescription. Of course these officers are retired and many of them are actively engaged. Do you think there are many who would be willing to work on service problems?"

"Why, hell, Jack. They would jump at the chance. I don't know what they are doing but I'll bet lots of them are discussing the very problems these civilian commissions are working on. The very fact that you use so many civilian commissions indicates a need for an organization of experienced military thinkers."

"You're right. When General Eisenhower was Chief of Staff he established a small group of thinkers. As I remember there were three officers given the duty of thinking on any problems considered worthy. The press called it his 'brain-trust.'"

"Yes, I remember that. Another thing your experienced military thinkers could do is write your textbooks. Do you know that all the texts we use in this university are written by recognized authorities of long experience. Your retired officers should write your texts; they are your recognized authorities of long experience. And they would put out a better job than the texts you were showing me the other day."

"How would you set it up, Dean?"

"Are you familiar with the 'Institute for Advanced Study'?"

"Not very. I know it's at Princeton, it's directed by Dr. Oppenheimer, and Einstein studies there. That's about all I know."

"I have been thinking that an Institute for Advanced Military Study would be a fine thing for the armed forces. Selected retired officers would be invited to participate on a long-term or a short-term basis. Facilities could be made available for selected Allicd officers associate themselves with this 'Institu for Advanced Military Study.' Such a organization could be used in a gre many ways to improve the armed forces

"The Princeton institute is a sma campus separate and distinct fro Princeton University, isn't it?"

"Yes, Jack. They use Princeton main for its fine library. It is like a small Arm post with restaurant, offices, lectu rooms and some housing. It occupi about a square mile of land."

"That would be expensive—it woul be hard to swing."

"Most good things are expensive. Ar way I have an idea that it would sa money in the long run. But that's n the point. The point is: Are you goi to use your *brains* or aren't you?"

"I wish there was a less expensive w to use them."

"There is, but it's not as good. Y could establish a military library with a couple of stenographers near cities wh officers retire—like Fort Myer, Fort S Houston, and the Presidio. The m chanics of assigning the right work o the right officer or committee could c tainly be worked out. With regard stipend, I am sure that increasing thi retired pay to active duty pay would fine. There are a lot of details that wo have to be worked out. The import thing, in my opinion, is to make full of our most experienced military bra Thcse brains are to be found amo retired military officers who have t for deep and serious reflection. In academic field the best articles, b texts, best thought come from men w have passed the age of vigorous ac and reached the age of reflection—I sure the same would hold true in y field."

"Chet, you have certainly come with a thought-provoking idea. Why you want to try it out on me?"

"Because I thought you would a with me and I like to be agreed wi chuckled Dean Wisdom.

"Well, you sure thought right," I poured each of us another B&B. "I going to send it to the COMBAT FO JOURNAL if you don't mind.

He didn't mind at all.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JACK C. JEFFREY, Corps of Engineers, was a Field Artilleryman from 1932 (when he was commissioned in the ORC) until 1947 when he transferred to the Engineers. He is a graduate of Texas A&M and was integrated into the Regular Army in 1946. He is now on duty at the University of Wisconsin.



ANKS AND INFANTRY AT NIGHT

CAPTAIN HARLAN G. KOCH

hat are the capabilities of infantry and armor when joined together in a night attack?

PTAIN HARLAN G. KOCH, Armor, was a nember of The Armored School research committee which conducted the study hat is the basis of his article. Other nembers of the committee were MAJOR ARTHUR H. KENNEDY and CAPTAIN DALLAS O. BAKER, both Infantry, and CAPTAIN GEORGE L. MILLER and CAP-AIN MATTHEW R. WALLIS, both Armor.

THE many interpretations of the correct tactics of the tank-infantry team in a night attack lead one to wonder if our night attack doctrines have not been too flexible. The battalion commander should be able to discuss a night attack with his company commanders, and the company commanders with their platoon leaders, confident of a common understanding, rather than uncertainty because of diverse opinions. That the latter is quite common is attested by the lack of confidence many officers have in the feasibility of night operations that include elements of armor.

The conclusions I have made here were drawn from a report written at Fort Knox in 1952 by a committee of

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infantry and tank officers who made a research study of tank-infantry night attacks. The mission of the committee was to clarify the rather vague treatment given the subject in our instructional manuals. Several outstanding battalion commanders and general officers who had participated in or observed night attacks contributed letters giving their views, and these were consolidated and summarized in the committee's report.

The study dealt primarily with the tank-infantry team in a pre-planned night attack against limited objectives. It should not be confused with night meeting engagements, night marches, night ambushes or night raids. A reinforced tank battalion speeding down a road in column at night to link up with a surrounded unit or to exploit an earlier action, is not the type of night operation considered here. Those special operations are in a realm of their own and are predicated upon many different types of situations.

A NIGHT attack by a tank-infantry team is made for the same reasons as other night operations. These are:

To avoid heavy losses which would be incurred during daylight. A situation might involve crossing a zone heavily defended by tanks or automatic weapons that would be prohibitively expensive in losses during daylight. Major General Ernest N. Harmon (retired), commanding general of the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions during World War II, had a contribution on this point. He wrote:

"We used the night attack three times in the second phase of the Battle of the Bulge under similar circumstances each time. The snow was deep, which slowed our tanks down to about three or four miles an hour. We were attacking towns built of masonry, in which the enemy had placed his tanks with the muzzles protruding out of the windows. The towns were on a slight elevation from the surrounding country, therefore our attack had to go uphill [through] 1200 to 2000 yards of open fields. By lining up the night before and carefully getting the direction angles we attacked at about 0500 hours during the month of January in a swirling snowstorm and in complete blackness. We managed by this method to get up to the town and in among the buildings covering the fire-swept zone in pitch darkness. We captured [three towns] by this method. Our losses were practically negligible."

To achieve surprise and psychological superiority. This has been a bone of contention with some infantrymen: "The tanks ruin the surprise!" Admittedly, tanks create more noise than infantry that habitually uses stealth. But some surprise and secrecy may be gained even with tanks, if we have been laying harassing fires on enemy positions. During the movement to the attack position these fires, largely increased, may cover the clatter of the tanks. Tank engines should be idled in the attack position and the drivers should be cautioned not to race their engines.

A captured German document stated categorically that American armor never attacked at night. One of our battalion commanders wrote that surprise was derived by the very fact that the enemy did not expect tanks to be brought onto his positions, but had expected them to be used in a rear area fire-support role. The shock created by the addition of close-range cannon, firing HE-delay, and the tremendous firepower delivered by the many tank machine guns give the attacker a definite psychological and tangible advantage.

To gain a limited objective vital to the situation. An important terrain feature from which to launch a larger coordinated attack the following morning might be the purpose for a night attack.

To accomplish the primary purpose of any offensive action—the destruction of the hostile armed forces.

To maintain the momentum of the attack. This is done chiefly to sustain impetus or initiative in a situation requiring a twenty-four-hour attacking day. Lieutenant General W. H. H. Morris (retired) wrote that the night attack "prevents the enemy from laying mine fields in his retreat, lends to the continuity of the attack, and also the enemy evacuates his position more readily at night than day. . . ."

THE purposes of attacking at night are fairly well known to everyone. But it's the "when" and the "how" that make for success. The ability of the commander to spot situations which demand or favor the employment of limited objective night attacks is of first importance. The attack must be so executed that there will be maximum control and cohesiveness. Faulty organization of the team, neglect of control measures, and improper conduct of the attack have resulted in a botched operation. Such outcomes have created mutual distrust between infantrymen and tankers and have caused some officers to question the practicality of this type of attack. Consequently a useful tool is in some danger of falling into disuse. The techniques of execution and planning mu be more forcibly and clearly emphasize

Detailed reconnaissance is importan General Patton once stated that soldie must learn to "conduct lethal operatio in the dark." He added that, "previou and very accurate daylight reconnai sance is desirable and limited objectiv attacks are essential." The comman ers must have an opportunity to exan ine the ground during daylight and many infantrymen and tankers as pos ble should view the objective and th proposed direction of attack from a va tage point.

Most commanders who were que tioned by the research committee pr ferred attacking just before dawn, as permitted selection of fields of fire stop the enemy counterattack and al permitted immediate exploitation if t enemy was routed. However, situation requirements and surprise variatio sometimes require that the attack be other times.

THE night attack should have a *we defined axis or direction of advan* with a natural feature or some pron nent object as a guide. Trees, hill masse houses which can be seen silhouett on the skyline or even a low bright st may be used as a guide to the objecti by the base unit. The artillery prepa tion might be concentrated sufficient to prove as a guide.

Difficulty of control must be appr ciated. This is the single most importa reason for the success or failure of night attack. As General Patton on said, "Except under very favorable c cumstances of terrain, and where ve thorough daylight reconnaissance h taken place, night attacks by armor a not economical." Rough ground d sected by gullies, small streams, hi paddy ridges, and hills amplify the p sibilities of lost control and failure. T nature of the ground must receive cri cal consideration.

One of the most flagrant mistakes infantry and armor commanders in pla ning tank-infantry night attacks is the selection of the objective. Oc sionally commanders select an objecti which is two or three miles away fr the jump-off lines. This usually defe the attack before it crosses the line departure. The distance to the obj tive should be limited to not more th 2000 yards. It should be a positiv easily definable terrain feature. T artillery or mortars might be called to place an occasional round of wh phosphorus just beyond the objective to illustrate the objective itself. Ho

er, the commander won't want his ttlefield illuminated if his purpose is take advantage of the concealment darkness. The tremendous difficulty maintaining control at night places lds against the success of the attack. he shorter the distance to the objec- e the better the odds for success.

Tank drivers and commanders must thoroughly trained in maintaining a w but constant speed. Too often nks run away from the infantryman. the infantryman advances ahead of e tanks his position becomes unten- le; if the tanks run away from the fantry the tank commanders might ceive fire from their own infantry, and ey have also lost the close-in infantry otection they will sorely need when ey get on the objective. The tank mmander must assist his driver in aintaining direction and spacing. He es this by establishing visual contact ead and to his flanks.

HE number of tank units that can be used depends greatly upon the ter- in. Some of the mountainous areas in orea might hold armor down to only e tank which would follow a road be- ween the paddies. In open country, ough, a battalion of tanks and a bat- lion of infantry can operate with rela- vely easy control. One outstanding tank ttalion commander wrote: "My ex- riences have indicated that more than n tanks and two platoons of infantry nning around in the same spot at ght, results in more confusion than rward motion." Another believed the st organization was a team in the pro- rtions of one infantry unit to one unit tanks with a preponderance of infan- y if possible. The size of the team ill be an important decision of the mmander who will have to take into nsideration the state of training of his nits, the enemy, and the nature of the rrain.

Control is much easier if each unit nows the capabilities of the other rough previous combined training. If is prior introduction is not possible en every effort must be made to "team n" the organizations while they are ll in the rear. Means of coordination ould be worked out in the relative iet of the assembly area. The attack elf will demand considerable mutual nderstanding and preplanned action the two commanders.

HE commander who orders the attack should definitely designate the team mmander. If there is to be a company tanks and a company of infantry, one of the two company commanders should be designated as team commander. The selection might depend upon the attributes of the two men, but the officer making the selection should not overlook the fact that the tank unit commander has the best facilities for control. His radio gives him immediate contact with every man in his outfit and each tank commander can relay information quickly to subordinate infantry leaders through the external telephone. Whatever the decision, it is important that the senior infantry commander of the attack remain in close touch with the senior tank commander in order that the tanks' communications system can be put to full use.

In the "team-up" specific infantrymen should be assigned to each tank and they should look upon it as their tank. The breakdown of the infantry platoon to the five tanks of the tank platoon should be done so that the lowest infantry commander can maintain control of his men and still provide protection for each tank. As Major General J. H. Collier phrased it, "there must be tanks with infantry and infantry with tanks." Once on the objective, the infantry remain closely associated with their individual tanks or the team dissolves into a jumbled mass. The tankers and infantrymen should not be given separate assignments on the objective but should organize as a team in a tight perimeter; each infantryman continuing to remain with his assigned tank. "Once the tank-infantry teams are formed for the attack they should not be broken up nor should the composition of the teams be changed until daylight," General Collier wrote.

THE simplest plan in a night attack is the easiest to control and carry out. It has been demonstrated on the battlefield and in the training that the formation most easily controlled, safest to the infantry, capable of the most firepower, and easiest to maneuver over the ground is the line formation. The infantryman should stay between and behind the tanks in order to destroy any enemy tank-hunters.

The tanks move ahead, firing as they go, and making avenues for the infantrymen through tactical wire and anti-personnel mines. The tanks should be twenty to forty yards apart, depending on the terrain and the degree of darkness. The interval between the tanks should permit maintenance of lateral cohesiveness and visual contact from tank to tank.

Some commanders advocated having the infantry ride the tanks to the assault area, and then dismount and deploy for action. In order to avoid confusion on the battlefield, the unit, if possible, should move out of the attack position deployed in the manner in which it will cross the line of departure. There should be no change of direction from the line of departure to the objective. It is believed by most commanders that to deploy after crossing the line of departure should be unnecessary if the attack is against a limited objective less than 2000 yards distant. This distance should not unduly fatigue the infantrymen if the rate of advance is properly controlled. Attempting to deploy at night on the battlefield, coupled with the confusion that is naturally going to occur when the enemy opens defensive fires, will complicate and might be disastrous. This also holds true for armored infantry; personnel carriers should be left in the attack position until daylight.

If the organization of the objective calls for more tanks than the unit can control on the battlefield during the attack, they and their infantry should wait in the attack position until the objective has been taken. To have too many vehicles following the formation will only clutter the battlefield and may prove to be a great disadvantage in the event it becomes necessary for the assault team to execute an about face.

The objective should be strongly organized with a tight perimeter with infantry in front of, around, and making contact between tanks; and a tank-infantry team held centrally to add depth to the position.

THE growing mechanization of armies should encourage the integration of infantry and armor. My intent in this article has been to indicate the capabilities and techniques of both arms when "teamed" to conduct a night attack and to emphasize the value of the night attack. The tank-infantry team is a lethal combination not to be discounted and its employment in the night attack should be greatly accentuated. More intensive night training should be conducted to develop proficiency and confidence in night operations. It should be stressed that not all situations will permit the employment of the tank-infantry team and these situations should be immediately recognized. Also not all terrain is tank terrain in daylight or darkness. There are certain limitations that if properly met will bring victory and not frustration. Success in night operations will inevitably develop better understanding between the two arms.

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The Month's Reading

Let's Have Martial Music

HANSON W. BALDWIN
The Saturday Evening Post
31 October 1953

Bring back the bands! Break out the swords! Increase unit and service competition; it is the breath of life. Build up the elite units. Restore the authority of command, the dignity of rank; give the company commander power to make and break his noncoms. Make the noncom proud of his stripes; increase his authority and prestige. The attempt to equate the technician and the leader of men, which started in World War II, has to be modified; the troop-leading sergeant must have distinctive arm patches and monetary rewards.

Give the enlisted man at least eighteen months in the United States between periods of overseas duty. Treat him as a human being—tough, hard, ready, but human—not a body, or a number. Emphasize leadership; leaders make morale—not a lecture on the history of Iran; not a course at the Food Service School. Standardize, toughen and make more homogeneous the now diverse sources from which officers and noncoms come.

Martinets and Mental Health

A Psychiatrist in
Psychiatry and Military Manpower Policy
Columbia University Press, 1953

I did not feel that combat was as likely to bring out psychoneurotic behavior as boredom and lack of purpose. I remember one island in the South Pacific which was never attacked by the Japanese and on which the executive officer was more or less of a martinet. The men developed an extraordinarily wide range of symptoms. I saw boys with hemianesthesia, anesthesia of a quarter of the body, gun barrel vision, legs in extension which could not be flexed—in short, the richest collection of gross hysterical symptoms I have ever seen. I felt very certain at the time and feel more certain now that the number of neurotic individuals would have been greatly decreased either with good leadership or if the island had been attacked once in a while by the enemy.

Mahan Today

CAPTAIN JOHN D. HAYES, USN
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
November 1953

World War II, the test of arms which proved Mahan's thesis, also produced conditions which ostensibly indicated that such a thesis had become obsolete. The effect of this has been that now, in the middle of the twentieth century when wars and theories of wars are leading topics of discussion, the works of this man who stressed the impact of war on man's progress are neglected and his name has become no more than a legend, despite the fact that he wrote of Europ in an age politically and militarily very much like our own The causes which produced this trend away from Maha were the airplane and the atomic bomb; plus the emergenc of a belligerent Communist Russia as a great world powe and the feeling that the Communist threat could only be an swered in kind.

The dimming of Mahan's fame under the impact o scientific warfare can be attributed in part to the U. S Navy, for despite lasting faith in his doctrines, it no longe looks to him as it once did. Before World War II the Nav was still untried and Mahan furnished it with a beacon, bu today, rich in its own tradition and experience, it can estab lish doctrines in its own right. The incentive to keep inte est in Mahan alive in a rapidly changing world is no missing. Mahan's works are no longer required reading aspiring naval officers and his volumes are left untouched o the shelves of libraries in the new joint institutions of mi tary learning. The U. S. Navy does not have the leisu today necessary for the type of scholarship displayed b Mahan and his sponsor, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, fir president of the Naval War College. No contempora naval scholars comparable to Admiral Sir Herbert Richmon or Captain Russell Grenfell in the British Navy, have com out of this war. None of those who were nurtured o Mahan's doctrines have grasped the splendid opportunity transform this penetrating theory into a working hypothes for today's situation.

Artillery—1917-1953

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVE
Annual Conference, National Guard Associati

The most dramatic advance in our program to build th firepower of our units has been the development of atom weapons for battlefield employment. Last May as I witness from a forward trench the firing of the first atomic shell fro our new 280-millimeter gun . . . I was acutely conscious the vast change that has occurred in artillery in my tim In World War I days, I trained as the lead driver of a fie artillery section. Our 75-millimeter field pieces, each drav by six laboring horses, had only an infinitesimal fraction the power of the atomic gun. Yet, by comparison, they we cumbersome in operation. They moved slowly under ev the best of conditions, sometimes bogging down complete They had to be manhandled into position, and once e placed they had a very limited field of fire. The new gia 280 has tremendous mobility. It can move along a highw at thirty-five miles an hour, and across country with ease. can be emplaced in a matter of minutes, and fired arou the compass. It is so delicately balanced that one man c elevate or depress it by hand if the power mechanism shou fail.

This gun will greatly enhance our defensive capabilities, hich is why we have shipped some of them to Europe. ltimately, as Army guided missiles are perfected, they too ill aid in delivering fissionable materials or conventional plosives in close support of Army ground forces. The im- rtant thing is that we have the gun *now,* and can give our ld commanders the capability of using atomic explosives fely and accurately in darkness or in any kind of weather, it should become necessary to do so.

oxing the Wings

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHARLES E. WILSON
Press Conference, 13 October 1953

THE PRESS: Mr. Wilson, you have been doing pretty well placing military jargon with some of your own better rms. What new term do you have for "wing"? Have you t any ideas as to how you can express that better?

SECRETARY WILSON: It is easier for me to think of the mber of planes in a group or the number of groups in a ng. Even the same kind of planes—the Marines and the avy don't have the same number of airplanes in a group or e same number of groups in a wing. I have discovered at. So the wing business doesn't really tell you anything. hat is one reason all this emphasis on 143 wings is—I would ow how to fox that one if I wanted to, you see, but—

THE PRESS: Are you going to drop the term "wing"?

SECRETARY WILSON: No, I don't think you will drop the m "wings," but you use all kinds of combinations of anes. We have wings of tankers, but we don't happen to unt them. We have transport wings. We don't count em. There are certain things we count as effective in this ng business and others we don't. We have reconnaissance ngs. We count them in the combat unit, but they don't cessarily fight either, you see, so it is—we have a great ny supporting aircraft of all kinds.

THE PRESS: How are you going to fox them, by the way?

SECRETARY WILSON: I am not going to do it. I just said ould if I thought it would be a good thing to do. You see, ually, our medium bomber wings now have just as big mbers in as the heavy bomber wings used to have, you see, d in a sense the Air Force foxed that one, because the avy bomber wings only have 30 airplanes and the medium mber wings have 45; so when you just switch that around, a have increased your air strength with the same number wings. That was the right thing to do for the country, but s fooling the wing business, the numbers racket.

estroying an Illusion

WALTER MILLIS
The New York Herald Tribune
23 October 1953

Here are all sorts of ideas, most of them illusory. The ion that by expanding our tactical air we can withdraw und troops [from Europe] is contrary to the experience Korea and defiant of Air Force doctrine; besides which, re is no money for expanding tactical air, in which Gen. uenther already feels himself woefully deficient. The idea that tactical atomic artillery (or air squadrons) can replace ground divisions is unsupported by any practical experience; and the whole subject of the effect of atomic weapons used tactically on a ground battlefield is still so inadequately explored and so full of unknowns as to offer no good basis as yet for policy.

The idea that America might soon retire from the front lines, removing her troops and leaving in their place only a pledge to bring up reinforcements when needed . . . is again quite unreal. The present trouble with the European defense is precisely the thinness of the existing front-line shield, compounded by the absence of trained and readily-available reserves behind it. Beyond that, the six American divisions in Germany today (like the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean) are even more important as a political and diplomatic force than they are as a purely military force, and to cut them down would have consequences running far beyond any compensation that could be offered by new weapons or new strategies.

Communist Laws of War

I. N. STEINBERG
In the Workshop of the Revolution
Rinehart & Co., 1953

On August 23, 1918, Latzis, one of the most important officials of the Cheka, published an article in *Izvestya,* with the headline—"There are No Laws in Civil War." He proceeded:

"In almost all periods, among almost all nations, the established customs of war were formulated in written laws. Capitalist war has its laws as stated in various conventions. Accordingly prisoners are not shot; peace delegations have the right to immunity; there is an exchange of prisoners. . . . But when you turn to our civil war, you will see nothing of this sort. It would be ridiculous to introduce, or demand the application of, these laws which once were considered sacred. Slaughter all who were wounded in the battle against you —that is a law of the civil war."

The Case for Horse Cavalry

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN K. HERR
The Story of the U. S. Cavalry
Little, Brown and Company, 1953

To sum up, as simply as possible for the lay reader, the case for the mounted cavalry: wars flow over all kinds of terrain, in all kinds of weather, and an alert enemy will try to fight in the kind best suited to his resources. Korea is an example of this. And there are many other areas in the world where the country is too rough and rugged for anything on wheels or treads but where mounted cavalry and pack trains can operate with ease. Mexico, which can be called our soft underbelly, is an example of that. Mounted cavalry can always supply many needed reconnaissance reports which the Air Force can not furnish at night or in bad weather, and which the motorized armored scouting units now in use can not supply when they are blocked on the roads or unable to move across country. No foe within range can hide from cavalry, in fair or foul weather, by day or night, on or off the roads.

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★ CEREBRATIONS ★

Our literate cocktail-hour tacticians stand to receive as much as $10.00 for their contributions to this department. However, the price for those "dashed off" with scant consideration for the rules of composition and rhetoric will be much less. Hold them to four or five hundred words and type them double-spaced.

There Ain't No Spies in Here

A military man's wife is probably the most dangerous potential espionage agent the enemy has—intelligencewise. It's not the personality but the situation.

She fishes for bits of information to help piece together the other bits of information she picked up at the neighbors and the commissary, because "There are dozens of things to attend to before the *move*." Quite naturally she tells the landlord and changes the address on the furniture payments, and then the magazine subscriptions have to be changed sixty days ahead of time. Then she has to check with other wives to see what they're going to do.

Such a situation gives a collector of intelligence little leg work to do before he has a pretty good picture of what's up.

We must constantly remind ourselves that security of information is every military man's business. We must each think of himself as a counterintelligence agent with definite responsibilities.

There are a number of "characters" you will meet from time to time who must be throttled in one way or other. Here are some of them.

The blabbermouth at the bar or on the train who wants to impress his listeners with his inside information. MR. BIG shrugs off the plain fact that there have been espionage agents in this country for many years.

The I'VE-ALREADY-SEEN-IT-IN-THE-PAPER character vaguely remembers a general blurb about the classified matter he's reading so he figures it's all right to spread the word around. He might be more careful on Secret and Confidential matter but he's quite a spreader of Restricted material since it's "not very important." He doesn't realize that the great bulk of information gathered by a foreign power falls in the restricted and unclassified category.

The I-GUESS-IT'S-OKAY-NOW character talks freely to the longshoreman at the port of embarkation. He figures the time for security is past. He sees the civilians standing around watching ship loading. Since they already know quite a bit about the movement Corporal John Doe tells the "friendly" dock worker where the ship is going when asked. It's hard to imagine a more favorable place to collect intelligence on troop movements than at the dock. Yet dock workers include Communists, as has been proven.

The YOU-OUGHT-TO-SEE-THE-NEW-STUFF character is the blabbermouth who tells the interested listener all about the new gear the outfit has. He likes to talk shop with his listener who appears to know something about what he's saying. The visitor on Armed Forces Day asks what "that little knob is for" and takes mental notes to fill in the blanks.

One ex-Soviet spy said that Americans were the easiest people in the world to spy upon because of their naïve, too-trusting attitude.

The "interested listener" likes to get information about commanding officers and other military personalities to supplement his rather extensive coverage gleaned from newspapers, military periodicals and the like. This information goes into the foreign country's files. It can become important.

A contributing factor to the postponement of the Iwo Jima D-day was the finding of a piece of paper on Peleliu which indicated there was a new Japanese commander on Iwo. A check of our G2 files showed that he was an artillery specialist. Therefore elaborate preliminary bombardments were fired to counter the expected artillery.

The WE'VE-GOT-OUR-OWN-LITTLE-CODE character is the most common of the lot. Through his personal code he can write the folks back home all manner of classified stuff. He figures no one gives a hoot where he's stationed. But Mama tells the neighbors, who tell the home-town paper. Next week there's quite a write-up. "Pfc. Johnny Smith is now on Verde Island, we hear. Johnny is a member of the Thirteenth Radar Aircraft Warning Company. During his last visit home Johnny told us that it was a highly secret outfit but did say he guessed it was all right to say he operated a . . ." No one has to guess twice what news service picks up information of that kind.

Then there's the NOBODY-ELSE-ON-THE-LINE character who is a radio or telephone operator. He transmits when he doesn't have to. He gives out classified information on the telephone. The least of his worries are the regulations on communications security. The enemy who monitors communications almost always gets vital information sooner or later.

The WELL-I'LL-BE-DAMNED character is conscientious before the flight over enemy territory or night reconnaissance patrol. He removes everything which might identify him in case of capture. Except a laundry mark up his sleeve, or an IOU from a buddy written on the back of a laundry slip. He's surprised when the enemy interrogators find it and tell him what outfit he belongs to.

The CANDID-CAMERA character is murder. His photos of buddies show up all sorts of things in the background. That little hill in one photo can be pinpointed; even the tree foliage is a give-away. An other photo of a buddy against an airplane shows up a little gadget that spells out tail-warning radar to enemy technical intelligence. This character gets a shot of the new jet interceptor which stopped at his field to refuel. He's seen dozens of photos of the plane in the magazines, so he's sure it's all right. But he doesn't know that all those photos he had seen had certain areas blanked out.

One security slip might set up a situation which would mean military disaster. That's why it is vital that every soldier, sailor, airman and marine must realize his definite responsibility to counter intelligence and report security slips to his unit intelligence officer.

CAPT. USMC

The Puff Target

The training of aerial observers in the adjustment of artillery fire is expensive and opportunities for use of overcrowded ranges are all too infrequent. But when an observer has mastered the fundamentals of artillery adjustment and radio procedure he can use the substitute range for actual firing that is described here. Of course, the real thing would be better but that is usually out of the question.

Any artillery unit having an area of 1000 square yards more or less free of vegetation and not too rough for a rapidly moving ¼-ton truck, can set up a Puff Range. One officer and three men can operate it and if they turn loose their imaginations and ingenuities they can add a great deal of realism to the operation.

A problem requiring four rounds of adjustment and six in effect, can be co-

eted well within the eleven minutes quired by Army Field Forces Firing est for artillery battalions.

The following equipment is needed: rcraft (with radio), a ¼-ton (with dio), two additional radios, a sheet of exiglas (12″ x 24″ x ⅛″), a sheet of id paper (1:20,000), field glasses, iff bombs, and grease pencils, lead pens and notebooks.

The area you are going to use must be rveyed and stakes put in every 100 rds. This area must also be laid out on id paper, adding additional lines, so at you have an intersection every 100 rds. The area should be marked every 0 yards as shown in Figure 1. If the ea is to be used for other purposes, a rtable marker can be made from a No. can. Flatten the can, weld a three ot iron rod to it and stick the other end the rod into another No. 10 can filled th cement. Paint yellow or white and ark with black.

The 12 inch x 18 inch piece of Plexiis is placed over and glued to the grid per and a right angle "plotter" is made m the remaining piece. It's a good ea to etch in marks every fifty yards ng the edges of the plotter as grease ncil marks will rub off. This plus the notebook and pencils are all the tools you need to run your "FDC."

If there is no high ground at or near the edge of the range you ought to put up a 12- to 15-foot tower to house the "FDC" and to monitor the crew that sets off the charges.


The two radios are placed in the tower. One is aligned with the aircraft and the other with the jeep radio.

Now for the puff bombs. At Camp Pickett I had them made up locally. In Germany we obtained them from a local factory with training funds, and made to my specifications at a cost of about thirty-five cents each. They produce a nice flash and give out a good cloud of white smoke that can be seen from an airplane at 3000 feet and sometimes 3000 yards. If you must make them locally here is the "recipe" for one puff bomb. In a paper sack or pint ice cream box place one pound of powdered limestone, eighteen inches of detonation cord taped to a cap (blasting, non electric) which has in it six inches of fuze time.

You are in the tower, your two "puff men" are in the ¼-ton with a good supply of bombs, the observer is in the air, your radios all work and you have drawn

Figure 1. ***Use of plotter in puff range "FDC"***

OBSERVER: ". . . from base point right eight hundred, add two hundred . . ."
"FDC": "From Dog Four, left five, drop two zero."






Figure 2. ***Target and Puff as viewed by the aerial observer.***

Relative size of burst is indicated by man standing at side of burst. Light object to the right is runway marker on old Messerschmitt base of the Luftwaffe. Bomb craters may be detected along a ridge in the middle background. This photo was made with telephoto lens at about 500 yards.

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in the GT line on the Plexiglas. You have told the observer the location of the base point and battery position, your recorder has his pencil poised, you're ready to go.

The first command comes down: "From Base Point, right 800 add 200." Placing the plotter over the grid measure you measure first the deflection (keeping the "range edge" parallel to the GT line), and then the range and mark it on the grid. You then call the ¼-ton and give them: "From Dog four, left five, drop two zero." Through your glasses you see the jeep drive rapidly to the D4 marker, one man dismounts and begins to step off the distance from D4. Finally he stoops over, straightens up and waves his arms (indicating the fuze is lighted). You give "On the Way" to your recorder and he relays it to the observer.

Fire for effect can be realistically given by making up half a dozen patterns of fire on cards showing the bursts in relation to the target. These cards would be kept by the senior puff man and used when called for by number by the FDC.

The men working on the puff range must be fast to catch on and thoroughly understand the job. With training and practice they will be able to set off a charge within ten or fifteen yards of the place designated by the observer. This is well within normal dispersion limits.

The idea for the Puff Target Range originally came from the now outdated FM 20-100, September 1947. I have made several changes and improvements over the old method and find that it works well and the men like it.

CAPT. WILLIAM T. SAMPSON, II

Air Strike Control

After seeing numerous air strikes miss the target by the proverbial "country mile" because of faulty target designation or identification I think the job should be turned over to the artillery aerial observer.

I saw several plans tried in Korea, but none seemed to do the job as well as it might have been done. The reluctance of the Air Force to turn over the direction of strikes to personnel not trained in their methods and operating procedures was partly the cause of this. But it ought to be easy to set up a course at Fort Sill to train officers to handle this job and make the air strike a more effective weapon.

In close support air strikes, the aerial observer has what appear to be four advantages over the present methods:

Familiarity of terrain. The artilleryman usually has a smaller sector to observe and flies more missions over the same area. And so he gets to know the ground better than the Mosquito observer. Frequently an artillery observer, through daily observance, is able to spot a buildup long before it is ready for use.

Knowledge of the target. Many enemy positions are difficult to see and find and the artilleryman would have the advantage in describing the target and recommending direction of attack to the flight leader.

Better marking devices. The smoke rocket used by the Air Force to mark a target is difficult to see. But the white phosphorus shell or 155mm smoke shell of the artillery can be seen for miles. Smoke shells also make it possible to use different colors in case of enemy deception.

Better knowledge of friendly troop positions. The accidental bombing of friendly troops is much more likely when the combat arms are on the move. Closer coordination between the infantry and artillery gives the artilleryman the advantage here.

The most difficult problem would be that of communications, but the idea is basically sound and a solution could be worked out.

The Mosquito pilot and observer have done a good job. But a properly trained artilleryman is by training and position able to do a better one.

Coordination between air and ground forces would have to be closer than it is to make this system work, but a committee composed of men from the two arms should be able to work out a solution.

MARTIN H. JURGENSON

CHANGING STATION?
Don't forget to notify us of your change in address.
Circulation Manager
Combat Forces Journal
1529 18th St., N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

What to Do With AWOLs

Before the 5th Infantry Division (training) was inactivated a few months ago it had developed an effective answer to the question of what to do with captured AWOLs who were serving stockade sentences. The problem was to train and rehabilitate these men—prepare them for duty in Korea.

The existing method of instructing prisoner-trainees had required the prisoners to accompany regular units on problems. This didn't accomplish the objective. The prisoners felt like outcasts and their morale and interest could not be stimulated. There was a need fc a method that would make the prisone feel that they "belonged," that woul make them proud of their own accon plishments. The answer was a prisone company, commanded and led by abl officers and noncoms.

To help orient the prisoner-trainees t this new method, the Division Con mander, Maj. Gen. George Barth, e: plained to them this was their opportu nity to get good training and make a sta in clearing their records. At the end c the training period he again spoke t them, evaluating their training, and tel ing them of their future opportunitie

The company commander formulate a plan which enabled the prisoner cor pany to work directly through the div sion staff sections, thus eliminating tl normal company-battalion-regiment ro tine.

A 100-man company, broken down in four platoons of 25 prisoner-trainees eac was formed. However, each platoon w placed in a separate phase of training permit the assignment of new appr hendees according to the training th had received before going AWOL.

The limit of 100 men was flexibl within one brief period the streng jumped to 207.

Supply was the hardest problem in tl administration of the outfit. The pr oner-trainees were in the stockade alo with other men in confinement and was thus impossible to issue each m his own rifle, mess gear and field equi ment. It took considerable time to iss each man his necessary equipment ea day and take it back at night. In ad tion each time the men entered or l the stockade they had to be searchl carefully. Sometimes different subje were scheduled for morning and aft noon sessions, which required reclaimi and issuing equipment at noontime.

Thus the supply room had the a pearance of a miniature weapons po with mortars, machine guns, automa rifles, and M1s in racks alongside shel of helmet liners, helmets, mess kits, te and poles.

With the cooperation of Ordnan two separate classes of rifles were stock one completely serviceable for ra firing, and the other fitted with a me ring through the safety to prevent bre ing down the weapon. Adjustments the firing pin and hammer, plus lockig of the piece, made this weapon comple ly unserviceable. It was used for d mounted drill and for training that d not involve actual firing.

When firing was listed, guards to

extra care to prevent any attempts of prisoners to escape. At no time was there a slightest attempt by any prisoner to use his rifle for other than its intended purpose.

Night training and a few other subjects had to be eliminated and certain other subjects were taught in private areas. But most of the training schedules were carried out alongside regular training companies. The prisoner platoons and their security guards (approximately one guard to every five prisoners) ate with the companies when in the field. Arrangements for feeding the prisoner company were made a week in advance with the company they were scheduled to be training with at that time.

Some training was done in the area of the stockade, where one large compound, approximately 400 by 250 feet, was constructed by the prisoners. Here, separate areas were set up for rifle, machine gun, and mortar instruction, as well as for conferences.

The prisoners also built compounds in each of the four main bivouac areas where they stayed during their final week of training.

For identification the prisoners wore black helmets with large white circles on each side and large white patches on their jackets. Cadre of the prisoner unit wore red-and-white helmet liners and officers wore green-and-white ones.

Fears that the men would attempt to escape, refuse to work, and create real trouble proved groundless.

"It's amazing how well things turned out," Captain Charles V. Ickes, the company commander, said. "The men realized they would soon be in the front lines and most of them were ready to settle down to learn how to become soldiers—and to restore themselves."

During the months the company existed only four men had to be disciplined with punishment more serious than strenuous physical exercise. Morale of the men of the company was high at all times.

They were told that twenty-four hours after they left the port of embarkation they would be granted a clean "bill of health" by the Army and would have unlimited opportunity for advancement. Since the first group went to Korea, Captain Ickes received several letters from former prisoners who had become noncommissioned officers, thanking him for the training and crediting him with their promotion.

It is interesting to note that in general the prisoner platoons exhibited more interest and ability in their training than

The Overread Mechanic

Literary genius—or a good old-fashioned mechanic? Which one do *you* want in your motor maintenance section?

Actually, there is a need for both: The genius to run down the various technical publications and come up with an interpretation; the mechanic to do the work. Maybe this is a facetious statement, and maybe it isn't. You be the judge. Here is a comparison of some of our preventive maintenance publications:

What	*Companion Publication*	*Purpose of Companion Publication*	*Remarks*
New D/A Form 461 preventive maintenance service (1 June 1951)	TM 9-2810 organizational maintenance and supply operation service and inspection (21 Oct 1943) listed as a reference on top of new Form 461	Information on proper use of Form 461	TM 9-2810 was superseded by TM 37-2810 (14 Mar 1945) almost six years before new Form 461 was adopted
TM 9-837, cargo and chassis truck manual (15 June 1951	WD AGO Form 461 (1 July 45) referred to in paragraph 64 of TM 9-837	Guide for preventive maintenance services	Whereas, above, we showed a new Form 461 referring to an obsolete manual; here we have a new manual that refers to an obsolete form.
TM 9-819 miscellaneous trucks (4 Jan 52)	New Form 461 and TM 37-2810, companion manual for Form 461, listed as a reference on page 303 of TM 9-819	Guide for preventive maintenance service	TM 37-2810 covers old, obsolete Form 461, not the latest one

To further complicate printed instructions, we are informed always to follow lubrication orders. That is fine, except that some vehicles are issued to using units before lubrication orders are published. Then we must use the more often confusing, temporary technical manual. What's a temporary TM? It is a publication, such as TM 9-837, that carries the statement: "This first edition is being published in advance of complete technical review of all concerned."

Some temporary TMs contain mechanical impossibilities; for example, in one case, mention is made of the effect of the ignition switch when trouble shooting the starter motor. The ignition switch is not even part of the starter circuit! Paragraph 233b of TM 9-837 is another illustration of these mechanical impossibilities. Then, too, lubricants are sometimes issued prior to the publication and distribution of instructions relative to their proper use; Grease Automotive and Artillery (GAA) is an example. First instructions were to lubricate everything that used grease WB or CG with grease GAA; then, hidden in an Ordnance newsletter, was an item that stated GAA must not be used on wheel bearings of vehicles going to, or being used in, Korea. Did you know we now fill the wheel hub completely full of grease? Where did I get the information? The Preventive Maintenance Monthly magazine, of course.

Don't get the wrong idea—I'm not peeved—I'm amused and well paid for all this confusion. I've spent countless hours trying to gather information that should have been at my finger tips. The average maintenance man needs this information. However, since he is not a scholar in the fine art of printed research, he should have this pertinent information on his maintenance problems readily available. How should we get this information to him? That's easy.

First of all, technical manuals should be made loose leaf, so that when changes occur, they may be properly placed in the manual. This will save thousands of dollars in manual revisions, and the latest information will be in a place where it may be found. Next, I would publish one basic maintenance manual (loose leaf) such as TM 37-2810. Then, for each new type of vehicle another loose leaf manual would be published; this manual would contain only information peculiar to that vehicle. As more information became available, it would be published for insertion in the vehicle technical manual.

Let's do away with newsletters, bulletins, magazines, and MWOs and get necessary information out as part of a TM in a form where it can be found!

One final bit of advice to those who write these things—when a change is published don't hide the fact in some index that the maintenance man may never see. Get the information to the man who can use it.

WOJG William C. Tusing

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most regular companies. Officers attributed this to the fact that the prisoners had to pay strict attention to detail and were free of outside distractions from training.

CAPTAIN FREDERICK JENKINS

Counter-fire Intelligence

In a long-drawn-out and deliberate defensive situation counter-battery and counter-mortar intelligence becomes increasingly important. As the enemy becomes stabilized, he becomes capable of placing large volumes of accurate fire on friendly positions from well constructed and well concealed emplacements. While this concealment works to our disadvantage, the relative permanence of enemy emplacements certainly is a simplifying factor in that, once located, this information is not likely to become out of date immediately.

The so-called "third phase" of the war in Korea is a fine example of a deliberate defense. It would be well in light of this example to consider the sources of counter-battery and counter-mortar intelligence available to an infantry battalion.

When the first incoming rounds land, a loud demand for accurate counter-fire intelligence arises. The S2 has a variety of sources at his disposal. These include air OPs, counter-mortar radars, and sound-ranging equipment both of the observation battalion and the regimental counter-fire platoon. However, information from these sources generally goes directly to the artillery, and the infantry battalion S2 only hears of them indirectly. In addition, these sources can only furnish information of a limited number of guns at one time. Certainly they alone cannot be depended upon to provide complete information.

Sources within the battalion include shell reports and the battalion intelligence section. Shell reports are useful but have their limitations. It is difficult to determine the flash-bang time when you cannot see the flash or tell which bang went with which flash or vice versa. When the rounds are coming in in large numbers few men have the time or inclination to rush from shell crater to shell crater with yardstick and compass jotting down notes. Nevertheless much information can be obtained from estimates of direction by sound, and information as to number, type, and caliber of incoming shells, and point and time of impact. The rendering of shell reports should always be encouraged.

The S2 has the organic battalion intelligence section to assist him, and this used to include the counter-fire sergeant whose principal duties fell in this category. The counter-fire sergeant was at one time in the S3 section and later placed in the S2 section more properly in line with his duties. More recently he has been completely eliminated from the T/O&E along with orderlies and bugles, based on the apparent feeling that he served no useful purpose. My experience leads me to believe that if properly used the counter-fire sergeant is more useful than either orderlies or bugles. In my outfit the counter-fire sergeant, working in conjunction with the line companies and the battalion intelligence section, proved to be a most efficient source of counter-fire intelligence.

Whenever possible the intelligence section manned two OPs. These were connected by telephone and radio to the battalion CP and were also directly connected with each other so that they could coordinate and compare observations. Thus they could be reasonably sure that they were reporting on the same shell or gun at the same time. The personnel manning these OPs were especially trained and skilled in map and aerial photograph reading, field sketching, range estimation, use of the compass, enemy weapons and equipment, sounds at night and other necessary techniques. Each OP maintained a map showing enemy defenses, known gun positions and emplacements. Some information for this came from their own observations and some from other sources. These OPs proved to be an accurate and reliable source of information. They were able to give reasonable estimates of direction by sound and accurate azimuths when flash or smoke was observable. They were able to do this because it was their principal duty and because they acquired skill with experience. When possible they were equipped with artillery compasses, and BC scopes or 20-power telescopes, and 8-power binoculars.

The counter-fire sergeant maintained a special map with overlays showing confirmed and suspected enemy artillery and mortar positions. When shell reports from the companies and battalion OPs came in, he pieced this information together. Estimates of direction would be generally rather rough and come from sound estimates, furrows, falling trees, and pattern of impact. With a sufficient number of estimates the accuracy increased. The counter-fire sergeant with these estimates of direction an knowledge of the range of variou enemy weapons could determine th general area from which the fire w coming. Within this area he cou check on his map for known or su pected emplacements of the type weapon in question or possible location Usually he could narrow this down a very small number of possibilities.

As he and other members of the i telligence section worked on this, th became very familiar with the activiti of certain hostile weapons and hen developed a fair ability at picking t right one. This information was th given to the heavy weapons compa commander, artillery liaison officer, S mortar liaison noncom, higher, low and adjacent units.

The counter-fire sergeant and oth members of the intelligence secti were particularly effective when th applied this knowledge in situatio that were stabilized. On one occasi a counter-mortar radar was located the battalion area and furnished ac rate and valuable information of ene mortar locations even under adve circumstances. At times the sergea was able to determine coordinates enemy mortar positions to within t meters of those found by the radar. was not that accurate always, to be su but he didn't have to be turned on a warmed up either. After the radar h moved elsewhere, it at least had left with some idea of how well we co help ourselves. I'll admit this inf mation did not always enable us knock out enemy weapons, but it help our artillery and mortars to silen them, which is the next best thing.

Sometimes simpler and more dir measures can be taken as the tid when our battalion was pestered by enemy recoilless weapon which wo use one position for a very short ti and then hurry on to another to av our counter-fire. In doing this it seem to use only certain positions, so mortars zeroed in on one of those p tions and waited. The next time enemy recoilless rifle crew appeared i that position it disappeared in a blid ing flash of prearranged mortar rounds

The point to be emphasized is t there are many agencies for coun mortar and counter-battery intellige but the usefulness of the counter sergeant and the sources of informa available within the infantry batta must not be overlooked. Shell rep and OPs can really help.

CAPT. LOTHROP MITTENTHA
Infantry-USAR

The Month's Comment

Points of View

"We can no longer prepare for every conceivable kind of war."

ROGER M. KYES
Deputy Secretary of Defense

"There are certain kinds of situations where certain military strength might be necessary, and they have to be provided for."

CHARLES E. WILSON
Secretary of Defense

"There is no sacrifice—no labor, no tax, no service—too hard for us to bear to support a logical and necessary defense."

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
President of the United States

Reenlistment Blues

AS a man who once gloried in the affluence of a $75 reenlistment bonus, one of our editors was momentarily stunned by the report that Admiral Arthur Radford was beating the drums for reenlistment allowances of $1,000 to $1,500. Recovering, he got a bit dogmatic. "I can guarantee they'll rue the day they ever put that kind of a carrot out in front unless they provide some kind of workable built-in device that will get rid of the incompetents," he said. "In my day the $75 bonus given for three years of service used to bring the professional privates reeling to the recruiting stations long before the 90-day grace period expired. . . . Still, it's pretty interesting. What's the upper age limits for enlisting nowadays? If the Admiral comes through I might be talked into another hitch or two."

In a more serious vein he went on to observe that the Admiral's proposition would have merit only if there was some kind of a sliding scale of payments that reflected the actual and potential worth of the man to the service. Some kind of (and we shudder to utter the words) efficiency rating ought to be devised that would make it possible for the Army to pay the highest bonus to the young and intelligent Pfc or corporal whose potential worth to the Army would make a $1,000 bonus a bargain for the government. Trouble with a rating system is that there would be a strong tendency to give all master sergeants the highest ratings and scaling them down according to the number of stripes the man wears. Such procedure would make the bonus arrangement only a little better than a fixed payment for time-servers who can't be faulted out of the service on account of behavior or performance, weak though the latter be.

AUSTERITY

FOR the quotation of the month we select the statement made by Senator John C. Stennis to newsmen: "We must have a lot of austerity in our military."

The Senator said it well and truly, for the austere soldier (sailor and airman) is indeed a paragon of the military virtues. The austere fighting man lives plainly. He leads a dedicated life. He is a disciplined individual. There are never enough of him.

Austerity in army organization and equipment is also highly desirable. Where there is austerity there is an absence of frills and fat and indolence. An austere army is one where brains, skills, machines and fire power are welded into a highly competent fighting machine.

There are some things that austerity does not mean. The lean and hungry soldier is the very epitome of the austere soldier, but the lean and hungry soldier is not a soldier on starvation rations. Rather he is a fighting man who eats just enough to stay at peak strength, shunning the waste of surplus flesh and flabby muscle.

And so it is with an austere army. An army that is forced by shortsighted economies, or selfish interests, or simple ignorance to spread itself so thin that it becomes too weak to perform its missions is not an austere army. To be forced to do without essential manpower, skills, machines and weapons is not austerity.

Austerity is not achieved by depriving a combat unit of essential radios because the unit has too many men engaged in communications. Austerity doesn't mean that an army should do without trucks, helicopters and cargo aircraft because the enemy has so few of them and therefore does without. Austerity doesn't mean disparaging an army's insistence that it must have every machine and weapon that can be devised that is useful to it, whether it be a tiny electronic gadget or an "atomic" cannon. Austerity doesn't mean cutting so deeply into "overhead" that combat units must support themselves at a cost to their fighting efficiency. Austerity certainly doesn't mean depriving an army of men who have the qualities of leadership and the intelligence and education needed to operate the machines an army must have.

Austerity also doesn't mean that the soldier and his family should be denied the opportunity of creating a happy home life, of having educational and cultural opportunities, and self-respect. Austerity isn't achieved by making slighting remarks about the "unproductivity of the military."

ALL such fraudulent attempts to secure austerity would result in exactly what Senator Stennis was trying to destroy in his comment. He was referring to the need for a strong positive moral tone in the military services that would give individual soldiers, sailors and airmen of all ranks the strength to resist the iniquitous blandishments and tortures of Communist "brain washers."

The danger is real. We seem to be moving into another period of non-shooting war and the tendency to cut, curtail and deprive the military services will be strong and persistent. There will be statements that it can be done without reducing fighting strength. There will be more attempts to make military men second-class citizens.

When austerity is offered we must look the package over carefully to see that it is really austerity and not an ersatz product that will leave us dangerously weakened.

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CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

THIS is the fourth in the series of articles on Career Management and how it works. If yo have any comment or questions on this series please feel entirely free to write the editors o Career Management Division.

Assignment of Overseas Returnees

"I just got my new ZI assignment, and darned if I'm not being sent halfway across the country. Why can't those people ever assign me near home?"

THIS has been said at least once by almost every officer. The assignment business is a mysterious thing to most officers, and this article will tell you something of what goes on in your Career Management (CMD) branch when you are reported available for an assignment in the United States after a long stint overseas. All officers should realize that there must be a tie-in between three important factors—the officer's wishes, the development of his career, and the requirements for officer personnel in the major CONUS commands.

You have a right to know how you are picked for your new post. Here is how it works. About four months before you complete your overseas tour you are reported for reassignment by the overseas commander to the Department of the Army. When this happens your career branch consults your Form 66 to determine what civilian and military education you have had, what MOSs you are qualified in, where you have been assigned in the past, and a variety of other pertinent facts.

It is an axiom of the service that "the needs of the service must be considered first." Still Career Management tries to assign an officer near his area of preference if it possibly can. Assignment officers must give careful consideration to many factors.

Here are a few examples. If you are 1st Lieutenant Brown, Infantry, and most of your time in the service has been spent as an athletic director, MOS 5661, it would not be logical for us to assign you to a unit near your home town as a National Guard organization and training advisor, MOS 2150. You aren't qualified for that duty. But you may be assigned as a platoon leader (armored infantry unit commander, MOS 1560) in order to make you a better infantryman. Or, if you are primarily an artillery unit commander, MOS 1193, and you are needed at Fort Sill, it would not make sense to assign you to Fort Dix as an I&E officer, MOS 5004, just because your home is in Newark and there is a vacancy for an I&E officer at Dix. If in this case you had had a good amount of experience in both MOSs, you might very easily be assigned to the vacancy which coincides with your desires.

You would be surprised at the number of assignments which do not coincide. You often hear of the times when this is not the case, but seldom does a fellow officer tell of the times when "I got what I wanted."

Many of you desire to attend your branch school for one course or another, and you note this fact on your Preference Cards. If you are qualified, some of you will wonder why you don't get to attend school on a TDY basis, en route to your new assignment. You know full well that going to school TDY en route is the most economical way to go and we know it, too. But the time element is very important when we talk about schooling. For example, if you are to return in September and the class you should attend doesn't start until 4 January, it's out of the question to order you to school 45 to 90 days early. You will have to go directly to your new post, and apply for the school at a later date.

How about the Preference Card?—the most maligned piece of paper the Army ever made official! This form is consulted prior to each assignment and, whenever consistent with the requirements and with the qualifications of the individual officer, he is assigned according to his preferences. In fact, your statement preference is considered so important b CMD, that a new form is being d signed. The new one probably will be full-sized sheet, much easier to unde stand, with complete instructions on th back. The Army areas and overseas the ters are listed, as are some special prefe ence assignments. We think the ne form will be a big improvement over th present one. All you will have to do w be to read the instructions carefully, loo at the map on the back, and take time think about what you want to check.


We should mention another very in portant factor: priority of needs. Eac requisitioning agency or headquarte lists its requirements on its requisitio according to the immediate need for certain position. Career Manageme must do its best to heed that priori Closely allied to this priority is the fa that some jobs require a higher degree skill and experience than others. For i stance, the assignment officer would doing an injustice to the officer if he signed a young lieutenant with only grade school education to fill the quirement for a college ROTC instru tor. Obviously, this would be a case malassignment. Lots of thought goes in each assignment.

The assignment business is not ar trary. The officers in CMD have hear and if they know what you want th may be able to get it for you. But th can't read your minds, either collectiv or individually. Be sure your Preferen Card states your desires clearly. If yo aren't sure what you asked for on yo old card get a new one from your ad tant and mail it to the Chief of yo Branch. If necessary, attach a note s ting forth clearly any compassionate special consideration.

[Next month: *Army Aviation*]

Irons in the Fire

Fork-Lift Truck Puts Trailers on Flatcars



An attachment that enables a standard, heavy-duty fork-lift truck to position a highway trailer on a railroad flatcar in a matter of minutes has been developed.

The attachment was designed for use with the standard 26,000-lb. capacity Ross Fork-Lift Truck, a product of Clark Equipment Company.

The fork truck is modified to allow speedy side-loading and unloading of highway trailers up to 35 feet in length onto a specially designed railway car which will transport two trailers. The modification consists of a special short upright and a standard side-shifter with toed-in forks that support a pin which fits into a recess at the front end of the trailer.

After the lift-truck has engaged the recess or "toe-plate" of the trailer, it maneuvers the trailer aboard the rail car and locks the trailer in place by dropping the trailer kingpin in a slot in the stanchion of the railway car.

One Engine—Four Motors

A German has invented a motor vehicle that has one engine that drives four motors—one to each wheel. Science Service reports that the central engine is a 75-horsepower, eight-cylinder diesel that drives an oil pump. This pump forces oil under pressure through flexible tubes to oil motors mounted on the wheels of the vehicle. These oil motors drive the wheels. Since no gears are involved, the system provides stepless speed control. To go faster you push down on the accelerator. To reduce speed, lift your foot and the oil motors brake the vehicle.

Beechcraft T-34A Delivered

The first production models of the Beechcraft T-34A "Mentor" trainer are being delivered to the USAF. The Air Force, which has ordered a sizable number of T-34s, will give it a series of operational suitability tests. The Beechcraft T-34 is an all-metal low-wing cantilever monoplane with fully retractable tricycle landing gear. It has a top speed of 189 miles per hour and a cruising speed of 173 miles per hour at 60 percent power. It has a service ceiling of 20,000 feet and a maximum range of 975 miles.

Automatic Radar Units

The experimental units of a line of automatic radar stations 1,200 miles from the North Pole, are nearing completion.

So lightning fast is the new system that a warning signal will be picked up and transmitted to the U.S. within seconds of the time an enemy aircraft comes within range. It is expected that this will give the USAF defense forces a six-hour warning.

The new equipment sounds a warning automatically whenever aircraft approach —greatly reducing the number of personnel needed for service in the Arctic. The installation is by Western Electric Co.

Miniature Wrist Radio

An experimental wrist radio able to pick up broadcasts within a range of 40 miles, has been developed by Army Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, Fort Monmouth, N. J. as a means of further exploring the possibilities of miniaturization. It has been dubbed the "Dick Tracy," although it does not transmit. The two and five-eighths ounce radio is worn on the wrist in the same manner as a watch. The set is contained in a Plexiglas case two inches long, one and an eighth inches wide, and three quarters of an inch thick. Its Lilliputian size is made possible through replacement of the conventional vacuum tube with five tiny



Germanium-veined parts designated as transistors and by other miniature components. A short antenna wire and a cord connecting the radio with the hearing aid type of receiver worn on an ear are concealed up the user's sleeve.

Seeing-Eye Airplane



This first flight photograph of the new United States Air Force RC-121C radar airplane shows the top "shark's fin" and lower "big bulge" radome installations of the giant Super Constellation-type airplane. Adapted for special defense missions, the long-range Lockheed transport carried America's most powerful search radar to high altitudes for line-of-sight surveillance. The flying radar stations can locate sneak raiders and can stay airborne for extended periods of time. Similar radar planes are in production at Lockheed for the Navy, which plans to use them as far-ranging forward eyes of the fleet.

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Front And Center

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Improvements in Gunnery

Various refinements and amplifications in gunnery technique and procedures have been incorporated in resident instruction at TAS since the publication of FM 6-40, "Field Artillery Gunnery," in 1950.

Precision Fire Procedure. A single procedure for the conduct of precision fire has been developed. Applicable to an angle "T" less than 100 mils as well as an angle of 100 mils or greater, the procedure eliminates the necessity for the observer sensing deviation in yards in fire for effect.

This method prescribes that a ½S factor will be used in fire for effect regardless of the size of the angle "T," unless a deflection bracket of less than one "S" exists. (If the existing bracket is less than one "S," it, of course, is split.) When the ½S value is computed to be smaller than 2, a minimum value of 2 is arbitrarily assigned. This facilitates both the establishment and splitting of a 2-mil deflection bracket to obtain a correct deflection.

The major advantages of the new procedure are three: (1) Simplified teaching; only one observer procedure need be taught. (2) More rapid and accurate communication; several transmissions between the FDC and the observer are eliminated. (3) FDC technique simplified.

"Record of Precision Fire" Form. In conjunction with the procedure described above, a new "Record of Precision Fire" form has been developed. On the face of the new form, a space is provided for complete initial data, adjusted data, deflection correction, and GFT setting; the face also serves as a complete, permanent record of the precision mission. Printed on the reverse side is the revised FDC sensing table and the new ½S table for quick reference. This item is not yet available for purchase through the TAS Book Department.

Range Corresponding to Adjusted Elevation. Using the graphic firing table (GFT) to determine range corresponding to the adjusted elevation has been found as reliable as interpolating for range in the tabular tables. Since final firing data are taken from the GFT, the preciseness of tabular interpolation for range is not necessary.

Range Deflection Fan. The procedure for marking the deflections opposite the 100 intervals on the range deflection fan has been refined to delete the zeros. Thus "2800" now appears as "28"; and "100," as "1." Except, the marking of "3200" has been changed to read simply "0"; this technique eliminates the possibility of an inexperienced operator reading a deflection in excess of 3200. In addition, the appropriate deflection is now marked on the left edge of the fan for both the red and black series of deflection figures. The black "T" is placed below the black figure on the left edge. Since the deflection reading is always made from left to right, the presence of the figures on the left edge serves to militate against a 100 deflection reading error.

Instruction for USAR Units

The fire support coordination center is the subject of classes presented by two officers of the TAS staff and faculty to USAR units throughout the Fourth Army area. The purpose of this instruction was to familiarize reserve units with the latest developments and technique in fire support coordination.

Effectiveness of Resident Courses

Steps were recently taken here to increase the effectiveness of study assignments for resident courses at TAS. All such assignments have undergone a complete re-examination to insure realism. Concurrently, certain techniques were adopted to emphasize, from the standpoint of the student, the importance of scheduled homework. None of the material covered by a study assignment is directly presented in classroom instruction; students are held accountable for preparing it by "pop writs" and end-of-course examinations. Review sessions, employing the conference technique, and practical exercises are used to correlate "homework" with material given in classes.

For the Artillery Officer Advanced Course, a program on effective study has been presented, stressing the advantages of an organized study plan including a regular time and place for study.

Revision of FM 6-40

The artilleryman's "bible"—FM 6-40, *Field Artillery Gunnery,* dated January 1950—is under revision at TAS. The new edition will be as thorough, complete, and understandable as possible. Organizations and individuals are therefore being encouraged to submit specific suggestions and new ideas for possible inclusion in the new manual.

Helpful comments would include: (1) specific details of any field artillery gunnery procedure or technique not adequately covered in the present manual; (2) sections or paragraphs of the present manual where fuller explanation is desirable or additional diagrams, sketches, or illustrative examples are required; (3) material or procedures in the present manual which should not be included in the revision; (4) any other areas that should be covered in the new manual.

To insure adequate consideration of all material, contributors are urged to submit their recommendations promptly and directly to: The Director, Department of Gunnery, TAS, Fort Sill, Okla.

Pamphlet on Battery Drill

TAS has produced much good supplemental literature on the training of firing batterics. One of the outstanding contributions in this field is a new 8-page pamphlet *Service-of-the-Piece Drill.* Prepared by the Department of Gunnery, it points the way to the accuracy, precision, and discipline necessary for the creation of a superio firing battery.

The basic concept of the booklet is tha properly supervised training is prerequisite to the delivery of timely and accurate fire Such training—and therefore this pamphle —emphasizes the value of short, snappy tes drills. Daily test drills enable the batter executive (and his superiors, as well) t determine not only the proficiency of th firing battery, but also the deficiencies i individual and team training that requir remedial action. The assistant executive chief of firing battery, and chiefs of sectio are utilized to the maximum in supervisin drill and detecting errors.

An illustrative example is included t demonstrate the proper conduct of a te drill and prescribe a sequence for rapic effective data checks on all weapons.

The booklet is being issued locally as a advance sheet for the firing battery phase gunnery instruction. Persons not attendin TAS may purchase copies for 10 cents fro the Book Department, TAS, Fort Sill, Okl

Radio Emphasized

TAS has a new plan to emphasize th adaptability and reliability of radio. Th crux of the program, in which all reside instructional departments are participatin is employment of radio as *the* communic tion medium in at least 50 percent of TAS field exercises. This practical instru tion is additional to the regular courses ar sub-courses offered by the Department Communication. The Department of Gu nery, for example, uses radio for all o served fire periods; while the Departmer of Motors and Matériel, respectively, use for all motor marches and firing demonsti tions. Increased confidence in radio a elimination of the almost catholic tenden to accept wire as the primary means of co munication, always relegating radio to secondary position, are the end resu sought by the system.

A subsidiary consequence of the progra is worthy of note: each student—no mat in which resident course he is enroll —now receives some communication struction and becomes familiar in a practi manner with artillery sets. All stude now leave TAS with a sound worki

knowledge of applied radio communication echnique.

Observer Message Modified

The message to the observer has been nodified.

In the past, when the decision was made o fire on an observed target, almost the vhole of the gunnery officer's fire order vas transmitted to the observer. But much of this information is not needed by the observer. So for the sake of brevity, a new "message to the observer" has been devised, based on the concept that the observer, if his mission is to be fired, can normally expect to receive everything he requested.

The observer is now sent only the information he needs to know: (1) batteries to fire for effect, (2) number of rounds to be fired for effect, and (3) concentration number assigned. For example: "Battalion, 3 volleys, concentration AA41." When changes are effected by FDC in the observer's initial fire request, they are noted in the message to him; example: Observer has requested fuze VT. Gunnery officer decides to use fuze delay (for ricochet). The resultant message to the observer reads, "Battalion, *fuze delay,* 3 volleys, concentration AA41."

New Prospectus Published

The most comprehensive extension courses prospectus yet prepared by TAS is being distributed. *Extension Courses for Field and Antiaircraft Artillery, 1954-55* is broad in coverage, detailed in fact, and concise enough for interesting reading. The prospectus covers everything from mailing and grading procedures to the benefits derived from participation in the program. As the title indicates, all available FA and AAA extension courses (with a brief description of the scope of each) are listed. For the first time, a section devoted to administrative matters is included. In addition, enrollment criteria and methods are spelled out simply in a complete and factual manner for everyone, from the Regular Army officer to the civilian abroad.

Current course enrollees receive copies direct. Other persons desiring a copy of this publication may get one from the Department of P&NRT, Extension Courses Division, TAS, Fort Sill 10, Okla.

Student-Instructors

For top quality results, resident instruction must be presented by the most capable instructors available. As any "platform pounder" can testify, it is not unusual to find a student in the classroom with more experience in the topic being presented than the instructor. The Artillery School is now capitalizing on that very situation.

The program uses selected members of the regular Artillery Officer Advanced Course (AOAC) as instructors for resident classes. Participation is voluntary but limited to those officers who are especially qualified to teach particular subjects.

Approximately 100, in the class of 240 officer-students, indicated a desire to teach.

To insure sound selections from this group, information forms, listing the prior military and civilian experience of each volunteer, are carefully screened. Equally important, the instructor potential of each individual is measured.

Revision of Courses

Extension courses are constantly in the process of revision. Two subcourses now under revision are:

40-26FA, *The Field Artillery Observation Battalion.* Distribution is expected to begin about December 1. This subcourse consists of six lessons and an examination, and covers organization and employment, survey planning, flash, sound and radar ranging, and meteorology. Credit hours: 18.

20-14FA, *Air Navigation.* Revision under review by Army Aviation School; distribution expected in February 1954; seven lessons and an examination; coverage: navigational methods, aeronautical charts, navigational pilotage, wind vector problems and their solution, and federal navigational aids. Credit hours: 21.

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Reorganization

A recent reorganization within TIS combined the former Extension Course Department with portions of the Training Publications Department to create a new Department of Non-Resident Instruction. The remaining portion of the Training Publications Department is now a staff agency known as the Publications and Visual Aids Office.

All work pertaining to Army Extension Courses, ROTC and Reserve components is now under the jurisdiction of the Department of Non-Resident Instruction. This consolidation was designed to effect coordination of non-resident instruction by placing all non-resident activities under a single head.

The Publications and Visual Aids Office now includes the Infantry School Book Department, the Army Field Printing Plant, *The Infantry School Quarterly,* the Publications Section, the Training Literature Section and the Visual Aids Section.

The reorganization will achieve greater efficiency and a fuller use of manpower within The Infantry School.

Missives

An Executive Order by the President prescribes the order of succession of officials who may act as Secretary of Defense and Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The succession to Defense Secretary is: Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force (in that order), Assistant Secretaries of Defense (in order of length of service), and General Counsel of Department of Defense. The succession to Secretary of Army is: Under Secretary, Assistant Secretaries (in order of length of service), Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff, and Chief of Army Field Forces.

✓ ✓ ✓

Army funds for research and development during the current fiscal year are 21.6 per cent less than last year; Air Force and Navy cuts were smaller; 16.2 and 16.3 per cent respectively. The Army has $345 millions to spend this year on R&D as compared to $440 millions last year.

✓ ✓ ✓

The Wherry Act, which has been the source of the services' only family housing for the past several years, is due to expire next July. However, with housing still critical at many posts and bases, the Defense Department may ask Congress to extend the Act, which permits the Federal Housing Commission to guarantee military housing mortgages.

✓ ✓ ✓

Air Force and Navy are grumbling more loudly than ever over the even distribution of "lower quality" manpower among the three services. The "even distribution" policy, inaugurated by Gen. Marshall when he was SecDef, has always been unpopular with the fly-boys and sailors. The Army must reiterate at all times and as clearly as possible that fighting squads, platoons, gun and tank crews are as costly and irreplaceable as aircraft and naval vessels.

✓ ✓ ✓

The plan to convert many of the National Guard's AA outfits to full time defense units near critical defense establishments and industrial complexes is still under study. In general the plan envisages full time duty by some members of each ack-ack battalion while the others would report for immediate duty in the event of enemy attack.

✓ ✓ ✓

An audit of the Army and Air Force Post Exchange Service by a civilian firm reveals that the breakdown of each dollar spent in the PX goes like this:

Food and Service	22¢
Tobacco	21¢
Candy	7¢
Bottled Drinks	10¢
Uniform accessories and clothing	12¢
Drugstore items, toothpaste, razor blades, shaving cream	6¢
Inexpensive wrist watches, insignia, lighters, and similar items	5¢
Stationery	4¢
Sundry (luggage, small appliances, portable radios, etc.)	13¢
Total	$1.00

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The Month's Books

- *Old Horses Never Die*
- *Who Starts Wars?*
- *Story of a Captive in Korea*
- *Traitor, Spy and Temptress*

BOOTS AND SADDLES

THE STORY OF THE U.S. CAVALRY, 1775-1942. By Maj. Gen. John K. Herr, USA, Ret., and Edward S. Wallace. Little, Brown & Company, Boston. 283 Pages; Illustrated; $6.00.

As the title accurately indicates, this book is the story, rather than a detailed history, of the United States Cavalry. It also reflects the never-say-die spirit of those brought up in the sabre and spur tradition. The late General Jonathan Wainwright in a foreword says: "Long have I advocated the retention of at least one full-strength mounted cavalry division, equipped with pack artillery which may be carried in pack or drawn behind horses. Such a cavalry division can operate in any weather, in any country, in any climate, and in any terrain. Let us remount the 1st Cavalry Division and return it to the United States to serve as a nucleus for expansion, if necessary, or for immediate action in an emergency." And the last sentence in the book proper is *"There is no substitute for cavalry!"*

The story of the American cavalry, and particularly of its part in protecting the westward expansion of the nation, is an interesting one, and it is fitting that it should be told by General Herr, our Army's last Chief of Cavalry. His co-author, Dr. Wallace, is a professional historian. If the story is also the story of the end of American cavalry, General Herr clearly does not believe that it ought to be. He says that the Russians today have at least twenty-five mounted divisions. Colonel Louis Ely, in his book, *The Red Army Today,* sets the figure as of 1949 at "over twelve horse cavalry divisions."

Incidentally, a good quiz show question might be: "In what war was the largest cavalry force used by one nation?" General Guillaume of the French Army in his *Soviet Arms and Soviet Power,* says the answer is the Red Army in World War II, "when the Red Army not only kept its cavalry but it never ceased to increase its numbers."

Although General Herr argues for the retention of cavalry, he has not let his views interrupt the flow of the story. There is considerable emphasis on the distortion, both in narratives and in pictures, of the facts of cavalry participation in American wars from the Revolution onward. There is some indication, perhaps not enough, of the great regimental pride and family feeling within units in the days of what was, with few exceptions, permanent assignment to one regiment. The redesignation of cavalry units, which the infantry had gone through earlier, in 1861 was done with typical disregard of the value of this pride. Incident to the changes, was an order requiring the dragoons and mounted riflemen to give up their distinctive uniform facings of orange and green, respectively—"to which distinctive detail all were strongly attached."

Another distinctive, and even more personal, detail was for many years officially prescribed for the cavalry alone. In 1848 the War Department ordered: "Moustaches will not be worn (except by cavalry regiments) by officers or men on any pretense whatever."

Also on the personal side, and debatable, is the authors' argument that one of the factors which contributed to the elimination of cavalry in our Army was jealousy on the part of officers of other arms, "especially among soft, and inactive officers behind desks," over the "certain indefinable social prestige which the man on horseback, the cavalier, the *hidalgo,* the gentleman, has always had over the man on foot."—Maj. Gen. H. W. Blakeley.

WAR—CAUSE AND PREVENTION

FROM ARROW TO ATOM BOMB: The Psychological History of War. By Stanton A. Coblentz. The Beechurst Press, New York. 539 Pages; Index; $6.00.

War, says Mr. Coblentz, is the master phenomenon of the ages and the overshadowing threat of our own time, but "men have never made much of an effort to understand its nature and to combat it in the light of understanding." The object of his book is to "analyze the conscious and subconscious impulses, the incentives and deterrents, the instilled habits of mind, the traditions, the mass motivations that underlie all mass combat." He seeks to present the psychological history of war so that the reader can arrive at some realization of what must be understood about its true nature and how war may be prevented. The alternative to success in the prevention of war is "the annihilation of civilization or of man himself."

Mr. Coblentz, who incidentally is bot a writer on war and a poet, thinks tha man's constant resort to warfare is more matter of centuries of indoctrination tha any inherent desire to fight. He believe that professional military men "have strong impulse to practice their trade." "W in the United States," he says, "have r cently had one notorious case in which a outstanding general brought about his ow downfall because, in defiance of his con mander-in-chief, he had advocated mea ures that the latter thought likely involve us in universal conflict." The ide of the inevitability of war, he thinks, most conspicuous in military circles, circles strongly affected by the military.

It is easy to cite historical examples, pa ticularly in the cases of wars precipitated b Germany or Russia, in support of this th ory, but it is equally easy to establish th the United States has been pushed towa wars more by civilians than by the militar Whether the civilians were from "circl strongly affected by the military" is ce tainly open to question. It would be ha for anyone to believe that within the for seeable future all wars could be prevente but it is pertinent to the author's commen on professional soldiers that General of t Army Omar Bradley, in his capacity Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, r peatedly stated: "We do not consider wor war to be inevitable." And in the autho solution of the problem of preventing w the crying need is stated to be the traini of our political leaders for their responsibi ties—"even as the leaders of the pulpit, t bar, and the army."—Maj. Gen. H. W. Blakeley.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

LINES FROM AN OLD BOOK

Be wise in time, and turn your horse out to grass when he shows signs of age, lest he end in a ludicrous breakdown with straining flanks.

HORACE

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

REPATRIATE'S STORY

I WAS A CAPTIVE IN KOREA. By Philip Dea W. W. Norton Company, Inc., 1953. 2 Pages; $3.50.

Philip Deane, correspondent for t London *Observer,* was captured by t North Koreans thirteen days after he rived in Korea to cover the war in July 1950. In April 1953 he was releas This book is about the two years and nie months in between.

His account of the thirteen days he v

n action with American troops is among he most moving we have seen. Here were Americans in savage fighting with little or o idea of why they were there or what ney were up against—and giving a magificent account of themselves. Deane imself was wounded twice before he was aptured.

Then began the long marches through ic cold, the brain washing, the endless umiliation, the merciless executions, death om hunger and lack of medicine—all of ie things we have come to associate with nemy prison camps. Yet with these things, iere were interludes of surprising kindess when it was evident the enemy was oing what he could in spite of his own itiful lack of food and proper clothing.

Deane gives us a picture of his captors iat is at once terrifying and a little sad. It a picture of some whom power has utrly corrupted; of others, simpler in their ith, who have accepted Communism as a ew religion because the pitifully little it ves them is more than they have ever ad; who will obey orders to shoot prisoners to take reasonable care of them with ual facility and very little puzzlement. nd there are those educated men, like the rmer dean of the Teachers' College in oul, who had gone over to the Commusts, well before the invasion of South orea, and who said to Deane:

". . . But there were others who would rn anyone against them—the one, for inance, who wrote outside the American X in Seoul [this was during the Occupaon] 'No dogs—no Koreans.' And those ho acted as if we had the plague when we ent near them. They called us 'dirty yelw bastards' to our faces. . . . Intellectual, Western thought appeals to me more an Marxism-Leninism, but the people irtured by Western thought want to, and n, call me a 'dirty yellow bastard' while ose nurtured by Marxism-Leninism are t allowed to call me that. I am a small an and I have my weaknesses. I cannot sregard insults, nor can I soften them by ying to myself, as Christ did, 'they know t what they do.'"

Deane writes of American soldiers in the mps who died bravely, of some who died roically, and of some, though they were small minority, who stole food from llow-prisoners and stripped the clothing m the dying, hours before they died.

Finally, Deane describes his fantastic rney of repatriation when he and a up of diplomatic and religious "interns" were sent through China and Russia a de luxe train with more food than they uld eat, private servants, and an unusual ount of freedom to observe conditions d people during stops and layovers. One ng Deane observed during the first part his trip—from Pyongyang to Antung—is teworthy. Along the road, this being on e night of April 8, he counted more than 00 trucks moving over bridges that were nplctely intact while all along both sides the road every town had been destroyed.



Pass In Review

Unfortunately the book publishing business goes through feast or famine cycles. After a dreary and unproductive summer enlightened only briefly by Dr. Kinsey's opus, the fall season has brought forth a harvest so bountiful the JOURNAL could not hope to review them all. However, there are some that deserve more than passing mention.

There is, for example, a largely unheralded little gem called *The Raid* ($3.00) by Laurence Greene. This fascinating biography describes John Brown's famous raid at Harpers Ferry as seen through the eyes of the villagers. No man to go about his research in a slipshod manner, Greene got himself a place on the side of one of the mountains near Harpers Ferry and settled down to do his book on the spot. We hope to have *The Raid* discussed more fully in a later issue.

One of the best books of the season for Civil War fans is Bruce Catton's *A Stillness at Appomattox* ($5.00). We didn't get the book in time for a full-length review in this issue but I had a chance to read an advance copy and it's topnotch. This is the final volume in his trilogy on the Civil War, the other two books were *Mr. Lincoln's Army* ($4.00) and *The Glory Road* ($4.50). These three books would make an unusually fine Christmas gift.

Several notable fiction items have come out this season, too. Sholem Asch has a new title *A Passage in the Night* ($3.75) that seems to be headed for the best-seller lists, and for the historical fiction fans, Samuel Shellabarger has *Lord Vanity* ($3.95). I haven't read the book yet, but the trade has certainly done a good bit of buzzing about a new book by Saul Bellow called *The Adventures of Augie March* ($4.50).

A new blossom on a hardy perennial is the latest of C. S. Forester's Hornblower books: *Hornblower and the Atropos* ($3.50). This one fills in the three-year period between *Lieutenant Hornblower* and *Captain Horatio Hornblower* and measures up in every respect to the other stirring narratives of naval adventure. Incidentally, take a look at the inside back cover of this magazine. Among the books in our special sale, you'll see a real bargain in not only the Hornblower series but three other Forester titles as well.

While it's not yet ready for review, those of you who check our "New Titles of Note" column will see that the final volume of Churchill's memoirs *Triumph and Tragedy* will be out this month. Since this volume starts off with the landings in Normandy and carries through to the end of the war it promises to be the most interesting of the lot. This, too, is a fine Christmas gift selection. Incidentally, we carry all of the Churchill volumes in stock and if you really want to go all out on a gift for someone, get the whole set.

Another new adventure story that rates high in interest is *Undersea Patrol* ($3.75) by Commander Edward Young of the Royal Navy. He tells a hair-raising story of the exploits of the sub he commanded during World War II.

One of the really intriguing pieces of fiction we've read just recently is Vern Sneider's *A Pail of Oysters* ($3.50). This book comes out just as his previous work *A Teahouse of the August Moon* hits Broadway in play form. The setting for his newest book is contemporary Formosa and is a truly fine and well-written story.

In a more sobering vein, we would recommend *Report on the Atom* ($5.00) by Gordon Dean, for three years Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Dean has written a factual account of what our atomic energy program is, what we have done and to some extent what the future holds. His words on the peaceful potential of atomic reactors open vistas that are most interesting to contemplate.—R. F. C.

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This struck him as a curious way to disrupt enemy communications.

Deane has tried very hard to make this report objective, and he has succeeded admirably. Nowhere does he permit the treatment he received to turn his book into what it might so easily have been—a worthless diatribe against his captors.—ORVILLE C. SHIREY.

PIECES OF HEMINGWAY

THE HEMINGWAY READER. Edited by Charles Poore. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953. 652 Pages; $5.00.

It is not the purpose of this review to debate whether or not Ernest Hemingway is this century's greatest writer of English prose. We leave such matters to the reviewers who seize upon the publication of a new selection from an author's works to debate such matters with themselves long and learnedly. We say he is and will cheerfully argue the point with anyone so inclined.

Mr. Poore has made an excellent selection from the body of Hemingway's work. Although he has to leave out much that some readers will wish he had included, the selection is clearly representative of Hemingway's writing as it has developed from *In Our Time* to *The Old Man and the Sea.*

Among the selections are *The Sun Also Rises* (complete), excerpts from *A Farewell to Arms, To Have and Have Not, The Old Man and The Sea, Death in the Afternoon* and *Green Hills of Africa.* Mr. Poore has included eleven short stories ranging from the anthologists' favorite, "The Snows of Kilimanjaro," to a new one not previously published in a book, "The Fable of the Good Lion."

For a bonus, there is an elaborately insane satire, *The Torrents of Spring.* Just what Mr. Hemingway was satirizing is hard to say, and the plot is something that might have been conceived by Robert Benchley and then cut up and pasted together by Rube Goldberg, but the *Torrents of Spring* will be an unusual experience for those who may not have read it.

Mr. Poore's foreword and his brief prefaces to the selections are helpful without being overpowering. Altogether he has done an admirable piece of work.—ORVILLE C. SHIREY.

ANOTHER ANALYSIS OF COMMUNISM

FROM LENIN TO MALENKOV. By Hugh Seton-Watson. Praeger, New York, 1953. 377 Pages; Bibliography; Indexes; $6.00.

To the torrent of books on communism, Seton-Watson has added a useful volume. His analysis of the common pattern of Communist behavior is particularly commendable, as is his explanation of the techniques of communism, not only where they were successful but where they failed. An especially interesting part of the book deals with the growth of totalitarianism in Soviet Russia and the inter-relationship of the regional and national movements with Moscow.

Seton-Watson is admirably acute in some of his opinions: "Mass witch-hunting, even if conducted by eminent persons, is a poor method of dealing with the communist danger . . . there is no doubt that communism is a deadly menace to freedom, and there is no doubt that fascists hate communists . . . but fascists must not be allowed to take the leadership of the struggle against communism, as the communists once took the leadership of the struggle against fascism. . . . There are two divisions in the world today. One is between the communists and the rest. The other is between those who regard slavery, torture and massacre as permissible methods of political struggle and those who do not. The first division is the more publicized, the second the more fundamental."

If you have enough fortitude to tackle another book on communism, you will find this rewarding and useful.—RICHARD G. MCCLOSKEY.

PARES' RUSSIA, 5th EDITION

A HISTORY OF RUSSIA. By Bernard Pares. Alfred A. Knopf, 1953. 642 Pages; Maps; Index; $7.50.

The late Sir Bernard Pares spent much of his life among the Russian people, studying their historical records. He made twenty trips to that country, the last in 1936 despite the fact he had become *persona non grata* to the Soviet rulers. The first edition of his history appeared in 1926, and ever since then it has been accepted as the standard history of Russia. This is th fifth edition, revised by Sir Bernard 1947, two years before his death.

This history is so well known through the world that only a description of th current edition is needed here. Beginnin with the prehistoric Slavs, Pares traces th course of Russia's history to the Bolshev Revolution of 1917. There are two length penetrating chapters on the Soviet Unio followed by one on the USSR in Wor War II, and an epilogue on the postw Soviet that brings the history to 194 Richard Pares, the author's son, adds a introduction which tells how Sir Bernar passion for Russia developed. There a an up-to-date bibliography and ten ne maps. This is truly the scholar's history the Russian people, and the current volur is a fine example of the bookmaker's a —N.J.A.

RAILROADS IN THE CIVIL WAR

VICTORY RODE THE RAILS: The Strategic Place the Railroads in the Civil War. By Geo Edgar Turner. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Ir New York, 1953. 419 Pages; Illustrated; dex; $4.50.

Every student of the Civil War kno that this was the first war in which ra roads played a major role. Troop conce trations were speeded by use of railroads both the North and the South. The victo at Bull Run was largely due to the u expected arrival of Confederate troo over the Manassas Gap Railway, and wh

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
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iis was seen, the strategic importance of iis new form of transportation became ovious.

Mr. Turner's book is the best study to ite on the logistical and strategic sigificance of the railroads in the Civil War. lis examination of the governmental oranization, North and South, shows the eat advantage accruing to the federal rces from better railroad administration Washington than in Richmond. His escription of rolling stock and railroad nes, supplemented by many excellent notographs and maps, provides necessary formation concerning material resources. BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG.

HOW THE LIMEY FIGHTS

ITAIN AT ARMS. By Thomas Gilby. British Book Centre, New York, 1953. 361 Pages; Index; $2.75.

The British soldier has for centuries now en driving his officers, his allies and his nemies quite mad with great impartiality. hen he has had his tea and washed up s mess gear, and is quite sure that there nothing else he has forgotten, he will atnd to whatever war he happens to be ghting at the moment. Then, to the conision of his exasperated allies and the conernation of the enemy, he fights like a ger.

This little book is a collection of excerpts om letters, diaries, reports, and recollecons of the British armed forces from 1704 Korea. Most of them were little known begin with, or have been out of print r years, but they show better than some of e great martial passages of English prose e temper and attitudes of the British ghting man, whether private or admiral. It is not possible in a short review to note a "typical" passage if, indeed, it ould be possible at all, but one of the best the annoyed comment of a brigadier out his South Korean allies: "I am not oing to have them executing people on my oorstep."

A good part of the book may not be very eaningful to the American reader, but it ill show him beyond all doubt that some his own odd military characteristics are onestly come by.—o. c. s.

ARNOLD AND ANDRÉ

E TRAITOR AND THE SPY. By James Thomas Flexner. Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1953. 431 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.75.

Until the publication twelve years ago of *he Secret History of the American Revotion* much had been written in defense denunciation of Benedict Arnold, the raitor, with not much care taken to sepate fact from legend. Carl Van Doren's ork unearthed from British secret archives cuments that make Arnold's act even ore infamous. It wasn't his lack of faith the cause; he had fought like a demon d bled for it. Nor the slights he suffered the hands of Congress; his relative rank d been restored. He had the cushy Philalphia command, the company of a lovely ung wife (Peggy Shippen, the Temptress) whose love of luxury he shared, and an opportunity to line his pockets through military purchases. It was simply his cupidity, which manifested itself early in life, that impelled Arnold to make the offer to Sir Henry Clinton.

Mr. Flexner's objective work adds little to our knowledge of Arnold. It is John André, the Spy, who emerges as the new character, through discovery of his long buried manuscripts in England and Australia. Hitherto we had thought of him as poet, artist, actor, scholar, all-around gentleman who ended pitiably but bravely. Now, through his own words, we see him as subaltern in the field and staff officer. He first fought the despised rebels (led by Arnold) at the Sorel River, was later captured, interned at Carlisle (he loathed rebels more after closer contact), and exchanged. The polish displayed in Philadelphia and New York Tory circles could be exchanged for the brutality of the soldier in campaign. (To Clinton: "Have we not fire as well as the sword, a horrid means yet untried?") And it wasn't cruel fate that thrust André into the role of intermediary, nor his desire to Do Something for England. André was ambitious, and as Major and Adjutant General of His Majesty's Forces in North America, he longed for the opportunity that would assure advancement under Clinton or security should Sir Henry be relieved. He thought that opportunity had arrived in Arnold's defection.

So here for the first time we have an account of the real circumstances in their lives that brought together the Traitor, the Spy, and the Temptress, with the narration done in highly dramatic detail. In using it the military reader will bemoan the absence of maps to illustrate the actions involved. The scholar will be handicapped by the separate publication of the source references, available only on request.—N. J.A.

HOW TO WIN

HOW TO BE A CONSISTENT WINNER IN THE MOST POPULAR CARD GAMES. By John R. Crawford. Doubleday & Co., Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1953. 256 Pages; $2.95.

If you toy with or work at bridge, canasta, samba, poker, pinochle, hearts, cribbage, pitch, blackjack, or gin, you'll find something in here to make your game better. Mr. Crawford presumes you have some knowledge of the game so he skips the elementary stuff and goes right into the winning methods and plays. He offers nothing really new, but his approach to things and the convenient organization of the book make it a most useful refresher. He gives enough practical examples of plays to underline his points, and his ten-point summary of the strategy and tactics of each game is particularly useful.

Some of you may remember Cpl. Crawford's work on crooked gambling during the war, and also that of the pre-eminent John Scarne. Crawford and Scarne don't always agree on the odds for or against various plays, but don't let that worry you too much. They approach cards from a con-



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siderably different angle. Crawford's book is well worth looking into.—Richard Gordon McCloskey.

HOW TO ESCAPE

THEY HAVE THEIR EXITS. By Lt. Col. Airey Neave, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1953. 275 Pages; Illustrated; $4.00.

"Escape," writes Colonel Neave, "is not only a technique but a philosophy. The real escaper is more than a man equipped with compass, maps, papers, disguise and a plan. He has an inner confidence, a serenity of spirit which makes him a Pilgrim."

Colonel Neave had enough of the philosophy to get transferred to Colditz—the "escape proof" fortress reserved for incorrigible "escapers." He beat that one, too, the first man to do so. His philosophy was so practical that he returned to the Continent to work with the French Resistance in rescuing Allied airmen, and took a leading part in rescuing the survivors of the First Airborne Army at Arnhem.

When the war was over, Neave had the pleasant-unpleasant job of delivering the indictments to the top-flight Nazi leaders: Keitel, Hess, Goering, Jodl, Doenitz and others.

Colonel Neave's story is a grand one, but somehow he fails to instill it with any sense of excitement or strain. The confirmed escape fan will find a distressing lack of detail.—Richard G. McCloskey.

COUNTER-ESPIONAGE

LONDON CALLING NORTH POLE. By H. J. Giskes. William Kimber and Co., Ltd., 1953. 208 Pages; Glossary; $3.50.

London Calling North Pole is one of the stories of almost unbelievable success that occasionally crop up in the field of counter-espionage. There is no doubt that the incident happened, first because the author of the book is the former Chief of German Military Counter-Espionage in Holland, Belgium and Northern France and, second, because it is supported by an epilogue to the book written by a captured agent who was, in a way, responsible for the whole thing.

This is the story of how, for twenty months, the MID-SOE London radio links with their supposed agents in Holland were under German control, causing the loss of about fifty Allied agents, a number of aircraft, and large quantities of arms and equipment. The damage to the Dutch resistance movement must have been incalculable.

H. M. G. Lauwers, the agent who was first arrested, consented to turn over his code to the Germans and to play back his transmitter. This, he explains in his epilogue, was not particularly unusual since MID-SOE in its turn would be glad to have a radio link with the Germans which was above suspicion. This was to be accomplished by having the captured agent fail to transmit his security check once the set had been captured. This would indicate to the British that the agent had been arrested and the set was being "played back" by the Germans. The British coul then set about deceiving the Germans o their own account.

Lauwers maintains that he followed th procedure and that his directors in Londo failed to notice the omission or any of th warnings he worked into later messag he sent for the Germans. This apparent incredible stupidity is the most difficult pa of the whole story to believe, and we sha probably not have it confirmed becaus although this hassle has caused lou screams for investigation in England ar in Holland, British intelligence has sa nothing for publication.

London Calling North Pole is difficult evaluate for that reason—because it te only two sides of a three-sided story. B it does show in detail how good, routi counter-espionage works pays off—in th case, of course, with more spectacular su cess than usual.—Orville C. Shirey.

BOOKS RECEIVED

THE ORIGINAL CONFEDERAT COLT. By William A. Albaugh III a Richard D. Steuart. Greenberg, Pu lisher. 62 Pages; Illustrated; $5.00.

THE WISE BAMBOO. By J. Malco Morris. J. B. Lippincott Company. 2 Pages; $3.50. Malcolm Morris' accou of his management of Tokyo's fam Imperial Hotel under Army supervisio Humorous.

THE POWDER FLASK BOOK. By R Riling. Robert Halter, Publisher. 4 Pages; Illustrated; $25.00 A really mo umental work on powder flasks, obj of one of the current collectors mani magnificently printed and illustrated.

THE CITY. By Julius Horwitz. T World Publishing Company. 219 Pag $3.00. Stories and sketches about N York by a talented new short story w er.

SHADES OF SCOTLAND YARD. S. Theodore Felstead. Roy Publish 1953. 206 Pages; Illustrated; $4.0 Stories grave and gay of the worl greatest detective force.

PASSAGE EAST. By Carleton Mitch W. W. Norton & Company, 1953. 2 Pages; Illustrated; $5.00. The story the yawl *Caribee* in the exciting sm boat race between Bermuda and E land.

SOPRANINO. By Patrick Ellam a Colin Mudie. W. W. Norton & Co pany, 1953. 288 Pages; Illustrat $3.75. The record of a 10,000-m voyage over the ocean in a midget s boat.

THE STRUGGLE FOR POLAND. H. Peter Stern. Public Affairs Pr 1953. 79 Pages; $2.00. The story hind Poland's collapse into the So orbit.

THE UNITED STATES AND ITA By H. Stuart Hughes. Harvard Uni sity Press, 1953. 256 Pages; In $4.00. A volume in Harvard's "Am can Foreign Policy LLibrary."

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
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Willing to die, if die they must.

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Where honor's held by rigid rules.
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To train the boy to be a man.
That done, to serve his country's need,
His comrades he'll be fit to lead.

They are our nation's chosen best,
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For knowledge, courage, strength of will,
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At first cadets, but every one
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Admirals, generals, captains all
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'Til peace shall come and war shall end,
On them for freedom we depend.
Men (in salute I raise my hand)
Trained to obey and to command.

If you would like a reprint of this poem, suitable for framing, write Chrysler Corp., Dept. RS4, 341 Massachusetts Ave., Detroit, Mich.

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THE LIAISON OFFICERS for the defense advisory committee for women in the services leave the Pentagon with Lt. Col. Emily C. Gorman, deputy director of the WAC. Representing the Navy, Army, Marines and Air Force, these officers are typical of the many women who have voluntarily entered the armed forces, finding a rewarding career while making their special contribution to our defense.



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ACTING OFFICER OF THE DECK Albert E. Kizis, Lt.(jg) U.S. Navy, directs a change of course on the bridge of the U.S.S. Tarawa. Kizis, a graduate of the University of Scranton, Pa., attended Officer Candidate School at Newport, N. J. Currently on a two year tour of duty, Kizis can ship over for additional duty as he chooses.

PHOTO BY PHILIPPE HALSMAN



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
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The Month's Mail

Work Hard for the Army

To the Editors:

The biggest trouble with present day young officers and non-coms is that they do not like to work for what they get. Getting a little dirty hurts their dignity and pride. Education is fine, but you have to put out more than just flowery words to get difficult assignments accomplished.

Too many of them made sergeant first class or second lieutenant in a year or two. If they had to spend some three or four years in the ranks before receiving a commission they would know how to take care of it properly. A lot of good, smart (intelligent) soldiers have spent that long or longer learning the trade and you can well see the difference in the performance of work given the Army in return. A lot of our young junior leaders today have had their positions given to them without proof of their ability to take charge and properly fulfill their obligations as a good leader should. Let them take Basic Training as a private and if they prove themselves, give them a trial period in which they can show their ability to be leaders of men.

The big trouble with most of the people who think discipline is rough, is that they have never really worked hard to attain a goal and achieve a lifetime dream come true. Take the Army as a profession if you love it and work for its betterment. It is a good career, but it takes a lot of good hard work to build a good stable organization to be proud of in the future. If you do not want to be a worker and help our Army to stay great, get out of it for the good of the service. Regular commissions should be for those who have the Army in their hearts.

I am a career infantryman.

LT. JOHN E. TODD
"M" Company, 508th ARCT
Fort Benning, Ga.

Memoir-Writing Commanders

To the Editors:

I noticed that (and this is a very minor point) in General Blakeley's down-to-earth review of Gen. Krueger's book on Sixth Army he claims five "affirmatives" among memoir-writing Army commanders. This should probably be amended insofar as the reference to General Stilwell and Tenth Army.

I do not believe that there has been any *per se* history of the Tenth Army published although there have been several unit histories that have included the Okinawa campaign which was, of course, Tenth Army's only campaign; and there was *Okinawa: The Last Battle* (part of the "U.S. Army in World War II" series) which was based on the material gathered by the combat correspondents. The course of this campaign was guided by General Simon Bolivar Buckner until his untimely death in the campaign's twilight; then Vinegar Joe Stilwell took over.

Stilwell's book, edited by Theodore H. White, contained his memoirs only up to the time of the end of his mission to the Chinese Army, corresponding roughly to the period covered by the recently-released Stilwell's *Mission to China* (another volume in the Army series).

So I don't think that there has really been any Stilwell-Tenth Army book to compare with Clark's, Patton's, Eichelberger's, now Krueger's or even Brereton's (which was considerably more than the history of the First Allied Airborne Army).

Not that this takes anything away from the review—or from General Krueger's book which I enjoyed tremendously. The one thing the book hasn't done satisfactorily (as noted) is to explain the formation of the many Task Force Headquarters for operations and the employment of "Alamo Force" instead of Sixth Army during so much of the island-to-island war.

Like myself, many members of the 102d Infantry stationed with the Army Task Force on Canton Island will recall the airplane crash General Krueger mentions in the early part of the book—but I do not r call that any of us on the island ever kne the crash victims included so large a nur ber of key staff officers en route to Gener Krueger's headquarters.

The November issue was fine; clean ar fresh and readable.

BRUCE JACO
31 South Fourth St.
Park Ridge, N. J.

Guardsman's Salute to TIS

To the Editors:

I have just completed and thorough enjoyed the Preparatory Rifle Markmansh Instructor's course at Fort Benning. I no have everything new TIS has to offer PRMI at my command. Next summ when the RA officers bird-dog my classes can proceed with confidence. I am up date. Pressure is being brought on t training divisions to teach men to hit wh they shoot at. When it reaches my unit will be ready. Sure, I've been over this b fore many times as a trainee and as instru tor. But each time I learn something. Ea trip to TIS teaches me more. The w PRMI is run is a lesson in itself to instru tors. You are given all the latest poop, a you practice it. You get back in the ran and see the trees instead of the forest fr a trainee's eye. This different perspecti is good for a man who trains other men.

Next Month's Journal

More than ten years ago then Lieutenant Colonel S. L. A. Marshall wrote in the *Infantry Journal* that *esprit* "is a dynamic and vital substance conducted to the living by the living." He went on to show that the finest *esprit* is in the loyalty of one man to another: the led to the leader and the leader to the led. In "*Esprit de* WHAT" coming next month, Maj. Gen. H. W. Blakeley doesn't put *esprit* on quite that personal a level, but he does show clearly that the restoration of our Army's regimental and battalion *esprit* can only come about if very difficult and thorny problems can be solved.

In a related vein Col. Hugh M. Exton deals vigorously with the problem of decentralizing authority so that noncommissioned officers and junior commissioned officers can learn by doing. The title—"How Do You Train Your Unit"—suggests the full scope of this timely article.

Another timely piece and one every reader will dip into eagerly is "Life Among the Indians" by Lt. Gen. W. B. Palmer. General Palmer, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, of the Department of the Army, tells what it takes to be a successful "Indian" on the General Staff. It's no place for glamor boys or glory-hunters, he says, for the GS officer must dig all of the time for "real facts, verified facts, complete facts."

Alaska is the country devoted to the first article of our new "Around the Bases" series. Next month we hop from Alaska to give you the lowdown on service in a country that does have one thing in common with it: enchanting scenery. The country is Austria—land of Viennese waltzes, and the custodian, in a way, of vanishing prewar culture and sophistication. The sophistication includes the political variety; Austria, as you know, is occupied by the four powers and is also hard by the Iron Curtain.

The National Guard is particularly for-unate to be able to attend this course. In he NG we do not have the opportunity o rub elbows with real soldiers often. We re old vets who have been out of the Army our or five years or we are high school oys who never saw anything nearer a sol-ier than our own NCOs and officers. Just he association in the barracks and in the eld helps us.

M/Sgt. Jack Aclin
Co. E, 117 Inf., Tenn. N.G.
Paris, Tenn.

Commo to Signal Corps

To the Editors:

The Cerebration "Commo to the Signal Corps" [September] touched off a chain eaction in this infantry commo! As an in-ntry communicator for many years, both s an enlisted man and as an officer, I feel uite strongly about turning over the means y which command and control may be chieved to an outside group. I gather that n his tour of Korea, Col. Kintner did not un into many of the Signal Corps officers ho were assigned as both battalion and egimental commos. If he did, I feel he ould not speak out so loudly in favor of rning the low levels of communication to ie Signal Corps. The Signal Corps of-cers I have had assigned at various times nder me as battalion commanders, were all ained by the schools run by the Signal orps. What their training consisted of, I o not know; it certainly wasn't basic com-unication.

Col. Kintner's remarks about communica-ons being taken for granted until they fail, e true. Too damned true in this outfit. ot enough prestige and rank for the mmo workers—score again for Col. K. A oung infantry officer who gets assigned to commo job is taking a chance with his ca-er? No, Sir! In my book he is prepping imself for future success. (Providing he es his job correctly.) No longer is it ssible to control groups of men by direct ntact and observation. A commander, om a platoon leader on up, must rely n an electrical means of communication. rom my experience, the only way for an ficer to learn fully the "so called compli-ted communications setup," is to actually o the job himself. I'd make it mandatory r every regular officer to spend at least ne year in communications both at battal-n and regimental level. The knowledge communications is a requirement for any 2 or S3 as well as for your battalion and gimental commanders. A forced tour of ty may sound harsh, but I assure you at one will not then run into S3's who der a commo to net an AN/GRC-9 with n AN/PRC-10. Or the S3 grabbing a ive microphone" from a radio operator d promptly violating every rule of se-rity.

Here in Korea, I heard the division com-ander, in order to identify himself to a mpany commander engaged in "a hold at all costs" defense, grab a microphone and start in "This is - - - - - -." Luckily for those of us around in the CP, Joe was unable to shift his artillery. For we knew that our net was constantly monitored by the CCF.

Unfortunately for Col. Kintner as for many of our regimental commanders today, they have run into an off breed communicator—the commo who talks a good job, but never produces. I am not only speaking of myself, but for the majority of the commos in the Army today, when I say we have a group of loyal, hard-working officers and men devoted to the furnishing of communications for the necessary command and control. Our only reward is the self satisfaction of doing a good job—at all times and under all conditions. We are not in the minority as many believe—we are around. And we are *infantrymen first, last, and always.*

Captain Commo
Korea

Squaring not the only Solution

To the Editors:

After reading Gen. Lynch's fine article, "The Infantry Division—Triangular or Square" [November], I realized that a change in the TO&E might prove valuable.

Squaring the regiment and battalion without decreasing our total number of divisions would require greatly increased manpower quotas. However, the true value, as emphasized in the article, is a much needed reduction of the "division slice," while at the same time increasing the unit's regenerative powers.

While squaring a unit is a solution, it need not be the answer. For example, the rifle company could easily support its three rifle platoons with three twelve-man squads, each with three AR teams; a change which would reduce the administrative overload, as well as increasing the firepower of the rifle platoon. Furthermore, these three-man AR teams could be made up in the ZI and be sent overseas as a packet—right down to the squad.

Changes such as these would have profound tactical and logistical significance, which could be interestingly discussed in an article supporting the triangular organization.

Lt. Charles J. V. Fries, III
Fort Lewis, Wash.

Stretching the Square

To the Editors:

General Lynch's article proposing a quadrangular infantry organization misses one point.

Additional combat strength in the division will result in more extended fronts both in attack and defense with *less* depth and flexibility and *no* increase in time for rest and rehabilitation *unless* our service

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
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USN

THESE are some of the bravest men on earth.

Yet these young holders of the Medal of Honor were never fighters for the love of fighting. They are men of war with a dream of peace.

They want a world in which small wide eyes can gaze in rapture at a tinselled tree. Where a happy Christmas is a child's inalienable right—because fear and force have at last given way to peace and law and goodwill.

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Yes. Beginning now, each of us who earns can put some part of his earnings into United States Defense Bonds. For by these Bonds we make our own families secure, first of all. Then, out of the security of our families, we build the strength of America—to *stay* at peace in a world where peace still is only for the strong.

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★ ★ ★

In all, 104 men have won the Medal of Honor in Korea. The men here represent them—and all the service men and women to whose devotion we in America owe our security this Christmas of 1953.

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schools stress that regimental and divisio fronts remain unchanged. Manuals mu emphasize this point and army and cor commanders assigning frontages must a ways keep in mind the primary reason f "squaring."

If commanders pay heed to the tempt tion to *use* the fourth battalion and reg ment, the staying power, the depth an flexibility of our division will be *reduce*

LT. COL. FRANK H. LINNEL

Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

Smith Versus Smith

To the Editors:

I thought the JOURNAL had done a be ter than mediocre job through public tion of the comments of Capt. Edmund C Love relative to the Smith vs. Smith matte [*Infantry Journal*, Nov. 1948] and that might be well to let sleeping dogs lie. Hov ever, I note that the matter is brought u again in the review of "Navy War—Vo ume VIII" by General Blakeley in yo November issue.

I have been tempted a number of tim to fill in a few gaps in the published d tails in those 48 hours just prior to an immediately after the relief of Maj. Ge Ralph C. Smith on Saipan and from th standpoint of the XO and later CO of th battalion (3d Bn., 106th Inf., the regime attacking initially in a column of batta ions) around which the "last straw" in th controversy seemed to center.

Since Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith a peared then not to know what was goi on in his own command and apparently no better acquainted today, as would see to be the case with the Navy historia Adm. Morison, I'm going to do it yet so day, so help me.

It is indeed unfortunate that it is po sible for persons to record for posterity u founded information and opinions such have been written in some instances abo the Saipan incident. More immediate, f example, is Adm. Morison's statement re ative to incompetent and overage compa commanders. I am thinking of four of n own company commanders at that pa ticular time, three younger ones killed wounded, and the fourth who, because superior rating, was integrated into and now a lieutenant colonel in the Regul Army.

Throughout the years that this contu versy has been publicly aired, the tag of i competency has never been placed up the proper shoulders. I have known sin that day, June 23, 1944, where it belon as do others who know the facts of t case. Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith was military man of topmost ability who h the confidence and respect of all who kne him except one.

LT. COL. FRANCIS P. FISH

1805 Maxwell Avenue
Parkersburg, West Virginia

THE INDISPENSABLE WEAPON

The safety of mankind lies in the minds, hands and hearts of American soldiers standing guard on the frontiers of the free world

GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY

THERE is still one absolute weapon—the employment of which dominates every consideration of National Security—the only weapon capable of operating with complete effectiveness—of dominating every inch of terrain where human beings live and fight, and of doing it under all conditions of light and darkness, heat and cold, desert and forest, mountain and plain. That weapon is man himself.

The striking technological advances of the past hundred and fifty years, while they have profoundly enlarged the scope and scale of warfare, have in no way diminished the importance of the human being in battle. Rather, they have increased his importance, and while subjecting him to greater hazards, have placed greater demands upon him.

Each of the changes in technical capabilities has brought changes in tactics. Each has required changes in organization. None has resulted in reduced over-all military manpower requirements. All have made increasing demands for skills and leadership.

One of the most significant tactical developments has been the consistently greater dispersion of troops on the battlefield, and with it a steady decentralization of the responsibility for tactical decisions. . . .

IN the Army today there are thirty-two distinct career fields. Each of these is a major specialty in its own right. To cite a single example of the standard required, a soldier of average or above average intelligence should complete no less than 128 weeks—two and-one-quarter years—of training before he is properly trained to perform the duties of an infantry squad leader, before he should be entrusted with the lives of others in battle. For a platoon sergeant the necessary training time is greater, and for the higher ranks, greater still.

Naturally, this is due in part to the increased complexity of weapons. But it is at least equally due to the increased degree to which tactical decisions must be made, effective leadership exercised, in even the smallest combat units. Thus, the soldier's capabilities have increased through the increased capabilities of his weapons, but the demands made upon his skill, his intelligence, and his character have likewise increased. These demands reach their peak in battle under conditions of maximum danger, fatigue, and confusion. The measure of the soldier's response is directly reflected in the casualty lists. The Army more than any other segment of our people wants those lists small.

In the course of my inspection trip to the Far East and Alaska, I saw the men in Korea alert to check and counter the possible resumption of Communist aggression. I saw the men who are keeping vigil in the North, standing faithful guard against possible attack which could come unannounced. In Greenland, in Panama, and along the Rhine, other American soldiers are ready for whatever emergency may arise.

These men are performing a vital service . . . It is their readiness, their presence in critical areas, which constitutes today another of the great deterrents to war. It is their presence which makes Soviet-led Communist aggression against friendly countries of Western Europe and of the Far East more improbable of success, and therefore less likely of occurrence. It is their presence on the far sides of the oceans which surround us, which . . . strengthens the cause of freedom everywhere. Any premature withdrawal, any ill-advised weakening of their position can be a grievous blow to freedom.

I HAVE been speaking to you of men, the basic element of armies. I do not underestimate the vital importance of weapons and machines. No army in the world has benefited more by the technical improvements in weapons than our own. Always anxious to gain maximum returns from every ounce of human effort, every risk of human life, the United States Army developed its basic military doctrine around the concept of firepower, for firepower and the ability to maneuver it rapidly are foundation stones of our military doctrine.

In Korea, once again, was demonstrated the value of the close industrial support of our military forces. It was the massed firepower of the American soldier which balanced the weight of massed manpower of the enemy's callous "human sea" tactics. Thanks to the industrial productivity of the American people and to the strength of the American economy, our combat units today are the hardest hitting, man for man, of any army in the world. We have recently given our Army atomic weapons. We shall add others as time goes on. The increase in firepower will be tremendous, the effect on tactics evolutionary.

We shall continue to have in the future, as we have in the past, the most modern and effective Army, man for man, that can be produced, and the most economical, in terms of values the American people most cherish.

From an address by the Chief of Staff, delivered at Cleveland on 10 November 1953

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Strategy of Restra

HANSON W. BALDWIN

We will be in great danger if we are led to embark upon an ideological crusade using unlimited means to achieve unlimited destruction and despair. If we are wise we will build upon a strategy of reason that has fixed, attainable objectives.

THE United States has been engaged for the past seven years in a state of conflict with Soviet Russia—a worldwide political, economic, psychological, and, in places, a military conflict. We are the leaders of a coalition—loosely tied by self-interest, fear, traditions, culture or heritage—of non-Communist or anti-Communist states, many of whom have a very close ideological kinship with communism. Russia is the leader of a group of Communist-dominated powers. The conflict is global, and it embraces political, economic, ideological and military methods.

The reasons for this conflict are both historical and contemporary.

The late Secretary of Defense Forrestal used to say that we lived in an era akin to that of the Napoleonic perio and he likened the situation of the United States tod to the position of England opposing a unified contine under Napoleon. I think perhaps a more fitting simi would be the era of Rome and Carthage, when the t super-states of that day ruled the then known world. any case, historically, I think, there have always be causes for conflict when vacuums of power, politic economic, military or otherwise, have been created. Aft World War II great vacuums of power were left in t place of Germany, Japan, and other nations that we once great, and there emerged two powers—the U.S. a Russia—so far superior in strength to any of the oth

HANSON W. BALDWIN *has been the military and naval editor of* The New York Times *since 1929. He graduated from the Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1924 and served in the Navy until 1927 when he resigned to become a reporter for* The Baltimore *Sun. In 1942 he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for the excellency of his reporting from the Southwest Pacific Theater. He has written many books on military and naval subjects and lectures frequently at military schools. This article is taken from a lecture on "The Place of War in International Relations," which Mr. Baldwin gave at the National War College in the late summer of 1953.*

or Chaos Unlimited

owers of the world that they can only be called super ates. That condition has prevailed since World War ., and in place of the nations that once were great and ie empires that we used to study in our geography books high school—in place of those powers, there have ex- ted vacuums of power which cry to be filled. Histori- lly these are reasons for conflict.

Contemporary reasons for this world-wide conflict are nown to all of us. There are political, economic, ideo- gical differences between ourselves and the Russians id, a factor that is too often ignored, there are major uman differences. We often say that if Russia wasn't ommunist we could get along. I think that is a ques- onable statement. There are very different yardsticks ed in judging human values in our two countries, in y case, and Russia was imperialist even before the days Communism. These reasons for conflict are so major at there is no end in sight, as far as I can see.

What are the courses of action open to us in this obal struggle in which we are engaged?

THERE was one course which used to be very popular: it was called isolationism. I do not need to emphasize at isolationism is *not* a viable political and strategic olicy today. To try to retreat from the global conflict to our own shell, into our own hemisphere, to build a aginot Line around the hemisphere, to cut our overseas mmitments; this is not feasible because in the world of odern weapons we cannot find a reasonable security by ch a process.

The map of the world is foreshortened; we have "live" ntiers, that is, frontiers vulnerable to assault. For the st time since the Indian wars when the settlers used surround their villages with stockades, we now have e frontiers, and that is a condition that is new and ange to most Americans. This new strategic factor counts, in part, for the confusion in our thinking. Long- nge planes, schnorkel submarines with atomic-headed issiles, inter-continental rockets, etc., can violate those ntiers. These new weapons have destroyed the former validity of isolationism as a political strategic doctrine.

Moreover, an isolationist policy is economically impossible. We are no longer an agrarian and pioneer continent. We are now dependent upon overseas sources for strategic raw materials. We have crossed the "Great Divide," an event of great significance to the future of America. A few years ago, as you remember, a Presidential Commission pointed out that we now import from overseas sources more strategic raw materials than we produce. We need the uranium of Africa and other materials which can be procured only overseas. And, in a military sense, it is clear that we cannot find security in a defense based on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. We need outpost lines, allies, and bases overseas.

And finally, isolationism or withdrawal into our shell would inevitably imply a relative loss of our great power position in the world and would only postpone the day of reckoning. Withdrawal of our support from our allies might lead to great triumphs for Russia, and so great an eventual increase in her power as to threaten even our continental insularity.

I would rule out isolationism then as a possible course of action. We need the world and the world needs us.

WHAT about world order by agreement? A parliament of man? A brotherhood of men? The United Nations developed? Some other type of world blueprint or world organization?

Our experience in the U.N. to date seems to me to show the impracticability of this utopian idea, at least in the lifetime of those of us now here. There may some day be a federal state of mankind, but it won't be soon.

World order by agreement is a dreamer's blueprint, and not a realistic political course of action today. We cannot depend upon the U.N.—or any other world organization—for political or military security.

What about the opposite extreme, world order by conquest—a preventive war? Hit Russia with our atomic stockpile before she becomes too strong and attacks us?

A deliberately incited war against Soviet Russia and

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ARCHIVE

her allies, a war embarked upon to prevent a possible ultimate attack by Soviet Russia upon the United States, is based, I submit, upon a number of fallacious assumptions.

The first fallacious assumption is that war is inevitable. I do not accept this assumption that war is inevitable, that some day Russia will attack us and that before she becomes too strong we had better attack her. This is not necessarily a valid assumption as we can understand by consulting past history. Quite often in the past the intangibles of history have intervened between what seemed to be certain war and the actual outbreak of that war, and there was no war. War may be *possible*, or even *probable*, and military men should always keep such an "eventuality" foremost in mind, but if we assume it is inevitable, we automatically close our minds to any other possible political course of action. We blind ourselves to possible solutions beside war.

I think the preventive war doctrine is also based on another false assumption, the false assumption of a quick and easy victory. This assumption was originally based upon our atomic monopoly which is now ended. We still have an atomic advantage undeniably, but Soviet Russia as a counter to our attack upon her with atomic weapons would almost unquestionably overrun Western Europe with her land armies. Although such a conquest would not be easy or cheap, in my opinion, Russia could still make Western Europe a hostage. Moreover we can never forget that the cities of Western Europe and perhaps our own cities are vulnerable to Soviet A-bombs. All indications are that any war with Soviet Russia today would not be quick and easy, but long and hard and that we and our friends would suffer heavily.

I THINK the third fallacious assumption on which this preventive war doctrine is founded, is that war settles all things; if only Soviet Russia were eliminated, all would be sweetness and light.

We said the same thing before World War II about Germany and Japan, and everything is far from sweetness and light now.

Moreover, all of our policies since World War II have been devoted to trying to restore some power in the vacuums that were created by that war, to building up the convalescent nations of Europe and of Asia and to assisting them to arise from the sickbed of World War II. Our help has benefited these countries materially. But we cannot complete their recovery by giving them virus pneumonia, by plunging them into another war. A major war now would, in my opinion, destroy most of the values we are trying to defend in Europe. It would mean the end of the middle way, and the triumph, eventually, when the war was over, of political extremism either of the right or the left.

War is precisely the thing we are trying to avoid if possible. If we seek war merely for war's sake or merely to destroy Soviet Russia, it does not represent a rational political aim. War purely for destruction—and not for construction—particularly modern war with its trend toward totality, is an irrational act, full of sound and fu and signifying nothing.

THERE is then a fourth course of action—the one v have been pursuing since World War II, with mistak and hesitations, but with some success: I call it the mi dle way, or the balance of power internationally and balanced program domestically. The balance of powe of course, implies a coalition of powers banded togeth against an aggressor state to assure by mutual suppo mutual security. We have been trying to fill in the va uums of power left by World War II, militarily, poli cally, economically, and to some extent psychologicall

Essential to the success of this program are, I thin three major policies: first, a restoration of Germany a Japan as great powers; second, continued participatic by the United States in the defense of Europe and As (obviously if we pulled out before these vacuums we filled in, the whole structure might collapse); and third program balanced domestically between too great milita strength and too little—a program that conserves o economy, and nourishes the incentive system, a progra that will give us reasonable preparedness for the lo haul as well as for the immediate emergency, a progra of something more than war that will win friends a influence people in the world.

This middle way, this attempt to restore the balance power in the world, to create a third force of strong a independent nations, is not an easy course. It has tric and will try, to the full all of the adult political a psychological characteristics—for which we as a peop have never been noted—the virtues of patience, tact, sponsibility and restraint. We can expect no quick su cesses, no dramatic battles won. We shall have to cou our gains slowly. And it is clear that any policy, th policy of the middle way above all, involves risks; w walk the tightrope between the abyss of war and t chasm of defeat. And we must be alive to the futu dangers of such a program. A rearmed Germany a Japan, for instance, may serve to checkmate Russia b will certainly provide new global problems.

We must, nevertheless, learn the wisdom of patien and we must understand as adult Americans that the is no permanent solution to all political problems in t world of men. The best we can hope for is solutic partial or complete, of existing problems; others will ari

Now viewed against such a long-term program- program where the political end is a more stable wor to be achieved without total war—the Korean War limited objectives and military restraint makes so sense. (Mind you, I am not defending the entire condu of the Korean War; I feel emphatically that if we h pressed to the full our military advantage in the Fall 1951, we would have had a truce sooner, more a vantageously, and with fewer casualties.) We ma mistakes in Korea and the military result is less th victory but considerably more than defeat. Neverthele the political fruits of Korea are obvious. Aggression h been halted; rearmament of the anti-Communist coaliti has been speeded up; the Communist timetable for t

onquest of Asia has been interrupted, and Korea has elped in the program of restoring a balance of power n the world.

But Korea is clearly—against the global perspective of onflict—a battle fought, and not a campaign won. The truggle for the world continues, and as we follow our iddle way and attempt to restore a balance of power, e face the undeniable risk of war, not only and not erely limited wars like Korea and Indo-China, but lobal war.

T is one thing to recognize frankly the risk of war and another to regard it as inevitable. In any program to estore the balance of power, to strengthen the middle ay, to provide greater national security in a more stable orld, recourse to global war is the last string to our bow; is the final alternative when all other courses of action ave failed. It should be so regarded.

And if war should come, its objective should never be erely destructive; the objective should be construction rough destruction. What does this mean in the case of war with Soviet Russia? It means well-defined objecves, defined in terms of power and territory. It does ot mean a world crusade against communism. Ideologial wars or wars of unlimited objectives with fuzzy aims nply the use of unlimited means toward an unlimited nd. The objective of ideological war—the destruction of ommunism—is not attainable by the sword; indeed, a lobal war with all its destructiveness might cause the apid expansion of communism, for all extremist political octrines thrive on destruction, dissolution, decay and espair.

I cannot emphasize too much the dangers of a great usade with force of arms against communism everyhere. We might follow this will-o'-the-wisp to our estruction; certainly so unlimited a goal would enourage the ruthless and unlimited application of all gents of destruction.

No, the sound objective of any global war against Soet Russia and her allies is a reduction of Russian mili-ry (and industrial) power and not its elimination or mplete destruction. It should be our objective to reduce at power to such a point that it could be balanced or ntained by the adjoining powers—Germany and Japan, nd other nations. This would imply: first, the withawal of all Russian military forces to Soviet Russia; the cession of the high tide of Russian conquest from Cenal and Eastern Europe; Manchuria, Korea, China; e Kuriles and Sakhalin. It means the defeat or disersion of Russian armed forces; it means Russian atomic isarmament; it might mean the establishment of an inependent Republic of the Ukraine; it almost certainly cans the overthrow of the existing Russian government nd the separation of Russia and Red China. It means ctory but not complete destruction; it does not mean a arthaginian peace—a peace of fire and sword, slaughter nd complete devastation.

I find myself increasingly concerned by the ideologil motivation of too many of our actions. McCarthyism nd the fear of a Red under every bed have confused many of us; there are too few thinking clearly in the terms of realizable goals. Passion too often holds the reins. Yet the atomic bomb does not solve political problems; promiscuous devastation is no substitute for a valid objective. I know it seems against human nature to ask you who deal with the science of force to indulge in deliberate physical restraint. Yet if the trend toward total war continues without moral or political or military restraint, the ultimate end is total disaster. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared solemnly in his recent speech to the United Nations, that, "Physical scientists have now found means which, if they are developed, can wipe life off the surface of this planet."

I would not go quite so far as yet, but without doubt a large-scale atomic war could mean today the end of civilization as we know it and a return to the dark ages.

Moreover, the unlimited use of atomic and hydrogen weapons by the United States—to blast Moscow and Kiev off the map, for instance—would certainly lead to political frustration and might lead to military defeat. We are not likely to encourage the defection of minorities in Soviet Russia by destroying their cities and killing their women and children; we are not likely to build a more stable world on a heap of ruins. Nor can we ever forget that many of the great cities of Western Europe lie virtually defenseless beneath the bombsights of Soviet planes. Is Denmark with more than one-quarter of her total population concentrated in vulnerable Copenhagen; is France, proud of the untouched glories of Paris, likely to be a stout ally if each nation knows the fruit of courage is to be complete devastation? Can we in America insure our atomic security by atomic attack, or indeed by any technical military defense that we can devise? Is "victory" to be measured by unequal piles of rubble where our cities once have been?

Such a war of unlimited means, I submit, achieves no valid political objective; it could result in mutual defeat.

ATOMIC restraint, weapons restraint—a strategy built deliberately upon such restraint—seems to me to be an indispensable part of any policy which hopes to achieve by a major war with Russia realizable and limited political goals. Whether we like it or not the world must return to the day of limited wars or "advance" to chaos.

The role of war in international relations must be defined, regulated, limited, harnessed to a practical and feasible political goal, fought according to a strategic plan that is keyed to that goal and with weapons, means and methods that contribute to that goal.

Ideological crusades tend to end in unlimited wars of unlimited means with unlimited aims which usually end in unlimited destruction and despair.

The soldier of today must look beyond military victory, or the poet of tomorrow may write as Southey wrote in "The Battle of Blenheim":

"But what good came of it at last?"
Quoth little Peterkin.
"Why, that I cannot tell," said he;
"But 'twas a famous victory."

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The Joint Military Armistice Commission meets at Panmunjom. Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan *(left)* and Lt. Gen. L Cho, North Korean Communist, exchange papers. Gen. Bryan described these conferences as "like walking on a tightrope.

Making an Armistice Work

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM R. KINTNER

Today's soldier must be as skilled in negotiating with Communists as he is in fighting them and Kaesong and Panmunjom are the testing grounds.

LIMITED wars lead to limited cease-fire agreements or armistices as the events of the post-Second World War attest. Not only in Korea but in Palestine, Greece, Indonesia and Kashmir violent disputes have been settled through negotiations. The emphasis the cold war is giving to armistice negotiations makes it important that more military men understand them.

An armistice is essentially a compromise. Both parties concede that they are unable to gain their ends by force and are willing for their own reasons to suspend fighting. It does not mean that they are ready to negotiate the issues that led to the war. Each side thereafter uses negotiations and the armistice machinery to promote its own interests and to restrict the interests of the other side. Since both parties meet on an equal basis, negotiations are between equals and not between victor and vanquished. This unpleasant fact is hard for many Americans to accept.

The armistice climaxed three years of costly fighting and months of frustrating negotiations. As General Clark stated, it permitted "the opposing sides to attempt a solution of the conflict by political conferences."

Acquaintance with the significant background helps us to understand the terms of the Korean Armistice. In June, 1951, Jacob Malik, Soviet representative to the United Nations, made a broadcast, suggesting that cease-fire in Korea was possible. This bid was made on the first anniversary of Red aggression and at a time when the Eighth Army had demonstrated its ability to smash the Chinese forces. Malik proposed that the belligerents meet and discuss "a cease-fire and armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel."

We accepted. The United Nations Command delegates, five in number, headed by Admiral C. Turner Joy, began to meet with the Communist delegation, headed by General Nam Il, in Kaeson Despite apparent Communist eagerne to talk, the progress was slow and labo ous and hardly discernible.

The principal problems were: fixing military demarcation line; arrangemen for a cease-fire and armistice contro and arrangements for prisoners of war.

The Red delegation initially refused discuss any line other than the 38 parallel as a line of demarcation. became evident that if the Communis got us first to accept a "cease-fire" th would stall indefinitely over other que tions. Freed from our military pressu they could build up their forces, with incentive to come to terms.

AFTER many discussions, the princip that the military demarcation li would follow the general trace of t line of contact was approved. As oth items were taken up, UNC negotiato followed a procedure of obtaining agre ment on general principles and th going into details. Each side agreed n to reinforce its military strength either terms of combat trained men or comb matériel during the cease-fire. The

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM R. KINTNER, Infantry, is participating in the work of the Military Armistice Commission in Korea. Colonel Kintner is an occasional contributor to this magazine and is the co-author (with Colonel George Reinhardt) of *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat.*

were many controversial issues involved n developing procedures to keep military trength in balance. The UN opposed he construction of airfields in North Korea into which the Communists could y fighter groups from Manchuria in less han an hour's time. The Communists bjected to the UN plan to rotate and eplace both combat matériel and men. Without replacements, our military trength in Korea would drop from attri- on. Both sides gave ground. We con- nted to the construction of airfields in North Korea while the Communists greed upon UN rotation procedures, rovided that the actual rotation was su- ervised by a Neutral Commission.

On 27 January 1951, the UNC pre- nted to the Communists a document hich, almost a year and a half later, ecame with modifications the Armistice greement. Most of the delay was in aking arrangements for those prisoners war who did not want to return. Be- use this problem involved the whole ee world-Communist relationship, its lution was frustratingly difficult to hieve.

SEVERAL agencies were established in the agreement to insure effective su- ervision of the Armistice, the most im- ortant being the Military Armistice ommission. Its task is to supervise the mplementation of the Armistice agree- ments, and to settle, through negotiations, its violations. The MAC consists of ten senior officers, five from each side, and staff assistants. The Commission has ten Joint-Observer teams, composed of officers of field grade, half appointed by each side. These teams function within the demilitarized zone and on the Han River estuary.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission supervises the rotation of personnel and matériel and checks on violations of the Armistice outside the buffer zone. It consists of four senior officers, two named by each side. The UN named Sweden and Switzerland, the Communists named Poland and Czechoslovakia. The NNSC is assisted by inspection teams, comprised of one field grade officer from each neutral, who supervise the carrying out of terms at the ports of entry (five in the north, five in the south).

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission consists of India and the four neutrals previously mentioned, with India's representative as chairman. The task of this Commission is to see that prisoners of war who apparently do not wish to be repatriated will have an opportunity to make their final choice free from coercion of any kind from either side.

NOW let us look at the terms of the Armistice itself, and some of the clauses that are of most importance.

Demilitarized zone. A buffer zone to eliminate incidents was created by having forces of each side withdraw two kilometers. In this zone are such famous outposts as Pork Chop, Bunker Hill, Old Baldy, White Horse, Finger and Heartbreak Ridges. Boundary markers were placed by each side indicating the zone. The Han River, where each side controlled one bank, is open to passage. No one shall cross the demarcation line without authority, or with arms. No hostile act shall be committed in or from that zone.

Establishing the Demarcation Line was one of the most important and difficult problems the negotiators had. Obviously, it should reflect the actual military situation. But, because of the terrain in Korea, a shift of a few hundred meters might give a locally dominant military position to one side or the other. This fact, along with the fighting which immediately preceded the Armistice, made it impossible to establish a line that would meet all the military requirements of both sides. Those with armistice experience elsewhere say that the Demarcation Line should be first established on the ground and then drawn on a map. This is a good principle if the fighting has stopped, but if a Demarcation Line is a preliminary requirement to a cease-fire, it would be difficult to perform.


All demolitions, mine fields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of MAC members within the Demilitarized Zone were reported. These hazards were removed under the supervision of the MAC.

Rotation of Personnel and Matériel. No new military units are being introduced in Korea by either side, except on a leave basis or on rotation, up to 35,000 individuals a month. The total military men in Korea are not to exceed the total of that side at the time the Armistice became effective. Matériel on a replacement basis can be admitted, but only through the Armistice ports of entry. Combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, used up or worn out may be replaced on a piece for piece basis.

Recovery of Remains of Deceased Military Personnel. Each side is to aid the other in recovering the remains of soldiers located in the territory they control.

Prisoners of War. Those desiring repatriation were returned within sixty days of the effective date of the Armistice. Sixty days after the Armistice began the remainder were turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commis-

Lieutenant General K. S. Thimayya, Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.



A Chinese soldier who wanted to be repatriated to China is carried to the exchange point by two Indian soldiers.



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Representatives of the neutral nations. From left to right they are from Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, India, Sweden and Poland.

sion in camps established in the Demilitarized Zone. Explaining representatives were to be sent by the country of origin to try to induce these prisoners to return. The representatives could "explain" in the presence of the Repatriation Commission and one representative from the custodian nation for a period of ninety days. After thirty days more the prisoners not desiring repatriation shall be free to go to the country of choice.

WHEN the signing of the agreement became imminent an organization called United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission was formed by General Clark, the UN commander, with Major General Blackshear M. Bryan as its senior member. General Bryan was instructed by General Clark to be principal UN spokesman in negotiations with the Communists. Most of the initial staff for this organization was taken from an Armistice planning group that had been established more than a year earlier in Japan. The UNC MAC staff supported the Senior Member by recommending positions to be taken on matters to be negotiated with the Communists, by conducting staff officer-level negotiations and by coordinating Armistice matters with other UN and US headquarters.

During the truce talks, most problems were investigated and resolved in staff officer and sub-delegation conferences and this became a precedent to be followed. Greater freedom of discussion is possible at this level. When agreement is reached, the solution is submitted for approval to the senior members of both sides. This system has many practical advantages. Time is saved and it permits simultaneous investigation and handling of problems. This precedent was continued after the Armistice Agreement was signed.

Cool, formal politeness was maintained in all dealings with the Communists. The language problem presented critical difficulties at all times. It is difficult to get a real meeting of minds when talk must pass through interpreters. This is especially true when there is a wide difference in views as there is between Western-trained minds and minds disciplined in the dialectic materialism of Communism. The definitions men so divergently trained attach to ordinary concepts may be varied indeed. The words used in the agreement often represented the lowest common denominator of acceptance for each side. They represented a broad area of compromise and were, therefore, subject to a variety of interpretations.

REGARDLESS of the discussions which went into the choice of terms, when finally signed the Agreement stands or falls on the printed word. The terms acceptable to both sides in truce negotiations are sources of trouble when they become the authority for implementation, inspection and control. For example, the provision of the agreement which required both sides to remove all hazards from the demilitarized zone within a limited period of time. To have done so was probably beyond the physical capability of either side. This buffer zone, the scene of prolonged position fighting, probably contained more barbed wire and mines than have ever been placed in one narrow strip of land. By mutual agreement a limitation was placed on this provision so that the task of clearing was reduced to a practical basis.

It is questionable whether it is possible to achieve the same clarity in language in an armistice as one strives for in a staff study. Each armistice agreement reflects a peculiar state of military and political conditions. Its provisions mirror local ambiguities. Familiarity with the general problems, plus as deep a military and local background as possible will do mor to assist the negotiator in achieving prac tical working agreements than efforts t achieve precise agreement on the mean ing of armistice terms.

The manner in which certain armi tice questions were necessarily handle was not always understood by officers an troops who were affected by them. A example will make this clear. The agre ment had a provision for the recovery the remains of military personnel burie in North and South Korea but the reco ery of remains in the buffer zone wa not considered. The heavy fighting whic occurred all along the line just prior t the Armistice in which the UN lost se eral important outposts was not antic pated. Many of these outposts wer found to be on the Communist side the demarcation line which made it im possible to recover the remains of me lost in the last battles without the con sent of the Communist forces. Arrang ments to recover these remains we initiated. But many connected issues d layed a decision and it took sever months to agree on the procedure to b used to recover the remains of the oppo ing sides of the demilitarized zone. Th frustrating delay was not readily unde stood by the troops who naturally we anxious to bring back the remains their fellow soldiers.

TECHNIQUES of negotiations wi the Communists should become we known to all U.S. officers. Communi officers selected to participate in negoti tions with the West at any level and f any purpose are generally competent an thoroughly trained for the job. Ours mu be equally competent if we are to ho our own.

As a result of trial and error certa ideas reached regarding principles negotiation may prove of value:

- The piecemeal rather than the pac age approach often facilitates negot tions. It is rarely advisable to lay all your cards on the table at one time.
- The strength of many of our poin may be dissipated by overelaboration.
- Cumbersome presentation, and uni terrupted arguments give the other si (whose representatives frequently u derstand English) time to arrange th counter-attacks.
- Positions should never be presented a subject for open discussion to be settl on a give-and-take basis. We must ta into account the Communist practice resisting free explorations of problems the conference table.
- Each position should be concis stated, reinforced by logical reasoning.

Positions should be offered as something to which a refusal is unacceptable but to which a counter-proposal is allowable. We should always display complete confidence in our stand and reflect a take-it-or-leave-it attitude.

Opportunities should be given for the other side to study the position and to produce a counter-offer. Discontinuing the discussion is one way of creating this opportunity. We should beware of talking when "breaking off" is overdue. Gain the psychological advantage of "breaking off."

Every position should be held on to for bargaining purposes even if agreement on it is unobtainable.

"Squeeze plays" should be presented as something that we can and will carry through unless a mutually acceptable solution is proposed quickly by the other side.

Avoid creating the impression of being over-anxious to settle anything—this normally invites refusal.

SUCH rules add common sense to bargaining. Perhaps the most important thing to keep in mind in Armistice negotiations with the Communists is a matter of attitude. The Communists regard the Armistice as a continuation of the war that preceded it. Both the war and the truce are manifestations of the same political policy. The remarks of the Communist delegate to the first truce session held at Kaesong in 1951 bear re-reading:

"Of course military matters are always political although together we will try to limit our talks to military matters and should it be that the military matters be related to political it will be discussed later." This thoroughly Clausewitzian approach is valid regardless of the wish expressed in the preamble of the Korean Armistice Agreement that "conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character."

What Lenin, in 1918, said of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk is also apropos: "The peace treaty is merely a piece of live maneuvering. Either we stand on this viewpoint of maneuvering or we formally bind our hands in advance in such a fashion that we shall not be able to move."


This does not imply that the Communists will seek to implement an armistice in a manner that is inconsistent with the agreement. Instead, within the latitude permitted by the agreement, they will use the armistice period to increase their entire power position in relation to our own. U.S. officers assigned to an Armistice Commission in their negotiations should anticipate and thus counter the inevitable Communist moves to gain advantages over us. Otherwise, we will come out of the armistice weaker than we went into it. It matters not whether the armistice ends in war or finally is terminated in a peace, unless we also regard it as a "piece of live maneuvering." Its acceptance may prove our undoing.

Our armistice representatives should avoid the pitfall of regarding the agreement as a mechanical document which must be mechanically executed. Such an attitude automatically concedes the initiative to our Communist opponents, who seize upon every opening to undermine aggressively our world position.

The philosophy behind "live maneuvering" should apply not only to our opponents but to our allies and to those neutrals who may be called upon by both sides to supervise aspects of the armistice agreement. Our chances of winning their genuine support may depend entirely on the ability of our armistice staff contingent to meet intellectually and personality-wise with officers from friendly, neutral and enemy countries.

THE number of armistices in the cold war makes it possible to predict, with reasonable safety, that more American officers may find themselves some day holding down a slot in an Armistice Commission organization chart. Whether they be assigned to the staff or to field observing duties, the old saying that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing still holds. Consequently, the officer of tomorrow should begin to study armistice negotiations just as carefully as the operations manual. You never know which you will need first.

The truce line and the demilitarized buffer zone



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ON THE HILL

LIEUTENANT JIM KYLE AND CORPORAL RICHARD SMITH

It isn't until you come down Off the Hill that you realize you have left something of your life up there and, given the chance, you would go back up

ON the Hill! You wonder how the phrase started. You know what it means, of course, for you're a member of a forward observer party of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion, the "Bark of the Wolfhounds," with the 25th Division somewhere in Korea, and you're on the hill now.

You know what it means. It means that you're up with the infantry, to do your job, so you can see what's in front of you. It means a backbreaking climb to the top of the hill; it means listening to the screaming whine of a 122mm mortar shell coming at you, and hearing the *crump* when it hits. It means sleepless nights, and work-filled days.

On the Hill means all this, and more. It means a lot of things that you can't put into words, some things that you aren't even sure you know. . . .

Everything happens at night, on the line. When it's dark and foggy, men can wander past the outposts, and no one knows they're there; then they drop silently into the trench beside you. You shudder involuntarily. With your thirty-two points you're getting too short to stay On the Hill, you remind yourself. But with only one more month of it, something keeps drawing you back, even when you are no longer expected to go.

You dismiss it from your mind, go back to the living bunker, light a candle, and start a letter. "Dear Ernestine," you write; "Everything's quiet here in Seoul. It's a snap, working in this supply depot. Almost wish I was up where there's action . . ." You don't tell your wife you're On the Hill. She might worry too much.

You finish the letter, climb into your sleeping bag, and doze off.

It's dark when the sergeant shakes you awake. You glance at your watch, sleepily. It's 3:00 a.m., 0300 the way the Army tells time, and it's time for you to take over OP guard. Somebody has to be in the observation post every hour of the day or night, and now it's your turn.

"Nothing much happening," the sergeant tells you as you pull on your boots.

Too quiet, you tell yourself, as you stand in the OP bunker and look out over the dark, rolling hills. Without a moon, you can hardly tell where the hills leave off and the sky begins. The silence grates on your nerves. Something's going to happen, you tell yourself. A flare lights up the sky to the north of you.

You come awake instantly. You know the area, but you didn't see the exact spot of the flash. You scan the area closely, and you see the next one. You begin counting seconds from flash to bang as you swing your BC scope to the spot, one thousand, two thousand—fifteen seconds later, you hear the muffled report. You do a fast bit of math, and

LIEUTENANT JIM KYLE, Artillery, and CORPORAL RICHARD SMITH were members of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, in Korea when they wrote this article.

cide that it's just about 6,000 yards to e enemy weapon. Then you read the al of the BC scope.

The *whump* of the weapon tells you s a mortar. The size of the flash tells u it must be an 82mm. You pick up e telephone and crank it. A sleepy ice answers at the other end. "Two, ease," you tell him, and soon another epy voice says, "Two section, Private lgerton speaking, sir."

"This is King OP. I've got an 82 out re. He's fired two rounds. Position of apon, azimuth 5318, distance 6,000 rds."

"Wait one," comes the distant voice er the wire. Then, a second later, he s, "Let's have those figures again, ease." You tell him, he thanks you, d you ring off.

OTHING else happens until you are almost ready to go off guard. Then, ddenly, you hear the fluttering whistle an incoming round, and dive to the r of the bunker. With a sharp *crump* explodes, and you get back up and be- searching your field of view with the scope, keeping your head well down. You search the whole area, while ee more rounds scream in. Each time, have to fight the instinct to dive to floor, but you want to find the guy o's shooting at you, and shut him up. ter four rounds, he stops, and finally give up the search. You try to call to report the shelling, but no one swers. Probably the lines were broken. u turn to the radio.

You fumble in the darkness and find knob. You twist it, and a loud hing noise fills the bunker. You nble around some more and locate the crophone. You press the big button the side of the mike, and nothing pens. You mumble a bit of profanity. en you hunt through the box of extra ts, still in darkness. You have no hlight. They're harder to get, here in ea, than the proverbial hen's teeth.

But finally you find the extra mike l plug it into the radio. Then you h the button, and with a squeak, the hing noise stops. You hold the mike front of the speaker, and a violent eal tells you the set is operating. You ng the mike to your lips, and call e Direction Center.

Dog One Eight, Dog One Eight, this Dog Niner. Over."

ou let up on the button, and the n fills the bunker once more. Nothing happens. You wait for a minute, n call again. Your voice is getting a bit frantic by now. That's one of the most helpless feelings you can have, to be On the Hill with no communications. You curse the radio under your breath. But this time you get an answer.

"Dog Niner, this is Dog One Eight. Over."

The voice is loud, strident. Too loud to suit you. And there is just a trace of a singsong accent in it. You ask for authentication. He can't give it to you. You know then that it's one of Joe's boys, trying to trick you. You ignore him.

Finally you get an answer you can believe. It's weak, and fades in and out, and you have to strain your senses to make out what it's saying, but it's FDC. You start to make the report of the shelling.

Outside, in the tunnel, you hear footsteps. You grab your carbine, pull the bolt back, put a cartridge in the chamber. At this time of night, you take no chances. You watch the door, your weapon ready. A flashlight shines



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through, and you relax. Joe doesn't use lights to find his way through the tunnels. The unknown person speaks.

"Is the FO here?"

You recognize the voice. It's the infantry commander.

"No sir," you tell him. "He's asleep."

"Wake him up."

"Yes, sir." The infantry officer says nothing more, but goes to the aperture and peers anxiously into the darkness. You know that somewhere, out there, his men are close to the enemy, and something is happening. You go into the living bunker and shake the lieutenant awake.

"Infantry CO wants you, sir," you tell him, and he nods to show that he understands. You go to the front office and continue making your report.

WHEN the lieutenant comes in, he and the infantry officer begin talking. You wonder what's happening, but it takes all your attention to get your report through to FDC. Then the FO turns to you. His voice is sharp, his words clipped short by urgency.

"Break it, Johnny. Fire mission!"

You press the button, the rush stops.

"Dog One Eight," you shout into the mike, "this is Dog Niner. Fire mission! Over."

The lieutenant has a flashlight. He's bending over a large map, pinpointing the spot where the infantry wants the fire. FDC answers you. "This is One Eight. Send your mission. Over."

The lieutenant tells you the numbers. You repeat them into the radio. You wait for FDC to say them back to you. The weak, distant radio voice begins to talk, and is drowned out by a fluctuating, singsong chant. The enemy has your frequency, and is blocking your communications. He pauses, and you grab your chance. You press the button, shout, "Change channels, over" and flick the switch to the other preset frequency on your radio.

Almost immediately, you get the call from FDC. He could only get a part of the mission before Joe blocked your transmission. You repeat the entire mission, and he reads it back. It's right, this time.

"Roger, over," you tell him, and only seconds later, his voice comes back.

"On the way, over." You answer him. "On the way, wait." You turn to the lieutenant. "On the way, sir," you tell him. A moment of dead silence, and you hear the distant thunder of the guns behind you.

"Splash, over," the radio says, and "Splash, wait," you answer.

You stand up and look out in the direction of the enemy. You count seconds. One thousand, two thousand, three thous . . . Six beautiful, deadly orange-red flowers bloom in the night like billowing puffs of fire. Air bursts, all. Deadly, murderous stuff. The infantry officer picks up your sound-powered phone, which is connected to his patrol.

"How's it look, Steve?" he asks. You can hear voices answering him, but you can't tell what they're saying. Then he turns to you and says "Right Five Zero, same range, give me two more volleys." You look at your lieutenant. He nods. The infantryman's words weren't right for artillery, but you put it into proper form and send it down. For a moment there is no reply, then the rush cuts. "Two more on the way." You roger him, and wait.

It looks almost in the same place. You tell FDC it looked good, then ask the infantry officer if he needs any more. He jumps, startled, and you realize he had forgotten your presence. He calls the patrol, then answers you.

"No, that's *ichi bon*. Good effect. One KIA, several wounded. Cease fire."

You push the button, tell FDC. They answer, "Roger, out."

You look at your watch. 0430. You've gone over your shift. You ask the lieutenant if he needs you any more. He says no. You go back to the living bunker, shake the next man awake, and return to the OP. A few minutes later, the driver comes in, rubbing his eyes sleepily. You tell him what's happened so far tonight, what to expect, then go back to your cot and sleeping bag. All at once, you're tired. You're barely in the warm sleeping bag before you're asleep.

IT'S bright day when you awake, but the bunker is still dim. You want to wash up and shave, but all the water you have comes up the hill in a five-gallon can, on your back, so you do a compromise job with a cupful of water —cold.

You rummage through a case of C-rations until you come up with a can labelled "Beans and Frankfurter Chunks in Tomato Sauce." You wonder why you always come up with beans. But you're hungry, so you stop wondering and eat. When you get to the OP the sun is high and glaring bright.

"Wire back in?" you ask.

"Not yet," the sergeant answers. His voice is tired. "You go out and trace it down to the check point."

The check point is that spot on the telephone line where your section's maintenance responsibility ends. You pick up your carbine, take out the fifteen round clip you had in it, put in a combat clip—two 30-round clips taped back to back—and start out. You hate this job. You start at the OP and trace the wire all the way back. When you find a break you splice it.

The break is easy to find. You find the ends, strip them of insulation, and make the splice. Then you follow the wire down to the check point, just in case there's another break. But there isn't, and you trudge wearily back to the hill.

You're hungry again when you reach the OP, so you break out another can of beans. Then there's nothing more to do so you crawl back into the sleeping bag.

You don't get to sleep very long. Somebody comes up to inspect the position, and whoever it is doesn't like the condition of the living bunker. He says it must be rebuilt. You have profane things to say concerning his probable ancestry but you are wearing two stripes so you don't say them. Besides, nobody woke you up while he was there. But after he is gone, the sergeant shakes you and hands you a shovel.

You take the shovel and look critically at the bunker. To yourself alone, you admit that it isn't worth a damn. A direct hit with a 122 would bring it down on top of you. But still you hate the idea of being told to dig out a new one, and you hate the idea of doing the digging.

However, you don't say much. You dig.

For the rest of the day you dig, and then you stand your turn at guard that night. It's not like last night. Nothing happens. You barely stay awake.

The next morning you dig some more. On the Hill, if you don't learn anything else, you learn to dig. Your best friend is your carbine. Your second best friend is your shovel. Dirt is your protection. Stateside, six feet deep is a joke. Here, it's life or death.

You spend most of the next two weeks digging. Now and then Joe lobs a shell at you, but you only flatten out for a few minutes, then he quiets down and you dig some more.

YOU don't dig all the time. One afternoon, the lieutenant tells you that the party is nearly out of C-rations. And you haven't had any mail since you've been up. So you and the driver, the new guy, jog wearily down the hill and get into the jeep and go back to the battery position, two miles to the rear.

It's an uneventful trip going back. You get the food and pick up your mail, and go back On the Hill.

The days blend into each other, end-
ss hours of digging and watching,
atching and digging. The occasional
coming round loses its novelty, so that
u merely flatten yourself against the
ttom of the bunker when you hear
e whine, and get up and go back to
rk after the *crump*. You can't say
hether you've been there two weeks or
o months, but it's been only thirteen
ys.

HE afternoon is dark, and swirls of
fog curl around the bushes in front of
ur bunker. It's not cold, but a chill
ns up your back and you shiver. This
the kind of weather Joe likes. You
r down your carbine before night, and
an it thoroughly. Then you reload
your clips, and make certain that they
are free of dust.

With the overcast, night falls quickly.
1930 hours you can hardly see the
ls that are Joe's main line. It's much
quiet. There's no patrol going out
night, and you're glad of that.

You watch the area out front, and the
mps begin to move. The March of
Tree Stumps. A kid one night shot
e hundred rounds at tree stumps. You
n't want to waste your ammo, so you
t watch.

You watch, and in spite of yourself,
u doze off. You dream. You're back
me and it's spring there too. . . .

Somebody shakes you. You're awake
tantly. It's the sergeant.

"Wake up, Johnny. We've got cus-
ners out front."

"How many?" you ask.

"Quite a few." Then you're standing
and looking out and he's right. There
quite a few. It seems as if all you can
are Chinese soldiers, moving towards
u with a slow precision. They're not
away, only about a hundred yards.
u're conscious of something going on
side you. It's the lieutenant, cranking
phone.

"Damn line's out," he says, and you go
the radio. You turn the knob and the
h fills the bunker, but before you
press the mike button the rush cuts
l Chinese chanting squawks at you.
e enemy is blocking your radio, again.
u're out of communication, unless . . .

You delve into a large box in the cor-
of the bunker, and emerge with a
ndie-talkie. Its range is so short that you
dly ever use it, but now it's all you
e. You turn it on, and the familiar
h comes from the earpiece. You press
button, and the rush cuts. You call
next OP. If you can reach them,
ybe they can relay your missions.

"Dog Two Three, Dog Two Three, this is Dog Niner, Dog Niner. Fire mission. Relay. Over."

A second passes, and you realize you're holding your breath. Then the rush cuts, and a faint voice comes to you.

"Ah, Niner, this is Two Three. Roger. Will relay. Send your mission. Over."

You breathe a sigh of relief, and turn to the lieutenant. "Where do you want to start, sir?" He names a series of letters and numbers, coded points on the ground for prearranged fire. You press the button.

"This is Niner. Company-sized group in attack. Shoot Able George Fox Five, Four and Two. Battery six. Over."

Two Three answers, and you wait then for him to give you "On the way." Seconds crawl by, and the enemy is moving ever closer. Then you hear the "On the way" and the *whoomp* of the guns in the rear, and then there's a screaming whistle overhead that makes you want to duck, and six orange-red puffs blossom directly over the massed enemy, and he is no longer massed.

High overhead, a star shell goes off, and the brilliant magnesium flare floats down. You can see a little now, but the dust raised by your air bursts is worse than fog would have been. The enemy is closer, and moving in.

You jerk back the bolt of your carbine, slide a round into the chamber. You raise it to fire, and the lieutenant says, "Not yet. We don't want them to find out where we are." You realize that he's right, and check the pressure of your finger on the trigger.

Above and behind you, the angry cough of a light machine gun splits the night. Tiny red fingers of fire, tracers, leap into the charging ranks. Off to the right, a quad .50 stutters its message of death. Far to the left, you can hear a BAR. Occasionally, a hand grenade goes off. Still, you hold your fire.

The lieutenant is busy shifting the artillery fire, to keep it on the moving enemy and hold it off our own troops. Somewhere in the night, you hear the faint cry, "Medic! Medic!" Somebody wasn't lucky.

Then one figure splits off from the charging mass, and heads straight for your bunker. You line up the sights of your carbine carefully, as carefully as you did the last time you were on a range, shooting for record. He is running now, and you squeeze the trigger. Just like in the book. You never know the weapon is firing until you feel it jerking in your hands. The Chinese suddenly stops running, his rifle flies into the air, he sinks to the ground, a huddled mass.

"Good shooting," the sergeant says. He is busy too. You can hear his carbine sputtering on the other side of the bunker.

The fight blends into a roar of sound and flash and the whine of ricocheting slugs. You remember only scattered incidents . . . like the lieutenant screaming into the radio, "Fire this position, and keep firing until I say to stop!"

And the tiny dark object falling just in front of the bunker, and the new guy yells to duck, and you duck just before the grenade fills the space where you were with chunks of steel.

And the infantry CO—you never know where he came from or when—saying, "Good work. Keep it up and we'll get 'em all."

The star shells turn night into day, and you hardly realize that it's getting light at last. The waves of enemy are fewer now, and the lieutenant shifts the fire farther out. There are huddled, dark shapes all over the front of the hill now, and you know that they aren't all Chinese.

You look around, and the new guy is sitting on a water can at the rear of the bunker. He's holding a handkerchief to his hand. You go over and take a look. It's nothing bad, just a deep scratch from a shell fragment, but you put your first-aid dressing on it. You realize that you're very tired . . . When the lieutenant wakes you up, it's after noon.

FINALLY the day comes when you are relieved. The infantry companies are rotating, and FOs follow their companies. The new crew comes up, and you look them over. For a moment you wonder how they'll make out, but it's no concern of yours.

You pack everything into your VT box, and *chogie* it down the hill to the jeep and trailer. You and the driver carry down the radios and the rest of the equipment. Then you go back up the slope and check to make sure you haven't left anything.

You haven't, and so you go back down. Or maybe you have. Maybe you've left a piece of your life, a short part of it spent on this hill. For you feel as if you've forgotten something. And as the jeep moves, carrying you away from your hill, you look back at it. It's not just *a* hill any more; it's your hill now, and you ask yourself, "Why? Why do I like it?"

You have no answer. You only know that, given the chance, you'll go back up. On the Hill.

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CIVIL CONTROL IN DANGER

Colonel Shillelagh

"You cannot discuss military policy today without running smack into issues of civilian control."—A staff officer in the Pentagon.

THE principle of civilian control of our government is so sound, so clearly established, and so deeply cherished that any open attack on it would arouse the utmost resistance. Yet the principle has been under attack for several years and is presently in great danger. But we hear no outcry, no call to arms. This can only be because the attack is not clearly recognized as such. Indeed the attack is hidden in such a fog that many of those who are endangering the concept do not recognize what they are doing.

The danger is this: lip service to civilian control has permitted it to be used to defend decisions and actions which it cannot justify. The concept is used as a cover for ideas and practices which are faulty and would not otherwise pass ordinary tests of soundness. If patriotism is the last refuge of scoundrels, civilian control is a close competitor. Whether invoked by knaves or honest men, it is a weapon that cows the timid and convinces the unimaginative.

It is time for all of us to think clearly and earnestly about all of the connotations involved in the phrase "civilian control." When we understand what it does and doesn't mean we shall see how our previous uncritical acceptance of the concept has permitted it to be abused as a guide to action rather than used as a powerful controlling principle.

Basically civilian control is the subordination of the military forces to the political authority of the government. We have a government which is directed and controlled by the elected representatives of the people. The military forces, like all other elements of the executive branch, are subordinate to the President. The Constitution makes the President the commander in chief of the military forces. That is civilian control.

Unfortunately though, the phrase can be distorted and twisted into a quite different connotation, as by those who urge that a military man should not be elected President because this would violate civilian control. It has been used to imply that the military are poor managers who must therefore be kept under close civilian supervision. It has been used to support the thesis that our military power under the President must be kept in separate parcels so that no single military man can have full authority to manage it for the Commander in Chief. All of these ideas may have certain merits but they cannot be supported by arguments that use the principle of civilian control.

A NATION's choice of government can range between military dictatorship and unarmed democracy. The American way is a middle way in which elected officials control the process of government and provide the framework within which professional military men serve the national defense. Like other middle ways, it involves a fine balance which may be upset by extremists.

Over a long period of years we defined this balance in the relationship that was established between the President, the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff of the Army. A similar relationship developed between the President, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. In the process we placed policy control at the Cabinet level and made it possible for the Cabinet to get the best possible professional military advice and leadership. Thus we recognized the subordination of the military forces to the political authority in matters of policy and clearly established military responsibility for organization, training and strategic planning. Working closely together, the Cabinet officer and the military leader could produce sound policy and effective administration.

This workable system of balancing the responsibilities and performance of civilian defense officials and professional military men could be upset either by a military dictatorship or by the disregard or destruction of military efficiency by political methods.

If the military leaders succeeded by pressure or force in making policy deci sions at the Cabinet level, they would b usurping the political power. Could thi occur? It seems unlikely. The top mili tary personnel are selected by the Presi dent and are subject to reassignment a his pleasure. It would appear impossibl for a military leader to usurp Cabine authority except with the knowledge an approval of the President. It seems prob able that any subversion of Constitu tional processes in our country wil hardly come from our military forces.

Can the balance slip in the other d rection, toward too much civilian cor trol? This is the present danger.

As the civilian (political) power supreme, the maintenance of a soun balance requires perception and restrair by the persons exercising this powe Thus, while military usurpation implie both aggressive military action and rai civilian passivity, civilian usurpation military authority implies only the no mal drift of human vanity and ambitio

There is no Constitutional protectio against this process. Military leade cannot stop it. In the final analysis, th perpetuation of sound balance is th responsibility of the civilian policy ma ers. They created our government an they can destroy it.

IT is in the question of what kind defense department organization should have that the issue of civilia control is most prominently raised. was used to kill General Marshall's in tial plan for a single chief of staff. It used against every move to provide mi tary resolution of the inter-service co flicts that have sometimes paralyzed th military structure and limited defen progress. The significant fact is th civilian control has no bearing on th problem. With a chief of staff of th armed forces and a joint staff for th Department of Defense, civilian contr would be fully preserved, precisely as was preserved in the old War and Na Departments.

There is a substantial issue as to the ındness and wisdom of establishing a ief of staff of the armed forces and a ense joint staff at the present stage development. Some competent per- ıs contend that the best military advice l direction our armed forces can re- ve is provided by a committee of the ee chiefs of staff. Maybe some inter- diate form of organization would be ter. The real issue is to get an or- ıization that will let us solve our litary problems. It is a question of ciency. The cry of "civilian control" scare technique. It seeks a decision related to the real merits of the ques- ı.

MORE subtle aspect of civilian con- trol has appeared in the practical op- tion of the Defense Department chanism. The assistant secretaries ve in the past been not a staff devel- ng coordinated policy for the Secre- , but independent and uncoordinated rators riding herd on the military es. This Messianic complex has ended to the assistants to the assistant retaries and to their assistants, all rid- forth in shining armor to loose the endary red tape of the military or- izations. In most instances policy ctives were not issued by the Secre- of Defense. Instead, civilian assist- s went into the services and directly officers in charge of particular func- ıs and gave them detailed instructions heir own devising. In consequence, three services in recent years have n severely criticized for unsound ıning and inefficient administration. the cause of it—dispersion of au- ity and disregard of organizational onsibility—apparently went unchal- ged by our military leaders.

is pertinent to observe that the offi- s who are most aware of the dangers oo much civilian control are those lian policy makers who are perturbed ıuse our organization for defense has ı so ineffectual. While endorsing ci- ın control as a principle, they recog- its abuses and seek to make the tary organization more effective.

is heartening to note that the new ense Department organization pro- s a sound commission for assistant etaries as assistants to the Secretary sharpened definition of command ınels. If actual practice can be ıght into line with organization, we ıld see tightened control of Defense y and clarified definition of the au- ity and responsibility of the military efs of Staff.

/hat is the responsibility of top mili- tary men? If they hold no final au- thority even in matters of military or- ganization and training, can they pre- serve and improve our military strength? Is it right and proper for them to oppose civilian abuse or does loyalty require them to submit in silence?

First, military men must understand the proper level of their own responsibil- ity and must accept the full measure of it. They must not shirk this responsibil- ity by expecting decisions on questions of organization, administration or effi- ciency to be made at political levels. They should not accept unilateral policy guidance from an assistant secretary when the policy should properly be made in the *name* of the Secretary. Nor should they accept detailed direction which compromises military operational responsibility. Military men can act in- telligently if they realize that "civilian control" is not some vague rule which makes civilians always right, but is a proper and definable exercise of political authority that requires full military ac- ceptance and jealous guarding of comple- menting military authority.

The jealous and full exercise of as- signed authority does not imply hostility toward or friction with other elements of an organization. On the contrary, it is only with such performance by all ele- ments that the full capabilities of the organization can be realized. The real damage to an organization is done by the individual who permits others to usurp his authority; and it matters not whether he acts from weakness, or a mistaken notion of cooperation, or an uncritical deference to a shibboleth. When he gives way, for whatever reason, he be- comes an idler, a non-functioning piece in the machine. His failure may render ineffective other elements of the organi- zation and contribute to its general deterioration.

Loyalty to the Secretary of Defense and to the country requires a vigorous dissent from what is known to be wrong. To accept the error in silence by abdicat- ing responsibility comes close to disloy- alty.

CIVILIAN control in its proper sense sums up a vital principle of our gov- ernmental organization, the subordina- tion of the military element to political control. The words have been abused in our Defense Department organization as a cover for false ideas and unsound practices. Military leaders have hesitated to oppose policies packaged as "civilian control" even when they knew the con- tents were wrong. Thus they have co- operated in corrupting a sound concept. If we are to have an efficient defense structure, we must restore the sound division of authority and responsibility between political policy makers and pro- fessional military men. Though the ulti- mate decision on policy rests at the politi- cal level, the primary responsibility for action rests on the military leaders. They cannot escape the opprobrium of inde- cision, inefficiency or waste in the mili- tary program by pleading their subordi- nation to civilian control. They must wield the full authority and accept the full responsibility of their offices. This includes defending our sound traditions of civilian control against distortions ad- vanced by the ignorant and the wily.

WHAT IS CIVIL CONTROL?

WE can better understand the tra- ditional subordination of the mili- tary power to civil authority if we recall its origin: the English experi- ence with Cromwell's Army. That armed force enabled the Protector to oust the King, and, in due course, to eliminate Parliament. The ensuing resentment against a standing army which was then bred in men of Eng- lish speech long hampered the devel- opment of a proper military policy, not only in Britain, but also in Amer- ica. The principle persisted; it is still popular. But just what precisely does it mean?

Actually, it means just what it meant in seventeenth century Eng- land. It means that in the United States the armed forces are the serv- ants and not the masters of the gov- ernment, that rulers are selected at the ballot box and not at councils of war or military staff conferences, and that the United States Army is non- political and does not, as in prewar Japan, undertake the assassination of unpopular officials, or, as in the re- publics of Latin America and the Levant, spark-plug the endemic revo- lutions that seat and unseat a succes- sion of presidents. . . .

The traditional concept includes as well a firm acceptance of the notion of a civilian President as Commander in Chief, surrounded by civilian sec- retaries who speak in his name and with his authority. When the Secre- tary thinks Yes and the Chief of Staff thinks No, the answer is Yes. It does not follow, however, that Yes is there- fore automatically the correct answer, or even that the Secretary is always the better citizen.

COL. FREDERCK BERNAYS WIENER
Combat Forces Journal
October 1950

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
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Japan—*World War II*




Soviet Russia—*World War II*



United States—*World War I*



United States—*World War II*



German—*World War II*



German—*Pre-World War I Pickelhaube*



France—*World Wars I and II*

What About the Helmet?

CAPTAIN JOHN R. D. CLELAND

The modern battle helmet made its appearance early in World War I. Between the wars our Army has made some changes and modifications and the present helmet was adopted in 1941. Today research and development ought to be able to come up with a helmet that is lighter, more durable, and gives greater protection than the M1.

WHEN the musket replaced the crossbow the knight in shining armor was knocked off his horse.

The suit of mail went out but breast plates and helmets were retained by both the foot soldier and the cavalry—for protection in hand-to-hand combat. As the musket and later the rifle were improved, hand-to-hand combat became less frequent and the breast plate and helmet disappeared, except for ceremonial usage—the British Army's Household Cavalry still wears the old helmet and breast plate.

In 1914 the troops of the Allies and the Kaiser took to the field without armor. The helmet appeared as a device of modern warfare when a French General Adrian discovered while talking to a wounded soldier that a metal mess bowl which he carried in his cap had saved the soldier's life. General Adrian developed a steel cap lining which was adopted by the French Army. Although this metal helmet was heavy and uncomfortable, the *Poilu* liked and wore it. Two factors appear to have entered into acceptability of this helmet: protection from enemy fire, and to a lesser degree, combat distinction. These two factors still carry weight in helmet development. In 19 the British and German Armies adopted helmets of their own.

When the United States entered World War I Uncle Sam started looking for helmets. He found 400,000 for sale in England and bought them. They were the old basin-shaped Helmet M1917, commonly called Tin Hats. The Helmet M1917 was the standard helmet of the United States Army until 1941.

To remain standard over such a long period, the tin hat had to beat off competition. The first experimental helm-

CAPTAIN JOHN R. D. CLELAND, Infantry, is on duty with Army Field Forces Board No. 3 at Fort Benning.

e tested by the Infantry Board in 9-1920. There were four helmets un- consideration and after tests for fort, stability, durability, and armor tection it was recommended that the met, Type 5A and the Standard Hel-, M1917 be modified with a new sus- sion and 50 of each be sent to the ntry and Artillery Boards for tests.

Various samples passed back and forth ween the Infantry Board and the ef of Ordnance until 1924 when 421 nets were issued to the 29th Infantry tested under the auspices of the In- try School and the Infantry Board. e two type helmets were tested from 4 to 1926 and the old tin hat was ined.

The helmet situation remained un- nged until 1941 when the Chief of ntry directed the President of the ntry Board, Brigadier General Court- H. Hodges, to conduct a new and prehensive test of steel helmets with ticular emphasis on the "pot" versus "basin" shape.

The Infantry Board determined that e ideal shaped helmet is one with a ne-shaped top and generally following contour of the head, allowing suffi- nt uniform headspace for indenta- ns, extending down in the front to er the forehead without impairing essary vision, extending down on the es as far as possible without interfer- with the use of the rifle or other pons, extending down the back of the d as far as possible without permit- g the back of the neck to push the met forward on the head when the arer assumes the prone position, to e the frontal plate flanged forward to m a cap style visor and to have the es and rear slightly flanged outward to se rain to clear the collar opening."

Based on these simple characteristics Infantry Board took the M1917 hel- t, which offered good protection to the of the head, and brazed on sides, a k and a visor. They made three of se models and selected the third, ich is now our standard M1. In de- ing a means to suspend it on the head l provide insulation against heat and d, the idea of the canvas liner was n. This was developed to become standard plastic liner. Materials used making the first M1 helmet and liner re: two sheets celluloid, five 1917 hel- ts, ten tubes Duco cement, one gallon llac, two yards khaki book-binding th, one gallon rubber cement, five iddell" suspensions (used in football lmets), and three sheets of plastic, " x 24" x .06" and all at a cost of ount 'em—$100.

FROM 1941 through 1945 no radical modifications were made in our helmet; the M1 was modified for parachutists, camouflage nets and bands were tested, and a quick release neck strap was devised.

In 1945 the Marine Corps came up with a helmet made of a new fiber-glass called doron. Although this material had protective qualities equal to the M1 steel and was non-magnetic, it was not as durable as the steel helmet. Consideration was given to building an aerial into the helmet for use by radio operators, but the idea was discarded as impractical.

In 1945 Ordnance, which at that time was responsible for helmet development, began design of a new helmet, the T21E1, based on studies of the contour of the human head conducted by the Aero-Medical Laboratory. Its shape was similar to the M1 but it presented a curved surface at all points on the body of the helmet and had a nylon liner which offered additional protection.

In 1946 the T21E1 was tested in conjunction with the doron helmets by Army Field Forces Board No. 3, but before the test report could be acted upon a new requirement entered the picture: an "all purpose" helmet was to be designed. One that would be suitable for use by infantry, artillery, armored crew members, parachutists and anyone else who needed a helmet.

THE period 1947-1952 saw helmets developed along these lines. Three separate models were produced and tested. They all consisted of a thin aluminum shell and a thick nylon liner. None of them proved suitable for any of the branches.

The basic reason for the unacceptability of these experimental helmets was the fact that an "all purpose" helmet tried to please everybody by incorporating desirable features such as ease of observing from parachute while in descent, being able to wash in the shell or being comfortable in a tank. This jeopardized the primary purpose of the helmet, protection to the head.

Strangely enough, even though designed to meet these special uses, none of the helmets tested has proved as good at these special uses as the M1, which still does the job.

Right now the two questions that need answers are:

- What helmet (weighing less than three lbs.) affords the best protection from shell fragments and small-arms missiles?
- What helmet affords the most complete coverage to the head without impairing the vision, hearing, or the ability of the front-line soldier to use his weapons?

Whether the helmet is one-piece or two-piece, plastic or metal, magnetic or non-magnetic, can be worn inside a tank, makes a fine wash basin, and any other similar characteristics is of secondary importance.

With the research and development in plastics, fibers, and metals that has taken place in the last decade it should be possible to make a helmet which is lighter, more durable, and has protective qualities far superior to the standard M1.






Helmets designed by Infantry and Artillery Boards, 1924-26

Two post-World War I Ordnance-designed helmets





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The Month's Reading

More Firepower

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS
Greenville, South Carolina
29 October 1953

During this year the Army explored every avenue of approach to the more efficient use of manpower. Although the number of Army personnel decreased, in no case have cuts been made which reduce combat power. On the contrary, alterations in organizational doctrine, better weapons and equipment, and continued refinement of training have made possible an increase in the effectiveness of our combat units despite a decrease in the number of personnel assigned. For instance, new tables of organization for the infantry division reduce its strength by some 600, but by converting about 500 service jobs within the division, its firepower is increased by 81 machine guns and 18 recoilless rifles.

Not an 'Atomic' Gun

EDWIN DIEHL
Saturday Evening Post
21 November 1953

The cost of producing the A-shell is low in terms of its effectiveness. While precise production figures are secretly-shrouded, in terms of the cost to produce high-explosive shells of the same total effectiveness, the cost is considerably less than one 1000th for the atomic shell.

Until now—to wit: this article—the Army has tended unintentionally to impress on the public brain that the new weapon our fighting forces has is an "atomic gun." The 280mm gun which fires the A-shell, is, needless to say, a great gun. But it should not be called an "atomic gun" any more than the B-29 which carried the first A-bomb to Hiroshima could be called an "atomic plane" merely because it transported the bomb to the target.

Rank in the Air Force

EDWARD J. CARLIN, JR.
Air Force
December 1953

Undoubtedly, specialist ratings inferior to NCO ranks would help the Air Force. But what is needed more would be a flying officer and command officer T/O wherein lucky gunners would not, by virtue of attrition, become so ranked as to force staff responsibilities. With so much rank commanding so few enlisted people, the highest ranked enlisted man fast fades into obscurity. I remember, from my ground force and Air Force experience, that an AF three starrer about equalled the ground force's colonel, and likewise with the major and first lieutenant of aforementioned services. Super ranking in USAAF, caused by wholesale commissioning of flying personnel, led to a tacit agreement between EM and junior officers alike that real authority in the AF began with field grade and not below.

The command counterparts of AF and ground jobs begi with bomber commander and platoon commander. Se geants take orders from plane commanders in the AF an give orders in the infantry. It's a bit preposterous to conceiv the infantry noncom attacking Jane Russell Hill as a tru equal of Master Sergeant Smith demanding more work ou of the 999th Bomb Group Stat Control Unit. The forme is a leader, the latter a responsible technician. The questio of responsibility in military life depends on who outrank whom. And when you create fabulous T/Os for moral purposes, responsibility moves upstairs at a rapid pace.

The 'Blessings' of Bounty

BRUCE CATTON
A Stillness at Appomatto
Doubleday & Co., 1953

The number of men to be drafted in any state, city, c county always depended on the number that had previousl volunteered. If many had volunteered, few or none woul be drafted. Since nobody liked the draft, it was to every body's interest to promote volunteering, and this was don principally by the payment of cash bounties. By the winte of 1864 these were running very high. States, cities, an towns were bidding against each other—some were almos bankrupting themselves in the process—and the drafted ma who wanted to hire a substitute was biding against all three The results were fantastic. The provision by which a drafte man could buy his way out of the service was a remarkabl effective device for making young men cynical about appeal to their patriotism. When it went hand in hand with a sy tem of bounties that often ran as high as a thousand dolla per enlistment, there was in operation an almost foolproo system for getting the wrong kind of man into uniform.

This system had created the institution of the substitut broker—the man who for a fee would find potential soldie and induce them to enlist. Some of these brokers may hav been relatively honest, although there is nothing in any cor temporary accounts to make one think so, but for the mos part they seem to have inspired army authorities to some c the most glowing invective in Civil War annals. At time they operated precisely as waterfront crimps operated, mak ing their victims drunk, getting them to sign away thei bounty rights, and then rushing them through the enlistmen process before they recovered. . . .

Most of the time the broker did not need to go to th trouble of drugging anybody. It was simpler to dredge in th backwaters of city slums and find human derelicts who, fo a little cash in hand, would willingly assign their bount rights and go and enlist.

* * *

These men brought into the Army of the Potomac an ele ment the army had never had before, and of which it coul not possibly make the slightest use. In camp they wer valueless, and early in 1864 the army command stipulate

it no bounty men could be used on picket or outpost ty. "If those fellows are trusted on picket," remarked one eran, "the army will soon be in hell." The mere business guarding them to see that they did not desert or plunder eir honest comrades took time and effort that should have en used in other ways. In battle they were a positive ndicap. Under no circumstances could they be induced to ht.

unior Officers—Red Style

Commentator, Radio Free Europe
News from Behind the Iron Curtain
November 1953

Junior officers [of the Polish People's Army] are treated as class of worker whose working hours are not strictly de- ed. They have no set holidays or free time. Their leave pends upon the whim of the regimental commander, for platoon commander is considered too insignificant a figure be allowed to choose the time when he would like to ke his leave. He is also too unimportant to be allowed the e of the recreation homes, which are officially at the dis- sal of all officers. In practice, they are filled with staff icers from the Ministry of National Defense and senior litary commanders. In practice, the junior officer is given opportunity to leave the camp, and no opportunity to prove his education. He has no time in which to do these ings. From five in the morning until eleven at night his y is filled with professional and political duties. Second eutenant Grzyb, an infantry officer who escaped to the 'est and whom you have heard on our previous broadcasts, ed to begin his working day with reveille at 5 a.m. and nt to bed at 11 p.m.—six hours sleep is all a junior officer entitled to. And [the] pilot who escaped in a MIG to enmark in May, has told you how his duties lasted from wn until 3 a.m. on one day, and how, after four hours' ep, he had to be on parade at 7:20 a.m. ready for new ties.

ino-Soviet Relations

WERNER LEVI
Modern China's Foreign Policy
University of Minnesota Press, 1953

Communist China can give full support to Russian ambi- ns in Europe because China has few interests there, while e involvement of the Western world in Europe will give ommunist China a freer hand in Asia. The Soviet Union n support Communist China in Asia because in most spects, and for the time being, what benefits Chinese in- rests also benefits Russian interests. The Soviet Union has tle to fear from Communist China as long as that country gages in a policy which makes her deeply dependent upon e Soviet Union in every respect. In whatever way this pendence may be evaluated by the Chinese Communist aders, they may consider it to have compensations. They longer have to rely upon a precarious balance of power r security; they have Russian support against a feared petition of Japanese aggression; they have a freer hand an ever before in South and Southeast Asia; they are eliminating all Western powers from China and in the end will have to deal with only one—Russia—instead of all; and they are managing somewhat to balance the loss of economic ties with Western powers by the creation of new ones with the European satellites of the Soviet Union. Most of these advantages, at one time or another, Chinese governments before the Communists have tried to obtain.

Red Infantry—Decisive Arm

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Soviet Military Doctrine
The Glencoe Free Press, 1953

The 1936 and 1940 *Field Regulations* [of the Soviet Army], the 1942 *Theses on Offensive Combat,* and the 1942-1945 *Infantry Combat Regulations* all explicitly state that *"The infantry is the main type of troop,"* and that "the infantry . . . determines the outcome of battle." These regulations further state and repeat that "Combined action of all types of troops is organized in the interest of the infantry, who fulfill the main role in combat."

This fact is taught not only to infantry officers, but, for example, to the young air force officers who read in the official textbook, *Aviation Tactics,* that "therefore the assignment of other types of troops participating in combined combat with the infantry is to act in its interests, securing its advance in the offensive, and steadfastness in defense."

Increased attention directed to the aviation, armored, and artillery arms has been explicitly stated not to mean that the infantry is no longer "the basic arm."

The Use of U. S. Machines

THEODORE H. WHITE
Fire in the Ashes
William Sloane Associates, 1953

Over and over for the past fifteen years I have watched strangers studying American ways, as if by dismantling an American combustion charger they could learn how to make themselves as warm as Americans. And over and over I have seen Americans trying to show them how the combustion charger works without explaining that the trick is not in how the metal parts of the combustion charger fit together but how the combustion charger is used socially, and to whose benefit. In every possible different context, I have watched puritan and conservative Americans thus transformed by their efforts abroad into radical symbols of disturbance.

A classic example was the experience of General Joseph Stilwell in China. The government of Chiang Kai-shek wanted guns and planes but wanted only to learn how to use the guns and planes. But Stilwell insisted that they must learn to fight, which is quite different from learning how to shoot a gun or fly a plane. Learning to fight, he said, meant that Chinese officers must stop selling their soldiers' ration for private profit, that soldiers must not be kicked, beaten or have their ears cropped, that they must be well fed and clothed, that their leaders must be brave and daring. This was the important thing in fighting. He could not get the idea across, and thus Chiang's armies, for all their guns, could not fight.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS



The Test of Gentility

PETER B. KYNE

"Sir," said the Adjutant, "you are forgetting that you are an officer and a gentleman. You are suborning falsehood." "I have never let a good soldier down and I never shall," said the Colonel. "This old man belongs to me. He's my boy."

"An' a great longin' come over me, sir, to go out wit' the bhoys an' the hell wit' bein' a human doormat."



PLEBES at the Military Academy and the Naval Academy may be a trifle short on ethics when they matriculate, but when they graduate it is presumed they are officers and gentlemen. Although it doesn't follow that this presumption is infallible, human nature being what it is, nonetheless it is heartening to know that the number of backsliders from the moral code inculcated at both institutions is so very small.

Once I knew an officer who outwardly was the beau ideal of an officer and a gentleman. At least that was my impression when, as a seventeen-year-old recruit, I reported to him with six other would-be heroes for service in the War with Spain. He did not seem too pleased with our quality but said he supposed the first sergeants would make soldiers out of us. I was shocked at his disdain and arrogance, for I had not previously seen a gentleman I could recognize as such on sight and who exuded the evidence of his class the way a horse exudes sweat.

He was a tall man with a fine military figure, and I wondered how one of his years (he was a veteran of the War Between the States) had managed to keep his belly flat. He commanded the regiment of Regular Infantry which had accepted my services. He was a handsome man and wore a small, well-cared-for mustache and a gold pince-nez with a black ribbon hanging from the front of his beautifully tailored khaki blouse. The day we fought our first pitched battle with the army of General Emilio Aguinaldo, the Old Man, in a starched white collar, rode his Filipino pony behind the skirmish line to supervise the job. And we took big casualties that day, so I decided he was not a stuffed shirt.

Between the surrender of the Spanish Army in the Philippines on August 13,

PETER B. KYNE, author of the popular "Cappy Ricks" stories and other light fiction, served as an enlisted man in Company L, 14th Infantry, in the Philippine Islands in 1898-99 and as a captain in the 144th Field Artillery during the First World War. During the years of his great popularity as a writer of fiction for the high-paying mass circulation magazines, Mr. Kyne also contributed to *Infantry Journal* and *The Field Artillery Journal*. One critic once wrote that Mr. Kyne's year in uniform "left him with far more literary grist than military zest"; an observation, incidentally, that could be made about any number of writers who served in the uniform both before and after Mr. Kyne. But it must be added that Peter Kyne never became a cry-baby critic of Army life. His articles in the service journals were affectionate reminiscences of his service in the Philippines. He felt great loyalty to the 14th Infantry and especially Company L and this was reflected most clearly in a short article he wrote for *Infantry Journal* on the occasion of the regiment's Organization Day in 1938. Now seventy-three, Mr. Kyne lives quietly near his native San Francisco.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

1898, and the attack by the Filipino army on February 5, 1899, the Army "rested." With the exception of two hours of drill five days a week, and outpost duty in the bush once a week watching the native army, we merely soldiered, and the tradition of bucking for orderly was revived. Orderly bucking in those days was almost a profession.

Each morning at guard mount the adjutant would select two privates for orderly duty—one for the Old Man and one for himself. The neatest and most soldierly looking men got the plum—considered such because the adjutant and the Colonel knocked off duty after retreat, and their orderlies could get in a full night's sleep. And there was no walking post, two hours on and four off, or herding prisoners at work.

One day I was picked by the adjutant as his orderly. When I reported I was directed to sit on a bench outside his office door. The transom was open, so when he called "Orderly!" I would enter, salute, and say "Sir?"

That day the mail from a transport had arrived, and I was fidgeting on my bench with my mind on letters from a girl who had said she loved me true but didn't, when the adjutant's summons came over the transom. When I reported I saw the Colonel sitting on a corner of the adjutant's desk, and he was looking at a photograph. He lifted his slow, lethal gaze to me and said, handing me the photograph, "Orderly, do you know that man? He is a soldier in this regiment."

I looked at the photograph. "Yes, sir, I do," I said. "It's Private Patrick J. Hennessy of M Company."

"Are you quite certain?"

"Yes, sir. Private Hennessy is maybe ten years older than this photograph, but I'm sure it's Hennessy."

"You know him well?"

"Yes, sir. He's a very good friend of mine."

"When and where were you born, son?"

I had been warned against that question by the corporal to whom I gave five dollars the day I enlisted. They never asked you how old you were if they thought you were lying your way in—and I was. Well, if the Colonel thought I'd reply truthfully now, he was way off base. "March 12, 1877, in San Francisco, sir," I replied.

"You lie," said the Colonel, but without animus. "How does it happen that you're pally with a man old enough to be your grandfather?"

I decided I was safe so I said, "Private Hennessy likes kids. The older men think he's stodgy and not in their class, so I guess that's why he has to fall back on a few kids for company."

"Why do you like him?"


"He's very kind to us."

"Explain."

"He has plenty of money and often, on Saturdays or Sundays, he takes some of us down to an eight-course dinner at the Hotel d'España in Manila. And he buys us beer between paydays when we're all broke."

"And, in return, what do you do for Private Hennessy?"

"On band concert nights on the Luneta I walk out with him. Until the Colonel banished them, I was his rooster-



buyer and picked some good ones, and we made money fighting them through the brigade. Also, Pat plays marbles with me."

"Good God!"

"He likes to play marbles and bought a hundred each for another kid and me, just so he could play with us. He used to play marbles with the kids at his home in San Francisco. He has a big agate taw and he's sudden death with it. I've seen him knock half a dozen marbles out of the ring without a miss."

"Do you give him a run?"

"Yes, sir. Pat shoots from the ground, but I'm a plumper and often I beat him."

"Well, I'll be damned!" said the Colonel. "What else do you play? Hop scotch?"

"Pat isn't that childish, sir."

"Then what's wrong with him?"

"I think he's lonely, sir."

"Is he a man of good morals—that is, reasonably good. We do not expect soldiers to be disgustingly good."

"Yes, sir. He never swears or tells dirty stories, and every Sunday he isn't on guard he goes to Mass at the Cathedral San Ignacio Intramuro."

"Does he ever get drunk and take you to bawdy houses?"

"No, sir. I do not get drunk or vis bawdy houses, and neither does Priva Hennessy."

"No offense intended, son. Has He nessy told you he is a married man?"

"No, sir; and I wouldn't ask becaus that would be getting nosey."

"Quite right, son, quite right. Wh else do you and your aged comrade do t pass dull time away?"

"Sometimes, sir, we sing come-all-ye or sometimes I play a harmonica accon paniment and Pat sings them."

"Ah!" said the Old Man, "just a coup of bards and poets. I notice you have faint Irish accent."

"My parents are Irish, sir."

"What is a come-all-ye?"

"An Irish ballad, sir—a folk song."

"And you know some of them?"

"Yes, sir. My mother taugl me them."

"Has your mother a nice voice?

"I think so, sir. We used t sing them together and laug over them. Some of them a very funny. We call them com all-ye's because they all begir 'Come all ye true-born Irishme a story short I'll tell'—and the you listen to a song as long as roll of toilet paper."

"Sing me one, son," the Ol Man urged gently.

I thought his order was far fro military, but I was well disciplined an promptly gave out with the first vers of a ballad laudatory of the exploits a bandit named Willie Brennan wh robbed the rich to give to the poor an who, poor lad, when cornered by th cops on a moor, was shot to death.

At the chorus I put coeneen into i But when I finished the chorus I pause feeling silly. But the Old Man declare I fascinated him and ordered me to co tinue to the end, so I did—to the sorrow ful end, and had him beating time t the chorus.

"Son," he said then, "find this Privat Hennessy and bring him here."

I FOUND Pat playing tick-tack-toe i M Company's squad room and gav him the dreadful news. It had to b dreadful whenever a buck was sum moned to the throne. Pat looked di turbed, but brushed his curly iron-gra locks, put on his blouse and followed m into the Presence. The adjutant saic "Close the transom, Orderly." So the didn't want me to hear them rawhidin Pat. I closed the transom.

"You may retire now," said the adju tant, and I did. I tiptoed down the co ridor and outside the adjutant's offic

cause the window was open, for no-dy shuts a window in Luzon unless a hoon is blowing rain into the room. he adjutant was conducting the pre-inary examination and I knew the d Man was watching Pat's face for ns of falsehood. I heard Pat say:

"Yes, sir, that's my photograph."

"So you are a married man?"

"Yes, sir."

"Your descriptive list, to the truth of ich you took oath, informs us that you a single man."

"Yes, sir. I lied a little bit about that, ."

"Why did you enlist? You're really old for service."

"I was tired o' the sameness o' me life, ."

"Fed up with your wife, too, were you t?" The Old Man had taken over.

"Well, for twinty-five years before I ld up me hand I'd have been happier wit'out her—not givin' the woman a ick eye, sir. I was like to go mad, therin' crazy, when suddenly the city s filled wit' sojers goin' out to Manila. he lucky divils, an' them wit'out a care life an' headed for wild adventure. n' a great longin' come over me, sir, to out wit' the bhoys an' the hell wit' in' a human doormat."

The Colonel said gently: "Sit down, ivate Hennessy, and tell me about your arried life. I have to know, because is morning I received a letter from a dy who claims to be your wife. Judge her surprise and indignation when e went to one of those places known a nickelodeon where, for five cents u may see those jerky things they call otion pictures, and who should she see arching off to war but you, with a ick on your back and a Krag-Jörgenssen le on your shoulder and doing little g steps as you were permitted to do, the utfit marching, I daresay, at route step the time. You were grinning, she de-ares, like the head of an old fiddle, and e was scandalized. The pictures must ve been taken the day we marched wn Market Street to the transport ck and the title identified the regi-ent."

"And now, bad cess to her," said Pat, he's on me trail."

"Well, she demands that you be dis-arged and sent home to care for her d the children."

With deep feeling Private Hennessy urmured: "The hell wit' her."

"You do not seem to realize that a man ho deserts his minor children is ac-untable to the law. I think it's a fel-y."

"Listen to me, sir, if ye please. I landed in America wit' ten dollars in me pocket—an' when I left it I was a rich man. I got into the contractin' business—diggin' cellars, excavatin' for buildings, diggin' ditches for the gas company. I had a knack for estimatin' yardage closely an' for removin' dirt— an' I prospered. Me wife was a nagger from birth—may the divil fly away wit' her if he only flew a mile a day. But I'd took the woman for betther or for worse, so why should I whimper whin I got the worst? I put up wit' her for the sake o' the children. Whin I was nice to her, patient an' kind, she mistook me attitude for cringin' an' pleadin' for her love. An' divil a day o' happiness I had until the day I enlisted. Here I have peace. An' if I'm kilt when we fight Aguinaldo—as we sure as hell will—thank God I'll be buried out here where she can't come sobbin' to me grave to show what a wonderful wife she was, an' prove to the neighbors that, in spite o' the black treatment I give her she forgives me an' loves me memory. The damned hypocrite!"

"But she says you left her and the children destitute."

"She's a liar. She was jealous o' the young widder woman that kept me books. Sure, the poor girrl had to have a decent job an' she was competent, and her husband was me foreman an' was kilt when a landslide o' sand rolled over him an' he was smothered."

"Was she beautiful?"

"Not so much, but sweet an' fine. Me wife was never done wit' pickin' on me to fire her, an' I'd be damned if I would an' damned if I didn't. The young woman knew me missus was afther her an' she was for quittin' to give me peace o' mind—as if that was possible at all, at all. So finally what did I do but turn everything I owned into cash. I give the young widder woman twenty thousand an' let her go, an' 'twas comin' to her because her husband had died in me employ, although she was too fine to sue me for something I couldn't help. I established a trust fund to support me wife an' the younger children well an' give them good educations, an' I deeded the home to me wife. Then I turned me business an' all me equipment over to me two oldest sons, with ample operatin' capital. An' they can make a fortune out o' it or throw it away to hell an' gone an' divil a hair I'll care. I took a hundred thousand dollars' worth of six per cint first mortgages for meself an' if ye sind me back to that purgathory, sir, I'll jump off the transport in mid-ocean."

"What you should have done, Private Hennessy, was to lay the woman across your knees and beat hell out of her with your razor strop. Incidentally, you are guilty of making a false enlistment on two counts. Your real name is John H. Cosgrove."

"Yes, sir, but 'tis happy I am as Patrick J. Hennessy."

"Well, then, God bless your Hibernian soul, stay that way, and good luck to you. Dismissed!"

PRESENTLY I heard the adjutant say, "Sir, what shall I write this hellcat?"

"Tell her," said the Old Man, "that a careful check of our rolls has failed to uncover a soldier listed as John H. Higgins."

Ah! I reflected, the West Point code forbids even a minor falsehood.

"Write her," the Old Man went on, "that we did turn up a soldier who bears a most remarkable resemblance to the photograph she sent us, and he may be her husband and serving under an assumed name. Tell her he had four gold teeth in front, that he has a pronounced impediment in his speech, and that on his breast is tattooed, in green, the harp of Ireland and, arching over it, the words *Erin Go Bragh*."

"Sir," said the adjutant, "you are forgetting that you are an officer and a gentleman. You are suborning falsehood and for falsehood they kick us out without honor and with forfeiture of all pay and allowances."

"I've never let a good soldier down and I never shall. By God, this old man belongs to me. He's my boy. What if he did perjure himself? That proves he's a man. Why damn it, man, the lie is the bulwark of civilization."

I hurried back to my bench so I could pop in like a jack-in-the-box if the adjutant summoned me. And I was sensible of a surge of quiet satisfaction, for I'd never be afraid of that Old Man again. The old liar was a gentleman in the truest sense of the word.

I WAS reminded of Pat some time ago when I read his death notice in a local paper. Only a hundred and two years old, and a former member of the 14th United States Infantry. Funeral under the auspices of the United Spanish War Veterans, Requiem High Mass at Star of the Sea Church, interment in Golden Gate National Cemetery. It must have gravelled his kin not to have been able to bury him in Holy Cross, but I suppose Pat wanted to lie with the bhoys.

I went to the mortuary to see him and discovered that during the past fifty years he had gotten quite bald. But he looked very peaceful.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

THIS is the fifth in the series of articles on Career Management and how it works. If you have any comment or questions on this series please feel entirely free to write the editors or Career Management Division. The article explaining the assignment of officers to Army Aviation announced for this issue has been delayed.

Selection for General Staff Duty

THE Army General Staff is a central agency that coordinates the Army's work policy and prepares plans and recommendations for the Army's military and civilian policy makers. Officers attain the necessary stature needed on the Army General Staff by experience in the field and by formal schooling. Career Management Division, TAGO, is charged with the overall responsibility for the selection and assignment of qualified officers to the Army General Staff.

Except in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress, not more than 4000 officers of the Army may be detailed or assigned to duty in the Department of the Army and of this number not more than 1650 may be "detailed to duty with" or "assigned to duty on" the Army General Staff.

OFFICERS assigned to the Army General Staff occupy positions of great responsibility and trust. To be eligible for "assignment to duty *on*" the Army General Staff an officer must:

- Be serving in the temporary grade of major or higher.
- Be assigned to a position requiring as a primary duty the creation, development, or coordination of policies, principles or concepts pertaining to a primary function of the agency to which assigned.
- Completion of a one-year assignment "detailed to duty with" the General Staff qualifies an officer for assignment to the General Staff. Officers who are graduates of the Army or National War Colleges and/or the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and general officers may be awarded constructive credit for the year apprenticeship duty.

Selection and assignment of officers to authorized general staff positions is a dual function of Career Management Division, TAGO, and heads of General Staff Agencies. The Chief, Career Management Division, is charged with overall responsibility, with initial responsibility being placed on career management branches of the arms and services. Whenever an officer completes an overseas tour or otherwise becomes available for reassignment within the CONUS, a careful evaluation of his record is made by his career branch. In response to requirements, qualified officers are selected. All officers of the combat arms and those of the technical and administrative services, specifically selected by chiefs of services, who possess appropriate qualifications are considered for assignment to Army General Staff vacancies.

OFFICERS selected must have demonstrated outstanding ability in field command and/or staff positions and have demonstrated high potential for outstanding performance of duty in the agency to which they are to be assigned by record of past performance. It is desirable that officers be graduates of the Command and General Staff or a higher military college. Taking into consideration Career Management policies and requirements for officers world-wide, available officers are carefully screened and either assigned to General Staff agencies or nominated to heads of such agencies for approval. Those selected and approved are placed on orders and "detailed to duty with" or "assigned to duty on" the Army General Staff, as appropriate. This process, coordinated between general staff agencies and career management branches, results in careful selection of the raw material which when properly molded is destined to become the "brains" of the Army.

Tours of duty in the Army General Staff are normally for a three-year period. The Army Organization Act of 1950 specifically provides that officers assigned to the Army General Staff shall serve a tour of duty not to exceed four years. In exceptional cases where by special finding the Secretary of the Army finds it in the public interest an officer's tour may be extended beyond four years. Upon on completion of a tour an officer may not be reassigned to Army General Staff duty within two years unless approved as an exception by the Secretary of the Army.

AT this point you may well be saying "How does this affect me?" Assignment to the Army General Staff is neither a prerequisite nor formula for success. However, it is a logical assignment for any officer who aspires to have a well rounded career.

Your performance of duty, sense of duty, efficiency, and academic achievements are under constant scrutiny by your career management branch. Every effort is made to so monitor your career that your maximum potential is developed. The demand for officers with high integrity, intelligence, and devotion to duty is never satisfied. Therefore, taking into consideration world-wide requirements of the Army, you may soon be assigned to the Army General Staff on your first or a successive tour. When this occurs you have taken one more important step in your career. Upon assignment you will have an active part in formulating Department of the Army policy.



The wild grandeur of Alaskan scenery is unforgettable. This is Lake Horseshoe near Mount McKinley.

ALASKA

In the land of the Sourdoughs, the ladies dress formally

MAJOR MARCO POLO

AROUND THE BASES—1

LASKA, to most people who have never been there, is a vast wilderness mountains, snow and Eskimos. It is of this—and much more. The snow is t as bad as you expect, most military ople living there will see an Eskimo ly infrequently, and the mountains d the wilderness turn out to be among e most delightful things about the untry.

Most soldiers and their families return m an Alaskan tour delighted with the experience. They think Alaska is great.

It is true that the temperatures reach extreme lows—50 degrees below zero is not unusual during the deep winter—but generally the weather is much milder than most of us expect. At Big Delta, where the Army has its Arctic Indoctrination School, the weather is about like upstate New York, except for occasional cold spells. Extremes of 60 degrees below zero have been recorded there, and in the summer it has reached 99 degrees above, but the average is seven degrees below in the wintertime and 57 above in the summer. The most unusual thing is the daylight, which lasts 20 to 22 hours in the summer, and only two or four in winter.

In the Panhandle—the coastal strip which extends south from Anchorage to Ketchikan—the weather is about the same as you will find in the Tacoma-Seattle, Washington, area.

Further north, of course, it gets worse. The handful of Army folk stationed at Point Barrow are inside the Arctic Circle, and are faced with true North Pole cli-

AJOR MARCO POLO is the collective pseudonym of the authors writing this series.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

mate. But for most military people Alaska is a pleasant surprise.

Physically, Alaska is a rugged, sparsely populated country one-fifth the size of the United States; twice as big as Texas. It has more coast line than has the entire United States, and all kinds of terrain. The highest mountain in North America, Mount McKinley, and one of the world's greatest rivers, the Yukon, are in Alaska.

Strategically, Alaska is probably America's most important piece of real estate. At the narrowest point in the Bering Strait it is only 56 miles between Alaska and Russia, and the most direct air routes between some of the world's major cities cross Alaska. For example, it is 1,000 miles closer to Peiping from Washington by way of Alaska than by any other route.

For this reason the Air Force is stronger in Alaska than the other services and the theater commander is an Air Force general, but the Army and the Navy are well represented. Alaska, in fact, has grown up with the Army, and the local communications are still run by the Signal Corps. Many of the roads were built by Army engineers.

FOR the soldier, Alaska is unusual in that it is the only overseas station to which he can drive. The Alaska highway, built by Army engineers during World War II, and now being contantly improved by the Army in Alaska and the Canadian government in Canada, is open all year round. In the wintertime it is a trip for an adventurer, but in the summer it is one of America's great touring experiences.

The highway actually starts at Dawson Creek, British Columbia, and goes 1527 miles to Fairbanks, passing through Big Delta at Milepost 1428. The road is gravel and blacktop, and while it goes through mountain country it follows contours so there are no serious grades to pull. At 20- or 30-mile intervals are "roadhouses," harking back to the days of horse and stage, that offer rough, but clean and comfortable lodging, food, small supplies, and motor fuels.

Many soldiers who have done it rec ommend driving to Alaska. If you elec to do so it would be wise to get a bookle entitled "The Milepost—guide to th land of the northern lights," publishe by the Alaska Highway Research Co. Box 2446, Anchorage, Alaska. It is avail able by regular mail for $1.00, and $1.3 if you want it delivered airmail. Th American Automobile Association has booklet and maps on the Alaskan High way.

IF you don't drive you will go to Alask by sea, leaving from Seattle, or by air leaving from McChord Air Force Base Tacoma, Washington, or Great Falls Montana.

Traveling by water, the trip normally takes about three days. Usually the boat land at Whittier, Alaska, but since i burned last summer and has not yet bee completely rebuilt, ships are also puttin in at Seward. By air, a matter of hours you will land at Elmendorff Air Forc Base, Anchorage. From the port yo journey either by train or automobile.



ALASKA—Our Last Continental Frontier



ese new quarters for Army families in Alaska are modern
l functional like garden-type apartments in Suburbia, U.S.A.

)USING is a major problem in Alaska, although it is steadily improv-. There is not enough government using to go around, and housing in lian communities is scarce, expensive frequently not good.

There is an ambitious building pro-n going on, both civilian and mili-, that promises to solve the problem ie day, but housing will be tight for a g time. Government quarters are d—two story houses with three bed-ms and full basement are found at t Richardson—but it takes up to a year company and field grade officers to quarters. At Big Delta, for example, e officers are forced to live in the lian community in two-room shacks n outdoor plumbing.

'ou have two choices, neither pleas-: leave your family in the States until find adequate housing, or take a big nce. Some soldiers solve the problem n trailers. Every military post has a ler park (Big Delta has two, one with m heat for every trailer) and the fa-ies are good. Trailers can be taken the Alaska highway, but some ship n in by water, and still others buy n in Alaska. If you are brave enough ull one over the highway it's a good stment, because you can always sell n place when you leave. The profit may make depends upon your skill trader.

'he housing situation is the key to long it will take you to get your ily to Alaska. If you wait for govern-nt quarters they won't leave Seattle il you have the keys in your hand. If you want to live off-post, they can leave as soon as you have a house. You can drive over the highway and take a chance on hotels and house-hunting, which is not wise as hotel rooms are scarce and expensive.

When your family does join you, you will want some household goods. Government quarters are sparsely furnished in the Quartermaster tradition. You can get along, but you'll be much more comfortable with your own pots and pans, dishes, living room furniture and—by all means—your own beds. Off-post quarters are inadequately furnished, if at all.

There is no television in Alaska, but there is radio, and the electricity is standard 60 cycle, 110 volt AC. You'll need a washing machine—automatic is all right in Alaska—and because the summers are dusty and the winters frigid you can make excellent use of an automatic dryer.

AS for clothing, take what you would take if you were moving to Maine, or upstate New York. The ladies will want their evening clothes, because there is something about living in the bush that makes people want to dress up. There is a good deal of entertaining at all the posts, and it is not unusual for people at Eielson and Ladd Air Force Bases, in Fairbanks, to visit back and forth with the Army folk at Big Delta, a distance of 100 miles. In such cases the visitors dress in clothes suitable for the road, pack their evening clothes in a bag, and the host provides a dressing room when they get to the party.

You will need sturdy clothes for the Alaska winters, but don't go overboard. Don't load up on fancy ski clothes; experience shows they are impractical and not really warm enough.

A couple of years ago there was some talk of issuing GI parkas to the dependents in Alaska, as well as to the men. Nothing came of it, but the women have taken care of it unofficially. The issue parka is a two-piece job designed for wear in bitter cold. Since it is seldom that the man needs the outer shell, almost all the wives wear the outer half of their husbands' parkas. They aren't handsome, but they are practical and accepted in Alaskan military society.

They are also cheap. The Alaskan

Interior of the new family quarters. Quarters like these are in short supply and Alaskan housing is extremely tight.



UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Eskimos and Indians make beautiful parkas and boots, but they are inordinately expensive, as is all other native handicraft. You will want to bring something back from Alaska—a parka or mukluks or carved ivory pieces—but shop carefully, such things are costly.

In fact, all local shopping tends to be hard on the service pocketbook. Alaska is a huge and thinly settled country, there are few roads and fewer railroads, and almost everything has to be shipped in. Clothing is expensive, and so is food.

The commissaries, however, are excellent, and prices reasonable. "Airborne" eggs and green vegetables come rather high, but "boat" eggs are only slightly higher than they are in the States. Milk comes from the States in paper cartons, frozen solid. Meats, too, reach you frozen.

Generally you can expect that everything will be from a little higher to a lot higher than it is in the States. For this reason you'll get a station allowance of $5.75 a day if you live off the post, $3.75 if you occupy government quarters. No one has yet been detected showing a profit on this allowance.

YOUR automobile is a big help in Alaska. There are only about 3,000 miles of road in the entire country, but the only other efficient means of transportation is the airplane.

If you don't drive over the Alaska Highway you can ship your car by water. The port will provide whatever special instructions are necessary, but it is wise to have the car waxed well—including the chrome—to counteract the effects of salt air.

Alaska is hard on cars, but the stories of how much extra equipment is necessary are generally just stories. Good service is available for all standard makes of automobile in Anchorage, Fairbanks and other reasonably large towns, and there is always some mechanical near-genius in a motor pool available for extra-curricular tinkering.

It is wise, however, to fit your car with heavy-duty tires (six-ply) because nearly all Alaskan roads are gravel and the stones chew tires pretty badly. An extra spare tire and wheel is a good investment. Tires are a matter of personal choice, of course, but truckers hauling over the Alaska highway believe that pure raw rubber tires hold up better in the cold than synthetic rubber tires.

Many people have found it prudent to have the bottom of their gas tank padded either with rubber or metal as protection against flying stones, which through constant hammering can pound a hole in the tank. Batteries should be fresh before leaving the United States, because the cold winters are hard on them. If you get quarters without a garage it is wise to carry your battery into the house every night to keep it from freezing.

The Canadians swear by the "headbolt heater," a gimmick that operates from 110-volt current and keeps the engine warm when the car is parked in your garage or driveway. It is not expensive and can be purchased in most northern United States cities.

Motoring in Alaska is an experience in good manners. No driver will pass a car that is stopped on the road. This is sometimes embarrassing in a country where gasoline stations are far apart and plumbing is scarce, but it has saved the life of many a motorist whose car has broken down in the back country.

ALASKA, for all its high costs and scanty housing, is "good duty." With care and wise dressing during the winter months the cold won't bother you, and the outdoor life is good for the entire family. It is cold but dry, and most people stay healthy. If needed, medical care is taken care of by local dispensaries, with hospitalization at the station hospital, Ladd Air Force Base, or the general hospital at Anchorage. Generally the medics evacuate to the United States any patient who will be hospitalized more than 90 days.

The schools are excellent all through high school, and they meet all the requirements of U.S. colleges. There are no house-servants available—Alaska is a

The road to Alaska.



pioneer country with a small populatio and there simply is no one to hire f housework. The Eskimos are a prou race and live in the far north—most Am people will seldom see one during a to in Alaska—and the Indians of southe Alaska are also proud and self-sufficie But Alaska is a clean place, except du ing the summer dust storms, and becau no one has domestic help, no one see to notice its absence.

FOR the sportsman the country is a pa dise, and everybody seems to devel into a sportsman during an Alaska tou Probably the best fishing in America there, not only in the ocean and the fa cold mountain streams but in the hu lakes that dot the inland. For the h game hunter there are moose, carib and mountain sheep and North Am ica's largest game animals, the Kodi bear and the Alaska brown bear. The are also all kinds of bird shooting, a most people find that game and ga birds are a welcome addition to the fa ily menu.

For the fisherman and the bird-shoo there is no problem over licenses. T Alaskan game laws set the non-reside rate quite low. Non-resident licenses f big game come high, however, so y had best wait a year and get your licen at the resident rate before going af sheep, mountain goat, or bear.

If you don't take your own equipme you can get it at the PX which stoc hunting and fishing gear. There are go sporting goods shops in Anchorage h prices are high. If you are a sportsm you'd better outfit yourself in the Unit States. If you drive to Alaska, the Ca dian government will permit you to bri rifles and shotguns into Canada, b hand-guns are not allowed.

Most recreation in Alaska is the o door type. As well as hunting and fishi there is mountain and glacier climbi for the adventuresome, boating duri the summer months, and skiing duri the winter. The posts supply ten courts and gymnasiums, as well as libr ies and clubs, and there is a golf cou at Anchorage. Alaska is still front country and everyone is open, friend and neighborly.

Almost all military people enjoy th Alaskan tour and many of them fall love with the country. For those w come completely under its spell there liberal homestead laws that make it p sible to get a piece of Alaska all yo own, for only the cost of living on it d ing your tour of duty. You can get t dope on this from the Department of t Interior.

The Month's Pictures



Competent medical officers say this American was tortured to death by sharp bamboo spears stuck into his flesh.

This U.S. soldier was murdered after his hands were tied behind him.



THESE ARE BODIES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS MURDERED BY COMMUNISTS IN KOREA

The number of United Nations soldiers who were the victims of Communist murderers in Korea will never be known. These official Department of Defense photographs give just a hint of the ghastly crimes committed by Red butchers against humanity.

The bodies of victims of Red atrocities after they had been moved to a central collection station near the investigation headquarters at Taegu.



UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

The Month's Comment

Soldier-Statesman

THE award of the Nobel Peace Prize to General of the Army George Catlett Marshall is a great honor bestowed upon a great man. General Marshall brought to the practice of statecraft the finest attributes of the military profession: dignity, integrity and straightforwardness. Every soldier can walk straighter and more proudly today because of this new distinction awarded to the profession of arms through this great soldier-statesman. The JOURNAL takes special pride in General Marshall for he was once (1909-10) an Associate Editor of *Infantry Journal*.

New Look

AS any avid reader of the sports pages knows, pre-game stories about an upcoming world series or bowl game are much more suspenseful than the actual reports of the games. Similarly a few months ago comment on what the "new look" by the new Joint Chiefs of Staff would be was confined only by the imagination and zeal of the commentators. But now that it is no longer a secret that the "look" didn't develop any radical recommendations, the commentators sound flat and disappointed, as though the game had ended in a scoreless tie.

A smart bookie who researched his subject before posting odds could have made a nice thing out of this. All he would have had to do, actually, was to ride along with a comment President Eisenhower made at a press conference not long after his inauguration.

The thing to remember, the President said at that time, is that the great facts that effect a so-called strategic situation and plan do not change rapidly. It takes no great wisdom to see how important to the general safety of the free world and the United States in particular are certain vital areas of the world. Therefore, the President concluded, no strategic plan suitable to the United States can be greatly different from any other so long as it is based on these facts.

Those who bet against the bookie in anticipation of a radically "new" strategy would have had to pay off early in December on the word of Admiral Radford who said the recommendations of the present JCS "do not represent any material change from those developed in previously approved plans."

An informed citizenry is certainly one of the chief bulwarks of a free nation, but a citizenry led to anticipate great expectations that couldn't materialize is not well served by those who through intent or ignorance mislead it.

TOMMY THIS AND THAT

KIPLING'S immortal lines to "Tommy this and Tommy that" indicted for all time the careless selfishness of otherwise decent and well meaning persons, who in peaceful times preferred to have all symbols of war put out of sight, out of mind—and out of national appropriations. Unlike the Victorian world of 1892, the world today is as near as it is ever likely to get to being divided into hostile armed camps. Men in uniform are very much in sight and mind and appropriation. And yet there is unmistakably a growing dislike and distrust of the military services and the men who are the living symbols of those services. The reasons for this have never been, so far as we know, scientifically isolated and identified, but if they were, we are confident that high on the list would be our citizens' growing weariness of the need for continued support of large military forces. It will soon be fourteen years since Hitler's Panzers overran France and set the U.S. to re-arming. Fourteen years is almost half a generation, and the future promises no relief. It is sad but understandable that decent citizens whose patriotism is unquestioned and who believe that the threat of Communism is real and immediate, still are moved to voice foolish and ignorant—and potentially dangerous—criticism of the armed forces and the decent men and women who serve in uniform.

WE are led to make these observations by the paragraph in the report of the Womble Committee on the atrractiveness of the military service as a career which called attention to the growing lack of public respect for constituted military authority. We think the committee—two admirals and three generals (Army, Air Force and Marine Corps)*—was right in its diagnosis and its warning that "the continued degradation of career military officers, as a class, can eventually do irreparable damage to our ability to attract and retain capable personnel." But we do wish that a committee other than one composed of men of high rank had complained about those who "aim their slanderous attacks at our military leaders whom they refer to derogatorily, collectively and repeatedly as 'the brass.'" We say this because we fear that the statement itself is going to be construed as another example of "brassism."

Elimination of the comment would not have weakened the point the Committee was making.

THIS national weariness of the military burden has also permeated the armed services themselves. And well it might, for the soldiers, sailors and airmen of the regular services have carried and are carrying a heavier burden than the rest of the nation. The Womble Committee noted this and commented:

> The continuing practice of stationing large forces in overseas areas without family living accommodations has brought about increasingly frequent periods of lengthy family separations. These disruptions of family life have appreciably increased living costs, multiplied personal problems, strained marital relations, and, in many instances, destroycd families. There are not sufficient numbers of able men who will willingly accept a career which prohibits or destroys normal family life.

The Committee did not say how much weight it gave to this source of service dissatisfaction, but we have talked with a number of officers and noncommissioned officers and are strongly inclined to believe that the strains put on family life of service men are far and away the principa

*Rear Adm. J. P. Womble, Jr., USN; Maj. Gen. R. N. Young, USA; Rear Adm. M. J. Arnold, USN; Maj. Gen. M. J. Lee, USAF; and Brig. Gen. N. H. Nelson, USMC.

use of dissatisfaction. Many of the other causes, real though they be, chiefly irritants that could be endured if the necessity for them was ar; which isn't the case, of course.

With a bit of encouragement from on high and a green light all of way many of the recommendations of the Womble Committee could effected by the services themselves. The decline in military authority d leadership as exemplified by the reduced distinction between ranks d lack of effective discipline and *esprit* can be halted and the trend rted in sounder directions by the services. If, as the Committee says, ercentralized authority has diluted the authority of junior officers and "officer's word is no longer recognized as his bond," much can be done the services to rectify these things. There are signs that the Army is ving in this direction and we hope it follows through all of the way.

will not be easy. Men do not easily change habits of years, even when they learn that the habits are bad. Furthermore, the tightening discipline and the growth of respect for the officer corps will only be ective if the dignity of the common soldier is also preserved and enced. The average man entering the Army today is not an uncouth terate but a lad quite capable of meeting any challenge the services y put to him. What he hungers for (quite unconsciously perhaps) d will respect is skilled instruction and training and effective leaderp of the highest order. Give him those and he will respond nobly in st cases; fail to give them to him and he may become a "problem sol-r" at worst or a time-server at best.

Civilian apathy and weariness encourage the selfish and the ignorant penalize the service family. As this magazine has said before, these nditions will be rectified only when responsible civilians are informed d move to eliminate them. There is evidence that that support is being stered. And there is also evidence, we are proud to note, that the my, especially, recognizes that the restoration of pride in being a dier is of first importance.

OR when the soldier walks proudly, head high and eyes bright, civilians ay be ashamed to say "Tommy, wait outside."

COLONEL BRECKINRIDGE A. DAY

OLONEL BRECKINRIDGE ATWATER DAY, the last editor of *The Field Artillery Journal,* died on 7 December. His selfless and tiring efforts to bring about the merger of the Artillery and Infantry sociations will never be forgotten by those who participated in the gotiations. After the merger was effected, he modestly withdrew from ive participation in the affairs of the Association and magazine, but ietly and generously continued to contribute his large knowledge of d artillery to the editors of the new magazine.

Colonel Day graduated from Yale University in 1913 and enlisted in famed New York 7th Infantry Regiment in 1916, serving briefly on Mexican border. He was commissioned a second lieutenant of field illery in the Regular Army in 1917, and spent the rest of his life in iform. He was a graduate of two courses at The Field Artillery School, l also of the Command and General Staff College. During his career had two tours of duty as an instructor at The Field Artillery School l, during World War II, he was the first U.S. military attaché to the ion of South Africa. He retired from the Regular Army a few years but was immediately recalled to active duty. His most recent assignnt was Chief, Editorial and Publications Division, Office of the Chief Military History, Department of the Army. He had been ill four nths before his death at the age of sixty-two. Burial was in Arlington tional Cemetery.

Personal Service

YOUR Association begun to notice an interesting pattern in the requests for information and personal services for our members.

Of course, with each new selection board there is a sudden increase of requests to examine 201 files and (1) estimate chances, or (2) offer some inkling as to why the lightning failed to strike. Our average on (1) hasn't been too good, but in most cases an examination of the file explains (2). We are struck particularly by the lack of leadership evident in too many cases where the officer reported on evidently has not been told of his weaknesses by the reporting officer. There is obviously something wrong with the leadership structure when Lieutenant Able tells us, "Captain Baker has given me wonderful reports; the Selection Board just hasn't judged correctly," and our examination of the file shows that Captain Baker rates Able somewhere between Li'l Abner and Bugs Bunny.

Another part of the pattern that is interesting is that these particular requests come in bunches from one post or one regiment, with never a question from other units in the same area.

The bet-settling requests come in bunches also. There will be a rash of questions as to the interpretation of a paragraph in a field manual, usually from one area. Several men from the same outfit will write about battle honors due their unit, to be followed by the same question from men in an adjacent unit.

Civil War history is a favorite topic. Another favorite type of question, and usually frustrating to our researchers, goes something like this: "About four years ago I read in some military magazine a discussion of a five-regiment division; could you find this article for me and send me a copy?" It usually turns out that it was nine years ago instead of four, and a six-regiment division instead of five.

And of course we have with us always the earnest youngster who writes, "I have just been assigned to Base Command headquarters. Air mail me everything you have on administration." If we did what he asks, his pay for four years would be tied up in postage.

We enjoy getting and answering these requests for information. There is always a danger that our readers will become mere addresses on mailing plates if we never hear from them except at renewal time. It's the mail from the members that reminds us our readers are human beings, with human problems—and helps us do a better job.

Our circulation manager saw this comment before we went to press and begged us to add that there is one type of letter we don't get nearly enough of. He means change of address notifications. Again we plead with you to send us your old and new addresses whenever you move. It will make a circulation man grown grey in the Association's service very happy.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

CITATION FOR MERIT

The editors of the Combat Forces Journal *have selected these twelve books as those which have made the most distinguished contribution to military literature during 1953.*

TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY
Sir Winston S. Churchill

FROM DOWN UNDER TO NIPPON
General Walter Krueger

A STILLNESS AT APPOMATTOX
Bruce Catton

ATOMIC WEAPONS IN LAND COMBAT
Col. G. C. Reinhardt and Lt. Col. W. R. Kintner

THE RIVER AND THE GAUNTLET
Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
Raymond L. Garthoff

THE ROMMEL PAPERS
Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart

HISTORY OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
Walter Goerlitz

CAUCASIAN BATTLEFIELDS
W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES
Robert Ross Smith

FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES
Louis Morton

STILWELL'S MISSION TO CHINA
Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland

These fine books are available through Combat Forces Book Service.—Each is listed in Selected Books for Military Readers (Page 48).

1953

LIBRARY

Front And Center — Notes on the News

rd Foundation Prepares I&E "Talks" • Stabilized Duty for Veteran Noncoms

Experimental U. S. and Belgian Rifles Under Test

ignal Corps is progressing in adapt- television for combat use. In experi- ts it has flown mobile television sets ght aircraft to direct artillery fire, on nnaissance missions, to control and ct movements of combat units during ations, and to control traffic behind combat lines. In one test at Fort gg, an artillery fire direction center sted fire on the basis of pictures it ived from a television transmitter g over the target area. Before field can be effective, lighter and simpler ronic devices must be developed, al Corps experts say.

* * *

he Ford Foundation which is spon- g the development and preparation different (if not entirely new) kind &E talk" has had its team engaged ie project working closely with I&E als in Washington. It is possible several of the Foundation's "I&E s" may be distributed to the services lace of the output of the regularly ibuted "Armed Forces Talks."

* * *

is reported that the Department of nse critics who say that Air Force es should be counted instead of gs are now tending to equate the y's separate infantry combat teams AAA battalions as "six divisions." A ble Christmas gift, even if delayed, t be a copy of FM 101-10.

* * *

my Aviation which has been boom- since the beginning of the Korean is still going strong. The Army itly announced that it wishes more ilar and Reserve officers would vol- er for flight training. Eligibility re- ements can be found in SR 605-95-1 ding Changes 1, 2 and 3. The Army 2,500 fixed-wing aircraft and heli- rs now in operation has almost as planes as the entire Army Air s in September 1939: 2,473 of all .

* * *

ie plan to stabilize the tours of duty ncommissioned officers of the first grades who have 20 years of service re shapes up as a wise policy. For many years the family life of career non-commissioned officers has been badly disrupted by overseas requirements and many 20-year men have given serious thought to leaving the service. If this new policy can change their minds the Army will gain. The knowledge and experience of these men can be of great benefit to the Army in training centers and with National Guard, Army Reserve and ROTC units.

* * *

The British caliber .28 rifle seems to be out of the running, but the Army is testing the quite similar Belgian FN rifle, chambered to handle the T-65 caliber .30 bullet developed by Ordnance Corps. (See COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, Jan. and Feb. 1952.) This Belgian piece is being tested alongside the experimental T-44 developed by Ordnance. Comparison of the M1, the T-44 and the FN may be of interest:

Weight (lbs.)	*M1*	*T-44*	*FN*
Rifle w/o accessories	9.56	8.2	8.68
Bayonet, w/o scabbard	.95	.72	.61
Flash Hider	.48	.22	.12
Stabilizer	—	—	.10
Grenade Launcher	.60	.30	.92
Length (inches)			
Rifle, overall w/o accessories	43.6	41.5	41.5
Rifle, overall w/bayonet	53.0	49.75	50.0
Barrel	24.0	21.8	20.75

The weapons all have the same muzzle velocity: 2700-2800 fps. The T-44's magazine will hold from 10 to 20 rounds and the FN's 20 rounds; the M1's clip has a capacity of 8 rounds.

* * *

A method of eliminating the doctor draft that will assure the armed forces of a continuing supply of medical officers is to be presented to Congress by the Department of Defense. The plan calls for the Department to sponsor the medical education of certain students who will agree to serve a year for each year of education the government pays for. Deans of medical schools would select the students.

* * *

For the next six months the Army is going to test administrative procedures involved in detailing enlisted men to mobilization assignments with Army Reserve or National Guard units near their homes when they complete their active duty obligation. This is part of the development of a method to make effective the law that imposes an 8-year military obligation on each American lad. The tests will be conducted within one military district in each of the continental army areas.

* * *

Quartermaster Corps recently concluded a test of tropical uniforms in Panama as part of its continuing program that has been conducted at such dissimilar places as Yuma, Ariz., Fort Churchill, Manitoba, and Korea. In Panama, QMC tested a hot-weather jungle uniform of permeable cotton cloth, a hot-dry desert uniform of cotton twill cloth; lightweight poplin cloth uniforms in green and tan colors; and a bush coat of lightweight cotton that resembles the jacket worn by the traditional British explorer.

* * *

There have been at least six studies of what is needed to protect the U.S. from enemy air attack since the announcement in 1949 that the U.S.S.R. had developed atomic weapons. But there is still no agreement on how the U.S. can be defended from enemy bombers, what it would cost, or whether it is even possible. Congress is expected to go into it during the coming session and one committee has its own expert busy analyzing the previous studies, the latest of which was by a committee headed by Lt. Gen. Harold Bull which reported to the National Security Council.

* * *

The part of the continental air defense program that is shaping up most rapidly, on paper at least, is the one that calls for the participation of some 91 National Guard AAA battalions from 26 states and the District of Columbia. These battalions will be permanently "on location" with full-time civilian caretakers who are also military members of the unit. In an emergency all members of the battalion would report for duty. It is expected that it will take several years to get all of the battalions equipped, trained and in operation.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Artillery Unit Redesignated

Under a recent Department of the Army directive, reference to, and designation of, a specific observation battalion will be made as follows: "---th Field Artillery Battalion (Observation)."

However, when discussing such organizations in a general manner, the phrase "field artillery observation battalion" may still be used. For example: "The capabilities of the field artillery observation battalion are listed herewith."

Communication Inspections

A newly written pamphlet entitled *Inspection and Maintenance Guide* for command inspections of infantry division artillery signal equipment has just come off TAS presses. This handy, pocket-sized (4x7 inches) reference is for the use of commanders.

The guide can be adapted to the conduct of spot and partial inspections. And, with minor modification, it is usable by armor and airborne artillery. It is a supplemental publication and is not intended to replace appropriate TMs and FMs.

The guide is so arranged that the user may evaluate, first, the maintenance system and, second, the state of training. The user is then provided successively with a check list for all types of equipment and a list of specific items of equipment; the latter list shows component parts and the most common deficiencies found in them. In addition, the guide contains general instructions for signal inspections, a list of common signal items, and questions that can be asked by inspectors.

Survey Potpourri

◖ Cumulative readings with the aiming circle: It has been determined that three cumulative readings give no greater accuracy than two cumulative readings when measuring angles with the aiming circle; consequently, teaching now indicates that only two cumulative readings are required.

◖ Aiming circle declination: Present survey teachings utilize four known points, preferably one in each quadrant, when declinating the aiming circle. This procedure is in contrast with FM 6-40, *Field Artillery Gunnery,* which requires only one such point although stating more than one is desirable.

◖ Survey teams: With the adoption of the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid system, the terms "dX," "dY," and "Y-azimuth" have been replaced by "dE," "dN," "dH," and "grid azimuth," respectively. New computation forms, incorporating these terms, have been prepared.

◖ Deflection angles: The use of deflection angles is not emphasized in survey teaching; instead, emphasis is placed on measuring of horizontal angles.

◖ Computation of distance from coordinates: Either leg of the triangle may be used in computing distance from coordinates; however, more accurate results are obtained if the longer leg is used.

Survey in Meters

Survey operations now require that all distances, both horizontal and vertical, be measured in meters. Instruction at TAS reflects this change in survey technique which has been made possible by the authorization of the 30-meter tape as T/O&E equipment.

This procedure eliminates the need for conversion factors in the computation of coordinates. Traverse computations for altitude are similarly affected.

Even where the map in use is contoured in feet, vertical control is still carried in meters and then converted to yards in one operation at FDC prior to the time of plotting.

All new maps produced by the Army Map Service since late in 1951 give the contour interval in meters. With such maps, starting control in meters can be obtained for survey purposes; the meter index on the graphical site table (GST) is then used in determining site.

Famous Artillery Quotations

The capabilities, value, and quality of field artillery are being pointed up in a new and novel way at TAS, through the use of famous quotations on the subject of artillery.

A program which recognizes the value of tradition as an important stimulus to pride and *esprit*—a collection of striking "artillery quotes" is now being assembled. Those with outstanding clarity, accuracy, feeling, and sincerity are selected for display throughout The School. Individual quotations are attractively prepared (either by silk-screening or printing) on cards and distributed to the various offices and classrooms at TAS.

A limited selection is distributed to USAR Schools and Field Artillery ROTC units.

Fittingly enough, the initial distribution included *The Mission of the Field Artillery,* written by Major General A. M. Harper, former Commanding General of The Artillery Center, now retired. His exemplary summation is quoted herewith:

"The Field Artillery accepts with pride its mission as the primary supporting arm to the Infantry and Armor. It operates zealously to maintain its establish reputation as the greatest killer on the battlefield, whether by conventional projectile, atomic projectile, free rocket, or guided missile. It executes its mission with an *esprit* that widely recognized as the Spirit of the Fie Artillery."

This will be a continuing project. Ar one who wishes to send in a quotati (including, whenever possible, the sou and date) is encouraged to do so. Send to: The Publications Editor, Department P&NRT, The Artillery School, Fort S Okla.

Special Associate C&GSC Cours

Four special associate courses of t Command and General Staff College w be offered at Fort Sill this spring for offic of the Army Reserve and National Gua Each course will last for two weeks. T first will commence late in February; t fourth and final course terminates in m April.

As in past years, the division level struction, consisting of three success courses or phases, is being offered. T year, however, marks the first time th "Phase I (Advanced)" will be presen here.

"Phase I (Advanced)," geared at cor level, includes instruction on communi tion zones and logistical commands. P requisites for attendance: Students m have completed all phases of division le instruction; additionally, they must h completed 50 hours of extension cou work on the corps and the operation p cedures of a field army.

The division level courses have b taught at Fort Sill annually for the p several years; their purpose is to train cers in division level staff duties.

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

New Parachute

The T-10 parachute, the replacement the T-7A model, is now in use at TIS. T new model is designed to provide a smo er landing for airborne troops. In addi to reducing the initial opening shock, canopy of the T-10, which is 35 feet ac at the widest point, eliminates much e scent oscillation by holding air for a lo period than the older models.

New Deputy CG

Brig. Gen. Aubrey S. Newman bec Deputy Commanding General of The fantry Center in October. This is a position recently authorized for The fantry Center. General Newman came f Fort Bragg, where he had been assis commander of the 82d Airborne Divis His new duties at Fort Benning will sist primarily of the administrative logistical operation of The Infantry Ce in support of The Infantry School.

LIBRARY

New Armored Boot


Science Service reports that a new boot protect servicemen from small anti-ersonnel land mines as well as from very old weather is under development by the Navy.

The boot has a vapor layer around the oot to protect it against extreme cold. The ottom part of the vapor layer, just under e outer sole, is made of a plastic armor at absorbs a lot of energy and is fragment-sistant. This layer is a new plastic, either fiber glass nor nylon, made for the avy by the U.S. Rubber Company. The avy christened it dynasorb.

Above the white plastic layer is a layer of een pressure, or blast, resistant material of nother plastic that is full of nitrogen-filled ubbles. This looks like foam rubber, but nlike foam rubber, the bubbles or cells are ot continuous. Under blast pressure, each these separate cells may expand like a alloon, break and collapse. But since each ll is separate from others in its layer, the lls do not all balloon and collapse to-ther.

This experimental boot that protects ainst small mines and cold weather eighs three and three-fourths pounds. he Navy is working now to produce a hter as well as better one.

Meanwhile, the special armored sole can strapped, like a skate, to the regular mmer field boot, for use in warm weather hen the temperature insulating feature is t needed.



New Jet Design

one Jet for AAA Gunners

Cutaway view *(above)* of Fairchild's J-44 rbojet shows a new concept in jet engine sign. Currently in production for target one and missile applications, the jet pro-les more power in ratio to weight and mpactness than ever before attained. In e 1000-pounds thrust-power class and ighing 300 pounds, the engine is 72 hes in length and 22 inches in diameter.

Jet Transport Designed

The Fairchild Aircraft Division has unveiled plans for a new high-speed commercial jet transport, the M-186 twin-engine jet liner and cargo carrier (artist's conception shown below). Another design, currently of a classified nature, is for a turboprop military aircraft planned for operation from unimproved fields.


Designed as a high-wing transport built around what Fairchild calls a "cusp" wing, the M-186 will be powered with two Wright J-67 engines which will enable it to cruise at 570 miles per hour (495 knots). Thrust of this type of engine is estimated at 12,000 pounds minimum.



Fairchild's Jet Transport

The plane will normally carry a crew of three and 44 passengers, with provisions for navigator and radio operator. High-density type of seating employed in air coach operations would permit accommodation of up to 64 passengers.

According to estimated performance characteristics, the M-186 will take off at 75,000 pounds within 2600 feet over a 50-foot obstacle and land in 2500 feet, using brakes alone.



Cutaway of "Starfire"

Cutaway *(above)* of the all-rocket-armed Lockheed F-94C Starfire shows some of the vital parts of this jet interceptor. The 600-mph-plus Starfire is armed with four dozen 2.75-inch rockets. The rocket tubes can be seen in the nose and wing pods. Almost entirely automatic, the Starfire can track and shoot down a target its two-man crew may never see, except as a pip on a radar scope. It packs more than 1200 pounds of electronic equipment.

Portable Refrigerated Boxes

Refrigerated boxes, designed to be knocked down into sections so they can be moved easily and reassembled as the occasion demands, are now available. The boxes measure 12 x 18 x 8 feet, and have a storage capacity of approximately 1100 cu ft. All units are self-contained with the machinery in an insulated section of the top of the box. The first boxes have been exported for use of the Chilean Army.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

The Month's Books

The Men of the Army of the Potomac ● The Future of Europe

Top-Notch Example of Military Book Publishing

END OF A SUPERB TRILOGY

A STILLNESS AT APPOMATTOX. By Bruce Catton. Doubleday & Company, Inc. 438 Pages; Index; $5.00.

Bruce Catton's final volume of his superb trilogy on the Army of the Potomac is proof that Ulysses S. Grant practiced a Churchillian theory which appears in Sir Winston's *Triumph and Tragedy:* "It is nearly always a sound policy to engage the largest number of the enemy as closely and continuously as possible, at the earliest moment and for the longest time." Nearly ninety years before Churchill penned those words, Grant was establishing a precedent for this "sound policy" in the ordeal by fire of his forces in Virginia. Mr. Catton reminds us of Grant's views on this subject. The Army had finally broken through at Petersburg. Richmond fell at last. But there was no surcease, there was no discharge in that war, and this is Mr. Catton's way of telling about the policy that guided the Army of the Potomac: "In refusing to allow the army to relax and celebrate Grant was simply following common sense. From his viewpoint he had not actually won anything yet. From the moment when he headed down to the Rapidan fords, eleven months and many thousands of lives ago, he had had just one idea in mind: to destroy Lee's army. Now Richmond had fallen, and so had Petersburg, but Lee's army still lived and if it was to be destroyed it must first be caught. It would never be caught by pursuers who let days or hours go to waste; not that army, led by that general. So the Army of the Potomac would keep moving, and if there was to be a celebration it could come later."

The foregoing is a sample of Mr. Catton's style. It is far removed from the stodgy and the ponderous and the pedestrian style of so much military history. But it is not alone the style that gives a quality of excitement and urgency to the book, that distinguishes it from many of its predecessors. There is additionally the Catton method of writing the history of the Army of the Potomac already well known from his earlier volumes. Mr. Catton prefers to tell the story in terms of the men in the ranks as well as from the point of view of the generals from Grant downward. These men are mostly nameless, but the spirit and the comments gleaned from their letters and diaries, many unpublished, help to furnish an atmosphere of realism and human interest that makes this Army a living thing in its progress from the Wilderness to the cease fire at Appomattox.

Military history can be written in a score of ways. It can emphasize grand or political strategy, it can dwell on training and weapons, or it can assume that organization is the most important element in war. Some civil war histories are so full of tactical details of no conceivable interest today except for the military antiquarian, that you can't see the forest for the trees. Or you can write military history to show some of the eternal fundamentals of war. And that is why I find Mr. Catton's three volumes, on the Virginia campaigns not only of great interest, but of undoubted value to the American soldier today.

What sort of men were produced by the social systems of North and South? Mr. Catton tells us. What affected the morale of these men in the Army of the Potomac and in Lee's forces? What qualities of leadership were needed to counteract fatigue and hunger and defeat? What was the psychology of the American soldier in 1864? Mr. Catton answers these questions. He tells us enough of the strategy involved. He keeps tactical details to a minimum, but he doesn't lose sight of the changes in tactics as weapons increased their rate of fire, and as the efficacy of field fortification made frontal attack in 1864 suicidal.

This is not a survey of the technical aspect of war. It does not attempt to derive abstract truths from this laboratory of warfare. But it does give a memorable picture of the travail of the Army of the Potomac as it fought the well known series of battles from the Wilderness to final victory less than a year later.

Mr. Catton has used primary sources whenever possible, and a bibliography and voluminous notes are evidence of his efforts to report this part of the Civil War accurately and authoritatively. It is possible to quibble about minutiae, but too often the sources give conflicting information and the historian must use his judgment in recording events. I gladly accept Mr. Catton's interpretations of these debatable episodes, realizing that the last word can never be said, but that there is little chance they can ever be described more clearly and more brilliantly.—Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

LINES FROM A NEW BOOK

THEME OF THE VOLUME

How the Great Democracies
Triumphed,
and so
Were able to Resume
the Follies
Which Had so Nearly
Cost Them Their
Life

Sir Winston Churchill
Triumph and Tragedy

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

EUROPE OUT OF THE ASHES

FIRE IN THE ASHES: Europe in Mid-Century. By Theodore H. White. William Sloane Associates. 1953. 405 Pages; Index; $5.00.

Successive international crises in recent years must have convinced the American soldier by now that he is an indispensable arm of American diplomacy. Too often he has seen diplomacy fail because power was wanting. Not often enough he has observed diplomacy succeed when it was backed by power. He has also seen that in the contracting world of the twentieth century our generals needed to be diplomats and statesmen as well as strategists and tacticians. Some knowledge of international relations is clearly essential equipment for actual and prospective military leaders. Consequently, a vivid and exciting book that explains our diplomatic-military partnership in Europe, and that describes the social and economic background of the European nations where our armed forces are stationed should be welcome reading for our professional soldiers.

Such a book is Mr. White's survey of Europe in mid-century. It examines the weaknesses of the friendly nations in Europe; it analyzes the Communist threat and the effect of American policy in rebuilding Europe to meet this threat. It shows that a positive policy became necessary when in 1947 it was clear that "the United States found itself not in a combination of power but in an association of decay that made real social or political balance with the Russians possible until it was corrected." For this reason, the United States embarked on its role of leader of the Atlantic Alliance designed to thwart further Communist expansion.

Theodore H. White writes in the best tradition of American journalism. He is a graduate of Harvard, 1938, who has had fifteen years abroad as foreign correspondent. He was co-author of *Thunder Out of China.* In 1948 he began his personal observations in Europe of the effect of the

LIBRARY

arshall Plan, of our military forces there, d of American policy in general. His ok is notable for clear writing, historical spective, and for its assessment of values our foreign policy in Europe.

Europe is dominated by the Big Three England, France and Germany—and their ent past and probable future are of para- unt importance. To a microscopic ex- ination of these three countries Mr. hite devotes nearly half his book. The ples of these countries are closely scruti- ed for their social institutions and atti- les and for their reactions to the United tes and Communism. The question of European Army, NATO and SHAPE examined in detail. This list of con- ts is not an alluring catalog and does nt justice to a book that is intensely in- sting and readable.

Mr. White is eminently successful in de- bing Communist infiltration in Europe l in analyzing Stalin and the Soviet icy in that area. His evaluation of TO, European Union, and of potential rman rearmament shows how powerful osition the Atlantic Alliance has gained the last five years. To maintain and in- ase this strength is no easy matter, and . White's suggestions to that end should examined with great care.—Brig. Gen. NALD Armstrong.

EXCELLENT MILITARY BOOK

JCASIAN BATTLEFIELDS. A History of the Wars On the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-921. W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff. Cambridge University Press, 1953. 614 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $14.00.

This volume by a British and a Tsarist cer is a work of love as well as of com- ence. It is the result of many years of nstaking research, extensive travel and tematic interviewing. Practically all ilable sources in the Russian, Turkish l Western languages were used to good vantage.

The book narrates the Russian conquest the Caucasus, operations in the Cauca- n theater during the Crimean war, the ucasian campaign of 1877-1878, the bat- on the Caucasian front during World r I, and finally the various post-revolu- n operations which ended with the con- dation of Soviet rule in 1921. In addi- n, the volume familiarizes the reader h the military geography of the Cau- us and teaches him a great deal about rations which, in difficult terrain, are dertaken with poor logistical facilities. ose interested in guerrilla warfare will d the work particularly rewarding, yet ucasian military history also is instructive ut large-scale land and combined land- operations. In all this the strategic nificance of the Caucasus becomes crys- clear.

The authors may not be overly sophisti- ed in matters of world politics and revo- ion, nor do they pay too much attention those non-military aspects of war to ich modern literature is giving a per- s disproportionate place. Instead they stick to military operations in the conventional sense and thus produce military history at its best.

The professional American reader must gaze at this imposing book with amazement and envy; amazement at the realization that in our era there still should be living military historians who do not select a best-seller subject and who do not attempt to write on the level of adolescents, but who are sincerely devoted to military problems as such; and envy that it is possible in a country of Western civilization to publish a technical military book which can be of interest "only" to the specialist but which nevertheless is illustrated with 39 excellent maps and eight full-page photographs. Thus, there are still university presses which give their support to military science, although in doing so they hardly will be able to "break even." Congratulations to Cambridge University Press! I am just a bit perturbed by the thought that it probably would have been impossible to publish this volume in the United States.—Stefan T. Possony.

REVIEW OF BRITISH MILITARY MIGHT

BRASSEY'S ANNUAL, 1953. Edited by Rear Admiral H. G. Thursfield. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1953. 512 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $9.50.

The 1953 *Brassey* is divided almost equally into four parts: a catch-all of general subjects and surveys; a navy, an army and an air section; and a reference section.

The first section runs down a general line of outstanding topics and questions. General Martin, military correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph,* in surveying "Commonwealth Strategy," points out that the British services have for fourteen years been grievously overstrained in a variety of hot and cold wars; that a stopping point must be found, and yet that "our salvation and that of the free world depends absolutely on our maintaining a solid front with the United States—only if we cooperate militarily with the United States can we expect the United States to cooperate economically with us." The solution to the dilemma of what "must" be done as balanced against "what we have to do with" seems, in General Martin's opinion, to be to include Germany in NATO and bury "that organisational nightmare, the E.D.C."

In a very reasoned chapter on "Lightning Victory," J. M. Spaight, an airpower authority if there ever was one, cautions against being lured by the will-o'-the-wisp of a lightning victory in the next war.

The chapters mentioned in this review touch only some of the high spots in this year's *Brassey*. The volume as a whole, both generally and specifically, is of interest and use to American readers. The integration of the NATO nations makes all the larger defense problems confronting the British forces of equal interest to all NATO members.

It is difficult to close a review of *Brassey's Annual* without wondering why the American services can't produce an equivalent.

NEW TITLES OF NOTE

TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY
By Winston Churchill $6.00

COMMAND MISSIONS
By Lt. Gen. Lucien K. Truscott . $7.50

U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES
By Dr. Louis Morton $5.25

CROSS-CHANNEL ATTACK
(Back in Print—Revised) $6.75

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By Raymond L. Garthoff $7.50

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By Bruce Catton $5.00

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By Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall, $5.00

ATOMIC WEAPONS IN LAND COMBAT
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THE STORY OF THE U.S. CAVALRY
By Gen. John K. Herr and Edward S. Wallace $6.00

CAUCASIAN BATTLEFIELDS
By W. E. D. Allen & Paul Muratoff $14.00

HOW TO BE A CONSISTENT WINNER AT MOST POPULAR CARD GAMES
By John R. Crawford $2.95

HISTORY OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
By Walter Goerlitz $7.50

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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Couldn't the Association of the U.S. Army, the Air Force Association, the U. S. Naval Institute, the Marine Corps Association cooperate on such a venture?—R.G.M.

FLANK ATTACK ON GENERAL MARSHALL

THE YALTA BETRAYAL. By Felix Wittmer. Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1953. 136 Pages; Index; $1.25.

Although Franklin D. Roosevelt is the main object of Mr. Wittmer's attack in this book, a considerable part of his barrage falls on the war-time Chief of Staff of the Army. It is tragic as well as ironic that this book should have appeared in the same month that General George C. Marshall received the Nobel Peace Prize and in a month when both Mr. Truman and Mr. Eisenhower felt obliged to protest against the repeated charge that he "was a front man for traitors."

The main theme of Mr. Wittmer's book is that Roosevelt was a soft touch for communists. This is an old story. The new slant is that the strategy of a direct cross-Channel attack was Marshall's principal contribution to the help-Stalin program. Few readers of this magazine can ever be convinced that the man whom President Eisenhower called "one of the real public servants of our times" was as stupid or servile as Mr. Wittmer would have us believe.

The way in which Mr. Wittmer deals with General Marshall's career and actions shows that he is not a reliable reporter of events, to say nothing about interpreting them. Writing of the appointment of Marshall as Chief of Staff in 1939, Mr. Wittmer says: "It was in 1939 that Roosevelt made a decision which, for a considerable period of time, was to turn the tables of history in favor of the Communist World Revolution. Over the heads of twenty major generals and fourteen senior brigadiers, George Catlett Marshall was made Chief of Staff. Six years previously, Marshall's nomination to the rank of general, upon the adverse routine report of the Inspector General, had been blocked by the champion of anti-Communism, General Douglas MacArthur . . ." The implications of these strange sentences are fantastic. The first is that the Inspector General made an "adverse routine report" on an individual in connection with a promotion. The second is that whatever action General MacArthur took as Chief of Staff in 1933 on Marshall's nomination as a brigadier had something to do with the issue of Communism.

A second bit of "history" which will be new to readers of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL concerns the "anti-communist" character of TORCH, the invasion of North Africa. This, Mr. Wittmer points out, was a diversion from Marshall's pro-Soviet strategy of a cross-Channel attack, and although he is elsewhere busy in showing that Mr. Roosevelt was a complete dupe to Stalin, in this instance he holds that the President "demonstrated that he still had independence of judgment left to decide against the suicidal . . . operation that Marshall and Stalin urged." Then, he says, "soon afterwards, Admiral Leahy, a patriot with common sense, was made chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, at least nominally, became Marshall's superior." Here the implication is that after his appointment, Admiral Leahy's common sense and patriotism restrained Marshall's impulses to conduct America's war in ways favoring the Kremlin. The author does not seem to know, or if he does, he makes no mention of the fact, that it was at Marshall's repeated suggestion that Roosevelt appointed Leahy.

Admiral Leahy's opinion of Marshall's common sense, patriotism, and strategic gifts are reflected on many pages of his memoirs. Mr. Wittmer does not quote any of these passages. His technique of distortion favors quoting reputable sources such as Leahy, Stimson, Sherwood, Deane, and Clark to document unimportant or noncontroversial matters, then, when he really wants to put over a fast one, he drags out a dubious group of "sources" such as John T. Flynn's *The Roosevelt Myth* (Devin-Adair), cited six times; Major Hamilton A. Long's *America's Tragedy Today* (Post Printing Company), cited nine times; and Alfred Kohlberg's *Stupidity, Treason, or Irrationality* (First Congregational Church, Los Angeles, California), cited twice. Since there are only 103 citations in the book, this will give the reader an idea of the usefulness of these "sources."

These are times of extreme political bitterness, but the nation is indeed in mortal peril if soldiers who have served their country with singular patriotism and selflessness are made the objectives of attacks of this nature.—H. A. DEWEERD.

USEFUL STUDY OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT

HOW RUSSIA IS RULED. By Merle Fainsod. Harvard University Press, 1953. 575 Pages; Index; $7.50.

This imposing volume is the most comprehensive and useful study of the government of Soviet Russia yet to appear in print. Dr. Fainsod discusses the social and political causes of the Russian revolution, the pre-revolutionary history of Bolshevism, the communist seizure of power and the consolidation of Soviet rule. He analyses the structure of the communist dictatorship, the role and organization of the Communist Party apparatus, the indoctrination of Russian youth, the party command setup, and the age, professional and social composition of the party. Other chapters are devoted to the various Soviet constitutions and to the glaring contradictions between these constitutions and Soviet realities; to Soviet bureaucracy; to controls and tensions in Soviet factories and agriculture; and to the Soviet armed forces. A particularly instructive chapter is devoted to terror as a system of power.

Dr. Fainsod has mastered the relevant printed sources and he makes full use of an impressive documentation. In addition, he has drawn extensively on the personal experiences of Russian expatriates. The skill with which he has combined the historical with complementary sociological and statistical methods is impressive. His objectivity is in the best academic tradition and is without a hint of whitewashing or wishful thinking. The seamy side of the communist dictatorship—which so often has been ignored in pseudo-scientific writings—is given its due weight, as indeed no significant factor has been overlooked. *How Russia is Ruled* undoubtedly will become the standard work on the subject.

This, of course, does not mean that the book is beyond criticism. His chapters on the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary history of Bolshevism show little understanding of Lenin's operational practices and fail to show the relations between Germany and the Russian revolutionaries. The chapter on the Russian armed forces is neither up to date nor illuminating. Surely in this day and age, it would have been necessary to pay some attention to the Soviet air force and submarine fleet. There would have been a need to describe the Soviet "rule" over the scientific community. The fact that the Soviet government is not only the ruler of Russia but also controls a world-wide revolutionary movement must have some bearing on Soviet governmental practices, but it is ignored. Perhaps the greatest omission is the failure to analyse the perplexing nationality problem systematically. —STEFAN T. POSSONY.

WITNESS TO THE 1917 REVOLUTION

IN THE WORKSHOP OF THE REVOLUTION. By I. N. Steinberg. Rinehart & Co., 1953. 307 Pages; Index; $4.00.

The author of this book served between December 1917 and March 1918 as commissar of justice in the Russian government. He is the only survivor of Lenin's revolutionary cabinet. Mr. Steinberg is not a Bolshevik but a member of the left wing of the Social Revolutionary Party, the only Russian party which was ever blind enough to enter into a coalition with the Bolsheviks. Steinberg and his comrades left the government in protest against Bolshevik terror and Lenin's signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. Their political careers ended in prison, yet to the very end the author and his group stood ready to defend the "revolution." To this day, the author seems to think that 1917 marked a milestone in the history of human progress.

The book presents some materials about the activities, hopes and disappointments of the left social revolutionaries. It also recounts some of the incidents of early Bolshevik terror. It might have been expected that Steinberg would present new information about the events of 1918. For example, it would have been useful if he had shed additional light on the reasons why the Soviets signed the Brest-Litovsk treaty. Unfortunately there is very little in the book which is of real interest. The book suggests that the author is a confused man who knows that the revolution has gone bankrupt but who clearly does not understand why this was inevitable. STEFAN T. POSSONY.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

E ARAB WORLD: Past, Present, and uture. By Nejla Izzeddin. Henry Regery Company, 1953. 412 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.50. The history of a people who occupy one of the most itally strategic regions of the world.

E PISTOL SHOOTER'S BOOK: A Modern Encyclopedia. By Lt. Col. Charles Askins. The Stackpole Company, 1953. 347 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.00. The pistol shooter's bible, overing every phase of the subject, by n authority and expert.

YOND CONTAINMENT. By William Henry Chamberlin. Henry Regery Company, 1953. 406 Pages; Index; 5.00. The story of the cold war; how it egan, why it was unavoidable, how it an be won.

LAND: White Eagle On A Red Field. y Samuel L. Sharp. Harvard University Press, 1953. 338 Pages; Index; 5.00. A review of ten centuries of olish history that explains the recurence of tragic complications in the potical life of a country without natural rontiers.

LING UNLIMITED. By Lloyd Mors and Kendall Smith. The Macmillan ompany, 1953. 417 Pages; Illustrated; ndex; $6.50. The story of American viation from Kitty Hawk to supersonics.

E ORIGINS OF SOVIET-AMERIAN DIPLOMACY. By Robert Paul rowder. Princeton University Press, 953. 256 Pages; Index; $5.00. A narative account of the events which led to ne recognition of the USSR by the ISA in 1933.

E WORLD BENEATH THE SEA. y Otis Barton. Thomas Y. Crowell ompany, 1953. 246 Pages; Illustrated; 3.50. The story of the deepest dive er made by man—4,500 feet.

MATE, VEGETATION & MAN. By eonard Hadlow. Philosophical Library, 953. 288 Pages; Illustrated; Index; 4.75. A textbook on the influence of imate upon life on the earth—plant, nimal, and human.

RCED HEARTS AND TRUE LOVE. y Hanns Ebensten. Derek Verschoyle, 953. 96 Pages; Illustrated; $3.00. An lustrated history of the origin and delopment of European tattooing and a rvey of its present state.

S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: The uartermaster Corps: Organization, Supy and Services, Volume I. By Dr. Erna isch. Office of the Chief of Military listory, Department of the Army. 418 ages; Illustrated; Index; $3.25.

RCHING BANDS: How to Organize id Develop Them. By Kenneth Hjelervik and Richard C. Berg. A. S. arnes and Company. 301 Pages; Illusated; Index; $3.75.

HABILITATION OF THE PHYSIALLY HANDICAPPED, revised edion. By Henry H. Kessler. Columbia niversity Press. 275 Pages; Index; 4.00.



Pass In Review

With the widely divergent reading tastes of our editorial staff, it is not often that we find complete unanimity of opinion on any one book. However, I have gotten more unsolicited commendations for *Russian Assignment* ($5.75) by Vice Admiral Leslie C. Stevens than any book in recent months. Admiral Stevens spent two years as our Naval Attaché in Moscow and few observers of the Soviet scene have used their tours as well. He obviously has a keen and agile mind and an immense curiosity for background and detail.

Lunching with two distinguished retired officers the other day, I was impressed by their discussion about what the new law set up in the way of survivors' benefits for the kin of service personnel. Until then, I hadn't been aware that there was much confusion on the subject. A few days later I received from Captain R. L. Walter a paper-bound pamphlet he had prepared entitled, *How Your Retirement Pay Can Provide Survivors' Benefits* ($1.00), which is a study of the Uniformed Services Contingency Option Act of 1953 and describes its ramifications in useful detail. I am recommending it to my luncheon companions.

Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott is the latest of the high-ranking officers to get his memoirs into print. His book *Command Missions* ($7.50) is due for publication late this month, and after reading the galley proofs, our judgment is that the book will attract considerable attention. We'll have a full review of the book in an early issue.

True adventure stories these days usually appear somewhat pale beside the prolific efforts of our science-fictioneers. However, Leonard Clark, an explorer who calls San Francisco home, has just published an account of his hair-raising experiences in the Peruvian jungle that will keep the most ardent adventure fan on pins and needles. In *The Rivers Ran East* Clark tells of his six months' trek through tortuous jungle of the Gran Pajonal, east of the Peruvian Andes, where he was searching for hidden treasure among the lost Seven Cities of Cibola.

There are two current items of interest concerning the monumental history of the U.S. Army in World War II being published by the Chief of Military History. A new volume, *The Fall of the Philippines* ($5.25), by Dr. Louis Morton, makes its appearance this month and the popular *Cross-Channel Attack* ($6.75) which has been out of print is again available with a revised insert.

Service personnel in particular should be interested in the new *Columbia-Viking Desk Encyclopedia* ($7.95; thumb-indexed $8.95) edited by William Bridgewater. This 1100-page volume is a condensation of the highly popular one-volume *Columbia Encyclopedia* which has been out for several years. The stated purpose of the book is to provide "basic essential information in all fields of knowledge"—and the mission has been accomplished admirably. Here's a chance to get a modern encyclopedia that is both inexpensive moneywise and economical from the size and weight standpoint.

Somewhere in our editor's wastebasket lie a few lines we devoted a while back to a book we enjoyed thoroughly and should recommend. I refer to Charles A. Lindbergh's *The Spirit of St. Louis* ($5.00). Everyone recognizes that the story of Lindbergh's solo flight across the Atlantic in the single-engined monoplane *Spirit of St. Louis* is indeed story material of the first caliber. However, what impressed me most in reading this book was the fine style in which it is written. It holds the reader's attention.—R.F.C.

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
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
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
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ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

Purposes and Objectives of the Association Cove
Association Affairs

DEPARTMENTS

The Month's Mail 6
Next Month's Journal 8
The Month's Pictures 10
Front and Center 12
The Month's Reading
The Month's Comment
The Word from the Schools
The Month's Books

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The Month's Mail

CBR Training

To the Editors:

Lt. Colonel Eben F. Swift's article "Division Objective" [October issue] is very interesting and presents the important point that first things must come first in our training. However, I take exception to his classing CBR warfare in the "nice to know" ring.

Chemical warfare is such a potentially powerful field that any commander who did not insure that his men could operate under these conditions would be guilty of criminal negligence. Just the fact that about one-third of all casualties among U.S. troops in World War I were from chemical agents, although the percentage of gas-shell fire was far below this, is dramatic indication of this fact. And chemical warfare has advanced far since then. Rapidly acting chemical agents could cause a collapse of our lines in contact with the enemy if our troops are not properly trained.

This training must be more than the ability ". . . to put on and take off his gas mask . . .". Our soldier must be able to *accomplish his mission* under CBR conditions. This means he must have training and experience in performing his mission under these conditions. . . . When your soldier is firing his weapon, individual or crew served, subject him to a chemical attack, and have him complete his mission. When he is on a unit problem of any type, let him encounter chemical agents and see if he can accomplish his mission. . . .

. . . By proper integration of CBR training, the necessity of allotting special training hours to CBR warfare can be greatly reduced. This means that "required" hours, which are the bane of the unit commander, can be reduced. The only extra time and work required will fall on the shoulders of the Chemical Corps officers and noncommissioned officers.

I'll admit that until CBR warfare is actually used, our training should be at the minimum which will insure that we do not suffer a military catastrophe, but we must not reduce it beyond that point. Just because chemical warfare has been used only sporadically since World War I does not mean that when the chips are down and nations are in a death struggle a weapon of this potential will be ignored.

COL. J. H. ROTHSCHILD
Office of the Chemical Officer
Hq, U.S. Army Forces, Far East
APO 343.c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif.

Efficiency Reports

To the Editors:

Regarding Major General Bergin's article, "The New Officer Efficiency Report" in the October issue:

That new report fails to take into consideration several important items. One which has been talked about in the Army for many years is what the enlisted men think of the officer. The other has to do with adverse comments by the rater.

We have one very bad basic fault in America: jealousy. Many a fine officer has been ruined by the adverse ratings of a jealous commander or rater. For instance, I know of one commander who was unfit to be an officer because he was the most unscrupulous person I ever knew. He detested anyone who was honest or efficient.

Good noncoms have been known to be denied commissions because someone could block them; the someone being either a higher noncom or a warrant officer.

Major General Bergin's report is fine. But to make efficiency reports better there must be several additions. One is from people serving under the rated officer. I believe that selected enlisted men should be trained to rate officers from informal conversations they hold with a percentage of those serving under the officer being rated. Another is to obtain a rating of the rating officer: his attitude toward others, especially his fairness. The report might even contain an additional entry like this: "In event of any adverse comment, do you hold any personal animus toward this officer?"

The only one who could give an accurate rating of any of us is God, and He has certainly put a big challenge in our hands in rating others.

MAJ. LEON C. W. KETTRING
SigC-USAR
1118 Clymena Drive
Toledo 12, O.

Stamp of Approval

To the Editors:

I was greatly impressed with the article "The Aviation Company: To Be or Not To Be?" in the December issue. This article clearly reflects growth and understanding of the principles of employment of aircraft and the inherent problems of maintenance. For flexibility of employment and efficie

ASSOCIATION AFFAIRS

AT the regular quarterly meeting on 14 December 1953, the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army elected Colonel Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR, Secretary-General Manager of the Association for a term ending on 30 June 1954. Colonel Symons had been acting secretary and general manager since the death of Colonel Joseph I. Greene on 25 June 1953.

Colonel Symons will continue the present management of the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL with himself as publisher, John B. Spore as editor and Colonel Robert F. Cocklin, Arty-NGUS, as Business Manager. Colonel Cocklin is also the Assistant Secretary of AUSA.

The Council adopted a Statement of Purposes and Objectives of the Association which had been prepared by a committee headed by Major General George C. Stewart, USA. The statement appears on the inside front cover of this issue.

The Council reviewed the current financial affairs of the Association and magazine with Colonel Symons and his staff and approved the measures that were being taken to strengthen the Association. It approved the staff's plans for a vigorous campaign to increase the circulation of the magazine.

The Council also discussed the editorial policies the magazine should follow to carry out the newly adopted Statement of Objectives.

MAJ. GEN. ROBERT N. YOUNG was elected Vice President of the Association, replacing General John E. Hull, who resigned when he left Washington to go to Tokyo.

New members elected to fill vacancies on the Executive Council are: Lieutenant General Williston B. Palmer, Major General James C. Fry, Major General Arthur G. Trudeau, Colonel Dennis M. Moore and Lieutenant Colonel Francis X. Bradley.

LIBRARY

ilization of equipment and personnel the option of the aviation company is indi-ed.

It is encouraging to note that those prin-ples, long recognized by the USAF and parent organizations, still apply and the ution is logically that employed by the SAF in Tactical Air Command's support-g field forces.

Lt. Col. "Blow up your Commander" bert B. Rigg will always have trouble h "metal crystallization" when dealing h a metal in a solid state.

LT. COL. WILLIAM H. MCGUIRE
USAF

ngley Air Force Base, Va.

rise

the Editors:

Having been enrolled in the advance rse SigC ROTC I find it doubly neces-y to renew my subscription to your gazine. I can find only the highest ise for your magazine . . . Being a stu-nt, I realize there is no actual substitute military experience. Armchair general-p is an easy attitude to fall into. From limited observations I've been able to ke both at Worcester Tech and at The adel, it is my belief that the Army offi-corps like that of the other services is tivated by ifice above and beyond that of any other fessional group I know of. That a career he Army is difficult and unrewarding in materialistic sense is sometimes difficult ace up to when a person such as myself pares it with civilian professional pur-s.

t is undeniable that the Army is a sys-. . . To a person contemplating a itary career, this might very well be the ke or break of it—specifically whether not he can understand the system, ad-to it and submerge his personal ambi-s to the task of doing his assignment to best of his ability. . . .

ROBERT B. BRODIE

rcester, Mass.

a Soldier

the Editors:

Back in the occupation days of 1946, a tenant colonel wrote a piece in Pacific *s and Stripes* in which he lamented the of courtesy, pride in uniform and dis-ine among enlisted men he encoun-d. There was something the matter them, he said. They weren't the same iers their older brothers had been in rld War II.

private first class replied a few days r. The teen-age soldiers of 1946, the wrote, were the same raw material of ch American armies had been built for erations. If they weren't turning into kind of soldiers their brothers and ers had been, then their leaders, in-cluding the lieutenant colonel, had better look to their business. They, and they alone, were responsible for the standards of discipline.

Something of this "put your own house in order first" philosophy applies, I think, to the slump in service morale deplored so much of late in service publications and in the newspapers.

Without a doubt, commissaries, housing, dependent care and other so-called "fringe benefits" play a big part in making the service a desirable career, and can be provided only by an awakened public and by Congress. But the major part, I think, in this work of building *esprit de corps* can be done by we who are the service.

Neither Congress nor the public had a thing to do with taking the heart and the spirit out of our units. Certain unfortunate policies and "tools of management" did that. Those machine-age monsters were not forced on the service. They were adopted.

A military unit is not a corporation. It is a thing of flesh and blood, and if it is torn to pieces every three months it will never grow into maturity, not in a million years. Only the service itself can bring this condition to an end.

And what about the public's attitude toward the man in uniform? The PFC mentioned earlier claimed that the officer who had the ability to command respect would get it. So it is in our relations with the public. The good man has ever won the respect of his fellows, of all who themselves were basically good.

Granted, our sins are no worse than those of our brethren in mufti. However, we lay claim, and rightly so, to a nobility of purpose that is over and above the normal pursuits of men.

If this be so, then let us present ourselves as befits our ideals and our traditions.

When we have once again made our units living organisms rather than machines, when we have demonstrated by outstanding example that we are truly officers and gentlemen, soldiers and guardians of the truth and the good, then, I think, the problem of morale, of esprit, and the concurrent problem of public esteem, shall have passed into oblivion.

LT. WILLIAM V. KENNEDY
ANGUS
Limestone Air Force Base
Limestone, Maine

CCC Veterans

To the Editor:

A newborn Civilian Conservation Corps veterans association has been organized. Former Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota is the president, and Mr. Daniel W. Bell, former Under Secretary of the Treasury, is treasurer.

Former members of the CCC and Army officers and men who served with the Corps are invited to join. The organization is pledged to promote conservation of human resources and natural resources and com-



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Next Month's Journal

WE know of no segment of the American public that has a better chance of being truly informed of the problems of national defense than the readers of the two New York morning newspapers: *The Times* and *The Herald Tribune*. It is Mr. Hanson Baldwin, no stranger to the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, who keeps readers of *The Times* informed, and it is Mr. Walter Millis who performs the similar public service for the reader of *The Herald Tribune*. It is of Mr. Millis we want to speak here, for in next month's JOURNAL he is going to spell out his interpretation of the impact on the Army of the new developments in nuclear weapons. Mr. Millis writes that his analysis is that of a civilian without any special classified knowledge and this turns out to be a virtue. For his article attests that his vision of the forest is not obscured by the trees. It is an immensely heartening and stimulating piece and we are hard put not to succumb to the temptation of quoting some of it here.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN BAKER WHITE, British Army retired, recently sent us an article on the strength and organization of the armies of Communism (Soviet Russia, China and the lesser satellites). Having never heard of Colonel White and not being expert in this field, we had it checked informally by persons whose competency is unquestioned. Their reaction went beyond saying that it was sound and as accurate as such a study could be; it was also enthusiastic. So we will be proud to publish it next month.

FLAME was widely used in Korea and a number of developments and gadgets that went beyond the conventional flame-thrower appeared. Lieutenant Colonel Walter L. Miller, Jr., Chemical Corps, who served in Korea and was partly responsible for some of the developments, will tell you how flame was used during that conflict and what the lessons are for the future.

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


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munity beautification. CCC veterans an others interested in these aims are invite to write to the secretary to have their name placed on the mailing list.

CLARENCE C. CAS
Secretary

Citizens for Conservation, Inc.
1710 Sixteenth St., N.W.
Washington 9, D. C.

120 and 122

To the Editors:

In reference to "On the Hill," by I Jim Kyle and Corporal Richard Smi [January issue], I question their accura in reference to a 122mm mortar. It h been my impression that the enemy in K rea used a 120mm mortar, and that the 122mm weapon was a gun and/or ho itzer.

CAPT. DONALD C. HOLM
USMCR

Arlington, Va.

● Our information supports Capta Holmes. We regret the slip.

Information Wanted

To the Editors:

I am working on a historical proj concerning the Eastern anti-Bolshevist v unteer units in the German Wehrmac during World War II, their fate after t collapse of the Axis and the German oc pation policy in Russia. My book w appear in English and German.

In my difficult research work I am ceiving much assistance from survivi East Europeans and Germans and from perts working in the field concerned several countries, among them the US One of the gaps in the few books and ot publications existing on the above subj are experiences of Eastern volunteers, b in combat and as POWs after that.

It is in this connection that I am tak the liberty of contacting you, hoping y readers may be able and willing to c tribute to the research of this nearly gotten chapter of current history.

Eastern volunteers were in action on fronts of the European Theater of Op tion. In Italy, Americans thought t were Japs; in Normandy Allied offi asked captured German liaison officers h they had managed to "compel them fight." Prisoners brought to camps in U were later handed over to the Russi (like most of the volunteers taken priso in Europe).

A tempting and still partly uncle chapter is the surrender of General Vla C in C of the German-sponsored Rus Liberation Army (ROA) in Czecho vakia April 1945 and his delivery into hands of the Soviets. I am sure there m be American eyewitnesses willing to te on all this.

References can be given if requested could also send a list with concrete detailed questions.

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
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The Month's Pictures



The bearded gentleman is Sir Hubert Wilkins, an expert in the tropical jungle as well as in the frozen north. Here he is in the Canal Zone examining a tropical uniform being tested by the Quartermaster Corps (see "Front and Center," January CFJ). The other gentlemen are, left to right: Robert L. Woodbury, a QM clothing technologist; Captain Denzel Reed, CO of the jungle testing detachment; and the wearer of the experimental uniform Private Warren Krasna.

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It's chow time at the winter training school, Hokkaido, Japan, and Sergeant First Class C. E. Eschbacher and Corporal Joseph Evans stoke the fire before putting the kettle on.



Food was also in the news in Austria when artillerymen of the 510th Field Artillery Battalion and the 11th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion gathered at Kavalier Haus in Salzburg to honor Santa Barbara, the patron saint of all cannoneers. Colonel Richard A. Gordon cuts the cake.



STATE OF THE NATION'S DEFENSES

The National Defense portion of President Eisenhower's State of the Union message to Congress called for a "new program" that "will make and keep America strong in an age of peril"

NCE our hope for all the world is peace, we owe ourselves and the world a candid explanation of the military measures are taking to make that peace secure.

As we enter this new year, our military power continues to ow. This power is for our own defense and to deter aggres- n. We shall not be aggressors, but we and our allies have d will maintain a massive capability to strike back.

Here are some of the considerations in our defense planning:

First, while determined to use atomic power to serve the ıges of peace, we take into full account our great and grow- ; number of nuclear weapons and the most effective means of ng them against an aggressor if they are needed to preserve r freedom. Our defense will be stronger if, under appropri- security safeguards, we share with our allies certain knowl- ge of the tactical use of our nuclear weapons. I urge the ngress to provide the needed authority.

Second, the usefulness of these new weapons creates new re- ionships between men and materials. These new relationships mit economies in the use of men as we build forces suited to r situation in the world today. As will be seen from the dget message on January 21, the air power of our Navy and r Force is receiving heavy emphasis.

Third, our armed forces must regain maximum mobility of ion. Our strategic reserves must be centrally placed and dily deployable to meet sudden aggression against ourselves d our allies.

Fourth, our defense must rest on trained manpower and most economical and mobile use. A professional corps is heart of any security organization. It is cessarily the teacher and leader of those o serve temporarily in the discharge of obligation to help defend the Republic. y alone will not retain in the career serv- of our armed forces the necessary num- s of long-term personnel. I strongly ge, therefore, a more generous use of the er benefits important to service morale. Among these more adequate living quarters and family housing units, d medical care for dependents.



Studies of military manpower have just been completed by National Security Training Commission and a committee ointed by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobiliza- tion. Evident weaknesses exist in the state of readiness and organization of our reserve forces. Measures to correct these weaknesses will be later submitted to the Congress.

Fifth, the ability to convert swiftly from partial to all-out mobilization is imperative to our security. For the first time, mobilization officials know what the requirements are for 1000 major items needed for military uses. These data, now being related to civilian requirements and our supply potential, will show us the gaps in our mobilization base. Thus we shall have more realistic plant-expansion and stockpiling goals. We shall speed their attainment. This Nation is at last to have an up-to-date mobilization base—the foundation of a sound defense program.

Another part of this foundation is, of course, our continental transport system. Some of our vital heavy materials come increasingly from Canada. Indeed our relations with Canada, happily always close, involve more and more the unbreakable ties of strategic interdependence. Both nations now need the St. Lawrence Seaway for security as well as for economic reasons. I urge the Congress promptly to approve our participation in its construction.

Sixth, military and nonmilitary measures for continental defense must be and are being strengthened. In the current fiscal year we are allocating to these purposes an increasing portion of our effort, and in the next fiscal year we shall spend nearly a billion dollars more for them than in 1953.

An indispensable part of our continental security is our civil defense effort. This will succeed only as we have the complete cooperation of state Governors, mayors and voluntary citizen groups. With their help we can advance a cooperative program which, if an attack should come, would save many lives and lessen destruction.

THE defense program recommended in the 1955 Budget is consistent with all of the considerations which I have just discussed. It is based on a new military program unanimously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by me following consideration by the National Security Council. This new program will make and keep America strong in an age of peril. Nothing should bar its attainment.

The international and defense policies which I have outlined will enable us to negotiate from a position of strength as we hold our resolute course toward a peaceful world. . . .

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Front And Center

"Limited Capacity" Men Still a Problem • Dislocation Allowance Planned

Family Housing Improved But Not Yet Plentiful

The release of some 200,000 enlisted men of limited capacity does not solve the Army's problem of what to do with men of this type. The law says that they will be drafted and Selective Service opposition to changes in the law that would eliminate them from the draft suggests that the problem will plague the Army for a long time to come. It is right here that the practice of modern industry could be borrowed to the advantage of the Army and to the profit of taxpayers. Industry spends a great deal of money in selecting permanent employees for technical training. It has learned that spending money to eliminate the untalented and unproductive early is less costly than doing it later.

✓ ✓ ✓

Like civilian communities all over the land, Army communities are teeming with so many school age children that schoolhouses bulge and crack under the strain. Typical of the problem is the one at Fort Benning. In six years the number of school children has more than quadrupled. There were 315 school children at Fort Benning in the 1947-48 school year and 1,395 at the beginning of the present school year. Benning plans to increase the capacity of one of its schools by seven classrooms and an auditorium-cafeteria before next September.

✓ ✓ ✓

The semiannual report of the Secretary of Defense noted that "except in a few instances . . . rent gouging of servicemen's families [was] greatly curtailed" during fiscal 1953. The report of the Secretary of the Army was not quite so hopeful. "Utilizing the limited means available, Army programs during the fiscal year helped alleviate the extremely critical housing problems which existed at many stations a year ago," it said. The report also noted an obligation: "The Army is well aware that family housing conditions at or near its installations have a direct and profound relationship to the morale and welfare of the military family. It is our policy to construct or otherwise make provision for quarters necessary to meet the needs of married service people wherever possible."

It is evident that those proponents of armor who think the Army is negligent in its understanding and use of the arm are adept at closing ranks in their fight for recognition. In Germany, for example, a number of officers of the arm are forming a European Chapter of the Armor Association.

✓ ✓ ✓

At the direction of the Department of Defense, the Navy Department is preparing legislation that will provide for the reimbursement of service families for the extra expense they incur when making a permanent change of station. As all servicemen know, present allowances don't begin to cover the out-of-pocket costs of a change of station move. What expenses the payment—called a "dislocation allowance" in the Pentagon—would cover, how it would be computed, and eligibility requirements will be determined by the Navy, subject, of course, to Department of Defense approval before going to Congress.

✓ ✓ ✓

National Guard and Army Reservists who have travel expenses in connection with attending training periods may, under certain conditions, deduct the costs for income tax purposes. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue's ruling on this appeared recently in The Air Reservist, *an official publication of the Continental Air Command, Mitchel Field, N. Y. Before taking a deduction you would be wise to seek a copy of the Commissioner's ruling as it covers only certain conditions.*

✓ ✓ ✓

It is no secret that Air Force commissioned and noncommissioned officers get promoted faster than officers of the Army and Navy. This condition, which has been remarked since early in World War II or before, may be accented under the "new look." Promotions come slower when strength reductions are the order of the day and faster when a service is being built up. Only the Air Force is on the way up and the Army may have to undertake strength reductions more drastic than anyone would have thought feasible a few months ago.

✓ ✓ ✓

There are many ways to describe an adequate defense posture but one of the most appealing in vividness of language was the one used by Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey in a speech several months ago in which he previewed the "new look." In that speech Mr. Humphrey called for a "balanced and adequate defense program, fluid and imaginative, mobile and elastic." He also warned that "there would be not defense but disaster in so massive a program of arms production that our strength and resources might become exhausted and we would lose the capacity to continue the effort—so that tomorrow's threat would have to be met with yesterday's weapons."

✓ ✓ ✓

The increase of the infantry regiment by the addition of two riflemen to each squad which has been tested at Fort Bragg probably won't result in an increase in the strength of regiments or divisions, even though Army officers involved are reported to strongly believe that the increase is worthwhile. The *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal* reports that the reduction in Army man power will preclude such increases in combat strength. It is worth noting that civilian officials in the Pentagon recently have emphasized that the Army was becoming more efficient by reducing the T/O&E of the infantry division by 600 men and at the same time increasing the fire power by adding more machine guns and recoilless rifles.

✓ ✓ ✓

Tireless dietitians and other experts of the Quartermaster Food and Container Institute turn out "new and improved" Army chow with what seems like clock work regularity. Latest improvement is a new version of the C ration that is based on "food preferences expressed by combat soldiers." New items in the ration are: beef and peas with gravy, chop suey with meat, ham and potatoes, fruit cake, pound cake, oatmeal cookies, soup and gravy base, and soluble tea. The ration will be packaged in a flatter, more rectangular package. You may get a chance to try the new ration sometime this year. Two and a half million of them are to be delivered to the QM beginning in May.

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places of our choosing."

Secretary of State Dulles



THE NEW LOOK STRATEGY

Thermo-nukes in the Economy Package

LLOYD NORMAN



THE "new look" strategy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the civilian administrators of the Department of Defense is a shotgun wedding of two incompatible military ideas:

(1) The glistening, still untried atomic (hydrogen) air power theory, that an enemy can be brought to his knees quickly and decisively in a cataclysm of super-bombs—without any help from the Army and Navy;

(2) The traditional surface theory, brought up to date with atomic weapons and missiles, that the enemy must be conquered on the ground —with the help of the Navy and Air Force.

Before two such irreconcilable theories could reach an agreement there had to be a "persuader" and this was the Administration's desire for a "long pull" military strategy that would balance the federal budget, nurture the national economy, and still provide a reasonable posture of defense.

The sudden shift of sentiment that left the Air Force so bedazzled was its discovery that it had an economy-sized package that was just what the men with the shotgun coveted. The package had two items in it: the thermo-

LLOYD NORMAN, Pentagon correspondent for *The Chicago Tribune*, has been a reporter for that newspaper for sixteen years. During the Second World War he served two years in the Navy as an ensign on a minesweeper in the Atlantic and at Admiral Nimitz's advanced headquarters on Guam.

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nuclear (hydrogen) bomb and a bomber aircraft. Put the two together and you have an explosive force of some five million tons of TNT that can wipe out a big city in one puff.

The simplicity and relatively low cost of the package is what made it the heart and core of the new look strategy. A step or two farther and it could become the whole strategy—as its most extreme advocates argue.


"Why do we need an army and a navy?" asked one of the most brilliant and persuasive air power strategists. "We can draw a red line across the map of Europe and tell the Kremlin that if they step across that line we'll clobber them with thermo-nukes"—Strategic Air Forcese for the thermonuclear bomb (they use the term with easy familiarity).

If you insist upon having some sort of army in Europe, perhaps just for psychological effect, the Air Power Strategist retorts that the Army had better go back to the Maginot Line defense with deep concrete bunkers to protect the troops from the searing heat and pulverizing blast of Soviet H-bombs.

He will concede that perhaps there may be some residual value in having ground forces in Europe, geographically placed to force the Russians to mass their armies into better targets for nuclear weapons.

"Okay, suppose you do have the Maginot Line in Europe," he said. "It will take only 25 divisions, and construction of the prepared positions would cost no more than a super-carrier (about 250 million dollars). I guess we could afford that luxury."

The Air Power Strategist condescendingly insists that Army and Navy strategists have stubbornly refused to recognize the revolution in arms. (The atomic cannon, he says, is typical of this outmoded thinking because it tries to superimpose the new upon the old.)



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILSON

THE Air Power Strategist would use atomic bombs of various sizes as "point" weapons to destroy the enemy's airdromes, atomic stockpiles and works, gasoline and oil stocks and other sources of the enemy's war-making capacity. That, of course, is the Air Force's traditional strategic bombing theory.

But he adds something new—the thermo-nuke. This, he says, would be the perfect battlefield weapon, an area destruction weapon for tactical employment against enemy troops, vehicles and supplies.

"The A-bomb is all right for industrial targets but why over-kill cities with H-bombs?" he asks. "It's a revolutionary idea but science and technology have given us the finest weapon against troops dispersed over the battlefield. It can destroy or cripple entire divisions. The H-bomb has made mobile ground combat obsolete.

"We must discard the World War II notion of the war of movement. If we have ground forces at all they will have to fight a war of position. They will have to be in position, ready to fight. They can't hope to get to their bunkers along roads jammed with civilians fleeing from atomic attack."

He would keep a small army as a sort of shield to keep an enemy from just walking in with a few machine guns and pistols and taking over. He would have the Army as a police force to keep order and take over key government centers after the Air Force has destroyed the enemy with nuclear weapons.

As for the Army's role of guarding the Air Force's bases, the Air Power Strategist thinks fighter interceptors and antiaircraft guns could do that job.

The Navy—in this framework reduced to the same insignificance as the Army—would need only submarines and perhaps a few destroyers because the Russians do not have much of an ocean-going fleet. The Air Force could knock out the enemy's submarine pens and shipyards with collateral bomb drops by the A-bombers on the way to more important targets inside the Soviet heartland.

The Air Power Strategist sees no need for a large, well-trained citizen reserve that could be mobilized three months or six months after D-day. He is convinced the first, or what he calls the decisive, phase of the war will be over in 90 days. In those three months there will be no time to call up reserves or to mobilize war industries. There will be time only for the fury of atomic blow and counter blow that will leave both sides in ruin and devastation and it would take 20 years to rebuild the factories and start the war over again.

Victory, if victory can be measured negatively in terms of lesser ruins and desolation, will go to the side that was strongest in atomic air power and used it most effectively. But the Air Power Strategist finds that the key to his whole argument is the power of initiative. Fission and fusion war strategy when carried to its logical conclusion is a "hit 'em first" doctrine that U.S. citizens and high policy makers find repugnant to our traditions. Yet the Air Power Strategist with coldblooded logic says that we cannot ignore the advantage that initiative provides us in a war for survival. "We can't worry about ethics or morality. If the Russians get the jump on us they'll wipe our cities off the map."

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ADM. ARTHUR W. RADFORD
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



GEN. MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army



ADM. ROBERT B. CARNEY
Chief of Naval Operations



GEN. NATHAN F. TWINING
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

HUS, the atomic (hydrogen) air power theory rests pon several assumptions that have not become part of ional policy: (1) that we will hit first, start a war if essary to take full advantage of the initiative which atomic war can be decisive; (2) that we will use mic weapons against an enemy's troops in the field, osing us to enemy retaliation against our cities; (3) t we will drop A-bombs on Soviet satellites, turning m and perhaps the neutral world against us; (4) that will use atomic weapons if necessary against the lands our allies if they are invaded; and (5) that we will them in limited or peripheral wars, such as in Korea.

The opponents of the air power strategy have concened most of their assault against what they call "one apon strategy" as a cheap short cut to easy victory. cretary of the Navy Anderson has raised the possibility t the atomic weapons on both sides of the Iron Cur- n might cancel themselves out into a tacit or formal eement to outlaw such weapons of mass destruction. us we might have to rely primarily upon conventional apons and conventional strategy for our defense.

Some Army and Navy strategists have based their arments against sole reliance upon atomic weapons on ral and collective security grounds. They have denced any idea that "we hit 'em first." They have rned that the world would turn against us if we ted an atomic war. Our allies in Europe and in Asia uld not countenance our use of atomic weapons except self defense, they emphasize. Our defense system, ed upon alliances, would fall apart if we engaged in fare repugnant to our allies.

Besides the fundamental question of whether we will r use atomic weapons in warfare, the surface strategists raise the issue of whether nuclear weapons are as ective as the Air Force planners say they are. Will the bomb stop armies from moving across Europe? Can A-bomb cripple Soviet Russia with its economy still gely agricultural and many of its vital factories scated across the vast reaches of the Soviet land mass or den in mountains or in the far north? Won't the ssian armies move into western Europe with supplies from long accumulated stockpiles even if their cities and industries are burned and blitzed? Then would we drop our A-bombs upon western Europe?

Considering these drawbacks of air power strategy, it is surprising that it has made so much headway in recent months and has become the core of the new look. The new look started a long time ago. It can be traced 50 years back to the birth of the airplane and some 20 years to the splitting of the atom.

That's ancient history. In 1945 the airplane and the atomic bomb were joined and the atomic air power theory was born. Its doctrine makers worked out a cogent, logically appealing theory that people could understand after seeing pictures of the ruins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and linking those pictures in a cause-effect relationship to the surrender of Japan a few days later.

That was the beginning. The B-36 with its bellyful of atomic bombs became the symbol of strategic bombing that could "neutralize" a nation's war-making ability and even bring it to its knees. The Air Force put to work civilian scientists and military strategists to develop a bombing system that could by wily maneuvering and radar countermeasures outwit the Soviet air defense system and strike at carefully selected targets where our A-bombs could do the most harm.

THE air strategists' most telling argument was that atomic air power was an inexpensive deterrent keeping Soviet Russia from going to war. They also offered their weapon as the decisive method of finishing off the Communists if the Kremlin ignored the deterrent force. They emphasized the truism that we could not hope to match Russia's armies and we could not gain a victory by defeating Russia's navy. Air was the dimension in which we could win.

The Korean war gave the air strategists the boost they needed. They got their 143-wing program and for the first time the Air Force was allotted more funds than any of the other services. Atomic air power strategy was winning more and more adherents in the high policy councils.

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The economic appeal of the air power-nuclear strategy is overwhelming

Winston Churchill declared that U.S. atomic air power was keeping the Russians from going to war. After an Air Force briefing in the Pentagon in January, 1952, on the atomic counteroffensive power of the Strategic Air Command, Churchill became a total convert to atomic air power, according to Colonel John R. Maney, USAF, a faculty member of the Air War College, who wrote about it in the fall, 1953, issue of the Air University's *Quarterly Review*.


In his article Colonel Maney made a surprisingly bold and frank attack upon so-called surface strategists. The strategic air power theory has been obstructed in the past by "military conservatism which acts to retard the growth of new weapons and new approaches to war," he wrote. He said that General Bradley, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not comprehend the full meaning of air power when he opposed General MacArthur's plan to end the Korean war with bombing of the "privileged sanctuary" of the Communists in Manchuria and other moves that Bradley feared would ignite a total war with Russia.

Pursuing his argument for more aggressive selling of atomic air power, Maney said former President Truman would not have taken the defensive "containment" policy against Russia in 1948 but would have struck out boldly in a diplomatic offensive if the military chiefs had understood the real capabilities of U.S. atomic air power at the time.

"A thorough understanding of the full capacity of air power by persons both in and out of the Air Force might well have served as the basis for a different policy in Korea and for the containment policy in general," Maney wrote.

But a new climate of military thinking has arrived in the Pentagon and in the White House. Maney finds "there is evidence that the present [Eisenhower] administration is receptive to reasonable proposals for increasing pressure on China." He urges that now is the time for the Air Force to thump for its air concept against "the inertia of vested interests and historical prejudice."

Those who observe closely the trend of policy-making in the Pentagon would agree with Maney. The new look which Defense Secretary Wilson talked about shortly after he took over at the Pentagon was in effect a renunciation of the policies of General Bradley, who obviously did not believe that atomic air power would keep Soviet Russia from going to war if we bombed Manchuria.



The new administration found the air power concept appealing. The new Defense Secretary soon discovered that he could not meet the Administration's goal of a balanced federal budget except by using the tremendou firepower of atomic and hydrogen weapons to reduc military costs.

Better business management, smaller overhead, fewe support forces, less waste would make some savings. Bu his big one would have to come from "new strategic plan and objectives giving proper weight to new weapons an equipment."

Deputy Defense Secretary Roger M. Kyes sketche the shape of the future military plans when he said las 12 November that "we must reassess our strategic plar ning and logistics in the light of technological advance and have the courage to discard the outmoded procedure and weapons which will no longer serve more tha tradition."

"We can no longer afford to prepare for every cor ceivable kind of war," Kyes said. "We can no longer a ford the luxury of the status quo in strategic planning."

The Deputy Secretary was certainly not thinking o atomic artillery and guided missiles when he spoke o technological advances.

KYES has had little encouragement from the Army Navy that war can be made cheaper. Admiral Rob ert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, said last 2 November that the new look could offer no "magic quick results" or provide any radical changes in weapon that would save money. He estimated that it cost th Roman Empire about 75 cents to kill one enemy soldi and today it costs approximately $250,000 to do the sam thing.

General Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, took a simil position. On 10 November he said that "notwithstan ing new weapons with immensely increased destructiv power, notwithstanding the developments in transpo tation which have brought all points on the earth's su face within a few hours of each other, the ultima determinant of military victory still is the trained fightin man with his feet on the ground."

Some day, General Ridgway said, control over land ar people may be exercised from the sea or sky alone but would be a dangerou perhaps even a fatal fa lacy to conclude in 19 that this date has a rived."

General Ridgway d clared the Army wou not neglect the ne weapons and wou combine old and new. He stressed the need to be su He talked about "tests to validate" the adoption of t new weapons. He even conceded that some day in t future the U.S. may "substantially alter the ratios land, sea and air strength in our present military esta lishment." He added, however, that "no evidence y

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duced today would validate such a course. Perhaps it ver will."

What security does the strategic bomber carrying A d H bombs offer? A high Army planner, who has ven many late nights to this question, wonders about e futility of atomic (hydrogen) air war.

Suppose we do everything that the air power strategists er as a cheap and easy way to victory, he said. Supse, even though it's irrational, that we accept the idea taking the initiative, of hitting them first. Then what? that the kind of world we want—a world in smoking, adiated ruins walking dazedly in a smog of cosmic dust? id who will be left to keep order among the survivors? ho will be able to take control of the seat of governnt and start picking up the pieces from which a peacel life can be made? He had the answer: the Army, of urse.

Another Army planner doubts that nuclear weapons r will be used against cities and industries. He bees that when the Soviet's stockpile of super-bombs ches frightening proportions, the American people ll insist upon any action, short of surrender of sovignty, to outlaw the mass killers.

It is conceivable, he thinks, that atomic weapons uld be used only against precisely defined military gets: conventional armies and navies.

far back as 1950 and even earlier, Army planners realized that the atomic weapons and guided missiles uld change the nature of future warfare. The Army s experimenting with guided missiles as long-range illery and antiaircraft weapons as soon as its research could disentangle themselves from World War II blems.

General J. Lawton Collins, then Army Chief of Staff, d on 4 June 1950, that atomic weapons could be deoped for Army use, specifically in artillery shells and ided missiles. He emphasized the accuracy with ich the Army could shoot its own atomic missiles for tical support of troops on the battlefield.

Two days later, then Army Secretary Frank Pace, Jr. zed upon the "revolutionary new weapons" as the ans to overcome the overwhelming superiority of the mmunist armies in men and tanks. Pace said the best y to stop masses of heavily mechanized ground troops by using smaller ground forces with these new weaps.

On 15 May last, General Collins made it clear that Army was adapting the new weapons—not necessarily replace men but to give them greater fire power to set our relative disadvantage in manpower.

General Collins estimated that the fire power of the antry division has been increased 68 per cent since orld War II, partly as the result of increasing the size the division by 20 per cent but mostly by providing re and better weapons. He said that the Army's sent-day 20 divisions were equivalent in manpower strength to 24 World War II divisions, but have the punch of some 34 World War II divisions.

It is this concept of giving the soldier more and more fire power through new and better weapons that has created in the public mind and in the thinking of top government policy makers the idea that weapons can replace men in battle. The ultimate extension of that idea, of course, is push-button warfare in which a few Cybernetic Generals in their concrete-and-steel command posts would wage war while the rest of us tended to the robot devices and electronic brains.

General Charles L. Bolté, Army Vice Chief of Staff, observed on 16 December that this talk of new weapons replacing manpower has given rise to some misconceptions, including "one that ground fighting is now outmoded."

'Nothing could be farther from the truth," Bolté asserted. "America must not as a nation be deceived again into the false belief that victory in war can be won without fighting for it, that machines can ever really replace men on the battlefield."

Bolté suggested that the argument in favor of cutting the Army is based on something more than a desire for economy. He left the hint that the razzle-dazzle about new weapons was being used to delude the American people in favor of a one-weapon defense system.

Recognizing the usefulness of the new weapons, Bolté said the Army is revising its organization tables and tactics to provide for effective application of these weapons and to strengthen our defense against an enemy which also has access to the same weapons.

"The Army, in fact, is undergoing a period of greatly accelerated progress and change," he said. "Its capabilities are greater than they have ever been before."

THERE are no glittering promises in this dirty business of ground warfare. Army leaders, although they envisioned the day when we could make up in greater fire power what we lacked in manpower, offer no dramatic or exciting escape from the high cost of war. And it has no neat, logical formula that says one atomic cannon can replace one regiment or that 20 atomic regiments could hold Europe against the Communist hordes.

Army planners—those overworked officers who not only have to plan for war against Communism but against the aggressive designs of the Air Power Strategists—have no pat answers for those who want the new look strategy.

STARTING from the fundamental premise that ground warfare has not been made obsolete by the H-bomb, Army planners have come up with ideas which they know will take time to develop and test for wartime use:

(1) Army combat units that are smaller, more mobile, more versatile, more able to disperse and mass rapidly.

(2) Deeper and more effective concealment and cover.

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(3) Conventional weapons adapted wherever possible to fissionable explosives.

(4) More and more reliance by the Army on atomic artillery for ground support; less upon Air Force tactical planes.

(5) Greater emphasis upon skill and leadership; mistakes will be more costly than ever in the future.

(6) Simplification of Army tactics and organizations; they must be stripped of encumbrances, complicated logistics, over-mechanization. Simplification will permit greater flexibility.

(7) The Army will be needed for "brush fires," —small, limited wars, as well as global warfare. Army units will have to be so organized and equipped that they can be combined into larger task forces for assignment to fight anywhere.

It is too early in this Army planning for a sharp, clear pattern to emerge. Some think the infantry division as it now exists will disappear in favor of regimental combat teams or brigades, each with its own supplies and support and capable of fighting as a self-contained dispersed unit.

Divisions might be slimmed down to 12,000 men each and would be spread out to cover a 10-mile front where necessary or massed quickly for a breakthrough. Some planners say that armor may lose its value because it cannot be easily transported by air and tends to be slower than other motorized equipment. Tanks massed for a breakthrough are too vulnerable a target for atomic weapons, they say.

Tactics would not change basically but they would be adapted to take advantage of mountain passes, rivers, road networks and all terrain features that would force an enemy to mass his troops and armor if he wanted to go on the offensive. These tactical maneuvers would make the enemy create targets for atomic missiles.

Experiments with new type regiments and squads are now under way. By mid-year the Army may be ready to announce basic changes in its divisions. But it will be two years or more—perhaps 1958 or 1960—before the atomic-age infantry will appear.

Some Army planners think the artillery and tanks will be dropped from the infantry division and will be organized into flexible units that could be added to or dropped from front-line combat outfits whenever needed. Thus, one division might have four or six infantry regiments backed by a half dozen artillery and missile battalions while at another time it might have only one or two regiments and no support—depending on its task.

But this much is certain: divisions will be smaller, maybe thirty per cent smaller. And they will be made more mobile, more flexible, more versatile.

THE new look strategy is then a forced compromise between two incompatible ideas. It provides for an Army because the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not convinced that the Air Force can make the super bombs do what the Air Power Strategist says they will do. And they don't want to take a chance on a one-weapon strategy that has not been tested in the only laboratory where it counts—on the battlefield.

Under this compromise, the Air Force has the task c carrying out the total counteroffensive if it fails t frighten the Russians out of starting a war. Clearly th defense plan will reduce the Army eventually to less tha one million men. And so the Army is to be weakene drastically and quickly.

National policy-makers, therefore, have decided th Army's role will be to provide relatively small, highl mobile combat units for rapid deployment to troub spots by air or sea. These units would remain in the U.S as a mobile reserve.

U.S. divisions eventually will be withdrawn from Kore and Europe (President Eisenhower showed the trend i announcing the withdrawal of two divisions from Korea and will be used primarily to defend our global syste of bases. Wherever they are placed in a defense lin such as in Europe, the Army units will be so positione as to force the enemy to expose himself to heavy loss from Army-controlled atomic cannon or missiles—as we as Air Force-dropped bombs.

This concept, although it accepts basically the a power strategy, does not relinquish the older, prove concepts of land and sea power. But the Army will hav to fight to hold its own against an air power strategy th already has a deeply fascinating hold on some of th Nation's highest policy-makers.

The Army will have to be persistent and persuasiv For it is quite evident that the event that tilted the ba ance in favor of air power was the Soviet hydronucle explosion. This seems to have persuaded the poli makers to buy the decision that the dimension of decisi in a future war was in the air.

A FAIR question at this point is: If air power is abs lutely decisive why bother with land and sea force Indeed, why cling to old-fashioned tactical air forces a costly continental air defense system? Why not ju strip down to a lean Strategic Air Command of 55-or combat wings?

That such a question can be put suggests the re sons why there is a growing feeling not only in t Army and Navy but also in some minority segments the Air Force that there has been too eager and p mature acceptance of the air power package.

So, you hear the counsel from some skeptics th perhaps the White House should establish a supr staff of senior military men and competent scientis and just plain, non-partisan civilians to take over th role of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. Th staff would advise the President on new weapons sy tems in an atmosphere removed from the partisansh of the Pentagon. And then the President could dec whether it is the course of prudence and wisdom a morality to stomp about the globe as an Atomic Go ath, brandishing a club that would leave this nati dangerously exposed, if it ineffectively shattered i impact, or would leave the world in such a shamb if effective, that victory would not only be a holl mockery but might be a complete disaster.

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A tank on the loose is a paratrooper's nightmare

ARMOR *VERSUS* PARATROOPERS

Lieutenant Colonel Henry Harmeling, Jr.

AFTER they successfully overran the Balkans in 1941, the Germans decided to gain further control of the Eastern Mediterranean by capturing Crete. Crete's importance was both offensive and defensive. Crete and its airfields would further German air attacks against Mediterranean shipping and permit air operations in support of forces in North Africa. At the same time it would prevent British air attacks on the Rumanian oilfields and other Balkan targets.

Crete is 160 miles long and from seven and one-half to thirty-five miles wide. All its important harbors, cities and airfields are on the north shore. The four important localities from west to east are the airfield at Maleme, the harbor and supply base at Canea, the airfield at Retimo and the airfield at Heraklion (Candia). The only road on the island worthy of the name connects these places.

The Germans formed a task force of air, ground, and sea units in command of General Lohr, a Luftwaffe officer. The land troops were the 7th Parachute Division and the 5th Mountain Division, and these were commanded by another air force officer, General Kurt Student, a pilot since 1913 and also an infantry commander in the First World War. This officer commanded all German parachute troops from the beginning of World War II to the end. All paratroopers were nicknamed "students" by the rest of the German soldiery.

The 7th Parachute Division represented the entire airborne force available to the Germans. It was an outstanding unit in every sense of the word—"corps d'elite composed of the ardent and devoted Nazi youth of Germany," as Winston Churchill has written in *The Grand Alliance*. Every man in it was a fanatical, tough, superbly trained and equipped volunteer.

Each German paratrooper carried with him at all times a copy of the paratrooper's Ten Commandments. They were both a moral code and a set of individual tactical principles:

- You are the chosen ones of the German Army. You will seek combat and train yourself to endure any manner of test. To you the battle shall be fulfillment.
- Cultivate true comradeship, for by the aid of your comrades you will conquer or die.
- Beware of talking. Be not corruptible. Men act while women chatter. Chatter may bring you to the grave.
- Be calm and prudent, strong and resolute. Valor and the enthusiasm of an offensive spirit will cause you to prevail in the attack.
- The most precious thing in the presence of the foe is ammunition. He who shoots uselessly, merely to comfort himself, is a man of straw who merits not the title of parachutist.
- Never surrender. To you death or victory must be a point of honor.
- You can triumph only if your weapons are good. See to it that you submit yourself to this law—first my weapons and then myself.
- You must grasp the full purport of every enterprise, so that if your leader be killed you can yourself fufill it.
- Against an open foe fight with chivalry, but to a guerrilla extend no quarter.
- Keep your eyes wide open. Tune yourself to the topmost pitch. Be as nimble as a greyhound, as tough as leather, as hard as



LIEUTENANT COLONEL HENRY HARMELING, JR., Infantry, is a 1942 graduate of the Military Academy and served in Europe as a rifle company commander during the Second World War. He is a parachutist and is now serving in Korea after attending the advanced course at The Armored School where he prepared this article while conducting research on armor and airborne warfare.

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British AA gunners on Crete send a *Luftwaffe* troop carrier flaming earthward.

Krupp steel, and so you shall be the German warrior incarnate.

The German 5th Mountain Division, which happened to be in Greece at the time, was chosen to carry out the air-transported portion of the operation. It was to be committed in transport planes after the paratroops captured an airfield. This division had had no special training in air-transported operations. Its commander, General Ringel, stated that the first airplane flight made by most of the young soldiers in the division was the flight to Crete; the prospect of flying in an airplane worried them more than the desperate battle in which they were about to be committed. Nevertheless, the 5th Mountain Division was a well seasoned outfit and its use in an air-transported role worked out very well indeed. The light mountain equipment of the division was ideally suited for air transport and their special training stood them in good stead in the mountains.

ACROSS 125 miles of water the beleaguered forces on Crete under General Bernard Freyberg awaited the assault they knew was coming. In contrast to the superb German troops they were a mixed crew—two British battalions, eleven Greek battalions, one Australian brigade, two Australian battalions, and two New Zealand brigades. All units were very short of vehicles, artillery and other equipment. The Greeks in particular were "weak in numbers, armed with a mixed assortment of rifles and little ammunition." Most of the troops on Crete had been recently evacuated from the fiasco in Greece and although it cannot be said that their morale was low they definitely had inherited a legacy of disaster. There is, however, an old proverb that says "An army of stags led by a lion is better than an army of lions led by a stag."

General Freyberg, a New Zealander, was one of those rare men who are in their natural element in combat. Like Marshal Ney of Napoleonic days he had a legendary career as a super combat hero. In World War I he rose from second lieutenant to the command of almost a corps. He received the Victoria Cross and the DSO with two clusters. Indestructible, he was wounded twenty-seven times in World War I and three times more in World War II.

When it became apparent that an airborne attack on Crete was imminent, Winston Churchill personally took an intense interest in reinforcing the island's strength in tanks. He writes in *The Grand Alliance:* ". . . It seemed to me that if the Germans could seize and use the airfields on the island, they would have the power of reinforcing almost indefinitely and that even a dozen 'I' [infantry] tanks might play a decisive part in preventing their doing so. I therefore asked the chiefs of staff to consider turning one ship of 'Tiger' (a convoy from England to Egypt) to unload a few 'I' tanks on their way through. My expert colleagues, while agreeing that tanks would be of special value for the purpose I had in mind, deemed it unadvisable to endanger the rest of the ship's cargo by such a diversion."

Mr. Churchill did not stop with this attempt. On 12 May he sent the following message to General Wavell in Egypt: "Will you consider whether at least another dozen 'I' tanks with skilled personnel should not go to help against Scorcher?"—the code name for the impending invasion.

General Wavell answered three days later, "Have done best to equip 'Colorado' [code name for Crete] against beetle pest. Recent reinforcements include six 'I' tanks, sixteen light tanks."

Once more, as late as 23 May (D plus 3) he sent the following to General



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Vavell: "Is it not possible to send more nks and thus reconquer any captured erodrome?"

He was on the right track but the iner- a and passive resistance of his subordi- ates foiled his plans. The chiefs of staff leemed it inadvisable" to endanger a hip's cargo to unload the tanks. General Vavell merely referred to "recent re- forcements of six I tanks and sixteen ght tanks" in answer to Churchill's quest to send "at least another dozen." What Wavell called "recent reinforce- ents" was actually all the tanks on the land, and some had probably been there r many weeks. Another dozen tanks hipped to Crete might have made it a fferent story.

ENERAL FREYBERG had to defend each one of the four important lo- lities on Crete with a self-contained sk force. A mobile defense was quite it of the question. His vehicles were o few and the areas to be defended ere too far apart.

He distributed his forces principally to otect the airfields. At Maleme were o New Zealand brigades; at Canea two ustralian and two Greek battalions; at etimo an Australian brigade and six reek battalions; and at Heraklion two itish and three Greek battalions.

The authorities differ about the exact mbers and dispositions of the tanks. ne says twenty-two tanks on the island the time of the invasion: six "I" tanks Maleme, ten light tanks near Canea d six light tanks at Heraklion. An- her mentions only six "I" tanks; two at ch airfield. Churchill states "there ere only nine parts-worn infantry tanks, stributed at the airfields, and sixteen ght tanks." And a message from Wavell Churchill on 16 May says "two infan- tanks are at each aerodrome."

Giving due credence to first-hand testi- ony we may reasonably conclude that ere were six serviceable infantry (me- um) tanks and sixteen oldish light nks on Crete, disposed as follows: two fantry tanks on the airfield at Maleme; n light tanks between Maleme and nea (fifteen miles apart); two infantry nks on the airfield at Retimo; two in- ntry tanks and six light tanks on the field at Heraklion. There is no infor- ation available as to the unit these nks belonged to (if any) or the state training or experience of their crews. ne tanks probably arrived on Crete cemeal over a period of several months, d they were probably manned by stily assembled crews of men already the island.

The stage was now set. The confident



Only about half of the élite German 7th Parachute Division survived Crete.

Germans were poised at the Greek airfields. The defenders braced themselves for the onslaught.

THE blow fell on 20 May. Following a terrific air bombardment, two regiments of the 7th Parachute Division landed by glider and parachute at 0800 in an area about eight miles long and three miles wide between Maleme and Canea to capture the Maleme airfield. The garrisons immediately and heavily engaged this drop and there was desperate fighting all through the day.

In the meantime the transport planes returned to their bases for two more parachute regiments. One of these landed at Retimo and the other landed at Heraklion, both about 1615. The two ran into very heavy opposition and could only organize defensive perimeters. The defenders hung on to the airfields and managed to destroy the greater part of the paratroop regiments. Neither managed to accomplish its mission of capturing an airfield.

But Maleme was the crucial spot. As darkness came down on D-Day (20 May) a group of German paratroops extricated themselves from the battle on the drop zone, reorganized, and launched an attack which won partial control of the airfield. The field was still under direct fire from the British artillery.

That night was a time for decision for General Student back at his headquarters in Greece. He had seriously underestimated the defenders' strength. All reports indicated heavy casualties to his troops. Instead of three airfields taken all he had was a very precarious hold on one. He seriously considered calling the operation off, but finally decided to fly units of the 5th Mountain Division right onto the Maleme airfield early next morning.

That morning saw the transport planes begin to land at Maleme. Losses were tremendous but as Churchill says, "The German High Command seemed indifferent to losses and at least a hundred planes were wrecked in crash landing in this area. Nevertheless the build-up continued." The mountain troops succeeded in freeing the airfield of artillery fire and by D plus 2 the field was com-

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pletely secured. The Germans could now safely fly in reinforcements enough to insure the conquest of Crete. The issue was never again in doubt.

The Germans quickly landed the rest of the 5th Mountain Division, which fanned out and overran the island, and forced the rest of the defenders to evacuate on 30 May.

A seaborne invasion was also attempted in conjunction with the airborne attack. Some four thousand troops sailed from Greece on 21 May in a fleet of commandeered Greek caiques—an improvised expedition, poorly planned and executed. General Ringel says in *The Conquest of Crete* that the only navigational equipment in the whole fleet was a 1:500,000 map of the Mediterranean and a pocket compass! This strange armada was intercepted at 2330, 21 May by British cruisers and destroyers. All of the four thousand soldiers were drowned when the force was destroyed. This had no effect whatever on the events that took place on Crete.

LET us now consider what became of the British tanks. As near as can be determined from accounts of the battle, the tanks were all used in counterattacks by twos and threes against the paratroopers on their drop zones. They apparently inflicted great losses on the practically defenseless (at the time of landing) Germans. General Student has this to say: "The few British tanks that were there shook us badly at the start—it was lucky that there were not more than two dozen." Lieutenant Colonel C. T. Schmidt in an article in *The Military Review* says: "At Heraklion the attacking troops suffered heavy losses from the tanks." Lieutenant Colonel D. B. Drysdale, Royal Marines, an authority on the battle of Crete, states "the tanks were used by twos and threes in the immediate counterattack role. They did tremendous damage before they were finally knocked out." Finally a literal translation of a report to General Ringel, CG, 5th Mountain Division, gives a little of the touch-and-go fighting around the Maleme airfield:

". . . Only by chance could a just-commencing enemy counterattack with tanks be stopped by a platoon of [anti-tank troops] who landed with regimental headquarters and were immediately dispatched in the direction of the biggest battle-noise . . ."

General Freyberg thus made excellent use of his twenty-two tanks. He distributed them at the exact spots where the landings came and they contributed materially to the foe's heavy losses. It is very doubtful that he would have done as well by holding all the tanks concentrated as a mobile reserve, for the Germans had complete air supremacy and the airfields were widely separated. Colonel Drysdale writes that, "Under these circumstances, the dispersion of the very limited amount of armor was, I believe, inevitable. It was, in any case, fully justified by subsequent events."

The Battle of Crete was a Pyrrhic victory for the Germans. They lost about half of the élite 7th Parachute Division which was their only airborne unit. Hitler was so shocked by the heavy casualties that he concluded that surprise attacks were now impossible and insisted that the days of successful airborne operations were over. As a consequence the Germans never again launched a large-scale airborne attack.

Crete shows most clearly that it is absolutely essential to provide an effective defense for airfields, especially on islands and isolated, remote areas such as Alaska. The capture of an airfield will give the attacker the capability of speedily reinforcing himself by air with plain troops. Denying airfields to the attacker compels him to reinforce by parachute or glider—a costly method at best. If the Maleme airfield had been held by the defenders, or even thoroughly cratered before it was captured, it is hard to see how the German attack could have succeeded.

Crete also shows that tanks are murderous anti-airborne weapons when employed against airborne troops immediately after their landings on the drop zones. Crete is the only historical example where tanks were employed against airborne troops during the actual landings. A tank on the loose in a drop zone is a paratrooper's nightmare. It assumes a significance out of all proportion to its normal value in combat. There were only twenty-two tanks on Crete in a battle in which some 50,000 men were engaged. Yet they were a most important element in the conflict. It is doubtful if twenty-two tanks were ever expended more profitably.

THERE is a final lesson here. Every effort should be made to decimate the enemy's airborne forces even if the immediate battle is hopelessly lost. If the defenders on Crete had not put up such a stout defense against great odds, they would undoubtedly have been subjected, as Churchill has written, to other airborne attacks against "Cyprus, Iraq, Syria, and even perhaps Persia." As it was, to quote him in conclusion, "The German losses of their highest class fighting men removed a formidable air and parachute weapon from all further part in immediate events in the Middle East."



British "I" tanks during pre-World War II maneuvers at Aldershot. General Freyberg's forces on Crete had six of these plus sixteen "oldish" light tanks with which to fight off the German parachute attacks on the airfields and ports.

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A Significant and Impressive Report

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY ESTABLISHMENT

he Men with Green Thumbs

The changes we recommend should be viewed as the first step in a continuing vigorous process of improving the organizational structure of the Department . . . Progress will best be achieved by evolution.

S those who know something about it could testify, the reformation of the my's organization isn't something to done rashly or in a day. If you have e authority and the zeal you can make provements here and there, but if you e at all responsible and conscientious ou are if you have authority), you are ite conscious that before you go about aring Army organization from its roots, u had better have something to set out place of it that will grow to full ength quickly.

The danger of wholesale uprooting d change is especially acute in time of r and cold war. In time of war inicient and wasteful organization can accepted in the knowledge that the ration is limited in time—at least we nericans have always so thought. Reornization during a cold war must be ne by conscientious men with green umbs who know how to prune with-t causing loss of strength; how to nsplant for greater strength and vigor; d what plant food formula is best.

The members of Secretary of the my Stevens' Advisory Committee on my Organization have proven themves men with green thumbs. Their -page, 20,000-word report is a reaned and responsible handbook for ose who would work in the garden of litary organization.

The committee recommends no wild inging with scythe or hoe that would liscriminately cut down fruitful plants well as rank weeds. It has wisely ced its reliance on evolutionary proces and the belief that healthy plants ven a helping hand have within them e power to throw off the diseases that use waste and inefficiency.

The Committee was formed on 18 September by Mr. Stevens in consequence of directives by President Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Wilson. The Air Force and Navy are making similar studies of their organization, but with inter-service committees.

During the ninety days, the Committee met every other week for four or five days, many of the meetings lasting far into the night. Each member did a tremendous amount of "homework," to the admiration of the full-time staff and its Army advisors. In all it heard 129 witnesses: 81 from the Army Establishment itself; many of the others were men who have been intimately and officially associated with the Army establishment in recent years or are presently in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Committee wisely shunned any attempt to inject personality clashes or controversy into their report. It criticized rarely and when it did it was impassionate and objective. (Its most pointed criticism was directed at unnamed Assistant Secretaries of Defense who sometimes in the past have violated orderly procedure and curtailed the authority and position of the Secretary of the Army by intervening directly in the work of the Army Staff.)

The following sections give the gist of the Committee's report with additional background and significant facts that the editors believe will be helpful to our readers' understanding of the work of the Committee and its implications.

Principal Changes

¶ Creation of a Deputy Secretary to serve as the Secretary's "intimate associate in the general management of the Department" (the office of Under Secretary would be abolished).

¶ Creation of an additional Assistant Secretary (for a total of three); each would have control of a single area: men, money or matériel.

¶ Redefinition of the role of the Chief of Staff to make him "operating manager of the whole Army Establishment."

¶ Addition of a second Vice Chief of Staff with one in charge of Operations and the other Supply.

¶ Establishment of a Supply Command that would have general responsibilities for the seven technical services.

¶ Establishment of a Continental Army Command which would take over all of the functions of the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, and have added responsibilities for the direction and control of the six Continental Armies.

Other Improvements

¶ Strengthening of the Secretary's position and authority in the Defense establishment and the Department of the Army.

¶ Relieving civilian secretaries of "operating" responsibilities.

¶ Relieving General Staff sections of major "operating" activities.

¶ Improvements in the organization for research and development.

¶ Improvements in financial management.

¶ Improvements in career management.

Civilian Control

The Secretary has an interest in and responsibility for everything done in his department. To discharge his duty he must delegate to others, but he can never rid himself of the basic responsibility which is his by statute.

IN its acceptance of the prevailing opinion of civil control of the military establishment, the Committee adds no new ideas to the philosophy—if indeed any can be added—but it does strike some lusty blows for the principle that could be more telling than all the words contemporary exhorters invoke about the sanctity of the phrase. The Committee wisely turned its attention to finding methods of making the principle work; a detail so obviously essential that it is often overlooked. They made three points:

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
The Secretary and His Advisory Committee on Organization



HON. ROBERT B. STEVENS
Secretary of the Army



MR. PAUL L. DAVIES, *Chairman*
President, Food Machinery and Chemical Corp.,
San Jose, Calif.



MR. HAROLD BOESCHENSTEIN
President, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
Toledo, O.

First, the Secretary of the Army is the responsible head of the Department. In setting policy and objectives he may seek the advice of his civilian assistants and military advisors and he may delegate authority to them, "but he can never rid himself of the basic responsibility which is his by statute."

Secondly, the role of his civilian assistants is to institute policy, set objectives and evaluate performance in their assigned fields. The Committee emphatically states that the present authority of civilian assistants to "*direct* and *conduct*" (Committee's italics) areas for which each is responsible, "is neither practicable nor desirable." Rather, "the role of the civilian is to inject an outside point of view, to improve business practices, to review operations, and to assume responsibilities for adherence to policies."

Finally, "the military provides the operating organization by which policies are executed." Because he is the "military leader" of the Army, the Committee concluded "that it is essential that the Chief of Staff serve as operating manager for the Secretary." Furthermore, as "the professional military field includes both combat and the businesslike aspects of supply," the Chief of Staff must have broad authority to conduct all the operations of the Army establishment.

Having thus carefully separated the functions and duties of the civilian secretariat and the military, the Committee proceeded to recommend organizational changes that would make the system work.

Deputy Secretary. The Secretary of the Army must devote so much of his time to interpreting "the Army and its policies to the Department of Defense, the Congress and the public," and in visiting forces and installations of the Army at home and abroad, that he needs a Deputy Secretary to free him of supervision of major Army programs. "He should serve as the Secretary's intimate associate and deputy in the general management of the Department." (The office of Under Secretary would be abolished.)

Assistant Secretaries. The assistant secretaries should be supervisors of three major functional areas: men, matériel and money. They should not be responsible for day-to-day operations but should be engaged in establishing objectives and policies and in evaluating performances.

Assistant Secretary for Financial Management would give the Secretary an assistant in the money area that he does not now have. This secretary would formulate fiscal policies, supervise the budget, prescribe accounting methods and data these methods should produce in the way of fiscal information, and appraise the effectiveness of Army management and organization. He would work closely with the Comptroller.

Stronger Position for Secretary of Army

The Committee believes that these steps need to be taken to increase the stature and influence of the Secretary of the Army, within and without the Department:

¶ He should "participate actively in the formulation by the Secretary of Defense of basic policies guiding the Department of the Army."

¶ He should "attend, as a regular observer, meetings of the National Security Council."

The Chief of Staff

We have concluded that it is essential that the Chief of Staff serve as operating manager for the Secretary. . . . The Chief of Staff's responsibility must embrace all operations of the Army.

THE Chief of Staff is an overworked man. He is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He, like the Secretary, must spend a great deal of time interpreting the Army to the Congress and the public, and in visiting and inspecting forces and installations all over the world. The Committee recognized this but it believed many positive virtues would be gained by making him the "operating manager of the whole Army establishment." "Operational success and efficient and economical supply management require close coordination and the resolution of differences between the using and supply elements of the Army," the Committee observed. It added: "The vital interdependence of supply and military planning makes it imperative that the Chief of Staff be responsible for supply and coordination."


Vice Chief for Supply. The Commit

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
Mr. Lovett's Famous Buzz Saw Didn't Have Its Reputed Bite*



MR. C. JARED INGERSOLL
Chairman of the Board, Kansas, Oklahoma and Gulf Railway Co., Philadelphia



MR. IRVING A. DUFFY
Vice President, Ford Motor Co., Dearborn, Mich.



LT. GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZER
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Research

would make it humanly possible for Chief of Staff to exercise this direcn by providing him with a second ce Chief; giving him one for operans and another for supply.

The Committee rejected the tradinal organization of fixing responsibilfor supply in the Assistant Secretary Matériel because this did not conform its closely reasoned belief that the sential role of the impermanent civil- is to establish objectives, formulate licies, evaluate performance and see t the military" does its job.

Another possible organization of the ce of the Chief of Staff that some offis familiar with the office have mulled r would retain the single Vice Chief r the same reasons the Committee e for the creation of a Deputy Secrey of the Army) and provide two Dep- Chiefs (Operations and Supply), lacing the two present Deputy Chiefs.

e General Staff

Assignment of operational responsibilities to the General Staff constitutes, in the opinion of this Committee, a significant weakness. This . . . causes confusion.

HE Committee would divest the Genral Staff of its "major" operating rensibilities.

G4 would be relieved of the biggest d under the Committee's plan. Its sent responsibilities for the technical vices would be transferred to the pply Command *(see below)* and the Vice Chief of Staff for Supply. G4 would also be relieved of some of its responsibility for Research and Development.

G1 would no longer direct and control the administrative staffs and services.

G3 would experience less change. It would continue to operate the schools it presently is responsible for. Some of its training activities would be taken over by the Continental Army Command *(see below)*. The Committee rejected a proposal that G3 should be split into two separate divisions: Operations & Plans; Training & Organization. It held that since the Joint Chiefs of Staff now do most of the strategic planning, the Chief of Staff no longer needed a "command post" as he did during the Second World War. The Committee also turned down a proposal that Psychological Warfare be consolidated with G3. The Committee contended that this function needs separate status because it is new and, as an "activity not well established throughout the executive branch of the government," needs encouragement.

G2 would be affected even less than G3. It would continue to supervise military attachés and operate schools to train intelligence personnel. It rejected the proposal for an "intelligence corps" because it "would tend to remove the responsibility for intelligence from operational officers." The Committee believes that "increased emphasis on and prestige for intelligence work is essential."

The Staff Sections

. . . existing distinctions among these staff agencies as to their relative importance and the organizational level at which they operate may be eliminated since such distinctions serve no practical purpose . . .

THE fourteen activities that the Committee lumps together as "staff sections" are shown in the chart on page 28. Most of them would continue to perform as they have in the past but the Committee did recommend substantial changes in four of them.


Judge Advocate General. While the JAG is by law the legal advisor of the Department of the Army, there are many other legal staffs within the establishment. The Secretary of the Army has a Department Counselor with a small staff of attorneys. Legal staffs exist within several of the technical services. The procurement division of the JAG is physically located within the office of the G4. Thus there is considerable overlapping and some lack of consistency in legal work within the Army.

The Committee seeks to eliminate this by assigning the responsibility for coordination to the Judge Advocate General. It prefers the JAG to the Department Counselor for this because the JAG can provide the continuity that a civilian counselor could not hope to furnish.

★"A reorganization of the technical services [of the Army] would be no more painful than backing into a buzzsaw."—Former Sec. Def. Robert A. Lovett. Certificates of Appreciation to the four civilian members were awarded by Secretary Stevens.

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THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION



GEN. MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY
Operating Manager of the Army Establishment

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The Department Counselor would ntinue to be the personal advisor of e Secretary of the Army and his civil- n assistants, but he would refer all her legal and legislative matters to the AG or the Office of Legislative Liaison. The Supply Commander should have competent staff of legal advisors but it ould be subject to functional supervis- n and coordination of the JAG.

Civilian Personnel. The Committee lieves the Office of Civilian Personnel ould be transferred from the Assistant ecretary for Manpower to that of a staff ction. It is "illogical," the Committee id, for that office not to be under the rection of the Chief of Staff as a large mber of civilians are employed in es- blishments subject to his direction and ntrol.

Reserve activities. The Committee ould abolish the offices of Special As- tant for Civilian Component Affairs d the Executive for Reserve and OTC Affairs and create two separate ff sections: an Office of Reserve Af- irs and an Office of ROTC Affairs.

Civil Affairs-Military Government. he Committee thinks greater emphasis ould be placed on these activities. It ould therefore create a separate staff ction, consisting of the Military Gov- nment Division of the Office of the ovost Marshal General, and the Mili- y Government Department of the ovost Marshal General School.

ontinental Army Command

To provide for more effective direction, to limit the number reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, and to insure the immediate effectiveness of these training commands [the six Continental armies] in time of war, the Committe proposes establishment of a Continental Army Command.

HE Continental Army Command would take over the present functions the Office, Chief of Army Field rces and have additional responsibility the work of each of the six Conti- ntal armies. The Committee believes e present AFF staff could take over ese additional responsibilities with only modest increase in the present staff." Training responsibilities are "now read among 15 or more organizations," e Committee reports. It would create earer lines of authority for training": G3 would establish all general train- ing policies.

Continental Army Command would be responsible for basic training of all individuals, all combat arms training, all combined training, and all civilian component training.

Specialized training would be the responsibility of the appropriate staffs and Supply Command until individuals and units are assigned to armies in the field.

Supply Command

Effective management of the Army's supply activities—the development, production, procurement, storage and distribution of weapons, matériel and equipment—necessitates a high and specialized order of competence. It also requires the understanding and attention of the Army's top civilian and military leaders that its importance and magnitude dictate.

THE need for a long look and reorganization of the Army's services of supply was one of the principal reasons for the establishment of the Committee. Criticism of the present organization goes back almost as far as the memory of man runneth. The Committee's decisions would assure one very important thing: responsibility for the activities of the technical services could henceforth be fixed. The creation of a Vice Chief of Staff for Supply and a Supply Commander (parallel with the Continental Army Commander) assures that.

In its consideration of the problem, the Committee had first to make basic decisions about the type of organization it would recommend.

It could adopt what has been called the "Navy System" of having the supply organization by-pass the Chief of Staff and report directly to the Assistant Secretary for Matériel. The Committee rejected this when it decided that the Chief of Staff must be the "operating manager" of the whole Army establishment.

It could have made a much more radical reorganization by recommending a functional type with "commands" for research and development, procurement, warehousing and issue, and so on. The Committee rejected this because the "development, procurement and distribution of an item is a more meaningful basis for organization . . . than specialization in each function." The Committee noted that many of the country's largest corporations are organized like the Army's technical services (General Motors is one). It did not say, as it might have, that many of these corporations patterned their organization on the Army. The committee did note that some corporations have recently shifted from "functional" to the Army's "commodity" type of organization.

The decision to recommend a Supply Commander came after the Committee determined that effective coordination could not otherwise be provided. It noted that while G4 "directs and controls" the technical services, men and money for them must come from G1 and the Comptroller.

Line and Staff. The Committee sees a "line and staff" with the technical services representing the "line" or operating elements and the staff represented by the Supply Commander and his headquarters, and the Vice Chief for Supply. It believes this would provide firm control, effect savings in money and manpower and be much more efficient. As the organization matured it could possibly begin to mix certain similar functions of each of the services: warehousing, for example. As it now is, the services are so tightly compartmentalized that even when they are together in such an activity as a general warehouse, each of the services operates its portion of it with little reference to the others.

As the organization matured it would give officers of the technical services greater opportunities for broadening their knowledge and rising to higher positions of authority. The Committee believes that the Supply Commander and the Vice Chief of Staff for Supply should always come from the ranks of the technical services.

The operational authority of the Supply Commander would be clarified. He

(Continued on page 38)

Combat Forces and Commands

The Committee . . . is impressed that the basic organization of the combat army has worked well. Its effectiveness has been demonstrated twice in this generation.

Thus the Committee made no recommendation for changes in the organization of the Army for combat. It said that testimony indicated that all overseas commands were "effectively organized for combat." It is known that the Committee heard testimony in favor of the re-establishment of the offices of the chiefs of combat arms (artillery, armor, infantry), but it took no notice of this recommendation in its written report.

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The Soviet Masters on the walls of the Kremlin on 7 November 1953.

MALENKOV'S DILEMMA

Admiral William H. Standley and Rear Admiral Arthur A. Ageton

IN 1925, Stalin said, "Not a single one of Lenin's disciples is worthy of Lenin's Mantle." When they invited Stalin to join their *Troika* of power, neither Zinoviev nor Kamenev suspected the inarticulate Georgian, the plodding work horse of the Secretariat, of ambition to become Lenin's sole successor. But, while Lenin still lived, Stalin had become an important member of three controlling party mechanisms—the Organization Bureau, the Central Committee, and the Politburo. With control of the Party Secretariat, he put men personally loyal to him into key positions in Party and government; thus Stalin built up a personal organization beholden unto him alone.

After Lenin's death, Stalin successfully played one faction in the Politburo off against another, expelling one after another from the Politburo and the party, finally resorting to the terrible blood purges of 1936 and 1938 to destroy those comrades-at-arms in the Revolution who might constitute the nucleus of an opposition. When, in 1941 and 1942 he assumed the additional posts of Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier), Generalissimo of the Armed Forces, and attained absolute control of the Secret Police through his loyal supporter, Lavrenti Beria, Stalin became the dictator complete, probably the most powerful, absolute, and autocratic ruler in the history of the world.

To compare the membership of the various Politburos down through the years has always fascinated me. An examination of early Politburos reveal that, by 1927, Stalin had eliminated hi fellow *triumvirs,* Zinoviev and Kamenev as well as his bitter enemy, Leon Trotsky. Stalin had also packed the Politbur with five regular and five alternate members, all his loyal supporters; by 192 all members of the 1924 Politburo ha been expelled from the Party and di graced; by 1938, all but Trotsky wer dead and he was murdered in 1940.

Of even greater interest to us now the composition of various Politburo during and since World War II. Thes are shown in the chart on page 33.

This top group of Communist Part leaders has changed little during th past eleven years. Some have died an

Admiral William H. Standley, *USN retired, was U.S. Ambassador to Soviet Russia during World War II. He was Chief of Naval Operations, delegate to the London Naval Treaty Conference, and initiator of the Vinson-Trammell bill, which provided for building and maintaining the Navy at treaty strength. He retired in 1937 after forty years of service, but was recalled to active duty during the Second World War. Admiral Standley was U.S. Navy member of the special War Supply Mission to Russia, then served as a member of the Roberts Commission to investigate and report the facts relating to the Pearl Harbor attack, and in 1942 was appointed U.S. Ambassador to Soviet Russia. Returning from Russia in 1943, he was again recalled to active duty and served in the Office of Strategic Services until 1945.*

Rear Admiral Arthur A. Ageton *is a graduate of the Naval Academy, Class of 1923. He served in battleships for seven years, attended the postgraduate schoool at Annapolis and did graduate work at George Washington University. He was head of the Navigation Division at the Naval Academy from 1941 to 1943 and from 1943 to 1945 he was executive officer of the* Washington *and in command of Amphibious Task Groups in the Pacific. Long a regular contributor of articles and short stories to national magazines, Admiral Ageton is the author of* The Naval Officer's Guide. *His first novel,* The Jungle Seas, *a story of destroyer action in the South Pacific, has just been published by Random House.*

This article first appeared in the September 1953 *Naval Institute Proceedings*. It has since been brought up to date and re-written in some particulars by the authors. **Copyright, 1953, by U. S. Naval Institute.**

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:hers have disappeared. But the most gnificant feature is the phenomenally pid rise of Malenkov from last of the ternate members of the Politburo in 942 to Number One on the list of 953 Presidium members. When I was Moscow, Malenkov was relatively nknown. I saw him only a few times, a t, flabby individual, with a moonlike, xpressionless face, in a drab Party uni-rm. Highly intelligent, sly, and clever, his impressive list of accomplishments uring and since the War would indi-te, as with Stalin in the early days of s rise to power, Malenkov's very ob-urity probably has been an asset.

OO young for the October Revolution, Malenkov enlisted in the Red Army hile still a boy and spent his time ecking up on the loyalty of his com-des. He left the Red Army in 1920, ined the Party, impressed his super-sors with his brilliant work, and was nt to school. It was Kaganovich who ought Malenkov to the attention of alin. From 1925 to 1930, he was chief Stalin's personal secretariat. He fol-wed Stalin's route to power, rising rough the Party Secretariat to become rsonnel chief of the Central Commit-e and a member of the Party Secre-riat; there, as a favorite of Stalin, he ubtless had much to do with the reparation of the papers of the great rges of 1936 to 1939. In those days, avrenti Beria was his only close friend. During the War, Malenkov ran the ussian aircraft factories. By war's end, e stood high in Stalin's favor, probably st below Zhdanov and Molotov. His op from fourth place on the Politburo st of 1946 to last place in 1947 coin-ded with his grim struggle for influ-nce with Zhdanov, Stalin's first deputy r Cominform and Communist Party affairs. Malenkov was appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee Secretariat in 1947, was removed from the Secretariat a few months later. During the interim, he won his battle with Zhdanov, humiliating his sick rival through his son, Zuri Zhdanov, by discrediting the younger Zhdanov in an argument over genetics and Lysenko's theory. Three weeks later, the elder Zhdanov died, reportedly of a heart attack; a group of the most distinguished Soviet physicians, accused of deliberately giving party leaders incorrect treatment for their ailments, were tried, convicted and imprisoned. The Malenkov regime has admitted that the accusers of these doctors lied and that the confessions of the doctors were completely spurious and by implication, were obtained "by impermissible means of investigation which are strictly forbidden under Soviet Law." One of those for whose death the accused doctors confessed responsibility, was Malenkov's bitter enemy, Zhdanov.

Back in Stalin's favor, in July 1948, Malenkov was reappointed First Secretary of the Party Secretariat and was pushing hard to pass Molotov in Party favor.

At the first Party Congress in thirteen years held in October 1952, Malenkov delivered the all-important policy speech, which Stalin had always made. He appealed to non-Communist countries of the West to break with America and to forge closer ties with Soviet Russia. Later in Warsaw, he said: "We believe that the co-existence of two systems —capitalism and socialism—is inevitable for a long period of time." But make no mistake—Malenkov is a true Communist, Soviet Russian style. He believes just as firmly as Stalin in the "permanent revolution." As well as he can, he will press for the spread of Communism throughout the world.

In January 1952, on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday, Radio Moscow saluted him as dear Georgi Malenkov, "True pupil of Lenin, Comrade-in-arms of Stalin." In his position as First Secretary, he had replaced the dead and discredited with men personally loyal to him and owing their advancement to him; like Stalin two decades earlier, he had patiently built up an organization of his own within the structure of the party. Ambitious, clever and unscrupulous, he had the good sense to get under a good man and work up. Now 52, his years of slavish loyalty have paid off.

As Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov was the Russian with whom I had the most frequent contact during my stay in Russia. Scrupulously correct and courteous, he was often cold and repelling and almost completely humorless. Even after upward of fifty meetings, both official and social, I never felt that I really got to know him.

An Old Bolshevik and revolutionary comrade of Stalin, he was Chairman of the Council of Ministers (1930-39), a member of the Politburo since 1926. For many years, he was considered to be closest to Stalin of all his advisers, although it appeared to me that Zhdanov and later Malenkov moved into this coveted position. Unlike Malenkov, who has never been out of the Soviet Union and has a reputation around Moscow of hating all foreigners, particularly Americans, Mr. Molotov has had many contacts with the outside world and Western ways. Restored to the post of Commissar of Foreign Affairs, his considerable experience and foreign knowledge may have a softening effect upon the decisions that Malenkov and the new Presidium make.

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FOR a time after Stalin's death, this new *Troika* represented the power and authority of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government: Molotov, Vice-Premier and expert in conduct of foreign affairs; Beria, who controlled the organizations for state security and the secret police, with their large numbers of highly disciplined and politically reliable troops; and Malenkov who controlled the party machinery, was Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and inherited the all-important function of directing the party's ideological policy.

If we look again at the 1953 Presidium of the Central Committee, we can see how well this *Troika* took care of members of former Politburos to continue the "interlocking directorates" between the Presidium and the government.

Marshal Voroshilov, a military elder statesman, was moved up to the honorary position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Marshal Bulganin became Vice-Premier and Commissar of War; Kaganovich, Vice-Premier and member of the Presidium; Mikoyan, Commissar of Internal and External Trade; Shvernik, Chairman of the All Union Council of the Trade Unions Council. Khrushchev was more recently given the vital control of the Party Secretariat and Party patronage. We may be sure that the new members and alternate members of the Presidium are loyal supporters of Malenkov.

Thus we see that the *Troika* returned to Stalin's wartime organization with Presidium members directly responsible for the conduct of affairs as commissars of the most important ministries. The new Presidium, which replaces the Politburo, and the members of the Presidium who can dominate it, still can exercise total power in Soviet Russia.

For a few months, everything seemed to go well with the new *Troika*. Yet all the while, I confidently expected a "Kremlin revolution," a bitter struggle for supreme power among the members of the Presidium. The very fact that Malenkov so heavily stressed Party unity indicated to me that he was apprehensive. In my opinion, this accounted for his haste in announcing the changes in party and governmental organization. It appeared that the new *Troika* wanted time to consolidate its position, to ensure the stability of its regime. The de-emphasis of Stalin was, at first, harder to understand.

We must remember that Stalin was able to capitalize on his relationship with Lenin. At every opportunity, he glorified the Great Lenin, Communist deity of the Soviet Union. Life-sized pictures of the Great Lenin with his disciple, Stalin, always on his left were displayed in Red Square, in all schoolrooms, on public buildings, and in every public place. During the War, Stalin's bulletins extolled the virtues of the Great Lenin and urged the people to hold sacred and to preserve the heritage handed down to them by the Great Lenin. It was as a devoted disciple of the Great Lenin that Stalin maintained his control of the Communist Party and his power over the Russian people.

Malenkov never had personal contact with Lenin; his association with Stalin, while close and sometimes intimate, was such as to make it difficult for him to set up a Great Stalin as his own and the Russian people's idol and thus by extolling the virtues of the Great Stalin, preserve the power which had been conferred upon him as Premier.

The new *Troika* had, it semed to me, a fatal weakness in that Party and Secret Police were represented, but not the Red Army. What of Marshal Nikolai Bulganin, Commissar of War, and Marshal Georgi Zhukov, his assistant commissar and Red Army war hero?

One must never forget that Stalin, as only General Secretary of the Party, had an even more formidable opponent in Trotsky, Hero of the October Revolution, commanding the absolute loyalty and devotion of the Red Army; that he had three of his Chiefs of Secret Police purged when he suspected them of conspiring against him; and that in the bloody purges of 1937, he was able secretly to try, convict, and execute Marshal Tukhachevsky and a group of the highest generals of the Red Army.

Stalin had something else of importance in his favor—the rigid party discipline—which made his former comrades acquiesce in their own defeat. Perhaps Malenkov inherited this advantage, but there was a difference. Not yet had he achieved complete dominance; he still had to depend upon a majority in the Presidium to achieve his ends. With the backing of the *Troika* and the new members, he seemed to have a working majority.

I HARDLY expected evidence of the struggle for power to become apparent as soon as it did. For some months after Stalin's death, it looked as if Beria were winning—not only the Great Stalin but also Malenkov were de-emphasized; Khrushchev took over management of the Party Secretariat; Beria installed his supporters in strategic posts in the Ukraine, Georgia, the Caucasus, and the satellite countries. Malenkov was uncommonly silent. Even the news break on release of the condemned doctors was given over Beria's signature.

Then unrest in the satellites broke into open revolt, hidden from Western eyes by the Iron Curtain. But nothing could hide from the West the riots and the hopeless, futile, desperate, and unorganized uprisings in East Berlin and Eastern Germany in June, which the Red Army had to suppress. Lavrenti Beria was the Presidium member responsible for the security of the satellites and East Germany. Malenkov had the issue he needed to challenge the most powerful of his opponents. Under the rigid party discipline, it is likely that Beria acquiesced in his own defeat—the Presidium decision was taken unanimously. So Beria toppled from his high estate as Number Two in the *Troika* and became a prisoner of his own secret police. With all of his potentiality for power and terror, how could this come about?

Along with the Chairmanship of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers (Premier) and the Party machinery, Malenkov apparently inherited something more useful and important—Stalin's super-Secret Police. This is an elite organization which took orders direct from Stalin or through his personal secretariat and reached out into key positions in Beria's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the Government bureaus, the Party organization, and the armed forces. It is probable that General Sergei Kruglov, who was Beria's assistant, prepared his arrest, even as Beria prepared the arrest of Yezhov, his chief in NKVD.

The Red Army may have participated. Rumors came out of Moscow of tanks and troops rolling down Sadovaya Boulevard toward Beria's home on 27 June the day he disappeared from public view. But these might well have been some units of the fifteen divisions of troops which belong to the Secret Police.

That Malenkov had the power to arrest Beria and to charge him with high crimes and treason before the Presidium and the Central Committee of the Party is proof enough that he had won his first battle in the struggle for supreme power in the Kremlin. The history of Stalin's rise to power may be repeating itself, with Malenkov playing Stalin's role in control of the Party machinery. With no other support, Stalin was able to eliminate four of his chiefs of Secret Police; apparently it was not difficult for Malenkov to purge the first of his.

BUT what of the Red Army? Unquestionably, Malenkov had assurance

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e backing of the Army before he had eria arrested. In the continuing strug- e for supreme power, can he count on continued support? The answer to at question lies in the minds and ambi- ns of two Army men: Marshals Niko- Bulganin and Georgi Zhukov, who erate the Commissariat of War and ntrol the Red Army.

Marshal Bulganin is a veteran of the il wars, a native Russian, originally a tory worker, came up through the rty organization and the Army to be- me both a marshal and a top civilian ministrator and executive. On the il side he has been President of the viet State Bank, Mayor of Moscow, mber since 1946 of the Politburo. No litical general, he commanded troops active operations during World War an Old Bolshevik, he long enjoyed alin's confidence. He considered him e of the best strategists in Soviet Rus- . With the support of Marshal Zhu- v, a professional soldier and the Red my's greatest war hero, Marshal Bul- nin and the Red Army are a force with ich Mr. Malenkov will have to kon.

BELIEVE that we can look with cer- tainty for a continuation of the "Krem- Revolution," a bitter struggle for preme power among the members of Presidium. This will not, in my inion, seriously affect the long-range jectives of the Soviet Union—the con- idation of the Soviet gains within its here of influence, the deterioration of anti-Communist coalition, the spread Communism to other countries. The ed of the Communist Party still reads that "it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to exist for a long period side by side with imperialist states. Ultimately, one or the other must conquer."

We must not be misled by the sinuous deviations of Communist tactics; whatever the name of the man who wins through to supreme power, he will still promote the world revolution by every means of subversion, coercion, intimidation, and even war.

We always watch with interest the appearance or non-appearance of prominent Soviet officials. It was Beria's absence from certain public ceremonies which first tipped us off to the fact that he was in trouble.

Both Malenkov and Molotov appeared for the annual celebration of the "Great October Revolution of 1917," and Foreign Minister Molotov held his usual reception to the Diplomatic Corps. The only Soviet speakers on this anniversary were military men—Marshal Voroshilov in his capacity as titular chief of state and Marshal Bulganin at the ceremony in Red Square.

If Bulganin's speech may be taken as a statement of Soviet policy, the peace offensive of Premier Malenkov apparently has ended. The Commissar of War brought out many of the old charges which sounded so familiar in Stalin's voice: warlike aims of the United States, the Soviet State's military power has grown stronger and stronger, defiance of Western warmongers. His aggressive speech may also be significant because *he* made it, not Malenkov. Marshal Bulganin controls one potential of power which, I believe, has not as yet knuckled under to Georgi Malenkov—the Red Army.

When I left Moscow in 1943, I made this entry in my diary:

Stalin's successors:

(1) Zhdanov
(2) Beria
(3) Bulganin
(4) Molotov
(5) Malenkov
(6) Kaganovich

Zhdanov is dead. Beria has been purged. Molotov at 62 has behind him no potentiality for power or terror. Kaganovich is 60 and has steadily lost influence as his former protégé rose in the Party hierarchy. Malenkov, in fifth position in 1943, now controls the Party machinery, the organs of propaganda, and has the backing of the Party organization.

With Beria out of the way, either Bulganin or Molotov is next in the uneasy seat. I would say that Bulganin, because of his position as Marshal of the Red Army and Commissar of War, is somewhat more secure. This may have the effect of uniting Malenkov and the Red Army (including Marshals Bulganin and Zhukov). And this may put the purge finger on Mr. Molotov, my fourth-priority successor.

The naked struggle for power will continue, not between parties or factions within the Party, but between individuals moving toward the seat of supreme power. In this joined battle, Georgi Malenkov now has another task unit in his task force, the potential for power and terror of the police apparatus, of which Beria, in his hour of challenge, lost control.

THE POLITBURO—1942-1953

1942	1946	1947	1948	1950	1953*
Stalin	Stalin	Stalin	Stalin	Stalin	Malenkov
Zhdanov	Molotov	Molotov	Molotov	Molotov	Beria
Molotov	Beria	Beria	Voroshilov	Voroshilov	Molotov
Kalinin	Malenkov	Zhdanov	Beria	Andreyev	Voroshilov
Khrushchev	Mikoyan	Voroshilov	Kaganovich	Kaganovich	Khrushchev
Andreyev	Voroshilov	Mikoyan	Andreyev	Mikoyan	Bulganin
Voroshilov	Andreyev	Andreyev	Mikoyan	Khrushchev	Kaganovich
Kaganovich	Zhdanov	Kaganovich	Malenkov	Beria	Mikoyan
Mikoyan	Kaganovich	Khrushchev	Khrushchev	Malenkov	Saburov
	Khrushchev	Malenkov	Kosygin	Kosygin	Peruvkhin
		Alternates			
Beria	Shvernik	Vosnesensky	Vosnesensky	Shvernik	Shvernik
Shvernik	Vosnesensky	Shvernik	Shvernik	Bulganin	Ponomarenko
Vosnesensky		Kosygin	Bulganin		Meinkov
Shcherbakov		Bulganin			Bagirov
Malenkov					

*At the Party Congress in October 1952, the name of the Politburo was changed to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

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The Month's Reading

The Candid PM

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
(Personal Minutes, January-July, 1945)
Triumph and Tragedy
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953

PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL ISMAY

25 January 44

Pray give me summaries of what our Intelligence predicted [about German strategy and will to resist] on the two previous dates, and what they predict now. Each summary should be limited to fifteen lines. Nothing must be circulated until I have had an opportunity of reading these summaries. Do not let the officers concerned know that what they said a few months ago is being compared with what they say now. It would only dishearten them.

The Modern Army

GENERAL CHARLES L. BOLTE
Army Vice Chief of Staff, USA
New York, N. Y.
16 December 1953

New weapons inevitably require modification of tactics and of tactical organization. The Army is carefully studying the impact of the new matériel. There is a continuous review of Tables of Organization and Equipment to make sure that they provide the optimum combination of men and matériel. Dispersion and mobility, which have always been vitally important, are receiving even more emphasis. Training in the capabilities and employment of atomic weapons is integrated into the training of officers and men at all levels. We are stressing the development of lighter and more reliable equipment and increased firepower and striking power. At the same time, greater emphasis is being placed upon the initiative of small-unit leaders and the physical toughening of the soldier.

The Army, in fact, is undergoing a period of greatly accelerated progress and change. Its capabilities are greater than they have ever been before.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

BERNARD BRODIE
Foreign Affairs
January 1954

It is perhaps impossible at this time to picture what ground campaigns will be like in a situation where both sides freely use nuclear weapons of all sizes, and it is certainly disagreeable to try. But one result appears inevitable and important. Large masses of men must count for less on the battlefield except to provide more lucrative atomic targets —and superiority in military manpower is the one respect in which the Soviets have had us at an apparently permanent disadvantage. It also seems plain that opportunities to apply nuclear weapons usefully are much more open ended in tactical than they are in strategic use, which means that the American advantage in numbers of weapons and in ability to produce them (which there is no doubt we can continu to enjoy for as long as we are willing to make the effort is likely to be profoundly meaningful for some time to come For the short range penetrations characteristic of tactical use the problem of delivery is nothing like so acute as it is i strategic bombing; attrition rates for aircraft are lower, wider array of aircraft types and much larger numbers c aircraft are usable, and in the gun and the guided missile w have alternative methods of delivery. All this would seem to present the NATO Powers with a great net militar gain vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, provided always the forme can stand up as well as the latter to the threat of destructio of their cities, and provided also that reasonable precautio is taken against surprise nuclear attack on our tactical a forces.

Firing for Record

I. B. HOLLEY, JR.
Ideas and Weapons
Yale University Press, 19

Probably the real beginning of scientific accumulation data for ordnance came after the [Civil] War, in 1867, whe orders went out to all batteries of artillery requiring an exa and detailed report of each shot fired. Units were instructe to record the history of each gun, the weight of projectile and the quality of powder used, as well as other similar i formation, on blank forms provided for the purpose by t Ordnance Department. A few years later an imaginati and resourceful Chief of Ordnance, Brig. Gen. Steph Vincent Benét, demonstrated the real utility of a systema collection of statistics as a basis for decisions regarding d velopment of weapons. Using the figures compiled by t Surgeon General on casualties during the Civil War a reinforcing them with similar statistics from the Franc Prussian War, General Benét argued that the saber a bayonet were no longer important weapons. Presentation these facts started the movement which reduced the sab to the status of ceremonial gear.

Service Schools

BRIG. GEN. DALE O. SMITH, U F
Pegasus
December 1953

Air Power has pushed war into a new dimension and ls altered the art tremendously. But basic principles of wa and national strategy have remained as the great teachs devised them. These principles are nurtured and flourish i our service schools where the popular confusion betwe principles and tactics is clarified. In our institutions of hig military learning there is little tendency to cling to the ol procedures simply because of someone's equity in the kn how of past tactics. If we have faith in these schools th will undoubtedly produce new thinkers, like the two Mah and Tasker H. Bliss, who will scrutinize war in its new li and devise tactics to fit new weapons. It is here that we

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hieve a harmony of military thought in our rapidly chang-
g times. Here that the concept of Air Power can be ex-
nined and adjusted to contribute to the ideal of unification.
Unfortunately our officer schools tie up valuable man-
wer. An officer in school as a student or an instructor is
t immediately available for combat. In times of emergency
ch as today, service schools are stripped to the bone or dis-
nded. Should this condition maintain in an extended
nergency there is danger of causing, through lack of school-
g, an officer corps that is ignorant of the fundamental
derstandings of the art of war. Costly as it is for our im-
diate fighting force, service schooling must continue
abated if we desire an enduring future.

Minds and Strategy

COLONEL JOHN R. MANEY
Air University Quarterly Review
Fall 1953

From the air point of view there are many changes that
uld be desirable in our strategy. But from a ground or
val point of view these changes may not be desirable at all.
he important thing we must remember is that we change
ategy by changing people's minds. Whether the differ-
ce of viewpoint is the result of logic on your part or illogic
the other fellow's part is immaterial. To him his illogic
ms logic and your logic, illogical. In the nebulous field of
litary theory and strategy, where the only final proof is
e test of war, the sole frame of reference for judgment is
e experience of the individuals concerned and the evi-
nce of history.

Delayed Decorations

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
(Personal Minutes, June-December 1944)
Triumph and Tragedy
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War

3 December 44

I propose to speak to the King on Tuesday about this [let-
from a commanding officer on the Western Front com-
ining of the delay in men receiving their decorations,
ecially the "Immediate" awards], but I should first like to
ve your comments. I am indignant that men should perish
thout ever receiving decorations awarded them months
fore. I need scarcely say that no inquiries are to be
de about the writer or the regiment, as I take the respon-
ility.

Why the Reds Attack Science

VICE ADMIRAL LESLIE C. STEVENS, USN (Ret.)
Russian Assignment
Boston, 1953

According to the communist philosophy, the physical
rld is all that exists, consciousness being at best nothing
t the passive reflection of that external world. Since the
antum theory accepts the existence of a random factor in
physical world which can be dealt with only statistically,
eptance of the quantum theory as anything other than a
venient temporary tool tends to destroy the communist
thesis that everything is knowable and to wash away the logical and scientific foundations on which their whole ideological doctrine, the necessary justification of their power to even their own peoples, is built.

The Soviet regime does not persecute academic freedom of thought capriciously, just for the sake of persecution, but only in cases where viewpoints can undermine the power of the regime or interfere with its operations. If the Western world would study the scientific and other intellectual controversies that rock the Soviet Union, with a view to identifying the threats to the regime that are involved, and would then throw its own intellectual weight into these controversies, it might go far in loosening the hold which communism has on millions of minds.

Interview

GENERAL NATHAN F. TWINING
Chief of Staff, USAF
U.S. News and World Report
25 December 1953

Q. Is your concept of air power going to result in a reduced size of armies, or will you need the large mass armies?

A. I don't want to get into the other fellow's bailiwick. I don't like to talk too much about that.

Q. What about from the Soviet side, not just ours? They have been depending upon mass man power—

A. I think that's what they still figure.

Q. How would that work? If the Russians send an overwhelming ground force marching across Europe to the extent that you couldn't bomb them because they would be interwoven with the other parts of the population, your only hope then would be to bombard their sources and bases. But, meanwhile, wouldn't their armies overrun Europe?

A. If war should come, and we started our air offensive, got it going immediately against their capability of attacking us in this country, and against their war industry, I don't think their army could be effectively supported for very long. In addition, their armies would be subjected to direct attack by tactical air forces, which also can be very effective.

Q. How does that idea of the knockout punch differ from the idea between the two world wars—the blitzkrieg idea?

A. The blitzkrieg was really a combination of armies and air which enabled them to overcome forces that had less mobility and less air support. If war is forced upon us, we plan to provide air support with our tactical force. In addition, we have the long-range bomber force which would go deeper to the heart of the enemy country and destroy its sources of military power.

Q. This is the strategic bombing—

A. That's right.

Q. During the last war many people felt that this wasn't as immediately effective as the warfare that went on in the armies and the tactical air force. Has anything happened to make you feel that you can accelerate that step? Is there a new weapon?

A. Yes. In World War II we sometimes had to go back to a target four or five times before we knocked it out. I don't think we'll have to go back a second time to knock out a target now.

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LIFE AMONG THE INDIANS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL W. B. PALMER

The General Staff is a corporate tribe with a few chiefs and many Indians. The latter do the work and expend the sweat—all in the interests of the United States Army.

THE General Staff is no place for glamor boys, self-seekers, and glory-hunters. It requires officers who are thorough, painstaking and sound. General Staff work is mostly hard digging to establish the facts. Our biggest concern is to be sure we know what we are talking about. That is the hardest thing in the world, to know what you are talking about. First and last we must have facts: real, verified facts; complete facts.

So what we look for first is common sense, just plain horse sense. Second, patience. And, most important of all, good temper.

You also need the ability, which you must develop, to show one or two essential facts on a piece of paper no bigger than the palm of my hand.


An army exists for only one purpose: action. The staff exists only to produce action. We call you an "action officer" because we want action. All you are here for is to get something done. Any paper, any word you write, is wasted effort unless it directly contributes to getting something done. You may have a long hard task, a lot of research, a lot of conferences, a lot of concurrences; but all the time your mission is to find that solution and get something done.

Now the first thing is to gather all the pertinent facts; but the hardest part of that is to be sure that they are in truth factual. I cannot warn you too solemnly that this is very hard, this being sure yo have right and true facts. The most aw inspiring people sometimes make ir portant assertions that are not facts at a

In London, one day in Februa 1944, one of our greatest generals to me that for the invasion of France o M4 tanks must have half of their a munition in the form of white pho phorus shell. He said our tanks h burned up lots of German tanks wi white phosphorus shell in Sicily, a anybody in the 2d Armored Divisi could tell me about it. I think we we then manufacturing about five perce white phosphorus shell for the M tank, so he was making a hair-raisi demand. I went at once to the 2d A mored Division to get the story. T commanders all assured me that it w quite true—white phosphorus had rea paid off in Sicily, destroying many G man tanks with fire.

I then asked them for detailed, ex accounts of some actions in which t had occurred. Ten days later, I was t that they had been unable to find a s gle soldier or officer who would claim have set a German tank on fire w white phosphorus shell fired from M4 tank.

They did find one case in which self-propelled 75mm mountain howit of low muzzle velocity had been sho ing white phosphorus at a German ta which broke into flames. The gun said very honestly that everybody h been firing at the German tank and did not know whether he had fired shot that did it. There was no disco able basis of truth in the very posit assertions which made one of the gr est tank experts in the world want change the whole production of ta



LIEUTENANT GENERAL W. B. PALMER *is Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, Department of the Army. This article is based on a talk he made to officers newly assigned to G4. A former Corps commander in Korea, General Palmer was commander of VII Corps artillery in Europe during the Second World War.*

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mmunition. This incident certainly ıught me a profound lesson about get-ing the facts.

Now that man honestly thought he ıas sure of his facts. But you are going) find a whole lot of people, of high ınk and low, who will try to brush you ff or give you a snow job. The most sual reason is pure laziness. But some-mes you are sniffing around a man's pet obby or even his private racket. What-ver the reason, a whole lot of people re going to give you inaccurate informa-on, airy assurances, vague promises, nd useless generalities. None of these ıbstitutes for facts is acceptable.

CANNOT say this too brutally: You are no good on the General Staff if ou accept inaccurate information. It your business to verify your facts. We ın't tolerate people who try to hand the ieneral Staff a snow job. I won't toler-e General Staff officers who let them-lves be put off with snow jobs.

When you write your report you robably start out like most other people, ıcluding me. You grope around sorting ıt your ideas, and you get better ideas ; you go along, and it always works out ıat in the first part of the paper you y poorly what you repeat more clearly the second part and finally state well the third part. The secret is to throw vay the first and second parts and save ıe last paragraph in which you stated all (for the third time) very clearly. ou will be a third-rater so long as you easure your big words and fancy ırases and can't bear to boil your paper own to bare facts simply stated. Just y out the facts, and tabulate them if ou can, so we can see quickly what you e talking about, with the maximum onomy of words.

One way I can spot an amateur is by ıe word *furthermore*. Probably one-ıird of all the papers I look at begin ith a fairly clear presentation and then mes that word *furthermore;* and then lot of wild swinging. You will never nd anything after "furthermore" but gument.

OW let's summarize what I have said so far. Your sole purpose is to produce tion. First, persist in and insist on ob-ining and verifying facts. Second, arshal those facts in logical order and ıt away all the fancy phrases that ob-ure the facts. Then you are ready to ek the concurrences of all agencies hose responsibilities are affected by hat you propose to do. When you get l that done you have a solution.

A word about non-concurrences: sup-pose some other Indian comes around to you with his project and you look at it and you think it's terrible. Well, that's too bad, but the only ground on which you can non-concur is that it will be unworkable in the area for which you are the responsible General Staff man. You are not entitled to non-concur because you personally don't like that solution. I give concurrences quite regularly to schemes which I personally dislike; if the logistic operations of the Army will not be adversely affected by the proposed action, I have no right to obstruct G1, G2, or G3 just because my private views are different.

"Staffs exist to produce action." You have worked hard at getting the facts, writing them up and getting the concurrences. Now the directive is issued. You have created it and you read it proudly. But my question now is: having produced that directive, have you produced any action?

Not one bit. You haven't produced anything but the distribution of a piece of paper by the AG. It is just going to pile up on a lot of desks, lost, buried, ignored. Nobody is going to read it. If anyone does, he'll misinterpret it. So, up to now, you have accomplished nothing at all.

Every directive must be accompanied by positive provision for follow-up, to insure that it is obeyed. A staff that thinks its whole business is to keep the mimeograph machine smoking all day long doesn't accomplish a thing. It issues ten times as many orders as it should and doesn't enforce any of them; then issues more orders saying that the others will be obeyed.

I have tried all my life to follow this rule: *Never issue an order that you don't intend to enforce.*

It is easy. You set a target date in the directive. You call for periodic progress reports. You make staff visits. You make command inspections. You take official notice of inadequate performance, in three stages of severity. The first is a polite note, calling attention. The second is an official letter mentioning the basic directive and the polite note, and directing immediate attention. The third lists all prior actions and calls for an explanation. Down comes the boom. If you show you mean business from the beginning, things almost never reach that last unpleasant stage.

Whenever anybody gives me a date when something will be accomplished, I put it in a special drawer I keep for that purpose; and when the date comes around I ask if the promise has been kept. People think I am merciless and perhaps I am, but when I am given a promise I want to know if it was dependable or just another snow job. People know it and don't trifle with me. That is follow-up.

WE have to work out many solutions with the people in Defense, Navy, and Air Force. They are sincere, they are trying to serve their country, just as we are. When you work at this national level, so many factors come in that no one man can begin to see the whole problem. Everybody finds it exasperating as unsuspected difficulties keep rising. Just keep a tight hold on your good temper, your sense of humor and your plain common sense. That is the essence of the whole business.

There are no envies and jealousies among my colleagues, the other Gs. We are all on the same team and we are all friends. We never raise our voices in talking to each other. I think each of us is likely to be more impressed by the judgment of the others than he is by his own. What I know of those men from a lifetime of association has won them that sort of respect from me. They are sound men, and they are only interested in serving the Army well.

IN conclusion, the thing that is essential is to know what we are talking about. When you have the facts right, you will soon have a well-organized, well-coordinated, workable solution. We want to have a good Army and we'll buy any solution that is good for the Service. We are not here to worry about the importance of our staff position.

We sometimes talk about feeling frustrated. We push a solution up and get it thrown back. There's always somebody we can't get it past. Every one of those people is bringing mature judgment to bear; he may be a nuisance to you but he has a good point just the same.

The pay-off, after this struggle and turmoil, is that what finally gets out to the troops causes the absolute minimum of confusion and disorder. The hard grinding out of the solution up here means that you won't issue a poor order, half-baked, not properly coordinated, that has to be followed with a string of amendments and afterthoughts, all driving the people in the field crazy. It is the extra effort up here that pays off.

The General Staff is a corporate brain. Only the Chief of Staff and two or three other people are entitled to speak for it, but each Indian on the General Staff, however, obscure, overworked and beset by darkness, is a very important member of the U.S. Army.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Reorganization of the Army

(Continued from page 29)

would, for example, take over the presently divided responsibility for Class II installations from the technical services and the Army commanders.

Research and Development

To provide the soldier with clearly superior weapons and equipment, three great institutions of this country must be welded into a working unit—science, industry and the military. To achieve this, the military must make clear its needs and establish conditions and relationships that stimulate the active participation of science and industry.

THE Committee found a number of inadequacies in the existing organization for research and development:

"Responsibility for leadership is diffused . . ."

"No adequate means exist to coordinate and actively stimulate the efforts of all engaged in research and development . . ."

"Significance of research and development has not been fully recognized . . ."

"The Army's research and development organization has not attracted adequate support and interest from civilian scientists."

The Committee considered numerous alternatives for strengthening research and development but decided on these two steps:

Reassignment of responsibility for supervision from the Under Secretary to the Assistant Secretary for Matériel.

Clarification and enhancement of the position of Chief of Research and Development in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research.

To accomplish the latter, planning functions in R&D now in G4 would be transferred to the Chief of R&D and other R&D functions of G4 would be transferred to the Supply Commander.

Research and Development would continue to be the operating responsibility of the technical services but closer coordination and supervision would be effected by the Supply Commander under plans established by the Chief of R&D.

Finally the Secretary's Scientific Advisory Panel should be expanded in scope in order to promote the interest and support of more civilian scientists.

Financial Management

If the Army's management is to use the revised structure effectively, improvements must be made in the processes by which the work and activities are programmed and controlled and by which financial resources are budgeted and accounted for.

THE key to the organization recommended by the Committee is that the Army is moving towards creating an organization that can supply the Secretary of the Army with the packaged information he needs to assure him that his policies are being carried out and how well, and with information he must have to set policies.

This information is almost entirely financial and managerial. Just as the Congress controls through the power of the purse, so can the Secretary control through his power to allot funds and require reports as to how the funds are being used.

That this is rapidly becoming possible is due to the establishment of the Primary Program System, the "performance budget" and the office of the Comptroller.

Comptroller. Secretary Stevens is in favor of a military rather than a civilian comptroller. He favors this in the face of opposition in the Department of Defense and the opposite type of organization in the Air Force and Navy. The Committee supports his decision. It says:

A civilian comptroller would "eliminate the continuity essential to the top management of financial affairs. . . . [The Chief of Staff] requires the services of a comptroller, immediately responsible to him, for the fiscal control of operations, the appraisal of management methods and procedures, and for the channeling of a continuing flow of information upon which decisions can be based. The effective performance of these tasks requires continuity in office, and understanding of Army organization and functions, and a high degree of competence."

The Committee would make the work of the Comptroller more meaningful by revising and extending the Primary Program system, by making the "performance budget" better relate costs to work to be done, and integrating the numerous accounting systems in use in the Army.

Finally, it would have the system of reports appraised to produce the kind of information the Secretary of the Army must have if he is to determine policy, issue instructions and follow up on performance.

The Comptroller, the Committee notes, has broad and significant functions. These functions "comprehend the whole gamut of financial activities from the development of budget to the audit of accounts. It comprehends, too, the design and continual appraisal of organization, management processes and reporting methods."

The Committee would place the Office, Chief of Finance, under the direction of the Comptroller. Besides other benefits this would "be a step toward creating a corps of officers trained in the whole gamut of activities included in the conception of Comptrollership."

Prospects

Whatever . . . actions may be necessary to make the foregoing recommendations effective, the Committee recommends they be taken.

IT is known that Secretary of the Army Stevens is backing this reorganization plan. Two pieces of legislation are required:

The creation of the third Assistant Secretary for Financial Management, and

The position of Vice Chief of Staff for Supply.

Certainly the support of the Department of Defense is essential and it is here that the program or parts of it may come a cropper. The emphasis on the Chief of Staff as "operating manager" and the elimination of the operating responsibilities of assistant secretaries in the fields of money management and procurement may be the proposals that will be argued against by those who worry about "civilian control." They may not be convinced that the Secretary and his assistants will have control through better organization and improved reporting methods.

The soldier, whether of the combat arms or the technical services, stands to gain stature. The proposed program asserts the important functions of the military man more forcefully than it has been stated by anyone in a long time.

Certainly some details might be a bit different—some of these have been mentioned—but none would affect the overall result very much, as long as the basic ideas are retained.

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TROOP DUTY CAN BE REWARDING

COLONEL HUGH M. EXTON

Unfortunately troop duty hasn't been very attractive in recent years, but it could be if we understood why and took steps to correct it.

WE hear a lot about the lack of attractiveness of the military service. There are indeed many things that should be made more attractive, but these "fringe" dissatisfactions usually disappear rapidly when an officer or noncommissioned officer finds himself performing a job that he believes is important and can feel that his superiors are relying upon him because they believe he is capable of performing it well. Traditionally an officer or noncommissioned officer assigned to troop duty has the best chance of achieving a high sense of satisfaction. But unfortunately and unnecessarily in recent years troop duty has soured many men and instead of being the most rewarding kind of service it has become a boring, harassing duty that many try to evade. We should understand why this is.

DURING World War II when the Army was expanded very rapidly to many times its previous size, experienced officers and noncommissioned officers were spread thinly and many commanders concentrated more and more authority into their own hands in order to get the job done. Unfortunately this curtailed the exercise of initiative by subordinates.

This "over-centralization" has continued, despite the obvious fact that subordinate commanders who have restraints placed on them during pre-combat training cannot be expected to become decisive commanders on the battlefield.

In one division early in World War II a training schedule was published by division headquarters which specified exactly what every company would do for every hour each week for a period of several weeks. The schedule completely by-passed the chain of command and effectively removed all initiative and authority from regimental commanders and their subordinates. Some of these subordinate commanders pointed out that the schedule would not work because no consideration had been given to the special problems of units, the availability of training areas, and necessary interruptions to training. It followed that interest in training decreased measurably. Because certain jobs had to be done by various units regardless of training commitments, these units were forced to violate the schedule. The schedule could never be completed. All this resulted in such a lowering of morale and efficiency that considerable strenuous work was necessary to bring the division to a creditable status. All this could have been avoided by publishing a training program covering the subjects to be mastered by a reasonable date and leaving the detailed implementation to subordinate commanders. This would have stimulated the interest, initiative, and responsibility of subordinate commanders. Division headquarters could have kept a finger on the training through periodic inspections and visits.

Over-centralization is an evil when the committee system of training administered by selected instructors is used at the expense of commanders who are relegated to acting only as housekeepers and observers. Much is lost if the commander does not control and command his unit during the training.

Over-centralization, or the failure to use the chain of command, results in:

- Reducing the prestige of the subordi-

COLONEL HUGH M. EXTON, Artillery, is now on duty at the Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1935.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

nate commanders in the eyes of the men, whereas a commander's prestige should be built up to increase the weight of his decisions, especially those made in combat.

- Creating a relationship between superior and subordinate commanders which will harm the command when it goes into battle.
- Reducing the initiative of subordinate commanders. All training must be aimed at the development of combat readiness. This must include training commanders to accept the responsibility that will be theirs on the battlefield.
- Giving the subordinate commanders the impression that they are not trusted by their superiors.
- Seriously endangering the operational readiness of the unit. A small-unit commander who feels he is trusted by his superior and is given authority and responsibility commensurate with his position, is keenly interested in doing a good job.

Sometimes over-centralization is the result of a commander's belief that some of his subordinates are not efficient, experienced, or aggressive enough to carry out his policies without detailed guidance. Over-centralization may be a temporary preventive, but it is not a cure.

SERVICE schools stress the need for careful advance planning in training activities. Usually G3s and S3s do their best to plan ahead as far as possible, taking into account the various foreseeable contingencies affecting training. However, it is the unusual staff officer who can take into account all the whims and changes of attitude by his commander. And it is these whims of commanders which so seriously affect training and the planning of the staff. Certainly not all commanders have sudden whims and certainly a commander should change his mind at times. However, I have seen commanders who change their minds too often. A thoughtful, hard-working commander can, within his own command, reduce the changes, interruptions, and conflicts which interfere with training plans.

Of particular concern are last-minute interruptions. A regiment following the division training program planned a field exercise for a particular day. The day before, word was received from division headquarters that there would be a meeting of all commanders, executive officers, and S3s the following day. This required the cancellation of the regimental exercise as all the key officers would be absent. Even if the meeting was important, a check of training schedules by division headquarters could have avoided interrupting an important lower unit exercise, or sufficient advance notice could have permitted a change in date for the exercise. Interruptions of this sort seriously impair the morale and interest of the subordinate commanders.

Similarly distracting are last-minute changes in training schedules. A regiment published a training program for a three-month period stressing progressive small-unit training. In the middle of the period, the regiment issued a directive that by a date one week later every man would have received six hours' instruction in mine laying. The battalions and companies had to revise their schedules completely and cancelled some special problems they had planned for the coming week. New lesson plans had to be hurriedly prepared, new training areas requested, and comments flowed freely to the effect "why doesn't somebody in this Army make up his mind as to what we're supposed to do?"

Interruptions and changes can be kept to a minimum by careful advance planning by commanders at all levels and by careful consideration of human values, such as interest, morale, and motivation.

In combat, soldiers fight in all types of weather, night or day, weekdays, Sundays, and holidays. In the scheduling of training, however, holidays must be considered. It is extremely disheartening for one unit training on a holiday to see other units observing the holiday.

When there is too much wasted time men begin to feel that their instruction has been improperly prepared, poorly organized, and their interest drops off rapidly. It is important that men always feel that what they are doing is worthwhile.

IN the Army we spend a lot of time emphasizing the proper preparation and organization of training. Hours are spent in learning how to use training aids, in the preparation of lesson plans, and in the presentation of instruction. Yet there is much poor preparation and poor instruction. We have all seen the sergeant instructor go to a class and read verbatim from a field manual. The natural reaction of the members of the class is that if each of them were given a copy of the manual he could read it better by himself and probably learn more. Then there are the instances of instruction conducted with a blackboard so placed that only a few of all the men can see it. The others stand around the edges of the group and soon are talking among themselves about everything except the subject of instruction. After a few such instances it is extremely hard to interest men in anything, and the training effectiveness of the company suffers.

It has been said that a busy soldier is a happy soldier. This is true only as long as the soldier feels his work is productive for him or his unit. It is far better to spend only thirty hours of a week in well prepared and organized training than to spend forty-eight hours simply because higher headquarters has so directed.



On-the-job training in Korea, since the cease fire, is extensive. A lieutenant direc a crew in the adjustment of the recoil system of a 155-mm howitzer.

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"O command effectively a commander must know the condition of his unit t all times. Thus he must have inspec- ons and call for certain reports. The xtent of both activities increases with ıe size of the unit. The report system time-saving for a commander; he can t at his desk and read the reports as ıey come in. But this leads to a ten- ency to require more reports on subjects ot already covered. Very often the per- ın who requires a report does not realize ıe implications for the lower unit com- ıander who has to assemble the infor- ıation. Even with all his problems, a ıpany commander may be able to ep his morale up if he can see progress. ut when he is required to report infor- ation which could easily be obtained the higher commander through a rsonal visit or one by his staff, his orale suffers a decided slump. If re- rts are piled on reports, this slump in orale can easily be transferred to the en in the unit.

Some commanders appreciate the re- rt problem and therefore concentrate inspections. However, this can be al- ost as bad as excessive reports. Certain spections have to be made periodically: ommand Maintenance Inspections, In- ector General Inspections, Training spections, and others. If a commander en schedules an unusually large num- r of barracks inspections, motor park spections, mess inspections, dayroom spections, TI&E display boards inspec- ns, and inspections in ranks, lower nit commanders will find they cannot vote time to anything but preparation r the next inspection, with a conse- ent decrease in proper supervision of ining.

It sounds like an old cliché to say at the solution is a balance between ports and inspections. But that is just at it is and it takes a wise and con- lerate commander to realize when this ppy medium is reached.

HE mission of all units is to achieve he highest state of combat readiness. t it is not often that a unit commander called up on the carpet because his it is inadequately trained or a unit mmander is commended because his it is well trained. That seems to be pected regardless of conditions. But ood many commanders are put on the rpet because their units have mediocre cords in AWOL, venereal disease, sol- rs' deposits, military injuries, acci- nts, courts-martial and other so-called rale indices. I have seen commanders led to task because of failure in one two of these matters even though their units were very highly trained. This leads to the placing of emphasis on making a high record on these peripheral matters at the expense of training. I have no intention of minimizing the importance of such matters, but they must be treated in proper relation to training and preparation for combat.

There certainly is no better way of providing recreation and physical conditioning and stimulating unit spirit than a well planned athletic program. However, to achieve these results the program should be kept on a company level and be so controlled as to remain a game and not become so important and involved as to approach a professional status and place athletes on permanent special duty.

Many of our commanders believe that time devoted to close order drill could be used to better advantage. There is no substitute for vigorous, well-handled close order drill for developing good personal appearance and bearing, individual discipline and the ability to move quickly and precisely. While outward signs of discipline such as clean uniforms, good saluting, and precise drill do not necessarily indicate a unit's overall combat effectiveness, they generally are good indicators of a unit's overall discipline. And good discipline is certainly a requisite for combat effectiveness.

One of the greatest sins which can be committed in the name of training is to use it as a means of punishment. The administration of punishments should never involve training. This does not mean that extra hours cannot be used for necessary training. To require a man to participate in rifle instruction, bayonet practice, close order drill, or a full field hike as extra duty or hard labor is a sure way of reducing not only *his* interest in training but also that of other men who know of it. Their motivation for future training as well as their respect for the commander takes an emphatic drop.

TO treat soldiers as individuals, accepting the fact that men have different skills, degrees of intelligence, likes and dislikes, backgrounds, and personalities, has become in recent years doctrine in our Army. This doctrine stresses that in combat and in training the soldier should not be told simply what to do, but that he be made to understand not only what he must do but why. Emphasis is placed upon continually informing the soldier in order that he can understand better the reason for his being in the Army, the reason for his being stationed where he is, the reasons for the activity in which he may be engaged. Emphasis is also placed on developing the soldier's interest and in stimulating his desire for military proficiency. Thus, it is apparent that in the Army there is appreciation of the need for the proper motivation of soldiers in order to increase their effectiveness. It is accepted that good leadership involves consideration of the individual.

This is all fine, but the desired results are often not obtained because of failures on the part of the commanders in the field. Some do not appreciate the importance of this doctrine, others do not understand the techniques of doing this, and others are just thoughtless. In every case the result is the destruction or reduction of the officer's or soldier's interest and will to learn, his desire to become an effective soldier. It is a failure of leadership that we cannot afford.

Athletics are fine—if widely participated in on a platoon or company level



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New Gear for a Progressive Army





ALUMINUM BRIDGES . . . LIGHTER, STRONGER, SAFER

Army engineers and the aluminum industry have developed new combat bridges that can be transported easily and rapidly, put in place quickly, and carry loads greater than World War II bridges. At left above is a scissors-type bridge that is carried and launched by a turret-less tank. It will carry up to 60 tons. At right above is an assault-type bridge that can be towed to the site by a truck. It is 43 feet long, has a 13½-foot roadway and can also support 60-ton loads.

COMPANY-SIZED TROOP CARRIER. Transportation Corps' famed 60-ton amphibious BARC was designed to carry heavy machinery, but in tests at the Transportation Research and Development Station (TRADS), Fort Story, Va., it has carried 203 field-equipped soldiers. The craft in the background are World War II 2½- and 5-ton DUKWs.




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


OBILE TV USED IN TRAINING

Signal Corps is exploring the tremendous pos-
ilities of TV as an Army educational and
ining medium. Above, a soldier TV camera-
an shoots the action as the Airborne Depart-
nt of The Infantry School demonstrates the




loading and packing of a howitzer for an air drop. Above, a class at an Army school receives demonstrations and lectures by TV.



-TON M47 TANK FLOATS

e weird-looking series of crates surrounding the M47 in the cut
ove will carry it safely across deep water as the cut below attests.



AND A NEW JEEP . . .

Willys Motors recently unveiled this new "Aero Jeep" under test by Army Ordnance at Aberdeen Proving Ground. It weighs 1,475 pounds and is 100 inches long, 60 inches wide and 65½ inches in height. However, its pay load capacity is 525 pounds cross-country and 1,025 on hard-surfaced roads. Willys says that 85 per cent of the parts are interchangeable with the standard jeeps.



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The Month's Comment

THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT

ON page 11 where we publish the National Defense portion of President Eisenhower's State of the Union message, the fourth point made by the President appears in bold face type. We instructed our printer to do this because we want every professional soldier to read it. The President specifically mentioned "adequate living quarters and family housing units, and medical care for dependents." When the President spoke of the need for adequate family housing he was speaking from experience. He and Mrs. Eisenhower know what it is to live in makeshift quarters, fashioned out of temporary barracks. They lived in such quarters at Camp Meade, Maryland, in the early 1920s. And the Eisenhowers know, too, the importance of medical care for Army families. And so we hope that the Congress follows the lead of the President, conscious that he is intimately acquainted with the conditions of which he spoke.

Alert Officers

IN his report on the events and the thinking that went into the creation of the "new look" (Page 15), Mr. Lloyd Norman concludes with a few paragraphs showing the trend of thinking in some quarters of the Army about "atomic-age infantry" and the eventual organization of the Army in the period of transition that faces us today. The trends Mr. Norman outlines are as he gathered them in the course of his work as a reporter in the Pentagon. They are highly suggestive and every soldier will find them extremely interesting, whether he thinks them on target or off. The significant and heartening thing is that Mr. Norman had no trouble at all in finding officers who are thinking deeply about the future role and organization of the Army.

CHEST OUT, EYES BRIGHT

WHENEVER soldier talk turns to the reasons for the civilian preference for the Air Force or Navy, you'll usually find agreement when someone says, "What the Army needs is something that can catch the imagination of the people like a silvery jet streaking through the sky at 600 mph or a destroyer cutting through deck high waves at 35 knots."

At times it has been suggested that tanks be glamorized, as though an elephantine 45-ton "Patton" could compete with a sylph-like Sabrejet for the public's affection.

Our own candidate for the job of wooing the public's fancy is the soldier himself. When he stands straight, gut in, chest out, eyes bright, he is the most appealing figure in the world. When by action he shows himself a man who is neither submissive nor arrogant, the people respect him. When he neither whimpers nor blusters when he speaks, but talks straight and clearly and to the point, the people admire him. The soldier himself is the Army's secret weapon in this scrap for the public's fancy. But there can be no quarter; every soldier from the Chief of Staff down must participate all of the time. But if the goal is pursued relentlessly in time the jet will get no more attention than last year's model at the auto show.

THE SOLDIER'S WAY

IT would be very easy to say that the Army's "had it," that the implications of the "new look" are disastrous to the Army and to the career of the professional soldier and that from here on it is every man for himself and you had better take to the hills, men, or try to get into something permanent like blacksmithing or short-order cookery.

Very easy, but not very soldierly or very sensible, so professional soldiers will do no more than utter a gripe or two to close friends.

It's been this way before. Hard times and little recognition have been the lot of the U. S. Army in more years than otherwise since 1775. Yet the Regular Army always survived to serve the nation selflessly and gloriously when the ordeal of battle came. But the soldier looks about him today and sees Communism growing in power and still aggressive i

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ent. The situation is not like it was in 1781, 1865, 1918 and 1945 en victory was unquestioned.

E soldier can agree with the "new look" so far as it deals with tangible cts. The soldier was aware before his critics that the center of gravity rmy power was dangerously off balance as long as a preponderance of Army's force was in Korea. His common sense and his technical wledge of war made him an advocate of bringing some of that power k home where it could be available for fast commitment wherever and never needed. The soldier would agree that the strength of the y could be reduced somewhat if the Korean conflict was definitely , if a European Army was more than a possibility, if plans and money e available for building a truly strong and ready National Guard and y Reserve.

ut the soldier is quite aware that the peace in Korea is not certified; a war rages in Indochina and that bonfires of war threaten in other s of the globe. The soldier notices that none of the Army's worldwide sions and tasks have been materially reduced and yet plans are made educe the Army's strength by eighteen or more per cent in the next nteen months. The soldier can hope that these reductions won't t the Army's combat capabilities. But he is too realistic not to have bts; in the past he has seen "wasteful" support strength eliminated l combat troops were so busy supporting themselves that they were nbat" in name only. The soldier has high hopes, too, that the new pons (ground and air) will save the lives and blood of men, but he ses to be starry-eyed at the prospect. The soldier cannot, as General gway said, go along with those who espouse "new and untested ces, machines and weapons in the hope that these can substitute for ."

the soldier the implications of the "new look" are far more distressing an the concrete proposals contained in it, so far as those proposals e been revealed.

ne of the inferences the soldier makes is that some of his civilian ers completely discount the Army because it emphasizes the heart- s of men rather than the timing of spark plug and piston stroke; use the Army believes that men of brains and brawn can win victories cannot be won by machines directed and operated by electronic vels.

ERE are other implications in the "new look" that are equally dis- ssing. But the soldier puts aside the unproductive casting of infer- es and gets on with his job. That is all he can do and he will do it , as always. And he can hope as he goes about it that his superiors let him do his full duty, without hampering him with restrictions penalties imposed by those who don't know what it is to be a pro- onal soldier.

he soldier does not ask for tranquillity in a world where peacefulness sham. The soldier does not ask for the comfortable living that per- ent existence in one community gives. The soldier does not ask for lth; when he became a soldier he passed that prospect by.

he soldier asks only that he be respected and that the nation do its l best to make his life and that of his family as much like the lives of ellow Americans as the nature of his profession permits.

The Army Changes

FIFTY years ago this year *Infantry Journal* published its first issue (*The Field Artillery Journal* began publication in 1910) and so 1954 is a milestone in the life of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL (now in its fourth year under that title).

The Army of 1904 and the Army of 1954 have striking dissimilarities and yet underneath there is a solid foundation of sameness. In the months to come we expect to point up some of the differences and some of the significant similarities. For we believe that in these days when the Army is most surely in a period of critical change it would be helpful to our understanding of where we are today to know how we got here.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

The Word from the Schools

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Human Research Unit

Army Field Forces has established a Human Research Unit at TIC which will study methods of improving infantry training and do research in the motivation and morale of infantrymen.

The unit is under the operational control of Army Field Forces with technical supervision coming from the Human Research Office in Washington, D. C.

Dr. Francis E. Jones will head the new organization until a military chief is selected. In addition to military personnel, the staff includes ten professional civilian psychologists.

Carbine Transition Firing

A new transition firing course for the carbine to be superimposed on the standard M1 transition course has been developed at TIS. The new course is in line with recent changes in the standard rifle marksmanship courses revised for the M1, the automatic rifle and carbine.

The course consists of eight targets for slow single-shot firing, and six targets for automatic setting.

A new course for the automatic rifle has already been established.

New Field Manuals

FM 22-5, *Drill and Ceremonies,* is a complete revision of the old manual. It contains a section devoted to instructors and another that describes the drill definitions.

FM 23-25, *Bayonet,* contains new illustrations of each movement to show exact execution.

These manuals are being distributed.

Extension Courses

The 50 series of the Infantry Army Extension Course program has been revised and is now ready for distribution. The 50 series is primarily designed to provide instruction for majors. However, first lieutenants and captains may enroll if they have successfully completed the 40 series or if their duties indicate a need for enrolling in this course.

To secure a "Certificate of Completion of Course Series" for the 50 series it is necessary to complete all of the required subcourses except those from which exemption is granted by virtue of completing a resident course of instruction at The Infantry School.

Most of the subcourses are new or have been completely revised to reflect recent changes in organization and the latest methods of employing infantry units. The new subcourses in this series round out the program of instruction and more closely parallel resident instruction at TIS. The subcourses which have not been changed are considered adequate in scope and up to date.

To obtain a list of the subcourses or to enroll in the 50 series write: The Commandant, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. ATTN: AEC, Department of Non-Resident Instruction.

New Training Films

New training films recently completed and released for instructional purposes are: *Rugged Rangers* (Film Bulletin No. 285); Training Films 7-1506 and 7-1642, being parts 1 and 2 of *The Reinforced Rifle Platoon in the Attack of a Built-up Area.*

Training Film No. 21-1840, *Principles of Leadership;* and Film Bulletin No. 283, *Ranger Training,* have also recently been completed and are ready for use.

These films may be obtained by military units upon request through the Central Film Library in each army area.

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

280mm Gun Battalion Tests

TAS is currently conducting tactical tests of the 280mm gun battalion. The purpose of these tests is threefold: (1) to determine if present doctrine and technique relative to the employment of very heavy artillery are suitable when applied to the employment of a 280mm gun battalion; (2) to further develop concepts relative to technical and tactical employment of the 280mm gun battalion; (3) to determine the adequacy of the unit as presently organized.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Artillery Quotation of the Month

There is nothing the artillery won't or can't do; no place the artillery won't or can't go.

MAJOR GENERAL DAVID G. BARR
CG, 7th Inf Division
Korea, 1950

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Graphic Solution for Mets

A graphic solution to the metro message has been devised and is being field tested at TAS. The solution requires the use of three graphical aids: a circular cross- and range-wind computer, a direction computer (similar in appearance to a GFT), and an elevation computer (similar in appearance to a large slide rule).

Among many advantages offered by the graphic method: Metro corrections can be computed for a target in approximately 1 minute. Range corrections for each element are accumulated on the rule, with the total result presented as an elevation correction. Instruction in computing a metro is greatly simplified.

Gunnery Training Aid

A fire direction projection kit, for use with the Vu-Graph projector, is currently in use in TAS gunnery instruction after nearly two years of experimentation. A teaching aid for fire direction techniques, the kit replaces, in most instances, the large terrain board type aid; e.g., the "puff board." The chief limitation of the old "puff board" was that it could be used effectively only with small groups of students. The new projection kit is limited only by the size of the screen available in the classroom.

The new training aid allows the instructor to cover all phases of fire direction instruction from the use of the graphical tables to the actual preparation of the firing chart. Components of the kit are: graphical firing table, 105mm howitzer; graphical site table, 105mm howitzer; military slide rule; and a 1/25,000 meter grid sheet with range deflection fan, coordinate square, target grid, scale, and mil protractor. Each component is a working model for projection.

Kits will be made available to Field Artillery ROTC units in the near future.

New Barracks

Twenty-one permanent, ultra-modern barracks are nearing completion at Fort Sill. The buildings will house on-post units. Occupancy by field artillery battalions has already begun. The construction was planned so as to complete the barracks in increments of five, with the final increment expected to be ready for use in early April.

LIBRARY



-am-See—where U.S. troops newly arrived in Austria are oriented for duty in a country that lies within the Iron Curtain.

AUSTRIA

Where They Waltz in Squeaky Shoes

MAJOR MARCO POLO

STRIA is one of the vital nerve enters of Europe, and a key spot in cold war. United States soldiers in ria have a delicate role to play for are all but surrounded by the Iron ain in a country occupied jointly by United States, Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia.

1945, when the Allies occupied the try, Austria was guaranteed treat- as a liberated rather than an occu- country, and eventual political free-

OR MARCO POLO is the collective pseu- nym of the authors writing this series.

AROUND THE BASES—2

dom. But because Austria is a major communications center of Europe, is highly industrialized and oil-rich, and because it juts deeply into the Soviet bloc of European nations, the Russians have refused to come to an agreement with Western governments about Austria. So it is still split, occupied by the Soviets and the Western powers.

SINCE the end of World War II the United States, Great Britain and France have provided Austria with money and technical aid to help make her self-sufficient. The Russians, on the other hand, have stripped the half of the country they occupy. In the typical Soviet pattern, entire factories have been dismantled and shipped into Russia, and Russia gobbles up sixty percent of Austrian oil production.

The American soldier finds duty in Austria delicate, hard—combat troops in the American zone train constantly, and spend a lot of time in the field—and fun. Austria is a beautiful country, and there is something there for everyone, no mat-

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

ter what his interests.

The American zone of Austria borders on Germany. Headquarters of United States Forces in Austria (USFA) is at Salzburg, and the only other large city in the zone is Linz, which borders on the Soviet zone. There are United States Army posts at both Salzburg and Linz, and camps scattered throughout the zone. There is another U.S. post in Vienna, the four-power-occupied capital that lies deep in the Soviet zone.

The fourth city garrisoned by USFA, Leghorn, is not in Austria, but in Italy. It is the port for USFA and the command has troops there and small detachments spotted along the supply route between Leghorn and Salzburg.

TRAVEL from the United States to Austria is normally by ship to Leghorn. Sometimes, however, soldiers and dependents will be routed through Bremerhaven, Germany. In either case the trip from the port to Austria is by rail, unless you have your automobile with you. Air transportation is sometimes allowed, in which case you land at Rhine-Main Airport at Frankfurt, Germany.

Concurrent travel was once authorized to USFA, but the housing situation is such that now there is considerable delay before dependents get there. The delay varies with each major area, but generally your dependents will not follow you before at least six months.

Once you have housing, it will be good. Originally all dependent housing in Austria was requisitioned. Quarters ranged from reasonably modern apartments to handsome villas. In some cases entire apartment buildings were requisitioned, and in others only certain units, so that it was not unusual for an American to find that his close neighbors were Austrian.

To a certain extent this is still true, but gradually the requisitioned housing is being returned to the Austrians. It is being replaced by American-style apartment developments. These, built by the Austrians with ECA funds and under Army supervision, are comparable to the better apartment developments in the United States.

Whether you live in such a development, or in an Austrian house or apartment, the quarters will be adequate and comfortable. The American-built units have central heating and 110-volt, 60 cycle current. But you are in for a few surprises in the requisitioned houses.

Few have central heating. In a country which has a climate like New England this may sound frightening, but it isn't. Austrian houses are warm. Some are heated by fireplaces, but many are heated by handsome tile stoves that are common in central Europe. While it's true you have to keep stoking them, many Army wives are delighted with the decorative possibilities they offer.

ELECTRICITY in Austria is confusing. In Vienna, where all dependent housing is requisitioned, it is not unusual to find a single apartment building with four types of current—220 volt, 50 cycle, AC—the so-called "standard"; 220 volt, 50 cycle, DC; 110 volt, 60 cycle, AC; and 110 volt, 60 cycle, DC. You never know what you're going to get until you plug in.


For that reason it is wise to have your electrical equipment converted before you leave the States. It is also wise to include in your hold baggage one or two transformers that will handle appliances like toasters and electric irons.

Don't worry if you fail to have your gadgets converted. Austria is an industrial country, its electrical products are good, and you can buy individual converters on the civilian market for as little as four dollars.

As far as electrical appliances are concerned, it is not necessary to take many with you. Radios yes, but no television. No need for a refrigerator (although you can make good use of a deep freezer) because the Quartermaster supplies them as well as stoves. Stoves in American-built quarters are electric, but in the requisitioned housing they may be electric or gas.

You can take a washing machine, dryer, and vacuum cleaner if you want to, but chances are they will only gather dust, because most Austrian domestic workers are suspicious of such gleaming gadgets.

As for smaller appliances, take the ones you have that you simply can



AUSTRIA — In the shadow of the Iron Curtain

LIBRARY

gine doing without, but don't stock with new ones. The Post Exchanges well supplied with American appli-es and the Austrian-built appliances very good, and have the additional ue of being built for Austrian cur-t.

sure to take your own beds. Gov-ernment quarters are furnished with ombination of Quartermaster furni-e and furniture of local manufacture. trian mattresses are made in three ions, lying crossways of the bed. e beds are hard to make, and the mat-ses have a tendency to separate dur-the night, especially if you tumble thrash in your sleep.

eople who like antique or period niture find Austria a virtual shoppers' adise, because the furniture is hand-e and quite inexpensive by our dards. If you are a modern furniture ocate, you'll be disappointed; Aus-n modern is heavy, awkward, and s it.

ustria has some of the best and ttiest tableware in the world, and so re is no need for you to hazard your e china and crystal to an overseas age. If you are a fancier of such gs you will come back from your heavily laden with dishes, silver-e and such.

inens—the utilitarian kind like sheets pillow cases and towels—are avail-e at the Post Exchange, but it is wise have a good supply in hand before leave the States. You'll find lovely e linens at surprisingly low prices.

IOPPING facilities in Austria are among the best of any overseas sta-. The Post Exchanges and commis-es are well stocked with the necessi-and some of the luxuries, but you soon find yourself at the local mar-s. There you'll find good meats and cious fruits and vegetables, the latter season only, of course. The commis-es have canned and frozen foods.

The meat supply on the Austrian ket is a delight to Americans with a e for red meat, poultry and venison. ats that are in a luxury class in the ited States are in every Austrian cher shop at prices that are extremely ap by our standards. You will find, example, pheasant and saddle of ison and whole filets of beef. Aus-n veal is particularly good. They kill ounger and dress it differently than do, and the result is a meat with a e delicate texture and far lighter r than we are used to.

As for clothing, most people rely on



Soviet "Officer of the Day" inspects international partol of American, British, French and Soviet soldiers in Vienna. Command of patrol is "rotated."

the Post Exchange for such things as shirts, shoes and underwear, and look to the local market for other apparel.

The Post Exchange carries all uniform items, of course, as well as a pretty good supply of men's civilian clothes, women's and children's wear. Most women do their "utility" and lingerie buying at the PX.

The best solution is to visit your favorite department store in the United States before you leave, and talk with the personal shopper. She will keep a file on your measurements, and your taste in clothes, and from then on you shop by mail. Best in New York, Marshall Field in Chicago, and Garfinckel in Washington are spoken of highly for this kind of service, but any good U.S. department store will probably be happy to take care of your needs.

Most Army wives in Austria soon find that Austrian seamstresses sew a beautiful stitch, but are lacking in a sense of chic. Styling is apparently beyond most of them, and most wives are disappointed in what they get. They wind up using their seamstresses only for simple jobs, such as revamping an old dress. If you can find a good seamstress, you are in luck, because Austria, at the crossroads of Europe, gets all kinds of handsome materials.

MEN are more fortunate, although they too depend on the Post Exchange for utility and sports clothing and accessories. The Post Exchange selection of suits and topcoats is standard and limited, but Austrian tailors are excellent. There was a time when they insisted on tailoring clothes their way rather than the American way (one officer tells of arguing for four weeks because he wanted hip pockets in his trousers and in Austria pants don't have back pockets; they compromised on one back pocket). Austrian tailors have resigned themselves to American foibles and they'll turn you out a well tailored suit for about $100.

Austrian dress clothes are excellent, and since there is an active social life among Americans, most officers have tailored dinner jackets and those who like (or find it necessary) to dress up invest in a suit of tails. Your lady and your tailor will agree that a waltz, even in Austria, isn't perfect unless the partner is in formal clothes.

European ready-made clothing is almost universally poor. So steer clear of it. Shoes, too, are a problem. Austrian shoes squeak—all Austrian shoes do—so you had better rely on the Post Exchange, or stock up before leaving the U.S. Women who prefer a certain brand had better make an arrangement for shoes by mail. Children's shoes are in limited supply in the Post Exchanges so it is wise, particularly with growing children, to take along a mail order catalogue which has a foot-measuring scale among its pages. Mail order service from the States takes four to six weeks.

In planning your wardrobe remember that the climate is about like that of New England, only damper. You will need winter clothes more than summer (winter uniform is worn all year around) and sturdy, comfortable shoes because you will walk a lot. Women should lean heavily on suits and winter-weight dresses, and be sure to take along a lightweight coat for spring and early fall. Take silks rather than cottons, because summers are short and cool.

In choosing fabrics the washable synthetics like orlon and nylon are a better bet than pure woolens because Austrian dry cleaners shrink things.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

THE children should be well supplied with rain wear and cold weather gear. A couple of pairs of boots or galoshes are a must. If you have a high school age brat he or she will need enough equipment to last at least a week in boarding school, because the only high school in the American zone is at Linz, and most students are at home only on weekends. They are quartered in dormitories, and the quarters, food and care are excellent. The school is accredited by American colleges and universities.

Elementary schools are operated at each of the posts, so there is no transportation problem there. The teachers are Americans, except for German-language instructors, music teachers, and a few other specialists.

And speaking of languages, the children will pick up German fast. It is not at all uncommon for an Army wife to take her four-year-old with her on shopping tours to be the interpreter.

It is helpful if you know a little German, but it isn't absolutely necessary, because most merchants who deal with Americans have a little knowledge of English by now, and the servants' grasp of our language ranges from fair to excellent.

The only problem you will have with servants in Austria is learning to let them do things their way. The Army maintains a servants' register, and they have all been checked out, so you need have little fear of getting a thief or spy. Wages are set by the Austrian government, based on type of work, age and experience, and most Army families find they can afford at least one servant.

But they are set in their ways. Austrians believe that clothes should be washed by hand, floors scrubbed on the hands and knees, and rugs swept. It is not unusual to see a housemaid down on her hands and knees, combing out the fringe on the rugs. If you let them have their own way they'll keep your house clean.

RECREATION-WISE, no matter what your interests, you will find something to satisfy them in Austria. For the outdoor sportsman, Austria is a perfect place. There is a great deal of game. The chamois, which lives in the mountain crags above the timberline, is one of the most difficult animals on earth to stalk and shoot. There is wonderful fishing. The spinning reel, now becoming popular in the United States, was brought here by Army people coming home from USFA tours. Take your sporting equipment with you, but if you're a gun crank leave room in your collection for at least one sporting rifle made by the gunsmiths of Austria; they are among the world's best.

All of the typical winter sports are available in Austria. For the skier there are some of the best slopes in Europe. Bad Gastein, for years a famous summer resort on the strength of its mineral springs, has opened several ski lifts and now is a year-around pleasure spot visited by skiers from all over Europe.

There are golf courses and tennis courts, and the Russian sector of Vienna sports a stable of good riding horses. The *Prater,* Vienna's huge park, has an amusement park that vies with Coney Island for thrills.

Music lovers will anticipate the annual Salzburg festival, which lasts a month each summer. It draws leading artists from all over the world. And in Vienna two opera companies run the other eleven months of the year. Vienna has excellent symphony orchestras, too, with visiting artists from all of Europe. If you prefer your music in more casual surroundings the wine gardens and cafés have accomplished musicians. Austria is a land of music.

IF you are a tourist at heart there are dozens of museums and castles, like pages from the history books, all open to



Want adventure? Thrills? Then join the Army and climb the Austrian Alps with this young lieutenant. It's all in the day's work at the U. S. Mountain Training Center in Saalfelden.

visitors. You are free to travel through out the American, British and Frenc zones. You can venture into the Sovie zone during daylight hours but whe the shades of night begin to fall—you better hike back into the free world.

All of free Europe is open to you. Yo can visit Germany, France, Italy, Spain the Scandinavian countries and Nort Africa. Special Services have an arrang ment with the travel agencies so you ca go on guided tours easily and for ver little money.

If you don't like the idea of guide tours, you are free to drive. While it not necessary to have an automobile i Austria, it is highly recommended.

If you have no automobile, or if yo are thinking of getting a new one, yo might be wise to wait until you get t Austria. United States-built automobile purchased through the Post Exchange through Austrian dealers, are cheap there than they are at home, because yo can ship them free on your orders, an you don't have to pay federal or sta taxes. Or, if you want a smaller, cheape operating car, you can buy one of se eral surprisingly good, surprisingly lo priced European models.

Maintenance is no problem, but it wise to take or buy a car with standa rather than automatic gearshift. T Post Exchange garages, and civilia garages in the larger cities of Europ can fix automatic transmissions but t village mechanic isn't hep to their int cacies. He is capable, though, of doi good work on less involved mechanic difficulties.

If you take an American car to Austr it is best to take one built by the B Three, because parts are easier to g And take a car that is easy on gasolin You will buy most of your gas from t Quartermaster, at a fair price, but if y have to buy it on the road in Europe y will pay up to 65 cents a gallon.

The only special equipment you w need for your car in Austria are six-p tires. Many of the roads are gravel, a they chew tires up pretty badly. It better to buy the tires in the States th get them in Austria, because while th are available there they are in sh supply, and sometimes certain sizes a out of stock.

You will enjoy your automobile Austria. It will help you get the "fe of Europe, it will be a big aid in sh ping and in the close-knit social l enjoyed by the people of USFA, and will take you to the quiet little inns the back roads where the people friendly, the food good, and the atm sphere peaceful and romantic.

LIBRARY

AREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

THIS is the sixth in the series of articles on Career Management and how it serves you. If you have any comment or questions on this series please feel entirely free to write the editors or Career Management Division.

pecialization For Combat Arms Officers

general, the purpose of the various rograms of specialization is to use to fullest advantage the knowledge of ers who volunteer to become spe- ists.

here are seven presently authorized d fields of specialization:

1) Atomic Energy with assignment oards, agencies and staff sections en- ed in research in the military use of nic energy;

2) Intelligence with assignments in h level staffs, CIA, CIC, attaché duty other similar activities;

3) Army Security with worldwide gnments to that agency;

4) Foreign Area Specialization with wledge of the total culture and lan- ge of a people;

5) Budget and Comptroller with ization on any level where a comp- er section is authorized;

6) Public Information leading to as- ment on any level where a Public rmation section is authorized;

7) Legislative Liaison leading to as- ment to agencies engaged in the ting of laws applicable to the Army the coordination of such laws with gressional bodies.

lethods of applying for Atomic En- , Intelligence, and Foreign Area cialization are outlined in SR 605- -20, SR 605-150-30 and SR 350-380- espectively. Specialization in ASA is erned by letter AGAO-S 210.31 (2 52)-M, Subject: "Career Special- ion in Army Security Agency for ular Army Officers," dated 11 April 2. No specific regulations have been lished regarding the fields of Budget Comptroller, Public Information, Legislative and Liaison. Officers in- sted in repetitive assignments within these fields should apply through channels to their career branch. Applicants should state fully their qualifications, training and experience in the particular field.

Any Regular Army or Reserve Component officer on active duty who has completed three years active duty service and is in the grade of first lieutenant or higher is eligible for specialization (for intelligence specialization two years service as a first lieutenant or higher is required). The combat arms branches consider the completion of five years service and the branch advanced course as desirable but not mandatory prerequisites for Regular officers.

Specialists have less opportunity for assignment to branch material duties than non-specialists. So before applying for specialist training and assignments an officer should be sure that he will be contented with frequent or repetitive assignments in one field.

THE Army's peacetime mission is preparation for war. Obviously, it is not possible to anticipate future events to the extent of earmarking large groups of individuals for specific type duties in time of war. An important aim of individual career development must be the creation of a reasonable degree of versatility. A specialist normally should not expect to seal himself off by assignments only within his field. Thus, specialists will have occasional assignments outside their field, particularly to branch material duties. Such assignments are desirable in order to permit specialists to compete with other officers for higher schooling and assignment to highly responsible command and staff duties.

In the intelligence specialization program, there are certain exceptions to the general rules. First, Reserve Component officers are transferred to Military Intelligence Reserve on approval of their applications. The combat arms branch to which they were assigned then becomes a detail branch. It is unlikely that these officers will receive further branch material assignments. Secondly, Regular Army officers serving in the ASA specialization field cannot be released from that duty except with the express approval of OACofS, G2, Department of the Army.

IN summary, the Army needs specialists but it is not the intent of Career Management to allow a specialist to lose contact with the normal duties of officers. The specialist must cooperate and have his own interests in mind in this matter of general career development. Specialization should not be considered as an easy path to early recognition. To warrant such recognition the specialist must excel in his field. Before any officer who desires to specialize does so he should be certain that he is qualified in his own branch. The specialist who fails to excel in his field and has not established qualification in his branch can expect no special treatment in the matter of schooling and promotion simply because he is a specialist. If the specialist excels in his field and maintains his branch qualification, specialization can prove both rewarding and satisfying.

Answers to specific questions on this subject may be obtained by writing to your own career branch.

[NEXT MONTH: The Civilian School Program.]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

The Month's Books

How the Reds Fight

HOW THE SOVIETS FIGHT

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE. By Raymond L. Garthoff. The Free Press. 587 Pages; Maps; Index; $7.50.

This book has undoubtedly a greater volume of information on Soviet military doctrine than any other unclassified publication. Thoroughness of research and a high degree of authenticity are made obvious by more than 1,300 footnotes. Soviet official regulations and manuals, and Soviet military books, pamphlets and periodicals are cited with utmost frequency. Also, the author has examined the published writings of dozens of ex-Soviet officers and interviewed a substantial number of such persons. He has searched extensively in German military sources. He has reviewed and considered the more reliable of the Western European and American unclassified publications on the subject to confirm or to supplement the information and conclusions drawn from his primary sources.

As a result, Mr. Garthoff has produced not only a highly objective exposition of Soviet military doctrine, but has gratifyingly gone somewhat beyond in presenting evidence of practices which conform to the doctrine or, in many cases, fail to conform thereto. For members of the armed forces of the United States (and other free world nations), this volume is highly valuable.

Mr. Garthoff is a member of the staff of the Social Science Division of Rand Corporation and this book was prepared as part of a research project for the USAF by the Rand Corporation.

The general conclusion which may be derived from the book, although not explicitly stated, is that Soviet military doctrine is sound, and that in many respects it resembles our own, but that deviations of the Red forces from their principles are in some aspects very great. It would be dangerous not to note, however, that the Reds are past masters in carrying out some of the most important military precepts.

The first of the bases of Red doctrine as set forth by Mr. Garthoff, is the fundamentally military nature of the Leninist creed, developed long before the advent of the Red Army. It resembles Clausewitz and it is clear that Red rulers understand military doctrine.

The early Red leaders talked much about a new scientific Marxist theory of war but settled for the old Russian Imperial General Staff principles. The 1914 Imperial Field Regulations remained in effect until 1925-1929, being then replaced by publications prepared by ex-Czarist officers.

The carrying over of military doctrine from the Imperial army implies vast foreign influence, particularly German, which had been incorporated in the tenets of the Czarist forces. The Reds do not admit their debt, foreign military theoreticians being acknowledged only in the political sphere. Collaboration with German military personnel prior to the advent of the Nazis to power was extensive in the development of the Red Army. Theories which stressed individual arms, such as those of Douhet and Fuller, were examined between the two world wars but were emphatically rejected.

The Historical Division of the Soviet General Staff, Mr. Garthoff believes, may at present be the primary agency for the development of Red operating doctrine.

In major portions of the text, Part II, "Soviet Principles of War," valuable insight is afforded into some of the differences between Soviet precepts and those of the West. Especially desirable are the frequent expositions of the difference between Soviet doctrine and practice.

Unfortunately Mr. Garthoff did not summarize these areas of difference. Nor in some cases did he bring them into sharp focus. However, the material is there for the digging.

The Russian version of the generally accepted primary Clausewitzian principles of military operations is in general amply presented, although not concentrated in any one area. There is no explicit discussion, however, on the cardinal principle of simplicity.

The author's account of the Red application of the principles of concentration of combat power at the decisive time and place is notable in its emphasis on the massing of infantry in narrow zones. He cites World War II instances, and believes that this idea continues in Soviet doctrine.

The interesting treatment of surpri brings out the extreme stress placed on th principle before the Soviets were surpris in 1941, and the playing down of its ir portance since then. The author caution however, against underestimating Sovi capabilities in use of this principle.

The author discusses the principle mobility at considerable length, but om the bonus he often gives us elsewhere contrasting doctrine with practice, althou the gap here is unusually great.

Omitting cavil as to where principles a methods begin, Part II is a rich encycl pedia of principles, of methods of ope tion, of leadership, command, staff, mora political control, intelligence, deception, curity, planning, training, supply and ma other aspects of the Red Army.

Differences in Red methods compared those of the West in general and of t United States forces in particular are to found frequently, although not as marke ly in operational matters as in such subje as political control. For an attack the Sov writers seem to believe that a superior of four to six to one is necessary. T Red emphasis on the desirability of circlement of enemy forces cannot but approved professionally, but their tender to attempt this feat regardless of the sit tion is clearly noted by the author.

The "salient thrust," claimed by the R to be their invention, may well be. would have no use for it. It seems to b carefully prepared crushing blow against enemy so weak that Western forces wo long since have dislodged and defeated h

The Reds, according to the author, st the vulnerability of sector joints as v as flanks in planning an offensive (and turn, are very apprehensive of their ow

During the discussion of operational trine, the author at times comments w wry understatement on the tendency of Reds to hold a military theory regard of their capability of carrying it out. A detailing the Red idea that all meet engagements call for the offensive, he st ". . . the result is not always favorable owing to the usual very low degree of in tive permitted to subordinate comman

In the non-operational aspects of the forces the author shows them to be q different from our own. The purging fifty per cent of the officer corps in 1 (including 90 per cent of the genera the police surveillance, the party co through political officers, the rigid c system, and the years of training for

Record of an American Defea

The Logistics of World War II

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

LINES FROM A NEW BOOK

It was characteristic of the entire history of the theater that directives on command and organization always seemed to fall short of clear-cut definitions of responsibility and authority, leaving much room for contention.

ROLAND G. RUPPENTHAL
U. S. Army in World War II
Logistical Support of the Armies, ETO, Vol. 1

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

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n in Suvorov schools in preparation for nmission as officers—these and many oth- soundly documented facts are well pre- ted.

Mr. Garthoff's estimate of Red Army mo- e in a possible World War III is impor- t. He states: "Not that the Soviet soldier uld not fight, and probably fight well, in oviet war of aggression, but he would it with significantly less enthusiasm than national self-defense."

n his discussion of the employment of combat arms by the Soviet Army the hor rightly considers World War II to e high validity as a guide to current trine. However, he apparently has been le to find very little unclassified informa- n bearing on the modification of Soviet trine due to postwar technological de- opments and the new strategic situation the USSR. The reader will wish that . Garthoff had advanced more specula- ideas, particularly on the Red Strategic Force and on Soviet use of atomic pons, however tentatively he might e chosen to do so. The author shows t in the air, as on the ground, lack of iative is a serious handicap to Soviet ts.

tress on support of ground forces by air mple, accompanied by valuable descrip- s of operational procedures by which is accomplished. The Soviet "Army Forces" (the VVS), comprising two- ds the Red air forces, supports the Red ny. For this purpose it believes, as does own air force, that its first mission is establishment of air superiority. How- r, our doctrine of "isolation of the battle- ds" is barely present, and is intermingled h close support of ground troops. The S, in the author's picture, is in effect llery using the airplane instead of can- .

nformation on airborne troops, also, is ger. Mr. Garthoff predicts that they be expected to be used in the future onjunction with other forces.

Ir. Garthoff came to study Soviet mili- affairs through his general studies of Soviet Union. His frequent notation he similarity of Bolshevik political ideas standard military doctrine indicates the on why military officers the world over to understand Leninism so thoroughly. entire machine of Soviet Russia oper- on military principles.—Col. Louis B. .

DEFEAT IN RETROSPECT

FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES. The U.S. Army in World War II. By Louis Morton. Office Chief of Military History. 626 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $5.25.

he documentation of defeat is a difficult ter. Here is a new book, the latest in than a dozen which have been devoted usively to our defeat in the Philippines ay in 1942. In addition, there have been erous magazine articles, and many of major histories of World War II have uded chapters on this Philippine Cam- gn. Dr. Morton's work is far and away the most objective and complete on those operations and yet there remain so many unanswered questions that more information must be forthcoming before a really valid assessment of that debacle can be made.

There are many reasons why it has been so difficult to get a well-focused picture of this campaign—and in justice it must be noted that Dr. Morton has certainly made a determined effort to do just that. First of all, the records that were kept left much to be desired. Of those, some were lost or destroyed. It is reasonable to believe that there still exist a fair quantity of valuable papers on this campaign that have not yet come to light. [Dr. Morton thinks there are such records. Mr. Hanson Baldwin of *The New York Times* wrote General MacArthur inquiring as to his knowledge of them. The General replied that he had "no knowledge" of such records and "brought with me no files whatsoever" when he left the Philippines.—Editors]

General Wainwright did write a book about the campaign but his book could scarcely be termed definitive. It is interesting to note that Dr. Morton advances the theory with some basis that the publication of Wainwright's memoirs actually discouraged many others from writing their views since they did not wish to oppose their former commander. The remaining few who have written were far enough down the command echelon so that they could throw little light on the so-called "big picture." The non-participants who wrote the superficial, popular accounts we won't count.


The defeat on Bataan and the surrender of Corregidor were so fraught with national emotion that objectivity has been not only almost impossible but highly impolitic.

Within the framework of these limitations, Dr. Morton has done a splendid job. Realizing the unpopularity in some circles of much that he had to record, he has been careful to document his important facts, and where an editorial decision as to the facts had to be made, he has shown the basis upon which these decisions were made. He has certainly made good use of all available materials. The factual correctness of much of the material presented in this book has been corroborated by this reviewer in personal interviews with participants.

The Fall of the Philippines strikes a particular chord not so much for what it says but for the big questions it leads up to but never quite answers—because known records are incomplete.


Why, for example, when the campaign and retreat followed War Plan Orange III —a plan that had been in existence for years and was well-known in detail by practically every American officer who had served in the Philippines—was there so much confusion? Why were the rear bases so inadequately stocked with provisions that our retreating forces were so early reduced to a starvation diet when tons of food were

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
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left at depots in Tarlac, Los Baños and McKinley? The Japanese didn't move that fast. The same question can be asked about ammunition, gasoline and other essentials. Large quantities of all these items were available on Luzon and there existed a well-known plan for their evacuation and yet the complete collapse of logistical support was one of the most important factors in the defeat.

Troop dispositions, communications failures and countless other aspects of the operations raise equally puzzling questions, particularly when the battles were fought supposedly according to our prearranged plans and by an enemy inferior in numbers. The most-publicized riddle of all also still requires an answer. How did our Philippine Air Force get caught on the ground, parked wing-tip-to-wing-tip many hours after the attack at Pearl Harbor?

These questions in no way reflect on the valor of the individual officers and soldiers nor do they discount their herculean efforts in the face of unprecedented hardships. In the absence of concrete answers—and in some cases there may never be any—the campaign will continue to be a puzzle to soldiers and historians alike.

One could wish that General MacArthur would explain the peculiar command setup which he intended to be effective when he departed for Australia. He intended to continue to exercise command control of the Philippine operations through his G4, Brigadier General Lewis C. Beebe, and had planned that General Wainwright would be commander of the Luzon Force only. General George C. Marshall, with the concurrence of President Roosevelt, intervened to correct this, telling Wainwright, "Upon the departure of General MacArthur, you become the commander of the U. S. Forces Philippines." General MacArthur remained silent, to the embarrassment of General Wainwright. It is of interest that the only criticism General Krueger makes of his superior in his book on the Sixth Army is the same tight tactical control that General MacArthur apparently hoped to exert on General Wainwright.

Partial facts are dangerous and too many assumptions must not be drawn until we have more answers. Certainly Dr. Morton has taken us as far as presently available material will permit. He has accomplished one major advance in helping to sweep away a good bit of the emotion surrounding what was after all a major defeat of American arms. A defeat of honor, though; for the gallantry and devotion to duty of the American soldier provided the inspiration around which the whole country was to rally and bring the enemy to his knees.—R.F.C.

SUPPLIES AND CONTENTION

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES, ETO, Volume 1. U. S. Army in World War II. By Roland G. Ruppenthal. Office of Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954. 616 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.50.

The story of logistics in the ETO in World War II was characterized on th higher levels by argument over divisio of authority and responsibility, plus mo duplication of effort, than the working el ments could cope with. Confusion was re ly compounded when ETOUSA, SHAE SOS and Army Group and Army Hea quarters got into the act. The theater su fered from too many G4s and not enou trucks. Add to this confusion a hig ranking officer like General Lee, and second-guessing War Department wi commitments around the world, and t wonder is that anything logistical was a complished at all.

The fact is, of course, that logisti miracles were performed as a matter f routine—the proof is in the accompli ments of the theater. Despite high-rankig wrangling, bad guesses, the difficulties f working with Allies in a strange land, a the unforeseen storm that wrecked the tificial harbors, somehow enough men a supplies reached the right place at the rig time. If Mr. Ruppenthal's book has ay fault, it is its preoccupation with the ma made difficulties of supply rather than wh the efforts that overcame these handica

Future commanders will find this bok even more valuable than will future log ticians. Operations planning should p cede logistical planning, with a certn overlap. In the ETO this was the exce tion rather than the rule. Last-minte changes in operations plans rarely took i o account the impossible burden these il

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stments placed on logistics—one such eakdown was described in detail in "An vasion is Jeopardized" by Brig. Gen. schal N. Strong (November, 1953, OMBAT FORCES JOURNAL). Army com-inders who refuse to release their logis-al "tails" to logistical agencies practically sure future breakdowns in supply. Tac-al commanders who highjack supplies eant for other create imbalances that reaten their logistics as well as the supply those for whom shipments were intend-. Hoarding one group of items almost ways means short supply of other, often ore critical, material.

One planning factor gone awry that ould be brought forcibly to the attention our makers of national policy was the ror in predicting replacement factors in en. The planners figured that 70.3% of e replacements should be infantrymen; 2% were supplied; 85% would have been more realistic figure. In July, 1944, 90% the losses were infantrymen. The War epartment had apportioned 76% of the fantry replacements as riflemen and heavy eapons personnel; 95% of the infantry placements should have been so trained. nly 39.7% of the infantry replacements ere rifle-trained, although the War De-rtment breakdown called for 60%. Na-onally, we seem headed for the same mis-kes today, although on a more colossal d potentially more dangerous scale.

The Office of Military History is to be mmended for permitting Col. Ruppen-al to write this book as he found the cts. There is little, if any, attempt to hitewash. The inferiority of our tanks ainst the Panthers and Tigers, the unin-rmed policies we used in our employment indigenous labor, the unnecessary squab-es between different command echelons, rors in planning and execution, and many her mistakes are detailed for the edifica-on of those who believe the Army of the nited States can do no wrong.

One thing we would change, and recom-end that the Chief of Military History ace a stop-order on immediately. This is e use of the term "bodies," meaning en. It looks bad enough in official cor-spondence and reports; it should never be ed in material that is made available to vilian readers. It appears twice in this ok.—A.S.

BOOKS RECEIVED

AMILY DOCTOR. By Richard and Dor-othy Williams. Random House, 1953. 245 Pages; $3.50. The life story of a typical city doctor, that illuminates the medical changes of the last fifty years.

MMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES. By Carol M. Cross-well. Oceana Publications, 1953. 98 Pages; Index; $1.00 paper, $2.00 cloth. The second edition of this guide to ad-mission to the U. S.

OLLECTED STORIES. By Sir Osbert Sitwell. Harper & Brothers, 1953. 541 Pages; $5.00. Thirty-one stories, with a special introduction by the author.



Pass In Review

Your New Year resolutions may be fading now but at the time this was written we were all summing up our deeds and misdeeds for the twelve months past. So we must call your attention to a really excellent annual picture history called *Year* ($10.00). This outsize volume (10¼" x 14") reviews the major events of the past year in pictures and text. The new volume on 1953 has 208 pages with over 1,000 pictures and 75,000 words of text. Among the highlights in this edition is the fine coverage of Queen Elizabeth's coronation. I've been keeping these books for the past several years and I find considerable enjoyment in looking over the old volumes.

In reviewing our book sales for the past year, I was quite surprised to find that we have a steady sale of the self-improvement books such as *The Art of Plain Talk* ($2.50), *The Art of Clear Thinking* ($2.75), and others of a similar nature. All of which leads me to believe that there will be many among our readers who will be interested in a new book just out called *How to Write Reports* ($3.00) written by Calvin D. Linton who is a professor of English literature at our local George Washington University. Although slightly professorial in tone, this little book is remarkably compact and complete and should be very useful to soldiers. Actually the book goes beyond the mere writing of reports and much of what he has to say about logical, clear thinking, how to get your thoughts into effective words and sentences and how to develop an effective style is equally applicable to all forms of written communication. To many of us, the most useful part of the book will be that in which he has included a grammar and punctuation refresher and a discussion of the mechanics of form.

Having heard some sad tales about the difficulty of getting good automobile service at distant stations, it occurred to me that a new book called *Motor Service's Automotive Encyclopedia* ($7.95) would be useful. This 768 page book is a complete automotive library covering the fundamental principles of construction, operation and repair of all types of cars from 1928 to 1953. It's written so that it can be easily understood, and there are over 2500 fine illustrations to show what goes where and why. There are many tips on labor-saving shortcuts and, probably more important, the official factory tune-up specifications for all types of cars.

After the astounding success of *Annapurna* last year, it seems a safe prediction to suggest that *The Conquest of Everest* ($6.00) will be an excellent seller this year. Written by Sir John Hunt, leader of the Everest Expedition, this is the step-by-step story of the conquering of the world's tallest mountain. In addition to the story itself, which is highly interesting, the book is filled with breath-taking photographs, some in color. The chapter on the final assault to the top is written by Sir John Hillary, one of the two men to reach the summit.

Though it won't affect the standings on the best-seller lists much, there is a new title out that will be welcomed by a large number of people in the Army called *Food Service for the Army and Air Force* ($3.50). Actually, it may be a misnomer to call this a new title inasmuch as it is an outgrowth of the old *Army Food and Messing* and I think there was an interim edition known as *Mess Management.* At any rate, here between two covers is a compilation of all of the published dope on running a mess, preparation of food; field messing, and everything dealing with the military application of the culinary art.

I received a note in the mail the other day asking me to mention the publication of the *History of the 110th Field Artillery* by Colonel John P. Cooper, Jr. The book can be obtained by forwarding five bucks to the War Records Division of the Maryland Historical Society, 620 Park Ave., Baltimore 1, Maryland.—R.F.C.

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
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A Nike battery (four launchers) set up at the White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico

This is Nike on the take-off. A booster charge starts it on its way, then drops off



These are the first pictures released of Nike, the Army's new antiaircraft weapon. A command-guidance, surface-to-air missile, Nike is controlled by radar from the ground and is credited with having uncanny accuracy. It can reach thirty miles or more into the air. It is the weapon that will be used by National Guard AA outfits assigned to the defense of American cities from enemy planes that get through the Air Force's defenses.

Fittingly enough, many of the details about Nike are classified. But we do know that it is highly mobile and that there are four launchers to a battery. The 1st Guided Missile Group, based at Fort Bliss, Texas, is the only military outfit to have fired Nike. But others will.

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MEET THE ARMY'S BOSS

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TELL THE ARMY'S STORY



GENERAL CHARLES L. BOLTE

Vice Chief of Staff, USA

Soldiers should proclaim the Army's role loudly and clearly, fully confident of its future usefulness

TO describe a modern army as masses of men—armed with rifle and bayonet—who can be conveniently wiped out en masse by super weapons is utterly erroneous. The machine gun disposed of that type of army many years ago. The whole concept of a modern army is geared to speed, dispersion, and firepower. The individual fighting man, whether by foot or by tank, must still close with the enemy and destroy him, but he now has weapons of greater range and firepower to assist him, and he has better communications with which to call upon these weapons.

The whole trend of our Army is towards smaller units of greater firepower and mobility, with a consequent capability to deploy over a wider area and to present a less profitable target. You may rest assured that your Army leaders are well aware of what new weapons can and cannot do and are acting accordingly. Our Army, far from being made obsolete by these weapons, is taking advantage of them to further strengthen our great capabilities.

Because the full potentialities of our global airpower, like our global seapower, are impossible of achievement without many bases overseas, we would need ground forces if it were only to protect these bases. But, more than the protection of air and sea bases, the compelling necessity for effective defense of strategic land areas of the world vital to our national security points out the requirement for strong ground forces ready to repel aggression. . . .

I believe, therefore, that it is time for all of us to think about the role of the Army in the light of the many new developments taking place so rapidly. It may seem to you to be a very complex subject—which indeed it is. Yet the broad outlines of the Army's capabilities and limitations are well known to you, and the capabilities and limitations of the latest modern weapons—though to a large extent highly classified—can be evaluated from your own military knowledge and from the information about these weapons which has been made available. You are already studying the effects of tactical atomic weapons upon the tactics of armor.

I want to assure this audience that the concept of mobile warfare is acquiring added importance as the effects of new weapons and their influence upon tactics and strategy are studied at higher levels. The Armor will continue to be a major force upon the battlefield and the necessity to have mobile, hard hitting armored units immediately available for any emergency is of paramount importance. How these new weapons will shape the organization and tactics of the Army as a whole is also a fruitful field for your study and consideration.

OF great importance, too, is the role that the Army plans as a partner in the Armed Forces team . . . The Army has a proud record of achievement and faces a future which may place greater demands upon it than any emergency of the past. We in the Army must never forget our prime reason for being—victory in battle. We are preparing ourselves daily for any mission—no matter how dangerous or difficult—which the security of our Nation may demand. And have no doubt about it, when the chips are down and the Nation is in peril, the Army's tremendous capability will be as essential as in the past.

I think that we should proclaim this fact with clear and confident voices, so that the people will have no doubt or confusion concerning the role of their Army, and so that our soldiers will have no doubt about the essential need they fill. You and your comrades in all the other arms and services are best qualified to explain the Army's many capabilits.

The Army will continue to be p- gressive and forward looking. We e taking advantage of every technical d scientific advance to enlarge our ca- bilities and increase our firepower. n our training and in our doctrine, we e gearing our thinking to the tests of .e future, while retaining the valid prin- ples which our extensive combat exp i- ence has demonstrated to be sound.

We should be neither pessimists o alarmists, but confident. There is in e Army today a great reservoir of comt experience and a corps of combat-tes d leaders of proved ability. Our Natio is the most advanced, industrially, sci- tifically, and politically, of any natn in the world, and our people are bles d with a high level of education, a stro g spiritual and moral character, and a d p love of country. Our people are equato any challenge to their security, and tl ir actions during the past decade and a lf have shown their capacity and willig- ness to defend their beliefs at any cit. Our Army, which derives its stren h and character from our people, refl ts their virtues and their abilities.

I KNOW from long experience ta you men and your comrades throu h out the Army all over the world are e finest soldiers and officers that any fig t- ing force can boast. I know, too, ta you not only have a glorious record e hind you, but that you have a futur of limitless service ahead of you.

You are not only a credit to the Ar r- ican people but you are the indispens le element of national security. The is e of victory or defeat still rests upon e bravery, devotion, and determinatio of the individual soldier.

I urge you, therefore, to think u on this subject . . . to be aware of the x panding capabilities of the Army in t is modern age. Each of you should, in e interests of our Nation, reflect on t is theme and carry it to the people w th truth and logic and should inculcate fi m your men at every opportunity.

This is taken from the address by General Bolte at the annual meeting of the U. S. Armor Association at Fort Knox, Kentucky

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Behind this symbol are 30,000 men and women with countless skills, trades and professions whose ingenuity is so greatly contributing to our nation's production resources. They are the builders of today's F-84F ***THUNDERSTREAK*** *fighter-bombers for our Air Force and for the air arms of the friendly allies banded together in NATO. ➢➢ The scope of our work is world wide even though most of us live on Long Island or within a 50 mile radius. Among other things we come and go in 10,000 automobiles. We earn an average of $2,500,000 weekly with which we support our families and our 230 individual communities by payments of more than $10,000,000 annually in Federal, State and local taxes (this is in addition to the millions paid in taxes by Republic itself). ➢➢ We also buy $631,000 worth of defense bonds each month. We use material and equipment supplied by 2,126 firms in the United States which totalled over $385,000,000 last year. This helps provide employment for another 300,000 of our fellow Americans. ➢➢ The aircraft manufacturing industry has become an integral part of the national economy as well as a vital link in the pattern of peace for the defense of our Country and the free world.*

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UNITED STATES ARMY

COMBAT FORCES Journal

Vol. 4, No. 8 March 1954

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Journal's Journal

THE COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL's objectives are stated in the objectives of the Association of the U. S. Army (see page 4 if you didn't read it last month) and to carry out these objectives it is the duty of the staff to represent the professional interests of the *whole* Army of the United States. We are very conscious of the dimensions of the task. And very determined to carry it out.

The principal way, as we see it, is to concentrate on those problems and subjects that affect the whole Army and every man in it. The professional interests of the Army embrace all problems of national defense. Therefore, we are interested in whether the resources given the Army will permit it to carry out its many missions. It means that we are interested in those problems that affect the efficiency and well-being of every man in the Army. It means that we are interested in the missions of all of the arms and services. This doesn't mean that we won't refrain from commenting on and explaining arm and service differences. It does mean that we will make every effort to be fair and present both sides of all such questions. Our job isn't to proselytize you, but to inform you so that you can think for yourself.

It is our job, though, to proselytize the public. We think the best way to do this is to keep the JOURNAL's professional standards high; to be literate, informed and as nearly authoritative as an unofficial magazine can be. This we think will make the magazine itself a symbol of the Army's alertness and efficiency. In the long run we think this will pay off much better than any effort to be sensational in order to attract the press and radio and TV commentators. We are always happy when the press finds something in the CFJ to comment on, but we don't think a professional journal has a duty to scare you or anyone else in an effort to make a headline.

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THE CURRENT SCENE

Tell the Army's Story. *Gen. Charles L. Bolte* Cove 2
Meet the Army's Boss. *A CFJ Staff report* 8
The New Strategy's Unanswered Questions. *Walter Millis* 2
New Look for Reserves. *A CFJ Staff report* 20
The Month's Reading—Interview with Monty 21

MEN AND METHODS

The Human Price of Combat. *Marjorie Van de Water* 24
Gridding the Single Vertical Photo. *Maj. Dana L. Thompson* 26
This Is Logistics. *Col. Edward E. Benson* 30
Career Management and Your Future—7. Civilian Schooling 32

AT HOME AND ABROAD

Around the Bases—Japan. *Maj. Marco Polo* 27
The Armies of Communism. *Lt. Col. John Baker White* 33

MACHINES AND WEAPONS

The Use of Flame in Korea. *Lt. Col. Walter L. Miller* 37
Irons in the Fire 41

DEPARTMENTS

Next Month's Journal 2
The Month's Mail 4
Front and Center 7
The Month's Pictures 18
The Month's Comment 32
The Word from the Schools 40
The Month's Books 43

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
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U. S. Infantry Association, 1893-1950
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PURPOSES

The Association of the United States Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Association shall be to encourage and foster for all elements, branches, and components of the Army of the United States, and for such veterans' and unit organizations as may be appropriate:

The dissemination of information relating to history, activities, problems and plans.

The exchange of ideas on and discussion of military matters.

The perpetuation of those Army and unit traditions that contribute to *esprit de corps* and superior performance of duty.

The cultivation of cordial relations among the several armed services and with the public.

The promotion, attainment, and preservation of high professional standards.

INSTRUMENTALITIES

The primary instrumentality for the carrying out of the purposes and the attainment of the objectives of the Association shall be the publication of its magazine, COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. The secondary instrumentalities of the Association for the carrying out of its purposes and the attainment of its objectives shall be the preparation, publication, and distribution of military books, and the performance of related activities in fact contributing to the Association's stated aims.

Adopted 14 December 1953 by the Executive Council.

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The Month's Mail

Thermo-nukes and Strategy

Let me congratulate you and Lloyd Norman on a very provocative and interesting article. You can be sure it was read with good deal of attention by the busy bevy of scientists in this institution and at other places where scientists are working national defense questions.

My feeling is that he hit upon but did not fully explore m of the terrible problems of national policy and strategy in t nuclear age. I am glad to see that you are having an article Walter Millis. I hope he can throw some light on what grou force operations may be like in the day of atomic plenty.

Name and address withheld.

● This is from a personal letter to the editor by a distinguish professor, now on the staff of a research organization.

To the Editors:

"The New Look Strategy" by Mr. Lloyd Norman renews faith in the courage and integrity of the United States Arm Nothing could be more dishonest, foolhardy, and ineffective th the security program we are being sold at the present time. It certainly not worth the cost. Half of its ineffectiveness could it be told without breaking security, but certainly there is enou damning evidence in the article to satisfy any intelligent read

I congratulate you on having the courage to print this article ..

DAVID C. PRINCE.

50 Washington Avenue
Schenectady, N. Y.

To the Editors:

That article on the new look in strategy was interesting, b doesn't it take a great deal for granted? For one thing, that Reds have no good guided missiles? They grabbed off quite a few missile men in Germany. Furthermore, they seem to hav a strange knack of simplifying things, as in their crude and v practical small arms, and their tanks, which are not as pretty ours, but much more numerous. It might be that they can do same with guided missiles. Also, they are not as noted for Kamikaze work as the Nips, but are capable of it. What if they get up a rocket missile with a suicide pilot? He couldn't re as fast as a robot, but he could think of a lot of things that ca't be built into the circuits of a 150-pound machine.

They surprised us with the MIG fighter. We had been l vised by many who thought they knew, that the Reds had o original ideas and could not make good jet planes. . . . They l four-engine bombers in service by the dozens at a time when C gress was arguing over the high cost of the first B-17. . . .

So, Mr. Norman's "Air Power Strategist" thinks fighter in ceptors and AA guns can guard bases? The Reds have develo guerrilla warfare to the point where it is quite a pain. An field with its long runways and huge fuel storage areas is of the finest targets there is. It takes other explosives to set o bomb dump, but a match and some straw will light fuel. Or e a flint and steel. . . .

There is much talk about small elite forces here and th We should think very deeply before we go in for such. A sm force can turn into a Praetorian Guard much faster than a la one. And then also, the small force may be like England's Contemptibles of 1914. They were the finest force of their c but when they were gone there was nothing to take their pl If we develop a small regular establishment, we ought to get a large Swiss type reserve force behind it.

I would like to see some articles on what we learned in Ko Not what we *thought* we learned, either. . . .

JOHN P. CONLO

52 Columbia Street
Newark, Ohio

ervice in the Ranks

'o the Editors:

I hear that the reduction in the strength
the Army is going to result in many
rmy ROTC graduates not being called
duty even though they have an obliga-
on to their government.

This is obviously unfair to the young
eutenants and to the men of their age
ho didn't go to college and were drafted
nd who served in Korea or elsewhere. It
so lends ammunition to those who have
sisted that the choice of college or draft
undemocratic because it gave boys who
ould afford to go to college an advantage
ver those who couldn't afford it.

The solution is to let these young grad-
ates serve as enlisted men and learn some-
ing about the Army in which they may
ter serve as officers. If you say that would
e a violation of the contract the Army
ave these ROTC students, I would say
iat it is also a violation of the contract
ot to call them up at all.

Furthermore, it is time that we recog-
ize that some of our best officer material
e the young, intelligent noncommissioned
fficers who entered the Army instead of
oing to college. Many of them are quitting
ie Army. If they could be commissioned,
iany of them might stay.

Indeed, the traditional gap between non-
ommissioned and commissioned rank needs
me new thinking in the light of present-
ay conditions. But that would take a much
nger letter than this one.

JONATHAN CARMEN

airfax County, Va.

5th Division History

'o the Editors:

This is my first letter to you since I sub-
cribed to your magazine in 1946. It is
ot educational, just a request for informa-
on.

Since I found out that my old division,
ie 65th, had a unit history published,
'he 65th Infantry Division Pictorial His-
ry, European Theater of Operations, 2
March 1945 to 9 May 1945, from the Of-
ce of the Chief of Military History, I have
ot been successful in locating the history.
have checked with your Book Service
)epartment, and they have no knowledge
f this history.

I would appreciate it if you would pub-
sh this letter. Maybe one of your read-
rs might have one to sell.

THOMAS D. NASH

009 North Oakley Ave.
Chicago 47, Ill.

Magnificent Piece

'o the Editors:

I thought "Division Objective" by Lieut.
ol. Eben Swift in the October issue was
ne of the most magnificent pieces I have
ver seen produced by an American Army
fficer. Certainly I could see why Colonel
wift was "one of those officers who were
ncouraged to write by Colonel Greene."
. . You have won my unreserved, cap-in-hand homage for having had the military acumen and the editorial courage to print such a thought-stimulating piece.

One reason the article hit me the way it did was because I was once thoroughly ridiculed by a senior officer at a cocktail party in Vienna in 1945 for making the observation that it was entirely possible for one determined enemy soldier to stop an entire division. I have never actually seen it happen but I have seen many situations in which it could have happened.

The article will make some people mad, but any officer with an open mind and some grassroots combat experience will cheer Colonel Swift for having done such a story —and for having picked one of our best divisions for the example. Those of the "Big Red One" who have any brains will be flattered by the choice, rather than offended; I'm sure the author selected them in this spirit.

MAJ. MARK M. BOATNER, III
G-1 Section,
Headquarters AFFE
APO 343
San Francisco, Calif.

GI Schooling for Pros

To the Editors:

After years of watching the armed services (especially the Army) fight for men with good education, I feel that I have a solution. This solution has been available since the end of World War II, but unfortunately the Army failed to grasp it, and so lost out to private industry.

The GI bill program indirectly subsidized private industry in its search for educated and skilled replacements for the labor pool. The Army did not get its share of these people as they became available. We must face the fact that the armed forces are, and will be in the foreseeable future, in the labor market for all skills, and yet they are not able to compete with industry.

Now there is no sense in sitting around and feeling sad. Let's attack the problem. Let's send our career men back to school under their individual GI rights and give them full pay and allowances while they are doing it.

This will bring howls of protest. Before you yell, though, let me ask: Do you want an educated service? Do you mean it when you say that modern arms require more and more brains? Yes? Well, let's proceed then. My program is a must for the services.

A man who puts himself through school, technical or educational, does so the hard way, especially if he also has a family. Even if he does this on Dad or the GI bill, it is hard going. When he gets through, he looks for the best job with the most immediate benefits, and frankly, the Army doesn't have enough to offer. Private industry does and it gets him. However, if the Army could offer full pay and allowances to a man in school he would think a long time about who had what to offer. If a man is going to make the service his career, he isn't going to have time to go

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back to school first, as we say enlist now or else. If he goes back to school we never see him again. By underwriting him as I propose, we could enlarge our entire Army school program. When we send a man to a service school, we have his pay and allowances, plus the upkeep of the school. So why not use the civilian schools that are already established and make the BAs and ABs commonplace in the Army?

MAJ. HARRY W. MORSE
USS *Eldorado*
FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

Alaska Base

To the Editors:

I like your magazine and find that it usually has something to say and says it well. I particularly enjoy your historical articles and was looking forward to your geographical series with a great deal of interest. The Alaska article, however, was a severe disappointment. A few examples might show you what I mean.

The map illustrating the article is poorly drawn and contains much incorrect information . . .

The Alaska Highway (and all other highways in Alaska) are maintained by the Department of the Interior, not the Army.

There are two television stations in Anchorage and one is being installed in Fairbanks.

How can you get around with no outer half to the parka?

The station allowances listed are those of 1951.

Heavy duty tires are not required as most Alaska roads are paved and the gravel roads are kept in reasonable shape except during the spring breakup.

Batteries will not freeze if they are maintained at full charge.

The statement "No driver will pass a car that is stopped on the road" is an unwarranted generalization.

I have omitted those doubtful items which are strictly a matter of opinion; however, there are many.

I hope the remainder of your series is more carefully researched.

LT. COL. A. R. GRANT
APO 949, c/o Postmaster
Seattle, Washington

● The map came from a source in the Department of Defense and we thought it was up-to-date. The editors asked Major Polo to report on the other items in Colonel Grant's bill-of-particulars, and he states:

"Touché! The colonel is absolutely right that Alaskan highways (and all other highways in Alaska) are maintained by the Department of the Interior. They are, in fact, maintained by the Alaska Road Commission, originally an organ of the War Department.

"He is correct, too, when he says the are two television stations in Anchorag and one being built in Fairbanks. Hov ever, when I wrote 'there is no televisic in Alaska,' and when *Combat Forc Journal* set it in type, the statement w correct. KTVA-TV in Anchorage beg limited broadcasting on December 11, 195 and KFIA-TV, also in Anchorage, beg on December 14. Both are still operati a short broadcast day under temporary pe mits. KFIF-TV, Fairbanks, has not y started broadcasting.

"As for the parka, I quote an officer r cently returned from duty as assistant co mandant of the Arctic Indoctrinatic School, Big Delta:

" 'In order to permit rapid adjustment clothing through the wide range of tei peratures and activities that a soldier the Arctic experiences, the Arctic unifor is designed around the layer principl Clothing is added to prevent excessive he loss, or removed when heat production e ceeds loss as usually occurs during musc lar work. By the addition or removal of layer of clothing, the soldier is able to mai tain his body heat balance. For most co ditions a soldier encounters, the interme ate jacket and trousers provide sufficie protection. As a result the outer parka a trousers, though an essential part of t Arctic uniform, are not regularly worn b soldiers in the Arctic.' This officer and h colleague seldom wore their outer parka their wives did wear them.

"On the station allowance, I listened the wrong Finance officer. Current allo ance for officers whose dependents are wi them is $3.80 a day. I'm sorry.

"About the tires. The colonel says, 'mc Alaska roads are paved.' My facts sho that there are 3,467 miles of road in Ala ka, of which 619 miles are paved. Th remaining 2,848 are gravel or dirt. I sti with the statement that 'it is wise, ho ever, to fit your car with heavy-duty tire and automotive engineers in the Office the Chief of Ordnance agree. Such tir will hold up better.

"Ordnance also supports me on the ba teries. FM 70-15 says: 'The efficiency storage batteries decreases with decreasi temperatures. At 40 degrees below zer even a fully-charged battery becomes pra tically inoperative. Batteries must warmed either by a heater or by remai ing in a warm room before they will d liver much power.' The FM goes on say that 'Batteries should be kept ful charged as a fully charged battery will n freeze at temperatures normally encou tered,' but it doesn't seem to me that makes much difference to the avera motorist whether his battery is actual frozen or whether it is too cold to wo when he goes out to try to start the car.

"As for passing cars that are stopped the road, the truckers wouldn't do it, ol timers in the territory wouldn't do it, a I can only conclude that the Colonel mu have had some unhappy experience wi newcomers in a normally friendly lanc

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Front And Center

What's Happened to "air transportable" Army • Teaching the three Rs "essential"?
Finance Corps wants to do a better job of paying you (not a raise!)

A few years ago all Army leaders were aying that the Army must become "air ransportable" and presumably all arms nd services were instructed to work towards that goal in establishing requirenents and in funds expended for research and development. One result of his was the development of the XV-1 Convertiplane (see page 41). Other delopments such as lighter equipment ave been publicized while still others re necessarily classified. The big quesion is whether future "new look" budgts will reduce Army funds for research nd development and field testing of nachines and weapons that may be deeloped. The Army's story of how long takes to translate a designer's blueprint nto a fully tested weapon delivered to eld units has never been adequately old. In contrast, the Air Force has an stablished SOP that gives it fresh pubicity at certain stages in the birth pangs f each of its new models.

✓ ✓ ✓

As the new president of the Air Transort Association, Former Under Secreary of the Army Earl D. Johnson is in position to urge the industry to give ore attention to the Army's need of reater airlift capacity. Influence is eeded in view of the projected reducion of the number of Air Force troop arrier wings from 17 to 11 in the "new ook" budget. Mr. Johnson, who has aid that "we will always need ground oldiers," thinks surplus airlift to meet ilitary emergencies is an unsolved roblem.

✓ ✓ ✓

Since the Army is to be cut more than en per cent, it would seem logical to ave Selective Service eliminate the one ut of ten men who has to be given an lementary education before basic train-ng. But such a reasonable opportunity o help the Army reduce its overhead eems impossible. Instead, these men are o be taught reading, writing and arithetic by the Army before they enr basic training. At the rate of 20,000 raftees a month, 200 men will have to e clothed, fed and housed for two to our weeks while they are taught the hree Rs. The soldier involved in caring for these men are part of the "support" force—a category that has been called "fat" and unbusinesslike.

✓ ✓ ✓

Contradictions in the objectives of the "new look" for the Army have been emphasized in a number of articles in The St Louis Post-Dispatch *by Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, retired. General Phillips has shown that the objective of creating a strategic reserve in the ZI cannot be achieved if the Army's strength is to be reduced without reducing the Army's commitments abroad. "As it stands today," General Phillips wrote, "the civilian command is demanding that the Army do the impossible, that is, to reduce its manpower without reducing overseas forces."*

✓ ✓ ✓

Some officers have objected to the name "Supply Command" recommended by the Advisory Committee on Army Organization, pointing out that the technical services have many other missions other than supplying the combat arms. The Committee realized that, but adopted the term only after writing a very special definition for the word "supply." Here it is:

"The term 'supply' is used to refer to that sequence of related activities that include research and development, computation of supply requirements, procurement, production, storage, distribution, maintenance and disposal of matériel, the rendering of logistical services such as medical, communications, engineering, transportation and the training of troops specializing in these activities and services."

✓ ✓ ✓

The All-Army Rifle and Pistol Championship matches will be held at Fort Benning in July as a part of the Army's Competitive Marksmanship program. Teams will represent the six army areas and major overseas commands. Candidates for the U. S. Army rifle and pistol teams will be picked during these matches.

✓ ✓ ✓

While a few members of the Congress are speaking of the advisability of gearing service pay to the cost of living (a practice that is becoming more and more common in industry), Secretary of Defense Wilson has said that the military is somewhat different from industry "on account of the fringe benefits and things that you get from being a veteran." He has not yet indicated which of those so-called "benefits" he would support. "If it is a sound and right thing, I'll take it on, on its merit," he has said.

✓ ✓ ✓

Soldiers may not get a raise but they may get paid with greater efficiency and less snafu. Finance Corps has a three-man committee at work on the problem of paying soldiers promptly and accurately under all circumstances. This is no fly-by-night study, but a two-year project. The committee is beginning its work by making a study of all previous reports on the same subject. The committee invites suggestions. Project officer is Lt. Col. J. M. Parker, Office Chief of Finance.

Get in Your Form DA 1041

If you have 17 years of service or more in any component of any of the armed services, or if you are already retired, time is getting short. The Uniform Service Contingency Option Act of 1953 carries a 30 April deadline for action. If you miss this deadline you're out in the cold—and the Act is a very warming deal for most eligible men.

This Act permits you to take a reduction in retired pay to provide a lifetime annuity for your wife, or payments to your children until they become 18. It affects *all* retired military personnel, and all those who expect to retire at any time in the future.

You must fill out Form 1041 by 30 April 1954, or before completion of 18 years of service, whichever comes later.

Most eligibles will be notified of the Act and the deadline through normal military channels. If you have 17 years or more of military service and haven't been notified, you had better check with the nearest military headquarters *right now!*



Mr. Stevens smiles at the welcome he received on his arrival at Eighth Army headquarters in Seoul on his second trip to Korea. In his first year as Secretary, Mr. Stevens made three trips to Korea and one to Germany, flew more than 500 hours and travelled more than 100,000 miles, the equivalent of four trips around the world.

A businessman, who knows soldiers and wants to do something for them, is a man you ought to know, so

MEET THE ARMY'S BOSS

PROFESSIONAL soldiers ought to be better acquainte with their civilian boss: Robert T. Stevens. In th year he has been Secretary of the Army, Mr. Stevens ha displayed a deep understanding of the motives and prob lems of the men who wear the uniform of the Army Soldiers who work with him say he is an "old pro" him self—a result that can be attributed in part to his servic in uniform in two wars. He has shown that he believe soldiers can be given a larger role in the operating respon sibilities of the Army.

Two incidents about members of the Stevens famil demonstrate the spirit with which Mr. Stevens is servin the Army.

In December 1952 a Seventh Army public inform tion officer told Private First Class William G. Steven that a *Stars and Stripes* cameraman wanted to photograp the son of Mr. Eisenhower's Secretary of the Army designate. Private Stevens was reluctant, but he put up to the PIO: "If you think it will help the Army, I do it," he said. It would and he did.

The second occurred last October when the Secretar and Mrs. Stevens flew to San Diego where Mr. Steven was to address the National Guard Association conven tion. When they entered the auditorium, the offic escorting Mrs. Stevens asked her whether she preferre to sit on the speaker's platform or in the audience. "I do whichever you think will be the best for the Army she replied.

Those who have watched Mr. Stevens during his fir year as Secretary will testify that his every action an decision is based on a desire to do "what is best for th Army and the nation."

In an interview with a representative of Comba Forces Journal he said that he is deeply hopeful th he can make at least one lasting contribution to the we being of the professional soldier. "At this time I don know just what it will be, but I am giving it a great de of thought and I am open to suggestions," he told h interviewer.

Chiefs and Indians in the Pentagon will tell you th if Mr. Stevens just continues as he has during his fir year he may long be remembered as the Secretary of th Army who renewed the Army's faith in itself. Perhaps that may be the lasting contribution he is seeking. C-

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ainly, if Mr. Stevens can help soldiers successfully ride ut the critical state of transition the Army is going hrough, it will be a significant achievement.

THE record is encouraging. Mr. Stevens has never failed to tell his fellow Americans publicly that they re fortunate to be served by soldiers who are men of ntegrity, high purpose and ability. Talk may be easy, but he record shows that he spoke up at a time when it night have been personally easier and politically wiser to emain silent, to say that the "vast majority of those who nake up our defense establishment, both in uniform and ut, are conscientious, patriotic, hard-working Americans, oing a fine job, day in and day out."

Mr. Stevens's first demonstration that he was prepared o defend the uniformed men when they were right came uring the ammunition hearings which broke when he ad hardly become accustomed to his new office. When ne Chief of Staff was under strong questioning by some enators, Mr. Stevens did not hesitate to intervene. Gen- ral Collins, he said, had a consistent record of having ecommended larger funds for ammunition than were sked by the Department of Defense. "I would like to ake this opportunity of paying my own tribute to Gen- ral Collins for having had the foresight to estimate the tuation the way he did," Mr. Stevens observed.

And a few months ago, at a testimonial dinner given y the leaders of the textile industry, Mr. Stevens spoke f the Army and its soldiers in these words:

"And, as for the Army. Well, no Secretary could ask or finer support. Believing as they do in civilian control f the military, there is never a time when they do not igorously support and uphold the hand of their Secre- ary. Our Army leaders are unqualifiedly outstanding. Ve should be thankful that our military can produce nen of such character and ability. We must maintain ne dignity of the professional soldier if the services are o continue to attract the quality of manpower needed to defend our country in time of war. This is a challenge to all of us."

He is a stanch believer in our democratic processes and is convinced that Congress reflects the will and the temper of the people. The solution to the ills that presently affect the professional soldier and his family is to get responsible people outside the Army interested in the problem, he has said.

"This is a tough period for the professional soldier," he told the JOURNAL. "I don't pretend to know all the answers, but I am sure that Congress will do the right thing if it is put up to it in a reasonable and fair way."

MR. STEVENS's belief in the democratic process includes literal acceptance of the principle of civilian control of the military. When asked his concept of the principle as applied to his position as Secretary of the Army, he replied very simply: "It means I'm the boss."

His concept of a "boss" is not that of a man who oversees every little job and second guesses his subordinates. He sees it as a job that requires him to determine and interpret basic policies to those to whom he gives the authority to carry them out. He then makes himself accessible to his subordinates in order to consult and advise with them on current operations and future plans. Not only is he accessible to his principal civilian assistants and to the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff but to the Deputy Chiefs, the four Assistant Chiefs, and the chiefs of the administrative and special staffs. But no matter how extensive the authority he delegates, he never forgets or permits his subordinates to forget that his is the ultimate responsibility for everything done within the Department of the Army.

Mr. Stevens believes that personal contact is the most efficient way of doing business and he and General Ridgway visit back and forth through their adjoining offices half a dozen times a day when both are in Washington. He has a distaste for written memoranda and



n Korea, Mr. Stevens visited Company B, 180th Infantry (among other outfits) and had lunch with Colonel Thomas Beck, the regimental commander *(left)*, and Lieutenant James Van Doren, the company commander *(right)*.

sees them as the cause of many differences that would otherwise not exist.

"The principal trouble with memo-writing is that people are tempted to put a barb into it to get it read," he said. "This raises questions and another memo. I write as few memoranda as I can and encourage everyone else to do the same."

An intense man who gives all he has to the job at hand, Mr. Stevens has worked so hard at being Secretary of the Army that some of his co-workers are amazed at the single-purposeness and concentration with which he applies himself. Some of them believe he would do an even better job if he relaxed occasionally. "His two greatest faults, if you can call them that, are over-conscientiousness and a tendency to do too much in the fields in which he is most interested," one of them observed recently.

He doesn't violate the chain of command and pass directives to the lower echelons that are involved in those activities in which he is most interested, but in the words of his admiring critic: "He calls 'em all in and keeps them there for hours, worrying the subject to death."

He devotes a great deal of his time to Congressional matters and to relations with the Department of Defense. No inquiry or complaint by a Representative or Senator is too inconsequential to escape his full attention. Part of this is undoubtedly a reflection of Mr. Stevens's complete belief in the virtues and wisdom of representative government.

He maintains close liaison with members of Secretary of Defense Wilson's "team" of Secretaries and gives close attention to all Army business with the Defense Department. He believes in unification and sees the need for a strong Department of Defense organization, but he also vigorously backs the Army's point of view in conferences with Defense officials when he believes the Nation's interests demand it.

Another responsibility that Mr. Stevens takes with utmost seriousness is the selection of officers for important command and staff positions. He holds that this is one of the most important functions of a Secretary of the Army. He has found that his prior military service helps him perform this task.

MR. STEVENS grew up in the toughly competitive textile business. The J. P. Stevens Company, one of the largest in the industry, is a family corporation that had its beginnings in 1813. The Secretary's father built the business to its prominence in the industry. The present Secretary went into the business after graduating from Yale in 1921—his college years were interrupted by service as a second lieutenant of Field Artillery in 1918. In 1929 his father died and he became President of the J. P. Stevens Company. In 1945 he was named Chairman of the Board. His reluctance to sell all of the stock in the firm in order to be confirmed as Secretary of the Army was based on much more than financial considerations. "I am steeped in sentiment and tradition with respect to the company that bears my father's name," he told the Senate committee. However, he did divest himself of the stock and was confirmed by the U. S. Senate



Colonel Stevens on the rifle range at Camp Lee, Va., in 1943

When he was commissioned in the Quartermaste Corps in 1942 he told the people he left in charge of th Stevens Company that he "would not in any way at an time, directly or indirectly, discuss with any former asso ciate anything that had to do with the purchase o Government materials."

Then when he reported for duty he told Genera Gregory, the Quartermaster General, that "in the ur likely circumstance that anything affecting the Steven Company would ever come to the attention of the Qua termaster Corps, that I would like to have an unde standing that it be referred immediately to Genera Corbin [Major General C. L. Corbin, now retired, bu then Colonel Stevens's immediate superior], or in hi absence, to General Gregory. That was followed metic lously through the entire war effort."

In addition to the J. P. Stevens Company, Mr. St vens has holdings and served on the boards of directors c a number of corporations. He has been Chairman of th Board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a officer in the Association of Cotton Textile Merchants.

One of the Stevenses' four sons is following h father's footsteps in the J. P. Stevens Company. Th third son, William Gallon, enlisted in the Army late i 1951 for three years, dropping out of college to do i Obviously proud of his son who had enlisted even thoug he was eligible for a college deferment, Mr. Stevens ha told how it came about: "He told us he didn't believe h should try for a student deferment. He felt he shoul do his part and that he was going to enlist." Then th

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ecretary added: "Now obviously, the whole question of udent deferments isn't quite as simple as that—the mili- ry services certainly need a large number of college ained men."

Young Stevens enlisted, expecting to go into the infan- y and combat in Korea. But like many a recruit before im, he found that the Army has its own way of dis- osing of personal expectations, and he found himself at Signal Corps replacement training center, followed y assignment to Seventh Army in Europe.

In addition to the South Plainfield, N. J. home, the tevenses own the American Fork Ranch near Two Dot, lontana where they raise white-face Herefords—"an perating cattle ranch," the Secretary says proudly.

S far as is known, Mr. Stevens had no prior intimation that General Eisenhower was considering him for ecretary of the Army. He had never met the President- ect until he was called to his New York headquarters r a fifteen-minute conference in December 1952, at hich he accepted the appointment. He is listed as a epublican but his political activities seem to have been ıbordinated to his many business interests and non- olitical government posts.

In 1940 Mr. Stevens was one of the many civilians ho heeded the call of President Roosevelt and joined ıe National Defense Advisory Commission in a civilian ıpacity. For a time he was head of the Textile Section the Commission and later was coordinator of defense ntracts, Office of Production Management, in the New ork area. One of the highest compliments paid his ork in those days is contained in a paragraph devoted one of his accomplishments by Robert E. Sherwood in *oosevelt and Hopkins*—that intimate history of the ghest levels of the administration of the Second World Var. Writing of the "bewilderment and frenzied un- rtainty that prevailed in Washington in 1940," Mr. herwood continued:

> Among the many patriotic industrialists called to Washington was Robert T. Stevens, one of the country's leading textile manufacturers. When he arrived he had only the vaguest idea of his duties, but Donald Nelson told him, "Look around in the War and Navy Departments and find out what their requirements are in textiles and figure out a way to meet them." Stevens found out about the needs for uniforms, blankets, blackout curtains, etc., which required no special talents, and then he began to think that perhaps he was called upon for the exercise of his own imagination. Trying to consider every phase of war activity that might involve the use of textiles he thought of parachutes. It then occurred to him that with French and Italian manufacturers of silk closed to us, our only source was Japan, and, while he knew next to nothing about the international situation, it seemed conceivable to him that this source might be shut off, also. He therefore felt that perhaps we should start stockpiling silk. He learned that the average requirement was four parachutes per war plane—figuring the heavy bombers (eleven men) plus the pursuit planes (one man) plus the essential reserves. He consulted the procurement officers in the Army and Navy and was told that they estimated they would need a total of 9,000 parachutes for the coming year, 1940-41—6,500 for the Army Air Corps, 2,500 for the Navy. Stevens did some multiplication of his own and told the officers that he figured they would need 200,000 parachutes instead of the 9,000 for which they were asking. They asked him how he had arrived at this fantastic figure. He replied, "The President has asked for 50,000 war planes. I just multiplied that by four."

WHEN Pearl Harbor was attacked, Mr. Stevens was in a surprising spot—the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he had completed a special course the day before. This had come about as a result of a letter he had received in September of 1941 from General Marshall, the then Chief of Staff of the Army.

General Marshall had invited about thirty-five business and professional men to attend a special course at Leavenworth. It was something of an experiment for he wanted to familiarize some selected civilians with what the Army was thinking about at that time of great impending danger to our country.

Secretary Stevens has since said: "I shall always be thankful that I accepted his invitation. Only eleven others did so. I think it is perhaps indicative of the general lack of a sense of urgency that only one out of three of us, who were invited, actually showed up. We graduated on December 6th, and I was saying goodbye to the many friends I had made among the officers stationed at the school when we received the news of Pearl Harbor.

"And so, as a civilian, I had the unique experience of listening to the details of the attack on Pearl Harbor unfold over the radio among Regular Army officers at a Regular Army post. Although I had served in the Field Artillery during World War I, that one experience at Fort Leavenworth made me more conscious of the necessity for military preparedness than I would ever otherwise have been. I have never wavered since that time on the subject of preparedness."

After Pearl Harbor Mr. Stevens went into uniform as a lieutenant colonel in the Quartermaster Corps. All of his wartime service was in the Office of the Quartermaster General except for a month's special duty in ETO in the spring of 1945. Uniformed businessmen were no novelty in the Quartermaster Corps during the war years and only the ablest stand out in the memory of the professional officers of the Corps. Mr. Stevens was one of these. A retired general officer who had some contact with Colonel Stevens in the Procurement Division of the Office of the Quartermaster General remembers him well.

"He was the highest type of citizen-soldier—the kind the Army must rely upon in time of war—outstandingly able, unselfish and energetic," this officer said recently. "Colonel Stevens's many years of experience on the other side of the counter—selling to the QMC—gave him a superb background for the jobs assigned him, but his competence went far beyond his mastery of the complex technicalities of procurement. He was a good soldier."

Mr. Stevens left the service in October 1945. For his services he was awarded the Legion of Merit and the Distinguished Service Medal, an honor that he says he "prizes more highly than anyone can know."

He returned to his business activities convinced, he said a few months ago, that "this old man" would never again be called upon by the Army. He was wrong—to the good fortune, soldiers hopefully testify, of the Army.

WE here at COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL don't conceive it as our function to tell soldiers: "Here's the way you should do it." The control we have been delegated to exercise over this element of the nation's press gives us neither omniscience nor authority, but a duty to give you pertinent facts and interpretation as fairly and clearly as we possibly can and in such a way as to prod and needle you into thinking for yourselves. That is why in the last several issues we have sought to interpret and clarify the issues raised by the advent of nuclear weapons in quantity and the new national strategy.

We began the examination in our January issue (which, because it was made up in November, actually anticipated the new military strategy) in presenting Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin's very timely warning that the use of "unlimited means to achieve unlimited destruction" could result in our own destruction, and his plea for restraint in our plans for using nuclear weapons.

In our February issue we continued the theme with Mr. Lloyd Norman's provocative examination of the origins and implications of the new strategy.

In this issue we present thoughtful reflections on the subject by another well-informed newspaperman. In asking more questions than he answers, Mr. Walter Millis points the way for further study of the problems raised by the strategy of instant retaliation.

We believe that these three articles are useful contributions to the national debate on military security. We also believe that they have laid the groundwork for some stimulating discussion on how the Army shall meet the challenges of the age of nuclear weapons. This field properly belong to soldiers who have battlefield know-how and to those scientists who can give soldiers the scientific know-how that must be applied to the soldier's organization and tactics. In our future issues we hope many of you will have an opportunity to contribute in a worthwhile way to this vital subject. Nothing could be more important right now.

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THE NEW STRATEGY'S UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

WALTER MILLIS

HE extraordinary and more or less unanticipated development of nuclear weapons—alike in power, in nvenience of delivery and particularly in numbers—has sed some problems, not only of battlefield tactics and eater strategy but of overall national policy, which are, say the least, disturbing.

Obviously of first importance to the soldier, these oblems are just as significant to the civilian, whose attides so often determine the conditions under which the ldier works and the objectives for which his life is comitted. The public reaction to the new abundance of uclear weapons is already affecting military policy. resident Eisenhower's announced intention to withdraw vo Army divisions from Korea does not mention atomic mbs; while the budget decision to cut back Army pernnel by about 18 percent in fiscal 1955 was not ostensiy based on the development of nuclear firepower. All ie same, it is hard to believe that these decisions would ave been risked had it not been for the mounting omic arsenal.

Yet as far as I can see, we have made barely more an a beginning upon the task of integrating these weapons into a rational structure of national tactics and policy. What follows is strictly a civilian view and the view of one with no classified knowledge of nuclear weaponry. But the published information is sufficiently disquieting. It is so full of baffling and fearsome dilemmas as to force everyone, civilian and soldier alike, back to some searching consideration of what as a nation we are doing and trying to do.

Since the introduction of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima, American military policy has been through several well-defined phases. We began by not only demobilizing our conventional forces but by trying to secure the abolition and rigid international prohibition of atomic weapons as well. It was soon clear, however, that the Soviet Union would never consent to the latter—or not, at least, until it had succeeded in establishing a nuclear weapons production of its own—while the possibility of another world war was much greater than it had seemed in the first bright days of 1946. Our policy entered a second phase, in which we left the conventional forces reduced to a skeleton, but relied on the threat value of our atomic monopoly to deter the Soviet Union from warlike adven-



WALTER MILLIS *is an editorial writer for* The New York Herald Tribune *and also writes a special column (called "Arms and Men") on national defense subjects.* MR. MILLIS *has been with the* Herald Tribune *since 1924. He is a graduate of Yale and his college career was interrupted with Army service as a second lieutenant of Field Artillery in 1918 (he didn't get to France).* MR. MILLIS's *several books and newspaper work mark him as a candid realist who writes persuasively and clearly. Some of his work is almost satirical, notably* The Martial Spirit *(1931), an appraisal of our conduct of The Spanish-American War, and* The Road to War *(1935), an account of the events that led to our entry into the First World War. This tongue-in-cheek realism is present, but less apparent, in* This is Pearl! *(1947), a meticulous account of the events that preceded and followed the disaster of 7 December 1941.* MR. MILLIS *wrote the present article at the request of the editors, who are grateful that he should take time from the busy life of a newspaperman to analyze the "new look" so clearly for our soldier audience.*



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ture. With a small stock of completed weapons and of planes we believed capable of delivering them, we held the Soviet cities and their inhabitants in hostage, as it were, for the good behavior of the Red Army.

IT was not always realized that there was another side to the medal: the Red Army, clearly capable of overrunning the whole continent long before any form of "strategic" attack on its industrial base could bring it to a halt, held Western Europe in hostage for the good behavior of the American atomic bombers. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had various forms of military action open to it for which the mass slaughters of "population bombing" were an obviously impossible reply. The first indication that this situation had its defects came with the Soviet rape of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1948; the crushing demonstration came with the Korean War in June, 1950, when the only thing which could save us from a shattering defeat was ground troops, conventionally armed, which we were just able to scrape together in time.

THE atomic bombs were useless. Throwing them at the great Russian and Chinese cities would have been as militarily futile, so far as the battle lines in Korea were concerned, as it would have been barbaric and dangerous. But there were probably too few in existence at that time (and too little practical experience with their "tactical" effects and potentialities) for them to have been dissipated in ground combat operations. In terms of the slaughter of a nation's inhabitants, the destruction of its resources and the long-term paralysis of its military strength, the most "efficient" use of nuclear weapons was, and undoubtedly still is, against the great centers of urban population—where they find a concentrated target to work on and ample quantities of glass, brick, inflammable structures and broken gas mains and power lines to work with. The more limited the supply of the weapons, the more necessary it is to save them for targets of that character.

But that kind of warfare is simply too big and terrible a bludgeon to apply in any conflict in which (as in Korea or today in Indochina) the object is something less than total destruction or total victory. The great program of rearmament launched in 1950 did not, of course, neglect the upbuilding of the threat value of our capabilities for nuclear destruction (the more so because we had discovered in the meanwhile that our monopoly was at an end and the Russians well on their way to creating a counter-threat) but its real center of effort went into re-creating the conventional forces—the ground troops, with



their modern heavy weapons, tanks and artillery, with their tactical air and naval support. These were what were needed for withstanding a limited-objective attack like that launched against us in Korea, for meeting a situation like that in Indochina, for holding strategic positions, controlling the local course of events or erecting something like a real barrier against the Red Army's ability to overrun Western Europe by conventional means, thus securing at a stroke a commanding position from which appalling amounts of atomic destruction thereafter would be unlikely to dislodge them.


Only the ground soldier is capable of fighting and winning both big and little wars

E had to escape the thralldom of a weapons system too big and too dangerous to use in anything but the st extremity. This denied us the power to take military tion in the various minor crises out of which the last ttremity might easily come, as well as denying us the wer to react in a major crisis in any but one way—a way hich the enemy might easily discover means to circum- nt or nullify. Though it may not always have seemed , the primary emphasis of the great military, diplomatic d economic programs undertaken after mid-1950 was the ground soldier; the infantryman, who alone holds takes territory, who is the last-line protection of one's n institutions and who actually captures the centers of e enemy's will—his governmental machinery, commu- cations and other levers of power—in order to bend that ll to our own. While billions have gone into support- g weapons and services of all kinds, the real core of our ilitary policy has lain in the rebuilding of our twenty my and three Marine divisions, in the build-up of the ATO armies; in our effort to bring German ground di- sions into the structure; in the arming and training of ghteen Korean divisions and the hopes of developing ground army in Japan.

All these troops and hoped-for troops have been de- ned in general along conventional lines, to meet Soviet d satellite armies designed on similar lines and to ht—whether in big wars or smaller ones—on the estab- hed pattern of holding or taking ground (ground, after , is where people live, and people are what wars are ways about), by the use of local firepower and indi- dual courage and sacrifice. Such was the policy of the ird phase, which opened in 1950, and as long as the nuclear weapons were relatively scarce, and would consequently have to be confined to a population-bombing campaign against big cities (which might or might not actually take place), it would seem to have been eminently sound.

NOW, however, it is being challenged on two broad grounds; and with the challenge we appear to be entering into a fourth phase, the shape of which is still obscure. The first ground is, bluntly, that this policy costs too much; the second, that nuclear weapons are no longer scarce. The task of creating a conventional military system that would really stand up against the Soviet-satellite system was already beginning to seem insupportable to all the NATO partners (including the United States) before the end of 1952. It meant unacceptable tax burdens and onerous claims on manpower for military duty. Neither the Soviet taxpayer nor Soviet manpower has much to say in such matters. But in the West, where both usually have an effective vote, the political leaders became increasingly convinced that to reproduce an approximation—in numbers, equipment and degree of readiness—of the Soviet conventional warfare system would "undermine the economic foundations" of the defense. The large initial plans have already been considerably scaled down and "stretched out" in time; whether justifiably or not, only the event can tell, though the decision, all things considered, does not seem unduly reckless.

It was easier to take, however, because of the transfor-



mation in the situation regarding nuclear weapons. It was apparently in 1952 that the atomic bombs really began to pour out of our own factories—possibly a more profoundly significant development than the success with the prototype hydrogen or "thermonuclear" weapon—and to be produced in numbers by the Russians. It also proved possible to reduce the package for a "nominal" or Hiroshima-type bomb to dimensions permitting it to be delivered by a fighter-bomber, a small carrier-borne naval plane or the Army's 11-inch mobile gun. All the services turned to an intensive study of the uses of the atomic bomb in their own operations; and as Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has recently said, these weapons have now reached "practically conventional status" with all. The idea that nuclear firepower now provides a new equivalent for Soviet manpower in conventional warfare is an obvious one. We have all just witnessed the Korean case, in which the smaller army, more lavishly equipped and supplied with firepower, proved an even match for a much larger force with inferior weaponry and ammunition supplies. The atomic fireball is the most staggering and deadly concentration of firepower ever known. Why should not the West, which presumably still holds a considerable lead over the Russians in the numbers of these weapons at its command, substitute them in conventional warfare for the men who would otherwise be required to meet the superior Soviet numbers?

THE idea is logical. But the question which troubles the civilian observer is, just how is this going to be done, and what are going to be the long-range effects on national policy, purposes and freedom of action? Just what did Admiral Radford mean when he said the nuclear weapons have reached "practically conventional status" in all three services? Obviously that Army, Navy and tactical Air (as well as strategic) now have the means of discharging them; that all expect to have numbers of the bombs available for their own use; that all are frantically trying to figure out how they may best use them and also, perhaps, what to do in case the Russians should start throwing them back. All this would still not mean that the weapons have been brought into the framework of conventional warfare as we have known it.

In 1950 we had to get men in a hurry to do things which we discovered that the atomic bombs we then had could not do. If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had said something to the effect that the nuclear weapons would permit the deactivation of so many heavy artillery battalions per division or so much armor or even so much infantry, we would have a fair assurance that the bombs really were reaching "conventional status" and showing that they could now do things for which in 1950 we had to get men. But no such comparison has yet emerged from the military authorities. And if the observer tries to make one for himself he runs up at the outset against an almost insuperable obstacle.

If one tries to estimate the effect of nuclear weapo on a conventional campaign of the World War II typ it is immediately obvious that the critical datum is t number of such weapons which will probably be ava able to each side. It is often said that in atomic warfa numbers are irrelevant; that if the Russians, for exampl can devastate all important areas of Western life wi 200 nuclear weapons, it makes no difference whether v have 2,000 or 20,000. The first couple of hundr thrown from each side will have done the job and d cided the issue—provided anybody is left alive to reco the decision. While this may be true of "strategic" atom warfare, however, it is certainly not true of the "tactica employment of atomic weapons.

CONSIDER another campaign on a basically conve tional pattern in Western Europe. If the Supre Allied Commander had ten or a dozen nuclear weapo available and reason to believe that the other side had more, the bombs would have to be used largely as wea ons of opportunity. Tactics would have to be devoted creating the opportunity, by forcing the enemy to conce trate into suitably profitable targets, while control ov the bombs would remain with the highest headquarte Tactics would also have to be devoted to dispersing on own troops and supply facilities to avoid the enem atomic strokes. The two aims—dispersal on one's o side and forcing the enemy to concentrate—are of cou contradictory and neither can be easily achieved, or achieved, successfully exploited, by a centralized t command subject to all the intelligence lags and rigidit of response which afflict higher headquarters. *The r result might be a war very much like past wars, emb lished by one or two strokes of very good or very bad lu but in the intervals requiring just as many men and p ceeding by much the same operations as we are famil with.*

The case would be totally different if the Supre Allied Commander had not ten but a thousand nucl weapons available. They could then be expended relatively lesser targets, and the authority to call for th could be vested in much lower echelons of command. the enemy possessed bombs in much smaller numb (and today the Soviet stockpile probably does not amou to more than a tenth of our own) they might have li or no surplus to give to their ground army commande and the net result might make it possible to halt a c ventional Soviet ground attack, and wage a success counterattack upon their troops with somewhat fe infantry and armored formations than would otherw be required. Yet our own ground commanders wo still have some anxious moments before deciding to be throwing these terrible weapons indiscriminately ab the landscape. If the Russians were unable to reply kind against our troops, the consequence might well

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A war in which both sides use nuclear weapons may require more and not fewer soldiers

nerely to force them to apply their limited stock in the nost "efficient" way, which is direct strategic attack upon Western cities.

It has always seemed to me most improbable that the nasters of the Kremlin would ever wish to begin a major ar with nuclear, population bombing. The Red Army is heir great and well-tried military instrument; the whole ourse of their atomic policy has quite clearly been di-ected, not toward the mere destruction of the West, but ward neutralizing our own atomic arsenal in order to ree the Red Army for the capture of the West (as Hitler aptured France) in as nearly intact a state as possible. Ve have to use our threat of nuclear, population bomb-ig to prevent war if we can; but to introduce these eapons into our conventional strategy in such a way as irtually to force any war that does break out into a pat-rn of general strategic destruction seems at the very ast a dubious course.

T is possible, of course, that the Russians will expand their stockpile to a point at which the Red Army will ave about as many of these weapons available as our wn ground forces. To guess what the real effects of this tuation would be is quite beyond the powers of a layman. both sides should begin by trying to apply their nuclear senal primarily against the armed forces of the other—in her words, to fight a conventional-type war with plen-ful supplies of unconventional weapons—the effects on very aspect of tactics and strategy would certainly be rofound and are today probably unpredictable. But it is least a reasonable guess that the requirement would be r more, not fewer, ground combat troops. They might ave to be equipped, supplied and led in altogether new ays; the whole theater might, as some have predicted, nd to break down into a vast guerrilla campaign waged innumerable small, lightly-armed knots of men capa-e of living for the most part on the country. But it ould still be the number and quality of the ground ldiers which would finally decide, if any decision at were still possible. In general, as the machines in war ave grown more and more powerful and destructive, ey have tended to neutralize each other and thus throw e emphasis back upon the man. And if the Russians ould be able to match, or even approximately match, ir nuclear arsenal for so-called "tactical" purposes, then e introduction of the atom on the battlefield would ob-iously in no way overcome their superiority in men.

The idea that nuclear weapons can be substituted for ined men in achieving those military results which as nation we would wish to achieve seems to me, as a lay server, to be an illusion and a pretty dangerous illu-n. It is almost impossible to form any idea of the ac-al consequences without having some estimate of *how any* weapons would be available to our own and to e other side; and that, of course, is one of the secrets st closely wrapped in atomic security. But the civilian, who has no access to such secrets, can at least see the broad outlines of the larger problem.

WE have developed two rather distinct forms of war. The purpose of all war and war preparation, of course, is to secure decision of those many issues in international life which cannot be settled by diplomatic, legal, ethical or other non-violent means. The one form of war, which has here been called the "conventional," relies for this upon the conflict of armies, the taking or holding of territory and the physical seizure or dominance of the enemy's governmental institutions. The other or "strategic" form relies upon either the threat or the actuality of the direct slaughter of the enemy people and destruction of their means of livelihood and communication—a means so terrible that it cannot ordinarily be used in the disputes of nations. The nuclear weapons, coupled with the possibility of airborne delivery, have for the first time made the second form of war practicable. But unless we are willing to rely upon it entirely, at the same time foregoing all those military objectives (such as the rescue of South Korea or the defense of Indochina) which can only be achieved in the old way, we shall have to maintain "tactical" ground armies, with their necessary air and naval support.

And while the possibility of reducing their size and cost by substituting atomic firepower for some of their present TNT and smokeless powder weapons in conventional operations has appeared, it does not, at best, seem a very hopeful possibility. Even with atomic weapons flying freely in the combat zone of a conventional military operation, we are likely to need just as many trained combat soldiers as before; while we will have certainly enormously enhanced the danger of the conventional operation turning into the direct attack upon the behind-the-lines populations and economies—something which represents the reduction to a tragic absurdity of all our ideas of military offense or defense.

IT is considerations of this kind which are profoundly disturbing to the civilian observer of what seems to be the present trend of military policy. I do not pretend to know the right answers. The nuclear weapons are with us; the horrible things are pouring out in even greater quantities here, in Russia and in Britain; they do not deteriorate with age, so the stockpiles will grow indefinitely, making constantly more urgent the problem of what in fact is going to be done with them and how they are going to be used. We cannot pretend that they do not exist. But it seems to me that the more we put our reliance upon them the more certainly we are preparing a universal destruction. Unless we retain the means to wage conventional warfare—and that means infantrymen, tankers and the artillery, air and naval support that goes with them—we shall only be committing ourselves to mass suicide of civilization.

The Month's Pictures



In preparation for exercises in Alaska, the 123d Combat Team trained on the snowy slopes of Mt. Rainier, Wash.



Through the eyepiece of the Army's new range finder, the camera sees the tar get—an M47 tank. Range finder furnishes gunner with precise distance to targe

Ubiquitous camera peers through Army's new range finder

Skier on Mt. McKinley . . . Fusilier poses with NATO rifle

A Royal Fusilier corporal shows off the Belgian FN rifle, recommended fo NATO use. The British and Canadian armies, among others, have adopted i



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The twenty-one American and one British deserters pose at Panmunjom in their last contact with the West.


Faces of twenty-two deserters who chose a faceless existence in lands where men are pawns

The face of war on a facsimile machine . . . Eskimo National Guardsman in summer(?) training

acsimile machine in use during a CPX held by the XVI Corps in Japan.



An Alaska National Guardsman tunes in a walkie-talkie during field training.



staff report

NEW LOOK FOR RESERVES

The Question remains: "Where are the Men?"

A NEWSPAPER reader could be led to think by reports in the press during the last ninety days that we are about to embark on the greatest changes in our Armed Forces reserve structure since the first National Defense Act in 1916. A closer look, however, creates understandable doubts, particularly at this early stage of the current reevaluation of our defense structure.

There have been some concrete developments, the full significance of which must await further deliberations. First of all, the Administration has embarked upon a new foreign and defense policy popularly described as one of "prompt retaliation" at times, places and methods of our own choosing. This major change in defense direction is pertinent here only to the extent it involves a rather large reduction in the men and units of our active Army. The budget calls for more money for reserve forces in fiscal 1955. The increase will probably be about 20 per cent. The Army is asking for $90 million to pay reserves and also more for the National Guard.

New Approach. The "new" thinking on how to get an adequate reserve force was introduced in a report to the President by Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. This report was highly significant for several reasons.

First, it represented the first tangible evidence of a real appreciation at the topmost governmental levels of the necessity for energetic action and follow-up if we are ever to have a reserve force worthy of its name.

Next, was its significant departure, at least for the moment, from the Universal Military Training concept which has pervaded our policy thinking since World War II. The Flemming report assigns UMT to at least a temporary limbo and President Eisenhower promptly indicated his agreement with this recommendation.

The third significant feature was its endeavor to reconcile the manpower needs of the military with the needs of the civilian economy in the event of an emergency and without the tremendous upheaval that has accompanied part mobilization efforts.

The Flemming Committee visualize two categories of reservists:

Immediately Callable Reserves would be subject to call as units and/or individuals when the President felt he needed them. The present National Guard and Organized Reserve units would be in this category.

Selectively Callable Reserves, the second group, would presumably include most of the other able-bodied citizenry of the 18-26 year old age group. This group would be screened continuously to insure that it contained military skills in proper balance for effective execution of required military missions. Each man in the "Selectively Callable Reserve" would be subject to call based on need, occupational requirements, and other factors. It would appear that the committee has in mind from this group a source of special talents that would be either used by the military or by industry, whichever's need for the individual was the greater. Who would determine this need has not yet been established, but presumably it would be a function of Selective Service. This part of the plan is likely to be one of the points of major irritation, as it embodies in somewhat different language the principles of deferment now existing and not overly popular or satisfactory.

Where are the men? It is ironic that in these days of tremendous technological advances that the distribution of physically able manpower is our knottiest problem and the crux of the whole reserve force problem. For example, our National Guard and Organized Reserve of today have many well-trained and well-qualified leaders. Most organized units of both categories are not wanting for equipment or armory and training facilities. What they lack is manpower. They have not been able to attract sufficient young men into the National Guard and Reserve to bring these units up to a strength level where they could be effective immediately upon call. Instead, the military talents of officers and men who have voluntarily participated in these programs have been dissipated in the discouraging effort of recruiting personnel for their units.

We must assume that the manpower for the reserve forces has not been provided in the past because of the unpopularity of involuntary military service. Numberless boards and commissions have studied and reported on the problem for ten years.

Congress has made a high-sounding declaration: "In a free society the obligation and privileges of serving in the armed forces and the reserve components thereof should be shared generally, in accordance with a system of selection which is fair and just, and which is consistent with the maintenance of an effective national economy."

In almost every session of Congress new legislation to meet the reserve problem is introduced, emasculated and passed, with the result that only a comparatively few men are drafted and these in insufficient numbers to meet the manpower requirements of the active forces. The majority of men do not serve at all (many for physical defects beyond their control). Every effort to provide manpower for the reserves has been successfully thwarted.

Solution? If certain provisions of the existing UMT and Service Act were used the problem would vanish. This says: "The Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, may provide, by regulations which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable, for the release from training and service in the Armed Forces prior to serving the period prescribed by [law] . . . of individuals who volunteer for and are accepted into organized units of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard and other reserve components."

Since regulations, if enforced, would provide quite a large source of basically trained manpower for our reserve components. Those who would prefer part-time service at home could pursue school or jobs without interruption. But it would also reduce the size of the active forces, something that has not been feasible in the past few years.

Propitious date. The report of the Flemming Committee is an excellent one as far as it goes. President Eisenhower has directed all government agencies to cooperate with it in arriving at concrete solutions for these problems by 1 April of this year. It would be foolhardy to attempt to anticipate what course of action Mr. Flemming's office may suggest. However, this date seems propitious.

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The Month's Reading

We depart from formula this month to devote this space to an interview which appeared in the *U. S. News & World Report*, an independent weekly news magazine, published at Washington.

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Interview with Monty

FIELD MARSHAL BERNARD L. MONTGOMERY
Viscount of Alamein
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
U. S. News & World Report
29 January 1954

Q *Field Marshal Montgomery, what will be the effect of the atomic weapons and other new weapons on your problems?*

A Well, the effect of the atomic weapon today is an imponderable. Nobody can say that the atomic weapon has proved that we can do with less forces. Not yet. That has not been proved. There have been no atomic weapons used in the active theater of war today—Korea, Indochina, Malaya —where fighting has been going on.

Q *You mean we can't appraise atomic weapons until they have been used in war?*

A No, no, I don't at all say that. We're now examining this question here. How will military forces be affected by the progress in science? It will affect the balance, you see—how much must exist in peacetime, always ready, and what can come along after war starts. It will affect that. But there's nothing yet to show that the total force you want has been made less because of the progress of science. It might. It's a "balance" we're after.

Q *How about the training of the troops to use these weapons? Have you enough information to train British, French, Dutch troops to use atomic weapons?*

A It started when General Ridgway [General Gruenther's predecessor] was here. We opened a school at Oberammergau last spring. Officers of a certain rank from the various nations go there and receive instructions in atomic protection. They study protection not only from enemy use of atomic weapons, but when we use them, to make certain we don't get the backwash. The training approach to the use of the atomic weapon is all going on.

Q *Well, do you think it would be useful to have some of these atomic weapons in Europe?*

A Certainly. I mean, I would never refuse any weapon. If I were to engage in a roughhouse in Europe, I would like to know that I should be backed by atomic power, certainly.

Mission: "To Forge the Weapon"

Q *Field Marshal Montgomery, when General Eisenhower was here at SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe] he told me once that your main job was to "forge the weapon," to get the NATO forces into good fighting condition.*

A Yes, that's true.

Q *What success have you had? How good is this weapon you've been forging?*

A Well, . . . in considering the defense of the West against the threat from the East, you've got to go back to the days of 1948 when the Western Alliance was formed. In those days, if the East had wanted to attack the West—I don't say they did want to, but supposing they did—there wouldn't have been very much in the West to stop it.

The task given us in the Western Alliance days, and carried on when the Western Alliance was absorbed into NATO, was to build up military strength quickly. There were three reasons for it. The first one was to have a deterrent against war. The second one was to have something available if anybody attacked us. The third one was to give confidence to the nations of Europe that we could handle an aggressor.

Now I'd say that today, 1954—that's about five years—that task has largely been achieved. There has been no war. The deterrent build-up for war has paid a dividend.

Now, as the forces grew and grew, the Supreme Commanders—starting with Ike, then Ridgway, Gruenther—they rather handed over to me the sharpening of this weapon. Today, the weapon may not be as big as we want it, but it's pretty sharp. It's a sharp sword on the ground, and backed by air power. Any aggressor five years ago would have had a walkover. Today he would not have a walkover. It would be a bit of "a party" today. Is that what you wanted to know?

Q *Yes, indeed, that's it exactly—*

A He would not have a walkover. He would probably think twice before he started a roughhouse, you see. And that's what we wanted.

Q *I heard it said the other day that if the Russians attacked next week they couldn't even reach the Rhine; the NATO forces are that good now. Is that true?*

A I would not subscribe to a statement of that sort. Where they would reach is a matter of opinion. I'm not prepared



Monty: *"Totally untrue" that soldiers fight the next war like the last one.*

to say today that they could not reach this line or that line in Western Europe. I think that's a dangerous statement.

The aim is to stop them before they could occupy the peoples and territory of the NATO nations. How many weeks or months we could hold them, and when we could start driving them back, is another question. That would depend on the state of our reserve forces.

The Key: Reserves—

Q *Would you say that the balance of forces has now reached the point where the outcome would depend very largely on generalship on both sides?*

A No. Of course, the outcome always depends on generalship. But it depends just as much on: "Is the weapon adequate, big enough, to handle this avalanche that might come at you?"

I think today we have reached the stage where the final outcome depends also on the extent to which nations can spring to arms behind the battle, and move up their reserves. If they cannot spring to arms quickly, what you've got out in front can't last forever without reinforcement. The NATO forces we have built can assure time for our nations to spring to arms and get mobilized. Our fate, if war comes, now depends on that—how fast and how effectively reserves can be thrown in.

Q *How do you see the defense structure changing, then, over this long period? Will we be able to have smaller active forces in the forward screen and count more on reserve forces as time goes on?*

A Well, you have hit a very good point, that. We've got to get "the balance" right as to what exists in peacetime and what comes into being after mobilization. It is that matter, you see, which is now being very carefully examined. What exists in peacetime is expensive, and some nations have said that they cannot continue to carry these enormous defense budgets.

Q *Do you think the Europeans will make some kinds of cuts?*

A You never know what political people will do. I doubt whether the nations of Europe will continue to carry these vast defense budgets indefinitely.

Q *If this were so, would you reduce the active forces and improve the organization and strength of the reserve?*

A That is being examined. The balance between the active forces and the reserve, the right balance between sea, land and air forces, all that is now being examined very carefully to try and get the thing right. That's going on. You're quite right in your question; there lies the answer. What you keep up in peacetime, in being, at full strength—that's expensive. What you keep up as a reserve which can come into being after mobilization—that can be relatively cheap. It's that "balance" that has got to be found.

Role of German Army—

Q *Well, Field Marshal, I wonder if you could tell me this: If defenses in Europe are now quite good, are German troops still needed?*

A Did I ever say they were "quite good"? I said that we have now built up sufficient military strength to be a deterrent against war, which we have done. But I think I said that they are not quite everything we would like. You can't do the defense of Western Europe, which includes Western Germany, without a German contribution. Western Europe includes Western Germany in it.

Q *How long do you think it will take to get the German divisions in the line?*

A I think that would depend a good deal on how quickly the equipment could be supplied. From the man-power point of view, the Germans could do it very quickly. I'm not so certain about the equipment. That's a lot of equipment, you know. I should think, from the command point of view, the thing could be done quite quickly. As for the equipment, it would take longer.

Q *What would be the effect, then? Would that permit NATO to reduce some of the other active forces and put them into reserve?*

A It might, but I should doubt it. I think it would enable us to hold the fort longer and give more time for nations to spring to arms behind; it would have that effect.

Q *How long do you think we should keep at the present force levels of American and British troops in Europe? One year, five years?*

A I haven't even thought of it. I hope during the time I'm mixed up in this business the American troops will not be taken away. They won't, of course.

Q *If you had to fight, you'd like to have them at your side?*

A Oho, certainly—don't ask me that, by the gods!

France: The Keystone—

Q *I'd like to ask a military question based on your wartime experience as Commander of the Northern Army Group. A number of military men, some German ex-generals among them, believe that it's possible to defend Europe with a force in the North and a force in the South. If France will not agree to German forces, they say, it will be necessary to defend Europe with German forces and without, possibly, French forces. Now, is it possible to defend Europe without France as the keystone of the operation?*

A You mean that you could ignore the French and say to them, "You can get out of it; we'll do without you"? Oh, no. Look at that great area there of France on the map. You can't do it. It's my view that you can't defend Western Europe without France. They are the big nation—43 million people. It's not on. What have you got left then? You've got the Dutch, 10 million; Belgium, 9 million; Luxembourg, 300,000. It isn't on. You can't do it without the French; you can't do it.

Q *It's a tempting idea to a lot of people in the United States. If you have to choose between French troops and German troops, they would just as soon have the German troops in the fight. Is that a feasible military concept?*

A We want the German troops in the fight, certainly; but do you mean, without the French?

Q *Yes—*

A You can't do the thing without the French.

Q *Another question sometimes asked in the United States is, "Will the French fight?" You've inspected the forces in the field. Are they any good?*

A Of course; they're a fine fighting race, the French. They've had a lot of troubles. You people who live in the United States and, oh, perhaps the British who live in the British Isles, they don't know what some of these continental nations went through in the war, occupied by the Nazis for a long while. They don't know. Of course, you people live 3,000 miles away. How could you in the Middle West know what it's like to be occupied? Even the British, who live just across the Channel, they don't know. And it's a lot of nonsense, I think, this talk about the French being no good, no fighting. It's absolutely untrue.

You go and see the national-service boys and you find that they are first-class boys, excellent boys. And they will fight. Of course they will fight. They want good leaders; anybody

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vants good leaders. The American troops, the British troops, ney want good leaders also. I'd say that the national-service oys of all these countries—Norway, Denmark, Holland, Bel- ium, France, Italy—they're excellent; excellent boys. All ney want is good officers. And when people say they don't nink the French would fight, you ought to stamp on it! Of ourse they'll fight.

Q *And the divisions are in pretty good shape?*

A The divisions they have in Germany are excellent. The rench Army in Germany is excellent.

Q *Have they got all their equipment now?*

A Oh, they've got as much as anybody has got. There's nore coming along, you see, and the French Army in the eld is excellent and will fight very well. And I hope you'll amp on any idea they won't. How do they spring up, these leas that the French won't fight?

Q *It's an old idea, I think, that goes back to the 1940 ebacle—*

A Well, it is 1954 now and things are entirely different.

ew Techniques for War—

Q *Field Marshal, since Alamein [scene of World War II mk battle], what changes have occurred in the tactics of ghting a war? If war comes now, would it be fought dif- rently than last time?*

A Oh, yes, because of the atomics and the progress of ience, you see. Let me give you a case in point. You men- on Alamein. Now at Alamein, for my original plan of tack, I had to have the moon. I wanted a waning moon, ou see, that would be just turned, going down, not a wax- ng moon. I wasn't ready in the September moon, so I had wait a month for the October moon. I wouldn't have to o it that way today.

Today you can make your own moonlight. We learned nat, as the war went on. With searchlights behind your nes, you could flash them up on the clouds and the light ould be reflected to the ground where you wanted it. We arned that, you see. I would make my own moonlight day. But we couldn't then; we didn't understand it.

Q *You could illuminate the battlefield?*

A Certainly. That's one progress. Now in Normandy we ad enormous armies; eventually a couple of million people nere. We went across the Channel and we had not got a arbor there. So we brought over these Mulberry harbors. Vell, you couldn't do a Normandy landing like that in an omic age. One A-bomb would wipe it right out.

Q *One bomb would wipe out the invasion force?*

A No. Wipe out the Mulberry harbor. So all the tech- ique has got to be changed because of the progress of sci- nce. And all that we entirely understand.

Q *Would you say that we couldn't afford now to be ushed off the Continent, because it might not be possible gain to have the large amphibious landings needed to come ack?*

A That's a very good question. Who told you that one? ctually, it would be difficult to get back. I don't say that big-scale amphibious operation is impossible, but I do say nat it would be difficult to do it against a good enemy in ne atomic age. It could be done, but it would be difficult, nuch more difficult to do.

But the question you asked was, "Since Alamein what nanges have been made?" Tremendous. The progress of ience has introduced many things which make it easier or us and many things more difficult for us. We soldiers re often accused, you know, of fighting the next war where ve left off the last one. Totally untrue. Totally. We're far more advanced in our thinking than are most politicians.

Q *Well, now, what about this whole question of mobility, which you had so much experience with in the desert? Has that changed any? Will there be more or less of it in the next war?*

A Oh, well, of course, the desert was a very different place from Europe. We had wide-open spaces. You could crack about, you see. The need for mobility is probably greater today than ever before.

Q *Why it that?*

A It's because, I think, of the progress of science and the fact that if you're static you can have things dropped on you. If you are quick and moving, the enemy doesn't quite know where you are. If you keep attacking him, he can't drop bombs on you. If he did he might drop one on his own troops. Mobility is the thing.

Q *What about holding a line somewhere in Europe? Is that impossible now?*

A We can hold a line, certainly. An obstacle line. To cross an obstacle line they have to concentrate. And when they concentrate, you have a target for an atomic bomb.

Mobility: Prime Need

Q *What about this idea of mobile islands, hedgehogs, and so on? Is that a useful approach?*

A Mobile islands? That's a new one. Mobile hedgehog? I'm for mobility. Absolute mobility. That's the great danger, with modern equipment. When you clutter people up with things, they can't move. When I was staying in Yugoslavia with Marshal Tito in September, and he was talking about all the equipment he was getting, I said, "Don't lose your mobility! Keep it! Your safety lies in mobility."

In the scientific age of atomics, your danger lies in digging yourself in and having something dropped on you. Don't think that Korea is any training ground for the next war. It isn't. It's a completely static war, except for patrolling. The lessons from Korea will be very valuable for patrolling and digging and in how to avoid shellfire. But it's no training for the next war in Europe. None. That's my view.

Judging the Russians—

Q *Field Marshal, there has been a lot of talk about 175 Russian divisions. Those divisions really don't concern NATO unless the Russians can put them in Europe with support to keep them in battle. They have pretty poor communications. When they get to West Germany, they are a thousand, two or three thousand miles from their sources of supply. What does NATO really have to face? How many divisions can the Russians send against West Europe?*

A I think it would depend on whether they want to attack us without any warning and without any mobilization procedure. If they did that, they could move about 30 divisions.

We, certainly, could hold that, you see. That's easy. But if they want, they could have a much bigger build-up. They've got 175 divisions all around. But I never bother much about counting people's heads. I count people's ability, you see. I think there's far too much counting of heads. I'd say, over all, that when we're assessing the possibility of what this guy can do, we're rather inclined to think he could do much more than he could. We have difficulties, ourselves. What about his difficulties?

Q *If it took him a month or two to put the larger number of divisions into Germany, by that time NATO would have reserve forces coming in, as well?*

A I hope so. If not, we would deserve to lose.

The Human Price of Combat

MARJORIE VAN DE WATER

Research teams of scientists took instruments into the front lines in Korea to learn just what the strain of battle does to a man's body and mind

NOW for the first time scientists know what happens to a man's body and mind under the terrific strain of combat.

Taking their test tubes, needles, gauges and mental tests right up to the front line in Korea, they have learned something of what made one man come through with flying colors and distinction while another broke into uncontrolled sobbing or became a speechless, quivering wreck of a man.

Now that the fighting has stopped, it can be told.

Worst place for a man to be during combat is alone in a place of relative security. Sitting there, inactive, while buddies are shot down can shatter a man's morale and sanity.

Carrying a wounded friend back to where he can get help, only to find that he has died without ever reaching succor seems to be the worst experience that can befall a soldier.

It is strains like these and not the enemy's bullets, knives or bayonets that try men's souls the most.

The assessment of the human cost of combat was made by a research team made up of scientists from various fields. Included in the party of 13 were five civilians from the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University, which sponsored the study under contract with the Army, five people from the Office of Naval Research, two scientists from the office of the Surgeon General of the Army, and one from the Naval Medical Research Institute.

Taking part were scientists from the fields of physiology, biochemistry, psychiatry, psychology, medicine and nutrition.

With their laboratory mounted on two jeeps and a trailer, the research team of 13 covered the central front and some of the heaviest action for a period of seven weeks.

The strain of combat is strictly an individual matter, it was found. Two men fighting side by side, climbing the same mountain pathways, subjected to the same enemy fire, straining every sense to detect the close presence of the enemy, carrying the same weight of burdensome pack, eating the same diet, fortified by the same training and special knowledge and weapons, nevertheless are each in a private world of stress and strain. That is because it is what the situation means to the individual soldier that is important, not the external facts.

One man may fear death; it takes every ounce of his courage to go forward toward the enemy. Every shell burst is a hideous climax of torture to this man. Another may be comparatively indifferent to death, safe in the confidence of divine protection or reassured by a strong faith in life after death. This man is not worried about a shell "unless it has his name on it." One may be intelligent and well-trained and confident in his own ability; another may be new to the situation and distrustful of himself.

But no matter how difficult the situation faced by any individual soldier, he is able to stand up to it while "the heat is on." In no case observed by the research team did a soldier crack up mentally during actual combat. It is when



In these two jeeps and trailer, a research team of 13 scientists took their centrifuges, hypodermic needles and other laboratory equipment right up to the front lines in Korea to find out what the toll of battle is on a man's body and mind.

MARJORIE VAN DE WATER, a psychologist and staff writer for Science Service, was one of the editors (with the late Colonel Joseph I. Greene and others) of *Psychology for the Armed Services.*

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The strain of combat is an individual matter, affecting different men differently.

Men can think better when the "heat is on."

Men can stand up to immediate danger, no matter how serious; they "break" when urgent demands of duty let up.

Men in combat lose adult white blood cells, for reasons the doctors do not yet know.

Men in combat sweat profusely, urinate frequently; yet in spite of losing water they do not drink. Nor do they eat much.

Getting men to eat and drink may be a new responsibility of combat commanders.

Science may find a hormone or other ingredient that will immunize the soldier against physical and mental crack-up in combat.

It takes five to twelve days for a soldier to recover from combat strains.

e urgent demands of duty let up; when
: has made the long trip back to com-
rative safety, particularly if he is carry-
g or aiding a seriously wounded friend
d especially if the friend dies on the
ay; or when he must wait alone in a
sition of comparatively safety or wait,
fenseless, under enemy artillery fire
at a soldier may break.

The strain of combat does not paralyze
e functioning of the higher brain cen-
rs, it was found. If anything, a man
inks better when "the heat is on."

TRIKING finding from the blood
studies of men just come out of com-
t was a great shortage of white blood
lls. The shortage is apparently due to
lisappearance from the blood stream of
ult white blood cells. Instead of 18
ult cells to one immature cell, the
portion was changed to three imma-
re cells to only one adult. It is the
ult white blood cell that battles for
e life of an individual when an in-
tious agent enters the blood stream,
an absence of these cells could expose
e soldier to danger from infection.

A similar shortage of adult white
od cells occurs in the blood of persons
o have been very severely burned or
o have suffered from such acute in-
tions as a ruptured appendix.

However, in the case of the combat
dier, no one knows what has hap-
ned to the adult white blood cells.
es the stress of combat in some way
as a poison in the blood of the sol-
r so that the cells are destroyed in
elling this toxic invader?

Another striking finding was that the man in combat loses water from his body. This is only natural. The man in combat is scared. That means that he sweats profusely. He urinates frequently.

Yet in spite of losing water in these ways, the man in combat does not drink. It may be because he is just too busy to think about it, but the chances are that he has no particular desire for water under the circumstances.

As a result of the dehydration, the man in combat loses weight. He does not usually realize this; in fact, he may tell you that he gains at the front. It is true that he gains, but this occurs after he comes back from the attack or patrol, after his recovery from the stress of severe combat, when the body is again storing the natural supply of water.

THE man in combat or on a patrol does not eat. He does not find fault with the food provided for him; it is the man back a little way who complains bitterly when the food is not hot or when the diet is not varied enough. The man in contact with the enemy just has no interest in eating. Rather than walk a few hundred feet to where a hot meal is being served, he will stay in his bunker and nibble on "C" rations.

Men who make a shock attack on an enemy stronghold carry assault rations with them, but only a few eat any part of their supply even though the attack may last 16 hours.

They say they are "too busy," "not hungry," or that their stomachs are "weak." Some complain of nausea.

Failure to eat and maintain his nutritional well-being probably adds to the stress endured by the combat soldier. A man should be well fed if he is to maintain his peak resistance.

Getting his men to eat and drink would seem to be a new responsibility of the unit leader in battle.

Will it some day be possible to give a man a pill or an injection that will immunize him against a physical or mental crackup in combat? This is a question I put to one of the scientists of the research team, Dr. Stanley Davis of the Operations Research Office.

It will be possible, he assured me. However, the research team are not yet ready to recommend such a measure. It may be, he said, that taking a dose of some hormone would enable the soldier to stand up under strains that otherwise would cause him to break. But when such a fortified soldier did reach his breaking point, it might not be possible for him to recover. It may be nature's way of protecting the human organism to set a limit beyond which a man cannot drive himself. It will be necessary to know a great deal more than scientists know now about the human's ability to stand strain and to recover from it, before they are willing to recommend an "antistrain" shot in the arm for men going into combat.

IT takes much longer anyway to recover from combat strains than has been supposed. A couple of days back of the front line and "a good night's sleep" are not enough. It is more like 5 to 12 days before the soldier is back to normal.

It is now known that it calls for a delicate balance in the functioning of the body's defense mechanism to withstand stress. Links in the chain are the hypothalamus, "emotion center" of the brain, the pituitary, a small gland at the base of the brain, and the adrenal glands.

When a man is badly frightened or greatly angered, the hypothalamus is roused. It acts on the pituitary, causing it to secrete ACTH. This, in turn, acts on the adrenal gland, stimulating it to secrete the recently discovered compound F along with other hormones.

After a brief but very difficult encounter with the enemy, the pituitary apparently lets down on the job. When the soldier is given a shot of ACTH, supplementing the activity of the pituitary, the adrenals respond by increased activity. But after a prolonged period of severe combat, the soldier loses the ability to prod his adrenals into service. Then the ACTH injection no longer has effect.

GRIDDING THE SINGLE VERTICAL PHOTOGRAPH

MAJOR DANA L. THOMPSON

The engineers issue a note of warning about our previous article on this subject: it isn't accurate if extended beyond one grid square

GRIDDING the single vertical photograph by the proportional divider method described by Lieutenant Colonel John P. Remy in the December 1953, COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a good field expedient for the specific use to which The Artillery School is putting it. It is necessary, however, to warn against an implication that the extension of the single grid square into a complete straight-line grid covering the entire photograph is valid.

Limited to one grid square the system will work to a practical degree of accuracy, but the determination of this grid square cannot be extended to give even fairly accurate determinations in adjacent grid squares. The implication that it can is present. This might lead some readers to believe that the entire photo can be gridded by the Remy method. It can, but not accurately and rapidly. For accuracy it becomes necessary to "restitute" each grid square separately; a slow process which would result in a series of adjacent quadrilaterals, but not, by any means, a straight-line grid. For rapidity the Remy method is applied to one grid square and then extended, inaccurately, by straight lines to form a grid. In the example *(Figure 3 of Colonel Remy's article; see cut)*, grid line 36 is out of position nearly 100 meters at a distance of less than 500 meters from the original grid square. This is something less than accurate. I have drawn in broken lines to show the position of the grid squares when resected individually.

Photogrammetrists have striven for years to devise a means by which single photographs can be, in effect, gridded accurately and rapidly. So far no one has succeeded. On a map the locus of points along a grid line is a straight line; while on a photograph it is an irregular line; not even a single-radius curve. The irregularities are resultants of several factors: the curvature of the earth; the aberrations of the lens; the perspective effects of relief; the tilt in the photo; and the instability of film and paper.

The most accurate rapid way to "restitute" any aerial photograph is by optical restoration, a process which cannot be accomplished in a photo-reproduction center and certainly not with artillery headquarters equipment. The next most rapid and accurate method is radial-line plotting, but this, as Colonel Remy says, is a slow and awkward preparatory process.

Using the same photographs and map used by Colonel Remy, the illustrations show the inaccuracies which occur when a single grid square is located by the Remy method and then used as the basis for extending the grid to the entire photograph. The terrain shown in the photographs is relatively flat. When rugged terrain is encountered the errors will be much greater.

Where the only requirement is to locate a point by map coordinates the Remy method will be helpful in identifying the point, but it will require the use of a large-scale map and a large-scale vertical aerial photograph. The lack of either of these will result in frustration.

The statement in Colonel Remy's article that "a large error on a 1/25,000 scale becomes noticeably smaller when 'blown up' to the 1/5,000-1/12,000 scales typical of our photos" is so obviously incorrect as to require no comment. How can an error be reduced by enlargement? Given the large-scale map and the large-scale photo the point desired can be picked by inspection of the photograph; and the coordinates of the point read from the map within the limits set by artillery (within 50 yards) without resorting to the Remy method. In terrain differing from the relatively flat area in Colonel Remy's photograph other factors will be introduced affecting the accuracy of the method. Abrupt changes in elevation, as in areas of rugged relief, introduce two upsetting factors: (1) changes in the scale within a single aerial photograph; and (2) displacement of relative position of points.



This was Figure 3 of Colonel Remy's article. Major Thompson has drawn in the broken lines to show the position of the grid squares when resected individually. The solid lines are Colonel Remy's.

FOR these reasons, mainly, The Engineer School has been careful to modify instruction in the use of aerial photographs as map supplements as in the Remy method, or as map substitute where no map of the area is available. The Point Designation Grid was developed, as described in Change 2 to FM 21-26, to provide a means for the positive identification of points for targets etc., without introducing the errors encountered when attempting to scale distances or determine azimuths on single aerial photographs.

In summation, it is admitted that although the Remy method will work as a device for determining the coordinates of a point within a 1000-meter square plotted as described, it cannot be used for adjacent squares without further proportional plotting. The limitations of the Remy method prevent its use for the constructing of grid systems at the photo reproduction center for application to other photos; and the "template" system is inadvisable because each photo and even each grid square within a given photo will be different. The template system is only applicable to the printing from identical negatives. This limitation would necessitate the construction of a plastic templet for every different photograph, an uneconomical requirement.

MAJOR DANA L. THOMPSON, Corps of Engineers, is on duty at The Engineer School.

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If you are assigned in the Tokyo area you probably will shop at the modern commissary on Washington Heights

JAPAN

Land of delightful shops . . . exotic food . . . strange sights

MAJOR MARCO POLO

AROUND THE BASES—3

WHEN you are assigned to duty in Japan you can expect a long wait for ur dependents. A soldier is rarely as- ned to "Japan" these days. The normal ignment is to U. S. Army Forces, Far st, and from there it's on the knees of Theater G1 whether you wind up in pan, Okinawa, or Korea. Most of us d ourselves in Korea.

So before you leave for USAFFE you uld be wise to settle your family so y can stay put, if necessary, until you urn to the States. Japan and Okinawa the only spots in USAFFE that you have them with you; and in any case will be months before they can join u. The minimum wait is twelve nths after you arrive in Japan and assigned before your dependents will n you, and you can expect a delay of to 18 months.

Japan is somewhat smaller than Cali- nia, a string of four islands stretching 00 miles down the Asiatic coast and ging in climate from near-arctic to o-tropic. The largest of the islands—nshu, upon which Tokyo is located —is about the size of Kansas, but the population is 63½ million, more than 30 times that of the Sunflower State. In all, 85 million people live in Japan.

As a result of the Japanese peace treaty of 1952, the situation of soldiers and their dependents in Japan has changed drastically. Where once we were there as members of an occupying force, today we are in Japan as protectors, invited by a friendly government.

Japan is close to the eastern edge of the Iron Curtain—from the northernmost point of Hokkaido you can look across with your naked eye at Russian sentries on duty on Soviet islands—and the Communists would be delighted to take Japan over as both an Asiatic and Pacific stronghold.

Most American soldiers now on duty in Japan get there from Korea. Tours in the Far East are computed on a Constructive Months Credit, or "point" system, which gives Korea troops shorter tours than other USAFFE troops. You can get out of Korea before you have pulled a full tour if you go to Japan, and many soldiers do. As far as your dependents are concerned, though, there are two catches to this system: you have to be assigned in Japan before you can get a quota for your dependents; and you have to stay in Japan a year after they get there, no matter how long you may have been in USAFFE.

DEPENDENTS' shipping priorities are based strictly on availability of housing, which is scarce; thus the delay of a year or more. Dependents, like their sponsors, travel to Japan usually by water but sometimes by air. Air travel is preferred by most, but the ocean trip can be very pleasant. The trip by air takes 36 hours or a little less, leaving normally from McChord Air Force Base, Tacoma, Washington, if it is military air transport, or Seattle if commercial. Traveling by boat and leaving from either Seattle or San Francisco, the trip takes from 16 to 19 days. Airplanes land at the Tokyo airport and ships dock at Yokohama.

Availability of quarters depends largely on where you are assigned. The Tokyo-Yokohama area is pretty well built up with government housing; other areas

jor Marco Polo is the collective pseudonym of the authors writing this series.



Like the super-markets back home, the Washington Heights commissary displays enticing rows of canned foods.

such as the island of Kyushu are not so fortunate. But in either case the housing is good, and is better furnished than government housing in almost any other place in the world.

Nearly all quarters are in Army developments, and are very much like Stateside quarters. During the occupation there were many so-called "United States houses," buildings taken over from the Japanese. Most of these have been turned back to the original owners. Some of them are now for rent on the open market; prices start at about $125 a month and run up to $200 or more.

MOST Army folk live in American-built quarters in Army posts or settlements. Some live in single houses (ranking officers and people with large families) but most have quarters in two- or four-family units.

The furnishings are above average. Most of them were made by the Japanese during the occupation, and are complete down to rugs and lamps. The lamps, actually, are pretty sparse and some of them are far from pretty. You will need your own linens. Cooking utensils are normally furnished, but most people want their own.

You will be wise to take your own beds. Quartermaster beds in Japan are just as hard as they are anywhere else.

Quarters are equipped with stove and refrigerator; small electric appliances are on sale in the Post Exchange and on the local market. If you want to take your own they will work all right, except slowly. Japanese current is 100 volt, 50 cycle, compared with the 110 volt, 60 cycle standard in the United States. Don't bother with electric clocks; they will run slow and drive you crazy. Electric phonographs will need conversion, a simple operation that can be performed either in the United States or in Japan. Toasters, coffeepots, irons and so on will work all right.

Don't take your automatic washing machine, or your food freezer. Your washer will not work properly on the slow current. Older, wringer models will, though. As for the freezer, it will be at the mercy of the uncertain power situation. Japanese current fluctuates at best, and since the end of the occupation and attempts by Communists to dominate the labor movement there have been frequent strikes and resultant power failures. Your freezer would simply spoil food for you.

You will want your radio, which will work all right after conversion, but don't bother with your television set because the only TV is Japanese, and the two stations now telecasting are only on a part-time basis.

Most of your household shopping in Japan will be in the commissary and Post Exchange. This is particularly true of food, because Japan does not produce enough food to feed her own people, and also because vegetables are not produced under sanitary conditions satisfactory to Americans.

THE commissaries have American canned and frozen foods, as well as dry staples. Some green vegetables are available at irregular intervals from the Quartermaster-operated farms. Meats are generally frozen, with the exception of Japanese beef, which is becoming available in steadily increasing quantity, and which is excellent. Choice of meats is generally good except for cold cuts and luncheon meats, which are in short supply and limited choice.

There is an American-operated mil reconstitution plant in Japan which con verts powdered milk into whole milk and frozen whole milk is also available

The Post Exchanges are able to fi most normal needs for simple things lik toilet articles, pots and pans, uniform and casual clothes, but they suffer th weaknesses of Post Exchanges ever where. The clothes all look the sam they are short on children's items, an the cosmetic selection is sparse. Durin the occupation there were huge Po Exchanges at Tokyo and Yokoham where you could buy almost anythin Now that the peace treaty has bee signed, those department store operatio have been closed.

So you will need your Stateside ma order catalogue, or an understandi with the personal shopper in your f vorite department store, to carry yo through your tour in Japan. Shoes f the children, cosmetics and party dress and frilly stuff for the women will the most frequent items you will be i porting from the States.

THE ladies are in luck, because the are some perfectly lovely fabrics on t local market in Japan, and many Jap nese women are wonderful seamstress Japanese seamstresses have little ima nation about Western styles, but th are wonders at making a copy of t dress on the cover of *Vogue*, for examp

Soldiers can now wear civilian cloth off-duty in Japan, and you can buy mu in the Post Exchange. For variety y can use Japanese tailors, who are c cellent and have fine cloth at th disposal; but you have to watch the closely because their idea of how to c a suit runs to wasp waists, peak lape and similar "sharp" tailoring.

In planning your wardrobe for Jap it helps if you know exactly where Japan you are to be stationed. Japan l regular four-season weather, but it var sharply from Hokkaido in the north Kyushu in the south.

There is a good deal of social life Japan, so the ladies will need so formal wear, a few dinner dresses, a a good selection of cocktail dresses. Co tail dresses, in fact, are the most-u dress-up clothes for women. Men get along in uniform, of course, but w probably want to take both summer a winter dinner jackets.

SHOPPING in Japan can be a delig Besides the fabrics, there are enam lacquer and brassware; gold, silver, c sonné and pearls; wonderfully delic

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tle carvings which have taken years complete; and some of the finest china ıd porcelain in the world. The biggest oblem in shopping in Japan is in not ıying half the stuff in sight. If you op carefully, compare prices and make effort to learn something about the rious crafts, you can bring things back om Japan that will be sources of pleas-e to you for years.

Beware of Japanese furs. There are ry few good furs in Japan, and many a oman who fell for the "Japanese mink" iel has been miserable with a coat that oked rather like yellow cat, striped ith a paintbrush.

Most people find browsing through e shops, on the Ginza in Tokyo, or ong the little side streets of smaller wns and villages, a wonderful way to end pleasant hours and at the same ne learn something about Japan. But is far from all there is to do. Recrea-ıal facilities in Japan are almost un-nited.

There is skiing in the north, fishing the mountain streams and volcanic kes or deep-sea fishing anywhere along e coast. There are many fine golf urses, and all of the military installa-ns supply the usual tennis courts, wling alleys, and so on. Hunting is nited, but thousands of ducks stop over the rice fields, making fine shooting ıring the season. Shikoku is known as e "Riviera of Japan," and its beaches e justly famous.

With customs strange to the Western-, and a history of centuries of devotion the fine arts, Japan is a sightseer's radise. There are hundreds of parks, rines and public buildings that are autiful and have colorful histories. In dition there are a number of holiday ots where guest hotels are either still erated by the Army or have been re-ntly enough to suit American tastes. ney are fine places to get the flavor Japan without such discomforts (to ıny Americans) as sleeping on the floor d eating from a table four inches high.

ATING, by the way, will be another pleasure to you in Japan. While it's t recommended that you buy raw food the open market, there are many ex-llent restaurants which cater to Ameri-ns, and actually if you like rice and a food you can eat almost anywhere long as you eat no raw vegetables. ou will find that the best cooking in pan, as in most of the Orient, is Chi-se (among the handful of "best res-ırants" in Tokyo, one is Chinese and e French) but Japanese cooking is in-esting and generally good. Beware



Winter sports are an attraction for service people visiting the Fuji-View Special Services hotel at Hakone.

of one thing, though—they serve hot *sake* with meals, and it is considered bad manners to let a guest have an empty glass. Despite the fact the rice liquor is served in tiny cups and has a pleasantly mild flavor, it has a high dynamite content. Take it easy.

BECAUSE there is so much to see in Japan, you will want your automobile. The port will give you specific instructions about readying it for shipment, but be sure it is in top-notch shape before you leave.

Traffic moves on the left in Japan, and slowly. The speed limits are well below 30 miles an hour throughout the islands. But a car is almost a must for an American. There are few buses, and they are for the adventurous and strong of heart. Japanese railroads are good, although not up to American standards in accommodations, and sometimes it's fun to use them. But rail travel is restrictive, and in Japan limited in where it can take you. If you do make a train trip remember that Japanese trains stick precisely to their schedule.

All schools are run by the Army. In areas where there are few American children, schools are not what they are in the United States. Where there are only two or three children of high school age, for example, correspondence courses or home study plans are used. But all the education is accredited by the Association of American Colleges and Universities. Be sure to take transcripts of your child's school record with you, to avoid delay in getting him registered in Japan.



Buddha is an attraction for sight-seers visiting Kamakura.

YOU will probably have servants in Japan; every American does. During the occupation, servants came with the quarters, but now they are private contractors on the open labor market. Wages have gone up since the occupation ended, but you can still get good household help for from $20 to $30 a month.

Japanese servants are excellent. They are loyal and hard-working, and by now most of them have worked for Americans before, and speak a little English. But take it slow until they get used to you.

There will be frustrations. Japanese girls are terribly sensitive, and if you are short-tempered you are apt to throw them into a complete tizzy.

In dealing with your servants, if you speak quietly and distinctly, show them how you want things done by running through it with them once or twice, and don't try to keep them from spoiling your small children, you'll get along fine. Children enjoy an honored place in Japan, and all adults seem to feel dedicated to making all children happy. You can't change it, your children will love it, so you might as well live with it.

JAPAN is a strange place, by Western standards, and only recently an enemy of the United States. But now it is one of the bulwarks in the defenses against communism, and its people have evidenced a strong desire to be our friends. If you accept them as friends, and recognize that customs which seem strange to you were moulded through centuries of living on a crowded island, you can get pleasure and education from a tour in Japan.

This Is Logistics

As a bullet cannot be sped to its mark without a gun and propellant, so neither can a fighting unit defeat an enemy without a logistical force

COLONEL EDWARD E. BENSON

A GUN without a bullet and propellant in the chamber is not a weapon. It is the combination of the gun, propelling charge and bullet that makes a weapon. Making the right ammunition available to the user of the gun at the right time and place is one of the functions of logistics.

In the early days combat forces largely lived off the land. However, today the implements of war are highly technical and all combat and service forces must be supplied with the necessities of life and the tools and materials they need to perform their various missions. Furnishing these needs at the right time and in the needed proportions is the mission of logistics.

Logistics is not an end in itself but a means to an end, namely, the success of the combat forces. Strategic planning must consider logistical requirements. Subsequent tactical plans must also include logistical planning. As troops are committed today, so also must their requirements be committed. Without tools and supplies combat forces cannot do the job assigned them.

The principle of logistics is not new. It is true that in the past some battles, and even some campaigns, have been won with little consideration of logistical support. Nevertheless, other things being equal, the chances of success rest with the forces having the most competent logistical support. History has repeatedly proved this contention.

Logistics then is important. So we ought to know what it is and who is responsible for its performance.

First, let us try to visualize what constitutes the complete logistical operation. The mission of logistics is to sustain the military force with its physical and operational needs. These are many and varied. They can be summarized as supplies of all kinds and the various types of services, such as hospitalization, evacuation, transportation, communications, construction and maintenance. Obviously the type, volume, and characteristics of such needs are subject to the circumstances and operations of the force being supported. Therefore, the first step in logistical operations is to determine what is required and how much. Secondly, after requirements have been determined, they must be obtained. Finally, they must be distributed where and when needed. Logistics, then, consists of three phases, namely: determination of requirements, procurement, and distribution.

TO determine who is responsible for and involved in logistical operations, let us start with the combat soldier. He determines his requirements by being aware of his shortages. He is told where and how to get clothing, equipment, food and weapons. To get what he needs he follows his instructions. However, he is a user and consumer and is not involved in distribution. The same applies to a group of soldiers operating a single tool, such as an artillery piece or a tank, or engaged in constructing a bridge or a railroad. The group is also a user and consumer and is not involved in the task of acquiring and distributing. But its unit commander is. He must determine the group's requirements and distribute what he gets within his organization. In turn, each higher commander has the same responsibility for all the forces under his command. Therefore it can be said that logistical responsibilities extend from the nation itself to the commander of the lowest administrative echelon of the military forces.

Logistical support moves from the higher commands to the lower. This includes planning, management and operations. It also includes supervision and control over such activities, plus constant cognizance of the status of the logistical situation. Operational plans should be based on the capability of logistical support available to sustain them. Obviously there are many times when it is necessary to take a calculated risk and go ahead even though available logistical support is questionable. However, the risk must be recognized for what it is and justifi

It has often been said that there are many persons and facilities involved logistical operations. There have be charges that logistic forces are built up the expense of the combat troops a that this weakens the fighting forces. and where this is true it should be c rected. But there have been times wh combat troops were weakened by the l of competent logistical support. Na leon failed in Russia because his com troops lacked sufficient logistical supp Wellington was successful in Spain cause he committed his forces in acc ance with his ability to support th General Patton's Third Army roa through France using gasoline and munition and bridges and many ot things furnished and delivered by serv forces. His success shows what an portant element logistics is and how contributes to fighting effectiveness. gistics is utterly essential to an ar This being so, a competently and c fully designed logistical team must part of each military organization.

WE said earlier that a weapon is a g propelling charge and bullet. If impact of the bullet on the target co be gotten without the gun and pro lant, then the gun and propellant wo be unnecessary. However, up to present all bullets require some sor launching device. Every element of structure of the gun and the cartridg scientifically studied, analyzed, ev ated, and justified. The gun is sync nized in every feature and detail with the requirements needed to discharge cartridge and make the bullet effectiv intended. The bullet is the key elem The gun's barrel has the capacity ne sary to contain the bullet and the stren necessary to contain the pressures wh eject it. The magazine has the requ storage space and the facilities wh move the cartridge and bullet into fi position. The criterion for the desig the gun, propellant and bullet is t capability to fulfill the requirement the bullet to accomplish its designed

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on. Thence the impact on the target is ıe result of the combined and related ınctions of all three elements. Therefore the combination of all those three lements is *the weapon.* Based on this oncept the gun and the propellant are ı reality logistical elements of the eapon.

From this point of view the composion of the weapon can be likened to the mposition of a military force. In prinple the relationship of the gun and the rtridge to the bullet is similar to the retionship of the logistical elements of a ilitary force to the combat elements of . The route of approach toward deterining the design of the logistical elents of a military force is, in principle, bstantially the same as for the weapon. he method of determining what is necsary logistically to attain and maintain ıe designed capability of a military rce is to determine the requirements of ıe key elements of the force—the comıt troops—and then to determine what necessary to make such requirements ailable.

In order to have their designed impact lue, each combat unit must be comete in accordance with its table of orınization and equipment (T/O&E). ıch a table is actually the plan and ecification of the unit. It includes rsons, arms and equipment, and is tually the design of a specific capabil-

Even though a combat unit has been mpletely equipped and supported with l the needs of its organic structure, it is ll not sufficient unto itself. It may be ven a mission which is in accordance ith its designed purposes, but the capalities of the enemy and the methods of odern warfare may make the accomishment of that mission dependent on additional support emanating from, d controlled by, higher commands. his means that a military force must ve required elements, both combat and rvice, that accomplish that support.

In the service realm, such additional pport for the combat troops consists of rnishing all required additional transrtation, both land and water; required nstruction such as ports, airfields, dges, roads, railroads, buildings, power ilities, plus the repairing and maintenance of them; clearance of terrain barrs and hazards, or furnishing means of ercoming them; furnishing means of nmunications; evacuation and hosalization; required maintenance of uipment; producing and furnishing ps; and many other similar services.

From the logistical viewpoint the reirements of the combat forces consist of all the required sustenance and maintenance of each unit in accordance with its design and purpose, plus all the service needs for the support of its operations and missions. This is the basic criterion for the design of the required logistical forces.

Most certainly, effective design of the logistical organization cannot be based on a ratio of the number of service troops supporting one combat soldier. Nor can any apparent enemy ratio of the volume of personnel, which they may have supporting one combat soldier, have any relationship with our logistical requirements. We have weapons that the enemy does not have. These affect the ratio between combat forces and their required logistical support. The approach toward the design of our logistical forces must be realistic. Each required function must be available and fully competent in all the aspects of its purpose. It applies to the entire logistical cycle.

THE determination of requirements is of first importance. It involves a complete, timely, qualified, and constant understanding and knowledge of all the present and prospective actual needs of the military force concerned and its activities. It applies to all echelons of command.

Then all subsequent action for the procurement of those needs must also be complete, accurate, and timely. All factors which affect the availability must be known, understood, considered, evaluated and planned. This involves such factors as the time required for planning, requisitioning, advertising, negotiations, accomplishing contracts or purchasing, manufacture, production, delivery, design of facilities and installations, construction, transportation, assemblage, and anything else which would effect the materializing of the need at the source from which it originates. This also applies to all echelons of command in accordance with the established procedures.

Those needs must then be distributed. All the tremendous capability of our nation to produce our military needs would be wasted if our armed forces didn't get them when they need them. Distribution is of major importance and a true concept of the scope, involvements, and requirements of the distribution mission must be fully understood.

Although distribution applies to all logistical needs, a typical supply operation is the best way to illustrate distribution.

In a theater of operations the area of distribution, for supply, is from the port of debarkation to the most forward troops in the combat zone, and for the full breadth of the theater. This area may not be great at first. However, as the combat forces progress, the area of distribution expands accordingly. Such expansion can then be to the extent of a large part of a continent. The size of the force which would operate in such an area is obviously dependent on the situation and circumstances. Future technological developments may revise our present concept of the frontage and depth capabilities of military forces. However, let us think of a theater with five field armies committed in the combat zone. Consider those field armies and their supporting forces as committed in a theater such as the European Theater of World War II. Then consider that approximately 100,000 tons of supplies must be distributed daily to all those troops. This gives us a vision of the scope of the supply mission.

However, we must further consider that those 100,000 tons consist of over 80,000 separate end items, each of which has a specific purpose and destination. The right item must be delivered to the right location. In addition to the end items there are the spare parts pertaining to them. In volume of items the spare parts are many times that of the basic item. Troops in combat are generally on the move and so the supplies have to be handled many times by the logistical forces before the using units get them. Therefore, some 300,000 tons of material must be handled in order to get those 100,000 tons to the troops daily.

All three phases of the logistical cycle —determination of requirements, procurement, and distribution—are equally important. A deficiency in any one will affect the capability of the force supported. All three apply to all logistical operations such as the provision of supply and all required facilities and services. A large proportion of the functions and operations call for specialist training and "know how" involving professions and trades. The quality of organization and the training of the logistical forces are important.

LOGISTICS today is big business. It is an essential and major element of the strength and power of a military force. Like big business it requires competent and experienced management to make it effective. Today a military commander has actually a dual role. He is commander of his troops and their operations, and at the same time he is a business manager. In this technological era he must be the latter in order to evaluate and materialize the designed capability of his forces.

The Month's Comment

Butter and/or Guns

EXCERPTS from two recent news stories:
"In the fiscal year 1953 we spent $16.2 billion on the Army. Under the 'new look' budget the Eisenhower administration plans to spend only $10.2 billion on Army defense during fiscal '55."

—*The New York Herald Tribune,*
4 February 1954

"Government-held farm surpluses are piling up at such an 'alarming' rate that the Commodity Credit Corporation may need more than the record 8.5 billion dollars which the Eisenhower Administration has requested to support farm prices."

—*The Washington Post,*
5 February, 1954.

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Catch 'em young—and Sell 'em hard

THE Army is the service of the reluctant volunteers. Not in every in stance, of course, but in an alarmingly high proportion of cases, th Army is last choice for prospective members of the armed forces. That not news, but we must face it.

We have heard many explanations of this not-very-complimentar situation, some of which stand up under examination and some of whic are as believable as a Communist peace feeler.

It isn't because the Army, even the Infantry, is too tough for America present generation of young men. Our Marine friends, whose boo training is the next toughest thing to a 49-cent steak, and who point excessive combat losses with something suspiciously like pride, don seem to have too much of a problem in attracting recruits.

It might be the lack of sex appeal in the uniform. But a well-presse well-polished soldier is a much happier sight than the average college k in dungarees and checkered shirts, something they wear by choice. An the Air Force, before it went to blue, didn't seem to have much trouble.

Some may say it's because the Army represents an anachronistic servi and isn't hep to the jet age. We'll argue this one, pointing to the batt ships and Marine infantrymen and Air Force food-service specialists o the one hand, and radar, guided missiles, tanks, helicopters and a fe other items on the other.

Some say glamor. And that might be it.

We read of the Air Force flying young teen-agers about the countr as guests of Strategic Air Command. The ten-year-old son of one of t editors has been to the Washington Navy Yard twice, to go through submarine and a destroyer. We read of Representative So-and-so retur ing from a cruise with the Navy. And so it goes.

Sweet are the uses of publicity, if we may garble a phrase. The Arm just doesn't take advantage of what it has. There is a planetarium at Fo Belvoir; it appears school children visit it in organized groups, but w have never seen anything in the Washington newspapers about it. T last time we looked, there were some light tanks at Fort Myer. If a young teen-ager has been invited to look at one of them, much less ri in one, we haven't heard of it.

Fort McNair has some of the snappiest retreat formations that ev gladdened the heart of a soldier. Have any teen-age groups been spec cally invited to see one of these parades? Is there a regulation that wou forbid the High School Cadet of the Week from pulling the lanyard the evening gun at any post? If we remember our boyhood days clear that would be a thrill for which we would have been eternally grate to the Army.

It isn't fair, of course, to point the finger only at the posts near Wa ington, but those are the ones we notice almost daily. Does Fort B (remembering the disproportionately large number of Spanish-America among Medal of Honor men) let the high school kids of El Paso feel th the Army is interested in them? Who, besides soldiers, have ridden the BARC? We don't know—we're asking.

Has any group of high school (or college) ROTC cadets ever be invited to eat in a nearby army mess hall? As a young cadet we wou have gladly paid for both the meal and the transportation.

We could go on and on, but we believe we have made our point.



n Army unit on parade in Moscow. The two stripes on the shoulder indicate the men in the front rank are corporals

THE ARMIES OF COMMUNISM

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN BAKER WHITE

In the West, Marshal Bulganin can muster four million land troops of varied quality and reliability and armed with weapons that range from very good to not so good

HERE can have been few subjects of world interest in the past eight years which there has been more specula-n, calculation and straight-out guess-g than on the size, equipment and iciency of the armed forces of Soviet ussia and her satellites. That there ould be guessing is not surprising, for ey are like a weapon inside a plastic coon on a laid-up battleship or plane. ey can be seen in Berlin, in Austria across the barbed-wire no-man's land the Iron Curtain frontier belt, but seen and appreciated only through the plastic cover spun about them by close to one million security troops.

But for all that it is possible by years of patient study, constant research, checking and re-checking of reports, to build up an accurate picture of the Red armed forces. That given in this article is based upon information that has taken four years to collect, married to nearly thirty years' continuous study of Communism.

The Red forces deployed along this line and behind it fall into five main groups. They are:

(1) The first-line troops of the highest quality, namely, the armored, motorized, artillery, guards-infantry and parachute divisions of the Soviet Army, with their supply units. The probable strength is about 1,400,000.

(2) The second-line infantry divisions and horsed cavalry brigades, many of them from the Caucasus, and Asiatic Russia. Officers and men are of good quality, well trained but restricted in their mobility by being mainly horse transported. They number about 1,200,000.

(3) The security troops, which include gendarmerie, railway police, frontier guards, field security police, and the guards of penal settlements. They are the Praetorian Guard of the Soviet State, with executive authority over all other armed forces. Distributed at key points in the Soviet Union and occupied territory, they total not less than 700,000.

(4) The armed forces of the satellite powers. Varying greatly in training, the quality of their equipment, and probably in a time of trial their loyalty to Communism, their strength has now risen to some 800,000.

(5) The forces under the command of the Fifth, or Military, Bureau of the Cominform—the secret armed formations of the Communist parties of Western Europe. There are also, in terms of hot-cold war, the Red partisan forces in Malaya and Indo-China.

It will be seen that excluding this last category, and the huge Chinese and North Korean armies, Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Bulganin has land forces in the West at his disposal totalling over 4,000,000. There are also 800,-

EUTENANT COLONEL JOHN BAKER WHITE, British Army, retired, has been a student of Communism for almost thirty years and has devoted a large portion of that time to a study of Red military forces. In 1928 he wrote *Red Russia Arms* and since 1945 has written *The Soviet Spy System* and *The Red Network*, all published in Great Britain. During the Second World War served in Military Intelligence. He had been a member of the Territorial Army in the London Rifle Brigade from 1934 to his retirement in 1945. He was elected to Parliament after the war, but resigned in 1953.

A glimpse at the Western satellites is not impressive




Hungarian Hussars . . .



Czech Communists on parade . . .



East German People's Police on parade



Albanian soldiers on the range . . .



Poles take 10-minute break

000 men in the Red Air Force and 600,000 in the Navy. It should be noted that included in the 700,000 security troops there are the Border Guards, Internal Security Troops and Convoy Troops, not at present under the Defense Ministry.

THE Soviet order of battle is based upon sixteen commands, nine of them in the Soviet Union. The main purpose of the present deployments, so far as they can be ascertained, would appear to be to add strength and support to the cold war, and not to be preparation for an early hot war. Certain of these deployments, notably those opposite the Bering Strait, in the vicinity of the Baku oilfields and between Berlin and Germany's eastern frontier are normal reactions to Russian bred-in-the-bone fear of attack from the West. That fear is real, and dates from Tsarist days.

Two years ago there were some fourteen divisions that had been stationed in Southeast Hungary since the spring of 1948 as a "reminder" to Marshal Tito and as support for the special brand of the cold war then being conducted against Yugoslavia. This force seems to have been reduced to about eight divisions. One of the armored divisions formerly in this area was identified recently on the Turkish Asiatic frontier, another was mentioned in a broadcast as being part of the Moscow garrison. The remainder seem to have been distributed in Germany and Poland to strengthen the substantial forces behind the line o the River Oder. The events in Berli on 17 June showed that at least four full strength armored divisions are stationed within a radius of sixty miles of the city

Today it is estimated that Russia ha a minimum of 170 divisions which in clude 15 motorised, 20 mechanised an 30 armored. The positioning appears t be as follows:

	Division
East Germany	30
Austria	2
Poland, Hungary, Rumania	12
U.S.S.R. (facing the West)	61

The 61 divisions referred to in th U.S.S.R. are distributed in the six mil tary areas of Leningrad, Riga, Minsk Kiev, Kharkov and Odessa. To this tot must be added at least 45 antiaircra and artillery divisions, making a total 215 land divisions in all.

Length of conscript service varies a cording to category from two years f ordinary soldiers up to five years for sp cialists and security guards. What ca only be a rough guess based upon pop lation statistics, would put the annu call-up at about 750,000 men. There no evidence that the Red Army, as d tinct from the satellite forces, has be increased in numbers during the pa three years—the accent has been on i creased efficiency and more equipme rather than on more men.

THE position of the Far Eastern R Army, which certainly numbers r less than forty divisions, with an avera strength of 10 or 12 thousand and high standard of training, is differe Recruited almost entirely from Asia Russia but officered largely from t West, it has been maintained at ma mum strength for many years. Not ev during the desperate days of the Bat of Stalingrad and the German drive wards Moscow, when trained manpo was so desperately short, did the Russ high command draw upon the Far E tern Army. Today it has a dual role. be on the watch for "Anglo-Americ imperialist aggression" and to act as a minder to Mao Tse-tung that "natio Communism must not be carried too It has also the role of providing train cadres to the Chinese Communist for

In estimating the number of Russ divisions it is important to remember t they are not all of a standard size. cording to Lt. Colonel Kyril Kalino member of the Soviet General Staff v escaped to the West, an infantry divis numbers 11,000 men, a motorized d

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The JSU-152 self-propelled 152mm gun-howitzer

n 13,000, and an armored division 500. Armored divisions, particularly home stations, are sometimes kept at trength of about 9,000, but experi-ed observers say that the armored isions moved into Berlin to quell the ne 17 demonstrations appeared to be full strength.

There can be no doubt about the high ality of the Red land forces, after five rs of war and eight years of tough d war training and battle readiness.

Nonsense stories die hard, and a great l of nonsense is still talked about the l discipline of the Red Army. The th is that every indication is that its cipline is excellent and ruthless ac-n is taken when it shows signs of ng anything else.

HERE is no doubt at all that over the ast three years the high command of Red Army has made an all-out effort improve its standard of equipment, ecially in the armored divisions. The eral tendency since the war has been concentrate on weapons giving the ximum defensive fire power. The alin" super-heavy tank is an example this tendency, for although it has bably greater fire power than any er armored vehicle, to travel any dis-ce it must have an outsize transporter ch, owing to its great weight, could be used on bad or war-worn roads. e improved T34 tank, which has bet-forward armor and a new system of k-linking, is the mainstay of the iet armored divisions, whose lighter icles are the Russian model jeep and Soviet version of the White scout car. n artillery the tendency is towards ater fire power at the expense of mo-ty. The heavy cannon now in full duction at the Gorki ordnance plant to be moved in three units—mount-

ing, breech and barrel, each towed by a special heavy tractor. The artillery experts, V. G. Grabin and F. F. Petrov, have applied the Gerlich tapered barrel principle to producing an improved model of the German long-range gun used to shell the British channel coast during the recent war. Artillery research and training, including guided missiles, have a high priority in Russia.

As to the rate of production of armored vehicles and artillery, the output of Soviet plants is not less than 5,500 tanks and self-propelled guns per year, and about 10,000 armored and scout cars.

The British War Office estimate is that there are 25,000 tanks and SP guns with the Red Army, and an equal number of older but serviceable vehicles in reserve parks. As to artillery, the annual output is probably about 30,000 and ammunition output not less than 24,000,000 rounds per year. In 1944 it was over 240,000,000 rounds including air bombs and mortar bombs.

About three years ago the Kalinin Taman mechanised infantry division was converted into an experimental "storm" division designed for swift and deep penetration into enemy positions, modelled on General Patton's historic thrust across France and Germany. Its equipment included SP guns, rocket batteries, large numbers of motorcycle troops armed with light machine guns, and attached formations of rocket-firing aircraft. There is reason to think that the experiment was a success and that other divisions have been converted to this special role.

THE estimates of the strength of the Red Air Force have varied over a very wide field. The Soviet Air Force is not an independent arm like the United States Air Force or Britain's Royal Air Force. There is a tactical or army air force, organized in air regiments, divisions and corps and subordinated to the local Army command, as well as a naval air arm, and these two exist to support military and naval operations. The force of fighters and interceptors for home defense, on the other hand, comes under the Air Defense Command, which includes antiaircraft defense, while the long-range bomber force comes under the Strategic Long-Range Command, which is directly subordinate to the Supreme Defense Council.

Of these the tactical air force is the most powerful and the most experienced, since during the war the main task of Soviet aviation was to support the Red

The Stalin-3 heavy tank, mounting a 122mm gun







The well-known MIG-15 jet and the twin-engine TU-2 medium bomber of the Soviet Air Force

Army in battle, and production was concentrated on planes for this purpose. There are more Soviet planes in this force than in any of the others, and a large proportion of them are jet fighters and fighter-bombers, such as the MIG-15 fighter and the Tupolev twin jet. However the Soviet Government has greatly developed its other air forces and expanded the production of the TU-4 long-range heavy bomber and defense fighters.

What is the total aircraft strength of the Soviet Union? General Gruenther gave a figure of 20,000 first-line aircraft to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1952, adding that 4,000 of the planes were jets.

According to recent American estimates, Russia produced 18,210 military aircraft in 1952, as against a United States output of 9,000 military planes in that year and an estimated 12,000 in 1953. But is an output of 18,210 planes really within the capacity of the Russian aircraft industry and the available manpower in it, and of the Soviet budget? The answer may well be that while Russia has 19,000 military aircraft, only about 14,000 are first-line, and that while Soviet production of fighters, fighter-bombers, and elementary training planes is undoubtedly high, the production of long-distance heavy bombers and troop transport planes is low.

As to the satellite armies in the West, there is no question at all about their incorporation in the Soviet battle plan. The sovietization of their staffs is now complete. All the satellite armies have large Soviet missions attached to them, and send officers to Russia for training.

The satellite armies have two serious weaknesses of which the Russians are very well aware. One is equipment, the other is leadership. Leadership is bad because of the ruthless purging of all the officers corps of "unreliable elements." Almost the whole of the 1945 general staffs of the satellite armies have been compulsorily retired or are in exile. The satellite armies lack both leaders and technical specialists.

Realizing these weaknesses, what plan has Russia for using the satellite armies in event of war in Europe? It seems clear that in accordance with her defensive strategy she would use them as a cushion to take the first shock of attack, and is prepared to accept their complete destruction.

SOVIET Defense Minister Marshal Bulganin must be able to see the weaknesses and problems of his forces. Admirable though they may be as support for a cold war, they are dispersed over an enormous field. They stretch from the Bering Strait in the East to Helmstedt in the West: from the Arctic Circle in the North to the Iran frontier in the South. It is true that he has the army commander's dream, one hundred per cent internal communications and almost all the raw material supplies required to sustain a war machine. It would be near perfection, if the communications were efficient, which they are not. Although much of the war damage has been repaired, largely by reducing the lines of Eastern Europe to single track, the Russian railways are far below Western and American standards of efficiency.

The majority of Russian roads, with the exception of a few motorways, are of very indifferent quality. A new minister for roads has just been appointed.

In their 1944-45 Western drive the Soviet armies lived on the country to a considerable degree. Today the cupboards and granaries and stores of Eastern Europe are bare. Russia's oil resources are barely sufficient to cover her peacetime needs, and are not sufficient to satisfy the insatiable thirst of great motorized armies.

The democratic defense system has its many weaknesses, but so has the Russian. Some of them appeared in the last war, and it is probable that few people save the military staff experts realize how near the Soviet armies came to absolute, final and complete defeat. Nor could they have carried out their counter-offensive without the great volume of war equipment placed at their disposal by the United States and Britain. The Soviet General Staff has learned a great deal from the 1941-1945 campaigns, and we can be sure it is making the most strenuous efforts to put the lessons into practice.

Towed 152mm gun-howitzer on parade in Moscow



LIBRARY

The Uses of Flame in Korea

Lt. Col. Walter L. Miller, Jr.



DURING the three years of the Korean conflict, flame was used advantageously by UN troops both in the attack and in defense. It was used in a number of forms and a number of very effective field expedients for using it were developed during the course of the conflict.

Perhaps the three most important lessons learned about the use of flame during the three years were:

(1) When you use flame, be sure to use enough of it. For example, one flame thrower will seldom do the job. It takes two or more to make sure that the target is really covered. One thrower can take over when the first is out of fuel thus prolonging the effect of the fire on the target.

(2) Plan their use. You must plan the use of flame weapons, just as you plan the use of other supporting weapons. These plans must include adequate quantities of fuel, servicing of the machines, orientation of operators, and coordination with other supporting weapons as well as the supported infantry unit.

(3) Training in the use of flame throwers. Each infantry division in Korea was authorized more than a hundred flame throwers and would have used more if they had been available. But the infantryman must be trained to use them; until he is, he will lack confidence in their effectiveness.





With the 100-foot extension hose the operator can swing his flame-thrower gun to meet the enemy without moving fuel tank

Emplaced Flame Thrower

A 25-GALLON Sponson fuel tank from the M3-4-3 Mechanized Flame Thrower, a 100-foot hose extension, and a portable flame thrower gun makes a fine weapon to throw fire from an emplacement. The entire assembly, filled with napalm fuel, weighs about 550 lbs. To get a pressure can for use on the MLR, holes for letting air in and fuel out were bored into a QM gasoline cap that fits the 5-gallon can. Pressure is supplied by a pressure bottle from the M2A1 PFT passing the air through a pressure regulator and reducing it to 28 PSI. In combat it was found desirable to have extra pressure bottles on the MLR to refill the tank. This is quieter than the lightweight compressor and won't attract enemy fire. The filled can of napalm fuel and lightweight compressor can be hand carried. The 2d Infantry Divisio used this weapon several times and i each case the enemy withdrew in cor fusion. Normally, the main fuel tank i placed in a bunker and the hose exter sion with gun run forward to the gur ner's "fighting hole" *(see above)*. Th hose extension allows the gunner fre dom of movement to adjust his positio to meet the enemy.

Hush Flare

AN illumination device that will silhouette the enemy during a night attack became known as the "Hush Flare." It consists of an illuminating grenade, two 81mm mortar metal cases and a five-gallon metal container. Holes 3/16-inch in diameter are bored in the bottom of the mortar cases. Upend the two cases in the metal container and wedge them tight with rocks. Attach a pull or trip wire to the illuminating grenade and wire it to the middle of the containers. Squeeze the cotter key so you'll have "hair trigger" release. Now fill the container with six per cent napalm. When the illuminating grenade is set off the napalm will be heated and two jets of light will stream out of the holes in the projectile cases, lighting a 50-yard area for three-quarters of an hour.



Hush Flare

Bunker Bomb

A FIELD expedient of great value to the combat infantryman is the napalm satchel charge or "Bunker Bomb." It consists of a caliber .30 or .50 machine-gun cartridge box, with a hole drilled in one end and the fuze from a WP grenade inserted through the hole from the outside. The body of the WP grenade is then screwed onto the fuze from the inside, sealing off the hole *(see below)*. The box is filled with about five per cent napalm and the lid fastened closed, preferably by a light wire. The soldier assaulting a dugout or bunker pulls the pin in the gr nade fuze and heaves the box wit contents into the interior of the fo tification. White phosphorus an burning napalm accompanied by i tense heat and choking smoke se the inside of the position. The 31 Infantry Regiment, 7th Division, i sued four of these charges per squa and got good results from it. I light weight makes it popular wit the foot soldier. Its use does n destroy a bunker as a shaped charg will and thus these positions ca later be occupied by friendly troop



"Bunker Bomb" consists of WP grenade and napalm in caliber .50 ammunition box. Release handle is on outside of box.



Soldier pulls the release and throw the bomb into the enemy's fortifi hole. Light weight makes it popul in hill fighting.

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ight Mechanized Thrower


O assist the infantry in the assault of enemy hilltop positions, particularly the last 50 rds, Ordnance and Chemical officers con-ructed a light mechanized flame thrower. ½-ton jeep was armor plated, its springs inforced, and a 25-gallon Sponson fuel tank om the M3-4-3 mechanized flame thrower as installed opposite the driver's seat. A 100-ot length of high pressure engineer air hose as coupled to the fuel tank and a portable me thrower gun attached to the other end the hose.

The vehicle would work up a hill and into suitable position under the cover of smoke d close-in weapons fire. Then the hose ould be run out and the flame aimed at the emy on the top of the hill *(see cut, page*). It gave the infantryman a 25-gallon me thrower with a 50-yard range, plus a 0-foot hose extension—that he didn't have to rry on his back! Later, a mechanized gun as added, so flame could be fired from the hicle while it was moving. The flame rower on this vehicle can be recharged with full supply of napalm fuel and compressed r within three minutes by a trained crew, ing the Chemical Corps' standard M4 Na-lm Servicing Truck. Portable flame throw-s were carried on the mechanized flame rowers to be used by the crews when the ound was too rough for jeeps.

A similar armored vehicle equipped with o caliber .30 machine guns and one 57mm coilless rifle was constructed to help infantry t across fire-swept areas and into key posi-ns. Known as the "Infantry Fighter," the w cost, low silhouette, light weight and great oss-country mobility made it popular.

ortable Flame Thrower


The standard portable flame thrower, 2A1, was used in the reduction of hill posi-ns, but its 72 pounds were too much of a ad for regular use. Also, it was necessary to duce the pressure regulator settings to 275-0 PSI in order that ROK soldiers and other en of small stature could operate the hand ip. Later a lightweight portable flame rower was devised by the Chemical Officer, Corps. It was made from the standard frame, e tank and gun group assembly from the 2A1 flame thrower. The standard pressure ttle was replaced by a lightweight Air Force O_2 3-man life raft pressure bottle. This me thrower weighed 40 pounds, and had range of 50 yards. It was favored by patrols d during assaults. The shortage in fuel is ade up by having a fairly large number of e lightweight flame throwers carried within e squad. This flame thrower is a field ex-dient and has limited use. However, it does int the way to development of a flame rower weighing about 40 pounds.



Rear view of "Flaming Dragon" reveals equipment and armor plate.



Front view of the "Flaming Dragon"



The "Flaming Dragon" becomes an "Infantry Fighter" by substituting recoilless gun and machine guns for flame-throwing equipment.

The Word from the Schools

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

New Courses

TIS has added five new courses to its curriculum. The addition for 1954's school year of a Judge Advocate General refresher course, Reserve Component Field Grade Officer refresher course, National Guard Officer Candidate course, Judge advocate General basic course and Wheeled Vehicle Mechanics course brings the total number of courses now offered by the Infantry School to 27.

The two-week Judge Advocate refresher course for the JAG Advanced Class is scheduled from 22 March to 3 April. It will consist of Infantry instruction that cannot be handled by the Judge Advocate General's School. The instruction will include atomic warfare, battle indoctrination, weapons, air transportability and combat arms training.

A Reserve Field Grade Officer course is scheduled from 12-24 April, and a Reserve Company Grade course will be held 19 April–1 May. Each class is authorized 185 National Guard and 25 Reserve officer students.

The National Guard Officer Candidate course will be held from 21 June to 17 August. Students will consist of those selected National Guard members seeking a commission. However, before being commissioned, each graduate must pass the National Guard board.

Three basic Judge Advocate General classes are scheduled. They will be held from 15 March–8 May; 28 June–25 August; and 27 September–22 November. The purpose of this new course is to provide newly commissioned JAG officers with basic military training.

Eleven classes, with an authorized enrollment of 50 students each, have been scheduled between 18 January and 24 August for the Wheeled Vehicle Mechanics course. It will consist of wheeled vehicle maintenance instruction and will also train mechanics to repair the vehicles used by an infantry regiment.

10,000 Airborne Soldiers

The Airborne Department at TIS will train 10,000 new airborne troops between January and April. Class capacities through 2 February have been 1,000. The first class had a total of 1,200 students. These are the largest classes conducted since World War II.

The volunteers will come from units of the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N. C.; the 11th Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Ky., and basic training camps.

More than 100 officers and enlisted men of the 508th Airborne Regimental Combat Team have been assigned to special duty as cadre and instructors in the Airborne Department to assist in handling this increased enrollment.

New Field Manual

Field Manual 7-30, "Service and Medical Companies, Infantry Regiment," has been revised by The Infantry School. It has been approved by The Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces and is being printed. It contains supply and medical doctrine adopted by the Army as a result of lessons learned in World War II and Korea.

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Oily Tube Decreases Velocity

A particularly interesting characteristic of weapon performance has been observed at service practices conducted at TAS during the past several months: Without exception, a decrease in muzzle velocity occurs if firing is commenced through a tube coated with a film of oil.

The oil film apparently has no appreciable effect on the muzzle velocity attained by the first round; since the decrease develops with the second and several subsequent rounds. Following this dip, muzzle velocity climbs back to the operating level (where normal, random variations from the average muzzle velocity occur). When graphed, the dip appears as a "trough." Evidently, the number of rounds in this trough is proportional to the oil film thickness in the tube when the first round is fired. Note: No trough develops when the tube is cleaned and swabbed dry prior to firing the initial round!

More than a ballistic novelty, the decrease in muzzle velocity can have one of two detrimental effects in a precision registration: (1) In the adjustment phase, a trough round (or rounds) can cause a false bracket, unknown both to the observer and FDC. The result is wasted time and ammunition, for the effect is identical to a round missensed by the observer. (2) In the fire for effect phase a series of trough rounds can invalidate an entire registration.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Artillery Quotation of the Month

In none of our previous combat experience has the value of Artillery been greater both in inflicting losses on hostile forces and in minimizing those of our own Infantry.

GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY
Korea, September 1951

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Experience data indicate that the trou occurs for all ranges and charges. Wh tests have so far been conducted only wi the 105mm, 155mm and 8-inch howitz —the trough has appeared with each these weapons; although its extent a magnitude are diminished in the heav calibers—supporting troops of The Artill Center are now required to *clean and a tubes before the first firing of the day.*

Current plans of the Department Gunnery call for similar tests to be co ducted with a hot, oiled tube.

Fluorescent Training Aids

Fluorescent training aids are now ava able for general use in classroom instructi at TAS. Using essentially the same m terials that have been a successful a popular advertising media, these visual a have proved both readily conformable heretofore difficult illustrations and a stro stimulus to student interest.

TAS uses fluorescent materials in th forms, principally: Chalk, paints, and ta The first—capable of producing clear, b liant colors on slate blackboards and eas adaptable to extemporaneous use by t instructor during class—is especially stu ing and effective when used in complica wire diagrams and organizational cha Paints are utilized, in accordance with structor requirements, by the Training A Section for prepared aids. The tape is p ticularly suited to diagrammatic instr tion, such as the presentation of tacti situations, and to classroom development partially preconstructed charts.

The materials are of two types: Fi there is the fluorescent material which, acting to the ultraviolet light in daylig always appears in vivid color. Then, th is the material which requires a spec "black light" (*i.e.*, ultraviolet) lamp bring out the color. Under ordinary lig ing conditions, this latter type appear natural white; thus, against a white ba ground, it is invisible until "black light" applied.

Communication Exercises

Recent POI changes at TAS have up the time allocated to communication tical exercises from the previous 20 perc to 35 percent of the total time provided all communication instruction.

Exercises are planned progressively present different situations and systems include the field artillery firing batt and battalion, division artillery, FS and certain AAA units (*e.g.*, battal group, and the antiaircraft operations ter). For each exercise, two preparat steps are required: First, students given a visual presentation of, and a bi ing on, wire and radio net positioning.

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RONS IN THE FIRE



onvertiplane

The XV-1 Convertiplane, the first military aircraft of this type ever built, is joint development of the Air Force, Army Transportation Corps and McDonell Aircraft Corporation. It embodies a completely new concept of flight nown as the "unloaded rotor" principle—a machine equipped with a rotor for rtical flight and wings and propeller for forward flight.

The XV-1 is designed to carry three passengers or two litter patients and edical attendant in addition to the pilot. The craft is approximately 30 feet ng, ten feet high and spans 26 feet in width.

sual presentation is accomplished by eans of a terrain-board display or by an tual walk-through of pre-established field stallations. The next step—usually a ap exercise in the classroom or at the oblem site—consists of planning the tacal exercise, to include specific instrucns for reconnaissance, selection of positns, and other pertinent items.

For a particular exercise, students are itially assigned a specific duty and are en rotated through various positions rom wireman to commanding officer) as e problem progresses from phase to ase; students are graded on their perrmance in each phase. Thus, the student ts into practice under field conditions e knowledge gained from classroom inruction; of particular importance, he bemes intimately acquainted with the cabilities and limitations of equipment, the oblem of how and where to employ availle equipment, the need for first and secd echelon maintenance, and the employent of field expedients.

Normally given near the close of instruction to insure that students have been thorughly trained in equipment, procedure, curity and systems employed, communiation tactical exercises are an integral part both general and communication specialist courses at TAS. It is recognized at, in addition to crystallizing classroom aching, these exercises enable the student work with personnel of varying degrees skill; and to gain experience in leaderip, initiative, and the imaginative applition of theory.

ough Sine Factors

Adjuncts to accuracy in observed fire, ugh sine factors provide a rapid, easy solution to the problem of computing lateral shift and change in distance when angular deviation exceeds 600 mils. Senior artillery officers will immediately recognize them as the old obliquity factors.


When reliable grid or polar coordinates cannot be determined, shifting from a known point is the best method of obtaining precise target location. However, when computing the lateral shift necessary in this method, the mil relation fails if the deviation exceeds 600 mils. In such cases, *i.e.*, when the angular deviation exceeds 600 mils—the sine values (rounded off to the nearest tenth) of the acute angles of the triangle formed by (1) the observer-known point line, (2) the OT line, and (3) a perpendicular to the OT line from the known point are used.

These rough sine factors are listed below:

Angular deviation in mils (Angles are rounded off to the nearest 100 mils before determining sine factors)	*Rough Sine Factor*
100–600	.1–.6
700	.6
800	.7
900	.8
1000	.8
1100	.9
1200	.9
1300–1600	1.0

The procedure—for computing the lateral shift and the change in distance when the angular deviation exceeds 600 mils—is simple. To compute the *lateral shift,* the observer-known point distance is multiplied by the rough sine factor for the angle of deviation at the OP. On the other hand, the *change in distance* along the OT line is determined in two steps: First, the observer-known point distance is multiplied by the rough sine factor of the angle at the known point; this gives the distance from the observer to the point on the OT line ("B," in the illustration below) where the perpendicular from the known point intersects the OT line. The computed segment of the OT distance ("OB," in the illustration below) is then subtracted algebraically from the OT distance to determine the change in distance.

This information is not contained in the present edition of FM 6-40, *Field Artillery Gunnery.*



LATERAL SHIFT

Sin 900 mils = Approx 0.8 (rough sine)

$$\text{Sin } 900 = \frac{\text{Lateral shift}}{2000}$$

Lateral Shift = 2000 x Sin 900
= 2000 x 0.8 = 1600

Lateral Shift: From BP, L1600

CHANGE IN DISTANCE

Sin 700 mils = Approx 0.6 (rough sine)

$$\text{Sin } 700 = \frac{\text{OB}}{2000}$$

OB = 2000 x Sin 700
= 2000 x 0.6
= 1200

Then:
Change in distance = OT dist — OB
= 2400 — 1200
= 1200

Change in distance: Add 1200

CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

THIS is the seventh in the series of articles on Career Management and how it serves yo If you have any comment or questions on this series please feel entirely free to write t editors or Career Management Division.

Civilian School Program

ARMY officers are in training in civilian colleges and universities and in industry throughout the United States. In the colleges and universities two programs exist, the long courses and the short courses: the long courses normally extend from nine to twenty-four months; the short courses, five months or less.

The purpose of the Army graduate education program in the long courses is to augment training conducted in service schools in order to provide a limited number of officers with specialized knowledge in scientific fields which will make them capable of working with civilian scientists and directing research and development in military fields, and in social sciences that will enable them to cope with the political and economic problems with which the Army is concerned. Essential language and area training is offered with a view to assignment to duties in which a knowledge of these languages is essential, as for example, intelligence type assignments. Annually, a few officers are enrolled for graduate work in various academic fields preparatory to their assignment as instructors at the United States Military Academy.

Training in short courses is usually in very limited and specialized fields and provides the officer with training essential for a particular assignment.

To be eligible for graduate training in long courses officers must meet these requirements: be Regular Army; be not over thirty-five years of age (waiver may be granted where circumstances warrant); have an acceptable undergraduate record, and usually have acquired a bachelor's degree or have completed substantially the requirements for that degree; agree to serve a minimum of four years after the completion of his graduate studies.

Regular officers of the combat arms may apply for civil schooling in long courses, normally on the master's degree level, in fields of the physical sciences (for example, nuclear physics, guided missiles, electronics, etc.), which courses usually run twenty-four months, and in fields of the social sciences (international relations, psychology, business administration, journalism, etc.), which courses normally run for a period of twelve to twenty-one months. In very exceptional cases, training is on the doctorate level.

An officer may list in his application two or more subject matter fields in which he desires graduate training, and may state his preference of institutions. Applications may be forwarded at any time to The Adjutant General, ATTN: AGG-ES. Applications are kept on file in Civil Schools Section, Education and Specialist Training Branch, Career Management Division, Office of The Adjutant General, and are considered whenever selections are made to enter officers in school to fill requirements in subjects of the officer's choice.

Regular officers of the technical and administrative services may apply for long courses to their respective career management branches. Specific subje in which officers will be trained by t technical and administrative services m be obtained from the service.

All regular tuition and fees requi by a university are paid under An contract with the university. In ad tion, up to $80 reimbursement per fis year is allowed each officer for the p chase of textbooks and expendable su plies used in his courses. Where a the is required, reimbursement up to $ is allowed to cover costs of typing a other expenses incurred in its prepa tion.

UPON completion of long courses, ea officer is required to serve in a ut zation assignment in the field of training for a period of approximat three years on Department of the Ar staff, headquarters of continental a overseas armies, and major comma and installations.

Regular and EAD officers of the co bat arms and of the technical and adm istrative services who desire training short courses in educational institut or in industry may apply to their car management branches. Previous coll training is not a prerequisite. A list subjects in which the Department of Army is desirous of training officers short courses is published from time time in letters and directives.

At the present time short courses Psychological Warfare and in Advan Management are offered to officers. T Psychological Warfare course is c ducted twice a year, in February a September, at Georgetown Univers and extends for a period of 16 wee Officers in the grades of first lieuten through colonel are eligible.

The Advanced Management Progr is conducted twice a year: in Febru and September at Harvard Univer for a period of 13 weeks, and in Ma and October at the University of Pi burgh for a period of 9 weeks. Offic in the grades of lieutenant colonel a higher are eligible for the Pittsbu course. For the Harvard course o colonels and general officers are eligi

The appropriate regulations concerning the civil schooling program are, for long courses:

SR 350-230-1, Training of Military Personnel at Civilian Institutions

SR 350-20-1, Selection, Administration, and Assignments for Officer Students

SR 350-230-50, Training at Civilian Law Schools

SR 350-230-52, Civil Schooling for Regular Army Officers of Armor, Artillery, and Infantry

SR 350-380-1, Foreign Area Specialist Training

SR 350-230-55, Civilian Education for Regular Army Transportation Officers

SR 350-70-1, Industrial Mobilization Training Program

FOR SHORT COURSES:

SR 350-230-65, Psychological Warfare Course at Civilian Educational Institutions for Army Officers

SR 350-20-1, Selection, Administration, and Assignments for Officer Students

Circular 10, dated 13 Feb 53, Advanced Management Training of Officers

Additional information regarding civil schooling may be obtained by writing The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C., ATTN: Civil Schools Section, Education and Specialist Training Branch, Career Management Division.

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The Month's Books

FATE AND GENERAL TRUSCOTT

OMMAND MISSIONS: A Personal Story. By Lt. Gen. L. K. Truscott, Jr. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York. 570 Pages; Maps; Index; $7.50.

I stated recently in these pages in a sum-ıary of the memoirs by senior World War . commanders, that General Truscott had ot been heard from. He has been heard om now, and the repercussions are likely) echo around in military circles for some me.

This is not to imply that General Trus-ɔtt has written a primarily sensational and ɔntroversial book, but interspersed in his ell-written "personal story," as he calls , are some extremely frank expressions opinion concerning many of his fellow ficers.

The author starts off by saying that "luck ays a part in the life of every man," and is evident that he realizes that Fate did m no harm when he was assigned as a ɔrps G3 in 1941 under a chief of staff hom he had never met before—one Colo-el Dwight D. Eisenhower. It of course ok something more that luck to work ɔ from that assignment to the job of an my commander before the end of 1944. His first overseas assignment was one at is not generally known: senior Amer-an officer on Lord Louis Mountbatten's aff. Mountbatten was chief of the Com-ned Operations setup which included e Commandos and amphibious training general. He was also believed to be in ıe to command the invasion of Europe a rather peculiar lateral command basis hich would control the assault phase on l beaches as a separate operation from e follow-up phases.

Truscott, never having been in combat d with no knowledge of amphibious erations, had some qualms about his w assignment, qualms which were not lped by General Marshall's greeting: ou are an older man than I wanted for is assignment," or General Eisenhower's mment: "You can learn, can't you?"

At the Dieppe raid, Truscott was the nior of about sixty American officers and en who participated or were "observers." e wrote his wife: "I will have to admit at I have seen war—and have been in nger—and have seen men die on land, sea, in the sky."

A point of considerable professional in-est is that there was, at the time, con-erable opposition to raiding. Although e discussion applied specifically to cross-annel raids, the arguments were not ıppropriate to any static ground situa-n preceding an offensive. The argu-nts in favor of raids included harassing e enemy, getting identifications, forcing e enemy to reveal his dispositions and e capabilities, and keeping our troops ensive-minded. In the 1942 situation British naval officer pointed out that while we were training our forces by means of raids, we were also training the enemy, and had this to say: "The Germans welcome these raids, for nothing shows up weakness in the defense more than an attack with a very limited objective. Every time we find a weak spot on the enemy's coast we point out his weakness, and there is ample evidence that he has taken and is taking full advantage of this information . . . "

Truscott, with the help of General Patton, got a sub-task force command for the North African invasion. He then became Deputy Chief of Staff to Eisenhower, and as such was closely associated with the controversial operations which resulted in the relief of several senior commanders.

As commander successively of the 3d Division, VI Corps, and Fifth Army, Truscott was a key commander in Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, Southern France, and in the final offensive in Italy. During much of this time, his immediate superior was General Mark Clark.

Truscott pays tribute to Clark's "personal charm," and great ability as an executive and administrator, but he is highly critical of some of his tactical plans and decisions. An example is his opinion as to the change in orders during the Anzio breakout: "There has never been any doubt in my mind that had General Clark held loyally to General Alexander's instructions, had he not changed the direction of my attack to the northwest on May 26th, the strategic objective of Anzio would have been accomplished in full. To be first in Rome was poor compensation for this lost opportunity."

He is equally frank about the "costly failure" of the 36th Infantry Division's attempt to cross the Rapido. As the publishers say: "Truscott is ruggedly honest in what he says about the other generals with whom he served." There will inevitably be readers who will disagree with his opinions or the desirability of his expressing them.

It is rather odd that what will probably be the last two books published by World War II army commanders should be exact opposites as to method. General Krueger's recent *From Down Under to Nippon* was so precisely limited to the story of his Sixth Army that much of it might have been written by an able historian who had never seen the Sixth Army. General Truscott's book, as has been indicated, is full of his personality.

It is unfortunate that, as the author says, "separation from personal records and pressure of other work" made necessary two pages of errata, and even they do not cover a considerable number of other errors, most of which, it seems, could have been caught by the publishers, particularly considering the price put on the book.—Maj. Gen. H. W. Blakeley.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

LINES FROM A NEW BOOK

The orientation lecture of Captain Gerald Russell, born in County Kerry, who commanded a troop of the 3d Cavalry on the frontier in the post-Civil War years:

"Young Min! I conghratulate yiz on bein assigned to moi thrupe, becos praviously to dis toime, I venture to say that moi thrupe had had more villins, loyars, teeves, scoundrhils and, I moight say, dam murdhrers than enny udder thrupe in de United States Ormy. I want yiz to pay sthrict attintion to jooty—and not become dhrunken vagabonds, wandhrin all over the face of God's Chreashun, spindin ivry cint of yur pay with low bum-mers. Avoide all timptashuns, loikwoise all discipashuns, so that in toime yez kin become non-commissioned offizurs; yez'll foind yer captin a very laynent man and very much given to laynency, fur Oi niver duz toi no man up bee der tumbs unless he duz bee late for a roll-call. Sarjint, dismiss de detachment."

The good captain was at times disappointed in the results:

"I decleer to God'l'moity! The base ingratoichude of dem wearies (his name for the enlisted men) of moine is perficly 'stonishin! . . . they hev just smashed a bran new skillit over my nice first Sarjint's head'n all becoz dey didn't hev enough toe-matusses in dere God-dam supe!"

MAJ. GEN. JOHN K. HERR
The Story of the U. S. Cavalry

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE PROBLEM OF NEW WEAPONS

IDEAS AND WEAPONS. By I. B. Holley, Jr. Yale University Press, 1953. 222 Pages; Index; $3.75.

The subtitle of this book: "Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States During World War I; A Study in the Relationship of Technological Advance, Military Doctrine, and the Development of Weapons," gives a clue to its content and purpose. The author served as a historical officer for the Air Force at Wright Field during the last part of World War II. This sharpened his insight into the relationship of ideas and weapons and convinced him that our country can no longer afford to follow haphazard and unsystematic methods in weapons development.

The subject chosen is a good one. The air weapon was a comparatively new de-



Pass In Review

Considering its size and scope, the war in Korea has probably received closer editorial attention than any other conflict in history. Few wars have had so many controversial features, including public debate on the strategy and tactics. But up to now there hasn't been a thoughtful, factual analysis of the major aspects of the whole operation. *Substitute for Victory* ($3.00), by John Dille, who covered Korea for *Life* magazine, helps fill this need. Dille believes that the war in Korea had to be fought, just as the truce was wise and necessary. He summarizes the many tactical benefits which accrued to our armed forces as a result of Korean fighting and since he feels that we could not have decisively defeated Communism in that theater, the MacArthur theory was wrong. Dille has sought objectivity and to avoid emotionalism, with considerable success.

Those of you who have been reading the bits and snatches of Major General William F. Dean's personal experiences as a prisoner in Korea which have been appearing in *The Saturday Evening Post* will be happy that his complete story will appear in book form in May. Tentative price is $5.00. Our book service will stock the book.

Nancy Shea has just come out with a new edition of her famous *The Army Wife* ($3.50), which will be welcomed in many quarters. She reports that the book has been extensively rewritten to meet present-day conditions. New sections cover Army life not only in the U. S., but at overseas stations as well. Likewise, there is much advice for the wives of NCOs and other enlisted personnel.

You who read the papers know what a tough job our Civil Defense people have had in getting the public interested in essential defense measures. The mayor in my town has publicly stated that he feels that CD funds are wasted. I think I can change his attitude by sending him a copy of Philip Wylie's new novel *Tomorrow* ($3.50), which, in addition to being a fine job of writing and an excellent story, is one of the most alarming books of recent months. It's alarming, because he is writing with the present-day American people and their lethargy concerning harsh realities of atomic warfare very much in mind.

Through our Combat Forces Book Service, we make available the books we think our readers need and want at the best possible prices. Just last week, we were able to make a deal which we hope many of our readers will welcome. We were able to obtain a modest number of the popular *Thorndike-Barnhart Dictionary,* in the thumb-indexed edition, which we can sell to our members at a greatly reduced price for a limited time. This dictionary retails at $3.75, and until we sell out the 60 copies we have, we can offer them at $2.25 plus the usual 25-cent mailing and handling charge. Since we can't get more of these at this special price, we'll have to handle the orders on a first-come, first-served basis. We can honestly say that this is the best dictionary buy we've had.

One of the more absorbing books of the current season is called *The Book of Famous Escapes* ($4.95), edited by Eric Williams, famed author of and participator in *The Wooden Horse* escape of World War II. Certainly, Williams is fully qualified as an escape expert, which makes it all the more interesting to read his selections of the most exciting and famous escapes in history. These fantastic and breathtaking accounts start with John Gerard's escape from the Tower of London in 1597 and run through a total of eighteen including seven unusual escape accounts from World War II. Two of the most interesting concern Casanova's escape over the rooftops of Venice back in 1756, and the exploits of the indomitable Winston S. Churchill when he escaped from the Boers in 1901.—R.F.C.

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velopment in World War I. Since we d not enter the struggle until 1917, o might assume that the United States wou be in a position to profit by the experien of the other belligerents and lead the w in exploiting the full potential of the weapon. We prided ourselves on our m chanical skill and manufacturing facilitie Yet the record we compiled in 1917-19 in the matter of producing effective co bat aircraft is a sorry one indeed. Tod we are in a position in relation to t guided missile which is similar to that the airplane in 1914. Like a great ma other citizens, Mr. Holley is concern that we shall do a better job of develo ing these and other new weapons than did with aircraft 35 years ago.

The story of our effort to exploit t air weapon in 1917-1918 can be brie told. Without a clear idea of what ki of planes were required and for what p pose, we nontheless set out to build vast air armada. We lacked adequate st machinery to estimate future needs and acquire accurate information about te nical changes which were taking place European aircraft development. Since t Signal Corps had been in charge of av tion in the U. S. Army, we leaned in t direction of reconnaissance aircraft. W a sublime faith that "individuals" co solve aircraft design and procurement pr lems, we sent many missions to Euro whose frequent suggestions for changes design drove constructors crazy. Not be able to keep up with the rapid obsol cense of designs and power plants, were limited at the end of the war to tu ing out obsolete observation planes wh Pershing begged us to keep in the Uni States. We were on the track of someth promising in the Liberty engine, but war ended before we gained anything fr its development. Then, true to form, allowed our painfully built-up techn agencies to dissolve, with an almost co plete loss of their specialized knowle and know-how.

Looking back on this frustrating expensive experience, Mr. Holley dr the following conclusions: (1) Maxim exploitation of new weapons requires understanding by the military of the n for superior weapons and for doctri governing their employment. (2) Our f ure to formulate requirements and trines for the air weapon stemmed fr faulty organization. (3) Our substitu of quantity for quality as an objective aircraft production stemmed from ig rance of the nature of the air war in Eur (4) A systematic, objective, and continu flow of information to all echelons was quired so that decisions on matters of sign, armament and employment could made intelligently. (5) Decisions in h ly technical fields which were made the basis of "opinions, memory, pers experience, or emotional bias" led onl failure.

What Mr. Holley is asking for are o ations research and analysis to go h

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
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
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in hand with weapons employment, tactics, and military leadership. The scientist must try to understand the problems of employing weapons in practice, but on the other hand professional military leaders must not insist on employing obsolete weapons simply because they have become accustomed to them in the past. One might add that it would be helpful to have a realistic statement of what our national objectives might be in a war with superdestructive weapons.—H. A. DeWeerd.

BEGINNINGS OF THE INEFFECTIVE SOLDIER

PSYCHIATRY AND MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY. A Reappraisal of the Experience in World War II. By Eli Ginsberg, John L. Herma, and Sol W. Ginsberg, M.D. Columbia University Press, 1953. 66 Pages; $2.00.

This little book, the first of the "Human Resources Studies" by the staff of the Conservation of Human Resources Project of the Columbia University School of Business, contains nothing that is new. But it may play a significant role in defining the role of military psychiatry: what it can and cannot do. It is concerned with changes in the psychiatric "theories" which affected personnel and manpower policies in World War II. It is based on the current "reflections" of a representative group of about 53 psychiatrists who were involved in military psychiatry during that period. Three major topics are evaluated: the significance of the screening figures which indicated that about one million men were rejected, attempts to determine "why men break," and comparisons of military service with civilian life.

Many of the psychiatrists have changed their minds about what they originally thought was important. The conclusions are familiar ones:

Screening procedures eliminated too many men because "potential breakdown" could not be accurately estimated. So now, only those who are obviously unsuitable are screened out.

There was too much emphasis on "clinical concepts" during World War II; now it is recognized that the position a soldier occupies, its "stresses and supports," are equally important.

Psychiatrists were "uncertain" about the extent to which military life differed from civilian life.

Finally, the usual recommendations for "improved personnel management" are made: "better and more mature leaders," "an improved rotation and replacement system," and "an improved basic training system."

Certainly, no one would dispute the need for better leaders, for rotation and replacements, and for better basic training. But no one has yet come forth with a solution. Indeed, there may be none, but it would be worth while if the authors could establish even this. For then we could get on with the problem of making the best use of the national policies toward military manpower, rather than accepting makeshift answers.

The authors are on the way toward study of *The Ineffective Soldier*. Perha there they will attempt a solution. Mea while, this little book will be interesti to anyone who would like to see how son psychiatrists have changed their minds. Capt. Roger W. Little.

TRACT FOR OUR TIMES

THE STATESMANSHIP OF THE CIVIL WAR. Allan Nevins. The Macmillan Company, 195 82 Pages; $2.25.

Victory in modern war requires mo than ever that statesmen and soldiers u derstand each others' purposes and pro lems. No longer can we tolerate, witho risk of defeat, a repetition of the disastro ignorance of general policy and politic necessities that frustrated the earlier Nort ern generals in the Civil War. This aspe of statesmanship is noted emphatically Professor Nevins's brilliantly written, su tle and succinct appraisal of civilian lea ership on both sides in the War Betwe the States. His reading of character a personality of Abraham Lincoln and J ferson Davis, his estimate of their effecti ness as leaders, and his interpretation their policies—military, foreign and dom tic—are valuable contributions to milita history. In a larger sense, his book is r without value to us as a tract for our tim when an international crisis presents ev more difficult problems to our statesm than did the domestic crisis of 1861 to L

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oln and Davis and their assistants. The rofessional soldier will also find the book profitable aid in his study of leadership. To reach his conclusions concerning the haracter of the two presidents, their ability s organizers and administrators, and the nfluence of moral and other intangible fac-ors on their decisions and actions, it is lear that Professor Nevins has weighed he evidence most carefully in his search or truth. Disagreement with a few of his ndings in no way alters the conviction of his reviewer that Civil War history has ained in this book a most helpful summary f the quality of leadership in that conflict. -Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong.

PROTECT YOURSELF

ENSION AND RETIREMENT RIGHTS. Edited by Lt. Col. S. F. Tillman. Privately published, 1953. 82 Pages; $1.00.

"You," says Colonel Tillman, "have the esponsibility of learning for yourself the enefits—either as a veteran or serviceman -to which you may be entitled. Also, the enefits that your dependents may be en-tled to—someday."

This little book is one of the few places here an attempt has been made to bring ogether in language that the layman can nderstand, the dollar and cents results of considerable amount of complex legis-tion. It not only discusses the pension nd retirement rights of various classes of ilitary personnel, but also the assorted enefits to which veterans are entitled, the latively new and little understood social ecurity benefits for military personnel and eir families, and survivors' benefits for tired personnel.

On this last subject—which involves the ection of what reduction, if any, in pay desired to provide some income for fami-es after the death of the recipient of mili-ry pay—all retired personnel face the ecessity of a prompt decision. It will be od news to those who have already re-ived the forms and instructions from the inance Officers who pay them that Colonel illman says "it's not very complicated, ally." Some will undoubtedly regard this mment as optimistic.

The author emphasizes the importance the initiation of an estate plan by every ldier—officer or enlisted man—as soon as enters active military service. By inte-ating government benefits and insurance ith commercial insurance and savings, d by making appropriate increases as u marry, are promoted, and advance in ars, you will better enjoy your retired ars.—H. W. B.

MANASSAS COMES ALIVE

LL RUN REMEMBERS. By Joseph Mills Hanson. National Capitol Publishers, Inc. 194 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index. $1.90.

Here we have a fascinating and histori-lly correct account of two of the most portant battles of our Civil War. Under ajor Hanson's facile pen the Manassas ea comes alive, as seen by the men who wore the Blue and the Gray ninety-odd years ago.

One might classify this as a guide book to the battlefield, but it is much more than that. The operations, the leaders, the soldiers are all here, together with accounts of what they wore and ate, and their weapons. For those who wish to trace the action on the spot, the maps are perfect, since they superpose the battles upon the modern road net.

The author, a competent historian, was, until his retirement in 1947, superintendent of the Manassas National Battlefield Park. This book should be possessed by every student of the Civil War.—Col. R. Ernest Dupuy.

BOOKS RECEIVED

FATE AND FREEDOM. By Jerome Frank. The Beacon Press, 1953. 376 Pages; Index; $4.00. A revised edition of Judge Frank's philosophy for free Americans.

GEOGRAPHY FROM THE AIR. By F. Walker. E. P. Dutton & Company, 1953. 111 Pages; Index; $7.50. The first book in English to explain and illustrate the use of air photos in the study of geography, with 96 plates and 3 diagrams.

AMERICANS ARE ALONE IN THE WORLD. By Luigi Barzini, Jr. Random House, 1953. 209 Pages; $2.50. An interpretation of America's role as the leader of the free world, by an Italian journalist.

HUNTING & FISHING IN NORTH AMERICA. By Michael Cramond. University of Oklahoma Press, 1953. 394 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.95. The author is a guide, explorer, and widely read contributor to sporting magazines.

UN: TODAY AND TOMORROW. By Eleanor Roosevelt and William DeWitt. Harper & Brothers, 1953. 236 Pages; Index; $3.00. The UN's accomplishments, functions, and future. Includes a question-and-answer section, and the UN Charter.

THE FLYING YEARS. By Lamont Buchanan. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1953. 188 Pages; Index; $5.00. A pictorial history of man's conquest of the air.

DENIZENS OF THE DEEP. By Philip Wylie. Rinehart & Company, 1953. 222 Pages; $3.00. True tales of deep-sea fishing.

DECISION FOR WAR. 1917. By Samuel R. Spencer, Jr. Richard R. Smith, 1953. 110 Pages; Illustrated; $2.50. The *Laconia* sinking and the Zimmermann telegram as key factors in the public reaction against Germany.

MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAST. By Allan S. Walker, M.D. Australian War Memorial, 1953. 701 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; $5.50. The second volume in the medical series of the official *Australia in the War of 1939-1945*.

A fighting American general's personal book about the war in Europe . . . his commands . . . his battle experiences

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★★★★ As you well know, the welfare of the Association [of the U. S. Army] is a concern I continue to share and, as in the past, I shall let no opportunity pass to enhance its value to the Army—and to the American people. Also, I want to take this opportunity to compliment the staff of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL for turning out a splendid publication.

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★ Stars in His Eyes

The February issue arrived yesterday and I have nearly finished reading it from cover to cover. May I congratulate you on an exceptionally informative and well-balanced issue! As each issue arrives, I appreciate more and more the worth of my subscription.

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TESTAMENT OF FAITH

It is the responsibility of every American to "per petuate a hard core of able, dedicated" soldier



ROBERT T. STEVENS
Secretary of the Army

GREAT leadership is a priceless military asset, and the lack of it can never be offset by numbers of men, by a preponderance of guns and tanks, of planes, bombs, ships or any other material things, no matter how good they may be, how modern, how powerful. No matter how large and well-equipped it may be, a military force which goes forth to battle without fine leadership—not only at the top but all down through the ranks—marches toward defeat and disaster.

We certainly have fine leaders today. Never before have we had available so many senior officers tempered in the fires of war, thoroughly versed by experience in the command of large bodies of men, and practiced in the solution of military problems of the first magnitude.

* * *

WE are also fortunate in having the kind of enlisted men who make up the bulk of our Army. I have seen them under the stress of battle, I have seen them standing guard at far-flung outposts, and I have seen them undergoing their grueling training. I have talked to them and I have come to know them. And, knowing them, I am resolved that they shall continue to have the finest possible leadership—they deserve no less.

* * *

There are many examples I could mention [that would] serve to illustrate the kind of men of which this Army is composed. I reaffirm to all America today what a wonderful United States Army we have!

In the light of [the] record, and the outstanding character of our professional military men, it is deplorable that the Army as a whole—more particularly its Officer Corps, and especially its senior officers—should too often be the target for irresponsible criticism.

The fundamental principle emphasized by President Eisenhower that ". . . professional military leaders must not be thrust into the political arena to become the prey of partisan politics" has too often been forgotten or flouted. There is a tendency to overlook the fact that the soldier is an integral part of the community and is entitled to the same guarantees and protected by the same Bill of Rights as every other American citizen. It is sometimes forgotten that it was the Army which played a major role in the foundation of this Nation and made possible the firm establishment of liberty, justice, and individual freedom. The Army has successfully defended those principles in every war, and I propose to defend it and its prestige and integrity.

* * *

IF I had to find a single word by which to characterize the officers of the United States Army, that word would be: Integrity—absolute, uncompromising integrity.

This includes both professional integrity and moral integrity. By professional integrity I mean unceasing striving to master one of the most complex, difficult, and demanding vocations which exist. By moral integrity I mean loyalty to the American people, to the Government, to constituted civilian authority, and to the principles of truth, justice, and liberty upon which our government is based. I mean as true loyalty to subordinates as to superiors—loyalty up, and loyalty down.

* * *

I WANT to tell you something about the military mind. It is a mind which seeks to anticipate and prepare for every eventuality. It is a mind capable of dealing brilliantly with the special problems which concern the military security of the Nation. It is a mind conditioned by courage, by a tradition of selfless service by the highest standards of character. It is, in short, a mind which measure every action by the yardstick of "Duty —Honor—Country." I fervently pra that our Nation will continue to develo such minds.

When I hear distinguished office slurringly referred to as "the brass" disturbs me greatly. I heartily endor the sentiment of that eminent America and South Carolinian, Bernard Baruch who said: "In my experience, 'the bras is all pure gold."

Men such as those who lead our Arm today cannot and will not let Americ down in any respect—of that I am ce tain. The perpetuation of this hard co of able, dedicated officers and noncom missioned officers is of especially vit concern to the Nation as dangers an uncertainties beset us on every han The day that America allows this bree of men to die out through indifferenc thoughtlessness, or neglect, that da America signs her own death warrant.

IT is of the utmost importance th everything possible be done to crea an atmosphere conducive to the maint nance of a career military servic clothed in dignity and honor, which w be attractive to the highest type of you America. Nothing is more detriment to the Service than a feeling among personnel that they are held in lo esteem by their fellow citizens. An action which fosters such a conclusio strikes at the taproots of our security.

Unless the trend of recent years is r versed, and a climate created in whi the development of military leadersh of the highest type is encouraged, the will be little hope that in the futu America will possess the kind of milita leaders we are fortunate enough to ha today and to have had in the past. T Secretary of Defense and the other o cials of the Defense Department, as w as the members of Congress, are givi the matter very serious consideration t the present time. However, it is n their responsibility alone. It is the sponsibility of every American

This is drawn from an address by Mr. Stevens at The Citadel, Charleston, S. C., 19 March 1954

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
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
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
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Vol. 4, No. 9 April 1954

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Journal's Journal

WE don't have the space to offer a course in the economics of publishing, but take our word for it that the more members we have in the Association of the United States Army, the bigger—and better—your JOURNAL will be. It's a chicken-and-egg sort of proposition: better JOURNAL, more members; more members, better JOURNAL. We spend a lot of time and thought on both ends: getting more members, producing a better JOURNAL.

General Decker, our President, recently wrote all the general officers in the Army and asked what they thought of the JOURNAL. He passed the answers on to the staff. So the staff knows now, if it didn't before, that practically every general reads the JOURNAL, and most of them read it intelligently and critically.

We've been analyzing the comments and we're more puzzled than ever before. Many generals merely mention that the magazine is staying on its toes. Others have specific comments, but in large degree they cancel each other out. Who is right? The generals who say we need more platoon-level combat-action material, or those who insist that we need more high-level military and geopolitical thought? Those who believe we should leave the technical field to the magazines of the tech services, or those who think we should publish a much larger proportion of tech service material? Those who want us to punch hard on the loss of service benefits, or those who tell us to stick to our professional knitting? Those who want us to become a borderline lobbying organization, or those who want us to be staid and circumspect?

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is not published particularly for generals, although a larger proportion of the generals in the Army are members of the Association than the percentage in any other rank or grade. How do you company grade and field grade officers, and you enlisted members, feel about things?

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Testament of Faith. *Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens* . . . Cover
Battle Future of Our Army. *Col. Unitas* 1
The Month's Comment: Loyalty Downward 1
Preview to Flash Burn. *A CFJ Staff Report* 3

MEN AND METHODS

Stars, Stripes and A-Bombs. *Col. George C. Reinhardt* 1
Celerity: Our Secret of Success. *Col. R. Ernest Dupuy* 2
The Rifle Squad: Key to Movement. *Lt. Thomas A. Ware, Jr.* 4
Career Management and Your Future. No. 8: Transfer or Detail? . . . 4

AT HOME AND ABROAD

Indochina: Terrain Tailors Tactics. *Capt. Harlan G. Koch* 2
The Month's Pictures: Indochina Covers 1 and
Around the Bases: Germany. *Maj. Marco Polo* 1
Fix-Your-Own-Car Shop 1

MACHINES AND WEAPONS

Copter Cavalry. *Maj. Bert Decker* 1
The George Method. *Capt. Edward H. Pykosz* 1

DEPARTMENTS

The Month's Mail 6
Front and Center 10
The Month's Reading 26
Cerebrations 3
The Word from the Schools . . . 3
The Month's Books 3

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
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ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

U. S. Infantry Association, 1893-1950
U. S. Field Artillery Association, 1910-1950

PURPOSES

The Association of the United States Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Association shall be to encourage and foster for all elements, branches, and components of the Army of the United States, and for such veterans' and unit organizations as may be appropriate:

The dissemination of information relating to history, activities, problems and plans.

The exchange of ideas on and discussion of military matters.

The perpetuation of those Army and unit traditions that contribute to *esprit de corps* and superior performance of duty.

The cultivation of cordial relations among the several armed services and with the public.

The promotion, attainment, and preservation of high professional standards.

INSTRUMENTALITIES

The primary instrumentality for the carrying out of the purposes and the attainment of the objectives of the Association shall be the publication of its magazine, COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. The secondary instrumentalities of the Association for the carrying out of its purposes and the attainment of its objectives shall be the preparation, publication, and distribution of military books, and the performance of related activities in fact contributing to the Association's stated aims.

Adopted 14 December 1953 by the Executive Council.

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The Month's Mail

Thank You, Sir

To the Editors:

I have been informed that the *Infantry Journal,* which I rea for many years, has been combined with *The Field Artille Journal* and is now published as COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL.

This is welcome news, indeed, and consummates in part hope of Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, when as Cor manding General, Army Ground Forces, he placed the respon bility for the Infantry, Field Artillery, Cavalry and Coa Artillery *Journals* upon the Chief of the Requirements Sectio Army Ground Forces.

I am very sorry to learn of the death of my good friend Colon Joe Greene. Joe and I served together in Panama as secon lieutenants, and for him I always had the highest regard an admiration. His going was a severe loss to the COMBAT FORC JOURNAL, but I take consolation in the fact that the staff, whi Joe had had working for him and on which he had indelib stamped his own personality, is carrying on with the Associati and the JOURNAL.

So that I won't miss the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL in the f ture, please enter my membership in the Association of t United States Army. Enclosed is a check for twelve dollars.

With all best wishes, I am

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. DE

Deputy Commanding General
Headquarters, Sixth Army
Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

● The staff deeply appreciates this fine letter from a great s dier, who once was Chief of the Requirements Section, Ar Ground Forces, and also served on the Executive Council of t Infantry Association.

Secretary Stevens

To the Editors:

In reference to "Meet the Army's Boss," in the March iss Is he?

Perhaps the question should be directed at Pvt. David Schi Colonel Francis Kreidel or Brigadier General Ralph Zwicker.

As for me, I wish I could feel more that he is the Army's b and not that of some politicians pulling strings behind his ba

CAPT. ARTHUR L. LAU
USAR

606 W. Bristol
Saginaw, Mich.

To the Editors:

Your article on Secretary Stevens was timely and informati It was timely because it appeared at the high tide of the con versy over Mr. Stevens' defense of General Zwicker. It informative because it gave us in the Army an insight into character of the man toward whom we look for leadership.

All of the fine things you wrote or implied about Mr. Stev were amply borne out by recent events. Mr. Stevens singul displayed that golden trait of leadership: loyalty downward. A apparently he did it on his own; with guidance from no one s his own clear conscience.

The fact that later Mr. Stevens . . . concluded what he ha reasonable right to assume was a gentleman's agreement widely construed at the time as a capitulation on the part of Stevens. Subsequent statements indicate that it was not a cap lation. And I believe that subsequent action on his part bear this out.

A disquieting aftermath of all this is the persistent run despite statements and releases to the contrary, that "Army S retary Stevens may still be eased out of his job" (*Newsw* March 8, 1954). The argument is that Mr. Stevens' usefuln to the service was damaged beyond repair by his "surrender."

Quite the contrary. Far from his usefulness being damaged beyond repair, I am convinced that it has been repaired beyond damage! For it is not every day that men of Mr. Stevens' qualities can be found to take over the civilian leadership of the Army. The integrity and deep sense of "loyalty downward" which he possesses are not so plentiful in the marketplace that we can afford to trade them for a bit of superficial face-saving.

The Army's answer to our Secretary's unhesitating "loyalty downward" is, I am sure, unanimous "loyalty upward."

LT. COL., Infantry

Norfolk, Va.

Thanks

To the Editors:

I would like to say how much interest I always find in your JOURNAL. Lloyd Norman's article on "The New Look Strategy" is of particular interest.

With all good wishes.

B. H. LIDDELL HART

Wolverton Park
Buckinghamshire, Eng.

It's Your Association

To the Editors:

Where have I been all these years? Page 9 of the January issue of the JOURNAL had an article, "Personal Service," that indicated a member of the Association could ask for an examination of his 201 file by the Association. This was news to me!

I have wondered what the Association did for its members. Though I've been a reader for thirteen years—and voted for officers, and the merger—I never knew what the Association could accomplish for its members directly.

Perhaps there are many more readers who are well aware of the JOURNAL, but know little of the Association itself. How about an article explaining the mission and accomplishments of the Association of the United States Army?

The current series written by the staff of the Career Management Group is serving a good purpose.

MAJ. R. V. TAIBBI

Leominster, Mass.

Organic Tac Air

To the Editors:

I predict that some day the Army will regain its tactical air arm. I say this with one qualification, and that is it may be quite some time in the future. Eventually the Army is going to have its own tactical air arm because it is part of the infantry-armor-artillery team. In a wide open moving situation such as will occur in the event of another large scale war, it is a necessity that the Army have tactical air under its own control. I don't always agree with the Marines, but I will give them unqualified credit for their tactical air setup.

I can hear the airmen answering with their standard arguments about mass at the decisive point. That is a good point. Who am I to disagree with one of the maxims of war? But let me define my terms. The Army's tactical air should be concerned only with close support missions. Interdiction and gaining air superiority is clearly a mission of the Air Force. They can do this with their planes that are designed to cope with enemy fighters and equipped to carry A-bombs and to perform the interdiction missions. But a plane and a pilot, the first designed and the second trained solely for close support of the ground forces is needed.

The Air Force pilot is of a different world than the ground soldier. He has never experienced ground training or ground combat. When he is called upon to make an air strike on such and such a hill he will do it to the best of his ability and knowledge. However, I believe that his knowledge is not great enough to do as good a job as his ability and his marvelous flying instrument of destruction will permit him to do. I mean this to reflect no discredit on our combat pilots in Korea.

The infantry division commander should have control of his own tactical air. He not only should have operational control, but the tactical air should be an organic part of his division. The planes should be piloted by men who have had basic training and a certain amount of service in a ground combat arm, and then sent on to flight training. The infantryman on the ground should be as accustomed to using an air strike as he is to using an artillery concentration.

America's strength lies in its technology. The mission of the American army is victory with the minimum number of casualties. Today with a cold war the new factor of economy has appeared. If one plane with some napalm can knock out a machine gun position holding up an attack rather than cost a platoon of infantry, the plane should be used. It will save lives and it is cheaper. I believe my concept of Army tactical air fits right in with the concept of smaller but more powerful forces laid down by President Eisenhower.

LT. HOWARD M. STEELE, JR.

APO 500, San Francisco, Calif.

Combat Films

To the Editors:

In addition to the courses prescribed in DATC No. 14, 1952, "Battle Indoctrination," there are other ways to prepare a prospective combat infantryman psychologically for combat. These are training films made up from actual combat scenes.

These films could be made by editing our large supply of combat films, and filming ("controlled" in contrast to "at random") actual battle sequences with a definite objective or purpose in mind.

These training films should be edited and planned as follows:

An Infantry School committee would determine what phases of combat are most needed to properly put across the picture in psychological indoctrination. Then another Infantry School committee would edit combat films already on hand. For future

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jobs the Signal Corps should inform the Infantry School as to the capabilities and limitations of combat photography.

Completed film would be supplemented by informal commentary. This commentary would state the similarity or dissimilarity between actual scenes and our doctrine.

The contents of such training films should follow generally and progressively what is covered in FM 7-10 through 7-40.

We know that technical difficulties would make it impossible generally, to film a unit even as small as a rifle squad through all phases of the attack on a limited objective. But this could be broken down, showing one unit crossing the LD, another moving into the assault position under supporting fires, still another in the actual combat assault.

As for the necessity of this project, can anyone deny that there is a gap between the indoctrination courses and actual combat?

I have mentioned only infantry. This is so because I believe that the amount of psychological necessary indoctrination and the transition gap to combat is greater in the infantry than in any other branch. However, they could be made for all arms.

CAPT. R. F. RUYFFELAERE

Office of the Army Advisor
State Armory
Holyoke, Mass.

On the Hill

To the Editors:

I picked your magazine up in the PX yesterday and was looking it over when I spied Lieutenant Martin's [*sic*, see editorial note below] article and I couldn't pass it by. I presume it was meant to be fiction; if not, it should have been. Lt. Martin may or may not be an excellent writer but, judging by his article, he's a lousy gunner. The first big flub to meet the eye was page 20, center column, 1st paragraph: ". . . six beautiful, deadly orange-red flowers bloom in the night like billowing puffs of fire. Air bursts, all. Deadly, murderous stuff." Anybody who would support a friendly patrol out in front of the MLR with air-bursting shells ought to have his head examined. Anybody that supported one of my patrols that way I'd cheerfully shoot without compunction, because that's practically premeditated homicide.

We now switch to page 21, center column, 5th paragraph: "This is Niner. Company-sized group in attack. Shoot Able George Fox Five, Four and Two. Battery Six. Over." Same column, next paragraph: ". . . and six orange-red puffs blossom . . ." (this guy is in a descriptive rut). It seems to me a Battery Six would be six rounds per gun, a total of thirty-six, rather than just six rounds total. Unless, of course, by shoot a "Battery Six" he meant to shoot the Battery Commander, and that woul only be one round.

The closing paragraph is really wh throws me, though, and I quote: "You hav no answer. You only know that, give the chance, you'll go back up. On th Hill." This guy should have been a M rine. Also, he's different from every oth FO from the 8th FA Bn that I've ever me there was one with my platoon up on Ou post Duck with us for three weeks, and h words as we came off the hill were: "If never see that G-- D--- F------ hill again will still be too soon." I agree with him. it was my job to take my platoon up on a outpost I'd do it without a word, but I'll h hung and drawn and quartered if I'd vo unteer my services and those of my men go live in a cave like a mole; I'm a man bu not a troglodyte!

SGT. DON MCGREEVEY
27th Infantry NCO School
APO 25, San Francisco, Calif.

● The "orange-red puffs" evidently ter porarily blinded Sgt. McGreevey as the is no Lt. Martin in the article at all. Th authors were Lt. Jim Kyle and Cpl. Rich ard Smith. Sgt. McGreevey is right; th order does call for 36 rounds and not si

✓ ✓ ✓

To the Editors:

Being an artilleryman, "On the Hill" the January issue deeply moved me.

However, I could not help noticing mistake in radio procedure. The OP w given "On the way, over" and replied, "C the way, wait," which would mean th the OP will make the next transmissio However, the policy of most battalions Korea was to give a "Splash" which th did. Therefore in this case the OP shou have answered "On the way, over."

Another error that could have been qui serious on the Corporal's part was using h aid dressing rather than the injured man

I enjoyed the article very much a would like to see more like it.

PHILIP L. BARD
Brooklyn, Conn.

Tired, but Unbowed Guardsman

To the Editors:

Thanks for your Staff Report: "Ne Look for Reserves" in the March issu Especially for voicing that plaintive que which as a National Guard company co mander, I'd like to echo: *"Where are t men?"*

When I think of starting a new u without a cadre sent down by S-3 . . visiting gas stations and garages looking f a motor sergeant and mechanics . . . hou ing restaurants for cooks . . . preaching high school assemblies for soldiers . . keeping that strength above minimu maintenance standards set by D/A . . cleaning and maintaining equipment wi a handful of people . . . when I think these and similar problems caused by la

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f manpower in the reserves, I don't mind onfessing that I envy my brothers-in-arms the regular establishment.

I'm inclined to think that too few people alize the extent to which, as you so aptly hrased it, ". . . military talents of officers nd men . . . have been dissipated in the scouraging effort of recruiting personnel r their units."

The Engineer company which I com- and was organized exactly two years—96 ills—ago. In that short time we have re- uited one hundred enlisted men and four ficers—an average of one per week. For rt time salesmen, that is not a bad aver- e. It takes a lot of time.

The discouragement enters, however, hen we find that our present strength is rty men and four officers. We've lost er half the men we recruited.

While this may not be significant, it is teresting to note that twenty-one of our sses have been to the active services. hile 21 percent of the men we recruited t what price!—are now on active duty, *have never gotten a man* in the outfit o, on returning from active service, faces period of so-called obligatory service.

I'm not bitter . . . just tired.

CAPT. JOHN H. BOLTON
CE-NGUS
lver Spring, Md.

oo Much Artillery Fire?

the Editors:

Maj. Mason J. Young's article in the ovember Cerebrations revives the ques- n of whether the increased rate of ar- lery fire in Korea was excessive. My orean tour, including duty at the FDCs two different divisions and one corps, nvinced me that the rate of fire was not ly excessive but potentially dangerous.

Maj. Young defends the rate with his ample of Company B which was saved the expenditure of 2,200 rounds. I onder if that amount was necessary or s it fired merely because it was available. ow long can that rate be maintained if e rest of the regiment is attacked? If the fantry depends upon this high rate, what ppens if it cannot be maintained?

There is an even more serious question. ere the thousands of young soldiers ined in the stalemated period of Korea en a true picture of combat?

CAPT. EDWARD R. GUHL
rt Riley, Kansas

ripe

the Editors:



For the past several months we have ard about a hundred different ways to ke the Army more attractive and there- inducing the men who really are the ckbone of the Army to remain in service. ese include medical care for dependents those not residing on an Army post (a sent impossibility), new uniforms, spe- list ratings (the biggest boner of all), d prestige (now non-existent) for non- some time and have seen the Good Army, the Pretty Good Army, the Indifferent Army, the Civilian Army and the present Army. Give us back the Buck Sergeant, the Lieutenant who merited respect from his subordinates by just being a "soldier" and you'll have the morale problem half solved. Favoritism, cliques—all contribute to the present state of the Army. . . . *Esprit de corps* will be automatic when harassment quits. Inefficiency certainly is not automatic and a distinction shared by the enlisted man alone—it comes from those whose actions are derogatory to the service, whatever their rank. I respect the officer and NCO who shows that he respects the uniform he wears and himself. I am certain other soldiers do too. The Army is what we make it and it is up to us to make this a good Army. It is our career. The examples set by those in authority are the ones the will be followed.

GEORGE M. CHANCELLOR
APO 39, New York, N. Y.

coms. All that has been accomplished though is to make the career soldier feel more insecure than ever.



At the present time there is speculation regarding reduction, retesting, discharging men whose AGCT scores fall below a certain percentage. The old-timers (SFC, MSgt and others with 10 or more years) feel that this is the straw that broke the camel's back and are getting out of the Army to stay. Most of these men have performed their duties satisfactorily for the past several years and a great number of them did so before such things as AGCTs and MOSs were ever heard of. Now they suddenly find that if they cannot put a bunch of scrambled cardboard together and read about 1000 words a minute, they are regarded as unfit for service or the grade they hold. Committees can burn midnight oil [but] I have yet to see anyone who actually contacts the everyday GI to ask him what should be done to better the Army.

I have been around this Army quite

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Swedish View of Warfare in 1960

Sweden's Defense staff has prepared a 100-page booklet on what war will be like in 1960. The JOURNAL has not yet been able to get a translation, but those familiar with it say the Swedes think that warfare in 1960 and after will be a war directed and controlled by electronics. In addition to nuclear weapons in quantity, they expect that improved Napalm, nerve gases and contagious viruses may be used. Electronic instruments will be used to control most weapons and this includes the use of television to spot targets and assess results of attacks.

* * *

The British have also taken a look at war of the future and the Minister of Defense has reported that "it must be assumed that atomic weapons would be employed by both sides." Following a period of "intense atomic attacks lasting a relatively short time" both sides would be forced "to seek to recover their strength, carrying on the struggle in the meantime as best they might." To the Defense Minister this emphasizes the "prime necessity of basing our defense policy upon the prevention of war. It also makes clear the need to keep the lead which we now hold in technical development on which we must rely to offset the preponderance of the Communist States in manpower. Our active forces must be able to withstand the initial shock. Our reserve forces must be capable of rapid mobilization behind the shield which our active forces provide and be ready to perform their combat tasks at the earliest possible moment."

* * *

The Chief of Staff Testifies on the Army Budget

In his formal statement on the Army's 1955 budget to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, General Ridgway touched briefly on the manifold tasks of the Army and its many commitments.

On manpower he noted that we will enter the fiscal year with a strength of 1,407,200 and finish with 1,172,700. This will be a quarter of a million fewer men than the Army had in fiscal 1954. This reduction, General Ridgway said, "has made it necessary for the Army to reevaluate its military programs, its present force structure, and its world-wide deployments in order to provide the greatest possible number of appropriately supported combat forces within the reduced ceiling of 1,172,700." He noted that the Army would have 19 divisions in fiscal 1955 and drop to 17 in the following year. In addition it has 18 regiments and regimental combat teams, 122 antiaircraft battalions, and 148 other combat battalions—"engineer, armor, field artillery, guided missile and rocket."

* * *

General Ridgway said that 315,000 men will be unavailable to the Army for combat or combat support units. These will be in training, in transient or patient status, or assigned to such tasks as "international headquarters, joint activities, reserve component instructors" and the like. Of the remaining 857,692, 669,516 (78.1%) will be assigned to "combat field army forces" and 188,176 (21.9%) to "support forces world-wide."

* * *

General Ridgway said that approximately one-third of the strength of the Army during the year will be "untrained input," that is recruits. He estimated that "replacements for losses through the year will be approximately 463,000" although the Army will lose about 707,000 men during the year.

* * *

General Ridgway said that during the year "it is planned to emphasize particularly the play of atomic and other special weapons to develop and test new doctrine pertaining to their utilization and role in modern warfare."

* * *

If the Congress agrees, you can be pretty sure that the Army will be in its new uniform—the "3d Infantry grey-green" job—within a year or so. The basic uniform will be the winter service uniform. It will be for general duty off-duty wear. Blue dress uniforms will be optional. The present "combat uniform" will be retained as the drill and training

"Grey-Green" Uniform Comin

uniform and local commanders will l
authorized to determine when it will l
worn. The big problem will be to co
vince Congress that now is the time
make the change and that it can be mac
economically.

* * *

*The elimination of the unit admin
trator and the return of his responsibi
ties to the first sergeant is one step in t
Army's program of revitalizing the no
commissioned officer corps. Another w
be the establishment of specialists, th
separating noncommissioned leade
from those who are without direct lea
ership responsibility Noncoms can al
hope that there will be a restoration
the prerogatives and privileges that ma
these leaders respected and envied by
ranks.*

* * *

There's a pronounced "airborne loo
in the higher echelons of the Depa
ment of the Army. The Chief of St
has been the Army's senior paratroop
for many years. General Lyman L. Le
nitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Pla
and Research, is a paratrooper, and,
everyone knows, so is Major Gene
James Gavin, the new Assistant Chief
Staff, G3. Also Lieutenant Gene
W. B. Palmer, Assistant Chief of Sta
G4, once commanded the 82d Airbor
Division. Some observers also sugg
that another favorable omen to airbor
operations is the announcement by t
Air Force that General O. P. Weyand
to command the Tactical Air For
General Weyand was commander of t
Far East Air Force during most of t
Korean conflict and he also was G
eral George S. Patton's favorite air offi
during the campaigns of the Third Ar
in Europe.

* * *

*In his statement on Army resea
and development General Ridgway
cluded a twenty-three word sente
that is no less than intriguing. It
"Among important requirements in
field of land combat is the developm
of sufficient tank and antitank capabil
to overcome known enemy potential."*

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
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For the nation's security we must close ranks and present a united front, proudly proclaiming the

Battle Future of Our Army

COLONEL UNITAS

each of us did not have a deep-seated personal belief that the Army must have a prominent role in the cold ar and will be a decisive factor in any future hot war, ir pride in the uniform we wear would be a mockery id our usefulness as soldiers would be destroyed. Yet, most without our realizing it, the Army is engaged in a ruggle for survival as a major combat service. Some ould make the Army a police force, useful only in cold ar situations, to prevent conquest by political subver- on and seduction, or to fight a "local" defensive type of ar on the order of the Korean conflict. Such a role ould eventually reduce the Army to impotency.

Thus, to escape limbo, the Army must not be content ith a defensive mission, but must maintain its position a powerful offensive arm, vitally needed in any war the future. Maintaining such a position will become increasingly more difficult and complex as new developments bring about an increasing overlap between traditional service functions.

Since unification, inter-service competition within the Department of Defense has been keen. It seems to me that the Army has been at a serious disadvantage for several reasons. First of all, our Army leaders, with perhaps more "joint" experience in high command positions than leaders in other services, have been fair-minded to the point where they are reluctant to support their own service. The inevitable result has been a gradual diminution of Army prestige.

Secondly, the Army has had to shoulder heavy postwar tasks such as the occupation of Germany and Japan, burdens with which the other services are not encumbered. Consequently, the Army has not been in a good position to react promptly to the impact of rapidly changing conditions of warfare.

Other factors that hurt the Army are of its own mak-

OLONEL UNITAS, Infantry, now on duty in Europe, is a professional soldier with eighteen years of service.

ing. We do not, for example, always present a united front, as the Army is far from being unified itself; with three major combat arms, seven technical services, and six administrative services, not to mention various other categories. Is it any wonder that we sometimes seem to be our own worst enemies? Until we get our house in order and get some semblance of unification within the Army structure, we shall continue to be at a disadvantage.

The Army has become the largest logistician of the armed services and this has tended to overemphasize our supply role at the expense of our combat role. Moreover, the support rendered the other services by the Army is not generally understood, nor is the Army fully credited for it. On the contrary, the Air Force and the Marine Corps, in particular, claim special praise as the most efficient users of manpower, while the Army for its reward is publicly accused of wasting manpower.

WHAT is the battle future of our Army? Present concepts of future warfare express two extremes. One is the so-called "push-button" concept wherein the war will be won or lost by inter-continental battles with guided missiles carrying atomic warheads. This concept would appear to rule out large conflicts between men on the ground or in the air, and offers "something for nothing"; that is, we devastate the enemy's homeland and decimate his people, without any casualties of our own.

The other extreme is that atomic weapons are simply larger packages of fire power and do not alter the fact that wars are won on the ground; all weapons existing only to help the ground soldier to advance.

Regardless of what our own personal convictions may be, the United States cannot afford to indulge in either extreme, but must seek a moderate course that seems to hold the brightest promise of victory.



THE strategic position of the United States today can only be maintained if it is able to intervene rapidly and decisively in any part of the world. To preserve this capability of decisive intervention we must secure our continental base, secure essential forward bases, and be able to deploy offensive forces rapidly to decisive areas. No single service can claim any of these as its sole or primary province; rather, these basic undertakings require the coordinated and complementary efforts of land, sea, and air power.

This strategic concept exerts a profound effect on the military posture of the United States. The Army, for example, must forever abandon its traditional scheme of mobilization, building up gradually in an emergency from a peacetime skeleton structure. Rather the Army henceforth must have combat-ready formations in being —divisions, corps, and field armies. Such forces will be needed regardless of cold war requirements, in terms of overseas troop deployments. Only when we have such formations can we be assured that the United States will have the offensive power to intervene in critical areas in time to be decisive. Moreover, the presence of such substantial forces in being may mean, besides the difference between winning and losing the war, great savings in the ultimate requirements in men, matériel, and time needed to defeat the enemy.

Some Americans say that the United States cannot afford to be prepared to fight any kind of war. They say that we should prepare only for a global atomic war of military aggression. This school may be ascendant. It proposes the idea of security through air power and opposes the concept of so-called "balanced forces." On the other hand, common prudence and good judgment would seem to dictate that the United States can't afford *not* to be ready for any type of warfare. The U.S. cannot gamble its survival on one theory alone.

REGARDLESS of what thesis we accept, and whether or not nuclear weapons are employed, the role of the Army still remains basically the same—to assist in seizing and securing bases from which to launch the final attack that will defeat the enemy's forces and occupy his heartland. Even under the extreme assumption that the enemy is rendered completely helpless by long-range atomic assault, armies, capable of offensive action, must physically occupy critical territory to prevent the resumption of hostilities, and to avoid creating the vacuum of power that will inevitably cause later conflicts. Thus it seems clear that initial minimum Army force requirements will remain fairly constant, whereas long-range Army requirements will depend largely on the conditions under which the war is fought and the general course it takes.

If the security of our country requires substantial Army forces, we must see to it that this inescapable truth is realized. We must work to make the nation aware that its Army has a major offensive role within the U.S. defense structure and that the Army is ready to carry out its assigned functions. To achieve this, the Army must pull together as a unit. There is nothing wrong with our men, our officers, our units, or with our schools and training establishment. They are fine. What is lacking is a common goal and a common program resolutely laid down from topside.

I outline such a program below. It is broken down into two general areas: policy and organization.

POLICY-WISE we should adopt a program along these lines: Establish a Department of the Army "party line," published widely throughout the Army and periodically revised in the light of current concepts and developments. This will guide the Army as a whole. This top

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de policy guidance should indicate the Army position n all important matters, particularly controversial sub-ects which have a long-term impact on the future of the rmy. All subordinate Army leaders and agencies could ien follow and support current policy. Thus senior rmy leaders would no longer announce dissimilar opin-ns on the effectiveness of the current Army-Air Force r-ground operations system, *vis-à-vis* a unanimity of ir Force opinion on this subject.

We must constantly emphasize the combat role of the rmy. Positive action must be taken to insure that the lministrative and technical services are kept in the roper perspective, existing solely to support the combat ms. It follows that the prestige of the combat arms ust be raised. The combat arms must get the highest pe of officers and men, and within the combat arms, ie infantry must have first preference. The best ord-ance and quartermaster troops in the world, and the nest artillery and armor, are of no avail, if our infantry not top-notch.

We must oppose "dog-robbing" for the Air Force and larine Corps, and insist that they assume responsibility r their own support wherever possible. If the present end isn't reversed, the Army may gradually assume as primary role, the common logistic support of the other rvices.

We must stress the Army's present position as the tual physical first line of defense—with combat troops ployed in close proximity to the Iron Curtain in Ger-any, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Korea. Likewise, e must emphasize the combat readiness of Army units meet any kind of emergency. We must not let the arines establish any monopoly as a ready ground force.

ur entire thinking must be geared to the cognition that the Army must be able to ovide effective combat forces on D-day, t on D plus 540 or 720. Thus, Army mo-ization plans must take first things first, thlessly eliminating all "nice-to-know" bjects, and cutting overall training times the bone. Under this concept of a sub-ntial ready D-day force, with a rapid ild-up to post-D-day force requirements, r Army Reserve and National Guard mponents need a complete overhauling.



N the organizational side, I think we should reorganize the Department of the Army so as to accomplish the lowing:

Recognize the combat arms as such, by designating a ief of Combat Arms, with infantry, armor, and artil-y deputies, and assigning him primarily personnel ctions, but placing him in a position to influence nch school, training, organizational, and development tters.

Eliminate Army Field Forces, establishing instead nec-essary operating commands, on a functional basis, such as a Replacement and School Command, and a Devel-opment and Experimental Unit Command, reporting directly to the Department of the Army.

¶ Eliminate the technical and administrative service chiefs, as such, and organize necessary operating agencies on a functional basis, such as procurement, construction, and so on, under one Supply Corps Chief and one Ad-ministrative Corps Chief, as appropriate. Present branch designations, units, and schools should be retained, but integrated into the new structure. Branches would be recognized personnel-wise by having branch personnel deputies under the Supply Corps Chief and Administra-tive Corps Chief.

FINALLY, in the organization of our units, take a bold new approach in regard to our present combat forma-tions, with the following objectives in mind:

¶ Increase combat effectiveness with proportionately less overhead, for example, along the lines of a square divi-sion and square regiment as suggested by General Lynch in "The Infantry Division: Triangular or Square?", in the November 1953 issue of this magazine.

¶ Reduce the number of different types of weapons, vehicles, and other equipment. We must overcome the tendency to keep adding new arms without giving up old ones. In particular, we must recognize the impact on our combat support and service support structure of guided missiles.

¶ Recognition of the need in an atomic war for highly self-sufficient units with great staying and recuperative power, and considerable mobility, that can continue to fight even when isolated and deprived of normal combat and service support. This applies equally to infantry, armor, or airborne formations.

¶ Put flexibility in our organizations so that major formations can readily provide smaller, compact, hard-hitting task force type units, airborne or air-transportable, for decisive exploitation where and when opportunity presents itself.

IN summary, the Army must retain an offensive mission and capability in this atomic age. Moreover, the Army must face up to the realities of nuclear weapons—it is inadequate to say that atomic weapons have not basically changed our doctrine, but have only affected the applica-tion of that doctrine, that is, our tactics and technique. Perhaps this conclusion sufficed when only the "nominal" and larger atomic bombs were taken into consideration, but with the advent of the H-bomb, on the order of megatons of explosive power, we must try to grasp its potentialities and re-charge our thinking. To do other-wise would amount to nothing else than suicidal neglect of our Army's responsibilities to the country we serve.

LOYALTY DOWNWARD

A man has honor if he holds himself to a course of conduct because of a conviction that it is in the general interest, even though he is well aware that it may lead to inconvenience, personal loss, humiliation or grave physical risk.—THE ARMED FORCES OFFICER

IN the last week of February Robert T. Stevens met the sternest test of his stewardship of the high office of Secretary of the Army. His performance was in the finest traditions of the military service.

His duty as he saw it was to protect the integrity of the United States Army in the general interest and for the greater good of the people of the United States. He had no other purpose. His weapons were idealism, a high code of personal conduct, courage and truth. If he made a tactical error it was from political inexperience, is personally creditable to him and of no lasting consequence. What is of consequence is that his pursuit of his objective was ultimately successful. Only time can reveal the full measure of the success. But certainly developments will show that more was gained than lost.

The COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is immensely proud that the March issue of the magazine, containing the story of Secretary Stevens, appeared during the week of his hard ordeal. If the staff could have anticipated the events that were to occur, it would have been even more emphatic (it could have been) in showing that Mr. Stevens is a man who has the best interests of the Army and the men and women who wear the Army uniform close to his heart. That we were not was due only to a small doubt as to the propriety of a professional military magazine giving even the appearance of blowing any individual's horn too loudly. (As a prideful aside, the staff can add that the article makes clear to the reader why Mr. Stevens acted and spoke as he did during that week.)

It is a measure of Mr. Stevens' sincerity that immediately after he had seen the newspaper accounts of General Zwicker's humiliating experience he called the General on the telephone and told him that if the facts were as represented in the press, "you have my full backing. Don't worry about this affair."

Then he publicly announced that he had directed General Zwicker not to appear on the following Tuesday before the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. "I am unwilling for so fine an officer . . . to run the risk of further abuse," Mr. Stevens announced. General Zwicker "suffered humiliating treatment only because he carried out actions which were his official duty and executed an order he had received from higher headquarters which he was required to execute. I cannot permit the loyal officers of our Armed Forces to be subjected to such unwarranted treatment."

There are a few vital facts here that must be kept clearly in mind.


¶ Secretary Stevens was not trying to "cover up" fo General Zwicker or any other person in the Army. Ther was nothing to cover up. He had already acknowledge that administrative methods had been faulty in the cas of Dr. Peress. But under the law they could hardly hav been otherwise.

¶ Secretary Stevens and the Army do not "coddle" Com munists. At Mr. Stevens' direction the Army had coop erated in every possible with the Investigations subcom mittee.

¶ Mr. Stevens did not say (and has never said) tha Army officers are sacroscanct and beyond fair criticism He did say: "The prestige and morale of our Arme Forces are too important to the security of the Natio to have them weakened by unfair attacks on our offic corps . . . I am confident the American people do no believe in unwarranted abuse of our loyal officers ar more than I do."

¶ Finally, he did not enunciate a policy of forbiddin officers to testify before the subcommittee. He directe that General Zwicker and two other officers who ha been summoned should not appear at a particular hea ing. Three officers only were involved, and one occasio He then offered to appear himself—in keeping, it mu be added, with his expressed opinion that the Secreta of the Army is the responsible head of the Army; th Army's "boss."

A man of honor, he held himself to a course of condu from the conviction that it was in the general interes The cost to him personally was great, far greater tha most of us can conceive. But whatever the cost, he d not count it, but bravely and forthrightly pressed fo ward in his sworn duty of defending the best interes of the United States and promoting its military securit



BRIG. GEN. RALPH ZWICKER

. . . all of us know that our military services and their leaders have always been completely loyal and dedicated public servants. . . . Their courage and their devotion have been proved in peace as well as on the battlefields of war. . . . In this tribute . . . I mean to include General Zwicker, who was decorated for gallantry in the field.
President Eisenhower

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THE CHIEF OF STAFF GREETS SECRETARY STEVENS



"In the course of my entire service I have met no government official who combines within his person a greater degree of integrity, personal courage, and sense of duty toward the Army, whose interests he has wholly at heart."

General Ridgway

HERE remains the task of assessing the effects of the ontroversy on the Army. This is no simple balancing accounts. Much remains hidden in the unplumbed ɔths of the minds of men, but it may be profitable to nsider some of the surface manifestations.

It is said by some that the whole controversy was an fortunate episode that was overemphasized as a vital w at Army morale. Army officers, according to this ory, are overly sensitive; they should learn to be as ck-skinned as men who love the rough-and-tumble political debate. This argument overlooks the fact that my officers by law and custom do not engage in po- cal debate and therefore any political attack on them one-sided affair.

Finally it is argued that the Army has survived harder ws at its morale and prestige than this one, so why t about it.

This much can be said for this theory: the Army will vive. Indeed, morale should be higher when soldiers derstand the full implications of Mr. Stevens' forth- htness and President Eisenhower's personal defense of neral Zwicker. The abuse General Zwicker suffered l not be forgotten. The wound it made will heal if t undisturbed, but it will certainly fester and grow if acks on the uniform persist. Such attacks are cumula- e and in time they can destroy an army.

Overemphasis or not, emotions had become so highly rged that the true issue—the integrity of the Army—s being lost. At the height of the controversy Gen- l Ridgway found it necessary to counsel with his senior cers and to explain to them what had actually oc- red. It is possible that this was a unique instance in the history of the United States Army. At what other time has the senior officer of the Army found it advisable to counsel with his senior assistants on such a matter as this?

During that conference General Ridgway paid a personal tribute to Secretary Stevens. "In the course of my entire service," he said, "I have met no government official who combines within his person a greater degree of integrity, personal courage, and sense of duty toward the Army, whose interests he has wholly at heart."

THERE is a lesson here for the American citizen who does not wear a military uniform. It is that soldiers are honorable servants of the nation and not serfs. It is that he who scoffs, degrades and insults men wearing the uniform, is indulging in a fantastically dangerous pastime that if persisted in could destroy the very well-springs of the military forces, leaving the nation deceptively defenseless. The appearance of a fighting force might remain, but the soul would be withered away. And an army without a soul is but an empty husk.

In summary, let it be noted by all that Secretary Stevens not only defended the Army well and proved that loyalty does go down as well as up, but that he also reaffirmed the principle that the civilian head of the Army is the proper avenue of approach to the Army by other departments and branches of the government.

Those hypocritical observers who are disappointed do not understand Mr. Stevens' mission. His object was not to interfere with legislative processes—his mission was to preserve the integrity of the Army and its personnel, and in that he succeeded.

Fort Belvoir Papers Please Copy

PUBLISHING a retraction is sometimes a bitter experience, but here is one we publish happily. We made a statement in our March issue that probably would stand up in court because it is factually true, but the implications were all wrong.

We wrote that we had never seen anything in the Washington newspapers about the planetarium at Fort Belvoir. *We* hadn't. But thousands of others had, and some of them wasted no time in telling us so.

We have since learned that newspapers in Washington, Alexandria and Fairfax County have carried stories and pictures on the planetarium, and that there was even a 15-minute television show on the subject. Our happy apologies to the Post Commander, the PIO, and others at Belvoir. They are "happy" because our one reason for the original comment was to help the Army—and we learn that Fort Belvoir was 'way ahead of us with this particular idea.

We might add, too, that the school kids who have told us about the planetarium are enthusiastic about it and Fort Belvoir.

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If We Are to Have Less We Must Have Better

TWENTY divisions this year; seventeen next year; maybe only fou teen by 1956. Unless Congress decides otherwise, the Army is t decline in strength. To the soldier this is a grim picture. It portenc a reduction in military strength that the facts hardly justify. The so dier has not forgotten—he cannot forget—the cost to the nation those manpower-starved two-battalion regiments of 1950 . . .

But in soldier fashion the Army will make the best of what is give it. This leads every thinking soldier to an inevitable conclusion: if th Army is to perform its missions with fewer soldiers, it must have *bett* soldiers, manning *better* weapons and equipment.

Army technical services and Army research and development age cies are working night and day to produce the better weapons an improved equipment the Army must have.

Better weapons and equipment aren't enough. The Army must al have *better* men; men who can learn the skills that are needed operate the new weapons and equipment. And since these skills a highly technical, Army training must be better. This means long periods of training. In some cases it takes a full enlistment for a soldi to become completely skilled in a vital technical job. So it is imperati that these better men, who are better trained, should serve longer.

The Army must also have better leaders, better noncommission officers. Good noncoms are developed through service, so those t Army must have can only be produced through long and hard trai ing. One hitch is not enough. It is in the second enlistment that noncom acquires the experience and confidence that make him reliable leader with a high standard of performance. And it is in l later hitches that the Army gets lucrative dividends from the inve ment it began when it tapped him as a potential leader.

So the Army must have better men, better trained, who serve long

HOW can we induce them to serve longer? Not long ago Senat Saltonstall expressed surprise when he was told that while t Army can offer a master sergeant about $350 to re-enlist, he can g up to $5,000 from the government by leaving the service. That because of veterans' benefits in education, housing subsidy and oth assistance. The Army doesn't ask that veterans' benefits be reduc just to encourage re-enlistments. Not at all. It just asks that a lit attention be given to increasing inducements and rewards for milita skill and service. This includes improved living conditions, medi care for dependents, a more stable family life. If the Army could ma these simple American desires more widely available to soldiers, t reservoirs of competent leadership and skilled technicians could be filled to the ultimate advantage of the nation.


If the Army is to have less, it must have better. To get better m and to keep the best, the Army life must be made more attractive.

IT is time to take a long, hard look at the re-enlistment inducem the Army can offer. That look should include the dollars-and-ce waste in training men only to lose them. It also includes such tangi desires as adequate pay, attractive uniforms, good housing conditio and stable family life.

That look must be taken so that the nation can have the greater—a needed—security of a finer, stronger Army.

STARS STRIPES and A-BOMBS

COLONEL GEORGE C. REINHARDT



HE summer sun had almost reached he horizon when lines of battle broke m the forest just where expected, but God they were not Marshal Grouchy's pected reinforcements, but Blücher's ussians! No art of generalship could w stave off disaster. Head sunk list- sly upon his chest, Napoleon rode m the plains of Waterloo en route to le and slow death. Behind him on field he had deserted, still fighting, geants held the Old Guard to its work nding a quicker death by spurning rter with the four letter words ser- nts have always used in all armies;

LONEL GEORGE C. REINHARDT, Corps f Engineers, is the co-author of *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat*. A Regular ince 1924, when he graduated from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Colonel Reinhardt is now on duty at The Engineer School.

words that somehow became "The Guard dies but *never* surrenders."

* * *

SOME 300 miles away and 130 years later, another general watched for the air strike that would precede his assault on another obscure rural village. The ominous distant buzz swelled into the roar of hundreds of low-flying heavy bombing planes. Earth tremors back at the command post assured him that tons of explosive were crashing down along the Perriers road according to plan.

Yet not exactly according to plan. Reports from the 9th and 4th Divisions were bad. Bombs had struck among them. There were hundreds of casualties and the assault was delayed for reorganization. For the moment there was nothing General Lightning Joe Collins could do except wait.

Where the bombs had dropped, sergeants were rallying shaken remnants of squads; forming platoons that gave life to attacking companies and battalions. Those sergeants did their work well. The General's plan suffered an amazingly short delay; minutes in some places; two hours in others that were harder hit. St. Lô fell before night. The decisive breakout had begun.

* * *

IN ancient days the ordeals in combat of generals and sergeants were similar, however different their lives elsewhere. Weapons were short-ranged; numbers engaged were small. However brilliant the general's plan, it was his good right arm that hewed out victory on the field. Henry of Navarre's white plume, Richard the Lionhearted's axe, were more than symbols. In those days armies literally obeyed the leader's "Follow Me." If the leader fell, the heart usually went out of the entire host.

But civilization's "progress" brought weapons that killed at constantly increasing range. Dispersion, no novelty in war's art, diminished the power of personal leadership. The gulf between general and sergeant widened. Wearers of stars became more and more their army's brain, less and less its strong right arm. The men with stripes on their sleeves remained "the backbone of an army" but added a new function: the delicate nerve system that responded to the brain . . . or, failing, caused paralysis and defeat.

ONLY yesterday the first telltale mushroom cloud rose swiftly into the sky over Hiroshima. One bomb destroyed a city. Now, little more than eight years later, the world is entering an era of atomic plenty.

What impact the first appearance of gunpowder on the battlefield had on generals and sergeants has never been explored. We can leave that intriguing research to antiquarians. What we want to know now is how atomic weapons will affect generals, noncoms and all other ranks.

Question number one—the role of generalship in tactical atomic warfare has received some attention. We dimly accept, without grasping the details, that the man who can loose such mighty explosions has been vouchsafed a tremendous power personally to influence the issue of every battle. The atom's impact upon generalship restores the personal capacity to influence combat action. Tomorrow's commanders, whether from command post map or command plane radarscope, will be able to order "three 20KTs here, four 40s there, and one 80 on that spot." Victory or defeat, life or death for thousands, will lie in the accuracy and timeliness of the commander's directive.

BUT what of the sergeants in atomic combat? Have superweapons changed their fundamental roles on the battlefield? Doubtless dozens of new MOS numbers in logistics, communications, intelligence and weapons handling will spread like a contagion. But tanker, gunner, doughboy, engineer and medic will still need their noncoms for the dirty vital tasks. An army's intricate, interlocking nervous system must continue to translate the brain's orders into muscular energy.

There will be no atomic-powered picks and shovels for digging the deeper and even more frequent foxholes into which each man must burrow or die. Atomic-powered ships, perhaps aircraft, may speed mountains of supplies over oceans (if they can find undestroyed ports and landing strips at which to load and unload) but the last long mile(s) into combat for front-line munitions and supplies will still be covered by foot and back power.

Small groups of technicians may handle atomic weapons, but hundreds and thousands of soldiers—under the watchful eyes of sergeants—will labor to restore essential routes and services battered by the missiles. Damage control was long a Navy term limited to shipboard connotation. Now redesignated "area damage control," it promises to emerge into the most exacting single job of combat support.

How will shaken and scattered survivors rally from the terrific blast and shock to remember their mission, often without officer leadership; reform to c cupy blocking positions, restore silenc weapons to action, maneuver, or advan in spite of losses—in all these and oth unforeseeable emergencies, the muscl of an army will function or go flabl in direct proportion to the quality the noncommissioned officers who e force the brain's commands.

Atomic warfare's front-line fight probably will note less alterations in l profession than will the combat suppo soldiers in the communications zone. U front, as Mauldin called it, the soldi will become accustomed to greater lon liness. He will dig oftener and deep for himself and his equipment. He w pay greater attention to avoiding the telltale indications that spot his positi for the enemy. He will be chary of wa ing ammunition, or any other commo ity, for many reasons, principally l cause they will all be harder to co by. In a word, the combat soldier w experience a rougher, dirtier war. I dividuals and very-small-unit resour fulness and discipline cannot ensure s vival but their lack will spell suicide.

But port companies, petroleum batt ions and the like will have more in co mon with tomorrow's combat soldier th ever before. Combat units offer aton targets when not in close contact w enemy forces (who would be decimat by the same blast), when concentrat in response to tactical imperatives, when occupying key positions whi either geographically, tactically or fr both aspects, unduly interfere with t enemy's chosen plan of operations. Tr enough, the sergeant and his men w seldom know when those risky con tions prevail. The tension will be e less; the penalties for carelessness fat But after all, that has been the comb man's precarious existence throughc warfare. The atom is quicker, more de ly, but the death it brings is no stran to front-line soldiers.

WHAT were once safe spots in Co munications Zone will now be subj to atomic attack. Units serving su installations will never be immune. C sequently it is rearward that the great strain will be felt. Every key local from port (or beachhead) to forw depot will attract atomic missiles proportion to its value to the tacti situation. Just as "dispersion" suffici to discourage all atomic attack is imp sible when tactical units are deplo for effective attack or defense, so no c munications zone facilities and establi ments can be split into sufficiently sm bits to be immune. If they were, t

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uld serve no purpose beyond self-main-nance.

Endless backbreaking tasks in depots, pair shops and construction jobs will e under greater pressure than last time. usterity will rule. Moments of rest om toil will be spent in deep, cheerless xholes, not the more comfortable but rribly vulnerable hutments and billets World War II. Installations com-eted will suddenly disappear or be rribly shattered in an instant's fiery eath. And survivors will have to re-re them in a minimum of time lest e combat they support be irreparably rt. To the veteran of ETO's Com ne the change would be like moving m Park Avenue to the slums—and rking longer hours for the privilege.

Preparation of an SOP for combat pport units working under the cease-ss threat of blast, searing heat and mma rays will take some thorough inking. Unpleasant probabilities quick-suggest themselves. Work during urs of darkness, like movement in mbat areas, will become standard. This ill include the urgent necessity for spersing time-wise where impractical ace-wise. Large-scale movie attendance ill be a dangerous luxury. (Improve-ents in television may eliminate it any-ay.) Even mess hours for adjacent its will be staggered, and all other cessary formations. Billets will be de-gned for protection rather than com-rt.

Any attempt to pin down details hits e old snag "it depends upon the situa-n." Units that operated under black-t in Normandy, trucks 60 yards apart the road, camouflage nets in place every halt, roared across France a few eeks later bumper to bumper while adlights blazed. The *Luftwaffe* had en shot out of the air!

Life—or existence—in an active theatre an atomic war will vary with the 2 estimate of hostile atomic capabili-s. If the estimate is too conservative, e plans of generals and the work of rgeants will be unnecessarily difficult. t an unjustified optimism could mean saster. Atomic warfare, unlike the post-an, won't ring twice.

MORALE, esprit, discipline—all those vital intangibles that differentiate be-ween outfits that somehow win through d those that crack up—are going to be much tougher to maintain. It will the noncoms, in rear areas, who must aintain them—without benefit of any w psychological "hardware."

Back in Com Zone also are the only obable Theatre of Operations targets for fusion weapons (H-bombs). Remembering that explosion effects extend in proportion to the cube root of bomb power, an H-bomb 1000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima blast would have a lethal range only ten times as great. Few troop concentrations uniformly cover an area large enough to warrant using such a behemoth. Several good-sized A-bombs, at selected localities, could cause more casualties and possibly at less cost to national stockpiles of critical material.

Only if the prospective target be a major port, a sprawling communications center, a depot covering more than 100 square miles, or similar logistic white elephant, would enemy target analysts squint along the megaton portion of their slide rules. That is another morale problem for the Com Zone soldiers with stripes on their sleeves. Maybe meritorious service wreaths of the future will inclose a miniature mushroom-shaped cloud and their wearers will gaze tolerantly upon Combat Infantryman Badges as Silver Stars now look upon Legion of Merit ribbons.

In any case, whatever the menace of atomic weapons for denizens of huge cities, they pose no picnic for tomorrow's sergeants, regardless of unit. Nor is there any escape in the thought: surely such a war will be of short duration. Human endurance can stand only so much. One side or the other will quickly break.

More than a century ago Jomini wrote emphatically that "the destructiveness of modern weapons precludes long wars." Experts have said that of every marked innovation in warfare's tools. The record doesn't bear out these predictions. More deadly weapons seem to protract, not shorten, armed conflict.

WHAT'S the answer? I doubt if there is one that can be put into brief comprehensible language. Like the Guards' sergeants at Waterloo, like fine sergeants at all times, the noncommissioned officers in atomic warfare can only describe their lot in four-letter words and inspire their units with the guts and initiative that have been the hallmark of American sergeants who were properly trained for their jobs.

Just how well are we performing that training today? Military conservatism, charges of preparing to refight the last war over again, are more easily made than refuted. Who *knows* the trend of a future war? What hunter would, on the trail of a tiger, puts aside his proven rifle for an untested "better" one?

Yet some of those charges have firm foundations. Eminent artillerymen have stated that the four-gun battery evolved from experiments as to the largest aggregation of pieces a single commander could control by voice commands. Yet we changed to six only many years after voice commands had been relegated to limbo.

What do we mean when we say we will counter atomic weapons by dispersing? Consider only the well publicized 20KT or Hiroshima weapon with its mile radius of casualties against unprotected personnel. Can anyone imagine dispersion *within* tactical units, or major command posts, or numerous types of rear-area installations that would preclude total destruction and still permit a unit, headquarters, or installation to carry out its mission?

Obviously companies of a battalion would be out of contact; staff sections of the headquarters would be strangers to their commander and to each other; operating overhead of the service installation would be prohibitive. Consequently atomic dispersion must be *between,* not *within,* units which are restricted in size in inverse ratio to their capabilities for mobility and communication. Each unit can minimize its vulnerability by digging like moles and taking every precaution against advertising its presence. Frequent moves will make good sense, when possible. The whole prospect adds up to more work, more responsibility, for every sergeant.

NEVERTHELESS, atomic warfare implies more in our favor than the reverse. Its scientific and technical complexities can be mastered by Americans faster than by the citizens of any other nation. Its requirements for superior quality among the most junior military leaders also matches our achievements whenever we have granted those leaders training and schooling adequate to their responsibilities.

We must accept the necessity for down to earth instruction of junior officers and sergeants in the tactics of atomic warfare, for their participation in realistic atomic maneuvers. Occasional, over-umpired, semi-secret "simulated explosions" during field exercises, rare opportunities to watch an explosion in Nevada and participate in an utterly unrealistic "tactical" exercise thereafter are poor fare for building the atomic-age noncommissioned officers we shall need. High-level schools, planning and CPXs provide the Army's brain-food, but the backbone and nerve system need nourishment too. It is time that we educate our noncoms in the parts they must play in atomic warfare.



The flooded rice paddies in the lowlands restrict armor to roadways. The jungle-covered uplands also hamper armor.

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TERRAIN TAILORS TACTICS IN

INDOCHINA

CAPTAIN HARLAN G. KOCH

THE strategy of the war in Indochina is closely related to the major terrain regions of the area. The Communist Viet Minh forces dominate a considerable part of Indochina, but the area they control is mostly sparsely populated, mountainous territory. French-Vietnamese forces, on the other hand, control the flat, fertile deltas of the Mekong and Red Rivers, and their operations are directed in large measure toward insuring continued control of these deltas. As major rice-producing areas and as concentrated centers of wealth and population, the deltas are keys to the control of Indochina.

A closer analysis of the terrain of Indochina will explain why it is difficult for the French-Vietnamese forces to expand their control, and how the specializ battle of Indochina is being fought.

Indochina, which comprises the Sta of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, cov 285,000 square miles, an area apprc mately that of California and Arizc combined. It extends nearly 1,000 mi from north to south and varies from 1 to 500 miles from east to west.

The population was estimated in 19 to be 27½ million persons. More th 70 per cent of the total population crowded into the few fertile lowlands

CAPTAIN HARLAN G. KOCH, Armor, a 1946 graduate of the Military Academy, recently received a graduate degree in geography at the University of Illinois. He served in Korea and Japan, and is soon to leave a Pentagon assignment for duty in Thailand.

Approximately two-thirds of Indo-
ina is mountainous. These mountains
ver practically all of the north and
rthwest and extend the entire length
Indochina. They parallel, and in
ces adjoin, the coast for most of its
gth. Although not particularly high,
y are extremely rugged and broken.
e dense forest cover and the numer-
s streams in deep gorges are barriers to
vement and are unfavorable to large-
le, mechanized, military operations.
e streams normally are torrential from
ay through September. Vehicles in the
untainous areas are limited almost
tirely to roads.

Indochina has two major coastal del-
: the delta of the Red River, in the
rth; and the extensive delta of the
kong River, in the south. These two
ategic lowland areas comprise less
n one-fifth of the country's total area,
t contain the major portion of Indo-
ina's population; the major cities; and
e chief centers of agriculture, manu-
turing, commerce, and governmental
ministration.

These two deltas have the best-devel-
ed transportation networks in Indo-
ina. Hanoi in the north and Saigon in
e south are the focal cities upon which
merous routes converge. It is in these
y strategic areas that France has the
mest control. *Possession of the two*
ajor delta areas insures strategic control
the entire country.

HE Red River Delta appears on the
map as a wedge driven along the axis
the Red River into the mountains.
is lowland is extremely flat, averaging
ly 10 feet above sea level. It is inter-
pted by low, steep, limestone hills and
lges, particularly on the inland mar-
s of the plain. Numerous caves in the
mestone hills provide natural under-
ound storage spaces. The entire plain
covered with rice paddies.

Where the Red River and other large
eams flow out of the mountains onto
e delta, their channels divide and then
rther subdivide until the entire area is
mpartmentalized. During the rainy
ison, the streams are swollen and the
e fields are often flooded and deep in
ud. The only areas suitable for move-
nt of conventional vehicles during the
ny season are on the levees, the all-
eather roads, and along the well-drained
land margins of the plain.

During the dry winter season (No-
mber through April) conditions for
vement are much improved. The
ger streams, however, are generally
fordable because of their depth, soft
uddy banks, and soft muddy bottoms.
Parts of the plain remain soggy or flooded during most of the year. Off-road movement of wheeled vehicles is greatly restricted even in the dry season because of the many paddy dikes and ditches. Operational maneuver is primarily confined to foot soldiers armed with light weapons. Tanks may provide support by delivering overwatching fire, but they are restricted principally to the roads within the sector of operations unless they are operating on the better-drained margins of the Red River plain.

The delta of the Mekong River, focusing on Saigon, is similar to the Red River Delta. It is almost level except for a few low, rounded hills. Military operations conducted in this area are also similar to those in the Red River Delta; the foot soldier is the most reliable maneuvering element. Special equipment, *i.e.,* amphibious vehicles, have difficulty in crossing the paddy land and marshes.

The strategic significance of the two delta areas contributes to their importance and probable selection as key objectives. Neither delta is well-suited for direct amphibious attack on its shore. The offshore waters of both regions are generally very shallow, muddy and fringed in many places with mangrove thickets or belts of mangrove forests. Along the Vietnam coast, north of the Red River Delta, the beaches are obstructed by numerous offshore islands and are backed by rice fields which are inundated for almost the entire year. Most of the Vietnam coastline south of the Red River Delta appears to be suitable for landing. The beaches along this coast are mainly long, sandy stretches and are relatively clear of offshore obstructions. Due to rice fields and streams, exits from these beach areas appear to be generally unfavorable except, so far as can be determined from topographic maps, in the vicinities of towns which have access to the north-south coastal highway. Surf and swell would create problems frequently from November through January.

Indochina's roads are not good. The





Deep in the jungle, French troops captured a Viet Minh arms dump.

principal roads are narrow and are primarily fair-weather or limited all-weather roads. The meter-gauged railroad system is at present extensively damaged and for all practical purposes serves only the areas contiguous to the cities of Hanoi and Saigon. In the current war small bodies of troops (battalion and lower) and particularly guerrilla forces use the numerous trails.

The extensive highways immediately in and around Hanoi and Saigon are of fairly good construction, whereas the least-developed roads are those which cross the central mountainous chain of the country. The few roads which cross the mountains to connect the Mekong River north-south road with the coastal north-south road and rail route utilize passes at 1,300 to 2,500 feet above sea level and are easily controlled by small guerrilla forces. Lowland flooding or rock slides impede traffic on all routes throughout Indochina. Outside the two strategic delta areas the roads of Indochina have been cut or occupied in many places by Viet Minh forces.

The Viet Minh forces receive the bulk of their supplies from southern China over this inadequate road system.

The generally hot, humid weather of Indochina reduces the efficiency of men and animals, is conducive to sickness, and presents many obstacles to military operations.

The characteristic annual precipitation for the largest part of Indochina is 50 to 115 inches with the mountainous sections receiving the greater share of the rain. This torrent requires special protection for supplies and matériel.

ONLY 14 percent of Indochina has been cleared of its natural vegetation. In the mountains and in hilly regions the natural vegetation is mostly tropical rain forest, the most impenetrable type of jungle in the world. It consists of closely spaced trees that are as high as 190 feet. Dense undergrowth, thickly entangled with vines, makes it nearly impossible for an individual to move cross-country. The delta areas and small coastal plains are intensively planted to rice and other seasonal crops. In the Mekong River Delta there are also large expanses of tall and short savannah grasses and marsh grasses.

Both the natural vegetation and the agricultural crops, particularly rice, impede the movement of troops. The flooded rice paddies considerably hamper movement, except where, during the dry season, they are planted to dry crops or allowed to remain fallow. Movement over steep, rugged, jungle-covered mountainous terrain is extremely difficult even for infantry troops. Numerous foot and pack trails cross the jungle, but only a few roads penetrate it.

Malaria, plague, typhus, cholera, typhoid, and amoebic dysentery are prevalent and can be principally attributed to contaminated food and water or to insects. Strangely enough, malaria exi principally in the mountainous territ while the swampy deltaic areas are pr tically free of malaria. This operates the advantage of the French-Vietnam forces who are mainly holding the l ground, and is a distinct disadvantage the Viet Minh who must combat t medical problems of malaria in additi to other activities. The lack of medici is one of the critical items of t mountain-based Viet Minh troops.

THE basic tactical principles of t Viet Minh Army are a result of t terrain. In the defense Viet Minh for organize key terrain features such villages, hills, forests, and defiles, a then maneuver between these positi with a mobile force to harass or to att French-Vietnamese probing forces. the Viet Minh are pressed too clos they break up into small groups, scat among the villages, and even mix w the inhabitants. Thus they rarely o a feasible target for aircraft or artill Cohesion is maintained by the fracti ing of all units down to teams of th men each. In broken terrain this p cedure not only facilitates rapid conc tration, rapid transmission of ord rapid break-up, but it also promo teamwork and *esprit*.

The Viet Minh make hit-and-r night attacks upon objectives with s swiftness that the reaction of the op ing forces is usually too late. The jective is then occupied or destroyed fore reinforcements arrive.

The Viet Minh forces use the grou to their advantage and attach consi able importance to intelligence. T commit themselves only after deta reconnaissance. During the assembl and the moving to an attack, they a the local populace as a counterint gence measure. Quite frequently, deceptive purposes, the attack launched against an objective 13 to miles from the departure or assem area. The lightly equipped sold march over reconnoitered forest t sometimes for two nights before reach the objective. This type of mobility lows the Viet Minh to gain surprise intervening against one or the othe two widely separated fronts in a s amount of time. When a preponder of French-Vietnamese troops are sembled, the Viet Minh breaks o particular assault and strikes elsewh

The primary objective of the Minh is not to win terrain but rath win battles in order to win the sup of the population. The battles are by the skillful use of terrain.

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uerrilla forces can control the roads that snake through jungle uplands.



Viet Minh soldiers disguised as omen, fishermen, peasants or French-etnamese troops infiltrate and then re-semble into units, usually battalion-e, behind the French-Vietnamese po-ions. This tactic is facilitated by the nan team organization and by the lack a continuous French-Vietnamese de-nse line. The teams infiltrate between e French-Vietnamese blockhouses, ickly concentrate, inflict heavy casual-s, and then disperse before becoming o involved.

THE French-Vietnamese, when operat-ing in the strategically important flat ltas, are able to use their tanks and avy artillery. But when they make rays into the mountainous jungle areas ey must lighten their equipment and apt their tactics to those of the Viet inh. In addition, the French-Vietnam-e have the advantage of air support. his advantage not only permits them to it parachute troops on the ground at y point without warning, but it also rnishes them with air supply and acuation in support of such operations. hen a raiding mission is completed the rachuted troops fight their way back their base by guerrilla tactics.

A study of the terrain in Indochina plains the nature of the war in that untry. The situation is quite similar, ctically, to combat in the Southwest cific area during World War II. One rce with modern equipment holds the portant ground while the other force nploys guerrilla tactics from the jungled nterland. This situation occurred re-atedly on various Pacific islands.

STRATEGICALLY, however, Indo-china presents a problem that is dif-rent from that faced in the Southwest cific. Large numbers of troops would e required to blockade the sources of pply to the lightly equipped Viet linh. In World War II, United States mmand of the sea severed the exterior pply lines of each island, leaving the panese at the mercy of mop-up opera-ons. This strategic difference, arising om the insularity of one and the exist-ce of continuous overland supply lines the other, explains the difficulty en-untered so far in executing decisive tions in Indochina. For this geographic ason the exhaustive and seemingly dless conflict in Indochina may con-ue for some time to come.

The Month's Reading

Initiative Breeds Leadership

LT. GEN. L. K. TRUSCOTT
Command Missions
E. P. Dutton and Company, 1954

In promoting initiative and leadership among junior officers and men, I insisted that battle was a simple business when conducted by common sense methods, and by soldiers who were physically fit and knew how to use their weapons, were capable of working and living together in the field as a team, and were disciplined to withstand hardship and danger in attaining the objective. I would not permit any junior officer to be punished for any mistake when he was acting on his own initiative. On the other hand, I insisted that all commanders deal harshly with failure to act boldly when the situation required it. The change was gradual, but the development of leadership in the 3d Infantry Division was marked and a cause for intense satisfaction.

Improved Brain-Washing

EDWARD HUNTER
The New Leader
March 1954

It is safe to assume that whenever free men fall into the hands of the Reds they will be subjected to [brain-washing]. Mind manipulation is still the most important weapon of the Communist apparatus. Moreover, in the future we can expect the "treatment" to be much more efficient. The Communists are making an intense study of their practices in prisoner-of-war camps, to find out where they were ineffective and how they can improve their tactics.

We can be sure they will not repeat the foolish mistake they made when they showed a group of our POWs some "germ-infested" bugs that were supposedly dropped by our fliers. One of our men casually picked up a bug and swallowed it. The fact that he did not suffer even the slightest discomfort was a devastating blow to the entire Communist project. Next time, however, we can be sure that the bugs will be so full of germs that anyone who touches them will die in agony right before the eyes of his buddies. What could be more convincing to naïve young Americans who have not been told the facts about Soviet procedures?

Why We Fight

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. DEAN
The Saturday Evening Post
27 February 1954

I've mentioned before my acute embarrassment when a North Korean interrogator asked me, "Did you personally explain to your men why they were fighting?" and I had to lie to him, because I had neglected to do that during the twenty days while I led troops in Korea, although I had always made a point of it in Europe and in Japan. Of all the resolutions I made in three years, I think this one—never to let this happen to me again—is the most durable. I believe it could be expanded to a general principle.

We, each of us, need to know exactly why we're fightin in Korea or anywhere else. An army can be a show windo for democracy only if every man in it is convinced that does fight for a free world, for the kind of government h wants himself—and that he personally represents the idea which can make a world free. Lip service is not enough. W must live our ideals; it isn't what we say that counts, in th long run. It's what we do and how we do it.

I am a troop commander and in no sense a politician and, of course, I speak for no one else. But I do believe these things: That we must present a factual world bette than the communist dream; that we must have political an swers simple enough for the dullest to understand; that w must, each of us, know and understand the things for whic we fight. If I learned anything in captivity, these were th lessons.

Hole in the Reservoir

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS R. PHILLI
The St. Louis Post Dispatch
17 January 1954

The third aspect of the new strategy, the creation of strategic reserve in the United States "which greatly im proves our defensive posture," is another simple and beguil ing concept.

From our central position between Europe and Asia th reserve can move in any direction to put out fires. The sta toward building the strategic reserve is being made by th withdrawal of two divisions from Korea.

But, alas, for the strategic reserve, present plans call for reduction in Army forces of substantially greater numbe than are presently to be withdrawn from the Far East. N reserve will be created because the Army will be reduce faster than troops will be brought home.

Army Will Carry On

SENATE DEBATE ON U.S. DEFEN
U.S. News and World Report
26 February 1954

Senator [Leverett] Saltonstall: I would not be frar if I did not say that the Army, whose appropriations hav been cut by 1.5 or 2 billion dollars, does not like the cu But never in all the hearings, to the best of my recollectio has it been said that we are relying solely on atomic pow or the ability to carry the atomic bomb. We are relying upo our ability to retaliate. We are relying upon building up warning system in this country, so that we may be in a po tion to retaliate if we are attacked.

I will say to my colleague from Washington that, so far I know, the new Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the ne Chief of Staff of the Navy, together with the Secretaries those two branches, are in complete accord with the budg

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lowances for this year. I cannot truthfully say that the ecretary of the Army or the Chief of Staff of the Army is ı full accord, but they realize that they have only a certain nount to work with and they will work with it . . .

* * *

Senator [Henry M. Jackson]: Is it not a fact that the hief of Staff for the Army is opposed to the new policy?

Senator Saltonstall: I would not say that he is opsed to the new policy. What I would say—and he was utrly frank about it—is that, because the number of Army ivisions has been reduced, the Army has been forced to ıake new plans and new assignments and to work out new ıethods of doing things. He was not in complete accord, of ɔurse, with the policy of cutting appropriations for the rmy by a substantial amount.

However, he did state emphatically that he was willing to ɔ forward and that they were making new plans, and that ıe Army would co-operate to the fullest extent. I believe ıy colleagues who were present at the hearing will bear me ıt in that regard. . . .

No Place for Pity

LT. GEN. L. K. TRUSCOTT
Command Missions
E. P. Dutton and Company, 1954

One must actually experience the hardships of war to unerstand the awful strain, both mental and physical, which ıttle imposes upon men, the dreadful fatigue and fear hich destroys the will and poisons every fiber. . . . I had ɔserved a tendency on the part of commanders and comdes to sympathize and pity. I felt little of these sentiments ıring battle, and moreover felt we could not permit them deflect men from their duty. We could not give way to eariness for that would only give the enemy an advantage. Ve could not allow able-bodied men to take care of wounded sick comrades until the battle was won. This drive is an nportant function of command.

Fustest and Cheapest

JAC WELLER
Military Affairs
Winter, 1953

Nothing was more important to the spirit of [Nathan edford] Forrest's troops, nor to their confidence in him, ıan the very real concern he showed for their lives. In spite his fighting ability and his many adjurations of getting in ıe first blow—"getting a bulge" on the enemy and "keeping ıe scare on them," as he called it, with continuous attacks Forrest was not a reckless commander. His men knew it. His famous "hit 'em on the end" remark—attack from the ank and rear—was part of Forrest's general economy of the ves of his men. He was most emphatically against the ontal attack that Hood made at Franklin, and against Wheeler's efforts to storm Fort Donelson. For him, and beıuse of him, men accomplished tasks requiring epic physical ndurance. Yet he realized what men could not do. He so realized that some victories were not worthwhile even they could be achieved if the cost in lives was too great.

Few men who ever fought have been such a master of bluff as Forrest. On literally dozens of occasions, he caused Union garrisons and even small armies in the field to surrender to his great superiority in men and guns—to stop the further effusion of blood as he phrased it—when in actuality Forrest had only a small fraction of the force he claimed.

Objective Is the Same

WALTER MILLIS
The New York Herald Tribune
19 January 1954

One could wage conventional warfare with atomic weapons and it would still be conventional warfare; one could wage strategic warfare with plagues of locusts or Roman triremes and it would still be strategic. The object of both is always the same: it is to bend or break the will of the enemy state. Strategic warfare, however, seeks to accomplish this by direct attack upon the lives, the livelihoods, the resources, the industrial plant, communications, wealth and earning power of the enemy people and the enemy state as a whole. Conventional warfare, on the other hand, seeks the object by physical invasion and occupation of the enemy state, in order to capture or overawe its governmental "will", this usually involving in the first instance destruction of the armies or fortifications which it has thrown up for defense.

Interdiction in Korea

LT. COL. S. B. FOLSOM
Marine Corps Gazette
January 1954

Generally speaking, a route is less vulnerable to attack than the vehicles which are supported by that route. This proposition is based on the assumption that vulnerability is not judged alone on assailability but rather on the lasting effect of these assaults. In Korea we did not produce lasting effects in our interdiction effort. A proclamation of complete failure is not intended here—the program simply did not produce what it should have. With air superiority over the enemy's communication areas, movement of sufficient traffic to support a large army even in a stalemate could have been made impossible. The fact that an enemy force succeeded under such pressures proved his ability to outthink and, therefore, outmaneuver us.

How did this happen? Our original concept was apparently solid—all traffic was attacked with such efficiency that nothing of any size could move on enemy-held roads during the day. Where the solid concept failed is reflected in that one word "day." We knew our target element to start with—traffic! We hit the vehicles—we stopped them. Then the enemy took to the cover of darkness and we did not follow him—we changed our target element. Some night effort was made but the large majority of missions continued during the daylight hours. Being unable to shift our weight we were carried by our momentum into a program of route plowing. The earth was churned, but being earth, suffered little lasting damage. Bomb craters were filled in, broken bridges by-passed and supplies moved forward.

If we are to survive, the new weapons must be harnessed to the Army's proudest tradition; the spirit that has made

CELERITY: Secret of Success

COLONEL R. ERNEST DUPUY

THE United States Army possesses a proud tradition. In all its military victories a vital element has been its offensive spirit, in which celerity, "that secret of success," predominated. Celerity of movement, and celerity of mind are the American ways to success in battle.

It is interesting to note that this tradition of celerity, the spirit which in 1918 changed a stalemate of trench warfare into hammer-blows of fire and movement, which in 1943-1945 tumbled one *blitzkrieg* into the dust of a more potent *blitzkrieg*, stems from the war which was itself the prototype of lightning war—our own Civil War.

IT came about as the result of the work of one man —Dennis Hart Mahan—Colonel, U.S.A., and Professor of Engineering and the Art of War at West Point from 1830 to 1871. Mahan was the man who, even prior to the Mexican War, was telling cadets that no great success in war could be attained without rapid movements.

Let's get down to facts. In the Civil War the vital strokes affecting the course of military events were, all of them, strokes in which celerity—speed, swiftness—entered as vital factors. Jackson in the Valley, Grant's Big Black River operation, Warren's *coup d'oeil* at Little Round Top, Sherman's march to the sea, Wilson's Selma campaign, Sheridan's cavalry on the *via dolorosa* leading to Appomattox; these are some of the lightning strokes which stand out for immediate inspection.

The railroads, the telegraph, balloons, torpedoes, mines —booby-traps, even; the revolver and repeating rifle that revolutionized cavalry action from that of shock to fire and movement; these were some of the developments "used," as Henderson writes, "in a manner hitherto unknown . . . even the formations of infantry were made sufficiently elastic to meet the requirements of a modern battlefield."

It was lightning war, geared to the relative speed of the horse, ushering into the world a future in which Toynbee's "mechanical cataphracts and winged archers" would strut the stage. The lessons learned would be utilized by alien soldiers on a thousand stricken fields until at last used again by the grandsons and great-grandsons of the men who wore the Blue and the Gray.

It is easy to say that this was expression of the buoyancy and ingenuity of a young nation; that it was an expression of the pioneer spirit which was transforming a wilderness and expanding a nation; that it was part of the spirit that almost simultaneously built the Union Pacific. Not only is this easy to say, but it is true. Was it, however, a spontaneous combustion, or was there som directing force, some educational guidance, even leave in the mass?

TURN back to Mahan, and remember as you turn th he was not only a professor of the art of war, but als professor of engineering in the school which fathere our system af technological education. One can sa with truth that Mahan systemized the study and pra tice of civil engineering.


The goal of his teachings was a flexibility of mir which, seizing upon new weapons and techniques, coul utilize them with the versatility of an Alexander, th mobility of a Caesar, the strategical genius of a Hannib and a Napoleon, to crush the most sensitive parts of a enemy structure.

Mobility, speed, surprise, boldness—these were M han's keynotes; his springboard was the achievements the great captains of the past. Into the minds of gener tions of cadets Mahan drummed the necessity for stud of the past, together with a mental flexibility whic would distinguish between the principles there pr sented, and the tactical and technical employment the weapons available.

"It seems incredible," he wrote in 1847, "that anythir short of the most entire ignorance of the past, could hav led professional soldiers to abandon the *spirit* of the c ganization and tactics of the ancient Greeks and Roma . . . of those rapid combinations by which, with a han ful of troops, Caesar so uniformly frustrated the pov erful and oft-repeated struggles of a warlike and restle people. The study of military history thus becomes ve instructive in a strategical point of view . . . On th other hand, in endeavoring to apply the . . . tactics of th ancients to our modern armies, errors of the greate magnitude might be committed. Every servile imitatio . . . is greatly to be deprecated . . . Misapprehension the value of a new agent renders all celerity, that secr of success, impossible."

HE made no pretense that he was inventing some ne solution for victory on the battlefield. On the co trary, he scorned the suggestion that any new theory any one new weapon could change strategical principl no matter how much it would affect tactics. He was th scientist, the laboratory expert, dissecting the specimen evolving theories, proving them from the past and enu ciating them as principles for the future.

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elerity is the word for the swift sweep
:ross France in the hot midsummer of 1944.

DENNIS HART MAHAN

"No great success can be gained in war in which rapid movements do not enter as an element. Even the very elements of Nature seem to array themselves against the slow and over-prudent general."

COLONEL R. ERNEST DUPUY, Artillery, retired, is the author of many books, the latest being *Men of West Point,* written for the Military Academy's 150th birthday in 1952.

To his satisfaction he proved that war is fluid, proceeding from bases and lines of communication. The spade, implementing the terrain, could be as important as the rifle and bayonet. One of his pupils, Sherman —who, by the way, kept up a correspondence with his old mentor, as did others—later would write:

"It was one of Professor Mahan's maxims that the spade was as useful in war as the musket, and to this I will add the axe."

THE point to be made is that the Civil War was, by and large, a West Pointers' war, and to that extent a demonstration of a single theory of war used by both sides. With the exception of Forrest, one of those rare natural leaders who spring to light from time to time, high commanders with West Point background predominated. Of sixty of the most important engagements, fifty-five were led on both sides by graduates; of the remaining five, one side or the other was commanded by a West Pointer.

These men were pupils of Mahan or, with rare exceptions like Lee—for three years closely associated with him when he was superintendent, during the best period of Mahan's life—they were familiar with and in sympathy with his teachings. Among the officers who came in from civil life on both sides, Mahan's works, now long forgotten, had wide circulation. Pirated editions were produced for Confederate use.

THAT not all Mahan's pupils were Napoleons, and that not all held open minds, cannot be held against the doctrine and the tradition. No more can our present great system of technological education be held responsible for the fact that not all its output are Baches, Michelsons or Millikans.

The clincher is that out of the Civil War period came an American tradition and a doctrine—the spirit of the offensive—and that it came with a number of proponents, not just one isolated great captain. We had a Washington in the Revolution; we had nobody to speak of during the War of 1812; we had a Winfield Scott and a Zachary Taylor (both with West Point staffs) in the Mexican War. But we had Grant, Lee, Sherman, Jackson, Sheridan, Wilson, Jubal Early and a host of lesser lights to practice lightning war by 1865.

We also had, it is true, McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker and a number of others who did not practice or did not heed what Mahan preached. They were of the type of men Mahan meant when he wrote:

". . . An active, intelligent officer, with an imagination fertile in the expedients of his profession, will seldom be at a loss as to his best course when the occasion offers; to one without those qualities, opportunities present themselves in vain."

The tradition would continue, in the long and sometimes frustrating years of our little wars against the plains Indians, in the greatest irregular light cavalry the world has produced. The outstanding exponent of celerity in these was, of course, Crook, the greatest Indian fighter of them all, whose nimbleness of mind and undying spirit of the offensive stood out in his stripped-saddle operations of 1876-1877—the Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition against Crazy Horse.

The tradition was in the doldrums during the Spanish American War. But it cropped out in the small action of the Philippine Insurrection and in the Boxer campaign. The growth of our service schools fostered it and paved the way for another demonstration.

CELERITY was the keynote of granite-faced Pershing's leadership in World War I; a celerity which was complemented by the celerity of the nation behind him and its technological advances—railroad building, harbor construction and all the other developments on logistics transported overseas. But today's world thinks of Pershing—if it thinks of him at all—as a monolith of tenacity. And one does not associate monoliths with speed.

But remember this: On September 1, 1918, Pershing pledged Foch that within twenty-four days he would fight his AEF at St. Mihiel, win his objective, and then with practically the same army, launch a major offensive —the Meuse-Argonne—sixty miles away.

The mind that can carry into execution two great battles, winning the one and launching the other to eventual victory, within such bracket of time and space, is indeed governed by the spirit of celerity. Furthermore, unless his subordinates were motivated by the same doctrine and tradition, Pershing's pledge would have been but a sorry boast.

And so we come to our greatest effort, and to a tradition by that time in full flower. How else does one explain the operations of our forces in Europe and in the Pacific from 1942 to 1945?

True, the United States, when World War II engulfed us, was bound by the shackles of that chain mentioned by Toynbee, "each link of which has been a cycle of invention, triumph, lethargy and disaster." We were near that "lethargy and disaster" when Pearl Harbor occurred. But what happened after is in the full flavor of that tradition of celerity, in which the entire nation joined.

IN Europe we find a wealth of celerity. It is hard indeed to find one instance, great or small, in those operations in which it was not an element, from Patton's four-pronged race through France and his later crisscross slashes in the Palatinate, to the leadership of unnamed platoon commanders. To single out one at the cost of silence about the others might be unjust, indeed.

But we will take one, because it discloses a mass celerity of mind as well as of matter; a celerity stemming from bottom to top and back again, and effecting a chain-reaction of imposing importance. To preface it we look on the words of two great men; they indicate the true meaning of celerity in war.

Wrote Patton: "One does not plan and then try to make circumstances fit those plans; one tries to make the plans fit the circumstances."

And wrote Mahan, one hundred years previously: "Once within the sphere of the enemy's operations, the commanding general is no longer at liberty to do what he

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ishes, but what best he can. Marches, maneuvers, com-
nts, depend upon circumstances for the most part im-
erative; decisions arrived at are often sudden, and
ought about by the attitude, resources, strength and the
orale of the enemy."

ET'S look at what General Devers has dubbed "the
miracle of Remagen."

When Task Force Engeman of Hoge's Combat Com-
and B, 9th Armored Division, nosed over the *Appoli-*
nris Kirche ridge to find the thin gray strands of the
emagen bridge still spanning the muddy Rhine on
March 1945, its commander rushed to grab it, flashing
ack the news. Hoge hastened to make the capture cer-
in, relaying word back at the same time. From Divi-
on to Corps, from Corps to Army, up to Army Group,
e electric word went, each commander in turn approv-
g, each one adding to the onward tide. Bradley called
senhower at Rheims.

"Brad, that's wonderful!" Ike shouted, according to
arry Butcher's narration of the scene. "Sure, get across
ith everything you've got . . . To hell with the plan-
rs!"

At the time Eisenhower planned a full-dress river
ossing and envelopment of the Ruhr from the north by
ontgomery, while Bradley and Devers would contain.
But when Hodges's First Army made good that bridge-
ad; when Patton, unleashed in the Hunsrück, made
incemeat out of remaining enemy forces south of the
oselle and then, popping over the Rhine one day be-
re Montgomery's crossing, began his own sweep
rough Western Germany, Bradley had presented Ike
th an entirely new situation. Ike passed the ball to
m. Brad would be the hammer, Monty the anvil.

And there you have it. A junior commander, seizing
itiative to take a bridge, brings about the greatest dou-
e envelopment in military history—325,000 German
ldiers caught in a bearhug encompassing a 4,000-
uare-mile area. Chain reaction of celerity in war;
elerity, that secret of success."

OOK now at the masterpiece of celerity in the far Pa-
cific. It is 15 September 1944. MacArthur is planning
invasion of the Philippines with Mindanao, southern-
ost island, his objective. His Sixth Army's assault is
geted for 20 December. The XXIV Corps, under
imitz's control, is afloat—another show—aimed at Yap;
ld Bull Halsey's carrier force is already screening it by
acking enemy air bases in the Philippines.

Halsey, finding unexpected weaknesses in Japanese
rial opposition in the central Philippines, flashes Nim-
, recommending abandonment of present plans against
p, Talaud and Mindanao; suggests instead attack on
yte, center of the archipelago. Nimitz, approving,
shes the Joint Chiefs, offering his own amphibious
ength, the XXIV Corps, in reinforcement.

The Joint Chiefs place the project before MacArthur.
rty-eight hours later the answer comes. MacArthur is
epared to assault Leyte on 20 October—two months
rlier than the original Mindanao schedule.

Once again one has seen celerity in action; the celerity which is prepared not only to make the plans fit the circumstances, but also, as Krueger would prove with his Sixth Army, swiftly execute them.

It would seem, then, from these samplings, that our military history indicates a tradition of celerity, the spirit of the offensive, that sprang directly from the Civil War, and that the seed was planted at West Point. If, in the reading, it might appear that the writer had slighted the operations and the great tradition of the U S. Navy, let it be remembered that the doctrines and initiative of that service, too, have been fostered by a man born at West Point—Alfred Thayer Mahan, illustrious son of an illustrious father.

WHAT now of the future? How does our tradition fit into this age of electronics and atomic energy? It would appear to be logical to hope that this tradition will be fostered. We live in an era of instantaneousness of communication and of breath-taking scope of striking range; an era in which the distance between the quick and the dead, and the time element available for command decision, are ever shortening.

It's an era in which the vacillation of one of Mahan's "slow and over-prudent" generals could bring about a disaster of magnitude unparalleled.

We are faced by potential danger not only to a far-flung perimeter embracing our allies of the Western World, but also to our homeland. We have an army, we have the most powerful navy in the world, we have an air force. We possess atomic and electronic weapons. In other words, we have the elements of a team on which this trinity of power must play in perfect coordination to get the best results.

IT is a strength not to be frittered away, either by projects of cordon defense or by rosy dreams of push-button war. The true power and limitations of new agents must be weighed, and weighed accurately, to attain Mahan's "celerity, that secret of success."

And we must not be misled, either by impetuosity or by the valor of ignorance. We must remember that this tradition of celerity may be a two-edged sword when misused.

"Who," wrote Mahan, "intent upon some striking success, rushes recklessly, in the pursuit of it, within the jaws of destruction, has learned but half his trade, and that the most easily acquired and the most dangerous in its application in such hands."

We should remember Baker, stumbling to death up a steep Potomac bluff in the valor of ignorance. We should remember Pope's snap judgment at Second Bull Run, Stuart's ride around the Army of the Potomac while Lee was losing Gettysburg, Custer charging to disaster on the Little Big Horn. They did not possess true celerity, but impetuosity. They were the men who leaped before they looked.

So, while cherishing our tradition of "celerity, that secret of success," let's remember also another cliché: "make haste slowly."




Shaping up for Exercise Flash Burn, the 663 Field Artillery fires the big 280mm gun. Eart tremors caused by the gun shake the camera an result in some picture distortion.

CFJ Staff Report

PREVIEW TO FLASH BURN

WHILE the Army's new weapons—specifically the 280mm gun and the Honest John field artillery rocket—will get the headlines, Exercise Flash Burn, to be run off in the North Carolina maneuver area in April and May, is much more than a public spectacle of the Army's show pieces.

The 60,000-man maneuver will see some rather ambitious parachute and air-landed operations, including the supply of a corps' airhead by parachute and air-landing methods; two companies of Army helicopters will be used, as well as light aircraft.



Slight Singe, an exercise that was a preliminary to Flash Burn, saw the heavy drop of jeeps and 105mm howitzers.

The experimental infantry regiment will be field tested by the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, which has been at that test now for many months. Basically the experimental squad has eleven men armed with M1s and two automatic rifles. The Heavy Weapons Company was abolished; its machine guns were placed in each rifle company, and the 81mm mortars and 105mm recoilless rifles in the Battalion Headquarters Company. Signal communication procedures have been streamlined with more field telephone service and improved radios.

Service and support units have been strengthened and simplified in an effort to speed up administrative and logistical work. The lessons of Flash Burn may suggest changes in the experimental infantry regiment and will help determine whether it or a similar organization should be standardized.


Flash Burn will test: defense against enemy air attack, active and passive; defense against coordinated tactical atomic employment; operational use of new and improved weapons; land mine warfare; retrograde movement with demolitions; tactics and techniques of guerrilla warfare; survival training; electronic countermeasures; alternate communications; rail, motor and air troop movements; Air-ground, night and day logistical support; civil affairs and military government; and tactical employment and defense against chemical, biological and radiological devices.

The G2 play has been carefully plotted and is a logical follow-up to the Aggressor operations in previous maneuvers in the area; notably Southern Pine in 1951 and Swarmer in 1950. Rea Aggressor captured personnel will fur nish the U.S. troops with intelligenc information. Planted documents an equipment loaded with tactical and tech nical information will also be used. I keeping with current Aggressor tactic clandestine operations will be empha sized. Every trick of the trade will b used to keep S2s and G2s on their toe

The Aggressor commander will be a sisted in painting a real live picture o his force to the U.S. force by the 304t MI Company, organized into an Intell gence Injection Detachment. This un will prepare cover stories for Aggress soldiers to be injected for capture, doc ments and matériel intended for U.S intelligence officers, and Aggressor cla destine agents.

The principal units participating Flash Burn are the XVIII Corps, th 37th Infantry and the 82d Airborne D visions, and the 306th Logistical Com mand. Altogether some 165 small units and detachments will participate.

The largest Aggressor units will be th 278th Infantry Regiment and the 3d A mored Cavalry Regiment.



LIEUT. GEN. A. R. BOLLING
Flash Burn Director

Lieutenant General A. R. Bollin Third Army commander, is maneuv director. His deputies are Major Ge eral Edward T. Williams, Deputy Co mander Third Army, and Major Gene Joseph P. Cleland, Commanding XV Corps. Colonel Glenn J. McGowan Aggressor commander. The chief u pire is Brigadier General Claude McQuarrie.

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ou'll work hard in Germany. The Seventh Army is in the field most of the time. But you'll also have time to play.

GERMANY

You can count on waiting many weeks for the family

MAJOR MARCO POLO

AROUND THE BASES—4

This article covers West Germany only. Since Berlin is an island in the Russian zone, it poses special problems which will be covered in a future article.

WEST GERMANY, defended by the United States, Great Britain and rance, appears to be well on the way emerging from the economic chaos left y World War II. Business is booming, ne shops are full, and the factories are rning out enough goods for local con-mption with some left over for export. While Russia still "occupies" East ermany, with all the restrictions the rm implies, in West Germany our oops and those of France and Great ritain have a protective role. Germany as no armed forces, so the American ldier is at once the neighbor and guard-n of people he was fighting just a few ears ago. Possibly more important, he is, or should be, a teacher instilling the lessons of democracy by his personal words and actions.

Germany is a small country by American standards—only a little more than half the size of Texas. It is thickly populated, and before the war had more than 500 cities of 10,000 population or more. The people gather together whenever they can. In rural areas you will find clusters of houses rather than the isolated farmsteads of America.

Northern Germany is flat and not particularly good farm land. It has a great deal of scrub woodland, as well as marsh land and hundreds of small lakes. In central Germany the land is hilly and the soil is rich and in southern Germany —Bavaria—it is mountainous. Many people consider Bavaria to be among the most beautiful regions in the world.

The climate resembles that of the

eastern seaboard of the United States, between New York and Washington. Winters, however, are long and while not extremely cold, are raw, damp and dreary. Summer is seldom particularly hot, although you will suffer through an occasional day when the temperature hits 90, and humidity is high. Annual rainfall is about the same as on the east coast of the United States, but it is spread out more in year-round drizzles. Winter uniform is prescribed for the entire year, although during summer months tropical worsted is permitted off-duty. So are civilian clothes.

THE normal tour in Germany is three years. The soldier can expect a long wait for his family. Officially, the Army says the wait will be from 35 to 39 weeks, but actually it varies according to the area to which the soldier is assigned. In Heidelberg the wait for quarters is four to six months; in Stuttgart six months; in Munich only about three weeks.

But no matter how rapidly you get quarters, it will take your dependents at least two months to get to Germany. No dependents may start the trip until their sponsor has arrived in Germany, been assigned, and has obtained a quarters allocation. By the time the passports are issued, orders cut, and dependents report to the port, 60 days usually elapse. Then there is a nine-day boat trip (or 24-hour airplane ride) before they set foot in Germany.

From the port of Bremerhaven you travel to your station by rail or private automobile. Aircraft normally fly out of Westover Field, Massachusetts, landing at Frankfurt.

Once you get it, your housing will be quite satisfactory. There is a rather complicated allocation system, depending on rank and length of time away from dependents and to a certain extent on assignment, but the quarters are all good. Most of them are apartments, some leased from the Germans and others built by the United States; a few are houses. In Munich most quarters are houses; in Stuttgart they are all apartments. German or American built, there is very little difference except for closets —American buildings have them, German do not. In the latter you will be provided huge wardrobes. The number of rooms in your quarters will depend on the number of persons in your family.

(One officer we know, assigned to Heidelberg, got quarters in two weeks. He has five kids. Folk less liberally endowed wait at least four months.)

The quarters are all well furnished, and they are complete with rugs, china, glass, silver, curtains, draperies and blankets. In a few cases linens are provided, but this is unusual. Baby furniture is not provided. You will have to bring (or buy in the PX) cribs and similar furnishings.

YOU must hire servants yourself. The local army headquarters normally maintains a servants' registry, and will recommend whatever help you want. Most of the help has worked for Americans before, and speaks (or understands) a little English. Wages currently run at about $18 a month for a part-time general housemaid (she also cooks) to $28 for full-time help. There are servants' quarters with nearly all family housing.

You will probably want to take your own pictures, lamps, and bric-a-brac, but it is not wise to take too much, or anything you are particularly eager not to have broken. Most people who spend a tour in Germany load their what-nots with local items. After all, Germany is the home of both Meissen and Dresden.

You will need your own household linens, kitchen utensils, and small electrical appliances. An electric roaster would be helpful because German stoves have tiny ovens. Your toaster, waffle iron, mixer, vacuum cleaner, and so on will all come in handy, but one word of caution. In some of the U.S.-built quarters the electric current is standard American 110 volt, 60 cycle. But generally in Germany the current is 220 volt, 50 cycle, and you will have to have your equipment converted, or arm yourself with transformers. Transformers are available on the German market, and frequently in the PXs. But for radios, record players and washing machines, have the conversion kit attached before you leave the States, because many people have had bad luck having it done in Germany. All your electric plugs will have to be changed to the German type —a simple household task that even you can perform.

Your washing machine should be the non-automatic type. Don't bother with a television set yet since (at this writing) television is just starting in Germany. Radios should be converted for best results, but they will operate through a locally procured transformer. Don't bother with electric clocks, since you can buy them on the local market geared for German current. Take your deep freeze if you have one, converted, of course.

The deep freeze is not a necessity. Shopping facilities, particularly for foodstuffs, are very good throughout Germany. You can buy all the standard American canned and packaged goods. Much of the meat and most of the vegetables are from the local market, and of high quality. Butter, eggs and pasteurized milk are brought in from Denmark and Holland, and fresh citrus fruits are available all year round. And if the commissary doesn't please your palate, the local shops are well stocked and happy to serve Americans.

Which brings up money. You will use Military Payment Certificates for purchases on military installations, and Deutsche Marks on the local market. The Deutsche Mark is valued at about 24 cents. Commissaries operate on a credit system, with bills payable by the month. The word from Heidelberg is that at current prices the commissary bill for a family of two adults with a part-time maid should run about $60 a month, while two adults, three children under 12 and a full-time maid should run up a bill of about $125.00.

Post Exchange facilities, like the commissary, are excellent. All the normal things are available; but like PXs everywhere, the choice of clothing is pretty monotonous, and women's shoes that fit are hard to come by. They do, however, have an unusual service in the Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward catalogues, and order blanks are available in the PXs. As in every other overseas station, it is wise to make an arrangement with the personal shopper in your favorite State-side department store for the purchase of things like shoes, children's dress clothes, and pretty dresses. Men's clothes, too, are a problem now that the wearing of civilian clothes off duty is authorized in Germany. The Post Exchanges have a fair assortment of sport clothes, but their suits are dull, and the German tailor who can cut a suit to the American taste is a rarity. If you can get to England or Austria, fine. If not, make a deal with a good U.S. tailor before leaving.

Like the tailors, the dressmakers in Germany have a heavy hand and a mind of their own. This is not one hundred per cent true, of course, and if you find a good seamstress you're in luck, but generally you will find unimaginative producers of bulky seams. It is too bad, too, because while German materials are still rather shoddy there are wonderful British, Swiss and Italian goods available that will give many womenfolk the urge to sew.

FOR recreation, Germany offers year-round opportunities for outdoor sports: skating and skiing (and bobsledding for the very brave) in the winter; swimming, riding and tennis, in the summer

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erchtesgaden and Garmisch, year-round esorts famous throughout Europe, are n southern Bavaria.

Germany is a land of opportunity for ne sportsman, the person interested in ne arts, or for the sightseer. Hunting nd fishing can be enjoyed throughout ne country (although your firearms ust be registered with the Provost Mar-ial, and you are required to have Ger-an hunting and fishing permits), and ere is always music. Every community as its orchestra, large or small, and in tuttgart the local opera company gives erformances ten months of the year.

In music and the arts, Germany gives ou an opportunity to participate as well ; listen and look. Private tutors are vailable throughout the country, and in me of the larger cities, such as Frank-rt, the Army maintains art and music nters where you can study instru-ents, voice, music theory, painting, awing, wood carving, sculpture, etc., r nominal fees.



Germany—and all Europe this side of the Iron Curtain—offers many diversions. And not the least of them is sightseeing—even the horse wants to peek.

DUCATIONAL facilities are excel-lent. The schools are run by the rmy, with teachers from the United tates except in certain subjects such as erman and music, where highly quali-ed local teachers are used. Each mili-ry post has schools from kindergarten rough the ninth grade, and there are ne schools which go through high hool. Four of these are so-called "dor-itory schools," where students from tlying areas may attend high school n a boarding school basis. The fee of 20.00 a month in these schools covers l living expenses, and weekend travel ck and forth to home is free. In all hools the Army operates in Germany ere is no tuition charge and books are ee.

For college-age children the Univer-ty of Maryland operates a two-year nior college at Munich, and depend-nts also are entitled to attend Maryland urses held on the various military sts, for which resident credit is given. lany students take advantage of the uropean universities.

You will need an automobile. Most ople take one with them, but you can y one in Germany, or order one deliv-ed there through the Post Exchange. If you elect to buy a car once you're ere, you have a choice of a new Ameri-n car, a used American car, or a Eu-pean car. In American automobiles, is cheaper to buy a new one there rough the PX than it is to buy a new ne in the States and ship it over, be-use you save state and federal taxes. sed cars (American) in Germany are going at pretty fair prices: a two-door 1950 Ford in reasonably good condition currently brings about $1150. Whatever you do, get a small car, and preferably one of the "big three" brands, since gasoline is expensive, there is frequently delay in getting any but the most common parts, and German roads (except the Autobahn) are narrow, winding and cluttered with kids, carts, geese and bikes.

Many people get interested in the European cars. They are built for the local roads, they are cheap to drive, and they are fun. But they are so small you wear them rather than drive them, and they don't offer the comfort of American automobiles. And they seem relatively expensive.

You will be required to have insurance on your automobile—the same $5,000-$10,000-$5,000 that is required on most U.S. Army posts—and to register it locally. You are also "requested" to get a USAREUR driver's license.

You will need the car for many reasons. Housing is frequently widely scattered in Germany, so in some cases you may find yourself 20 miles from the commissary and PX. There are usually busses, but bus travel leaves much to be desired—with an armful of groceries. Also, in the cities, local public transportation is none too good and always crowded. Also there are the sightseeing trips you'll want to make.

ALONG with your car you will want a camera. Wherever you go you'll find scenes of such interest and beauty that you will want to take your own pictures "for the record." If you have a camera, take it with you. You will suffer violent temptation to spend your money on a German camera, for the Germans make some of the finest cameras in the world. Don't resist too hard, either. Get expert advice if you feel you need it, but do take advantage of your location and buy a German camera at a bargain.

Your clothes should be the same as you would have for life in New Jersey, except that you won't need as much true summer clothing. It never stays very hot in Germany; the ladies will appreciate a light wrap most summer evenings. Living among the military folk is decidedly informal, but the women will want two or three simple evening and/or dinner dresses and now that mufti is allowed, the men can make good use of a dinner jacket.

For recreation you will need the same equipment you use in the United States—golf clubs, tennis rackets, favorite guns or fishing tackle according to your own interests. The PXs and German stores offer excellent skis, skates, sporting weapons, fishing tackle, etc. If you are an ardent hunter there is no reason to stock up on ammunition unless you are a handgun fan addicted to the heavy calibers, which ammunition is hard to come by in Germany.

One last tip about Germany: Learn the language if you can. It helps in dealing with your household help, making friends with the neighbors, seeing the country, and picking up bargains in the stores.



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COPTER CAVALRY

MAJOR BERT DECKER

MAJOR BERT DECKER, U. S. Air Force, is on duty at Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe. He tells us that his interest in the potentialities of helicopters is of respectable lineage, going back to the days when anyone who talked " 'copters" was considered a little "tetched in the haid."

THE CO of the 5th Helicopter Cavalry Squadron faced his twenty-three pilots. His back was to a map thumbtacked to a piece of plywood leaning against a tree.

"Group has given us orders to hit an enemy infantry division advancing along these two parallel valleys," he said, poi ing to the map. "They are in truck co voy, moving fast, spaced rather closel prime targets.

"Their objective is obviously t bridges at Keypoint where two valle converge at the river. They most lik

The 5th 'Copter Cavalry Squadron clobbers an enemy truck convoy

ill put paratroopers there any minute, ut that's not our headache. Air-observa- on claims those convoys should be bout at this point in this valley at 1420, ne hour from now. That is where I ant to hit them!"

He paused and wet his lips.

"When they reach this point," he con- nued, "we will be here in this small alley to their left, our right facing em." He pointed to the map. "We ill be in single file, flying tandem, paced at two hundred yards, flying in at direction [pointing] just the oppo- te to their direction. We will hug the p of that ridge, treetop level, and I ean treetop. Trim 'em!

"When Air-ob Four—he will be up n top—sees that our tail has cleared the an of that convoy in the next valley, e will give us BY THE LEFT FLANK, FLY. Ve will maintain radio silence but on is order we will all swing left, go up ver that ridge abreast and down on em. Notice as we clear that ridge we ill only have about 300 yards to go on at road. That will give you less than even seconds before you are on them. Notice the ridge has only a few scat- ered trees according to these air photos. o between 'em, not over 'em. Hug the round, come in low. Got that?"

He glanced from face to face. They odded their heads. Their faces were tent.

"Then get this: I will not be able to atch you and give commands. I'll be usy. As you come down on that road, ving right and run up it for a hundred two hundred yards, pouring it to them. Vatch the guy in front of you. Don't oot him down. Then swing left and op down behind this woods and tan- em on me. We should be out of sight three or four seconds. Do you see here I mean?

"From there, follow me across the val- y and up this deep ravine—keep low up over into the second valley, right here. As you see, this second valley is heavily wooded, but right along here the woods is cleared on both sides of the road at least a hundred yards for over five miles or so. It's a dream spot. They can't see us until we are on them. The road does wind, so watch it." He paused for breath.

"I will take us in parallel to the road," he continued, "coming back in this direction. When I give you RIGHT OBLIQUE, FLY, we swing in and hit them from the rear. Drop down over the treetops, swing low and left on the road and rake them for two to three hundred yards. Then up over the woods on their left and follow me home.

"Any questions?"

One pilot raised his hand.

"What is it?"

"Do we take napalm bombs or just strafe?"

"We just use our fifties, thirties, and rockets. No napalm. We travel light and fast. We're saving the napalm for tanks. Any other questions?

"None? Good! Push your copters out from under the trees at exactly 1355. It is now 1330. Dismissed!"

AT 1355 hours the cavalry-pilots and their mechanics pushed the single-seater copters out into the clearing. They were odd-looking machines. Two single-bladed rotors which turned in opposite directions were pushed by two small, powerful engines slung right under the blades. Below the engines was the pilot. His cockpit was a powerful sphere of thick, clear, transparent plastic. Even the round hatchway door was transparent and maintained the perfect spherical lines of the cockpit. Below the cockpit sphere was a tricycle landing gear with a wide spread. Slung on the top of the landing gear, nestled up close to the sphere, were four caliber .50 and six caliber .30 machine guns. Just below the machine guns was a row of rockets. A stubby tail stuck out in the back. There was no torque compensating rotor on it. Apparently the counter-rotating rotors took care of torque.

The CO appeared. The pilots began climbing into their machines. Quickly they strapped themselves in; practically only their legs and arms could move. The harness they buckled themselves into was padded with foam rubber, as were the seats and the seat backs. They even hooked their crash helmets to a wide rubber band. Their heads could move so far and no farther. A sudden crash would not snap and break their necks. Each man looked as though he were ready to go over Niagara in a barrel.

The engines started with quiet but powerful-sounding purrs. The copters took off fast, one after another, angled up over the woods and were gone, leaving the trees swaying from their backwash.

A few minutes later the squadron was purring straight up a broad, long valley in close vee formation. A wide river was a placid ribbon 300 feet below them.

The valley veered left but the CO led them straight on up over the ridge. They crossed several shallow valleys and approached a higher range of mountains. The CO signalled for single file and started up a shallow valley. They were low, hugging the forest, flying between the taller tree tops. An enemy squadron flying high over them never even spotted them. However, one jet broke off and started a dive on a lone observation plane.

A calm, concise voice spoke over the air.

"Air-ob Four to Fool One. You are about a mile from your planned departure point. I'm getting out of here!"

The 5th flew on unnoticed. Suddenly the CO signalled by swinging right and then sharply left. Each copter swung left with him. Abreast, the long line of copters skimmed up over the ridge and dipped down into the next valley.

MANY of the enemy never knew what hit them. The copters came in low and fast, some of them only four or five feet off the ground. Their machine guns pounded. They swung right at the road, smashing their slugs into the trucks and then hedge-hopped over them. One

—apparently an ammo truck—exploded violently, blowing a helicopter high into the air. A rotor flew from it in a high spinning arc.

"Fool Six to Fool One! Fool Five is rolling out!"

"Fool Six and Fool Seven cover him! Fool Eight get him!" the CO snapped as he slapped two rockets into a truck turning off the road to get out of his fire.

Fool Five was really rolling. When his rotor went, he yanked the old "Roll Stick" but fast. The landing gear with its machine guns plowed into the ditch, the engine with its one rotor and tail went whirling off at an angle; Fool Five was twisting slowly end over end wondering if the sphere's parachute would open. The sphere glanced off a tree trunk, bounded over a low stone wall at an angle, plunged through some bushes and finished up in a plowed field fifty yards from the road.

As the sphere rolled to a stop, Fool Eight was practically setting down on top of it, peering anxiously in at Fool Five. Fool Six and Fool Seven circled overhead watching the road.

Fool Five's grin was wobbly and he staggered as if drunk but he made it to Fool Eight. He flopped across the machine guns and hooked his harness to the safety snap. The three copters were flitting down over the hill zipping between the tree tops when the enemy fired his only shot in the action. It was wide. The copters were gone. They left eighty burning or wrecked trucks behind them.

"Fool Eight to Fool One. I have Fool Five. Fool Six and Seven are covering us."

"Good! Good! Take him home. Six and Seven too. They can never catch us. Good luck!"

"Roger and out!"

WHEN the squadron burst out of the narrow ravine into the second valley, the CO sensed something was wrong. He could see strips of the road through the trees but no trucks flashed along it. "They must have stopped," he thought and led the squadron back up towards the ridge, looking for a clearing.

The clearing he found was merely a hole in the forest, right on top of the ridge. As they landed, the CO ordered Flight Charley to be security guards. The four flyers pulled tommy guns from their racks and moved off into the forest in four different directions.

The CO didn't climb out of his copter. He was looking up at the tallest tree on the edge of the clearing.

"Hey, Joe!" he yelled. "Do you think you could get down off that if I put you up there?" he asked, still looking at the tree.

"Hell, yes," said Joe. He climbed onto the CO's landing gear and grinned at him through the plastic floor. A minute later Joe was in the top of the tree peering up-valley. When the CO landed he found all the pilots were just inside the perimeter of the clearing, peering into the deep woods. They were chattering about how many trucks they had clobbered in the first valley. The CO grinned a little tight smile of satisfaction. A tight vee of jets flashed overhead, low. Their wings swept back abruptly and bulged near the fuselage. Enemy! "Might be cover for that truck convoy!" thought the CO, lighting a cigarette.

Ten minutes later Joe called.

"Here they come, boss!"

"How far?"

"About five miles. They don't seem as bunched but they are coming fast." He was trying to time them with his watch.

"Never mind that, get down here. We will be able to hear their engines from here. Gather round, gang!" The CO was spreading his map on the ground.

"A little change of tactics," he said. "I got the lay of the land better as we came in. We'll pop back over the ridge here after we hear the first truck go by, sneak along the far side of the ridge until we find that ravine we originally came in, swing left in on them and hit them from the rear as we planned before. However, this is the change: Space at 300 yards, not 200. They are not as bunched and there will be less chance of you shooting the copter in front of you. Watch that! After making your run, swing right off the road over the trees and dip down in the valley to its bottom. There swing right and we'll tandem to their rear. Charley, you will be leading, and I want you practically wading in that creek. I'll be tail and

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give the word on the radio when to flan right again. As we reach the road w should hit the second half of that convo just stopping and bunched up. Empt your guns. Got it?"

They were all grins.

"OK. Flight Dee relieve the securit guards so I can brief them. Come i when you hear the first truck motor."

IT happened just the way the CO ha planned it. They clobbered the firs half of the convoy, dipped down out o sight into the valley and swung to th rear to catch the second half of the con voy bunching as it stopped. The twent of them came through without a scratch The enemy jet cover flashed over ther twice as they snaked through ravines bu never saw them. It just about kille them when the CO made them maintai radio silence all the way home.

The Group Commander was deligh ed. "That should slow them down couple of hours," he said to the 5th CO. "If they try to push on tonight, h them with napalm using your infra-rec We will have tanks at Keypoint befor midnight. We already have a battalio here. Flew them in while you wer gone, just in case. Personally, I hop they turn back. Our 6th Squadron ha already mined the roads behind them You know, those new fast-laying plasti jobs I told you about. That's going t be one sad division by morning eithe way. You certainly did your share."

IT took almost all of World War I t learn that planes could be used t attack the enemy. Planes were first use for observation only. Then a pilot ob server got a bright idea. He tried t throw a brick through the propeller o an enemy's plane. The enemy got ma and started to shoot his pistol. Actually Not being able to hit anything, the nex day he brought a shotgun. That di some damage. The damaged lad wa rather peeved. He was really burne when the enemy rigged up a machin gun that was synchronized to shoo through the propeller, and shot hi down in flames. By the end of the wa dog-fighting was a gay, dangerous spo and when things were dull, the pilo took to shooting at people on the ground

We are being just as slow to realiz the military value of helicopters. Som day we will realize that they are th most versatile ground-support weapo we have. We might even be sma enough to realize that we should us them in mass concentration against th enemy when and where he least e pects it.

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is car owner, replacing his brake bands at the Fort Sill Automotive Safety Repair op, has plenty of first class help from Junior, who wields a mighty hammer (on his nose?), and from a trained mechanic on duty at the shop.

FIX-YOUR-CAR SHOP

N a barracks at Fort Sill one morning, Private First Class Jay Blank was bemoaning the terrible fate that had befallen him. The brakes on his r had gone bad and the $12.82 in his pocket was all he had until next ıy day—and he wouldn't, sad to say, have enough left out of his pay en to get a commercial brake job.

"Seems to me a guy smart enough to be a big shot typist ought to know ıat he can save himself a lot of money by doing the job himself over at ıe Post automobile repair shop," one of Blank's fellow PFCs observed.

"I'm no mechanic. I don't even oil my typewriter," Blank rejoined.

"You don't have to be a mechanic. They've got fellows over there that ıow more about cars than you do about your home town. They'll show ıu how and they won't let you make no mistakes, neither."

PFC Blank decided he would check into this. "After all," he thought, f I don't get those brakes fixed they'll be taking up my post permit and l be on my uppers for sure."

That afternoon he drove around to the shop and found that it was true; ; could fix his own brakes under the supervision of expert mechanics, ıd the only cost would be for materials.

In the days that followed, Blank found the shop was equipped with odern tools and equipment where soldier car owners could learn shop fety, shop practices, care and use of tools, lubrication methods, mainteınce procedures, engine tear-down and assembly, and brake relining and ljustment. Blank became a regular "customer" of the shop. It saved m money and gave him an interesting hobby.

What does this mean to commanders?

First, *higher standards of safety* (with the result of fewer accients). Thanks to the repair shop, Blank's car can pass the post inspecon.

Second, *higher troop morale.* The hobby occupies Blank's spare ne productively.


Third, *better military vehicle maintenance.* What PFC Blank arned about the maintenance of motor vehicles gave him a skill the rmy could use. Commanders who visit the shop find men who are inrested in motors; men who have developed a sound maintenance backound. These men are selected for specialist training in motors.

The top command of The Artillery School recognizes the potentialities the Auto Repair Shop and encourages its use. Requests for operaonal details of the Shop are frequently received at The Artillery School, news of its value and its success has reached major installation comanders throughout the country. Such requests are encouraged and ıould be addressed to the Director, Department of Motors, The Artillery chool, Fort Sill, Okla. It should be added that the Shop is a project in e Army's Crafts Program sponsored by the Adjutant General's Office.


LT. COL. JOSEPH SAFER



The mechanic supervises every step in the work of inexperienced car owners. Here one of them watches an owner placing new brake linings on the drums.



This soldier-hobbyist is using the shop's modern equipment to clean his car's spark plugs. The shop's hours are geared to soldiers' off-duty time. Except for Monday when it is closed all day, the shop is open from 1300 to 2030 hours from Tuesday to Friday, and from 0900 to 1930 on Saturday, Sunday and holidays.



A motor tune-up, performed under the supervision of trained mechanics and using modern equipment, teaches car owners the value of good maintenance. The shop rules are posted on the wall.



THE RIFLE SQUAD KEY TO MOVEMENT

CAPTAIN THOMAS A. WARE, JR.

THE formula for success in battle is F + M = S. Spelled out it is Fire Superiority plus Decisive Movement equals Success. The manuals call it fire and movement. Without fire superiority, movement in the face of determined resistance is suicide. Fire superiority does not capture objectives unless complemented by decisive movement. One is completely dependent upon the other.

Our Army accepts and teaches this principle. And tactical failures in battle can usually be traced to improper execution of F or M, sometimes both.

Since World War II the firepower of our infantry division has been powerfully increased. By adopting the six-gun battery our artillery is at least fifty per cent more powerful; there are now three times as many machine guns in the rifle company as before; the addition of recoilless rifles has greatly increased the firepower of the infantry battalion. Nevertheless, there are still soft spots. All available weapons are not always used: the quad .50s and the twin 40s of the AAA (AW) Battalion, or the heavy weapons of the reserve battalion. More often faulty fire comes from failure to use the right weapons on the right targets at the right time. We do not get the full benefit of our tremendous number of weapons. Fire, however, can be and is being constantly improved through proper training, planning and practice.

Officers of other armies say we are stronger on the F than we are on the M. However, the emphasis on fire has caused our movement to suffer. To get maximum results with minimum cost, a relative balance must be maintained between F and M. We do not have that balance and the gap is getting wider. To restore the balance we shouldn't cut down on our firepower but we should increase our movement. As the number and power of weapons are increased, movement becomes much more difficult.

Our problem is to find out what will make our men move and shoot. Several methods have been put into practice.

CAPTAIN THOMAS A. WARE, JR., Infantry, is a 1948 graduate of the Military Academy. He entered the Army as an enlisted man in 1943.



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lucements were offered to make the antry more attractive and appreciated, ch as combat pay and badges and spe- l markings for the uniform. The ue, necessity and ugly glory of the t soldier has been fairly sold to the blic. Those are all steps much de- ved and not to be discarded, but will y, when the chips are down, make a n fight? I don't think so.

What does a man fight for? His coun- ? His division? His regimental com- nder? Only partly. If he fights it is pride in himself and for his buddies the company and squad. He doesn't nt to let them down or to lose face or



break faith. He moves or doesn't move according to his state of mind, training, discipline and control. He must have a feeling of belonging and have faith in his weapons, companions and leaders. These things we now know. Any attempt to increase our movement against fire must take these facts into account. There is no catch-all solution but there must be, and are, down-to-earth steps in the right direction.

THE rifle squad is our basic unit or foundation, and here is where movement originates. Regiments are stopped because squads are "pinned" down. General J. Lawton Collins has often said that good squads make good platoons and eventually good divisions. If we are to narrow the gap between F and M, here is where we must start, for the rifle squad is the key to movement.

Within the past fifteen years the organization of our rifle squad has twice been changed radically. In our square divisions we had the eight-man squad headed by a corporal. When the divisions were triangularized our squads were modernized also. During World War II we had the twelve-man squad with its Able (scout), Baker (AR), and Charlie (riflemen) teams. It was found that one man could not adequately control eleven others in dispersed, flat-on-the-belly warfare, hence our postwar nine-man squad. Eight men are still too many to get up and move without exposing the leader. If we are to give the needed impetus to M, the squad is due for another change.

The rifle squad should have eleven men, broken down into squad leader, assistant squad leader, and three fire teams of three men each. Each fire team should be armed with a BAR, until a suitable lighter weapon is issued. What advantages would this squad have over the present-day one?

Morale, a product of team spirit, would be enhanced. Marines have a thirteen-man squad which they like very much. It is composed of a squad leader and three fire teams of four men each with one AR per team. General Marshall also found that weapons crews gave a far better account of themselves than did individual riflemen. Why? Again because of the team and because they knew they had a weapon that would really hurt the enemy. It is possible to make every rifleman an organic part of a tightly-knit weapons team. It should be done.

Discipline is the heart and soul of any army. Movement increases or decreases in direct ratio to the state of discipline. Discipline can make men perform their duty when their desire to survive rebels. Discipline, which was not perfect in World War II, took a sharp plunge after VJ Day. When discipline goes, so eventually do morale and efficiency. No doubt the Army had to accept the criticisms of a grateful nation (via Congress) and the provisions of the Doolittle Board to save its very existence. The low point was reached when soldiers were pampered and coddled, and made unhappier as a consequence. That point has passed, but the damage has not yet been fully rectified. The well-meaning career plan also played its part when in 1949-50 there was a flood of automatic promotions. Most platoons had more corporals than privates. There was an overall stepdown of pride and respect for stripes, authority and discipline. How could a man expect to act like a noncommissioned officer when he did the work of and was treated like a private? The complaint is often heard that we have no good junior noncoms to run our squads. Small wonder! Our present TO lists one sergeant first class, one sergeant, and five corporals out of nine men! Keep the squad leader as a SFC and his assistant as sergeant, but reduce the corporals to three. Each team leader will be a corporal. He will be held responsible for his two men and all weapons. Authority any responsibility either bring out a spark in a man or show his weaknesses. What better training could you have for future squad leaders and assistants? We'll have better noncoms if we treat them as noncoms.

Control became more difficult as the power of weapons increased. With smaller teams the squad leader, instead of having to push or pull eight individuals, can work through his team leaders and assistant squad leader. Many times initiative comes with responsibility. The team leader has only to say to the men on either side of him "Let's go." Visualize the vast improvement that would result when the squad was forced to advance by fire and movement. The squad leader and his assistant will be where they can

best see and control the teams. Instead of shouting out numbers or names it would only be necessary to yell Able, Baker, or Charlie. Two teams covering and one moving. If, however, only one man in a team responded (not always the leader), the others would usually go, too. They couldn't let him down. Atomic warfare will require even greater dispersion than we now practice. Control must be decentralized or lost, and with it movement.

FLEXIBILITY is a must in all military units. General Collins stressed the fundamental purpose, need, and tactical use of our triangular concept. Flexibility is a cornerstone. Let's carry this concept through down to our basic unit, the squad. The three similar interchangeable units would be the fire teams. Seldom in training, and rarely in combat, will a squad be at full strength. This situation puts the acid test to the flexibility of any unit. A team would still be a team with only the leader and the AR gunner. Even if a squad were reduced to five men it should still be effective with a leader and two AR teams. If the platoon were so reduced as to require cutting down to two rifle squads, the platoon leader should assign the remnants of his smallest squad (two to four men) to another as a team and not as individuals (keep that team feeling).

Flexibility would help us man outposts and form patrols. We know now that to send one man is useless, so the buddy system was started. Two are sent at the minimum. If the job is worth doing, such as listening post or interior or contact patrols, it is worth doing right. Why not send a team? It would be far more effective than several individuals. It has a leader, automatic firepower, and each man has a sense of responsibility for the others. As for reconnaissance and combat patrols, they could be made any desired size from one team up. A team or teams could be temporarily attached to another squad if the mission called for it.

IT is obvious that such a rifle squad would call for some changes in our tactics (not fundamentals) and formations. However, the addition of a second AR to the rifle squad has already made our squad tactics and formations somewhat obsolescent.

In the attack the squad leader could have his assistant cover his advance with one or two teams, while he maneuvered with one or two teams (again flexible). Fire and movement would be by team rushes. Of course, the squad as a unit will continue to cross the LD and advance, as far as possible, under the protection of heavier supporting fires.

In the defense each fire team would be an individual strong point within the squad strong point. No outpost or position would be of less than team strength.

Several possible formations will be given to show the many possibilities:

Squad in column or as a point. Many fire fights are won or lost in the first minutes. Who "pins" whom down first? The scout element is a full team with its own AR. The squad leader and his assistant have teams they can control easily. Thus any surprise fire can be quickly countered by the leaders of the squad.

Squad as skirmishers. During the first phase of the assault fire the AR men would be about one pace in front of the line so as to have clear fields of fire. The others would move on line with them for the final stage. Team leaders keep visual contact with squad leader and assistant.

The squad diamond. The old standby, the squad diamond, would not be changed much and it keeps the teams intact. It also permits automatic fire in any direction quickly.

Defense. The two-man foxhole is now a must. We have found, especially at night, that a man will fight much better if he has someone to share his fear. The fire team would permit shoulder-to-shoulder contact, a powerful tonic against loneliness and fear. Each team would become a strong point.

Since men seem to fight better as weapons crews, let's dig them in in that way. Besides preserving the team spirit, and providing all-around defense this would permit a three-relief, around-the-clock guard. Naturally it is more vulnerable to enemy fire and tanks than a one- or two-man foxhole but no more so than a horseshoe emplacement. It more than compensates for its size by its ability to be a strong point.

Training. The fire teams must live, work, play and train together until they are a team in fact and not just in name.

Every man in the rifle squad will have to be as well-trained with the automatic rifle as he is with his M1 rifle. He must be able to take care of it. Each soldier must fire the AR, as well as the M1, for qualification. The best men can be selected as the gunners, and a ready pool of trained replacements is available as proof against constant turnover in training or battle. Grenades, rifles and the AR are the tools of the fire team's trade. Field problems must start at the team level to develop skill, confidence, initiative and, above all, spirit of teamwork.

THESE then are the basic advantage and employment of the squad. Perhap you can think of many more. There ar some disadvantages. It will require eight een more men per rifle company, 16 per regiment, and 486 per infantry divi sion. If worse comes to worst it woul be far better to have thirty-six division that would carry their full weight tha thirty-seven so-so ones.

Three ARs per squad will shoot up to much ammunition. Perhaps, but that i what they said before the Garand re placed the Springfield. If the progran now in effect to lighten the weight of th soldier's equipment is successful, the am munition will get there. From th studies made so far, though, it seem that the main problem is to get peopl to fire the ammo they have at the righ time. The added weight of the AR i not gleefully accepted during maneu vers, but in combat its firepower make it a welcomed friend. The Belgian FN automatic rifle may, before too long replace the M1 rifle, the carbine, th AR and possibly the light machine gu In that event the proposed principle and team organization would still be ap plicable. Perhaps every third FN coul have a light, folding bipod attached nea the muzzle to give that extra stability accuracy and added range so desirable i the present AR.

A reorganization of the rifle squad int three fire teams has many advantage over the present squad. It should hel increase the ratio of fighters to non fighters.

The formula F + M = S will wor if we bring our movement up to par wit our fire. The key to M is the rifle squa

Since this article was written, a eleven-man rifle squad with two AR was tested at Fort Campbell. Repor suggest that the results were good. How ever, it is doubtful if the change will b made, due to the manpower requir ments and the effort to decrease the siz of the infantry division. To my mind the principles stated above could still b applied even in our present nine-ma (two AR) squad, in one of two ways: (Form three teams of three men each (ac one AR) with squad leader, assistan squad leader and senior corporal as tea leaders. (2) form two permanent fi teams in the squad and train that wa Team Able with men Nos. 2, 4, 6 and under the squad leader, and Team Bak with men 3, 5 and 7 under the assista squad leader (a corporal in each team be assistant team leader). Test these tw methods extensively, side by side, an pick the best.

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CEREBRATIONS

bolish Propaganda

Doctrinally our Psy War people say
it *propaganda* is a perfectly legitimate
ord, derived from the Latin *propagare*
o peg, to set down, to spread) and that
ey will continue to use it to designate
tain of their activities. But when, in
tures, I make an objective presenta-
n of the Psy War definition and doc-
ne, I get some might fishy looks.

The purity of the origin of the word
opaganda may be unquestioned. But
has a sickly complexion that frightens
herwise brave men. Goebbels and the
viet Agitprop have made millions
nk of the word as something leprous,
d they shun it.

Usage, we all know, determines the
nnotation of a word, and eventually
es its dictionary meaning. And the
rd fact today is that most people today
w a distinction between the words
th and *propaganda.*

In the light of its generally ill-favored
nnotation, why do we bullheadedly
sist in using *propaganda* for our le-
imate activities? It only hurts us. One
Psy War's outfits is called the Con-
idation Propaganda Company. What
nouthful to hang on an outfit! The
rpose of the Consolidation Propagan-
Company is to move in with Civil
airs or Military Government and as-
in the control of communications;
lio, press and the like. Imagine the
ction of the peoples in future liber-
d or occupied areas to that unpsychol-
cally selected title! The *propaganda*
it is going to make it very difficult to
nsolidate anything.

Why not call it something simple and
ocuous? Civil Communications Com-
ny would be good, for it has the virtue
being alliterative and the innocent
ght even think it polite.

We Americans have learned to call
dertakers *morticians,* and door-to-door
k salesmen *educational advisors,* so
should have little trouble being
ally euphemistic and calling propa-
da *information.*

MAJOR DANIEL J. KERN, *USAR*

's March Again

We have been hearing for years
ut armies which have something ours
sn't. In World War II we heard about
anese soldiers who marched phe-
nenal (by our standards) distances
through the jungle. We heard about the Russian soldiers who bested the Germans partly because they were tougher, could march, could stand a little more cold, could live out in the forests, could move into position on foot, and could fight with a little simpler and a little less equipment than our soldiers did; we still hear about them—the same things, how many of them there are, and that they are receiving improved equipment. From Korea we heard about Chinese Communist troops who marched farther than ours can, who climbed the mountains more easily than our troops, and who marched by night.

We have known all along that our soldiers can't march. The evidence of our admission is in our Tables of Equipment and in our tactics. The number of trucks in the TO&E, the number of bulldozers in the engineer battalions, and our reluctance to advance in a campaign until we provide for getting the roads through are all partial results of our admission. We rationalize this deficiency by explaining to ourselves that our way of life doesn't prepare Americans to march. Chinese have been walking all of their lives and our men have been riding. And it's true. Our men have been riding instead of walking both before and after they entered the Army. And before and after they entered battle.

We think that it hasn't hurt us to be realistic about this difference in a basic soldier capability. But it has hurt. And it's wrong. We need the spirit of the street urchin heard announcing to his gang that he could "spit further, jump higher, squat lower, run faster," than any kid in town.

Let's look more closely at this one point—marching. Is it really necessary to admit that U.S. soldiers can't march as well as Chinese Communists? What is basic about marching? It seems to be a matter of endurance and training. Normally, the stronger, healthier man will, with all other things equal, have more endurance. Are Americans, man for man, weaker and less healthy than Chinese? We know that isn't true. But the Chinese always walked and are accustomed to it. That's where training can even us up. If we set out-marching any army in the world as a training objective and allot the time necessary to it, we Americans will be able to outmarch any army because we start with better health and greater strength.

But such a training program would be at the expense of other activities. Is it necessary and is it worth the cost? We know we have this deficiency but we've always had firepower to tip the scales. We hope we always will have firepower on our side. But we can't be sure; the enemy is no dumbbell when it comes to research and development. So we had better try to be his physical equal.

It looks as if we have at least two good reasons for re-establishing a marching tradition in the U. S. Army: (1) we may fight future wars without the expected compensating advantage of firepower and (2) it will restore confidence and self-respect to U. S. soldiers.

Let's get at it. Let's start marching.

LT. COL. JAMES R. KENT

Saint Barbara

EVERY so often one of our artillery members asks us for biographical material and a picture of Saint Barbara, the patron saint of artillerymen. We've always been happy to respond to these requests but they are coming so frequently that we dug into the old files and worked up the best biographical material we could find, had it mimeographed and are now prepared to make it available at no cost to you who want it. We sent our picture of Saint Barbara to a photographer who made us up a stock of prints in two sizes: 11 X 14 and 8 X 10. If you want a picture for framing you should ask for a "mat print" and if you want the picture for reproduction purposes ask for a "glossy print." The prices are quite modest, $3.00 for the 11 X 14-inch size and $2.50 for the 8 X 10-inch size.

The Rifle Squad

What is this talk that is going around about increasing the size of the rifle squad to eleven or twelve men? I'd like to speak up against it.

My concept of the rifle squad and how it should operate bears heavily, of course, on why I'm opposed to increasing its size.

¶ The rifle squad should be the smallest maneuver unit in the infantry organizational setup. As such it should be, in a manner of speaking, indivisibly small;

that is, it should remain an entity during operations and not be split into two or more parts for circuitous type maneuver.

¶ It should be simply armed. The habit of girding the squad with more sinew than it can regularly and efficiently use must be guarded against. As soon as we settle on either the T44 or the FN rifle, it should become the principal weapon for every member of the squad.

¶ The squad leader, with rare exception, should be able to control directly everyone in his squad. He should not have to exercise control through an assistant.

In short, if we do not have a squad that remains an entity during operations, if we do not have a squad that is simply armed, and if we do not have a squad whose members can be personally controlled by its leader, then I maintain that we do not have a squad at all. We have a section!

Advocates of a larger squad contend that the increase in size will provide a cushion against casualties making the squad ineffective early in battle. The answer to this is that an oversize, unwieldy squad will be far more vulnerable to casualties than a well-knit, tightly controlled one.

I should like to go back to my third point and expand on it. If we accept the principle that the squad leader should be able to control directly everyone in his squad, then we are asking too much of one man when we ask him to exercise direct control over ten or eleven other men on the field of battle under conditions of maximum danger, fatigue and confusion. We are stretching his span of control beyond the breaking point. Actually, we are imposing upon him a wider span of control than upon any other infantry leader in the chain of command!

And who is this man from whom we demand more, proportionately speaking, than we do from any other infantry leader? He is our lowest-ranking infantry leader. As such, he has doubtless had the least amount of leadership experience.

In an address at Cleveland last November, General Ridgway stated that "a soldier of average or above average intelligence should complete no less than 128 weeks—two and one-quarter years—of training before he is properly trained to perform the duties of an infantry squad leader, before he should be entrusted with the lives of others in battle." Yet, under conditions of large-scale or total mobilization when our army, as always, will have to sprout like Jack's beanstalk, this rifle squad leader may very well have to be a lad with only a few months of training.

Are we not, therefore, being inconsistent in our approach if we raise the standard required of our future squad leader, when we know that in all probability we will be unable to give him at the time he should have to prepare him for his responsibilities?

In the same address, General Ridgway pointed out that one of the most significant tactical developments has been the consistently greater dispersion of troops on the battlefield, and with it a steady decentralization of the responsibility for tactical decisions.

How, in the face of this development—the consistently greater dispersion of troops on the battlefield—can an increase in the size of the rifle squad be justified? The control problem of the squad leader will be magnified not alone by the increase in the size of the squad but by the greater dispersion of the soldier within the squad.

As a matter of fact, I'd much prefer to see the rifle squad decreased to something like seven men!

LT. COL. GEORGE JUSKALIAN

Double Exposure Locates Enemy Artillery Positions

The use of photography in combat had some interesting developments in Korea, one of the most useful of which was the technique of photographing *occupied* enemy artillery positions.

This technique involved nighttime exposure on film which had previously been exposed during daylight. This double exposure made it possible to identify active enemy artillery positions. It worked like this.

An OP would be selected from which active enemy artillery fire could be expected to be observed. The azimuth to the center of the area under observation of the OP would be determined and the photographer would be instructed to lay his camera on this azimuth. The camera would be solidly mounted on sandbags and the azimuth would be checked on the ground-glass focusing screen of the camera. Then the daylight exposure would be made using one-half stop under a normal exposure on regular high-speed panchromatic film such as Super XX.

The camera would be left in its fixed position until nightfall. During the darkness the shutter would be opened for an hour, to approximately f5.6 to take advantage of night illumination.

When developed, the film shows pinpoint flashes superimposed on the daylight photo. These flashes were from the fire of enemy artillery.

From the OP the film would be sent to the laboratory for developing and printing, a process that can take as little as forty minutes after its arrival at the lab. The prints are then sent to the corps artillery S2 for evaluation.

The problem is to match the photo to the counterbattery map. Since the coordinates the OP are known and the coordinates of distant points on the photo can be determined, a series of directional rays are drawn on the photo. Inspection will usually give the location once the azimuth is known. A higher degree of accuracy may be obtained by taking two photographs from the OP. A location is determined by plotting the intersecting rays on the counterbattery map.

Usually the photography confirms that a previously suspected position is indeed occupied by the enemy. However, when flashes on the prints are from an unsuspected location, it is wise to verify the occupancy of the position by other methods.

It is not difficult to learn to tell the difference between the flashes made by enemy artillery and the flashes made by outgoing friendly fire. When friendly artillery exploding on the target is photographed it makes larger and more irregular light spots on the film than the flashes made by enemy artillery fire as it leaves the piece.

The camera used in these operations in Korea was the standard PH-47 Speed Graphic with either Super XX or Superpan Press film. The issue tripod was not used because it is too light. However, the "combat tripod" consisting of a heavy-duty pan-tilt head, and short "machine gun" tripod legs can be solidly locked in position. It was found that the five-inch focal length on the PH-47 camera was not ideal for this work. However, an accessory lens with a 10-inch focal length and an aperture of f1:4.85 is available in the PH-277.

Army Field Forces has encouraged this method of identifying enemy artillery positions and recommends further exploitation and development of it. It believes that it would be of value in a war of movement as well as in conditions such as existed in Korea.

How to Write a Staff Study

First, state your conclusions. That's not the way the manual tells you

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gin a staff study, but that's the way done. If you know what you want prove, proving it is easy. Let's take an easy example that you want to ove that carbines should be equipped th tripods. (Never mind your preceived ideas, just say the old man nts it that way.)

From your conclusion evolve an appriate statement of the problem. An e-catching generality is best: Should tain small arms be equipped with dehable mounts (bipods, tripods, quadods) so as to improve accuracy of fire d provide maximum effectiveness?

Now make your assumptions. These important. Make one assumption porting your conclusion: The inacacy and ineffectiveness of certain all arms (*e.g.* the carbine) makes it solutely necessary that some type of port or steadying device be provided its use. And make another assumpn precluding any other conclusion cept the one you wish to prove: The steel, collapsible, expandable, nonpendable, completely interchangeable, ee-armed weapon mount (hereinafter own as the carbine tripod) is the only sting or possible device suitable for achment to and support of the carbine. his is much like the old syllogism thod whereby you can absolutely ve anything: Soldiers are brave; "Bugt Benny" is a soldier; therefore, ug-Out Benny" is brave.)

You'll want a few facts bearing on the blem. Here again, unsupportable and -disprovable generalities will stand u in good stead. Besides, you don't ve to dig for them; you can dream m up. For example: It is known that y few soldiers can fire the carbine h any great degree of accuracy bend five hundred yards; headquarters ops and other rear echelon personnel ually equipped with carbines are nous for their ineptness in the hang of unmounted small arms; such ops, so equipped, constitute a real eat to combat troops in rest areas; etc. u get the idea.

As for the discussion, you needn't be concerned. A passage from Von ausewitz or Victor Hugo will do. No e ever reads the discussion anyway. you make the quote from a field manl, and it happens to be discovered, it'll pear original. Few ever read them.

Make your recommendations strong: view of the above, it is deemed abutely necessary that certain small arms equipped with the all-steel, collapsi-, expandable, non-expendable, comtely interchangeable, three-armed apon mount heretofore known as the carbine tripod. One recommendation should reflect back to the statement of the problem: Such mounts would greatly improve accuracy of fire and provide for maximum effectiveness in the use of such arms, especially the carbine. Add a third for urgency: These tripods should be procured immediately (from Mighty Mount Company, the sole manufacturers) and stocked for immediate issue.

Before you submit your staff study you'll want to give it bulk and show you've thoroughly explored the problem. Attach a few copies of the old classified troop programs, mimeographed SOPs, a few overlays, a dog-eared issue of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, and mark them with appropriate red, green, and yellow tabs.

That's about all there is to it. If you want to see how easy it is, try one of these: Should infantry be equipped with red bow-ties? Should merchant seamen receive combat pay? Should tanks be mounted on pneumatic tires? All absolutely provable.

This is what is known as completed staff work. Good or bad, you'll probably never hear of any tangible results from your carefully developed staff study. But what the hell? It pleases the old man, and that's what you were after to begin with.

SUSFUSO



Two-Reel Wire Cart

An infantry outfit in Germany has resurrected the long obsolete reel cart for laying wire. The cart was designed to make it possible to maintain continuous communication with a company CP during an attack. In field operations it is possible to lay one or two lines of wire at a rate of two and one-half miles an hour.

The cart has two 15-inch bicycle wheels mounted to a frame consisting of trips of metal welded together. The stationary axle is welded to the frame. Two pipes fit snugly over the axle but free enough to turn easily when the cart is in operation. The pipes are small enough in diameter to permit Reel DR-4 to fit over them. When two reels are used a ¾-inch metal washer is placed between them and each reel turns in an opposite direction. It has a detachable handle which makes it a compact load in the back of a jeep or trailer. The handles in the rear are handy for lifting the cart over obstacles (*see cut*).

The three-man crew keeps in continuous contact with the CP by means of a circuit established through two contact plates or discs fitted to the axle. Two brushes, similar to those on generators, are fastened to these discs, and wires from the brushes are connected to a telephone EE-8 or to the test clips of telephone TS-1.

The cart can be used to lay two lines in any direction if it is in a stationary position. If it is moved it can, of course, lay two lines in the same direction. It can also be used to lay a new line and pick up an unserviceable one in the same operation.

To get supporting fires for combat patrols use

THE GEORGE METHOD

Captain Edward H. Pykosz

AS a result of many night combat patrols in Korea, the George Method of securing supporting fires was developed. It assures that the exact location of the patrol is known at all times and makes it possible to get full use of the company's 60mm mortars, attached machine guns, and even recoilless rifles. The patrol leader at the time of enemy contact is free to command and control his men, knowing that his company commander will give him supporting fires when and where he needs them. The George Method is so simple that all members of the patrol have confidence in it.

The George Method requires the preparation of an overlay of the patrol route. This involves a daylight reconnaissance by the patrol leader, assistant patrol leader, squad leaders, SCR 10 radio operator and the WEE 8 operator. At this time, the azimuth from the line of departure to the patrol objective is taken. Also noted along the patrol route are landmarks which will be distinguishable at night: lone trees, roads and cross roads, destroyed tanks or vehicles, and other distinctive features.

When the patrol leader returns to his CP after the visual reconnaissance, he starts building the George Method. He plots the distinguishable landmarks on an overlay of the patrol area and compares them with a map of the area *(see cut)*. He then plots the route of the patrol, checking it against the landmarks already marked in.

Next he draws in the phase lines. He starts from the line of departure and numbers them toward the patrol objective, running the lines through easily distinguishable features. Phase lines may be given the name of a state or the home town of a patrol member. Do not use the name of more than one state or town for that may lead to confusion. From the line of departure, forward phase lines might be called: Michigan 1, Michigan 2, Michigan 3 and Michigan 4.

Then he puts in the zone lines, extending them well beyond the patrol objective. He centers one zone on the route of the patrol to insure safety from supporting fires. To avoid confusion he letters the zones from left to right.

This procedure requires the plotting of phase lines and zones before each patrol when you are on the offensive. However, in a defensive operation the plotting can be done immediately on arrival in that sector. The only changes that have to be plotted thereafter are the different patrol routes used on each occasion.


THE George Method is effective only if those who control the supporting fires participate in the planning. They are briefed and given copies of the overlay of the patrol route. Included in the briefing are the Artillery FO, CO of the fire support tanks, and HMG platoon leaders, the 4.2-inch mortar FO, the 81mm mortar FO, all company officers and possibly the S3 or assistant S3 of battalion.

Overlays or maps by themselves will not keep a patrol from becoming lost or unsure of its exact whereabouts. One check on its position is made from the WEE 8 wire rolls. Using only new, full rolls, when a roll is paid out the exact distance covered is known in yards.

Azimuth shot to the objective or back azimuth shot to a distinguishable feature at the line of departure will help to pinpoint the patrol location. The passing of each phase line marked by a feature that can be identified at night gives periodic checks on the patrol's location.

When it will not disclose the patrol the exact location is communicated back to the company so that support crews will be prepared if a request comes in.

If enemy contact of superior strength is made, the patrol should attempt to disengage before the entire platoon is involved in the fight. At this time the exact location of the patrol should be relayed back in order to get suitable supporting fires where needed.



CAPTAIN EDWARD H. PYKOSZ, Infantry, now on duty at Fort Riley, Kansas, served in Korea with George Company, 23d Infantry, 2d Division, which developed the method described here and gave it its name.

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CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

NO. 8 *Transfer or Detail?*

WHEN an officer decides the grass is greener on the other side of the fence and requests a transfer or detail to another arm or service, one question that must be answered is: "Will the proposed change be in the best interest of the service?" This article outlines some of the considerations and processing actions involved in arriving at a final decision. Before making an official request each officer should clearly understand some of the differences between a transfer and a detail. A transfer, if approved, will permanently remove him from the assignment jurisdiction of his basic branch. He must be fully qualified to perform duty in the new branch, for it thereafter will monitor his career and determine his duty assignments. Reserve officers on extended active duty may apply for transfer if they are performing in the branch to which transfer is desired or cogent reasons exist for transfer to a branch in which they are fully qualified perform duty. There are no provisions transfer of National Guard officers while on active duty. However, if otherwise qualified, they may apply for detail. Regular Army officers are not authorized to request a transfer to another branch until they have served at least two years in their basic branch after appointment in the Regular Army, except when the Department of the Army finds it necessary to build up a specific branch. Although technically qualified for duty with another branch, an officer who has spent considerable time in his basic branch should apply for transfer only after careful consideration of all factors. There is some danger that he might become "neither fish nor fowl."

A detail is a temporary shift to another arm or service in order to meet the needs of a specific branch. It does not affect a permanent change in basic branch. A detail may be considered comparable to an apprenticeship and normally should not be extended beyond three years. Officers who remain in a detail status for longer periods lose opportunities to increase their basic branch capacities. They are depriving themselves of basic branch practice and theory as well as basic branch schooling. In time they should request return to their basic branch or transfer to the branch to which detailed.

OFFICERS must have good reasons for wanting a transfer and these must be clearly stated in their application which is submitted through channels. Indorsing commanders indicate their reaction to the request and if the request is not favorably considered they must state reasons therefor. Applications received from officers alerted or on orders for oversea assignment are returned without action. The application may be resubmitted from the oversea destination.

Details for Army Security and Military Intelligence officers may be considered as "carrier" branch details because Army Security and Military Intelligence are components of the Army Reserve only, and are not basic branches of the Regular Army. Therefore, Army Security and Military Intelligence officers who are ordered to active duty are detailed in a basic Army branch appropriate to their qualifications. The Intelligence and Security Branch, Career Management Division, monitors their careers and determines duty assignments. Army Security and Military Intelligence ROTC graduates on active duty are normally detailed to the branch of service in which they received ROTC training. Officers on active duty who are approved for transfer to Army Security or Military Intelligence normally are detailed in their former basic branch.

When applications for transfer or detail are received in Career Management Division, they are referred to the applicant's basic career management branch. In the basic branch the entire record is reviewed and the application is forwarded with recommendation to the career management branch to which the officer is requesting transfer or detail. If the losing and gaining career management branches approve the requested change, orders are issued. In the event of disagreement, applications are referred to the Chief of CMD, for final determination.

Here are examples of the preceding actions: Captain Jones requests transfer from Artillery to Armor; if both branches approve the request, orders are published announcing the transfer. Captain Smith requests transfer from Infantry to Signal Corps; Infantry branch disapproves and Signal Corps approves; Captain Smith's application is referred to Chief, CMD, where the entire file of Captain Smith is reviewed and analyzed before a final decision is made.

AT times the Department of the Army encourages submission of requests for transfer or detail to branches that are short of officers. These announcements normally are published in D/A Circulars and include the grade, MOS, qualifying schooling, or other factors which potentially qualify the applicant. Department of the Army Circular 58, 20 July 1953, encourages qualified officers to submit requests for transfer or detail to Artillery, Corps of Engineers, Ordnance Corps, Judge Advocate General's Corps and Medical Service Corps. Normally, an officer is not transferred from one branch to another without his consent; however, involuntary transfer may be made if the Secretary of the Army rules it is in the interests of the service.

The decision to request a transfer or detail to another branch rests upon each officer. If he is firmly convinced that his transfer or detail would be in the best interest of the service, he should submit a request.

NEXT: *Reserve component duty.*

The Word from the Schools

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Advanced Course Has War Game

A three and one-half week war game—"The Life Cycle of an Infantry Regiment"—is now included in the Infantry Officers' Advanced Course. This exercise becomes the second part of the six-month-long course.

In the first part (approximately 21 weeks) the student is taught fundamentals and the principles and techniques needed to prepare him for the duties and responsibilities of an infantry field grade officer. In the past this was the only instruction given to prepare officers for field grade positions in the infantry regiment.

But now the second part of the course gives the student an opportunity to apply these principles and techniques. A series of related exercises requires him to solve "requirements" corresponding to those experienced in a field grade assignment. Students actually perform as regimental command and staff groups or as individual commanders, with minimum guidance from TIS faculty.

The war game is divided into a sequence of seven phases—each incident to the stages of an infantry regiment's life cycle. These are the phases:

¶ Activation of a regiment
¶ Training of a regiment
¶ Preparation and overseas movement of a regiment
¶ Overseas staging of a regiment
¶ Regiment in combat
¶ Regiment in occupation duty
¶ Movement to Zone of Interior and inactivation of a regiment.

Small-Unit Studies

The infantry squad and the effectiveness of small infantry units are being studied at The Infantry School by the Psychological Research Associates. Sponsored by the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University, the unit is studying the squad during daylight operations to determine the number of men and the necessary equipment needed for an effective squad.

The other project being conducted by the Research Associates is to determine the effectiveness of small infantry units during a night patrol. It is being sponsored by the Personnel Research Branch of the Adjutant General's Office.

Instructors' Conference

TIS will hold its annual Infantry Instructors' Conference from 21-26 June for those infantry instructors now assigned to the various service schools.

The meeting will stress the fundamentals of infantry training, tactical principles, organization and logistics. In addition, there will be conferences stressing the new developments and trends, new weapons and equipment and new infantry techniques. The conferees will receive instructional material from the Airborne, Automotive, Weapons, Communication, Ranger and Staff Departments of The Infantry School.

Summer Training

More than 4,200 Infantry ROTC cadets and Army Reservists, both officer and enlisted, are expected to train at TIS this summer.

Schedules for the six-week training cycle for ROTC cadets and the two-week training period for the Reserve units will be prepared in April.

Patterson Award

Second Lieutenant Robert J. Geniesse, who graduated from the Infantry OCS last year, received the second annual Patterson Memorial Award.

This award is given annually to the graduate of the Infantry OCS who "distinguishes himself by demonstrating outstanding qualities of leadership, academic proficiency, aptitude and character, and gives promise of exceptional achievement in the service of the nation."

The award, which honors the late Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, consists of an engraved trophy, a scroll and cash.

1954 Army Pistol Team

TIS was host in February to more than 50 of the Army's best pistol shots. The best of the group were selected to represent the Army in the National Mid-Winter Pistol Matches in Tampa, Fla.

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Nonstandard Antennas

Some artillerymen appear not to be familiar with the method of using nonstandard antennas to increase the line-of-sight capability of frequency-modulated radio sets.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

ARTILLERY QUOTATION OF THE MONTH


We have the best artillery in the world.

GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS
Desert Rock, Nev., May 1953


★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

The best way to improve the capabilit is to place the radio set itself in a higher o clearer position and operate it with stanc ard remote control equipment . . . a proces which assures maximum efficiency from th field or vehicular antenna as it is sti mounted on or at the radio set. The secon method of increasing line-of-sight is t improve the location of the antenna whil the radio set remains in a protected pos tion. However, achievement of commun cation by such methods—employing th issue antenna—is sometimes impossible c difficult to the point of impracticability. I those instances, nonstandard antennas ma be used.

Diagrams of two different expedient ar tennas—"the vertical half wave" and "th vehicular" are shown in Figures 1 and below.



"VEHICULAR"
Figure 1



"VERTICAL HALF WAVE"
Figure 2

The sufficiency of the diagrams ther selves makes it feasible to limit discussio of construction to the vertical half wa antenna only; for that expedient—(1) Ru out the necessary length of field wire; th length should be an odd multiple of t quarter wave length of the set. At the a tenna end, tape back one quarter wa length from the end; the distance is o tained from the formula: "Quarter wa length=234/frequency (in mcs)." Th answer is in feet. Thus, for a frequency 30.0 mcs, the length would be 234/30 7.8 feet. (2) Separate the wires as show and suspend one end in the air from a tr or pole; let the other end hang free of t ground. (3) Using a coaxial adapter, co nect the radio set end of the lead-in to t appropriate terminal on the radio set. (If the antenna fails to give the desired

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ılts, the length of lead-in is varied (by ıches) until satisfactory communication is stablished.

adio Violations Decrease

The increased emphasis placed on radio ɔmmunication at TAS (reported in the ecember 1953 issue) has paid off with a ıarp decrease in student procedure viola-ɔns. A recent 2-week check of problems ıowed that only five errors are consistent- made. Since these errors are not restricted situations at TAS, they are listed here a guide for the general improvement of dio communication:

Unauthorized transmissions: These metimes degenerate into personal con-ersations. Excessive transmissions cause elay and slow the problem.

Failure to press microphone switch a cond or two before starting transmissions. y not allowing the transmitter to warm ɔ, the first few words may be lost.

Unnecessary communication checks.

Operators transmitting before listening: ıch action causes break-ins on transmis-ɔn in progress and disrupts communica-ɔn.

Speaking too fast when sending fire issions: Rapidity causes unnecessary FDC rors and requires avoidable repetition of ınsmissions.

attery Failures

Using units can avoid many instances of ttery failure with the AN/PRC-9 by opting two simple procedures.

First, at the conclusion of each day's eration, the radio operator should mark the battery itself the amount of time it ıs in use during the period. And second, ıen a battery is nearly exhausted, it ould be discarded.


This "near exhaustion" stage can be de-rmined accurately by a load-voltage test nducted, preferably, in the following ınner: In preparation for the test, the erator should (1) remove the transmitter-ceiver unit from its case and plug it into BA-279/U; (2) install handset H-33/PT;) turn the receiver to full volume; and (4) rn on squelch switch—without advance. ıe actual test is then made with a D-C ltmeter; the test sequence and meaning readings obtained are shown here:

READING	USABLE	DISCARD
-A to + A	1.2 to1.35	1.15 or lower
-B to + B1	52 to 60	51 or lower
Press microphone switch and read		
-B to + B2	105 to 120	104 or lower
-C to + C2	4.5 to 5.0	4.5 or lower

In connection with the above, it should noted that voltages listed on the side of te BA-279/U are for "test before using cta" and intended for use only with Bat-ty Tester TS-183/U and new batteries.

lunker Roof Tested by Fire

A firing test was recently conducted by te Department of Combat Arms, TAS, to determine what effect U.S. projectiles with quick and delay fuzes have on earth-and-log-bunker roofs *(see cut)* such as were used in Korea. It was known that this type of roof had withstood the direct hit of a 122mm shell "without even any dust being shaken down on the occupants of the bunker"; however, it was not known whether the projectile had a quick or delay fuze. Since Fort Sill did not have any 122mm howitzers, the test was conducted in two parts: the 105mm howitzer firing fuze delay and the 155mm howitzer firing fuze quick.



The roofs fired on consisted of a layer of logs which were one inch in diameter for each foot of unsupported span, about 5 feet of packed earth with a sandbag rim, and a burster plate. For the various phases of the test, the only difference in the roofs was in the burster plate (a hard layer of material near the surface of the roof designed to insure early activation of the fuze).

In the first part of the test, with the 105, terminal ballistics (striking velocity and angle of impact) were the same as for charge 7 fired at range 7500. One burster plate was constructed of 3-inch slab rock; the other, of earth- or rock-filled metal canisters. In this test, a 105mm projectile with delay fuze blew away a large amount of packed earth; but paper stretched underneath the layer of logs was undamaged.

In the second test, it was determined that charge 4 at 800 yards would approximate the terminal ballistics to be expected from indirect fire with charge 6 at 10,000 yards. Three kinds of burster plate were employed: earth-filled metal canisters, three inches of small rock, and a layer of 3-inch rock slabs.

Results of this part of the test were similar to those obtained with the 105mm howitzer. Externally, great damage was done to the roof; internally, there was none beyond the starting of transverse cracks in several of the older and drier logs and longitudinal cracks in one or two of the relatively sound logs (no logs were cracked by the 105mm projectiles). Because it was considered a certainty that a 155mm shell with delay fuze would penetrate or smash the logs and because the Communists are not likely to use delay fuze in unobserved counterbattery fire, there was no test with the 155mm fuze delay.

As compared with metal canisters and 3-inch small rock, the greater strength of the slab rock burster makes it the most desirable for inclusion in a bunker roof. Metal canisters and 3-inch small rock are virtually equivalent to each other in resistance capacity.

Appropriate modification of the figures given in FM 5-15 has been recommended.

TAS Librarian to Retire

Morris Swett, known wherever artillerymen foregather as the Chief Librarian of The Artillery School, is going to retire this year—for the second time. It will mark the end of 39 years of service at the Fort Sill library; service that was continuous except for a few months on the staff of *The Field Artillery Journal* in 1939.

Now 65, Morris Swett enlisted in the Army in 1909 and spent several years at West Point with duty in the Academy's library. In 1915 he was transferred to the School of Fire at Fort Sill and remained until 1939 when he was retired from the Army as a Master Sergeant. He then joined *The Field Artillery Journal.* In October of that year, the late President Roosevelt issued an unprecedented executive order placing Mr. Swett in the civil service and back in his job as librarian at TAS



MORRIS SWETT

During his years as chief librarian at TAS, Mr. Swett directed the library's growth and saw it expand both in size and service until today the TAS library is one of the most complete military libraries in the world.

The Month's Books

FROM NORMANDY TO POTSDAM

TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY: The Second World War, Volume VI. By Winston S. Churchill. Houghton Mifflin, 1953. 800 Pages; Maps; Diagrams; $6.00.

The theme of the final volume in Churchill's monumental "personal" history of World War II is an ironic one. It runs: "How the Great Democracies Triumphed and so Were able to Resume the Follies Which Had so Nearly Cost Them Their Life." The coverage is from D-day to Churchill's defeat at the polls in the midst of the Potsdam Conference in July 1945.

It was in this period that for the first time Sir Winston began to have misunderstandings with Roosevelt and sharp differences of opinion of politico-strategical matters with Eisenhower. It was also during this period that Stalin's imperialism began to assert itself. Churchill could see the Grand Alliance which he had done so much to construct achieving one military victory after another, but at the same time he feared that political advantages of incalculable importance were being lost in the purely "military" strategy adhered to by the American government in western Europe.

Those partisan Americans, who have pretended to find in General Marshall's advocacy of a cross-Channel attack in 1944 an aid to Communist causes, will find no support for their crazy theories in Churchill's pages. He was all for a cross-Channel attack and knew that he could not risk failure in *Overlord* on account of any adventure "in the Balkans." He did not advocate Anglo-American operations in the Balkans but suggested abandoning the invasion of Southern France in 1944 in order to strengthen Alexander's forces in Italy to a point where they could defeat Kesselring decisively and invade Austria via the Istrian peninsula.

In view of Churchill's decisive defeat at the polls in July 1945, it may be pointed out that his proposed operations via the Adriatic could not have prevented the ultimate Communist domination of this area in the postwar period unless the Labor Government which succeeded him was prepared to keep large British military forces in this area for an indefinite period to offset the Red Army. Since the United States was unwilling to do this and had announced our desire to pull our troops out of Europe as rapidly as possible, it was somewhat visionary of Sir Winston to cherish the thought that a change in strategy alone might have stemmed the Red flood which swept over Eastern and Central Europe from 1945-1947.

The first and last requirement of strategy and policy is that it must be effectively implemented. With both Britain and the United States determined to demobilize their armies, navies and air forces immediately after the German and Japanese defeats, there could be no effective counter to Soviet aggression in the power-vacuum areas created by these developments. These are the hard facts of life and neither the glittering quality of Sir Winston's prose, nor our resentment at his shabby treatment at the polls in 1945 should obscure these realities.

Churchill's instructions to General Scobie, the British officer in charge of operations in Athens in December 1944, may well serve as a model for political leaders when required to give guidance to their military subordinates in similar situations. He told General Scobie just what had to be done but *not how,* and assured him that he would be supported to the full if he were forced to shed Greek blood.

Sir Winston's chapters on Yalta make it clear that there never was a "Yalta Betrayal" in the sense that Roosevelt alone sacrificed interests and rights which he had the power to secure against Soviet militar might. For those who argue that an Allie invasion of Austria, Hungary and Yug slavia would have worked against the lon term interests of the Soviets, it should b pointed out that at Yalta, Stalin actual proposed that the British and Americans d this! But as Churchill observes: "It co him nothing to say this now."

Where Churchill is likely to look be in history is in his conviction expresse shortly *after* VE-day that Britain ar America should attempt to win a final se tlement on outstanding differences wi the Soviet Union *while they yet possesse great military power in Europe.* In a urgent message to Mr. Truman on M 12, 1945, Churchill wrote: "What will b the position in a year or two when th British and American Armies have melte and the French has not yet been forced d any major scale, when we have a handf of divisions, mostly French, and when Ru sia may choose to keep two or three hu dred on active service? Surely it is vi now to come to an understanding wi Russia, or see where we are with her, b fore we weaken our armies mortally. . . The meeting he proposed came at Potsda and in the midst of it, he was relieved his office by the British voters.

The Churchill program of maintaini military strength in Europe after the w would have to be complemented by a fir ly-adhered-to policy of employing th strength in diplomatic actions to force h back to the boundaries of 1939. As w discovered in the Acheson period, "buildi up situations of strength" as a basis f negotiation with the Soviet Union, is n enough. The time comes when a nati must be prepared to act on the basis of th strength, otherwise nothing happens.

Shortly before the appearance of t volume, Churchill received the Nobel Pr for literature. This volume itself may r rank among his most notable literary wor It was composed in the midst of exacti political requirements and is filled w quotations from contemporary documen The publication of these papers, howev makes the volume of outstanding imp tance to the student of world affairs and military readers. Taken together the volumes of this tremendous series con tute the most important single contri tion to the history of our troubled tim They belong in the library of every seri student of war.—H. A. DeWeerd

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

LINES FROM A NEW BOOK

My idea was that every recruit should have the full infantry training before he was put in the artillery, the engineers or the armored units for supporting front-line duty or to supply or desk jobs in the rear areas. Every soldier, I firmly believed, should be taught to fight on the ground, with his rifle, before he was assigned to specialized branches. Then when he had to, as many men have, he could fight like an infantryman and protect himself and his fellows like a doughboy.

Along with this training I wanted to make the rifle the symbol, the personal symbol, of each infantryman. Each rifle is individual and has its own characteristics which a man must learn. I wanted to institute a system in which each soldier would have a single rifle throughout his tour of duty, a rifle that would be given to him with ceremony, preferably by his general, when he earned the right to carry it.

GENERAL MARK W. CLARK
From the Danube to the Yalu

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

DANGEROUS CONFUSION RAMPANT

UNCONDITIONAL HATRED: German War G and the Future of Europe. By Captain Rus Grenfell, R.N. The Devin-Adair Compa 1953. 273 Pages; Index; $3.75.

American readers acquainted with writings of Captain Grenfell are aware t


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
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
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


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the good Captain has been steering a somewhat erratic course of late. Though his writings on naval affairs have never featured criticism of his own professional colleagues, even where their backwardness invited it, he has recently set himself up as a critic in the field of world politics and grand strategy. This tendency, already apparent in his *Main Fleet to Singapore* (1951), is carried to unhappy lengths in the book under review.

Reduced to its simplest terms Captain Grenfell's principal theme is that Germany has not been the dangerous aggressor she has been described to be in two world wars. The secondary theme is that Germany posed no real threat to Britain or to the United States in these two wars and it was a mistake to have insisted on the destruction of German military strength in both of these wars.

American isolationists will take comfort from Captain Grenfell's advice that the United States should take its marbles and go home, leaving European security safe in the hands of a new third force, composed of Germany, France, and Britain. The implication that this combination could now, or in the near future, stand against the Soviet Union without American help betrays the extent of the author's confusion.

The blurb on the jacket conveys the impression that this book had to be published in the "still largely uncensored United States." Let no reader assume that British publishers have all suddenly gone conservative—or that they are stupid. They are not stupid. They simply will not publish a bad book merely because the author happened to write a good one in the past.—H. A. DeWeerd.

GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

THE INCOMPATIBLE ALLIES: German-Soviet Relations, 1918-1941. By Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer. The Macmillan Company, 1953. 350 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00.

Gustav Hilger, a German born in Moscow, was Second Counselor at the German embassy in Russia from the time of the revolution in 1917 until the Nazi attack on Russia in June 1941. In the present work he has collaborated with Alfred G. Meyer of the University of Washington.

Hilger had a personal acquaintance with nearly all the important figures in the Russian foreign office, and was a friend and aide to Ambassadors Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dirksen and Count von der Schulenberg.

Students of military affairs will be particularly grateful for the full treatment given to Soviet-German military collaboration from 1919-1930.

Hilger believes that Germany today has two choices: make an alliance with the Western Powers or with the Soviet Union. He warns that the second choice will reduce Germany to the role of a satellite state and make the defense of the rest of Western Europe impossible.—H. A. DeWeerd.

THE MYTH OF THE NON-POLITICAL OFFICER

THE NEMESIS OF POWER: The German Army in Politics 1918-1945. By John W. Wheeler-Bennett. St. Martin's Press, 1953. 829 Pages; $12.00.

Mr. Wheeler-Bennett, a British expert on German affairs, has written what undoubtedly will be a definitive work on the political activities of the German General Staff in recent times. Sound scholarship, penetrating judgment and literary skill are demonstrated in every chapter of this monumental work. The appearance of the book at the eve of rearmament in West Germany is timely. The author acknowledges that the threatening posture of the Soviet Union has made the rearmament of West Germany inevitable, but he wants us to enter the new era with our eyes open to the lessons of past experience.

Mirabeau once observed that Prussia is not a country with an army but an army with a country. War has been Prussia's national industry and no other country showed a more "phenomenal capacity for military resilience or for beating plowshares into swords." Three times in the last 150 years Prussia or Germany has been defeated in war. Twice she made a speedy military recovery led by the same officer corps which presided over the defeat and then deftly passed the responsibility for loss of the war on to the civilian government. Mr. Wheeler-Bennett fears that we have all the makings of a new recovery of power by the German military including a new stab-in-the-back legend. This time it is being claimed that Hitler's interference with the General Staff led to Germany's ultimate defeat in World War II.

Contrary to the commonly-held belief that German officers did not concern themselves with political matters, the author shows that the Army, through the General Staff, exerted a paramount influence on the Government of the Weimar Republic at every stage of its life. It achieved this influence and fostered this legend by operating from outside the government itself. Only during the period of Schleicher did the Army attempt direct control and then with bad results. Aside from a few moments of greatness, the record compiled by the General Staff during the period covered by this volume was one of narrow professionalism, selfishness, moral cowardice, and political ineptitude.

The greatest part of Mr. Wheeler-Bennett's work is devoted to the role of the Reichswehr in the rise of the Nazi Party and finally to the relations between the Army and Hitler. It was part of the Fuehrer's evil genius that he appealed to their basest instincts and brought out the worst that was in men and institutions. Thus, when the Army insisted that Hitler put the S.A. in its place in 1934, Himmler made the Army a party to the massacre of the S.A. The Army did not shoot the S.A. leaders; that was done by the S.S. But the Army condoned this act of barbarism as it also condoned by inaction the murder of Schleicher and the destruction of Fritsch' reputation. After this, the Army coul hardly pretend to be shocked by the con centration camp horrors inside the Reic and the mass extermination organized b the S.S. and Gestapo outside the country

The German Army sold its soul to th Nazis in 1934 and never could quite mak up its mind to recover it. One gets th impression from these pages that as lon as Hitler was expanding the Wehrmach and thus creating new jobs and opportun ties for promotion, as long as he was passin out decorations, cash and real estate, an as long as he seemed to be winning th war, the men of the General Staff did no oppose his barbarism. Only a handful c officers around Beck and Hammerstei had the moral soundness and political goo sense to oppose Hitler all the time becaus he represented an evil regime. Late come to the resistance movement like Romm and Speidel did not oppose Hitler until h military inefficiency was as apparent as h barbarism had been.

What strikes a foreign reader mo strangely about the record of the Germa officer corps in this period was the weakne and vacillation of the group. There wer of course, admirable exceptions, but i general a record more replete with delay uncertainties, waverings, and hesitatio would be hard to compile. By contrast th non-military participants in the resistanc movement were models of firmness an clarity of thought. At one time or a other nearly every important German ge eral came out in some kind of oppositic to Hitler. This includes Guderian, wh pretended to follow a path of unswervir loyalty to the Fuehrer to the point of co demning his own colleagues to death b who, at the same time, talked of making a end to the war behind Hitler's back. D spite this almost universal conviction th Hitler had to go, it was never possible f the officer corps to do anything effecti about it. Somebody in a key spot was a ways changing his mind. No one want to take the personal responsibility for ki ing the Fuehrer when that act would ha been comparatively easy to carry out. Hu dreds of them lost their lives in a muddl and complicated plot which backfired the officer corps in July 1944.

The German officer corps talked grand of its "honor." Perhaps Admiral Raed illustrated its concept of honor more naiv ly than anyone else. He supported Hitl until the end even though he was kick out of office in 1943. He made no prote against the concentration camps and t extermination of millions of Jews. It w only in March 1945 when his old frie and colleague, Otto Gessler, showed hi the scars and mutilations inflicted up him at the Fürstenberg Concentrati Camp at Hitler's orders that the Admira sense of "honor" reacted. Then he *secret* took off the Golden Party Badge that had worn until that time!

Wheeler-Bennett's chapters on the Ge

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an resistance movement, on the plot of ly 20, 1944 and its consequences, are mplete and well balanced. He refutes e claim, made in some circles, that a iblic relaxation of the unconditional sur- nder demand would have made the task the groups opposing Hitler any easier. e warns against assuming that Hitler's ath in July 1944 would have meant the d of hostilities with the West and a ncentration against the Soviet Union. iat was Rommel's rather absurd belief. e reminds us that the Allied governments tered and maintained the war at great st for the primary purpose of destroying rman militarism. To have expected any sponsible Allied government to preserve mnants of that military strength by a trick ice with a new set of faces in 1944 was expect the impossible.

Baron vom Stein saw his fellow Prus- ns in the early Nineteenth Century thout illusions. He said: "We shall have wait for an awakening in our country that public spirit which the British and nch and other peoples possess, if we do t imitate them in setting for our military ders certain bonds and limitations which ey must not disregard." These words ıy be useful to the German people now d in the years to come. This book is in- pensable for an understanding of recent rman history and that of World War II well.—H. A. DeWeerd.

RARE BOOK ON RUSSIA

SSIAN ASSIGNMENT. By Vice Admiral Leslie C. Stevens. Little, Brown and Company. 568 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.75.

Vice Admiral Leslie C. Stevens was ival Attaché at the American Embassy Moscow from 1947 to 1949. During ose years and in spite of Soviet restric- ns on travel and hampered as he was by reluctance of Russians to talk to for- ners, he learned a great deal about Rus- and its people. Admiral Stevens shows nself to be a detached and objective ob- ver who worked hard to understand the ssians and their culture. His unusual owledge of the Russian language, litera- e, theater and of Russian art in all its ms enabled him to practice as a social chologist seeking to understand the re- ionship of individuals to each other and ween the individual and the group. The ult is a travel book of rare interest.

There is little reference in this book to Soviet armed forces or to political and nomic affairs. The Russian government nes in for only brief comments, although never escapes from the sense of fear l repression that despotic communism ıses in the Russian people. Many pages devoted to the theater, ballet, opera, rature and art in Russia, but these are anced by equally detailed and thorough- exciting reports on hunting and fishing editions, often under extraordinary dif- ılties and hardship in the harsh Russian nate.

He has been most successful in achiev- ing his purpose. He finds Russia a "world of spies and informers which substitutes for the Promised Land," but the Russian people appear as sensitive and generous and inclined to be friendly. This is an exceptionally well written and readable interpretation of the mind and heart of the Russian people and of their social system that we in this country will do well to understand.—D.A.

REPORT ON THE AEC

REPORT ON THE ATOM. By Gordon Dean. Alfred A. Knopf, 1953. 328 Pages; Index; $5.00.

The former chairman of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission gives a sweeping view of the AEC program and its implications from background to forecasts, from relations with the military establishment to appraising Russian achievements and probable intentions.

In the military field Mr. Dean soundly argues that we can "use our tactical weapons in the field" to "virtually cancel out Russian manpower superiority" yet abstain from strategic bombing except in retaliation for Russian attacks on civil populations. He believes the Russians "would certainly think twice" before they invited such retaliation.

Even if, as is probable, Russia also possesses tactical atomic weapons, Mr. Dean remains optimistic because "we have succeeded in getting the competition back on a basis where the premium is no longer on manpower" but "on technological competence and production capacity," our best field.

Any "moral stigma" against using atomic weapons on the battlefield is falsely inspired for selfish reasons. Compared to napalm, atomic weapons are simply bigger, no more horrible.

The author warns that the H-bomb, "rigged" to produce high radioactivity over "thousands of miles in the direction of prevailing winds," can become "an instrument for the destruction of civilization and possibly of all mankind." His only ray of hope lies in the user's fear of "boomerang effect from air currents" the user "could not predict . . . in advance." Here the unscientific reader is at a loss to argue but recollections of high altitude weather prediction leave him uneasy.

In the military field, the book contains contradictions. Atomic weapons are called "absolute whether the target is a regiment or a whole nation" then, two pages later, "good civil defense" can reduce casualties "perhaps 50 per cent" and "reduce property damage."

Arguing reasonably for adequate production, he contends less soundly that mere stockpiles will "deter attack on our homeland" and "help deter" fringe wars like Korea. Unmentioned are the delivery agencies, capable of penetrating hostile defenses, to place those stockpiled bombs on the selected targets.

However, Mr. Dean returns to full agreement with strategical doctrine when he

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forecasts a short decisive atomic war since "conversion of assembly lines to items of war while atomic bombs rain about them is utterly unrealistic."

His principles governing the division of authority between military and civil power are incontrovertible but a misconception appears regarding procedures. He states that it is the business of the military to "recommend the number of weapons to adequately defend the U.S." "This recommendation is not a requirement . . . which cannot be questioned . . . by the civil power."

What of the directive (clear statement of national policy) which the military must have *before* it can make a sensible recommendation? Weapons to defend Korea against invasion were not likely to be included in the military's 1950 recommendations when it had been officially stated that "Korea was of no strategic importance to the U.S."

Thus the demand that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "originate recommendations for military planning and operations" which "the National Security Council reviews" omits the essential first step. The JCS recommendations must be based upon National Security Council directives on national policy, because of the very preeminence of the civil power Mr. Dean supports.

Like Dr. Vannevar Bush he urges closer liaison between science, represented by the commission, and the JCS; liaison which he says is presently lacking.

Mr. Dean also convicts this country of "consistently underrating Russian technological and production achievement." Instead we "should believe what we see." A chapter packed with comparative statistics supports his argument.

On the future of peaceful developments in atomic energy Mr. Dean is both optimistic and conservative.—Col. George C. Reinhardt

MEXICAN WAR GENERAL

GENERAL WILLIAM JENKINS WORTH: Monterey's Forgotten Hero. By Edward S. Wallace. Southern Methodist University Press. 242 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00.

It is natural but unfortunate that the Mexican War has been overshadowed by the longer, bloodier and more significant War Between the States which came such a short time later. The fact is, the campaigns of the Mexican War stand as the first consistently well conducted operations of the United States Army. True, there were brilliant achievements by Captains Lee and Bragg, Lieutenants Grant and Thomas and Jackson, but the major credit should go to the senior commanders who were responsible for the planning and execution of an unbroken succession of victories against invariably superior numbers of Mexican troops. Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor have received a good deal of attention (although not as much as they deserve); however, the subordinate generals such as Quitman, Twiggs, and Worth are virtually unknown.

On that ground alone, Edward Wallace's biography of General Worth would be a valuable addition to American military literature. In addition, though, he has produced a book which is not only sound but extremely readable. Devoting the first third of his work to Worth's early career, in the remainder Wallace presents a clear and interesting account of Worth's participation in the campaigns in northern Mexico and then in Scott's expedition from Vera Cruz to Mexico City.

It is regrettable that Wallace makes frequent comparisons between Worth and the late General Patton, basing them on what can only be described as gross oversimplifications of the circumstances. But this is a minor defect, and the merit of the book as a whole is so great as to make this flaw hardly worth mentioning.

The text has been illustrated with excellent maps and a fine selection of contemporaneous prints and engravings which are of considerable interest in themselves. —Lt. Col. John B. B. Trussell, Jr.

ADMIRAL TURNED NOVELIST

THE JUNGLE SEAS. By Rear Admiral Arthur A. Ageton, U. S. Navy (Ret.). Random House, 1954. 339 Pages; $3.75.

Admiral Ageton, Naval Academy graduate, destroyer skipper, Invasion Force Commander and developer of a simplified system of solving for lines of position in navigation, is a man peculiarly well qualified for a second career of writing about the Navy. Members of the Naval Service have long appreciated those few books written about it by persons who have gone the long way in it. Which is not to say that there have not been excellent books about the Navy from the pens of others, but only that the technical training for a military life at sea is not conducive, in general, to a literary bent. This reviewer was consequently delighted with the opportunity to read *The Jungle Seas*.

The book deals with the South Pacific campaign in the early days of World War II, when our troops were struggling for a toehold on Guadalcanal—and the Tokyo Express, running nightly down The Slot, was doing its best to cut them off. It deals also with life in Noumea, the French base from which some of our forces operated, and concerns the hectic pulsating life ashore: The men off their ships and the women receiving them.

The hero of the story is Lieutenant Jerry Doyle, Executive Officer of U.S.S. *Hale* (DD-456). On the flyleaf of the jacket, Doyle is described as a man who looked at women in such a way as "to bring them to him in droves." For the record, it should be pointed out that Jerry Doyle seemed to know his stuff as "Exec" and later as skipper of a destroyer.

The Jungle Seas deals primarily with men and women enmeshed in the problems resulting from the war. The locale, partly aboard a United States destroyer in com bat and partly ashore in Noumea, provide the frame against which the story of me and women in love and battle is portrayed Ageton writes cleverly with deep familia ity with naval subjects. His description of destroyer life and the actions and reac tions of destroyer personnel well from th deep backgrounds of his own years of serv ice experience. This reviewer, perhaps be cause of his own professional affiliation would, however, like to have seen a bi more explanation of the destroyer action —a minor criticism to which all books fa heir in one form or another.

The big story behind the book—th deathless story—that can never be forgotte is about the fearless men and doughty ship and the fierce running sea battles in th jungle seas off Guadalcanal. A centur ago fleet actions smaller than these woul have been cause for reams of vocal an literary adulation. In later days they hav been neglected for more glamorous thing and, to be sure, they have lacked a spoke man. In the telling of this long awaite saga, as brave and daring as any known t history, Admiral Ageton has given a goo account of himself. It is hoped the futur will realize the hint of more to come fro the same author.—Commander Edwar L. Beach, U.S.N.

DANGER! PRETTY CHARTS AHEAD!

HOW TO LIE WITH STATISTICS. By Darrell Hu Illustrated by Irving Teis. W. W. Norton Co., Inc. 142 Pages; $2.95.

Why the publishers chose to hide valuable book from public gaze by usin a "cute" title is beyond me. A much bett title, more truthful and one that might hav sold the book to the millions who need would have been: *How to Read Statistic and Graphs Intelligently.*

The statistician who wants to prove point can do so without resorting to an thing as crude as an outright lie. All h has to do to be convincing is to use a mea when a median would show a truer pictur or emphasize the percentile when the rea er thinks he means a percentage, or use figure in a pictograph which is twice high but gives the impression of eight tim the bulk, or make a percentage of increas look like a percentage of the whole, distort an abscissa or an ordinate—there a dozens of other tricks.

In these busy days when most of us g a large part of our information from grap and pictographs, it is a good idea to be abl to find the jokers in the presentations. Th next time the motor officer tells you th he has cut his accident rate in half, fin out whether it is the rate per vehicle, p vehicle mile, per vehicle hour, whether h has changed his base lately, and just wh he calls an accident. There are many, man ways we can be fooled by statistical shar ies, and when we are fooled it can be costl

An hour or two spent with this book wi make a healthy skeptic out of the mo gullible; and since the military must de

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:h facts we should be sure our facts are rect, and not what some graph artist nts us to believe are correct.—A.S.

BOOKS RECEIVED

IE GREAT IRON SHIP. By James Dugan. Harper & Brothers, 1953. 272 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.50. The story of the ship that laid the Atlantic cable. The *Great Eastern* was the largest iron ship ever built.

IE COMPLETE AND AUTHENTIC LIFE OF JESSE JAMES. By Carl W. Breihan. Frederick Fell, 1953. 287 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.50. Together with all known and verified data about Jesse, his brother Frank, and the Younger brothers.

IE SECOND TREE FROM THE CORNER. By E. B. White. Harper & Brothers, 1953. 253 Pages; $3.00. The author's selection of his own pieces (of whatever nature) written over the past twenty years, that he thinks stand the test of time.

IE OFFICERS GUIDE. Military Service Publishing Company, 1954. 569 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.00. Twentieth edition of a ready reference on customs and correct procedures which pertain to commissioned officers of the Army.

IE ARMY WIFE. By Nancy Shea. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 367 Pages; Index; $3.50. Third revised edition. Advice for wives of officers, NCOs, and other ranks.

IE AMERICAN LEGION READER. Fiction, Articles, Humor, Cartoons from *The American Legion Magazine,* Selected by Victor Lasky. Hawthorn Books, 1954. 500 Pages; $4.95.

IESE MEN MY FRIENDS. By George Stewart. The Caxton Printers, 1954. 400 Pages; $6.00. A narrative of men and events in the British Army and the RAF during ten extended tours in the UK, Africa, Asia, and Europe.

IE AMERICAN EVERYDAY DICTIONARY. Edited by Jess Stein. Random House, 1954. 570 Pages; Illustrated; Thumb-indexed; $2.50. All the everyday words and meanings, with the less common words that the average person might occasionally use.

NEW PATTERN FOR A TIRED WORLD. By Louis Bromfield. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 314 Pages; $3.75. Most of the present troubles in the world rise, in Bromfield's opinion, from serious maladjustments and limitations of raw materials, markets, food and population.

W TO RESTORE ANTIQUE AND CLASSIC CARS. Edited by George A. Uskali and Curt L. Johnson. Popular Mechanics Press, 1954. 190 Pages; Illustrated; $2.95. Rebuilding old engines, restoration of bodies, leather upholstery, springs, tires and tubes, and painting.



Pass In Review

Lee Nichols, a United Press reporter, has put together an excellent documentary on the evolution of racial integration in our Armed Forces in a new book called *Breakthrough On The Color Front* ($3.50). Despite that unfortunate title (which sounds like a new wrinkle in television), Nichols' book is a valuable record of a major social reform that has been accomplished in a remarkably short period of time and almost without incident. There is little new or startling in the book for most uniformed readers who have been a party to the events which he describes, but it is a highly interesting report of a solid American achievement that has, among other things, knocked a big hole in Communist propaganda precedures.

This has been a good year for books about wartime escapes. Since we mentioned this subject last month, we've read another book that falls in that category although, technically speaking, it's more about what transpired before the escape took place. It is *Eight Bailed Out* ($3.00) and is written by a Major James Inks, USAF. Inks was a member of a B-24 crew that got shot down on a Ploesti raid and then spent several months with Czech guerrillas of both breeds before being returned to Allied control. It's quite a story.

***A brief word** to a number of disappointed book customers: additional copies of Possony's* Strategic Air Power *(Combat Forces Press; $5.00) have now been bound and it is back in stock.*

If you are one of our regular book customers, with your name in our files, you are being cut in on a good thing. As a result of our annual inventory, we have decided to eliminate a number of titles from our stocks. To dispose of them, we have made up a folder listing all of the titles and offering them to you at low prices. These were mailed out to those book customers whose names we have. If your name wasn't on our list and you'd like to get in on this sale, let's hear from you.

In the interests of self-preservation, I prefer not to discuss books that I haven't dipped into myself. This month, however, I feel that circumstances warrant a departure from that practice. The editor of this magazine has been stopping by my desk from time to time, regaling me with passages from Isaac Deutscher's new book about Trotsky called *The Prophet Armed* ($6.00). He's made me think it is a book I must read and I hereby pass his recommendation on to you.

Discussing books in a military magazine is somewhat confining in that most of the titles necessarily deal with the grim business of warfare or at least are serious. However, I should like to mention one this month solely for the reason that it is sheer pleasure to read. This is *Coorina* ($2.75) by Erle Wilson. It is a story about the Marsupial Wolf, indigenous to Australia, and a more beautifully told story hasn't come to my attention in a long while. The book has no message, no axe to grind, and may not even be factually correct, although it appears to be. Pleasurable reading, though.

Among the upcoming books of interest are: *From the Danube to the Yalu* ($5.00) by General Mark Clark, due in May; *The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur* ($5.00) by Frazier Hunt, due in June; and two titles just out, *Churchill By His Contemporaries* ($6.00) edited by Charles Eade; and *Secretary Stimson* ($4.50) by Richard N. Current.

Worthy of separate mention is *U. S. Grant and the American Military Tradition* ($3.00) which will be out this month. Written by Bruce Catton, whose *Stillness at Appomattox* ($5.00) won this year's National Book Award, this new book is a short biography and an all-around appraisal of the life and career of U. S. Grant.

Parents will find Dr. Fredric Wertham's *Seduction of the Innocent* ($4.00) of great interest. Dr. Wertham attacks comic books, citing them as being an invitation to illiteracy, a stimulus to unwholesome fantasies, suggestive of criminal and sexually perverted ideas and actions and as helping to tip the scales toward maladjustment and delinquency.

—R.F.C.

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An 81mm mortar position in the densely-wooded hill country northwest of Hanoi. The mortarmen are members of the French Foreign Legion.



In an approach to a Viteminh guerrilla base a French paratroo with a rifle grenade in place on his 7.5mm MAS rifle mo through the grass that covers the lowlands southwest of Ha

The Month's Pictures

Indochina Terrain Makes It an Infantry War

A French infantry outfit uses an amphibian vehicle to cross a swollen stream in the Red River Delta southeast of Ha



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A seal can be struck into a medal. Each year the Association awards medals to the outstanding ROTC student in many colleges and universities.

Thus, as you can see, the Association does have a need for a seal that can do several jobs. To get one, the Executive Council has voted to award $100 to the person who submits a design that is selected as the best by a panel of judges to be appointed by the Council. Deadline for entries is 30 September 1954.

So here's your chance to make your doodling or your hobby pay off. Everyone, except members of the Council of the Association and their families, employees of the Association and their families, and the judges and their families, is eligible. The Association doesn't ca whether you are a private or a general, a marine or Red Cross hostess, a housewife or a junior high scho student, a professional artist, designer, or practici doodler. All the Association wants is a design that w make an effective seal for the Association.

For those who are not too familiar with what t Association is and does, read the left-hand column page 4 of this issue. Remember, the Association is f all branches and all components of the Army. It American. It is not a government instrumentality. stresses the fighting man, but welcomes all who belie in national defense. It is proud of the history of t American soldier, from the snow at Valley Forge the ice at the Chosin reservoir. It recognizes the bomb, the H-bomb, the guided missile . . . and beyor It believes that man is the soul and fiber of the Arm and remains so despite technological development.

Read the rules that appear below, and go to wo

May the hundred iron men be yours!

Contest Rules

1. This contest is open to any citizen of the United States, and any member of the Association of the United States Army not a citizen of an Iron Curtain country. Members of the Executive Council of the Association of the United States Army, employees of the Association, and members of their immediate families and of the families of the judges are not eligible to compete.

2. An award of $100 will be given to the person submitting the design that the judges select as the best of those entered. The design should be suitable for use both as a medal that can be awarded to individuals by the Association, and as the seal of the Association of the United States Army.

3. You may submit as many designs as you desire but each design must be submitted on a separate sheet.

4. All submissions become the property of the Association of the United States Army.

5. The Association is not committed to the use of the award-winning design, but the award will be presented whether or not the design is used.

6. Each design considered for the award will be checked by a heraldry expert, but the entry need not have any heraldic significance. If the design has intended heraldic significance, a descriptive statement must accompany the design.

7. Your submission need not be a finished work of art if all details are clear and if it can be copied by a professional artist.

8. The decision of the judges will be final.

9. There will be three judges: one from the graphic arts field, one from the heraldic field, and one with thirty or more years of active military service.

10. Entries arriving after 30 September 1954 will not be considered. All entries should be addressed to:

The Secretary, Association of the United States Army
1529 Eighteenth St. N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

11. No names or other identification shall appear on any design. Place your name and address on a separate sheet attached securely to each entry. The Secretary of the Association will assign an identifying number to each entry and remove the sheet showing name and address before submitting the design to the judges.

12. The name of the award-winning contestant will be published in the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. Upon recommendation of the judges, names of contestants whose designs are of outstanding merit may also be published.

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NCO instructing a recruit in use of the flame-thrower.

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UNITED STATES ARMY

COMBAT FORCES Journal

Vol. 4, No. 10 May 1954

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Association's Journal

WHAT goes on at a meeting of the Executive Council of your Association? Here is a report of some highlights of the meeting of 22 March.

The Secretary's report received a thorough going-over. The Council members asked many penetrating questions about the business side of the Association's activities.

The Secretary of the Association was directed to prepare a one-time report on inventories and purchases, and was given authority to devalue obsolete and obsolescent books on hand.

The next item was a discussion of editorial policy; the President appointed a committee to study this problem, and directed the committee to report at the June meeting.

The Council authorized a contest to select a seal for the Association (see the inside cover for details).

The question of an annual meeting at an Army post or installation brought forth some enthusiastic discussion. The Assistant Secretary was directed to prepare a plan for such a meeting.

THE President appointed a new Nominating Committee; in naming the committee he expressed his feeling that more Council members should be chosen from the ranks below lieutenant colonel, pointing to the valuable services of Major Kenworthy, Major (then Captain) Boatner, Captain Glasgow, and Captain Bolton.

The officers and members of the Executive Council of your Association take their duties seriously; they devote much time and effort to improving the JOURNAL and to assisting the staff in keeping the organization on a sound financial basis.

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THE CURRENT SCENE

Words to Help You Serve. *Generals Jacob Devers and Lucius D. Clay*
The Army Is Still in Business
Inner Lines: Strength or Weakness? *Col. John L. Powers*
Preview to Logex-54 *CFJ Staff Report*
Our Fine New Army *Relman Morin*

MEN AND METHODS

Reserves in Atomic Warfare. *Brig. Gen. George E. Lynch*
Where Can We Get the Fighting Men? *Maj. Irvin M. Kent*
Attack Along a Ridgeline. *Capt. Russell A. Gugeler*
The Making of a Marine. *Col. A. T. McAnsh*
Career Management and Your Future. No. 9: Reserve Component Duty

MACHINES AND WEAPONS

Air Transport Developments Lag *ARDC Report*
Inaccurate Rifles Make Inaccurate Riflemen. *Capt. Straight Shooter*

AT HOME AND ABROAD

Around the Bases: Okinawa *Maj. Marco Polo*

ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

$100 Award for Winning Design for Association Seal Cover
Election of Officers

DEPARTMENTS

The Month's Mail 6
Front and Center 8
The Month's Reading 28
The Word from the Artillery School
The Month's Books

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
Advertising rates furnished upon request to any of the advertising offices.

Words to Help You Serve

MANY reasons have been given for the very definite reluctance of many young men to pursue planned military careers. The decline of service morale was brought on in large part by attacks on the military profession and economic discrimination. All these must be rectified before the services can compete on even terms with other professions for the best American youth. There is also the idea that the profession of arms is out-moded. This we don't believe. Opportunity still exists.

It occurred to us that men who have devoted most of their lives to the Army, who had retired after successful military careers, and then went on to important second careers in industry, should be able to make dispassionate judgments that young men would heed. So we asked a few retired officers to speak their minds. Two of their replies are reproduced below.

It was entirely unplanned, but we are struck with the similarity between the statements. Both General Devers and General Clay have balanced the appeal of idealism with the hard facts of personal development and security. Both point out that the size of the pay-check is not the most important consideration, and both say they believe that opportunities are greater now than they were when they entered the Army.




Stimulating and Satisfying Life

General Jacob L. Devers

PERHAPS ten years from now—and certainly forty years from now—you will look back to this period either with regret or with satisfaction, for the decisions you make now will determine the pattern of the remainder of your life.

Three primary factors are involved—your own tastes, aptitudes,

(Continued on page 47)



Opportunities and Responsibilities

General Lucius D. Clay


I HAVE been distressed for some time over the reports which have reached me about the difficulties the Army is experiencing in attracting qualified young men to accept commissions with a view to making the Army a career.

I suppose some of this comes from the apparent lessening in the

(Continued on page 47)

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ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

U. S. Infantry Association, 1893-1950
U. S. Field Artillery Association, 1910-1950

PURPOSES

The Association of the United States Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Association shall be to encourage and foster for all elements, branches, and components of the Army of the United States, and for such veterans' and unit organizations as may be appropriate:

The dissemination of information relating to history, activities, problems and plans.

The exchange of ideas on and discussion of military matters.

The perpetuation of those Army and unit traditions that contribute to *esprit de corps* and superior performance of duty.

The cultivation of cordial relations among the several armed services and with the public.

The promotion, attainment, and preservation of high professional standards.

INSTRUMENTALITIES

The primary instrumentality for the carrying out of the purposes and the attainment of the objectives of the Association shall be the publication of its magazine, COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. The secondary instrumentalities of the Association for the carrying out of its purposes and the attainment of its objectives shall be the preparation, publication, and distribution of military books, and the performance of related activities in fact contributing to the Association's stated aims.

Adopted 14 December 1953 by the Executive Council.

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The Month's Mail

Responsibilities of a Great Power

To the Editors:

The JOURNAL is to be commended for publishing the Baldwin Norman and Millis articles in your January, February and March issues. I found them most stimulating. But I must agree with the distinguished professor, extract from whose personal letter was in the March issue, that the articles did "not fully explore most of the terrible problems of national policy and strategy."

It is significant that you chose to preface Mr. Norman's article with the quotation from Secretary of State Dulles. There is little doubt that the National Security Council's basic decision was influenced largely by the inability of conventional weapons to reach a satisfactory decision in Korea even when firing ten times the amount of ammunition as the enemy. Mr. Norman probably is correct in stating "the Korean War gave the air strategists the boost they needed." For, unfortunately, in Korea the misdirection of the effort, military restraint or compelling circumstances caused the strategy to be changed from annihilation to attrition. That experience has led the public and possibly the Army to accept the premise that the United States cannot cope with Asian mass power.

This premise is not necessarily valid. Land distances and large masses of men have been overcome in the past by maneuver as well as new weapons. Surely the United States Army could develop the means and strategy to operate successfully in Asia provided there was a good purpose and the desire to undertake the venture.

The "new look" strategy appears to be based also upon the principle that American military occupation of additional continental land areas would not serve the best interests of the United States. The casualties and consumption of other resources in Korea having revealed again the immense burdens of empire, there is a new resolve to avoid or minimize the burden. Membership in and continued adherence to the United Nations organization can be explained best as an attempt by the United States to avoid some of the responsibilities of world leadership. No one knows what the destiny of the United States will be. For in spite of contrary intentions, other nations, in other times, attained the glory of empire and a golden age with attendant great consuming burdens and responsibilities.

There seems to be general agreement that the nuclear weapon can easily eliminate the glory of empire, but there is no agreement that nuclear weapons will enable a great power to avoid its responsibilities to civilization.

In humility I am reminded of a sign I once had on my office wall: "Bring your problems to me and I will complicate them for you."

COL. R. A. HOWARD, JR.,
Quartermaster Corps.

111 East 16th Street
New York 3, N. Y.

Why I Read Combat Forces Journal

To the Editors:

I was once an infantryman and subscribed to the *Infantry Journal*. I was once a cavalryman and subscribed to the *Cavalry Journal*. Now I am in the Finance Corps and subscribe to the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL.

The first copy of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL I ever saw was in the Air Force Officers' Club at Thule, Greenland.

Because COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is read by enlisted men and officers of all ranks and grades of all the arms and services, I believe some platoon-level combat-action material should be presented in each issue along with some high-level military and geopolitical thought. Food for all without surfeiting one group of readers and starving others.

As to technical material, I think it best
at it be left to the magazines of the tech-
al services. Liberal references should be
ed in order that the thread of military
nking may run through each and all of
Service publications to form an un-
oken strand.

Let's stick to our professional knitting.
m confident that we military men will
n be in the sunshine again. If we spend
time wailing about what we are not
w getting and about what we have lost,
shall soon become ineffective, and be
gible proof that those who have whittled
ay our benefits were right.

Continue to be staid and circumspect.
vide information about legislation, yes,
make it informative only.

I am in the Finance Corps, but I like
"keep up with things" in the Army.

Now I have a question: Would members
the combat arms like to hear from the
nkers and general business managers"
the Army?

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a great
gazine. If you aim to suit a catholicity
Army tastes I am sure you will have in-
st and response and the magazine will
tinue to thrive.

LT. COL. SIDNEY S. EASON
Finance Corps
ance Center, U.S. Army
ianapolis, Ind.

or Example of Research

the Editors:

Gentlemen, please! Get yourselves a
icious science or medical editor before
reprint claptrap "science" stuff. I refer
"The Human Cost of Combat" in your
rch issue.

That stress research team in Korea was
of the most superficial, uncoordinated,
unproductive outfits I have even seen.
built them a concrete-floor, running-
er laboratory many miles behind the
t. A few of the members of the team
tured up to stable positions and did a
work on men on patrols (before the
ols went out and after they came back).
en fighting broke out and real stress
present, the team was in Japan to
yze a mass of data they could have
ily obtained by studying a college ball
n.

There was a lot of worthwhile front-
research in Korea, but this was the
est example I know of. I was Chief
Operations, Medical Section, Eighth
y at the time.

LT. COL. DOUGLAS LINDSEY
Medical Corps
dquarters MTC
Sam Houston, Texas

per Fidelis

he Editors:

o have said U.S. Marines have a *higher*
casualty rate than the U.S. Army
ld have been a fact and easily demon-
le by statistics. A higher percentage of

You know...



I think this is it, Tom!

Remember we were talking the other day about how a serviceman might provide voluntary protection for his dependents' health? Well, I think this is the answer, Tom.

Look at this: if a man—whether he's a PFC or a lieutenant commander—joins this non-profit Armed Forces Medical Aid Association, he's getting, at cost, all-round hospitalization protection for his wife and children.

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There's one thing certain: it's something that men with vital military responsibility should know about, Tom. Why don't you write today for this free illustrated booklet that contains all the information? Here's the address:

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Department J • 403 West Nueva Street • San Antonio 7, Texas

TRUSTEES: LT. GEN. H. J. BREES, USA (RET.) • LT. GEN. E. C. WHITEHEAD, USAF (RET.) • LT. GEN. H. R. HARMON, USAF (RET.) • MAJ. GEN. W. H. KASTEN, USA (RET.) • MAJ. GEN. A. E. NOYES, USA (RET.) • BRIG. GEN. C. R. GLENN, USAF (RET.) • BRIG. GEN. W. SPENCE, USA (RET.) • COL. C. CHEEVER, USA (RET) • CAPT. E. M. WALDRON, USN (RET.)

all the men in the Marine Corps see actual combat. With this must be considered the factors of length and nature of combat.

But to blithely write as you did in your "Comment" in March of "*excessive* combat losses" is to go beyond the facts to an *evaluation* of the dozens of other factors which produce casualties. It is an incredible generalization which carries the implication that perhaps tactics are basically different or Marine leadership is less competent or more bloodthirsty or some equally inane attempt which would hardly stand under professional analysis.

I hope such careless writing is simply the result of unconscious service rivalry and pride in the Army's record.

The only casualty statistics to which marines point with pride is the *ratio* of MIAs (includes returned POWs) to all other casualties—an interesting index of unit morale, discipline, and cohesiveness. You might compare the same Army ratio for Korea.

BRUCE LASALA

Englewood, N. J.

• The sentence to which Mr. LaSala objects reads "Our Marine friends, whose boot-training is the next toughest thing to a 49-cent steak, and who point to excessive combat losses with something suspiciously like pride, don't seem to have too much of a problem in attracting recruits." It is clear, we think, that the intent of the sentence was to praise the Corps' ability to use the hard facts of combat to attract recruits.

Specialization

To the Editors:

For some ten years I've been a fairly regular reader of the JOURNAL, without ever succumbing to the urge to write a letter for publication. But the article on Career Management—Specialization in your February issue moves me . . . if I should let myself go this letter would have to be written on asbestos.

It seems to me a symbol of out-of-date thinking that a specialist (especially an intelligence officer) is not considered to be on a par with infantry and artillery unit commanders, S3s, and others. The article says that the Army's peacetime mission is preparation for war, and the writer might have added that in wartime the mission is to win the war at the least possible cost in men and money. And on whom do we rely to tell us when we will have to fight? On intelligence officers. Who our enemy will be? Intelligence officers. Where the fighting will take place? Which weapons and how many men we will need? The answer in every case is—intelligence officers.

Probably the most irritating statement in the whole article is that a specialist must excel in his specialized field, and at the same time maintain his branch qualifications. This is just as illogical as requiring an Army surgeon to excel as a surgeon and be qualified also as a rifle company commander, or requiring a rifle company commander to maintain qualification as a radar technician.

The only satisfactory solution to which we must come, is the creation of an Intelligence Service on the same level as the other branches. It muts be composed of carefully selected officers who have already served five years or so of apprenticeship in one of the other arms or services, who have an aptitude for and liking for intelligence work. Needless to say, they must have equality of opportunity as regards promotion.

CAPTAIN G2

c/o Postmaster
New York, N. Y.

•The writer's objections should not be aimed at Career Management Division but at higher policy-making levels of the Department of the Army. The proposal is not a new one, and has been rejected for sufficient reasons by many responsible officials.

Soldier

To the Editors:

Maj. Gen. Kenneth F. Cramer, Southern Area Commander of U. S. troops in Germany, who died recently, was criticized for being a strict disciplinarian back in 1951 when he had a New England National Guard outfit at Camp Pickett. Complaints from the troops and their wives led to a couple of investigations of his command. General Cramer had a jo to do. Included in his job description wa making men out of babies, undoing dam age in character caused by inefficient pa ents, and getting his division ready fc combat. He was concerned with "Comba Preparedness" and "Success in Battle" an not with USO shows and ice cream wag ons. His unit was behind in training. H did something about it and he got result The 43d Infantry Division has a goo record and a good name. General Cramer presence is still felt in that Division.

A salute and tribute to an able com mander, Major General Kenneth F. Cran er, whose foremost thought was "Meet an defeat the enemy."

MAJ. GEORGE E. BANIGAN

APO 343, San Francisco, Calif.

Sell 'em Hard

To the Editors:

I must congratulate you for "Th Month's Comment" in your March issu You have seen the light.

From 1946-1948 I had the honor to ser as Asst. PMS&T under Col. Edgar H. Ke ner at the North Texas Agriculture Co lege, Arlington, Texas. Colonel Keltn had the vision and imagination to unde stand what went on in a young man's hea and the ability to let his junior officers u their own imagination and ability. Fu ther, he was in turn backed up by Lieu Gen. Thomas Handy, then commandi Fourth Army.

In this ROTC program, we organized cadet corps that was so proud of itself th it was famous throughout the Southwe Our idea was to sell the armed services these young men, their communities, an their families. In short, we were selli the Army at the grass roots.

Among our many successful proje were:

• A crack drill team and social orga ization, the Sam Houston Rifles. This gro was selected from the best men in t cadet corps, by nomination of the oth cadets, their military and scholastic grad and their own desires. Once each year went to San Antonio to participate in t Battle of Flowers fiesta. While there it w housed, fed, and quartered by the Arm and for all practical purposes was part f the garrison. These men never forgot th

• The cadet corps, under the directi of Colonel Keltner, organized an annu ROTC small-bore rifle shoot. Every hi school ROTC unit in Texas sent a tea It was an outstanding event in their sch year. The Army sent instructors on TI and every small town that had a boy the got plenty of newspaper coverage. T Army never was sold so well.

• The senior cadet officers in unifo were the guests of officers at local Office Clubs on periodic occasions.

• Fourth Army never failed to send functionary to a major school activi Sometimes it was General Handy himse In this the Navy joined us.

Election of Officers

The Executive Council of the Association of the United States Army, at its regular quarterly meeting 22 March, voted to reopen election of Association officers to balloting by the Association membership.

The election of officers by the membership was suspended (under the provisions of the By-Laws) during the Korean emergency, when the velocity of transfers among the officers of the Association and members of the Executive Council made it impossible to obtain the quorum necessary to carry on Association business. It is necessary, in order to have a quorum present for Association business meetings, to limit officers and Executive Council members to persons stationed in or near Washington. Election by the membership, under emergency conditions, was too slow a process to keep the Executive Council manned to working strength.

Under the By-Laws of the Association, the Executive Council will elect a Nominating Committee in December of this year. This Committee will submit a slate of at least two nominees for each position falling vacant in 1955. The slate will be presented to the membership through the columns of the JOURNAL for voting not later than March, 1955; officers so elected will take office at the June 1955 meeting of the Executive Council.

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• The Army, the Navy, the Air Force, ıd the Air and Army National Guard, us the Army Reserve were used on every ɔssible occasion. They furnished equip- ent, films, and backing galore.

We had a corps with stars in their eyes. have seen the results of our handiwork roughout the armed forces, men who ıve joined the regular Navy, Air Force ıd Army. Some of my young men were lled in Korea, but the details of their ath showed that what we had taught em they believed in. As you say, a man ver forgets a thrill like being honored a real post. These young men never d forget and they carried out the finest ıdition of the service, even unto death.

MAJ. HARRY W. MORSE
SS *Eldorado*
PO, San Francisco, Calif.

unker Bomb

the Editors:

I wish to compliment your magazine and . Col. Walter L. Miller, Jr., for the in- mative article, "Uses of Flame in Ko- ," in the March issue. As a former gular Army man turned student (Uni- rsity of Illinois), I am a regular reader the JOURNAL because of just such ar- les as Colonel Miller's.

I would, however, like to take exception that part of the article that deals with bunker bomb. While serving with ve Company, 15th Infantry, I carried d used to some extent the bunker bomb, d believe that I can speak with a cer- ı knowledge on this subject. Colonel ller's bomb cannot be used for maxi- ım effectiveness because of its casing and very unsafe because of the position of grenade.

First, neither the caliber .50 nor .30 ma- ne gun ammo box is suitable to obtain ximum effectiveness from the explosion. h boxes are constructed so strongly t the force of the explosion erupts out the weakest side, limiting the possible a of damage. Also, a good deal of the losive force is wasted in trying to break of the box.


My second exception—placing the gre- le in such a position that neither the nor the handle of the grenade can be ched or held while the can is being ried. A soldier carrying a bomb in one ıd would normally be carrying a rifle his other during any approach march on patrol. Thus the soldier would not able to prevent the pin from coming , the handle from flying off, or the bomb n exploding.

We found that the thin-sided caliber .30 ammo can was better suited for use ause it shattered, sometimes into several es, and the force of the grenade ex- sion threw the napalm in all directions e or less evenly, and over a larger area. The grenade should be placed on the dle side of the can immediately in front or behind the handle of the can. Then the grenade handle can be bent over the handle of the can allowing both to be grasped at one time with one hand. Even if the pin is then pulled, through some accident, the bomb cannot go off.

All that is needed to make these bombs, besides the can, WP grenade and napalm, is an iron spike to make the holes, a soldering iron and solder for the lid. First, two holes, one for the grenade and one to pour in the napalm, are punched in the handle side of the can, the grenade is inserted and its handle bent into place. The side which was first removed in opening the can is soldered on securely. It is a good idea to also solder the two metal pieces holding the handle. This is an extra and sometimes necessary safety precaution. The napalm is then poured into the can and a stopper of wood wrapped in a bit of cloth is wedged into the hole. It must be tight and must not stick out too far.

This bomb, and variations which included both the faults I find in the Colonel's bomb, was used by a test squad (of which I was a member) from the 15th Infantry.

SGT. ROBERT M. LAUTH
USAR
5644 N. Wayne Avenue
Chicago 40, Illinois



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MAIL COUPON TODAY

Front And Center

Our soldiers are no longer the highest paid in the world. An unofficial study by a Finance Corps' officer shows that in some grades, principally the noncommissioned and lower commissioned ranks, Canadian soldiers get higher pay than U.S. soldiers. For example, a Canadian sergeant married with one dependent and occupying government family quarters gets $194 a month; his U.S. opposite number draws $178.24. A U.S. captain with one dependent, serving overseas and separated from his family, is paid $428.64 as compared with a Canadian captain's $443. Canadian dollars are worth more than U.S. dollars, so the actual difference is greater than the figures indicate.

✓ ✓ ✓

The line between strategic and tactical air is disappearing, General Nathan Twining, the Air Force Chief of Staff, told a Senate subcommittee. He said that in a future war the tactical forces "may well take and give the first air blows." It is the objective of the Air Force, he said, to equip every "offensive fighter and bomber aircraft of our tactical forces to deliver nuclear weapons of all sizes on tactical targets." He also said that strategic forces are adaptable to tactical use.

✓ ✓ ✓

"Area fire" versus "aimed fire" of the caliber .45 pistol is a subject of hot controversy in the *Military Police Journal*. Also involved is the question of whether military policemen are or are not "deplorable marksmen" as some officers of the Corps have attested. These officers say that the "area aim" method taught at the Provost Marshal General's School is largely responsible. Pointing out that the controversy is similar to that which raged in the columns of the "COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL and infantry circles" during the first year or so of the Korean conflict, Lt. Col. William P. Dunn wrote in the MP magazine that the infantry soon "started and has continued an intensive program to improve infantry marksmanship." He wants the MPs to do the same. "The importance of and necessity for policemen being able to hit what they shoot at seems to be generally recognized in all police agencies except our Corps," he wrote. In conclusion he said: "Let's take a tip from the infantry and get back to the basic principles and practices of traditional American shooting."

✓ ✓ ✓

In a White Paper issued to Parliament the British Minister of Defense said: "The Army has to bear the main burden of the cold war, though both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force have their parts to play. . . . None of the Services can be reduced in size or efficiency to such a point that it would cease to make an effective contribution to the deterrent or to provide a sound basis for mobilization." The Paper said that the Ministry expects to increase the size of the Army from 220,100 to 226,400 in the next year. It observed: "There will also have to be an improvement in all three Services in the numbers of men prolonging their current engagements if the increasing shortage of NCOs and skilled tradesmen is to be made good."

✓ ✓ ✓

Because Lieut. Gen. Lauris Norstad, deputy commander of NATO for air, has expressed a need for a "lightweight," "day-superiority" fighter for close-support missions, U.S. and British designers are again in controversy over the merits of such a plane, the magazine *Aviation Week* reports. Such a plane should weigh 5,000 lbs. empty, as compared with contemporary U.S. fighters which are from three to six times heavier. U. designers say it is more than mere "stripping off gadgets." A British "lig fighter"—the "Gnat"—is soon to fl Other European aviation firms are al in the running for such a plane, t magazine says. General Norstad's speci cations are reported to require armame of either paired 20mm cannon with 2 rounds; paired 30mm cannon with 1 rounds; or 12 three-inch rockets pl two 500-lb. bombs plus two napal bombs.



✓ ✓ ✓

Hanson Baldwin of The New Yo Times *is the vanguard of those who b lieve that the military services are suff ing from a shortage of the old milita verities. Among his other suggestions f improving the services is to "bring ba the bands" and have more martial m sic. However, the Air Force eith doesn't read the* Times *or isn't influenc by it, for it is going to reduce the nu ber of Air Force bands by twenty-fi per cent. It says it will save enough m power to staff a fighter wing and si have plenty of music by having trav ing bands that move from base to ba*

✓ ✓ ✓

How many authorized Army new papers do you think there are? A recc tabulation reveals that there are 4 Here's a breakdown:

Daily	*U.S.*	*Overs*
Letterpress or offset process	0	3
Mimeograph or ditto process	29	39
Weekly, semiweekly or biweekly		
Letterpress or offset process	38	39
Mimeograph or ditto process	47	145
Monthly or semimonthly		
Letterpress or offset process	16	15
Mimeograph or ditto process	33	35
Frequency of publication unknown	15	13
Totals	178	289

Many of the mimeograph or ditto pers are little more than daily or we ly "poop sheets" but they are listed authorized Army newspapers in t records of the Department of the Ar Office of Publication Information.

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Army Unveils Skysweeper...

Deadly Accurate Anti-Aircraft Gun

THE STORY BEHIND THE STORY:

■ "HOW CAN WE stop hostile jets that slip through our primary defenses?" Newsmen covering Army Ordnance's demonstration of the Skysweeper saw the answer to attack by high-speed aircraft at medium range—and spread the story over front pages from coast to coast. It was the story of a gun that could "see" through fog and darkness . . . pick out an enemy within a 15-mile radius . . . compute its speed, altitude and course in seconds . . . then, automatically aiming itself, shoot the plane out of the sky.

■ Actually the story began when Army Ordnance anticipated the threat of faster flying jets and started to work with Sperry on the problem. Through its pioneering in radar, Sperry engineers were able to design the "eyes" of needed performance. From Sperry's experience in electronics came the "brains" to compute precise firing information. Sperry's developments in servo mechanisms provided the "muscles" for rapid aiming and firing.

■ The Skysweeper gunfire control *system* which resulted from the cooperative efforts of Army Ordnance and Sperry is typical of the many systems which Sperry has developed working with various branches of the military to meet critical needs. Once developed, Sperry manufacturing specialists convert engineering designs into precision weapons for large scale production. Among similar projects at Sperry today are systems for bombing and navigation, missile guidance and naval gunfire control.

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THE ARMY IS STILL IN BUSINESS

BUT IT MUST "SELL" ITSELF IF IT IS TO STAY SOLVENT

HAT really is new about our strategy and force struc-ure? We still have an Army, a Navy, and an Air ce. Is it so startling that an end to the fighting in ea should bring a reduction in the Army, and likely e cut-back in the Navy? It would be foolish to say t the Army's combat readiness will not suffer seriously n budget and strength reductions. But the reduc-is need not be catastrophic if the Army will make the st of what it has, and if the trend does not get out nand.

This is not an attempt to adjudge the soundness of the tive strengths of the services. However, a brief look is ealing. Even with forecast reductions, the Army will well over a million men strong and the Navy will con-ue as the world's most formidable flotilla. The Army l Navy remain very much in business. As for the Force, all major phases of air power have been under elopment continuously since World War II. For Air ce development to go apace, with renewed emphasis its strongest weapon—strategic nuclear weapons—is no e remarkable than the mounting importance placed the Navy on atomic-powered submarines, or by the ny on atomic artillery. All three of the services have n developing and adopting new weapons, equipment, ics, and techniques since mid-World War II. The new weapons are *additions* to our arsenals, not outright substitutions.

Does the 1954 "new look" imply a major change in our military weapons, strategy, and structure? Manpower and money ceilings placed upon the several services have changed from the year before, but this is the case every year. What counts is that the integrated concepts of national security which have been painfully and carefully evolved over a period of nearly ten years should not be scrapped by the turn of a catch phrase or a single year's budget!

As General Ridgway told the Senate Appropriations Committee in March of this year, the current reduction in Army funds is not accompanied by a reduction in Army functions. It is noteworthy that the press widely questioned the "new look" and supported General Ridgway's observation that the Army's job was in no way minimized. Even so, the "new look" certainly has caused concern and confusion in both military and civilian circles.

A survey of the actual strengths, functions, and deployments of the armed forces should provide assurance beyond the sound and fury: United States military power today is actively supporting national policy at home and abroad and as near to the borders of the Communist empires as can reasonably be expected. Quite apart from the obvious reliance that we place on our allies, the United States has found it necessary to exercise its total power with, among other things, very large elements of

e authors of this article are two field-grade regulars, one nfantry and the other artillery.

its Army, Navy, and Air Force. All three services are standing ready in such far-flung regions as the Mediterranean, Western Europe, the Far East, and the Arctic. It ought to be apparent that the size and importance of the several services cannot be fixed, but must vary with location and task; and it is clear that each has an indispensable part to play in each major region. Considered as a whole, United States military power at home and abroad is an *integrated force* in which the three major elements are balanced *against the tasks to be done.*

CALL it function, task, mission, or what you will—the business charged to each service now and in the event of war is what determines balance. If the U.S. is to survive it must have military forces capable of performing the *wide variety* of things that must be done to support national policy. Security in 1954 is not reducible to an "either-or" solution. No service alone can do the whole job; there is more than enough for all three. Because modern military operations are almost invariably carried out by armed forces working in combination, it is incontestable that a functional balance must exist—as it does—among the land, sea, and air forces. Yet this concept is in danger of being discarded for a new strategy in which we prepare for only one kind of conflict: one in which our main power will be the weight of retaliatory air forces armed with nuclear weapons. The great fallacy is that this concept cannot be related to any acceptable national objectives. A strategy that would not bring advantageous results to the United States is simply unsound. Many authorities have branded the extreme air concept of mass destruction as the least desirable basket in which to put our eggs. Apart from morality, a strategy relying chiefly on nuclear weapons cannot guarantee success. Such a war would end in a Pyrrhic victory. Even though the Army and Navy continue to exist in some strength, the 1954 budget tends to limit our strategic capabilities to mass destruction, to unlimited and useless war. The die is not yet cast hard, for the shape of the armed forces is determined several years prior to a current budget. But the drift toward a strategy of total and mutually destructive war is strong. It must be checked and a more realistic plan adopted.

Our national objectives include the limiting of war. If we must fight, it should be for an end that will increase the chances for peace and eliminate the seeds of further conflict. Military men must join with statesmen in a new crusade—a wise and deliberate campaign to keep the scope and horror of war at a minimum. The great upheavals of global war must be avoided if any vestige of peace is to return to the world. Balanced forces that will permit the free world to trade its present defensive strategy for an offensive effort in which various forms of force can be applied as positive deterrents to war and as guardians of peace. Therefore, the U.S. must have balanced forces if it is to exercise wise and influential leadership.

Perhaps the reluctance to accept the inevitability "balanced forces" is a part of the American love of sloga like "first things first," and the desire to put things neat packages. Our military readiness must have a firm foundation than the drifting sands of day-to-day cris and wishful thinking. We dare not fall back on th whimsical practices that traditionally have kept th United States unprepared.

Let this be understood: there is no basis for a drast new look. The trend toward a soberly-calculated poli should be nourished, not sickened by a huckster's sloga With the lessons of Korea all too fresh in our minc America needs to be assured that a violent and unre soned switch has not occurred in our integrated plans f national security.

WHERE, now, does this inquiry lead? Well, the Arr is deeply affected by the threatened misconcept, b cause it minimizes the Army. Soldiers may rightly sco at the suggestion that land forces are outmoded. Bt they must face up to the fact that the myth lingers c even in the face of land wars in Greece, Israel, Ind china, Burma, Malaya, and Korea (not to mention t NATO land forces in Western Europe).

That the "outmoded Army" idea disturbs the mora and integrity of the Army is important but not pa mount; worse storms have been weathered. The vc practical reason why the Army must object is the dang of a recurrence of the neglect which sent it into Kor with a shoestring force. It is hard to understand w that instance of gross neglect has failed to convince Americans that we cannot risk the neglect of any of t major services.

The Army's case is sound, but it has not been ma with sufficient vigor. Unfortunately, the Army contin to appear before the public as an inferior member the team, a position which it does not occupy and ca not accept. The popular belief in air power is the ch cause of this. And most unfortunately, this tends c place the Army in the distasteful position of disagr ing with air power supporters when as a matter of fa there is no real disagreement. The Army believ strongly in air power. The conflict arises because und standing of true air power capabilities is not widespre and therefore, it is fallaciously assumed that "air pow can do the job of armies, and that mass armies cann exist when the enemy has superior air power.

These notions of the air-power-over-all theory, as th affect the Army, should have been destroyed once a for all by the record of what happened in Korea. It w (and still is) fashionable to argue that the Weste World could not hope to match the "human wave" tact and "unlimited" manpower of the "mass armies" of Co munism; therefore the U.S. should not waste money an Army, but concentrate on air power. Until Kor the United States Army was without experience t

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ould reply to this. It was confident, though, that an rmy that concentrated on quality of men and weapons ould offset a considerable superiority in strength. Once e got into high gear in Korea, we proved that point. The ed masses were by no means invincible, and the smaller ighth Army took their measure time and time again.

We should have learned from Korea that the scientific progress" in killing finally reduees war to a struggle on ie ground. Korea proved again that nothing but deter- ined infantry, properly supported, can stop other men n the ground. The Chinese armies in Korea exploded ie theory that no army can live without air superiority. ood infantry ean and will press (or be driven) forward the darkness, in bad weather, and under cover, without gard to their losses, against the full power of superior r forces. Air supremacy on the battlefield is highly de- rable but not always decisive. Although United States r (and sea) power in Korea was virtually unchal- nged, the numerically greater Red armies, while hurt, ere not paralyzed by this superiority.

IR advocates explain that Korea was a unique situation. Indeed, it was uniquely in our favor—an ideal situa- on in which to bring our air (and sea) power to bear. s necessary as was the fine air and naval support, the ct remains that it still took large ground forces to check ed aggression in Korea.

The experience in Korea confirmed the Army's un- aken belief that a well-led, mobile, hard-hitting land rce, equipped with the latest weapons and *supported y superior air and naval forces,* can handle ordinary land rces of much greater size than itself.

However, air power extremists haven't shown a recip- cal appreciation of the Army's role in gaining and aintaining command of the air.

We can be certain that the Soviets are alive to the le of land forces. The Soviets doubtless are restrained mewhat by America's superiority in producing atomic eapons and aircraft. But, since they view our advantage so as a principal obstacle to their plans of world domi- ation, the Soviets are exerting every effort to overcome ir superiority if such it is. Methods of neutralizing our omie supremacy and stopping our strategic bombers ust be occupying the time of Soviet military planners, ientists, and production specialists. Our entire outlook ust be governed by this: *The Soviets have made much ster progress than expected in both fields.*

We cannot be sure how we do compare in nuelear air wer, but our 1948 complacency is somewhat out of te today. When both sides have enough mass-destrue- on weapons to wage atomie war, the military value of ch weapons may beeome neutralized. In any case, the ommunists, with their lesser regard for life and their rge populations, may be better prepared to absorb the sses of such a war than the West. Nevertheless, the nited States has no choice but to invest heavily in these weapons. Soldiers will agree to the wisdom of our nu- clear program. What they do object to is the reeurrent neglect of land forces.

At the end of World War II, Moscow perceived and exploited fully the West's greatest weakness—the absence of adequate armies. So the Soviet and satellite armies were put to the task of furthering the definite politieal aims of Communism. The pattern is clear in Eastern Europe, China and North Korea. If Indochina is saved for the free world it will not be by the threat of "massive retaliation" but by men on the ground.

A reduetion in NATO land forces, espeeially those of the United States, would bring joy to the Kremlin. The NATO build-up that began in 1950 was a serious set- back for the Communists. The Red armies in Europe became checkmated to a degree and they must be dealt with before further Soviet aggression can succeed.

It is significant that Soviet effort to duplieate the Amer- ican atomic potential is not being made at the expense of Communist land forces.

THE relationship between armies and nuclear weapons can be put in this way: Will Soviet armies be stopped if the United States and Soviet Russia fight a duel with nuelear bombs, homeland to homeland? Nuelear weap- ons cannot stop armies in the field unless those armies are made to concentrate, and the Red armies will not eon- eentrate unless forced to by sizable Allied armies.

This establishes the need for land forces in modern war. If America's allies could provide all the land forees needed to eheck Communist land power, the United States eould properly reduce its Army. However, this is impossible now and improbable in the foreseeable future.

There is a need for a loud, elear eall for adequate land forces. We must emphasize the Army's full belief in and reliance on tactical atomic weapons to an extent un- precedented in the history of new weapons. The Army's war plans, training programs, organizational and strategic eoncepts all provide for the new weapons. The Army has placed such faith in these weapons that it is staking its part of the future security of the United States on them. When the United States Army is that confident in weap- ons which have never been tested in battle, the potentiali- ties of the new weapons cannot be said to have been negleeted.

Yet Major General James Gavin has written: "The ad- dition of atomie weapons of catastrophic possibilities and an inereasing degree of air mobility for land forces, the shield—the national shield—on the field of battle must be incomparably thicker, tougher, and more resilient. . . . Forces in being of a strength eonsidered adequate to delay while the nation mobilizes in terms of World War II yardstieks, will invite disaster. . . . Sinee the USSR now is in a position to employ tactical atomic weapons . . . the eonclusion is inescapable . . . *additional land and air forces will be needed.* . . . There appears to be no

avoiding this conclusion, however unpleasant it is to our economists and politicians."

So much for the main theme. In the Atomic Age, land forces seem to have a clearer role than ever before. If anything can be called *evident* in these confusing days, the purpose of the United States Army surely emerges from any honest inquiry.

But having come this far, what next?

THE Army requires a living doctrine on which its own convictions can flourish and public support be won. The Army needs to know the principles on which it stands. Let us attempt to outline them.

Flexible Military Structure. The United States must have a military structure capable of meeting the most likely kind of emergency, but also able to react to the unforeseeable. It should be designed to support the national objectives; conversely, it should be such as not to work contrary to those objectives. U.S. strategy should aim at winning peace as well as war. In any case, we cannot risk preparing for *only one kind* of war.

Vital Roles for Land, Sea, and Air Forces. There are certain functions in war which only an army can perform, just as there are functions which only an air force and a navy can perform. Recognition of this precept is given in the unification of the services and in the fact that all three services today, though large, have missions that tax all their strength.

Key Role of Armies. It is significant that every major military action or threat to world peace since 1945 has been made with land forces. Unless allied land power (which means the continued presence of U.S. Army forces) is able to withstand Communist armies on the ground, the chances of mounting an effective offensive are slight. The West must have enough land power in being *at the start* of a war to prevent defeat at the outset. This is a fundamental presupposition of the major political, economic, moral, and military affiliations of the people of the United States as represented in the actions of their government.

This means for the United States a new concept of war. For the first time in our history we must have forces in being at the outset of a war. We can no longer count on having time to mobilize. It is this change in circumstances that Americans find hard to accept. In Communist thinking, the conflict has already been joined. The warning has been issued repeatedly. Like it or not, the United States must be ready to fight at any and all times. This means an Army of respectable size, fully prepared. We cannot risk the future devoid of a sizable army in being. This is the true "new look."

The land battle, along with the air and sea battles, is an integral part of the effort to gain command of the land, sea, and air in decisive areas. The timing or priority of any phase or campaign of a future war depends too much on the circumstances to be predicted. There is no such thing as separate land-, sea-, or air-phases. The initial loss of the battle on land in any decisive area o conflict could well contribute to our defeat in the air o at sea; the reverse is also true. If we lose in the air or se we may be defeated on the ground. Further, the lan forces must be of such strength and so disposed as t ensure that the *political* objectives of the nation are no lost in the initial phases of war. Political aims, whethe they can be attained short of war or whether they mus be fought for, cannot be reached without land force And if we lose our political objectives, there can be n point in fighting at all!

THE responsibility for raising and maintaining armie lies with the Congress and ultimately with the people And while the American people have shown that the will support all measures required to insure the nation safety, they are insufficiently aware of the essential role o land forces. Unless the Army presents facts and recom mendations to the people, it is, in effect, usurping th people's right to decide for themselves. It can be expecte that the civilian officials of the government will respec the Army's non-political nature and permit professiona ly determined military judgments and requirements to b stated. The Army has no right to bow to expediency; must present its case.

A major reason for the Army's ineffectiveness in gair ing public support is a reluctance to take a firm stan on controversial subjects. Inevitably there crop up di ferences of opinion on the best way to prevent or wi wars. Inescapably, there arise controversies over whic service is best qualified to do this or that function. Cor troversy of itself is not reprehensible; only when unfai accusatory, and dishonest methods are used to settle should controversy be prohibited. The very definitio of unification automatically makes the Army an inte ested party to almost any inter-service difference of opi ion. Admirable as it may be to avoid "scraps," by remai ing aloof the Army denies the nation the benefit of th land-force viewpoint. A negative attitude on contr versies may well suggest that the Army is equivocal an spineless. Can the Army's conciliatory position on unific tion disputes be shown to have improved public opinio of the Army? The record is emphatic! When contr versy revolves around issues vital to the nation and th Army, the spokesmen for land power must not remai silent.

Our national strategy must have public approval an confidence; the size, composition and roles of our arme forces must be substantially acceptable to the people.

The issues brought out in the so-called inter-servic quarrels usually are not matters that the military depar ments alone *should* decide upon. They are of such gre importance that the people and their elected represent tives have the duty to participate in determining them.

The Army must henceforth stand up and clearly spea its piece. Others will judge it; but only the Army ca makes its own case.

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Reserves in Atomic Warfare

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE E. LYNCH

Reserves will be attractive targets for thermonuclear weapons. and so their disposition and mission must necessarily be altered

T this moment in atomic history, the Army finds itself with a weapon first developed for uses not intimately related to combat on the ground. Consequently, ground forces must adapt their doctrines to the effects, in offensive and defensive, of the several types of atomic missiles that are capable of being effectively used on the ground battlefield.

A complete and flawless theory of the tactics of atomic missiles in ground warfare is not likely to be evolved in the near package, designed overnight by an inspired group of military scientists. Rather, these tactics promise to emerge, bit by bit, by empirical means in the many experiments which together make up the tactics of ground action.

It is the intention of this piece to explore the effects of atomic missiles on ground force reserves in the theater of war, and to develop some principles which will harmonize current doctrine and the employment of atomic missiles. To provide a common orientation point, this examination assumes the system of ground forces organization which the U. S. Army has today. It is quite probable that other ventures into the study of atomic ground warfare will conclude that one of the essential adaptations is a radical change in our military organization and in its forms and functions. However, in the matter of ground force reserves, the principles and the objectives to be brought out in this discussion should remain creditably, regardless of the form of military organization.

SINCE we are scrutinizing ground force reserves in atomic warfare, let us agree that reserves are those combat forces assigned to a commander which he has not committed to action or to the use of another commander.

Brigadier General George E. Lynch, an occasional contributor to these columns (this is his third article in the past seven months), is Assistant Division Commander of the 43d Infantry Division in Europe.

The reserve force is to be found in every infantry and armored combat unit from company through division and in all combat formations above the division. Fairly obviously, the reserve exists to exploit offensive successes, to shore up defensive reserves, and to make it possible to give rest and revitalization to troops who have expended their energies and resources. These purposes seem to remain unshaken by the impact of atomic action. It is also significant that only recently the rifle company's "support" platoon changed its identity to "reserve" platoon, with the result that it is to be viewed as a dynamic, flexible element in contrast to its traditional role of a static, fixed force.

RESERVES in the battalion and on up through the division have ideally been at about a third or a quarter of the troop strength at each echelon. As often as not, reserves at these levels have been nonexistent or nearly so. In older wars of the 20th century, the number of divisions in corps, army, army group and theater reserves tended to approximate a third of the total number of divisions situated in the theater. But in World War II, the pattern differed sharply. The European Theater of Operations luxuriated in the few instances when it could lay claim to as much as ten per cent of its divisions being in strategic reserve. Corps and field armies were frequently fully committed. Reserves of divisions frequently doubled in harness by being counted as both division and corps reserve. This diminution of the reserve principle resulted in a very delicate balance which fortunately never became unseated. Perhaps the Western Allies' heavy preponderance of air strength served to relax the traditional need for ground force reserves. The unknown factors in this equation defy a mathematical solution. However, the total result was quite apparent. Strangely, the poverty of ground forces seemed to force the Western Allies to a strategy of continuous attack, for they were too weak to indulge in a deliberate intentional defense. Some general once said, "I am not strong enough to defend, therefore I must attack." Clausewitz also called the defense the stronger form of warfare.

The paucity of Western Allies' ground reserves in the Second World War, and the partial fulfillment of the reserve role by air forces did not eliminate the need for these missing reserves. This was most clearly and alarmingly demonstrated when Field Marshal Von Rundstedt launched the Battle of the Bulge. Theater reserves rushed to the battle, but these divisions were far too few for the task. Then, General Patton's Third Army performed a most remarkable movement. Within four days, six divisions of Third Army vacated their positions in which they had been in close engagement with German forces, and moved distances of as much as 100 miles, into action against the penetration. Third Army and its southern neighbor, Seventh Army, thinned out their forces, almost all of which were in active contact with the German armies, and in a general sliding movement to the north reorganized a continuous but greatly weakened front in Alsace and Lorraine. Third Army's six divisions had become in fact Theater reserves. Because of the flexibility of the several army commanders an the motorized and mechanized mobility of their troop units already committed in the front lines became The ter reserves and quickly intervened to save a situatio which otherwise could have been catastrophic. Perhap this action was the primitive origin of what may becom the pattern of reserve forces in atomic warfare. It is e tremely significant, and the principles involved wi receive further attention later in this examination.

Reserves in atomic warfare retain their traditional pu poses; however, the characteristics of atomic missiles i troduce certain changes of reserve forces' locations an missions. Both in attack and in defense, reserves hav been nominated as profitable atomic targets. Attractive ness as an atomic target will depend on the location an the formation of a particular reserve force. The economic of atomic warfare are still somewhat intangible, so mea urement of the results of atomic attacks against groun force reserves, in relation to the resources expended i the fabrication of the missile, is not too meaningfu Tactical advantages to be gained by atomic eliminatio of selected reserve forces may be so great that measur ment again cannot be expressed in specific terms. Thes matters must still fall into the fields of leadership an military art. Nevertheless, a local reserve of infantry ba talion strength would seem to be a profitable atom target if it is in position to exercise decisive influence o an action of importance, and if it is so disposed that a atomic missile could destroy or incapacitate the battalio


Reserve battalions of front-line regiments have, in th past, almost habitually been located so as best to a ticipate the ground action, and have been disposed in battalion mass for ease of communications, control an battlefield administration. This tendency is probably carry-over from older times, for modern communicatio and motor transport have long since erased the need f compact reserve formations. In fact, even aside fro atomic considerations, how much better a front line reg ment is prepared to handle local reverses if its reserv battalion is disposed laterally in company masses! In th case, no matter where the point of enemy penetration envelopment, the regiment has a force (reinforced com pany) reasonably close to the threat and capable of actin as a blocking force while the remainder of the reserv battalion is hastened to the scene to complete the missio There is also an additional advantage in time and spac in that, being disposed laterally in company masses, th battalion is virtually already in a dispersed column form tion which can start moving in any desired directio simultaneously *by company,* whereas a battalion in compact formation must uncoil and the movement do not start until its slowest company is ready. Figure 1 di grams the regimental atomic and traditional formation

THE same principles and time and space factors note above apply in the case of the infantry regiment i reserve, whether it is backing up the front line or is pa of a division which is itself in reserve. The infant regiment, by being dispersed in battalion masses behin the front line, can quickly bring the weight of a full i

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REGIMENT ON THE FRONT LINE

ATOMIC FORMATION



TRADITIONAL FORMATION



FIGURE 1

ntry battalion to bear at any part of the front or of the ttle position while the remaining two battalions are ut in motion to perform their assigned missions. Com-anies within these battalions achieve the same readiness d tactical advantages as outlined above for the regi-ental reserve battalion if they are in company masses. These formations are not intended to resemble in any ay the pre-World War II "Battalion Reserve Line" and Regimental Reserve Line." Those were static in con-pt whereas these formations possess mobility and readi-ss. Figure 2 shows divisional atomic and traditional rmations.

Masses smaller than company size are not suggested, r the company in battle is truly the smallest unit which ntains within itself most of the means for providing day-to-day needs.

The advantages cited above for the dispersion of local serves have been viewed with regard to normal as well to atomic effects. The vulnerability of reserves to atom-attack compels dispersion which compounds the ad-ntages inherent in the dispersed form in reserve forces.

HEATER reserves have, in previous wars, been lo-cated with regard to strategic threats and so that the nited mobility of foot and horse elements could match e calls made upon them. Also extended supply lines obably influenced the selection of theater reserve lo-tions. These locations were apt to be central and very ep. These older wars were sometimes characterized by e absence of the continuous front which appeared World Wars I and II. Deep central reserves were erefore a strategic necessity.

In future wars, the creation and maintenance of a ntinuous front promises to be a normal and primary jective of a prudent theater commander. Mobile re-ves can achieve their missions equally as well by lateral ovements parallel to the front from positions close up, they can from central positions deep in the rear. If the eater, army group and field army commanders have essed well, their reserves can be placed close to those rts of the front which are most critical. At the same time, motorized mobility will allow these forward reserves to speed to unanticipated distant situations, much in the manner of Third Army's rush to the Battle of the Bulge.

An enemy airborne capability will require the retention of some deep reserves.

The user of atomic missiles will, no doubt, select his tactical objectives and areas of decisive action as guided by existing principles of war. His atomic missiles may be used to pierce the enemy lines, or to eliminate the reserves which are capable of intervening in the area of decisive action or, if he is well endowed atomically, for both courses of action, separately or together.

In the atomic attack, the attacker will likely ready his exploitation forces to rush into the vacuum created by atomic penetration of the lines. If his atomic attack was aimed at the local reserves, with ground forces making a penetration of the front lines, exploitation forces will similarly be prepared to advance in conjunction with the atomic blow at the local reserves. In the attacker's case, the key will be the readiness of mobile exploitation forces (whether airborne, helicoptered, armored or motorized or a combination of these) and precise timing of the atomic blow to permit exploitation when the situation is most ready.

The defender must be so deployed and prepared that his reserves are not destroyed by the atomic attack; or, if key reserves are destroyed, that other forces can quickly intervene and carry on the mission of the destroyed reserves. At the same time, the defender's own atomic means will be geared to a counter-move against the attacker's reserves which will have been assembled to exploit the attack. In both cases, rapid and sound intelligence media are obvious requisites, and flexibility and rapidity of delivery of atomic missiles will be decisive.

Reserves of the defending forces must, then, be located close to the front so that those reserves which may have been eliminated by atomic blasts can be quickly replaced by lateral movement of mobile reserves of adjacent units —as in the case, again, of Third Army's action in the Battle of the Bulge. This points to an added mission for every front-line or local reserve force—that of specifically

being prepared and mobilized to replace the reserves of adjacent divisions and corps. The reserves of field armies and higher echelons will, as always, be prepared for any emergency in their respective areas or sector, but they must, like the local reserves, be prepared and mobilized for instant maneuver to restore the situation where mass atomic attacks may have wiped out the local reserves of sizeable portions of the front.

IN the defense, frontages and depths of battle positions will usually be of such generous proportions that no unusual difficulties will be found in situating reserves so that congested and inviting targets are not created. However, in the attack, there exists a common impulse for all supporting troops and local reserves to crowd the battle position. Commanders of these elements strive commendably to offer and to accomplish the most rapid service possible. Reinforcing artillery units, as well as those belonging to the attacking divisions, are compelled to seek positions quite close to the front in order to support the attack to the limits of their maximum range. Impetus of the attack will depend, in part, on continuing close follow-up by these same artillery units. Reserves which have been charged with exploitation or relief missions must similarly crowd the area close to the front so as to be able to execute their respective missions on short notice, and without delay or loss of time. In addition to the straining of all these units against the front, the width of this front must necessarily be considerably less than that of a defensive front in order to bring to bear the preponderance of force necessary to overcome the enemy resistance. Something must give—the contents exceed the capacity of the package! The only flexible dimensions in the problem appear to be time and the depth of corps and division zones. Conventional depths of zone used in World War II and in the pattern of maneuvers in 1953 simply cannot be followed or used as guides in atomic warfare. The rear boundaries of corps and divisions must move farther to the rear to provide room for tolerable troop densities. The additional rearward spaces thus provided must become the reservation of service units of the corps and divisions. The more forward areas vacated or made available by the relocation of service troops will provide living and operating room to local reserves and to supporting artillery units.


The dimensions of the areas required to provide living and operating room to attacking infantry and armor, to artillery and to service-support types can be determined. The factors will vary according to the terrain, the forces involved and the estimates of enemy atomic capabilities. Somewhere the decision must be made. Army units participating will usually be assigned to the corps. Units reinforcing the divisions will come from the corps, and other corps units will perform corps missions in the divisional areas. It seems clear, then, that the corps commander must compute the requirements for space in the divisional areas and must locate the divisional rear boundaries sufficiently deep to avoid congestion at the front. At the same time, he must coordinate precisely the movements of corps units whose missions require them to operate in the divisional areas. The resulting trend toward division rear boundaries farther to the rear might cause congestion in the area between division and corps rear boundaries unless the field army headquarters allows its corps latitude in establishing corps rear boundaries. The same degree of latitude will be necessary in the case of field army rear boundaries, although these are usually so far to the rear that atomic considerations will probably not affect them.

AT this point, some of us may wonder at the difference between this concept of the organization of a front and the concept of a deployment of troops wherein a perimeter or stronghold is formed, securing its service troops and installations within the position. This discussion so far has been predicated on the ability to create and maintain a continuous front. In event that the continuous front collapses or is seriously penetrated, troops must be capable of redeploying, either in the position or at a new location after withdrawal, into self-sustaining secure strongholds.

The pattern of a corps in action in atomic warfare a

DIVISION ON THE FRONT LINE

ATOMIC FORMATION



TRADITIONAL FORMATION



FIGURE 2

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A TYPE CORPS IN ACTION



All Infantry, Artillery and Armored elements of the Corps and its Divisions in this area.

All Divisional service elements in this area.

All Corps service elements in this area.

FIGURE 3

art of a continuous front is depicted in Figure 3. Its gnificance is threefold. The first is the elongation of ıe area from front-line regiments to corps rear boundary -this effect is not measurable in the diagram, but has just een discussed and is a critical factor in the planning at orps headquarters. The second effect is the specific ompartmentation of the battle position as a preserve for orps and divisional combat units; the division rear area or the location of divisional service units; and the corps ear area for corps service units and army service units upporting or attached to the corps. The third effect is ıe form of deployment of the four divisions of the corps. ll of the combat units of the corps are in the battle osition. The two center divisions are disposed in normal wo up and one back" formation. The two flank divions are in columns of regiments. Essentially the two ar regiments of the flank divisions form the corps reerve. In event of atomic attack against the corps, whethit be against the regiments in enemy contact, or against ıe regiments in rear, there is a regiment nearby which ın beat the enemy to the hole if one has been created the front line; or can move to replace another rear giment if it has been so damaged that it cannot carry ı its mission. It is also seen that each flank division is ready in column formation prepared to move as a divion to any desired point of action, in or out of the corps ne. This move can be initiated at once by the rear giments of the division. Meanwhile the committed giment of the division is relieved by the neighboring vision's reserve regiment, or a part of it so as to retain division reserve in the neighboring division. In atomic tack, whether the corps be the recipient or the user, ne is the most vital factor and this sort of disposition the corps provides the optimum of time. Figure 3 ows a type corps deployed for atomic action.

The pattern discussed above is only a pattern, and there will be variations to suit the terrain and the strength of the forces in attack and in defense. The unchanging factors will be the location of corps reserves in the forward areas, and organizational arrangements which permit rapid entry into local atomic situations, and disengagement of divisions for action elsewhere.

The typical corps deployment shown in Figure 3 might be thought to withhold too many regiments from enemy contact because of the column formation of the flank divisions. The formation shows only six of twelve regiments with enemy contact. In conventional deployment of the corps, it would be expected that the corps would place one of its four divisions in a relatively deep central reserve position. If the three-line divisions deploy conventionally, there will result six regiments on the line, which of course is the same front-line strength as in this atomic deployment of the corps.

ATOMIC action in ground warfare, as it has been discussed here, promises to require some sharp changes in functional thinking of field commanders. At present, decisions regarding the use of atomic missiles themselves tend to be vested in corps and higher commanders. No strong reasons for downgrading these decisions to division level are apparent. However, the deployment of divisional elements has traditionally been a responsibility of the division commander—and division commanders may not look kindly on what they could regard as a corps intrusion into division responsibilities. The maxim, "give the commander the mission and the means and let him determine how he will accomplish his mission," will not survive in atomic war. Corps commanders will necessarily find themselves charged with greater intimacy in the direction of operations of their divisions.

STRATEGY

INNER LINES: STRENG

COLONEL JOHN L. POWERS



Moltke's annotation of Jomini's theory fits today's situation:

The power and velocity of the new weapons gives the exterior position of the free world an opportunity to encircle the inner position of the Communist world



COLONEL JOHN L. POWERS, *Infantry*, presently a student at the Army War College, is a 1937 graduate of the Military Academy.

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OR WEAKNESS



HE position on the earth's surface of the two conflicting worlds—free and slave—is of vital interest to all soldiers. rtainly a consideration of the spatial relationship of the o in terms of the more powerful and faster weapons that ve emerged is of first importance. More specifically this quires giving thought to the question of whether the eory of interior lines retains the validity advanced by mini.

The Communist world covers about one-third of the earth's nd surface, is fairly compact and centrally located in rela- n to the bulk of the land areas of the earth. It is poorly uated to control the seas and the air.

The free world covers about two-thirds of the earth's land rface, is widely distributed and dependent upon the seas communication between its parts. It is favorably situated control the seas and the air.

In short, the Communist world is an interior position and e free world an exterior position.

This leads naturally to a consideration of the theory of terior lines. The chief exponent of that theory was mini, who wrote: "An army whose lines are interior and oser together than those of the enemy can by a strategic ovement overwhelm the enemy forces one after the other by reuniting alternately the mass of its forces." Clausewitz, although admitting that the theory was based "on the truth that the engagement is the only effectual means in war" nevertheless rejected it as "another instance of one-sided theory which was never able to govern real life."

The Prussian campaign against Austria in 1866, directed by Moltke, demonstrated rather decisively that the advantage of interior lines was only of relative significance. Moltke's words on the subject were: "The unquestionable advantages of the inner line of operations are valid only as long as you retain enough space to advance against one enemy by a number of marches, thus gaining time to beat and to pursue him, and then to turn against the other who is in the meantime merely watched. If this space, however, is narrowed down to the extent that you cannot attack one enemy without running the risk of meeting the other who attacks you from the flank or rear, then the strategic advantage of the inner line of operations turns into the tactical disadvantage of encirclement during the battle."

THIS statement deserves close examination. First, it indicates a belief that the inner line of operations constitutes a strategic advantage for the force employing them, but only when there is sufficient space to permit the defeat and pursuit of one enemy force without thereby creating the opportunity for another enemy force to attack the flank or rear. Secondly, it points out that if the space is insufficient and thereby permits an attack on the flanks or rear, the strategic advantage not only disappears, but is immediately replaced by the severe tactical disadvantage of encirclement.

This means that at some stage the force operating on interior lines is subject abruptly to transition from being at an advantage to being at a disadvantage.

The question becomes: what conditions effect this transition? The answer is: when the force employing interior lines cannot move to attack an enemy force without risking an attack on its flanks or rear by another enemy force.

The views of Jomini and Clausewitz on this question were conditioned by the speed of a man on foot or a horse. Moltke's included the speed of a railway. Likewise the observations of all three were conditioned to the limited artillery range of their day and the speed and destructive ability of nineteenth century cavalry. Air power was unknown; so was the land power moved by motor vehicles. So also were nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. But these facts do not alter the essential validity of the views held by Clausewitz and Moltke.


RATHER, the effect of these new machines and weapons is the extreme shrinkage of time and space factors and an enormous increase in destructive power. In short, the interior position held by the Communist world has been transformed by our new weapons from one of strategic advantage of interior lines to a disadvantageous position of tactical encirclement.

While it is granted that the concept of an area roughly 6000 miles by 2000 miles being tactically encircled may be difficult to grasp, the essential factor is present for modern sea and air power.

The Communist world is open to tactical encirclement by an attack on its flank or rear.

COMBAT

ATTACK ALONG A RIDGELINE



THIS article is taken from one of the most important and valuable books the Combat Forces Press has ever published.

Combat Actions in Korea, a book that tells the details of twenty separate small-unit battles of infantry, artillery and armor outfits of the Eighth Army, is a worthy companion to *Infantry in Battle,* the most famous small-unit action book ever published.

Combat Actions in Korea was conceived by Major General Orlando Ward when he was Chief of the Office of Military History, Department of the Army. Many Army historians participated in the collection and writing of the book but the principal participant was Captain Russell A. Gugeler, Artillery.

Each chapter of the book is concluded with a discussion that analyzes the action, points out errors of omission and commission, and emphasizes the lessons that are in the action. The discussion that follows the chapter used here was written for the Office of Military History by Lieutenant Nicholas A. Canzona of the U.S. Marine Corps.

The announcement of the book's publication appears on the back cover of this issue.

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CAPTAIN RUSSELL A. GUGELER

THE first break in the Naktong defense line at the central sector of the Pusan perimeter occurred during the early morning of 6 August 1950 when an estimated one thousand enemy troops crossed the Naktong River and penetrated the zone of the 34th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division. The regimental commander immediately committed his reserve and counterattacked, but the North Koreans clung to their bridgehead on the east side of the river. During the night the enemy moved sufficient forces across the Naktong to replace their losses and increase their strength. When the division commander, Maj. Gen. John H. Church, learned that the enemy h crossed the last good natural barrier southern Korea, he committed his serve, the 19th Infantry, in an effort drive the enemy back across the riv During the next few days Gene Church attacked with all the troops could muster from his own und strength division and from units attach to it by Eighth Army. The North K reans, however, continued to build their forces east of the Naktong.

By 8 August, North Koreans, totali a reinforced regiment, had waded t river and pulled raftloads of hea equipment, including trucks, across w



m. Two days later they appeared to
/e two regiments in strong positions
t of the Naktong. Consolidating all
ops in the southern part of his divi-
n zone under the command of Col.
n G. Hill, whose 9th Infantry Regi-
nt, 2d Infantry Division, was attached
the 24th Division to help restore the
ktong line, General Church ordered a
nterattack on 11 August. Task Force
ll's attack ran squarely into strong
my attacks and the entire operation
its direction and impetus in the re-
ting confusion. With communications
king much of the time and enemy
es scattered throughout a large area,
regimental commander summed up
chaos by saying, "There are dozens
enemy and American forces all over
area, and they are all surrounding
h other." During this period of grim
bat, a desperate effort was made to
vent collapse of the Naktong line,
ile North Koreans fought back with
al determination. Task Force Hill,
v comprising three infantry regi-
nts, launched a full-scale attack again on 14 August. It failed once more.

General Church ordered the attack to continue at 0630, 15 August. It would commence on the left (south) flank of the task force zone where the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, was to lead off in a column of companies. The battalion commander chose Company A to lead the attack.

Eighth Army planned maximum artillery support and gave Task Force Hill priority on tactical airplanes. Early that morning, however, it began to rain, and thick clouds along the ridgelines interfered with effective operation of the planes.

SOON after first light on the morning of 15 August, the commander of Company A summoned the leader of the 1st Platoon, Lt. Melvin D. Schiller, to whom he briefly outlined the plan of attack. Lieutenant Schiller, whose platoon was to lead the company column, had time only to take his squad leaders to high ground where he could point out to them the objective and the general route to be followed. The 1st Battalion's objective was a ridgeline a mile and a half long and approximately four hundred feet higher than the stream and the rice paddies at the ridge's base. There were several separate peaks along the crest of the ridgeline.

Followed by the rest of Company A, Lieutenant Schiller's platoon proceeded to the southeast end of the ridge, took up its attack formation, waited a few minutes until the end of a fifteen-minute artillery preparation, and then started up the ridge in a general northwest direction. Members of the platoon, knowing that the North Koreans had repulsed a similar attack that Company B had made two days before, expected trouble. For about a quarter of the distance, however, the platoon moved up the ridgeline without interference. Then two enemy machine guns, firing from the left, forced the platoon to the ground. When this happened, the company commander called Lt. Edward L. Shea and told him to take his 2d Platoon through the stalled unit and continue the advance. Lieutenant Shea and one of his squad leaders (SFC Roy E. Collins) exchanged dubious glances. Their platoon consisted of 9 inexperienced men and 24 replacements who had joined the company three days before.

Motioning his men to follow, Lieutenant Shea started up the ridge.



"Let's take a look at it," he said, as he strode off erectly. As he neared the 1st Platoon's position, enemy fire forced him to the ground. He crawled up beside Lieutenant Schiller who was lying on his stomach behind a native grave mound which was about four feet high, four feet in diameter, and covered with neatly trimmed grass. Lieutenant Schiller was trying to locate the two enemy machine guns that were holding up the advance. He and Lieutenant Shea suspected that the guns were located on the short hill on the left flank, since the string of enemy bullets seemed to cross just above the grave. Just as the two platoon leaders reached this conclusion, a bullet struck Schiller's helmet. It cut his head, followed the curve of his helmet, passed through his shoulder, and emerged to lodge in Shea's leg just above the knee. The two officers, both casualties, immediately directed their platoons to open fire against the enemy guns. Friendly fire caused the enemy guns to suspend fire, and the attack moved forward along the ridge top with the company commander, Lt. Albert F. Alfonso, directing the platoons.

THE two platoons worked well together, one group moving forward while the other fired at the enemy positions. Moving steadily, Company A soon reached the first high peak at the southwestern end of the ridgeline. It was about 0830 when the company stopped to plan for the continuation of the attack. There were freshly dug holes, but no enemy in the area.

Beyond this point the narrow crest of the ridge dipped slightly before rising again at the next peak. Formed by a spur ridge, the next high point appeared to be a rocky cliff, about four hundred yards away, which lay athwart the long ridgeline and the direction of attack. Just in front of the point where the cliff joined the main ridgeline, there was a depression, or saddle. During the few minutes that the company spent preparing to continue the attack, several of the men observed enemy soldiers movi near the saddle. On the previous da members of Company A had seen enemy machine gun firing from the t of the rocky cliff.

Lieutenant Alfonso pointed out t saddle in front of the rocky cliff and to MSgt. Willie C. Gibson (now leadi the 2d Platoon) to secure it. Alfonso th lined up the 1st Platoon behind an e bankment on the high ground and signed it the mission of firing at a enemy interference, and especially silence the enemy machine gun, if fired. Under the protection of the Platoon's base of fire, the 2d Platoo would dash along the 500-yard-lo ridge. Once the 2d was in the sadd the 3d Platoon would follow and rei force it.

SERGEANT GIBSON lined up h four squads in the order they were leave. He planned to follow the Squad. He detailed Sergeant Collins the end of the line to make certain th

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very man in the platoon moved out. pl. Leo M. Brennen (a squad leader nd veteran of the Pacific War who had ined the company three days before) raightened and partially pulled the pin n a grenade he carried.

"I'll be the first to go," Brennen said. The rest of you guys follow me."

Brennen jumped over the embankent and started running toward the bjective. Sergeant Collins checked his atch. It was 0845. Three other men llowed Brennen at fifteen-yard intels, all of them running just below the est of the ridge since enemy guns fired om the opposite, or southwest, side of e ridge. Just after the fourth man left, e North Koreans fired several short rsts from the machine gun on the rock iff, hitting two men from the 1st Plaon, one in the eye and the other in the ck. Both were killed at once.

"After that," one of the surviving men id, "it was just like jumping into ice ater."

But the rest of the platoon followed, ch man about ten or fifteen steps bend the man in front. No one was ounded until the next to the last man Cpl. Joseph H. Simoneau—rose to go. burst from the North Korean gun ruck him in the leg and shoulder. He lled, "I'm hit!" and fell back toward rgeant Collins. Collins pulled him ck, called the medics, and then, after tifying the leader of the 3d Platoon at he was the last man from the 2d, mped over the protective hump of dirt d ran.

This had taken no longer than five inutes. Sergeant Collins had gone only ew steps when Corporal Brennen, the d man, reached the end of the ridge. ter running the entire distance, Brenn looked over the low, pinched ridge parating him from the enemy-occcued ground and saw three North Koins sitting around their machine gun if they were relaxing. The gun was out twenty yards in front of him. ennen had one grenade ready to throw d he tossed it. As he did this, he ticed movement to his left and turned see another enemy light machine gun d its crew nearer than the first. He ed one clip from his rifle at them at e same time the machine gun fired at n. Corporal Brennen hit both enemy diers manning the gun, and believed killed them, but not until they had ot him through the leg. He slid down e hill a short distance to a protected a. A brief period of noisy, confused, d furious fighting followed.


As the members of the 2d Platoon reached the saddle, they formed a firing line along their side of the litle ridge. Lying close to the ground, they peered over the ridge frequently to observe and fire at the enemy, who was often only a few yards away. Three or four men who became casualties within a few minutes slid down the slope to join Corporal Brennen. There, Sergeant Gibson and a medic were now caring for the wounded.

Sergeant Collins, whom Lieutenant Shea had appointed second in command, reached the combat area a few minutes after the first burst of activity and took over the direction of the 2d Platoon. Like Corporal Brennen, Sergeant Collins carried a grenade with the cotter pin straightened and the ring over his index finger so that he could flip out the pin quickly. A few seconds after he reached the saddle there was a burst of fire from an enemy burp gun on the left flank. Collins ran back toward the bank on the left end of the firing line and looked over the ridge just as a North Korean rose to fire into the American line. Collins dropped his grenade on the enemy side of the hill and jumped to one side as a burst from the burp gun dug into the ground near him. His grenade-burst threw the burp gun into the air, and as Collins rose to look over the ridgeline again, another North Korean picked up the gun and tried to reload it. Sergeant Collins shot him with his rifle. At this moment SFC Regis J. Foley of the 3d Platoon came up to Collins.

ACCORDING to the plan, the 3d Platoon was to follow immediately after the 2d Platoon. Sergeant Foley, the first man behind Sergeant Collins, reached the saddle, but the next man mistakenly turned into another narrow area about two thirds of the way across. Consequently, the entire 3d Platoon was lost to the action since it came under such heavy enemy fire that it could move neither forward nor to the rear.

"Foley," said Sergeant Collins, "you watch this end and don't let them get up here."

Collins then started back along the line of riflemen where several gaps had occurred as men became casualties. Some men were already yelling that they were out of ammunition, even though each rifleman had carried two bandoleers and a full belt of M1 clips—a total of 176 rounds. Sergeant Collins knew they would need help to win the battle they had started. Unaware that the 3d Platoon had gone to the wrong area and was now pinned down by heavy enemy fire, and believing that it would soon join him, Collins sent a runner to the company commander asking for more help and for more ammunition. He especially wanted grenades, which were easy to toss over the ridgeline. While he waited for word from the company commander, he went along the line, taking ammunition from those who were wounded or dead and distributing it to the men who were effective. By this time most of the men



in the platoons were calling for help, wanting either ammunition or medics. In addition to the close-in fighting that continued, the enemy machine gun up on the rocky cliff had turned and was firing at the exposed rear of the 2d Platoon. Fire from this gun varied according to the amount of fire that the 1st Platoon's base of fire delivered against it. When the covering fire was heavy, the enemy gun was quiet; but it resumed firing when the 1st Platoon quit.

IT took Sergeant Collins's runner eight minutes to make his round trip. He returned with a note from Lieutenant Alfonso which read, "Pull out."

At the far right of the line, Cpl. Joseph J. Sady yelled for a grenade. "They're pulling up a machine gun here," he shouted.

Collins threw Lieutenant Alfonso's note down and took a grenade to Corporal Sady who tossed it over on the enemy gunners.

"That took care of them," he said.

An enemy rifleman, firing from a distance of ten steps, hit Corporal Sady in the head and killed him. The next man in the line killed the North Korean.

Sergeant Collins worked back along the line. At the left end Sergeant Foley, who had been stationed there to hold that flank, came sliding down the ridge bareheaded and bleeding. He had been hit by a split bullet that had apparently ricocheted from a rock and had cut into his head. Collins bandaged him and told him to go back and ask the company commander for more help. But as soon as he was gone, Sergeant Collins realized that because his ammunition was so low, and because less than half of his origina strength remained, he had no alternativ but to break contact and withdraw. H called down to tell Sergeant Gibson t start getting the wounded men out. Si men were wounded, two of them ser ously, and Gibson started to evacuat them by moving them down a gully be tween the two hills to a road at th bottom.

NEAR the center of the saddle a Negr rifleman, PFC Edward O. Cleaborn concentrated on keeping an enemy ma chine gun out of action. Standing up o the ridgeline and shooting down into th enemy side of the hill, he kept killin North Koreans who tried to man th gun. He was excited and kept firin rapidly, calling for ammunition and yel ing, "Come on up, you sons of bitche

DISCUSSION Lieutenant Nicholas A. Canzona

WHILE the American soldier is typified by courage, he is, at the same time, universally marked as an impulsive, intelligent individualist. Thus it is that strong leadership and guidance are necessary to weld a group of American soldiers into a singular unit of specific purpose. Without this directing strength at command level, each in the group will nobly carry on in his own merry way; and though the individual conduct of each might be highly commendable, the unit's mission can end in complete failure.

This fact is the underlying cause for the failure of Company A, 34th Infantry, in its attack on 15 August 1950.

If the aggressiveness and heroism of Brennen, Collins, Cleaborn, Sady, and others had been organized into a single, vigorous effort against the enemy, the objective would have been secured. Instead, each of these able fighters carried on his own private war, while the acting leader of the 2d Platoon was caring for wounded, and the company commander was entrenched with a base of fire five hundred yards away.

Correct and successful command at the platoon and company levels is not conducive to long life, because the commander must constantly expose himself in order to lead and maintain control. The commanding officer of Company A was conspicuously absent in action and decision from the time that he failed to join the 1st Platoon when it was first hit by long-range fire, until the very end of the engagement when the survivors of the 2d Platoon withdrew from the bloody threshold of victory.

IT was unfortunate that the leading platoons lost their brave but reckless lieutenants when the battle had hardly begun. Had the leader of the 1st Platoon considered the enemy's point of view for only a moment, he would have realized that a conspicuous grave mound would be top priority for a machine gunner firing from a distance of several hundred yards. Taking extreme ranges into consideration, it is highly possible that the North Korean gunner did not even see the lieutenant, but was merely firing at a likely target. The 2d Platoon leader committed a grave error and set a poor example by joining the other officer within the narrow confines of the tempting target. What more bitter lesson against bunching up could be learned than to have two unit commanders became casualties as a result of *one* bullet? This disaster was an appropriate climax to the scene which just previously found the 2d Platoon leader walking erect along the crest of a hill that was under fire.

A study of the terrain would indicate that the company commander could have moved his entire unit into position on the high ground of the larger hill. Had he taken advantage of the natural cover afforded by the ridgeline, his company might have accomplished this movement without sustaining a casualty. Then, with the company organized in the area which was used for the base of fire, the commander could have devised any number of plans involving mancuver, supporting arms, and assault for seizing the remainder of his objective.

But he first set a bad precedent when he allowed the 1st Platoon to halt as it came under long-range machine-gun fire. Instead of directing that unit to continue the attack, he impulsively pushed the 2d Platoon into the lead. It is noteworthy here that another platoon became lost and immobilized later during the crucial stage of the battle.

The company commander should have been the key figure in the final phase of the attack; he should have been the spirit of a two-platoon assault which never materialized. Instead, remaining five hundred yards behind with the base of fire, he was so unable to control the two leading platoons that one of them even became lost and completely ineffective.

Judging from the fact that the 2d Platoon fought a large number of the enemy at a distance of only a few yards it is evident that the Americans were practically in the heart of the North Korean position when they came to halt. Then, for several minutes, bravery and sacrifice—which could have won the day—went for naught; and a great number of casualties was sustained without decision being forced.

Had the company commander fo

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nd fight!"

Sergeant Collins told him to get down n the ground, but Cleaborn said, "Ser-eant, I just can't see them when I get own."

About this time an enemy soldier mped over the little ridge and landed n top of Sergeant Collins who was ripping ammunition from one of his en who had just been killed. The Jorth Korean grabbed Sergeant Collins y the waist and held on tightly. Seeing is, Cleaborn jumped down and started ter the North Korean who kept hiding ehind Sergeant Collins. Collins even-ually persuaded Cleaborn that the en-ny soldier wanted to surrender, and leaborn went back to the firing line. ollins pushed his prisoner down to the tch where Gibson was evacuating the ounded. Sergeant Gibson loaded the prisoner with the largest wounded man who had to be carried out, and started him down the gully toward the road.

BY the time Sergeant Foley returned with a renewal of the company commander's instructions to withdraw, the evacuation of all wounded men was under way. As men left the firing line, they helped the wounded. Only six men remained in firing positions and several of these were so low on ammunition they had fixed their bayonets. Sergeant Collins told the six to fire a heavy blast at the enemy's position, and then move out quickly. All but Cleaborn fired a clip of ammunition and then started to leave. He reloaded his rifle and said he wanted to fire one more clip. As he jumped back on the ridge to fire again, he was killed by a bullet through his head. Sergeant Collins and the remaining five men ran back along the ridgeline, the route of their advance.

It was 0932 when the men reached the little spur from which the 1st Platoon had been firing, just forty-seven minutes after the attack had begun. Of the original 36 men in the 2d Platoon that morning, only 10 were unharmed. Nine wounded men walked or were carried down the ditch to the road, three dying before reaching the road. The other members of the platoon were dead.

The 1st Battalion's attack had been stopped. Other elements of Task Force Hill encountered similarly stubborn resistance, and during the afternoon the commander of the force recommended to General Church that the attack be discontinued and that the force dig in to defend the ground it occupied.

lowed the 2d Platoon, he could have spurred it into an assault. With men like Cleaborn and Collins setting the pace, the North Korean soldiers probably would have reeled back and retreated or surrendered. Moreover, it is probable that the 3d Platoon would not have strayed into temporary oblivion had it been following on the heels of a watchful company commander. Even after this unit had wandered into the draw, it certainly could have been retrieved under sufficient prodding. Could it have fared any worse than to lie exposed and inmobile under the barrels of two enemy automatic weapons? Hardly!

Although the enemy force could have been eliminated by a combination of aggressive leadership and small-arms fire, the apparent lack of artillery support during this attack is enough to shake the foundations of The Artillery School at Fort Sill. In the introduction to the battle account, there is mention of the fact that Eighth Army planned "full artillery support." Where was it? Why was it not employed when a relatively small group of enemy on a prominent terrain feature held up a battalion attack? If the enemy's guns were periodically silenced by sporadic bursts from Company A's base of fire, surely white phosphorus and high-explosive shells would have wrought havoc with such cautious defenders.

ONCE again the big gap between tactical theory and practice is glaringly exposed by the bland statement: *"After* an artillery preparation, the attack moved off about 0700." Company A then had to proceed a mere one and one-half miles, while unmolested enemy gunners lolled pleasantly in their holes and fingered their triggers expectantly.

When once the area occupied by the enemy was known, not only artillery, but also mortars and recoilless rifles could have rained a devastating barrage of steel and fire into the hostile position.

The layout of the terrain and the location of the enemy's defenses were ideal for maximum fire support throughout all but the assault phase of the attack. Shielded with covering fire, Company A could have retained excellent control to a point from which the final, victorious assault could have been launched.

Another deadly, disquieting annoyance for the North Koreans might have been in the form of flanking and frontal machine-gun and rocket-launcher fire delivered from the center and northwest portions of the larger hill. Such weapons would have been able to give added protection to the 2d and 3d Platoons until they were in position to assault.

Why small-unit commanders overlook the lifesaving potential of supporting arms, and why higher commanders tolerate that oversight, are questions which cry futilely for logical answers.

IN general, nothing but the highest praise is sufficient for the individual conduct of the soldiers of Company A throughout this action. Although their lieutenants were wounded early, leaving them nothing in the way of leadership except long-range encouragement from their company commander, they closed with the enemy, clung tenaciously to a position of bitter attrition, and inflicted many casualties on a foe who was flushed with victory and confidence. When ordered to withdraw, they did so in an orderly fashion, ensuring that wounded comrades among them were first removed to safety. Even in this last, most distasteful of all military maneuvers, they acquitted themselves with honor, despite the fact that they had no really effective covering fire.

It was indeed fortunate for the men of the 2d Platoon that the flame of natural leadership in Sergeant Collins burned brightly during this engagement. Had it not been for his initiative and exemplary action, the plight of the platoon might have ended as complete catastrophe.

Noble as his sentiments might have been, the NCO acting as 2d Platoon leader picked a poor time to work as a medic. While his command was being decimated, he should have played a role far more active than that of comforter to the afflicted.

That Cleaborn and others were probably carried away by temporary fanaticism—to the point of paying for it with their lives—is certainly not to the discredit of these men. Had an experienced commander been present to maintain control and demand discipline, it is very possible that these soldiers might still be alive. Or, at least, they would have had a victory in return for their supreme sacrifice.

The Month's Reading

Press On with the Beer

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
(Personal Minutes, June-December 1944)
Triumph and Tragedy
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953

PRIME MINISTER TO SECRETARY FOR WAR 20 Nov. 44

Good. Press on. Make sure that the beer—four pints a week—goes to the troops under the fire of the enemy before any of the parties in the rear get a drop.

The Way It Is

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DONALD L. PUTT
Commander, Air Research & Development Command
Speech, Harrisburg, Pa.
10 March 1954

During the recent "March of Dimes" campaign the Air Research and Development Command collected a sizeable contribution by staging a basketball game between a team of colonels and a team of master sergeants. Some people appeared surprised when the *colonels* won, but not so a grizzled old master sergeant. Turning to one of his men he was overheard to growl: "No wonder those youngsters won. After all, in this man's Air Force it takes less time to become a colonel than a master sergeant!"

What Is the General Staff?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER L. WEIBLE
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations & Administration
Speech, Washington, D. C.
25 March 1954

In the minds of some Americans, the term "General Staff" has taken on sinister connotations—not because of what it is but because of the way some other countries, most notably Germany, have abused it. . . .

The General Staff of the United States Army is nothing more, actually, than an administrative system, corresponding to the administrative systems which are widely employed in industry. In its General Staff, the United States Army has agencies to coordinate all planning and activity in the major fields of Army responsibility. These fields of activity are classified as personnel matters; intelligence matters; planning, training, and operations matters; and logistics matters. This system exists at all echelons down to include divisions. Thus, just as a corporation has its Vice President in charge of personnel, the Army has its G1. A corporation has a Vice President in charge of production, the Army has its G3 and G4. In sum, the General Staff is the special instrument of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff for the coordination of activities of the various specialized agencies of the Army. . . .

One misunderstanding which has prevailed widely is that our General Staff, like the old Prussian General Staff, is a career field. Apparently there are those who think that there is a body of officers specializing exclusively in General Staff duty, in contrast to the "line," which is made up o the personnel who serve with troop units. A further mis conception is that there exists antagonism between line an staff. Both these beliefs are completely erroneous.

In the United States Army, staff duty—including Genera Staff duty—is merely one of the many types of assignment which every officer can expect to perform at one time o another during his military service. It is not a career fiel in itself. . . .

Engineered 'Scorched Earth'

MAJOR GENERAL G. N. TUC
The Royal Engineers Journal
March 1954

Sad as it may be for the ally who is closest to the aggres sor, the hard fact must be accepted that against modern weapons it may not be possible to halt the superior air an ground forces of an aggressor at the frontier. Of course a aggressor can be hit at long range, but his momentum wil carry him so far. In this event, while offering tenaciou resistance, it would be possible to create in the path of th enemy a transportation desert in order to slow his advance The Germans did this effectively in their 1917 strategi withdrawal, but of course they had time to do a methodica and painstakingly thorough job. Even in limited time, an in face of rapid advance, it is suggested that engineers to-day 35 years later, equipped with modern machines and power could rip the bottom out of every airfield, road, railway bridge and bridle path, and sow mines in the resultin debris. The enemy cannot fight without forward airfields o without means of transport for fuel and ammunition. Ce tainly hardy troops could live on the country for a while but even Napoleon's Revolutionaries were halted by th desolation east of the lines of Torres Vedras. Behind suc a belt of scorched earth the defending tactical air force should be able to regain air superiority, and the land force should have time to reinforce and to organize offensiv counterthrusts.

PIO Is a Reporter

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of Information
U.S. Navy Public Relations Newslett
5 March 1954

A Navy captain with an excellent operational reputatio and an engaging personality remarked: "The Navy's bes public relations is simply to do a top-notch job. We don have to go around bragging about it—the American peopl will know it!" While we're willing to credit the America people with innumerable capabilities, mental telepathy isn one of them. They do have a thoroughly human curiosit about just how the Navy is using their money and we hav a definite responsibility to let them know.

. . . Just as a commander has an administrative sectio

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harged with seeing that the necessary reports go in to his eniors in the chain of command, in the same manner he as a public information section to make sure continuous eports are put out to the very top echelon of command—the merican people.

Some naval officers still confuse public information with ropaganda. The right outlook should be the same one taken n getting up a report to a senior. Make it factual and to ie point. If you try to color it or distort it to make you ook better, you're in for a rough time when the truth comes ut—which it will.

* * *

If you fail to keep the public informed, you can hardly lame them for feeling you can't be doing so well—otherwise hat are you trying to hide? If their doubts grow too big, we on wouldn't have a Navy suitable for the tremendous job iat must be done in any future war. If we don't have a itable Navy, we wouldn't have a Nation for long. It's as mple as that.

After the Bombers Pass

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. DEAN
The Saturday Evening Post
27 February 1954

On June sixteenth, we moved south again—for once, traving in daylight. I had a chance to see fields planted where ties had been, bomb-resistant villages hastily built in cans, and the railroad lined at every stream with whole idge sections ready to be shoved in place if existing bridges ere bombed. I think no major bridge had escaped bombing. ut I was ready to believe the North Koreans who claimed at they could have trains running within hours after any w bombing. I also saw elaborate truck hide-outs in cans. The few houses still standing in the villages were npty of people, but crammed with boxes and sacks of mili-y supplies. Roads had traffic-control points, complete with okouts and flagmen, every two kilometers.

Radar Defense of U.S.

SIR ROBERT WATSON-WATT
Foreign Affairs
January 1954

(Sir Robert was a pioneer in radar development, especially in iginating and perfecting the radio-location system.)

May I now, in conclusion, interview myself briefly?

Question 1: "Can a radar network be designed, on the nowledge available to us within 1953, to give certain warng at a defense command center of the passage of any airaft over a frontier lying outward, by about six hours flying ne, from any major target of attack in the continental nited States?"

Answer 1: "My personal answer is broadly 'yes,' but it is bject to many reservations and explanatory supplements nich cannot be set out within the limits of an article."

Question 2: "Can an aircraft crossing this frontier be entified within 15 minutes to the degree of being classed 'very probably hostile' or 'very probably friendly'?"

Answer 2: "I do not think that an adequate or nearly adeate solution to this problem has yet been found."

Question 3: "Can the early-warning network envisaged in Questions 1 and 2 ensure the destruction of an overwhelmingly large fraction of a hostile force before it reaches a major target?"

Answer 3: "Not without the absolutely indispensable activities of an inner radar network for control of interception, and of a very large, exquisitely organized and stringently practised interceptor force."

Question 4: "Can such a destruction ratio as is envisaged in Question 3 be achieved without the network of Question 1 and the organization envisaged in Answer 3?"

Answer 4: "Quite certainly not without the latter, almost certainly not without both; almost certainly 'yes' if both are well designed and well operated."

Question 5: "Are these two radar networks and the elaborate interceptor organization indispensable to the defense of the United States, having regard to other military deterrents to aggression against the United States?"

Answer 5: "Yes."

Question 6: "Do you think the United States economy can afford the provision and operation of this threefold defense system, together with the other deterrents mentioned in Answer 5?"

Answer 6: "Yes. Expensive as they are, they are certainly within the reasonable reach of an economy with a present Gross National Product valued at a billion dollars a day. A just appreciable reduction of the material standard of living in the United States would probably be involved; but it would not be more than a minute fraction of the hardships still being suffered by every nation outside North America on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This I say not from secondhand information only, but from personal observation, in and since World War II, in every continent save Australasia and on both sides of the Iron Curtain."

Question 7: "Have you anything more to say on aids to averting successful aggression against North America?"

Answer 7: "Yes, two widely different things. First, that we must not underestimate the risk that isolated defense airfields, in the Far North for example, *could* become intermediate airfields used by the aggressor. Second, that as words are still triggers that release bombs, we should be diligent to use no word that tends, avoidably, to unite the ordinary citizens of Soviet and satellite lands with their dictatorial masters."

Investment in the Army

WALTER LIPPMANN
The Washington Post and Times-Herald
25 March 1954

The American people have gotten to know the Army well because so many millions of them have been in the Army. They do not exactly think the Army is perfect, nor do they love it without reservation. Yet there is scarcely a family in the country which does not have invested in the Army something personal and poignant. Just about the last thing they would think of complaining about is that this Army, which has just fought a murderous war against armed Communists, and not merely against fifth amendment dentists, is coddling Communists.



Off-duty life on Okinawa can be as pleasant as life along the Florida Panhandle whose climate it resembles.

OKINAWA

Life on the 'rope in the sea'

MAJOR MARCO POLO

AROUND THE BASES—5

THERE was a time, not long ago, when assignment to Okinawa was like being sent to the ends of the earth. But times have changed, and so has the Ryukyus Command. Today Okinawa is a fine place to be stationed if you don't suffer from the geographic claustrophobia some people get on islands.

"Oki," as those who have lived there usually refer to it, is a narrow matchstick sticking out of the sea between Japan and Formosa. The island is 67 miles long and from three to 10 miles wide. The southern half of the island is rolling, and has most of Okinawa's towns, farms, roads and people. Northern Okinawa is mountainous, sparsely populated, and practically inaccessible except for practicing infantrymen and other rugged walkers.

The island is one of the United States' important outposts on the edges of the Asian mainland. The Ryukyu Islands group is a series of islands lying like a string of beads (Okinawa means "rope in the sea") running between Japan and Formosa. Okinawa itself is about 440 nautical miles from Shanghai, 400 from Formosa, 840 from Tokyo and 6,000 from San Francisco. The island group sneaks up to within sight of the southernmost Japanese island, but few of the Ryukyus are inhabited. Okinawa proper is the only one upon which American troops are stationed.

The people are Asiatic, primarily of Japanese descent but darker and stockier than most Japanese. The language of Okinawa is Japanese, although the culture is a mixture of Japanese and Chinese, with a sprinkling of local art and customs. They are a rugged people who live close to the land and the sea.

Most American troops on the island are Air Force, since Okinawa is an important air base. Bombers from the islan flew combat missions over Korea a through the fighting there. The Army however, maintains a regimental comba team, a number of technical and suppor units, and a military government de tachment.

Normal tour of duty on Okinawa 15 months these days, but if dependen go, their sponsor must stay at least a yea after his family joins him. Since ther is a three-month wait for dependen now (it has been as high as 18 months you can expect to stay on Oki about year and a half.

The journey out is normally by boa Both you and your dependents will prob ably leave from San Francisco, and yo can expect the trip to take from 20 25 days. Air travel to the island is rar although some families are now retur ing to the States by plane. Concurrer travel to the island is not authorized.

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Living is comfortable. There was a me when quarters were none too ood. A one-time deputy commander eported he liked it fine except that his ouse, like most other military quarters n the island, had a tin roof, and it was irectly in line with the foot of a bomber unway. Every time one of the big lanes took off he had a sensation that ust be similar to that of a mouse in a ass fiddle. New housing has been built st the past couple of years, and now ou will find family quarters in solid, omfortable concrete houses with asphalt le floors. Closets are big, there are airy orches, and the houses are typhoon roof. This last is important on an island hat experiences one or two typhoons a ear; gales are so violent that they ac-ually have blown the paint off an auto-obile.

URNISHINGS in family quarters are good, but prospects for the future aren't right. This disappointing lag in progress simply because we are no longer on an ccupation status. As trustees for the Inited Nations we are building a local dministration (the islands themselves ill belong to Japan). Result, as far as ving conditions are concerned, is that rniture that was once manufactured y the island as part of occupation pay-ents is no longer available. Small items ke end tables, lamps, and other furnish-gs not normally considered Quarter-aster issue will be issued only until ocks are depleted.

So you will be smart to take lamps ith you, as well as the other bric-a-brac nd small items of furniture you feel ou will need to make living more com-rtable. Rugs are not an item of issue nd it is not wise to bring yours along ; they may be susceptible to mildew. rass and fiber rugs are on sale for low rices on the local market and most peo-le have found them highly satisfactory.

Take your electrical appliances with ou. They will all work without adjust-ent since power on Okinawa is the me 110 volt, 60 cycle current you have the States. Your normal Stateside dio will bring in the 17-hour a day roadcasting schedule of the Armed orces Radio Service stations, but many eople like to have a short wave set that ill pick up stations in the United tates, the Philippines and Japan. There no television on Okinawa, and it does ot appear likely that there will be a deo station for a long time. There does ot seem much chance that AFRS will o into video any time soon.

You will want a washing machine, nce the Okinawan climate will keep your clothes hamper full. It had best be a non-automatic type, because the supply of spare parts for the automatic models is not satisfactory.

Bring your pots and pans and kitchen utensils. However, a cautionary note is in order: Okinawa is a hot and humid land and the air is salty, and rust is a common household nuisance. For that reason aluminum, copper and/or stainless steel equipment is more satisfactory than iron or tin.

The same consideration is important in selecting the furniture you will take with you. You can get along on what the Quartermaster will furnish, and you might be wise to do it. In any event firmly resist any impulse to tote along your overstuffed pieces, good leather-topped tables or desks—anything that can't endure dampness and mold.

The exception is beds. Take your own, because QM mattresses are . . . you supply the description from your own experience.

Include in your household goods a few simple tools—hammer, saw, screwdrivers and so on—and a collection of nails, screws, nuts and bolts, and other small hardware. Such items, hard to come by on Okinawa, are necessary to the maintenance of your quarters.

Shopping facilities on the island are generally good, but there are a few items you will want to stock up on before you leave the States. Take plenty of shoes, and a good supply of "findings" if the love-light of your life has a hankering to be a seamstress.

OKINAWA is a coral island, and the rocks are hard on shoes. Also, you will walk a lot because much of the recreation is outdoors on the beaches, the golf course, or picnicking. The climate is good, and will keep you outside. The weather is about like northern Florida's, with summer's high temperatures seldom getting above 90 and winter days almost never dropping below 45. Highest temperature ever recorded was 96, and the lowest 41. The year-round average is 72. Humidity is high, staying largely in the 90s during the summer.

Temperature and humidity make clothing hard to care for, and have made Okinawa a pretty casual station as far as dress is concerned. On duty, soldiers wear summer cottons except from 1 January to 14 March. Civilian clothes are authorized off duty. The ladies find that cottons and a couple of light suits will carry them for daytime wear. They will need a couple of formals, but they should be simple, cool, and easy to care for. They go months without wearing a hat on Okinawa, but rain and wind make the ubiquitous scarf one of Oki's most popular items of wearing apparel.

"Washable" is the keynote for Okinawan clothing. Dry cleaners on the island are not equipped to handle delicate materials.

YOU will find shopping facilities spotty. The commissaries are good, carrying a full line of canned goods, frozen fruits and vegetables, and an excellent supply of meat. There is a full supply of milk from the reconstitution plant on the island. There are some fresh vegetables available through the commissaries, which are locally produced on farms inspected and approved by the Army. All in all, the food supply for the military families on Okinawa is as good as in most outlying areas of the world.

Actually fresh vegetables are in short supply at times and some military families have found gardening helps supplement the deficiency. If you are interested you would be wise to stock up on seeds, both vegetable and flower, before you leave the States. The soil is fertile and gardening can be fun. However, if you aren't the "green thumb" type you can hire a native gardener for $12 a month, maybe less. Household help is cheap in Okinawa and $12 is about the top wage paid or asked.

The Post Exchanges are like PXs everywhere. They have a good supply of tobacco and toilet articles and other odds and ends. But don't plan to dress yourself or your children from their counters. Children's clothes, shoes, underthings, women's clothes, hose, cosmetics, are all in short supply and all (the clothes, that is) look pretty much alike. Items of uniform and some sports clothes are available in the PXs.

The ladies will want to stock up on cotton underthings (the humidity makes nylon clammy and uncomfortable) and on those little boot-socks called "peds" before leaving the States. What is true of nylon slips is also true of stockings. Hose are seldom worn in the daytime.

As I have said before in this series, it is wise to leave a file of sizes and color and style preferences with the personal shopper in your favorite United States department store before going to Okinawa. You will make good use of such a service. And take a mail order catalogue or two; it takes six weeks to two months to get mail order delivery on the island, but it will be worth it for such things as children's shoes and toys, and some sporting equipment.

You will find yourself doing a lot of shopping by mail. Since the States are



Picnics are popular and some Okinawa scenery is ruggedly impressive. You can wear mufti off duty.

so far away, the mail order facilities of Japan and Hong Kong will tempt you, and you should try them. For men, Hong Kong has several excellent tailors who will provide good suits quickly and far cheaper than you could get at home.

Outside of the military facilities such as the PX and commissary, stores on Okinawa will meet some of your needs nicely, others not at all. There are a few large department stores there, that handle many things of interest to the service family. The women will be fascinated by the yard goods, imported from Japan, the Philippines and Hong Kong. Material, weave, finish and price are all attractive, but here is where they will need the findings they brought from home, because such things as thread, buttons and binding tape are scarce on Okinawa.

Also available on the local market are jewelry (they cultivate pearls on Okinawa; some of them are black and extraordinarily handsome), some works of art, small items of furniture, grass rugs, and china. Glasses, however, are hard to come by and it is wise to leave home with a good stock of the dime-store variety for family use.

THERE are automobile agencies on the island, too. You can buy a Ford or General Motors car for just about what it would cost you in California (without California's personal property tax) except for an added $300 or so shipping charge. You can escape this freight cost if you go to Okinawa without an automobile, buy one there for delivery to the U.S. port, and have it shipped on your travel orders. This is a good plan if you need a new car except that it takes time, and, despite the island's smallness, you will find an automobile an awfully handy thing on Oki.

With several automobile agencies on the island, there is very little service problem. However, the climate is hard on cars, so yours should be in good shape before you leave the States; and have it undercoated and put on a coat of some long-lasting finish protector to guard the paint and chrome from the salt air, which raises hob with paint jobs and unprotected metal. The only special regulation you will meet with your car on Okinawa is a $1.00 annual licensing fee.

Since most of the recreation is outdoors, and since the weather is as good as it is, you will find your car in steady use going to the beaches, golf courses, tennis courts, picnics, or just sight seeing.

In addition to the usual outdoor sports, Okinawa offers three spectator sports not common in the United States. Cockfighting, a favorite Okinawan game both for the sport and the gambling it provides, is a national pastime. Every village has its bird pit, and the fights draw big crowds. There is bullfighting too, of a kind almost unknown anywhere else in the world. Instead of pitting bull against man, as in Spain and Mexico, the Okinawans pit bull against bull. The huge animals are carefully bred and trained, and the fights are a riot of action. Trainers work in the fighting rings with their animals, urging them on with word and rope, and there is strong partisanship in the crowd. Bulls seldom are killed in these fights, but it is far from gentle.

A THIRD Okinawan fighting sport is the battle between mongoose and snake. Most Americans have never seen a mongoose, but the scrappy little animals are common on Oki. The natives not only use them to hunt snakes, but pit them against the poisonous "Habu" snake in public fights.

Also for recreation there are hunting and fishing. Most people turn to dee sea fishing, although there is some rea sonably good fresh water fishing on th island. As for hunting, there are duck and doves and some tiny quail, and ther are rumors that there are boar in th northern mountains. Soldiers frequentl make up hunting parties to go after th wild pigs, but seldom if ever bag one.

If you are one of those who dislike t have your recreation and exercise g hand in hand, the island has an exce lent network of service clubs and hobb shops, and the officers' clubs sponsor formal dance every now and then.

The schools on Okinawa are ver good. Operated by the military, the provide kindergarten and grades fro first through 12th year. School bus carry the students back and forth, an lunches are available at school at sma cost.

Since the war the Okinawans hav developed a sincere interest in educatio and there is a university on the islan now, but college level study for depen ents of military personnel is not avai able on the island.

SOUTH of Naha, Okinawa's principa city, is "Suicide Cliff," where hun dreds of Japanese soldiers killed then selves in the summer of 1945 rath than surrender to United States troop The island was die-hard enemy ter tory. Today nearly 60,000 Okinawar work for the United States militar forces, diligently and with often-den onstrated loyalty. These people, as we as their island, are turning into an im portant outpost in the struggle for hu man freedom, and the American servin on Oki advances that struggle both b what he does on the job and what h does in his dealing with the island people. It is an interesting and hearte ing assignment.

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MANPOWER

WHERE CAN WE GET THE FIGHTING MEN?

MAJOR IRVIN M. KENT



The hazards of combat impose physical and mental limits on the fighting man.

Our goal has to be—
Every fit man trained
to be a fighter;
Every other man
trained to do the
essential job he
can best perform

MAJOR IRVIN M. KENT, Judge Advocate General's Corps, was a platoon leader and company commander in the 60th Infantry, 9th Division, during the 1944-45 campaigns in Europe. He entered the Army in 1942 from Syracuse University where he had earned a commission in the ORC. He left the service in 1946 to attend Harvard Law School. After graduation, he served as a government attorney in Nuremberg and reentered the service in 1948 while still in Germany. He successfully completed a competitive tour for a regular commission in the JAGC and is now on duty in Washington.

WORLD WAR II and Korea have taught us that there is a maximum time limit to the physical and mental hazards imposed on the combat soldier and after that limit is reached his performance in battle doesn't even measure up to the minimum standards of fighting efficiency.

This raises a question: Where are the replacements to come from so that the Army can relieve the soldier when his usefulness in combat is ended?

The answer, it seems to me, must be: In case of a general war every mentally and physically qualified man must expect to do his fair share of combat duty. This regardless of the service—Army, Air Force, or Navy—that he joins.

The Army *alone* cannot supply the answer. As we found out in 1944-45, it is going to be necessary to put men who were initially in the air and service forces into the lines as infantrymen. This is not something to be deplored but to be expected and therefore planned. By the very nature of war some branches of the military and naval services have more men (actually and percentagewise) who do not directly see combat or even combat type conditions than others. Such services get a larger number of volunteers who thus successfully avoid combat dangers and hardships. To permit a physically and mentally fit man to be almost assured of avoiding combat by volunteering for a particular service is a national failure to assure best use of available combat qualified manpower. It also imposes an unfair burden on too small a percentage of men and unnecessarily reduces the efficiency of our ground force combat units.

To overcome this handicap we must now, before general mobilization begins, make certain interservice regulations and agreements as to the mutual transfer of manpower (perhaps on a loan basis), without depriving the career soldier, sailor or airman of his long-run promotion and retirement rights and benefits.

TO start with first things first, if we are not to waste combat qualified manpower we must see that combat qualified men are not assigned to jobs which command less than their full capabilities unless the man has already served his combat tour. Before going further, it is necessary to define the term "combat qualified." Combat qualified, in my opinion, means that combination of physical *and* mental ability to meet and withstand the rigors of the modern battlefield for an extended period of time. It cannot mean merely physical stamina alone, nor merely nervous stability alone. Many men physically fit for front-line duty are incapable of maintaining nervous stability under the pressures of modern combat for more than very short periods of time. Likewise, many men with perfect nervous stability, who would be able to go for months in combat without breaking mentally, are physically incapable of enduring the bodily hardships that go with combat.

It is equally necessary for us to define the term "job capability." Thus, when

One aid to classification. With rare exceptions every man physically able to fight should be trained as a fighter no matter what other potential skills he may possess.





The cook in a rifle company must come closer to the physical standards of a rifleman than the cook back at ComZ or ZI, so also with clerks and drivers.

we say that a man may not hold a job below his capabilities, we must think not merely in terms of physical or mental capabilities alone, but of the sum total, and while doing so we must keep in mind that there are and will be rare specialties, where men with special abilities would be more useful to the nation in a non-combat assignment than they would be in a combat assignment, regardless of how well they are otherwise qualified for such combat assignment. For example, men with very rare language capabilities might be needed for liaison or intelligence work in areas that may be far removed from active theaters of operation. Highly skilled cryptographers may well fall into the same category. However, such skilled persons would probably never total more than one or two percent of our service manpower, if indeed the figure would be that high.

Thus, each job within the Department of Defense must have not one but two physical profiles applicable to it: a minimum and a maximum. *The only acceptable excuse for a man holding a job below his own capabilities in time of general war should be either that he has already served his combat time and has been rotated out of combat, or that he has completed combat training, but has not yet been called into the replacement stream.* Naturally, every rule has its exceptions and the exception to this rule is that of a man possessing rare skills.

THIS establishment of job profiles must be far more complete than anything we have in the past attempted and it must go into every field and every branch. Merely to set minimum and maximum standards for infantry, artillery, quartermaster, and such is futile and wasteful. For example, the company clerk of a rifle company of a combat organization does not need to have the same physical qualifications as the rifleman of the same company. The fact that he may see combat for a comparatively short period of time in an emergency is no excuse for the wastage of a fully fit man by such an assignment.

On the other hand, the physical requirements for his job must be higher than for the company clerk of a rifle training company in a ComZ or ZI replacement training center, or for the equivalent job at an air, service, or naval base. With the possible exception of an advanced fighter base, the conditions of life at such an installation do not require very high physical standards. Actually for such a job at a ZI installation most of the men we now classify as IV-F are physically fit. Men who have inferior eyesight, no teeth, broken eardrums, or even lack one leg could clerk in a ZI installation. It is a matter of readjusting our mental attitudes. The idea that every man in uniform has to be able to make the obstacle course is a luxury in which we cannot indulge in a war against powers that have far greater resources of manpower than we have.

AMONG other good examples (which in the aggregate total a vast amount of manpower) are cooks, medics, finance men, truck drivers, and military police. Look closely at the demands made on these men. In each case keep before you a mental picture of the combat rifleman who should stand at the apex of our pyramid of capabilities. In each case compare the demands of the individual position against the standard of the rifleman.

Take the first cook of a rifle company. He must, I think we will all agree, be almost up to the rifleman standard but even here there are some exceptions. For one thing, the ability to make long marches is not an absolute prerequisite. He must, however, have considerable physical stamina and be able to take exposure and hardship for long periods. Therefore he should be comparatively young and vigorous, and capable, if need be, of engaging with the enemy at close range at least for limited periods of time. Therefore the maximum and minimum profiles for this job will be quite close to those of the rifleman.

Now the cook back at the division headquarters company obviously does not require as high a standard of physical toughness. But he must have enough stamina and ruggedness to carry his share of the load of work and take part in the defense and security of the division CP. But as soon as we get to the rear of division or the corps headquarters, our standards for cooks must take

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sharp drops. Men in the ComZ need not be able to sleep on the ground for weeks without having rheumatism catch up with them, because they won't have to. At that stage they will have beds or cots and some degree of shelter more comfortable than a pup tent. Consequently, they can be older, or more nervous (even much too much so to be worthy of consideration for duty farther to the front). Into this same category would fall all cooks at overseas air, service, or naval force installations, except the most forward fighter and supply bases. *To put a perfectly physically qualified man on duty as a cook at an installation hundreds or thousands of miles behind the lines as we have done and are still doing, is a misuse of manpower.* Now, when we get back to permanent or semi-permanent installations in the Zone of the Interior, all we need is someone who was sufficiently physically fit to be a cook at any Stateside restaurant. Age limits here could well go up to the sixties or over. Certain nervous disorders which have hitherto been considered as automatic disqualification for duty in the armed forces could be waived. Standards for eyesight, hearing, and teeth could come way below what is now considered a minimum even for non-combat duty.

THE overall position of motor vehicle drivers is roughly the same as that for cooks. The quarter-ton driver of the line companies must have nearly the same profile as that of the rifleman, again with the same exception—slightly flat feet would not be disqualifying here. Otherwise he should be vigorous and have a high degree of stamina. Only slightly less vigorous standards will apply to all other drivers who normally operate forward of the division CP. For drivers, eyesight and hearing and physical coordination cannot drop as low as for clerks and cooks, but the use of older men, men with varicose veins, few or no natural teeth, some blood pressure, and heart conditions, should be the rule rather than the exception. One of the sights that galled combat men during World War II was perfectly healthy fit youngers assigned as jeep and sedan drivers around the U.S. or in the British Isles, during the months infantry replacements were coming out of the bottom of the manpower barrel.

These examples could be continued, but once the basic principle is accepted, as it sooner or later must be, it is only a matter of thorough surveys by competent boards with the proper backing from *top* authority. By competent boards I mean boards composed of men who can see both the big and little picture through experience, who know the field they have under study and have the expert medical advice. In times of war or general mobilization the probable increase in pension liability of the government because of the induction of what was hitherto considered substandard personnel is a valid consideration when weighed against the necessity for combat replacements.

DURING World War II we had a short and sad experience with the drafting of men over 38. After a trial period most of them were given the opportunity of (and, in fact, many were pushed into) asking for discharge. The statement was then made that proportionately too many of them were in the hospitals. Why were they in the hospitals? The answer is clearly established. It was because we threw them into ground combat units and expected them to be able to take that training. When they failed to measure up to that we discharged them, at the same time we allowed young, vigorous, healthy men by the tens of thousands to stay in non-combat, non-hardship jobs. Certainly those older men could have done magnificently in these other jobs. Some of them literally fought their way into service jobs rather than return to civilian life in the middle of a shooting war. There, from all I have heard, they performed well and on the whole better than younger men for whom such jobs did not represent an adequate outlet for their physical and mental energies.

WE must do some deep thinking and planning in the use of our most priceless and most limited war material: manpower. In this thinking we must be prepared to eliminate any of our old slogans, shibboleths, and outworn ideas that stand in the way of the most efficient use of what we have available. Otherwise, in a long and hard struggle with numerically superior foes we are rapidly going to find ourselves with ground combat forces dwindling in both quantity and quality and no qualified replacements in sight. *We cannot afford in the national interest to continue those same very costly mistakes in manpower usage and misusage.*

Our slogan cannot be "Every man a trained combat fighter"—that is wastage of manpower. Our slogan must be "every *fit* man a trained and potential combat fighter, every other man utilized and trained for the job which can use his potential to the fullest." Combat type training for these other men can be cut to the absolute minimum.

Highly skilled cartographers and men skilled in other equally critical professions or trades must be used where their special talents are most needed.



AIR WEAPONS

AIR TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENTS LAG

TECHNOLOGICAL advances in air transport for 1953 dwelt on a report by the Air Research and Development Command of air progress in 1953. In a bulky, 1200-word address, Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, ARDC commander, listed Air Transport fourth of the "four basic missions" of the Air Force (1. Air defense, 2. Strategic Air, and 3. Tactical Air) and devoted only a few paragraphs to technological developments in air transport.

It is necessary and altogether laudable that ARDC put its principal interest in creating fighters and bombers that can fly faster and farther. If the U.S. is to control the skies, its technological efforts must never be turned aside from the principal task of creating the best possible air machines and weapons.

This includes aircraft of all necessary types, *including air transport aircraft*. But it is clear that the Air Force is not doing as much as it might to create a first-class air transport fleet. None of the 1953 developments in air transport was a "milestone" in aviation progress. The Chase XC-123 assault transport is an improved version of an already proven assault transport. The Lockheed YC-130 is the newest development in the few relatively high-speed long-range transports that have appeared. The Piasecki YH-16 helicopter isn't exactly "new," although it made its first flight in 1953. And the new methods of dropping heavy equipment are developments that were to be expected in the normal course of events.

The captions on the photographs on these pages are taken *verbatim* from the report by General Putt.




YC-130 (Lockheed Aircraft Corporation)—Development continued during the year on this high-wing, long-range cargo and troop transport powered by four Allison turboprop engines. First flight is expected early in 1954.

YH-16 (Piasecki Helicopter Corporation)—One of the largest known helicopters designed for operational use, the YH-16 completed its first flight in 1953. It will be capable of carrying 40 men over the longest range ever achieved by a helicopter.




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A new method to parachute heavy equipment was devised for the C-124, the Air Force's largest production transport. Utilizing a pre-loaded pallet system, the aircraft crew can drop a total of 40,000 pounds within a few seconds. The system was conceived and tested by the Wright Air Development Center and the Douglas Aircraft Company.

A new type of platform on which to load equipment for aerial drops was tested by the 6511th Parachute Development Test Group at El Centro, California. The platform features an air bag which absorbs some of the landing shock. Tests indicated a decrease in ground impact from 35 g to 12 g when the air bag was used. The development will reduce the number of parachutes necessary for equipment drops and will permit the use of lighter platforms.

A new method for tying down cargo in aircraft for aerial delivery was developed to permit automatic release of the tie-downs when the extraction parachute inflates. The new system eliminates the need for personnel to enter hazardous areas to manually remove the tie-downs prior to aerial cargo drops. It also permits rapid jettisoning of cargo in case of emergency.



C-123B (Chase Aircraft Company)—First flight of this medium transport, designed for landing troops, vehicles, and heavy equipment on unprepared strips in forward combat areas, was made on February 23, 1953. Being produced by the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation, this high-wing transport is powered by two Pratt & Whitney R-2800 engines.

INDOCTRINATION

The Making of a Marine

COLONEL A. T. McANSH

The boot training of our own Marine Corps has a world-wide reputation. We all know something about it; most of us enough to be quite sure that it wouldn't work for any military force that has the large and complex commitments of our Army. However, it is always possible to learn something from the way the other fellow does things.

We are particularly fortunate that the author of this piece is a Regular Army officer. If we had a Marine write about boot training we are sure that many readers would dismiss it as more evidence of the Corps' great capacity for blowing its own horn loudly (not a bad trait in itself). If we had a professional writer from civilian life do it, he might get across the superficial manifestations without ever catching the inner forces that transform a civilian into a fighting man. No one could have done it better for us than Colonel McAnsh, who was himself a "boot" thirty years ago.

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MY experience at the receiving end of a training division occurred with a rival outfit at Parris Island, where Marine "boots"—recruits to you—are transformed into marines. That was thirty years ago—1923—but the memory of it is still vivid, as you will see if you read on.

The first lasting impression the boot receives on Parris Island and the last one he takes away with him is that of h Drill Instructor, so a word of explanati on this individual is in order.

DIs are sergeants and corporals s signed to boot training companies f the purpose of imparting instruction ir boots and moulding them into marin They conduct all basic instruction, great majority of all other instructi and also perform a great many oth tasks as well, and very well. The DI always to the front in boot instructi the officer well back. This is done d liberately. The reasoning is this: T NCO who leads the men across t beachhead or the last 100 yards of op ground between himself and the ene is the one who can best train the impr sionable boot. The boot will listen him with respect and follow him in co

COLONEL A. T. McANSH, Infantry, has been a military man since 1923, serving in the Marine Corps, the National Guard and the Regular Army. During the Second World War he served with the 33d Infantry Division in the Pacific. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff School and the National War College. Recently he completed a tour of duty in Brazil and is now posted for the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg.

—he has been trained to. The NCO virtue of this chance of demonstrating leadership with recruits gets confince in himself and is better fitted, refore, to lead others in combat. It is ull circle—the thing feeds itself.

How do these DIs get their stuff oss? What do they teach? What was form of supervision?

) speak from the things I witnessed s best. The sole overhead of my boot npany (actually a platoon of 65 men) isisted of one buck sergeant and two porals. No officers were permanently gned *and no permanent squad lead-*

With the exception of a few specized subjects such as chemical war- and rifle-pistol marksmanship or a

few inspirational talks by officers along with a little tactical instruction, the three training noncoms carried the entire training load, trained us, moulded us, badgered us from daylight to dark for thirteen never-to-be-forgotten weeks.

Where did the squad leaders come from, for one must have them? Very simple: from among the 65 boots themselves. At the first formation, Sergeant Doyle (our Chief DI) called out, "All former servicemen, former Regulars, National Guardsmen and military school graduates, fall out over here." About ten or twelve did so. Doyle lined them up and asked each a question, looked them over, and eight of them were briskly detailed as "Provisional Squad Leader, First Squad"; "Provisional Squad Leader, Second Squad," and so on. Thus the company was formed. Based on past experience, plus extra studying and some extra coaching by the three noncoms, these eight played a creditable part in moulding those under themselves into marines. It was a good laboratory for testing leadership. If one of them couldn't cut the mustard, back he went into ranks and another was substituted.

ALL instruction was based on Army Infantry Drill Regulations, except for reviews (not parades), which were taken views (not parades), which were taken from and based on the *Landing Force Manual* of the Navy. An outstanding exception to our noncom instruction was rifle-pistol marksmanship. Marksmanship, particularly with the rifle, was specialized in with a vengeance. To the marine, his rifle is holy and is issued along with first issue of clothing and equipment. The serial number goes into his service record, and the rifle remains with him until he leaves the Corps. He polishes the stock lovingly and keeps it close to him. Whatever his specialty in the Corps, he must annually qualify with the rifle.

With this as a background, the boot went to the preparatory range for one week of grinding labor, followed by another at the firing range. His coaches without exception are sergeants. Before dismissing our company and turning us over to the rifle specialists, Doyle casually informed us we were to be trained by the world's best shots: Sergeants who had won championships at Camp Perry. Doyle implied if we did not qualify 100 percent under this renowned tutelage and thus disgraced him, the company and the Corps, we had best go over the hill and hunt up the nearest Army recruiting station.

The instruction was thorough and professional and if the boot tried he was helped. If, however, he got out of the four-ring too often, or appeared to be goofing off, a gentle reminder from his coach, "What's the matter, Jack, are you yellow?" greeted him. The boot blinked back the angry tears, wriggled into the already tight sling, and vowed he would demonstrate to this bastard that someone else could shoot, too.

At the end of the day, as the dog-weary boots plodded several miles back to the barracks, Sergeant Doyle (having had one of his rare easy days) would call them to attention and indulge in some snappy cadence marching, just to let them know they were not as tired as they believed they were—and mostly to let them know they were back under their company sergeant's wing, and not to get too cocky about all the stuff the specialized birds had been handing out.

How about the Character Guidance Program? It was included, though I didn't hear it called by that name. Something definitely guided my character along impressively at times. I shall try to portray it in several "flashbacks."

Item. A bewildered applicant, feeling all of his eighteen years, slowly leaves the train that has brought him so far and, carrying his heavy suitcase, approaches the waiting truck that will take him the remaining distance to the launch, which in turn will take him across the water to Parris Island. A couple of natty marines stood in the rear of the truck near the dropped tailgate. "Give us your hand and we'll help you up," they said. Grateful for such kindness on their part, he did. Up he went, up, over, and ended up hard against the cab back. Bewildered, sore of head and heart, he pondered, and wondered just why the hell he's here. Aside from the recruiting sergeant (gentlemen all, due to policy and necessity), he has just met the Marine Corps.

Item. Somewhat later a group of applicants are lined up before a Marine major with his back to the flag. At the end of a short swearing in period, the applicants say "I do," a sergeant says "Follow me," and they end up at the barber shop.

What consideration! The boots file in. The barbers have an air of speed and efficiency. The customers are moved along quickly. The reason is simple. Five or six sweeps from head to back with the shears and the wise guy from Brooklyn, smoothing down his long curly duck-butt hair-do, is as bald as the rest of us. In a few brief moments each is

on a common and proper level—all done by a pair of hair clippers.

Item. Each of sixty-five boots picks up his heavy sea bag of gear issued him at the supply department, together with the rifle, slowly straggles over from the receiving depot to the East Wing (basic training) and into the company area. At the direction of the sergeant who led them, the sixty-five break ranks and move into the barrack to seek out a bunk.

IN the barrack the book looks around. He notes the immaculate cleanliness of the floor—he will find out why later—the sparseness of the furnishings, and then a line of white plaques about eye level above many bunks. The inscriptions on them catch the eye: "Joseph C. Foster, Pvt., USMC. Killed in action. Soissons." "James Baxter, Sgt., USMC. Killed in action. Belleau Wood." "Howard Burke, Pvt., USMC. Killed in action. Mont Blanc." (These are not real names.) The list stretches on. The boot puts down his heavy sea bag and swallows hard. He was meant to.

Item. *First morning.* Time: early. Sixty-five boots are deep in an uneasy sleep, when the door opens, lights flash on, and a Voice barks: "Hit the deck." The Voice leaves and continues down the line of barracks, then starts back for the first one. The boots are sitting up rubbing their eyes except for one who is still snoring strong. An eagle look from the corporal, a quick step to the bunk, a heave, and the boot lands on the deck, bunk and bedding on top of him. The corporal strides out without a word or backward glance. The boot picks himself up amid the jeers of the others. Next morning "Hit the deck" penetrates his consciousness clearly.

Item. *First evening.* Sixty-five boots are back in barracks after the nightly movie, a required formation which included a short on how to strip an automatic rifle. A corporal walks in and says, "Get into your bathing suits." This is a new one. The beach is far away, but the boots comply.

OVER in the receiving depot, the boot had been handed a galvanized iron pail containing a straight razor, toilet kit, *The Marine's Handbook,* towel, and so on. In the bottom, however, was a bathing suit and two cartons of steel wool. This pail and contents cost the boot $9.60, which was deducted from his $20.80 monthly pay. (A big-hearted Navy had already taken out twenty cents from his pay for hospital recreation funds or something, I don't know—even to this day.) The boot had looked it all over, at least the bathing suit looked good—beaches, blondes, fun. He got into it. Back comes the corporal and barks, "Break out your steel wool; break out your mess gear." The corporal sits down and gives a demonstration of what is wanted. A strong, clear, painful light dawns on the boots as the corporal begins polishing a sand-blasted canteen with the steel wool and explains that he wants every piece of mess gear polished and burnished until the inspecting general can use any portion of the mess equipment as a shaving mirror. Furthermore, we had just two weeks to do this little item in our spare time because there would be a full field inspection on the morning of the second Saturday with four drill companies present and Sergeant Doyle wants ours to be the best and he would surely raise hell if ours isn't. The boots wondered mildly just what Sergeant Doyle had been doing so far.

For the rest of the evening and for two weeks of evenings thereafter, except for time out for movies and fights, the boots worked away on the mess gear, rubbing away at the metal with sore hands (I still hate the feel of steel wool), cursing the DIs, the Corps and everything in sight. All except the Provisional Squad Leaders, who discreetly kept their ears and mouths shut, thought their own thoughts and polished away on *their* mess gear. Occasionally the corporal (the sergeant remained in lofty seclusion in his room) would saunter in, look around, then wait for some boot to ask if he thought his piece of equipment would pass muster. "Corporal, sir, look at this!" (Sergeants and corporals on PI always were addressed as "Sergeant or Corporal, sir.") The corporal would look it over, then finally grudgingly admit it might pass. At other times he would park on a bunk and reel off portions of the instructions on Interior Guard Duty (no boot could leave the company area until he knew his General and Special Orders) or some other manual, callously ignoring the black looks or occasional angry tears. When he left, his ancestry was discussed in minute detail.

The time gradually went by and on the second Saturday morning, four boot companies pound out on the field, pass in review and lay out equipment as they have been told to do. Under the lashing tongue of Sergeant Doyle, adjuring them to be the first to get equipment laid out (as he was later hounding them to be first to be reassembled).

Equipment out, everyone stands at rigid attention. Eyes front. Out of the corners of his eyes, the boot sees 250 se of mess equipment shining in the su in orderly rows like burnished sterlin He is impressed. For the first time l gets a glimmer of light on the whc thing.


Do you get the general idea? I thi so. Character Guidance programs are fine thing. One just has to be careful all that goes into them.

How about time to see the inspecti general? Well, that was all arrang too. Come to think of it, the overwork Doyle must have doubled in brass t because I distinctly remember him sa ing at regular and frequent intervals th if anyone did not like the way he w running things he would always be ha py to give him an interview behind t "head" with stripes off. I do not rec any interviews with the inspecting ge eral by any of our boots.

Shirts came off at other times, thoug The constant pressure had to have o lets and having no other outlet, t boots took it out on one another. In t chow line, in ranks, or during the frequent breaks, a sudden sharp word an accidental (or not) jab with an elb was enough to cause a right to the ja The flurry immediately caused the ev present sergeant or corporal to rush with a righteous show of anger demar ing what in the hell it was all abc —none of this in ranks—if you're such raw-meat eater wait until after supp And about three evenings a week as t boots were back in the barracks af supper, "Outside" sounded and the bo piled out and fell in (piled out is the c rect term, as everything was always the double). Down to the boxing ri they go, and along with other drill co panies, watch their own two men or t from some other company put on t gloves and fight it out until one has h enough, then shake hands. The co pany then hike back to their area in dence. The tension is over, the athlet officer has picked up a few prospe for his next smoker, and the Charac Guidance program has received a lit extra shot of aggressiveness—for free.

How about liberty (leave to you) p icy in town? How about the dam This was extremely simple: there were liberty and no dames. The nearest to was several miles away on the mainla and for an amphibious-minded out the boats were few and guarded, and swim was long. The dames were all o on the mainland and it appeared th stayed there. If there had been around for the boot to stare at before dropped dead-tired on his bunk at

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In the process of teaching the boot, the DI transmits the priceless intangibles that make a man a marine.

of the day, his interest in them ıld have been purely platonic.

IE instrwuction grinds on week after veek, and parallel with it, subtly at the not so subtly at the bottom, goes the of getting across to the boot the tra- ons and meanings of the Corps. He rs the Commandant tell the history of Corps, the things it has done, how by whom. Then he hears it repeated others. He early learns to sing *From Halls of Montezuma* and recog- s *Semper Fidelis.* He learns of other ting outfits and is told that any ma- who isn't equal to two sailors or e soldiers just isn't wanted. Slowly e of it penetrates, and he begins to eve that the Corps may be a good it (it's only bastards like Doyle that l things), and as his muscles toughen his chest expands, so does his ego. there is always a DI to cut him back n to size.

oyle did not have everything his way. He had to account for his ac- s, too. He had the normal chain of mand over him—and that included her character as interesting in his s as Doyle.

ergeant Major Blake ran the office —and other things—for the Training Group C.O., "Wild Bill" Wallace. The Sergeant Major was very efficient—and officious, too, according to some DIs. The boots got all of this second-hand from the orderlies for they were not made privy to such goings-on. But when a boot drill company got close to training group headquarters, they could hear Blake chewing out some luckless boot or DI with a vengeance. This might have been all in a day's work except that Blake was so interested in his work that he continued it at times down in the Sergeants' Club after a few beers—or something stronger sneaked in during Prohibition days—had been polished off.

He was somewhat at a disadvantage for he only weighed 145 with his clothes soaking wet, and inevitably some DI, stung to remonstrance, would methodically and efficiently take the Sergeant Major apart. But he was always at his desk the next morning, features somewhat disarranged, bellowing away, possibly at his opponent of the night before. Nothing personal—he had bellowed the same way the day before, too. The Colonel took no notice of his plastic surgery and the Sergeant Major did not enlighten him. He buried his own dead. He just kept on raising hell in the office and at the club. Just as inevitably some DI took him apart again.

Gradually the boots harden, the hair gradually grows to respectable length, and with it a growing look of confidence comes into the boots' eyes. They obey unquestionably now. They find out marching in cadence is easy. They find themselves counting cadence off duty, stopping suddenly shamefacedly. They sing the Marine hymn with gusto. They are secretly proud of the Corps and acquire a grudging respect for Sergeant Doyle. They keep all this to themselves, though, while proclaiming loudly what a "chicken outfit" this is and what they will do to that Bastard Doyle when they get off the island.

AND what of the officer corps which sparked and directed this activity, from afar and on high?

My experiences with it at Parris Island were limited to a small amount of tactical instruction, some company drill (when four boot companies were put together), the pay table, parades. I only remember one vividly—the C.O. of the Training Center, Colonel "Wild Bill" Wallace. He was a character, always

even-tempered, always mad. We saw him infrequently, but sometimes heard him when the company was drilling near headquarters and some luckless boot was on the carpet for some infraction of the rules. The colonel must have been raised on a Spartan diet—at least he believed in handing one out. "Five days bread and water," he would bellow, and the boot started across the "grinder" (drill field) to partake of his "Angel Cake and Wine" as the Gyrenes called it, in five days of solitary philosophical contemplation of his navel.

"Wild Bill" was not the only colorful officer in that colorful Corps. There were plenty of conscientious and quiet ones too, but we talked of the others. The great Goettge of football fame (killed at Guadalcanal), his equally famous running mate "Harry the Horse" Liversedge; the one and only Smedley D. Butler with his two stars and *two* Medals of Honor, and always the legendary Captain Louis Cukela ("Cuke" behind his back) with his Sam Goldwyn use of the King's English: "Squad right two times and don't —— 'em up!" "Next time I send a damn fool, I go myself."

The officers came from many places and schools, a few from Annapolis, VMI, University of Maryland, The Citadel and many direct by way of Belleau Wood. But they all had one common characteristic—a fighting heart, possibly best personfied by Captain "Cuke." When you looked at his ex-DI face and his fearless eyes, you hardly needed to glance at the *two* Medal of Honor ribbons on *his* chest to know that Kuke would always be the "Point." You didn't care if he misused the English language. You didn't care if he couldn't read it.

And this fighting heart is good for any leader of fighting men to have. The ancient Romans put up a statue to the general who saved them in one of Rome's darkest hours, with this inscription: "Because he did not despair of the Republic."

All things come to an end. Advanced training is completed. A full issue of field equipment is next, accompanied by a full field inspection of all equipment and clothing. The boots line up for initial assignments. Assignments are filled as much as possible on a volunteer basis. They wait for Sergeant Major Blake to yell out places. "Haiti—over here! Cuba! Santo Domingo! Seagoing! Aviation School!" Even then aviation was popular. Lucky applicants go on, some of them to become successful enlisted pilots. (In Nicaragua I saw sergeants flying three-motored Ford transports as part of flights



The eighth week arrives and the DI wheels his boots through their final para

making food and supply drops to columns deep in the hills.) Finally all are assigned. Orders are published. Time to put the show on the road.

THE boot's final parade. All companies participate, but his company is on the Right of the Line. The boot, his hair grown out again to a respectable ¾-inch regulation length, and resplendent in his dress blues, *worn for the first time,* stands proudly at attention awaiting the command PASS IN REVIEW! He looks at Doyle out in front of him, putting those boots through their paces for the last time. Can it be that his face has actually taken on a semblance of kindness? He wonders. There goes the command, the band sounds off and the companies swing into line. The boot grips the butt of his rifle fiercely and does his best to insure a perfect line. They go past "Wild Bill" Wallace. EYES RIGHT —FRONT—RIGHT BY SQUADS. The company moves on out across the "grinder" to the company area. Sergeant Doyle informs them they looked good without the usual limiting adjectives. The boot feels all is well. Swinging along in quick cadence, he finds it good. The thrilling strains of his song, *Semper Fidelis,* come down the wind. The picture becomes clear—everything is in focus. The grind of the past weeks has meaning, it has all been to make him a marine. He glances around right and left. His buddies seem to have got it too. He a his swing along with a lighter step a a lighter heart. They have got the wo By a curious alchemy not known co pletely even to those who participate a guide it, the Man and the Corps ha become as one.

AND moving on to other stations, h py to be away from Parriis Island a Sergeant Doyle, for whom he now ha wholesome respect tinged with admi tion and no little fear, he finds he me him again in a new guise, a little l gruff perhaps with different techniq "Knock off the Sergeant-Sir—boot stu But First Sergeant Novak lets him kn that he too agrees with George Washi ton in that "Discipline is the soul of army" (and a Marine Corps). The n easier regime is easier only by comp son with what he has just left. Int tively, he sees that was the general i all along.

And that is the way I found th And left them. But I followed t progress with interest, for once hav been one of them the stuff does not off easily. And later as the Corps panded twentyfold in a war big enou for all to get in and enjoy, I chec to see if the product I knew had b too thoroughly diluted by the fast pansion. I concluded that it had that the DIs and the "grinder" were clicking.

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LOGISTICS

PREVIEW TO LOGEX-54

WHEN Lieutenant General W. B. Palmer returned from command of the Corps in Korea, he observed that aining of future commanders has not epared them to cope with their logistic oblems as skillfully as they cope with tical problems." One of the functions LOGEX-54, a logistical map maneu- scheduled for 3-8 May at Camp kett, Va., is to help overcome this akness in our service. Some 2,100 diers and Wacs of the logistical serv- s will "play" the exercise, in an nest effort to learn more about logis- al support.

General Palmer, now G4 of the Gen- l Staff, has pointed out that although United States has based its first line defense overseas, "all of us [com- nders] still have a lot to learn about nducting overseas wars and supporting pendent allies." And an overseas war exactly the setting for LOGEX-54, h the participants solving on paper kinds of problems involved in sup- ting a Type Field Army in an in- ion of southern France. (Southern nce has been the locale of all six vious Logex "problems.")

There are three types of logistical com- nds. A Type A command is used to pport a combat force of approximately 000 men; a Type B command sup- ts a combat force of some 100,000 n, and a Type C command supports rce of 400,000 men. The latter is the e of the hypothetical combat force d in LOGEX-54.

The postwar emergence of logistical mands proved successful in Korea. d the annual LOGEX-type exercises, ich began in 1948, helped develop m.

THE annual LOGEX problem is unique nd a little history should be of in- st. Some 14 technical and adminis- ive service schools will take part in GEX-54, whereas in 1948 only two ools—Quartermaster and Transporta- n—participated. That 1948 exercise ually had its beginning the year be- e at the Quartermaster School. The mmandant of the School, dissatisfied h the practical training his advanced er students were receiving, since it



LOGEX transportation is geared to the terrain of Southern France

left unanswered the question of how well these students would perform under combat conditions, directed the setting up of a CP Exercise in which the students were assigned to fill the various Quartermaster staff positions. The results were satisfying, but left unanswered the question of interservice coordination, so in 1948 the Transportation School was invited to take part in a combined CPX.

In 1949, under a Department of the Army directive, 10 of the service schools took part in the exercise, known then as "Exercise LOG LEE." And the following year, more service schools participated, as did Air Force and Navy representatives. The 1950 exercise, held at Fort Belvoir, Va., was known for the first time as LOGEX.

No exercise was held in 1951, but in 1952 LOGEX was reinstated at Camp Pickett, Va., which has been its site since that time. The exercise reached a peak in participants last year, with some 3,500 uniformed persons participating. LOGEX-54 is expected to be even larger.

In addition to representatives from all of the technical and administrative services, the Command and General Staff College and the Army General School will participate as will representatives of the Navy and State Departments. The latter will fulfill the present-day concept that each field army commander should have a political advisor on his special staff.

THE tactical situation created for LOGEX-54 is in the same geographical area as the invasion of southern France during World War II. The student officers and reservists will hold positions in (1) the special staff sections of the invading Army and the Type C Logistical Command supporting that Army, and (2) the headquarters of certain of the larger service units of those two major commands.

Control officers will hold positions at higher headquarters and will represent subordinate units in order to present these requirements to the student players.

The play centers around the logistical support necessary to keep the combat elements fighting effectively, rather than the tactics necessary to defeat an enemy in battle. Each student player will learn more about what is expected of his own service in supporting the combat forces. He will also become familiar with the missions of his sister services and the coordination needed for effective support. Coordination between the services is difficult to impose upon the students in their schools, and can best be presented to them in an exercise such as LOGEX.

While other exercises this year will present various aspects of chemical, biological, and radiological warfare to the combat arms, LOGEX-54 will at the same time give the logistical services practical experience in meeting an enemy utilizing those devices. The Medical Service and others will cope with the threat of biological warfare. The Chemical Corps and other services will be concerned with combatting chemical attacks and planning to support retaliatory measures. All participants will learn of radiological problems, as well as of thermal and blast effects, when atomic bombs are theoretically dropped behind our lines.

Thus LOGEX-54, by providing practical experience, under simulated conditions, will serve to carry out the needs, pointed out by General Palmer, for more logistical training. Through the exercise, commanders of the future will be more aware of logistical needs and the problems involved.

'OUR FINE NEW ARMY

RELMAN MORIN

Associated Press Correspondent
in *The New York Journal-American*, 15 March 1954

WE were having dinner in the Generals' Mess in Korea the other night, and looking at t faces around the table, a thought suddenly struck me—

"The people at home don't have to worry about Americans' interests out here . . . they're good hands."

The staff officers sitting there looked like the department heads of some hot-shot Americ corporation. They were all youngish, lean, incisive, alert. There wasn't an overstuffed color in the lot.

In the buzz of conversation, drifting through the room, there was some shop talk, natural But they also were talking politics, the Berlin conference, economic conditions at home, and whole range of subjects outside the immediate purview of the Eighth Army and its officers Korea.

This, of course, is the "new army."

It is bringing along a group of sharp young officers with brains, background and the abil to handle problems the old army never confronted. They are technicians and specialists in t various phases of warfare, to be sure. But they also have to be diplomats, administrators, and ecutives in the plain business sense of the word.

They may be occupied with a battalion front but they also are aware of military budgets, t relations between the army and Congress, and the shifting strategies of the global war.

Nobody typifies these men better than the commander of the Eighth Army, Gen. Maxw D. Taylor. Taylor is 52, lean, sinewy and looks like a college athlete. Because of his four sta the staff call him "the old man," although he is only a few years older than most of the Moreover, he can trim their ears off at tennis or handball, which he plays regularly.

He is a fighting soldier—the general who parachuted into Bastogne to rejoin his division, t 101st Airborne, when it was locked in the Battle of the Bulge.

Ever since he was a young officer, he has been in posts around the world that threw him contact with problems of diplomacy and international lations. He speaks French, Spanish and Japanese, a picked up a working knowledge of Chinese while he v stationed in Peiping. Now he is studying Korean.

He has also started an education program in the arr directed mainly toward raising the educational level the noncommissioned officers, the kingpins of any arr He visits the classrooms incessantly and keeps a const check on the progress.

He is a soft-spoken man by nature, but he can tough as nails.

Taylor is typical of America's "new army." You ca help but conclude: "our interests are in good hands, w men like these."

Eighth Army on guard in Korea



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ORDNANCE

Inaccurate Rifles Make Inaccurate Riflemen

CAPTAIN STRAIGHT SHOOTER

An infantryman holds that we won't have good shooters until men in training have rifles that are not "bell-mouthed" at the muzzle . . . but Army Ordnance has a different opinion

KOREA was a "rifleman's war," as many have observed before me. Men coming back from Korea emphasized the need for riflemen who could shoot to kill. The Army began to concentrate on high standards of rifle marksmanship.

I was involved in this on a very low level. Having been in Korea where I had experienced the rifleman's war, I was quite prepared to teach men to shoot when I reported to a training division as chief of the weapons committee of a regiment. During the next sixteen months I learned a great deal, some of it unpleasant.


I have seen training companies turn in scores, during record firing exercises, that did not truthfully reflect the actual scores fired. I have seen hundreds of misses scored as bull's-eyes. The only way to be certain of the proficiency of any particular company is to watch the hits on the targets. I submitted a written report on score cheating to the Division G3. Then a company was closely checked by scorers unknown to the firer. The results were shocking. Of 190 men, only 80 qualified. What was the reason for such poor shooting by "trained" men?

My answer is that *most of the rifles used by that particular company were not accurate by any of our standards.* Did I fire each rifle to test its accuracy? No, but let me continue.

I was on leave in my quarters at the time the company fired, however. I received a phone call at my home from the battalion S3. He told me that the company had boloed 110 out of 190 men. I told him I'd be out to show him why. When I got to the tactical training area, the company was dispersed throughout the area. However, one platoon of thirty-nine men was available. I asked the platoon sergeant to call this platoon in and have every man who had failed to qualify on the range, step forward with his rifle. Twenty men stepped forward. I inserted a caliber .30 ball into each of the twenty rifle muzzles. In each case the ball was inserted freely, without force, until the brass case touched the muzzle. What did this prove? It proved that the rifling in every case was completely worn out close to the muzzle end of the barrel. The diameter of the ball was exactly .3075 inch. I used a Starret 0-1 inch micrometer to take measurements. The Ordnance Corps' maximum allowable breech reading of the M1 rifle is .305 inch.

COMMON sense reasoning will show that a bullet squeezing through a breach measuring .305 inch or less will not be accurately released from a muzzle measuring .3075 and larger. Why are rifles worn to such a degree, when Ordnance inspections supposedly eliminate such weapons? Simply this. *There is no provision for the use of a muzzle gauge with the M1 rifle.* I received this information officially. My informant neither

CAPTAIN STRAIGHT SHOOTER is the pseudonym of an infantryman now serving overseas.




Rifle No. 1. Worn out, could not be zeroed at 300 yards. Cartridge has been inserted ball first to the extent that only the brass case prevented further insertion. Ball diameter (next to brass) .3075 inch.



Rifle No. 2. Excellent condition; stayed in the 12-inch bull at 300 and the 20-inch bull at 500 yards. In this case the cartridge could not be inserted beyond the curve of the ball. This is the same cartridge used in Rifle No. 1.

PHOTOGRAPHS AND CAPTIONS BY THE AUTHOR



Rifle No. 1. This shows a ball inserted in the muzzle. The ball was not forced in any way, rather it dropped from the fingers to the position shown. The ball measured .308 inch at base.



Rifle No. 2. The same ball as inserted in Rifle No. 1 could not be inserted into the muzzle of this rifle. It had to be balanced on the muzzle to be photographed.

confirmed nor denied my contention that worn muzzles were largely the cause of poor marksmanship.

Why didn't we have rifles with worn muzzles replaced? We couldn't, because we had no authority to turn in such weapons.

"Since there is no muzzle gauge authorized for use with the M1 rifle, the diameter cannot be used as a standard of unserviceability," was the answer my plea for better rifles received. Can anyone say a rifle is no longer accurate? Yes. An Ordnance expert can tag a rifle *if* (a monstrous word), in his opinion, it has fired 8,000 to 10,000 rounds. Certainly there are many other reasons for tagging a rifle as unserviceable. I am speaking of accuracy only.

I have personally fired hundreds of M1 rifles that could not be zeroed at three hundred yards, some at one hundred yards. I usually fire in the high expert bracket with the rifle, the carbine, and the pistol, provided I *select* the weapon. I have demonstrated on the range that a rifle with a worn muzzle could not be zeroed at three hundred yards by the best marksman available. The demonstration was observed by infantry officers only. Civilian weapons repairmen were convinced but would not commit themselves officially. There was one civilian ordnance repairman strongly antagonistic to my contentions, who said "the use of a caliber .30 ball as a gauge was wrong because they varied as much as two or three thousandths of an inch." This is not so. I have measured thousands of caliber .30 rounds with a micrometer and never found one to measure under .3075, nor over .308 inch—a high standard of manufacture, acknowledged as such.

In many instances our finest competitive shooters buy surplus service ammunition for their own loads. If our caliber .30 ball answers the needs of target shooters we can assume it to be good. As for using the ball as a gauge in a given number of rifles, so long as we use the same ball, it is, for all practical purposes, a gauge. If the ball is inserted in the muzzle without force it will retain its original dimensions. Usually a glance at the muzzle end of a rifle will show the cause of inaccurate fire. I know from experience that few officers can determine when a rifle muzzle is worn out. I have seen many officers embarrassed because they could not determine the cause of inaccuracy in a rifle. This usually happened when one of them would attempt to show a trainee that it is "you, not the rifle, that is at fault" and end up red-faced because he was incapable of hitting the target. When an officer is the victim of such an incident the men he is training suffer too.

A little time and experience on the range will prove to you that a caliber .30 ball is a practical muzzle gauge. Of course many things can cause inaccuracy. You must check the front and rear sights for tightness. If the sights are tight, examine bore. If the barrel is not worn out, bent, ringed or improperly bedded, it should keep in the bull's-eye at three hundred yards—which is a reasonable range.

I SUBMITTED a suggestion through the efficiency awards committee of the training division, explaining my finding in detail. I suggested a solution to the problem of worn muzzles. I said that the steel cleaning rod was being improperly used and that it was bell mouthing our rifles. (See if you can find a straight cleaning rod in your unit after it has been used for a week.) I suggested that the thong be revived for cleaning the barrel and that a muzzle gauge be used during all Ordnance inspections. My suggestion was rejected. I was not consulted by Ordnance personnel, military or civilian. I then submitted another suggestion that was flatly turned down by the post ordnance officer. That precluded the suggestion being forwarded for an evaluation by higher authority. My recommendations showed how a steel pilot or guide could be used to protect the first inch of the muzzle (the delivery end) from the abrasive action of the cleaning rod.

This pilot is available in most sporting equipment stores. My idea was rejected because "each man would have to have a pilot." I asked, does each man have a cleaning rod? Then they said, "the pilot would get lost." No one had anything against the pilot as I intended it to be used—to protect the business ends of our rifles from the abuses to which they are subjected.

ORDNANCE CORPS DISSENTS

The Ordnance Corps was given the accompanying article and, at the request of the edtiors, prepared the following statement on the subject.

Bell Mouthing and Its Influence on the Accuracy of the M1 Rifle

REPORTS have been received in the past from field organizations indicating that eccentric muzzle wear (bell mouthing induced by the indiscriminate use of bore cleaning devices) is detrimental to the accuracy of the M1 Rifle. As a result thereof, extensive investigations were conducted at technically qualified Ordnance installations. In each instance, these investigations failed to establish a correlation between eccentric muzzle wear and inaccuracy.

In the course of the foregoing tests, ten reconditioned M1 Rifles were selected and targeted for basic accuracy by Springfield Armory. The muzzles of five of these weapons were then reamed to approximate an extreme degree of eccentric muzzle wear. Subsequent targeting revealed that this condition had little or no adverse effect on the accuracy of the weapons.

An additional number of inaccurate weapons evincing eccentric muzzle wear were obtained from the field. These rifles were representative of weapons used extensively and cleaned under normal field conditions. Tests of these weapons indicated that invariably, factors other than bell mouthing contributed to inaccuracy. Such deficiencies as heavy metal fouling in the bore, improper bedding of the stock, bent barrels, torn lands, excessively pitted bores and burred gas ports were encountered during the investigation. The presence of one or more of the foregoing deficiencies could result in an inaccurate weapon.

Ordnance test engineers have determined that in most instances where evidence of eccentric muzzle wear is indicated to any extent, the barrel is usually unserviceable in other respects. In these instances, the pertinent weapons should be returned to depot maintenance for a complete overhaul.

It is the intent of the Ordnance Corps to provide the best maintenance possible for its weapons. However, certain extenuating circumstances do exist. Rifles that are utilized during training are subjected to considerable rough usage. These rifles are utilized in bayonet practice and field exercises and consequently may develop certain deficiencies, as noted in the above paragraph. Instructions are published in D/A technical manuals to provide Ordnance field personnel with information necessary to correct these deficiencies. In addition, an inferior weapon can result from inadequate preventive maintenance at the organizational level.

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Unfortunately the trainee has little or
o conception of the damage he causes
y continually rubbing the bore of his
ifle with a steel rod, usually one bent
eyond practical use. He knows no better
ecause he has not been impressed with
ne importance the lands and grooves
lay in the accuracy of his rifle.

Does he look to see if his rifle lands
re sharp and that the bore is not ringed
r pitted? No. He looks to see if a speck
f dust is waiting to give someone an
xcuse for not giving him a pass. Watch
squad of trainees, or veterans for that
natter, "clean" their rifles. You'll see
nem wearing the lands out of the rifle
y abrasion. And the Army provides
ne tools.

Sincere infantrymen can talk of better
ghting and aiming devices, carloads of
xtra ammunition for practice, and em-
hasis on the fine old American tradition
accurate rifle fire, but they won't get
if the rifles aren't accurate.

WE can revive our tradition of Ameri-
can marksmanship by first checking
ne muzzles of our weapons.

The problem is big but it is not in-
rmountable and it can be licked. We,
ne infantry, can test-fire every rifle in
very squad in every battalion, in every
giment, in every division, until we
iminate rifles that can't be zeroed at
ree hundred yards—a very reasonable
nge. We have men who are expert
ots. If they can't zero a rifle, using
ndbag rests as all record holders do,
en eliminate that rifle for re-barreling.
conomy-minded people may say that it
ould be too expensive. Isn't it cheaper
an expending ammunition fired from
accurate rifles? If the infantryman
ust "shoot to kill" then the infantry-
an must be able to say "this rifle is
o longer accurate enough to meet our
nditions." Let Ordnance issue us our
ols but give us the right to decide the
uality. It is our lives that are at stake.

If we try and cannot zero, the weapon
ust be repaired. How much does it
st to re-barrel an M1 rifle? I don't
ow, couldn't care less, and I do pay
xes. I do know this: trainees have fired
to 400 rounds during practice and
cord firing with a rifle that is useless
far as accuracy is concerned. The
st of those 400 rounds would surely
ver the cost of replacing a defective
rrel. There is nothing complicated
out it and it could be done at division
vel.

We would then be ready to produce
en who could shoot with confidence,
en who would seek targets instead of
oiding them.

Words to Help You Serve

(Continued from page 3)

GENERAL DEVERS—

and potentialities; the influences of parents, friends, or successful individuals whom you admire; and the varied fields of endeavor stretching out before you. In order not to be swept along by the prevailing wind, you must know yourself; make an unbiased appraisal of the influences playing upon you; then weigh carefully those careers that appeal most to you.

In 1905 when I entered the United States Military Academy, the Army offered certain basic things, as it does today: a life of service to your country and to your fellowman (and if this sounds too idealistic to you, examine yourself to determine what better goal you can have); high standards of morality and integrity; and security, including medical care of yourself and your family. At the time I made my decision the Army offered a fairly good education and a limited amount of travel.

Today, recognizing that the indispensable weapon is man, the Army is geared to train its own technologists and technicians to carry on the most diversified, vast and global business ever attempted in the history of mankind. At the Army's expense you can earn a master's or doctor's degree—you can even compete, under ideal conditions, for a Rhodes scholarship.

Unlimited travel opportunity may take an Army man to Alaska, Europe, the Middle East, Asia—almost anywhere in the world; teaches him to live under all conditions of terrain, weather, and climate; introduces him to every race and custom; allows him to examine closely conditions under varying political setups abroad; and in the final analysis proves to him conclusively the unquestionable merit of the free democratic way of life and the glory and privilege that are his in defending it.

After forty-four years of active service—if I had my life to plan over, it would be the Army for me. I can think of no more stimulating or satisfying life.

GENERAL CLAY—

importance of the ground forces to our national security in these days of atomic and thermonuclear power. If so, they should remember that there will always be a need for ground forces to seize and occupy the important bases throughout the world and to prevent unrest and to restore order in combat areas. It may become a much more mobile force than in the past, but its importance to victory if war should come will never disappear.

Today, the Army with its diversified opportunities and relatively rapid promotion, looks far more promising than it did following World War I when national security received scant attention. I served approximately twenty years as a junior officer in an Army which had few troops and little, if any, new equipment during this period. Yet it had faith in itself and managed to maintain high morale and intellectual growth in its commissioned service.

The Army gave me the opportunity to see many parts of the world, to live and associate with many fine and able persons devoted to the welfare of their country. It enabled me to at least accept the challenges of higher responsibilities. If I had the choice before me now, I would not give up or trade the days I spent in the Army and I left it with a sense of obligation which I shall never lose.

If the young men of today are selling the Army short, they are making a great mistake.

CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

No. 9 | *Reserve Component Duty*

THE contribution of our reserve components to the winning of the nation's wars is recorded in history. To insure the same high degree of participation in the future, the regular establishment must give full and active support to the peacetime training of reserve component elements. This article deals with an important phase of that support: the assignment of officers as reserve component advisors or instructors.

Reserve Officers' Training Corps, National Guard and Army Reserve programs were reinstituted following World War II and large numbers of qualified instructors and advisors of the various arms and services were assigned to duty with the reserve components.

At the present time, the number of officers assigned to reserve component duties is determined on a broad basis by the Department of the Army. Within the limits of these broad outlines, the number of officers required for reserve component duties is determined by the Army commanders who bear the responsibility for the training and instruction of the ROTC, National Guard, and Army Reserve units in their commands. Selections and assignments of officers to reserve components are made by career branches of the various arms and services, in response to requisitions received from the field. Officers on active duty desiring assignments to reserve component duty may, if they meet the requirements outlined in SR 600-145-20, "Assignment to Reserve Component and Reserve Officers' Training Corps Duty," apply through channels for such duty.

THE tour of field grade officers assigned to reserve component duty is normally 36 months; company grade 12 months, with the exception of ROTC company grade instructors, which is 24 months. However, if not needed to fill urgent oversea requirements, or military schooling, officers may be permitted to continue to serve on reserve component duty for periods up to one year beyond the normal tour.

The Special Regulation referred to above prescribes qualification criteria for the assignment of officers to the reserve components. Requirements range in grade from colonel to captain of the combat arms and technical services although substitutions in grade may be made. Also, warrant officers and enlisted personnel are assigned to the reserve components as assistant instructors, assistant advisors and clerical and administrative assistants.

It is desirable that Regular Army officers serve at least one tour of duty with one of the reserve components. However, such duty is not limited to Regulars. National Guard and Army Reserve officers on active service are used in all reserve component instructor-advisor positions except as National Guard advisors in the state of legal residence prior to entrance on active duty.

Repetitive assignments to the same component or level of duty are normally avoided. When it is necessary for the good of the service to relieve an officer before he completes the normal tour, he will be credited with completion of full tours. Reassignment of such officers to reserve component duty is not required; however, they may be reassigned if the needs of the service demand it.

THE Army General Staff and high command give full weight to the importance of the reserve as a major element of our armed forces. It would be well for any officer receiving a reserve component assignment to take careful stock of his qualifications. He can improve his record as well as raise the reputation of the officer corps among the civilian population. It is particularly important that officers selected for reserve component duties possess, to a high degree, certain qualities. Some of these are:

Respect the civilian status of reservists. Consideration must be given to the interests of the reservist when making demands which cannot be met without serious injury to his business, profession or personal relations. Most reservists do not resent this if it is obviously necessary.

Professional knowledge. Members of the defense team not on active duty expect the Army Advisor to be fully qualified. As one National Guard general put it: "If you don't know mo about military matters than I do, a l of taxpayers' money has been wasted o your training."

Personality and leadership. On th type of duty command relationship ofte is from nebulous to nonexistent. Appl cation of the finest principles of leade ship is necessary. Every act or utteranc may influence people but will not nece sarily make friends. Lack of tact and in patience in unimportant matters are ce tain to negate the efforts of otherwi qualified advisors.

Outward manifestations of perso al conduct, such as temperance, carefu selection of associates, impeccable groo ing, attention to duty and other action enhance the prestige of the Army in l cal communities. This is particular significant on the college campus whe character is being molded. In any a signment, personal conduct below t standards established by the office corps cannot and will not be condone

The attitude of the officer's wi and family. This is a delicate matt but it must be remembered that a wif attitude toward and conduct in the co munity has a profound bearing on h husband's effectiveness. This is applic ble to his children. Objectionable i cidents involving other members of t family will materially nullify an of cer's otherwise outstanding performan record.

Standard of living and maint nance of credit rating. An officer mu maintain prestige of his position by a appropriate standard of living but h must live within his financial mean An officer may be a complete failure b cause of his inability to meet financi obligations.

SO long as a major part of our milita strength is in the reserve, reser component duty will continue to be o of the most important in the Arm Officers and enlisted men selected f reserve component duty must be cap ble of superior performance. The pr tige of the Army demands it; the safe of our country requires it.

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The Word from the Artillery School

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

ARTILLERY QUOTATION OF THE MONTH

The battlefield achievements of the artillery arm have enhanced the prestige of the entire American Army as well as its own reputation.

MAJOR GENERAL HARRY F. HAZLETT
4 June 1943

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

ogress on FM 6-40

Revision of the artilleryman's "bible"—M 6-40, *Field Artillery Gunnery*, dated nuary 1950—is up to schedule. A repentative sample of ideas and suggestions m the field has been reviewed.

In addition to requests carried here for mments and suggestions (COMBAT RCES JOURNAL, December 1953), ques were mailed directly to more than 100 ected persons and officers including cern general officers and the PMS&Ts of illery ROTC units. The number of inridual and unit replies is gratifying. Apoximately 20 general officers have reonded; a reply from the 59th Infantry avy Mortar Company—a reserve unit Nogales, Ariz.—indicates the widespread erest in this project.

These contributions are greatly apprected by TAS and others are urged to ford pertinent remarks without delay. Maial should be submitted directly to: The rector, Department of Gunnery, TAS, rt Sill, Okla.

d of Mission

As part of its overall effort to reduce dio transmission time, TAS now teaches t to indicate sufficient fire has been dered on a particular target the observer d send only the words "end of mission" FDC. There is no objection to the phrase ase fire" when used before "end of mis-n," but it isn't necessary.

S Continues Reorganization

TAS has discontinued the Department General Subjects as it presses to condate and streamline school activities ich began with the general reorganizan of July 1953 (COMBAT FORCES JOURL, September 1953).

Functions and responsibilities formerly assigned to the Department of General Subjects have been transferred to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Commandant and to the Department of Combined Arms. The Examination Review Board, The Artillery School Instructor Training Program, and the Corrective Reading Program have been added to the functions of DAC; while combined Arms has been given the Methods of Instruction Division and the Management Division.

MARS at TAS

Two Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS) stations have been extremely active at Fort Sill during the past several months: Station AA5USA is operated and maintained by personnel of the Department of Communications, and post agencies; amateur radio station K5WAH (MARS call sign: AA5WAH) is maintained by post signal personnel.

Under the supervision of a post MARS director, the stations have rekindled a statewide interest in the military affiliate system; and membership has nearly doubled. Increased participation in the future is expected.

At TAS, students in communications courses are taken on tour through AA5USA and are encouraged to study and apply for an amateur license. This station handles varying amounts of both official and quasi-official traffic with other military installations. Station K5WAH is available to licensed amateurs stationed at Fort Sill who are separated from their own equipment.


Snow Hall

TAS is awaiting the completion of Snow Hall, its new and magnificent $2,500,000 academic building. It is expected to be completed by 1 July.

The completely air-conditioned, two-story structure will be large enough to house 50 classrooms and 2,500 students. Its interior occupies some 190,000 square feet of floor space.

The building consists of an auditorium, classrooms, offices, a lounge, storage rooms, snack bar, kitchen, mechanical equipment room, textbook and instrument issue rooms, dressing rooms and a rapid reading room.

It is named for the late Maj. Gen. William J. Snow, the first Chief of Field Artillery.



'The Artillery Has Been Terrific'

A letter received by The Artillery School, Fort Sill:

The Hague, January 26, 1954

Reading COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, January 1954, I came upon your article about famous artillery quotations. Being an artillery officer myself with interests in artillery quotations, who can stimulate the *esprit de corps* I received from a friend a copy of a tribute to the Royal Regiment of Artillery by Field-Marshal Montgomery, which I will give you here.

"I would like to pay a compliment to the gunners and I would like this to be passed on to every gunner. The gunners have risen to great heights in this war. They have been well commanded and well handled. In my experience the artillery has never been so efficient as it is today: it is at the top of its form.

For all this I offer you my warmest congratulations. The contributions of the artillery to final victory in the German war have been immense. This will always be so: the harder the fighting and the longer the war the more the infantry and in fact all the arms, lean on the gunners. The proper use of the artillery is a great battle-winning factor.

I think all the other arms have done very well too. But the artillery has been terrific and I want to give due weight to its contribution to the victory in this campaign.

B. L. MONTGOMERY
Field-Marshal
C in C 21 Army Group"
Germany, 27-6-45.

If it is possible for you to send a copy of your already distributed quotations I will be very grateful.

Yours very truly
JOE H. BUITENHUIS
1st Lt Royal Netherlands Arty
Bachmanstraat 25
The Hague, Netherlands



KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD

The Month's Books

Two of the books under review this month are weapons in the current campai to restore pride of unit in the United States Army. Dr. Greenfield's "The Histori and the Army" is a useful flanking attack on the subject; the work of Army h torians certainly is close to the preservation of unit esprit. The second book provic logistical support for the campaign by detailing the formal histories of the infan regiments now on the rolls of the Army.

The next two reviews discuss books that cover great sweeps of history. Oma book is a classic of military history that few American soldiers have ever read a Mr. Cyril Falls' survey of warfare in the last 100 years is a handy outline and guic

The final four reviews are concerned with Soviet Russia and China. We especia commend to you Colonel Dupuy's comments on U. S. involvement in Russia duri the years of the Revolution.

Historians of the Army

THE HISTORIAN AND THE ARMY
By Kent Roberts Greenfield
Rutgers University Press, 1954
99 Pages; Map; $2.50

Reviewed by
MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY, Ret.

Dr. Greenfield, Chief Historian of the Department of the Army, is convinced that unless history is written promptly it cannot be written correctly or adequately. In this little book, based on a series of lectures which he gave at the College of Puget Sound, Dr. Greenfield is primarily attempting to invite public attention to what he calls "the most ambitious enterprise in the writing of contemporary history that has been undertaken in our time"—the history of the United States Army and its Air Forces in World War II. As most military men know, the preparation, and in fact the publication, of this series of more than sixty volumes is well along. Considered in connection with Admiral S. E. Morison's semi-official history of the naval operations of World War II, the promptness and thoroughness with which that struggle is being covered is "unprecedented"—to again quote Dr. Greenfield.

If it is easier to write accurate and complete history while the people who made it are still alive, it also harder to write honest history. Living officers of high rank may have their feelings hurt. Dr. Greenfield quotes General Devers as saying to him, "Well, isn't that the kind of wound a soldier has to take?" This was typical, Dr. Greenfield says, of the attitude of the Army high command: "If we have not succeeded in putting out honest history it has been our own fault."

There are of course some skeptics who are of the opinion that people, even though they be professional historians, who are writing about the Army and being paid by the Army are not likely to be either completely objective or as candid as they might be under different circumstances. Dr. Greenfield's answer to this is to cite General Eisenhower's agreement, as Chief of Staff, to three conditions proposed by Dr. Greenfield: freedom of access to all records necessary to write a comprehensive history; freedom to call the shots as the historians see them; and the individual responsibility of the author of each volume attested to by the putting of his name on the book. "This," says Dr. Greenfield, "adds up to academic freedom."

On the basis of some personal acquaintance with both the professional historians in the Office of the Chief of Military History (currently Maj. Gen. Albert Cowper Smith is Chief) and the Army officers on duty there, I believe that both groups take pride in writing and publishing facts. This does not mean that either group would subscribe to the idea that unfavorable facts should be accompanied by invective, or that unsubstantiated charges should be included in a historical narrative—even though it is a fact that charges have been made.

In scope, Dr. Greenfield's book extends from an account of the confused action, involving parts of the 7th Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions, at Dornot in September 1944 to a discussion of the problems and hazards of coalition strategy. Included are some perceptive comments on the Army's functions, methods, and troubles.

An example of particular interest to readers of this magazine is the author's comments on the infantry-artillery tea "Divisional artillery, reinforced with a m of corps and army artillery, was often t giant member of the team, and perform the decisive role in battle—a fact eas overlooked because modern military nar tion, like all tales of battle from time i memorial, tends to focus on men in n tion. . . . In many decisive engagements t role of the infantry was not to bre through but to occupy and mop up pc tions in which artillery concentrations h shattered the power of the foe."

Oddly, General Eisenhower in *Crusa in Europe* indicated that even he was m informed on the subject of the artiller part in the Normandy campaign. Af describing the hedgerow country, he co mented: "As would be expected unc these conditions, the artillery, except longe-range harassing fire, was of little u fulness." In an article in *The Field Ar lery Journal* (March-April 1949), this wr er attempted to prove, entirely by infant testimony, that General Eisenhower w misinformed.

On the vital subject of esprit, Dr. Gree field makes the comment that "it was, a is, an article of faith in the Army that tea spirit, the pride of the soldier in his un willingness to do and endure heighten by association with men with whom has learned to work is vital to . . . bat effectiveness . . . and that this can be tained only by continuous association the officers and men of a unit throu training into battle." Many a soldier, v tim of expedient inactivations of old a proud units and of the evils of individu rotation, will feel that this particular ticle of faith has been about as well served as the Prohibition amendment years ago.

On Air Forces cooperation in close support of ground forces during Wo War II, Dr. Greenfield doesn't mince words. Of the airmen, he says: "It w impossible to interest them seriously developing the equipment, techniques

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

LINES FROM A NEW BOOK

We Americans have a tendency to wait until a crisis comes and then go all out in its solution, at the very time when its solution is most costly.

CHESTER BOWLES
Ambassador's Report

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★


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


THE MILITARY GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN

By Brigadier-Gen. COLIN R. BALLARD

This book is one of the great military classics about the Civil War. It explains Lincoln's influence on the strategy of that conflict and proves that he not only chose good generals, but that he was himself an excellent (if completely unconventional) strategist. He understood the higher strategy of war as a whole, and Gen. Ballard demolishes the legend that Lincoln was a politician "whose bungling interference hampered his generals."

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
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
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By Col. W A. GRAHAM, U.S.A., Ret.

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


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skills need for genuine teamwork in ground combat."

He pays tribute to the Army's administrative proficiency, but emphasizes the burdens put on the Army by the many overhead and housekeeping chores it must perform for other elements of the Department of Defense.

This book, by reason of its brevity, lucidity, and variety of subject matter, should not only fulfill Dr. Greenfield's purpose of inviting public attention to the Army's World War II history project, but it will also clarify, for civilian and military readers, some of the Army's current problems.

THE ARMY LINEAGE BOOK
Volume II: Infantry
Chief of Military History
Government Printing Office, 1953
859 Pages; $2.00

Reviewed by
COLONEL FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER

This volume gathers into compact form the official historical records of all infantry units now on the rolls of the United States Army, and sets out their lineages, battle honors, and distinctive insignia. As to Regular Army and National Guard units, these data have not been published since before World War II, while similar information as to Army Reserve units had never before been compiled in a single publication. The records of the individual units are preceded by an interesting history of the organization of United States Infantry, which traces the effects of tactics and of weapons on the tables of organization.

The several recitals raise some troubling thoughts. Why, for instance, are old regiments with fine traditions so often kept from combat? Of the twenty-five Infantry regiments of the Old Army, *i.e.*, 1869 to 1901, no less than sixteen have no World War I battle honors. Four proud and old National Guard regiments have no World War II battle honors whatever, and two more can show them only for single companies.

And why, when reductions in strength become inevitable, is it apparently always the oldest units that are inactivated? Just before the outbreak of the Korean hostilities, six of the oldest Regular Infantry regiments, including the 1st, 2nd, and 10th, all of which antedated the Civil War, had been so treated. If the destruction of unit morale had been specifically assigned as a mission to G3, it could not have been more successfully accomplished than by such organizational gyrations.

So far as the book under review is concerned, three major criticisms must be made.

First, the cut-off dates are not uniform. Generally the last date is June 1950, but this is not invariably true, and that circumstance not only detracts from the book's usefulness as a reference volume, but will doubtless make more difficult the preparation of supplements.

Second, there is nothing to show the nature of the World War II service rendered by the National Guard regiments separated from their divisions by the 1942 triangularization. Sometimes there is a clue in the battle honors, sometimes not. A few more lines under each unit would have been most helpful in rectifying this substantial omission.

Third, there is no clue to the disposition of the Organized Reserve regiments similarly separated in 1942, and generally converted to other arms. Many of them had World War I battle honors, yet in this volume they have disappeared without trace. The preface says: "The reader who cannot find his own regiment is advised to search carefully through the lineages. By this means he may find its history perpetuated in some other command. Certain Infantry units have been converted to other branches, and consequently will appear in later volumes." But this is surely a most unsatisfactory substitute for a table of disbanded Infantry units showing their disposition.

According to the foreword, *The Army Lineage Book* is being published "initially as a series of provisional volumes, which can be combined into a single, definitive book at a later date." It is to be hoped that the major deficiencies noted above will then be remedied.

Crimea to Korea

A HUNDRED YEARS OF WAR
By Cyril Falls
Gerald Duckworth and Co., London
410 Pages; Map; Index; $6.00

Reviewed by
H. A. DEWEERD

This is a very useful and interesting survey of a century of warfare by the sometime Chichele professor of history of war at Oxford University. Beginning with the Crimean War 1854-56, Captain Falls shows that the methods of waging war have made continuous progress, but he professes to see little evidence of "revolutions" in war. Change is gradual but continuous, and most any army today could decisively defeat any army of comparable size equipped and trained twenty-five years earlier. Because he feels that tactics are more important in winning wars than strategy, he gives primary attention to fighting. He does not join the chorus of voices berating the conservatism of the military profession but insists that medicine, law and architecture have shown similar resistance to change in the past.

As a feat of condensation, Captain Falls' achievement in covering a century of war in 400 pages is a remarkable one. He does not claim to have included everything of importance that happened but assures his readers that what was left out was at least considered. American readers may be a little surprised to find Lee offered as the "supreme" military figure in this century even though he never commanded more than a hundred thousand men in combat, paid comparatively little attention to tactics, and never had to deal with an ally or conduct an amphibious operation acr great distances.

Captain Falls was among the many B ish writers who condemned strategic operations in World War II which h urban areas as their principal targets. E he now admits "that there exists an e ment of the inevitable in the ascendar which it won over the minds of lead who, while half-ashamed of what th were doing, were more than half convinc that no alternative existed."

Due to the concentration of milita power in the hands of the Soviet Uni and the United States, the author expe to see a war of continents emerge if effo to preserve peace between the giants fa He deplores the disappearance of mo factors restraining the actions of nations war and writes:

> "Owing to the recklessness of t modern state, in part inevitably, owi to the arming of whole nations for w and the type of weapons which scier has put into their hands, the condu of war has deteriorated morally. Scrup have been blunted; laws of war a conventions have been disregarded; discriminate slaughter has been enco aged; the rights of neutrality have be violated; and the works of art of centu upon century have been destroyed wi out compunction. As a result, war day represents a more deadly menace mankind and its civilization than it w a century ago. Then, civilization cou absorb periodical warfare without s fering serious damage. Whether it c absorb periodical large-scale warfa now must remain a matter of doubt.

But he ends his book with a stateme of hope that these terrible disasters may spared mankind.

This is a handy reference work and w serve admirably as an outline and guide the history of war since 1850.

War in a Time of Change

THE ART OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES
By C. W. C. Oman. Edited by John H. Bee
Cornell University Press
176 Pages; Map; $3.00

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

In his preface, Dr. Beeler points out th Oman's essay on war in the middle ag published in 1884, is one of the class of military history. It was "the first tempt to survey the whole broad field warfare, and it has remained one of t best accounts available to the general rea er." Dr. Beeler has revised the text wh later studies have showed that changes a needed.

This new edition of a book long out print is of particular significance tod During those centuries war dominat every other activity. It was a time of tro ble, of rapid political, economic and soc change. It was a time, like today, wh weapons and tactics were in a period

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nsition. Since the future military leader ould have some knowledge of the effect conditions like these on the conduct of r, he should welcome this attractive edi- n of Oman's brief essay. The thoughtful der will find in this scholarly but en- taining book many lessons applicable to ay's manifold problems of war in a ftly changing environment. It will also vide a fairly adequate substitute for an's massive two-volume edition that mines the subject in far greater detail.

e Behavior of "Bolshevik Man"

A STUDY OF BOLSHEVISM
By Nathan Leites
The Free Press
639 Pages; Index; $6.50

viewed by
EFAN T. POSSONY

Nathan Leites must be ranked as one of truly distinguished political scientists our time. His recent study is a brilliant tribution to the science of political anal-, not only in the information it presents also in the method it employs.

Through an intensive examination of the nplete writings of Lenin and Stalin and ough a microscopic study of Soviet reac- s to internal and external situations, the nor has sought to diagnose the behavior erns of the "Bolshevik spirit." His del of "Bolshevik man" is without com- son in modern social science literature. careful reading of *A Study of Bol- vism* by the President, his Cabinet and nbers of Congress, and by our chief lic opinion makers would contribute stantially toward the prevention of ataclysmic war. Unfortunately, the nces that our political leaders will have to devote to the study of "Bolshevik " are small. Let us hope, then, that r working staffs and officers of our ed forces will make every effort to y Leites' unique volume.

o summarize the book's message or lenge the author's judgments—if that necessary—would require ample space. at is worth repeating in a brief review those tenets of Bolshevik behavior h concern the very survival of the stern world:

The Bolshevik "party aims at a radi- ransformation of the world."

The Soviets do not entertain any illusions about the "extreme" risks en- d in such a course.

The party believes firmly that "all mediary positions between total vic- and total defeat are unstable; that the tion of who [will destroy] whom is at imes the only realistic question in the ions between the party and the rest of world."

"Spontaneity of the masses" inside outside the party is similar to the pro- y of even hardened leadership to re- nd do what comes "naturally." Such tation leads to catastrophe, and must ontrolled by a "conscious" effort to nate the "soul."

- "Instead of taking the line of least resistance, one must go to the limit of one's strength and skill."

Failure to understand these crucial points of bolshevik policies will probably represent the last great intellectual failure permitted to this civilization.

What Leites has to say about the possibility of "deals" with the Soviets should be of particular interest to those who are anxious to waste their time in negotiating about the "lessening of international tensions:"

> "To Bolsheviks, high tension is the normal state of politics. . . . What Westerners call a 'real agreement' seems to Bolsheviks inconceivable. It is often predicted in the West that if particular issues—the Austrian treaty, for instance —could be settled with the Politburo, an easing of the overall tension might ensue. For Bolsheviks this does not follow. There might be less 'noise,' but the basic situation—the presence of two blocs attempting to annihilate each other—would be unchanged. The only 'real settlement' is that by which one of the contestants is utterly destroyed. . . . A 'general agreement to live and let live' —[achieved by] 'local and limited settlements'—is inconceivable. The party is obliged to strive for the annihilation of its enemies. . . . There are only two stable conditions: being dead and being all powerful."

To the many pessimists who have come to think that the problem of handling the Soviet Union is insoluble, a word of encouragement. Mr. Leites' powerful study, while emphasizing Soviet strengths, is also a primer of Soviet weaknesses. Dostoyevsky's words of many years ago still apply:

> "It would be to our great disadvantage if our neighbors were to perceive us more minutely and from a shorter distance. In the fact that, so far, they have understood nothing about us, lay our great strength. But the point is, that at present, it seems, alas, that they are beginning to comprehend us better than heretofore: *this is very dangerous.*"

Revolution and Intervention

THE ALLIES AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
By Robert D. Warth
Duke University Press
294 Pages; Index; $4.50
THE SIBERIAN FIASCO
By Clarence A. Manning
Library Publishers
210 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.75

Reviewed by
COLONEL R. ERNEST DUPUY

Mr. Warth's well-written, well-documented thesis covers the initial year of the upheaval rocking the world in 1917—the great revolution which demolished despotic Tsarism only to replace it with bloodier, anti-Christian Communism. Unfortunately, however, in this reviewer's opinion it adds nothing new to the sordid tale.

Perhaps the best thing about it is that here between the covers of one book are most of the facts already published elsewhere, in one way or another. Also, lest we forget, it reiterates the unpleasant truth that the diplomats of both the United States and the Allies are to blame for an almost complete misunderstanding of what was going on in Russia.

The childish ignorance of realities evidenced by our own Ambassador to Russia, David R. Francis, was equalled only by the blundering concepts of Raymond Robins, American Red Cross representative. The one swallowed whole the wishful thinking of Tsarist proponents, the other the sugar-coated pills rolled by Lenin, Trotsky, *et al.* Between them they so clouded Woodrow Wilson's idealistic vision as to produce the later fantastic military expeditions to North Russia and Siberia.

It was unfortunate indeed that the United States, with no axe to grind in the European area except to finish the war with Germany, should have been led down the garden path by the Allies through the stupidity of our own diplomats. There was, of course, no justification militarily or otherwise for participation in the North Russia fiasco. The Siberian expedition did have some logical reasoning behind it, since it countered Japan's bid for the Maritime Provinces of Siberia.

The book ends with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, curtain of the first act in the bloody drama of the U.S.S.R., and prelude to these military ventures. The reader puts it down with the inevitable reaction: "This is where we came in."

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As to Mr. Manning's book, it must be said that it is in no way an exhaustive account of the operations of General Graves' expedition in 1918-20. However it does attempt to analyze objectively the causes and the results of what the author so well characterizes as a "fiasco." If not so comprehensive as John Albert White's *The Siberian Intervention,* it is one more searchlight thrown upon a diplomatic blunder which constitutes prelude to World War II and to Soviet empire-building in Asia.

General Graves, operating under President Wilson's famous *aide-mémoire,* found himself plunged into a mess in which our own State Department, acting apparently at cross-purposes to Wilson's directive, was his worst hindrance.

Ghosts of two men long dead stalk through these pages; the unfortunate Kolchak and the unspeakable Semenov—the latter furbished a bit too bright, in this reviewer's opinion. They share space with our then Ambassador to Japan, Roland Morris, and the Consul General at Irkutsk, Ernest L. Harris. These two, with free-wheeling Raymond Robins, combined in effort to hamstring Graves.

This book's only interest to the soldier is as illustration of the amazing cross-play between State and War Departments, hampering a commander in the field; Graves' own book, *America's Siberian Adventure,* tells the military side.

Dr. Manning's contention that this episode furnishes a key to the riddle of Soviet empire-building, and also to its possible future dissolution, gives food for thought. It is unfortunate that sloppy copy-reading mars the reader's enjoyment. His publishers should have served him and the reader better.

Breaches in the Chinese Wall

MODERN CHINA'S FOREIGN POLI
By Werner Levi
University of Minnesota Press
399 Pages; Index; $5.50

Reviewed by
STEFAN T. POSSONY

Professor Levi has compiled an intere ing, objective and on the whole quite curate history of China's foreign pol since 1840. Based largely on non-Chin language and secondary source materi his analysis of the factors which have giv birth to Chinese policy, though not co plete, is lucid, and in proper perspecti Starting with the feudal and Confuci thought patterns of a nation supreme its isolationism and supra-individualis the author traces China's tortured exp ences from the opening of her ports

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a current check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 56 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

THE HISTORIAN AND THE ARMY. By Kent Roberts Greenfield. 99 Pages; $2.50. How the history of the U.S. Army in World War II is being written, by the Army's Chief Historian.

KESSELRING: A SOLDIER'S STORY. By Marshal Albert Kesselring. William Morrow & Company, 1954. 381 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5. Memoirs of the German CinC in Italy and the western front.

SOLDIERS AND SOLDIERING. By Field Marshal Earl Wavell. British Book Centre, 1954. 174 Pages; $2. Talks on leadership.

THE WAR IN KOREA. By Major R. C. W. Thomas. Gale & Polden, 1954. 119 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; $2.00. A military study of the war in Korea up to the cease fire.

THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK. By William Bradford Huie. The New American Library, 1954. 1952 Pages; $3.25. A highly flavored report on the service, trial and execution of the only soldier to be executed for deserting in the face of the enemy during World War II.

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. By A. R. M. Murray, Philosophical Library, 1954. 240 Pages; Index; $4.75. The author is Extension Lecturer in Social Philosophy in the University of London.

WHY DICTATORS? By George W. F. Hallgarten. The Macmillan Company, 1954. 379 Pages; Index; $5.50. The causes and forms of dictatorships which have appeared from 600 B.C. to the present day.

CHURCHILL BY HIS CONTEMPORARIES. Edited by Charles Eade. Simon & Schuster, 1954. 461 Pages; Index; Illustrated; $6. Thirty-nine analyses by persons of prominence, including Compton Mackenzie, Emanuel Shinwell, Air Marshal Joubert, President Eisenhower, Adolf Hitler, Mrs. Roosevelt, General Martel, Paul Reynaud, Leslie Hore-Belisha, A. P. Herbert, A. M. Low, and Bernard Shaw.

THE CHALLENGE OF MAN'S FUTURE. By Harrison Brown. The Viking Press, 1954. 290 Pages; Index; $3.75. A scientist calls for mankind to enlist in a crusade that will save civilization.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. Council on Foreign Relations, 1954. 231 Pages; $3.75. Composition of governments, political party programs and leaders, affiliations and editors of leading periodicals, and other political information.

CAVALRY OF THE SKY. By Lynn Montross. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 92 Pages; $3. The story of Marine Corps helicopter operations since World War II.

THE INDIAN WARS OF THE WEST. By Paul I. Wellman. Doubleday & Company, 1954. 484 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5. A Hollywood writer tells the story of the Army's part in the settling of the West.

AIRCRAFT CARRIER. By J. Bryan, III. Ballantine Books, 1954. 205 Pages; Cloth, $3, paper $.35. What it was really like on CV *Yorktown* in the Pacific. By the co-author of *Admiral Halsey's Story* and *Mission Beyond Darkness.*

COMMODORE JOHN PAUL JONES, U. S. NAVY. By Capt. Donald John Munro, R.N. William-Frederick Press, 1954. 109 Pages; $3. An unbiased and eulogistic account.

A HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. By Clement Eaton. The Macmillan Company, 1954. 351 Pages; Index; $5.50. An outstanding work on Confederate politics and government.

CHANGING GREENLAND. By Geoffrey Williamson. Library Publishers, 1954. 280 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.95. A timely book on the great island, with a fine section on Thule.

THIS IS INDIA. By Santha Rama Rau. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 155 Pages; Illustrated; $2.50. A lively personal report by the author of *Home to India* and *East of Home.*

HOW TO MAKE SENSE. By Rudolf Flesch. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 202 Pages; $2.75. The latest in this author's series in self-expression.

HOW TO OPERATE EXCAVATION EQUIPMENT. By Herbert L. Nichols, Jr. North Castle Books, 1954. 150 Pages; Illustrated; $1.50. Adopted as a text by Corps of Engineers schools and other facilities.

MONEY CONVERTER AND TIPPING GUIDE FOR EUROPEAN TRAVEL. By Charles Vomacka. Dover Publications, 1954. $.50. Converts foreign currency into dollars, dollars into foreign currency. Also tipping information; government regulations; official, unofficial and black market rates; pictures of coins.

HOW TO TAKE BETTER PHOTOGRAPHS. Edited by Betty M. Kanameishi. Popular Mechanics Press, 1954. 160 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $2.50. All the professional tricks of composition, lighting, developing and enlarging.

THE EXPLOITS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES. By Adrian Conan Doyle and John Dickson Carr. Random House, 1954. 338 Pages; $3.95. A new collection, never before published in book form, based on unsolved cases from the original stories.

THE GLORIOUS MORNINGS. By Paul Hyde Bonner. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954. 228 Pages; $3.75. Stories of shooting and fishing, ranging from rural New York State, South Carolina, Maryland, Pennsylvania, on to Scotland, Ireland, and Italy.

THE SATURDAY EVENING POST STORIES: 1953. 344 Pages; $3. The annual collection of popular fiction from the SEP.

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estern trade to the emergence of the esent Communist state. The gradual delopment of foreign policy through rebeln, foreign exploitation, cultural upheavdynastic changes and war is explained th skill and learning.

Levi is to be commended on several ounds: The bad faith of the West, inding the United States, toward China many dealings from Versailles through lta is exposed candidly. Similarly, Tsarand Soviet imperialism *vis-à-vis* China laid bare with no mincing of words. e author shows that Chinese Communist licy was subordinated to Moscow's direcn from its earliest days, and especially tween 1941 and 1949. Thus, the myth Mao's independent rise to power is deoyed by a scholar who surely had no conceived notions on this score. Lastly, sent Sino-Soviet relations and Chinese mmunist aspirations in Asia are anaed in their intimate relation to the Sot-directed efforts at world domination.

The author, however, can be criticized failing to consider the conspiratorial luence of *American* Communism on deopments in China, especially after 1943; ving lip service to the questionable contion that the Chinese Nationalist regime st bear practically all of the responsiity for its own demise; taking an entirely gative attitude toward the incredible difilties encountered by Chiang Kai-shek his 30-year struggle to create a modern ina; failing to attribute Chiang's 1926 ak from the Communists to his early l full appreciation of their real aims.

t is regretted that, in the interest of iding the non-objective "virtuosity that rks . . . contemporary political . . . trait painting," Professor Levi has rected his analysis of the American and rnational Communist impact on the irs of modern China to a small footnote:

"The 'arguments' of the Great Debate on American China policy are not considered here in detail. The debate had little to do with the facts. It belongs, not to Chinese history, but rather to the sad history of American party politics."

This specious attitude to a historical de on the unsupported assumption that ad "little to do with the facts," is quite xcusable and surely is not based on obive fact-finding. The author's failure se the factual information produced in Congressional hearings on the Institute Pacific Relations and the MacArthur dissal amounts to deliberate neglect of r-class source materials. While Levi is rheaded on many counts, he just has yet come to understand the full imlations of the Communist techniques of flict management.

Nevertheless, *Modern China's Foreign icy* is a good-sized step forward in a l where American educators and "old na hands" have been traditionally slow ecognizing the facts of life.



Pass In Review

The growing popularity in hobby work, particularly among service people, is an interesting phenomenon. Psychologically, we're told, it's a healthy trend. As our contribution to the cause, we'd like to mention a new handbook in the hobby field that probably won't come to the attention of the people who would be interested in it. This one is called *Plexiglas: Craftsman's Handbook* ($1.50). This attractively printed handbook describes all of the various processes involved in fabricating items from Plexiglas. There are lots of pictures, too, to illustrate the various steps involved.

This has been a busy month for historians of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt era. Leading off, we find a book by Rear Admiral USN (Rtd) Robert A. Theobald called *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor* ($3.50) which purports to show that FDR was responsible for the debacle suffered by our Navy on that day that "will live in infamy." Admiral Theobald can scarcely be termed a disinterested party since he acted as an advisor to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the naval commander in Hawaii, at the time of the Japanese attack. Offsetting this attack on FDR is one directed at the staunch Republican, Henry Stimson, who is also given the blame for Pearl Harbor in Richard Current's *Secretary Stimson* ($4.50). So you can take your pick—personally, we blame the Japanese war lords and Hitler. Getting back to the Roosevelt part of the era, we do want to mention a new biography (and the only one we've seen) on Louis McHenry Howe written by one of his secretaries, Lela Stiles. The book is called *The Man Behind Roosevelt* ($4.75) and sympathetically relates the story of the ex-newsman who guided the Roosevelt political destinies from their beginnings. Though his passion for anonymity made it difficult to assess his full worth at the time, his prescience as to the ultimate stature of FDR and his loyalty and devotion to the cause were beyond question. Even if you don't particularly admire FDR, this book will be of interest.

Speaking of FDR reminds us of the White House and the White House reminds us of a new book we just received with the unlikely title of (you guessed it) *The White House* ($3.95). Basically, this is a beautifully illustrated (many of the pictures are in color) tour of the Executive Mansion. However, the bright text adds a great deal to the worth of the book. In it the authors trace the residents of the White House and the changes which each of them made in the place. One interesting series of photographs shows the various sets of china which have been purchased over the years for use on state occasions.

Many of you will be delighted to know that Rudolf Flesch has written a new self-help book called *How to Make Sense* ($2.75). This book sort of ties together his previous *The Art of Plain Talk* ($2.50), *The Art of Readable Writing* ($3.00) and *The Art of Clear Thinking* ($2.75) by showing how improving your speaking, reading and writing can help you to a better way of life. Doctor Flesch is his usual frank and uninhibited self and, as might be expected, has little patience with the Great Books, vocabulary building books or those on English improvement, which he dismisses as "communication pills." It is sometimes difficult to go all the way with the theses advanced by Doctor Flesch, but there is much in his writing that is excellent, and you are always stimulated by reading him. This latest effort is no exception.

Since we've already let ourselves get slightly involved in politics this month, we might as well go all the way and tell you about a fine new book that has just been written by William S. White, chief Congressional correspondent for *The New York Times*. This book, *The Taft Story* ($3.50), is an honest and objective study of one of the more controversial and influential political figures of the last decade. While this is by no means a definitive biography (and White never claims it is), it is an excellent piece of writing and will probably stand for a good long while as the best on Taft, for it is going to be difficult to do a much better biography of him until more time has passed and his impact on America can be better judged.

—R.F.C.

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pinpoints the essentials of mobility in

Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses

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The significance of the skiiers is that they are the first "buddy platoon" to reach the 1st Cavalry Division at Hokkaido in Japan. These men, trained together since they entered the Army, were sent to the Far East and as a platoon were assigned to Co. I, 8th Cavalry. The 1st CavD also has a "Carrier Company"—a full company of infantr men—officers, noncommissioned officers, and men, th trained together for 19 weeks at Camp Breckinridge, K

Helicopters stay in the news and in action—as in Korea where the 7th Infantry Division in Operation "Red Wing" moved the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry to a forward assembly area just behind the front lines. The air lift was performed by the 13th Transportation Helicopter Company.

(For more on helicopters see page 18.)



The Month's Pictures

There are no finer pistoleers in the world than these fi members of the 1954 United States Army Pistol Squa Each of these five men wears the Army Distinguished Pist Badge, the highest award given by the Service for individu prowess with the weapons. *From left to right, front ro* CWO Oscar Weinmeister, M/Sgt Huelet Benner, and CW Robert Knight. *Standing:* Lt. Col. Ellis Lea and Maj. W liam Hancock. Col. Lea is team captain and both he a Maj. Hancock also hold the Distinguished Rifle Badg



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Paratrooper Medical Corpsman on maneuvers administering blood plasma.

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UNITED STATES ARMY

COMBAT FORCES Journal

Vol. 4, No. 11 June 1954

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Association's Journal

This is the time of year when our Assistant Secretary, in addition to other duties, carries on a wide correspondence with ROTC units throughout the country. Your Association, following through on a project inherited from the *Field Artillery Journal,* provides an Association of the U. S. Army medal to an outstanding cadet at each college-level ROTC unit. There are two medals at present, Infantry and Artillery. When our contest for an Association seal is completed (have you been working on your entry?) the seal will be incorporated into a Branch General medal which will replace the two present ones.

The actual contribution which these medals make to the *esprit de corps* and recognition of outstanding performance of duty can be measured in the attitudes of the PMS&Ts and the cadets alike. No medal is provided unless the PMS&T asks for it—and the requests come thick and fast. Your Association has provided 449 of these medals in the past three years.

Colonel John E. Coleman, former Editor of the *Field Artillery Journal,* donates a one-year subscription to COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL to the medal-winning cadet at Cornell, his *alma mater.* (Other ROTC graduates please copy.)

Presenting these medals without charge is just one more of your Association's little-known services. If you will turn to page 6, you will see that one of our objectives is to: "[perpetuate] those Army and unit traditions that contribute to *esprit de corps* and superior performance of duty." There is ample proof the ROTC medals contribute mightily to this particular objective.

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COVER

War Dog patrol on truce line in Korea. *U.S. Army photo*

THE CURRENT SCENE

Design for an Atomic Army *Col. George B. Sloan* 1
Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses *Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin* 2
Long and Rocky Road *M/Sgt. Thomas C. Gordon* 2

MEN AND METHODS

Whirly-Birds Lift 105 Section 1
The British Regimental System *Maj. Julian Paget* 3
The Defense of a Battery Position *Capt. Russell A. Gugeler* 3
How the Germans Surrendered *Forrest C. Pogue* 3
Career Management and Your Future. No. 10: Airborne Officers 4

MACHINES AND WEAPONS

Assault Bridge for Armor 3
More Fire Power for a Fire Power-Plus Army 4

DEPARTMENTS

The Month's Pictures .. Cover 2
The Month's Mail 6
Front and Center 10
The Month's Reading 28
Cerebrations 4
The Word from the Schools .. 4
Irons in the Fire 4
The Month's Books 5

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PRACTICE MAKES PERFECT—This unusual photo shows a Sikorsky H-19 helicopter over the Han River near Seoul in a simulated rescue of a downed pilot. The practice mission by a U.S.A.F. Air Rescue crew was similar to nearly one thousand actual rescues during the Korean war, made on land and at sea behind enemy lines.

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HELICOPTER EXPRESS — Regularly scheduled Air Express flights in Southern California form a new service started last December by Los Angeles Airways, Inc., and the Air Express division of Railway Express Agency, Inc. Big Sikorsky S-55s, like that above, and S-51s, are used for the speedy shuttle to cities as far inland as San Bernardino.

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PURPOSES

The Association of the United States Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Association shall be to encourage and foster for all elements, branches, and components of the Army of the United States, and for such veterans' and unit organizations as may be appropriate:

The dissemination of information relating to history, activities, problems and plans.

The exchange of ideas on and discussion of military matters.

The perpetuation of those Army and unit traditions that contribute to *esprit de corps* and superior performance of duty.

The cultivation of cordial relations among the several armed services and with the public.

The promotion, attainment, and preservation of high professional standards.

INSTRUMENTALITIES

The primary instrumentality for the carrying out of the purposes and the attainment of the objectives of the Association shall be the publication of its magazine, COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. The secondary instrumentalities of the Association for the carrying out of its purposes and the attainment of its objectives shall be the preparation, publication, and distribution of military books, and the performance of related activities in fact contributing to the Association's stated aims.

Adopted 14 December 1953 by the Executive Council.

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The Month's Mail

Concentrate on Movement

To the Editors:

In "The Rifle Squad: Key to Movement" (April), Capt. Thomas A. Ware, Jr. made a significant contribution to our ne for a basic change in squad tactics.

If we are strong on fire superiority and weak on "movemer then we need to concentrate on M. We need a special school work more effectively on tactics.

ELIJAH CLARENCE ALFC

Army ROTC
Howard University
Washington, D. C.

Independent, Ear to the Ground

To the Editors:

The editorial policy of the JOURNAL has been too consister good over the years to warrant any criticism. But since you you are puzzled over recent comments of general officers, I'd l to make a few observations.

I believe the solution to your paradox is variety. A balance both platoon-level combat action material and high-level milit thought is needed. Personally, however, I incline toward former. There's no dearth of high-level thought and theory official publications, but yours is the only magazine that has m tactics and techniques live for the man on the ground who, any final analysis, is the one who must get the job done.

It seems to me that those journals that have survived (ot than by subsidy) were the ones that refused to toe any pa line, that did not rely over-much on official material, that v comed controversy, and finally reached down to the working le and gave the man on the ground practical solutions to his pr lems.

Also, there is much to be said for the purely fictional piece stimulating interest and keeping a magazine alive. Why doe the JOURNAL try an occasional "combat story" just for the sto sake, and for the hell of it?

CAPT. AVERY E. K *USAR*

2952 South Columbus St.
Arlington 6, Va.

Disagrees With Our Ideals

To the Editors:

I don't believe your magazine is getting the right ideal acr

You believe in too many men in the armed forces. You helping the Army and the other service to teach out of d training. The armed force isn't teaching H-bomb warfare lik should. Too many officers like the kind that kicked Gen. B Mitchell out of the service are still in power. They are too set their ways and believe that all war will be like World War I a II. They are so set in their ways of old-fashioned training I lieve we will get caught with our pants down again. And you far as I can see in the past and you are still helping them out letting them write for your JOURNAL.

Also since you will not take a stand on Sen. McCarthy fo against, I again think your JOURNAL is not being fair. I am per cent behind McCarthy and I hope he runs the reds out of Army and other armed forces.

For the above and many other reasons that I have I shall ne again take an COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL and any of your ot books and magazines.

The above was my own ideals and I mean when I said, I ne want to see an COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL again. As you d like people to disagree with your ideals, I know this will end the waste paper basket.

M. G. NICH

APO 40 c/o PM
San Francico, Calif.

isgracing the Uniform

o the Editors:

In regard to making the Army more at-active, let's do something about ex-serv-emen who wear parts of their Army niform with civilian dress. It burns me o to see men disgracing the ones who love e service and who worked for stripes and ho fight for the Division insignia that me men insist on wearing just to show f.

What can be done? Give the local civil-n authorities in areas where there are no ilitary Police, the power to apprehend id deal with such persons. Make National uard officials crack down on their men ho wear the uniform improperly. If they e it so much, put them on active duty r twenty-four months.

It's a disgrace to every proud soldier and dishonor to our buddies who died on the ld of honor.

SFC Robert S. Simpson
Westside Court
xington, Va.

opter Cavalry Now

o the Editors:

The psychological time for "Copter Cav-y" (Major Bert Decker, Combat Forces Journal April 1954) is now. We have nde our bluff on instant atomic reprisal d it has been called. The battle at Dien n Phu hangs in the balance and an operation no greater than that described by Major Decker would turn the tide. It is very probable that never again will there be an opportunity to gain such a psychological and military advantage with so small an expenditure.

Many more helicopters than have been mentioned are dispersed through the armed forces. They could be flown to Indochina and be ready for action probably within a week. They would still be able to continue operating after the monsoons have rendered all other means of transportation impossible. A decisive outcome would place overwhelming strength in Mr. Dulles' hands. As far as we know, the Russians cannot strike back in any comparable manner so that this form of instant retaliation is less likely to provoke a general war than any other that might be suggested.

David C. Prince
50 Washington Ave.
Schenectady, N. Y.

Why They're Generals

To the Editors:

I read with interest your column "Journal's Journal" in the April issue and was not surprised to learn that practically every general reads the Journal, which is merely another reason why they are generals.

Better Journal, more members, better Journal. Sure must have a lot of members.

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sion. It is in a training division that most potential members are, and once a member always a member.

The Commanding General of the 6th Infantry Division at Fort Ord has the right idea in this respect. Information pertaining to the Association of the United States Army was included in the orientation of the newly arrived officer. No pressure is required. All that is necessary is to have a few subscription cards handy, a few copies of the JOURNAL located in the place of reception, and then tell them what it is all about. Nothing to it.

I'll bet my whiskey ration card that the 6th Division is leading the rest of the training divisions in membership.

Back issues of the JOURNAL make the best reference library a military-minded officer or noncommissioned officer can possess, whether he be in staff or command, in Infantry or QMC. Some officers I know refer to the JOURNAL oftener than they do FMs and TMs.

A captain was gathering material for a course of instruction he was to give on infantry tactics. He had FMs and pamphlets all over the place. It would have taken him days to get the stuff he wanted to fit the group he was preparing to instruct, had it not been for a friend who informed him of the article "Stress the Fundamentals" which appeared in the JOURNAL several months ago. That was all he needed. It is much easier to read and absorb something written by someone who gives you the feeling of confidence in knowing he knows what he is writing about, than it is to read and retain something written by an obscure author. A lieutenant was required to submit a paper on "NCO Prestige" for TI&I. Being a member, this required no sweat. He submitted a good letter based on ideas and suggestions contained in "The Month's Mail." A few months ago an officer was required to give a lecture on security. He found a good article in Cerebrations.


Many officers are doing the same. In the JOURNAL can be found something on any military subject.

As a suggestion, I recommend a list of the training divisions be published, in order of standing in number of members of the Association. I believe this would inspire some members located in such divisions to get on the stick and guide their unfortunate fellow officers into the realm of the wise. I mention training divisions because of the rapid turnover.

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


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


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


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Front And Center

The New Look's emphasis on air and naval power began to lose much of its luster during the last week in April as the news from Dien Bien Phu began to make it crystal clear that if the U.S. was to intervene in Indochina it would have to be with ground combat troops and if it intended to go to the rescue of Dien Bien Phu it would have to be with airborne forces (and the U.S. has only two airborne divisions and one airborne RCT). The situation in Indochina is such that even though the U.S. does not intervene, it still would appear that the reduction in the strength of our land combat forces in the Far East is no longer advisable. That was another of the goals of the New Look; designed to reduce Army strength and to create a strategic reserve in the U.S. The New Look appears more and more to be in the position of the dreamer who was finally convinced that he faced a condition and not a theory. The theory of massive retaliation and a smaller defense budget was attractive. Dien Bien Phu, actually, and as it symbolizes the fact that Communist aggression can be stopped only by ground combat forces, is a condition; a reality that has to be faced.

* * *

Battlefield surveillance problems and techniques are under study by the University of Michigan for the Army. Among the methods being studied are radar, infrared techniques, battlefield illumination, seismic and acoustical devices.

* * *

The Army is urging all of its commanders to get full use from the Army aviation assigned to its commands. It has noted that in some instances aircraft have not been used to the full extent possible and in other instances Army aviators have not been able to maintain and increase their flying efficiency. The Army training program for aviators stresses flying proficiency. Aviators assigned to tactical units are urged to practice the landing and take-off from short runways, and aviators assigned to utility and command aircraft are urged to increase their proficiency in instrument flying. Commanders are urged to get full use from aviation assigned them and to report if they have aviation in excess of their needs.

* * *

About $1.3 billion will be spent on military research and development in the fiscal year ending this month. This is about two and a half times the amount spent in the years preceding 1950. Altogether, research and development for military purposes costs about $2 billion a year and is about half of the total national outlay for research and development. The military R&D budget for the coming fiscal year will be about seven per cent less than the budget for last year. The Army's portion of this reduction is larger than the other services'.

* * *

Implementation of the Army's reorganization report (COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, February 1954) isn't proceeding very fast. For one thing, Secretary Stevens hasn't been able to apply himself to it because of the Senate investigation. But more significant is the lack of acceptance of the report by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. One DOD objection is the recommendation that the Comptroller be a military officer rather than a civilian. In contrast to the difficulties experienced by the Army report is the support and public praise the Secretary of Defense gave to the Navy report. The Navy report provides for a civilian comptroller. The report was prepared by a committee composed of Navy officers and civilian officials of the Navy Department. The Army report was prepared by a civilian committee.

* * *

The Air Force is still having trouble dropping paratroopers on the proper drop zones, a difficulty that was costly in lives in World War II operations. The Air Force has taken over the pathfinder jobs from the Army and uses what it calls "combat control teams." However, their techniques are still less than perfect. A different method, one that uses a device that calculates in flight the exact moment the pilot should signal the paratroopers to jump, has been perfected by the Royal Canadian Air Force.

* * *

A permanent promotion law for Reserve officers appears rather dim in view of the statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense John A. Hannah that such law should await implementation of an improved reserve program. The catch is that early legislation to strengthen the reserve structure isn't very promising at the moment. Progress depends upon the report Dr. Arthur S. Flemming makes to the President on the reserves. But Dr. Flemming has been waiting for a report by a military committee of senior officers who were asked to prepare a plan for the reserves. That report, due in April, hadn't been made on 1 May.

Report on Flash Burn

An early report from Exercise Flash Burn by Hanson W. Baldwin in *The New York Times* provides interesting comment on some of the tactical methods and techniques tried out during the North Carolina war games. Some of Mr. Baldwin's observations:

- There is need for improved methods of identifying drop zones so that troop-carrier pilots can bring their planes over the proper point at the proper altitude at the proper time. There is also a need for more drop zones in atomic warfare; a separate drop zone for each battalion would avoid massing and concentration. Flight formations are too large. More assault type aircraft are needed.
- Command relationships between the Air Force and Army are still not satisfactory, in the Army's view.
- Army assault helicopter tactics are not as advanced as those of the Marine Corps. Part of the trouble is the divided responsibility between the Army and Air Force.
- The eleven-man squad with two BARs and the shift of some of the arms of the heavy-weapons company to rifle companies was generally approved by those who watched the maneuvers.
- Tactical television has tremendous possibilities, and its development should be pushed.
- Methods of identifying an atomic target adequately and promptly must be improved by both the Army and Air Force. The time lag between the call for an atomic strike and its execution is too great.
- Camouflage and concealment and the siting of positions were inadequate.
- Defense against chemical, biological and atomic attack was inadequate in both practice and theory.
- Supply and logistics were well executed.
- Morale was high and the training achieved was excellent.

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
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DESIGN FOR AN ATOMIC ARMY

"he Army's contribution to the new strategy must be the creation
of "in being" forces that are completely air transportable and
capable of seizing and holding key areas in the enemy's homeland

COLONEL GEORGE B. SLOAN

ROM the time of our national beginnings our country has relied on our *potential* military strength, not our mmediately available forces, to deter or defeat aggressors. ut that is no more, if we accept the pronouncements of rious influential spokesmen. We now rely upon imediate massive retaliation by forces in being. We shall it is implied—destroy the aggressor's cities, burn his ctories, kill millions of his people and maim or shock to helplessness millions of others. We are to imagine at within a short period after the enemy begins a war, s homeland will be a scene of ruin and disorder, his overnment inoperative, his transportation system at a andstill and his communications disrupted. This ushing attack will be executed by strategic air and val forces. The Army has no part in it and no respondility for it. Such complete isolation of the Army from l connection with the nation's primary strategic proam has caused some people to ponder the question of hether we are justified in maintaining an active army.

If it were certain, or even likely, that the strategic air efforts would produce a decision, cause our enemy to surrender, and achieve our nation's war objectives, there would indeed be no justification for an active army. Unfortunately, however, there is lack of convincing evidence that the strategic air offensive will produce these results. That it will create paralyzing destruction is almost certain. But if history has any lesson for the military student, no single fact is more amply demonstrated than that bombardment alone—regardless of its intensity —is never conclusive. The inability of air power to close with the enemy and force a decision means that the most that can be expected of this air offensive is a stalemate; the enemy will be prostrate but not lifeless, and we will not have the means to administer the final, decisive blows. We will not have the means precisely because the Army is not a partner to the strategy.

It is here that the Army will be needed to win a decisive victory. Closing with the enemy and completing

COLONEL GEORGE B. SLOAN, *Infantry, is a 1937 graduate of the Military Academy and a 1953 graduate of the Army War College. During the Second World War he served in the Aleutians with the 37th Infantry and on Kwajalein with the 7th Infantry Division. He then went to Europe where he was G3 of the XIX Corps. During the Korean conflict he commanded the 27th Infantry and was later Chief of Plans, G3 Section, Eighth Army. He is now on duty in the Pentagon.*

his subjugation is the Army's business. The problem is to make it clear to all that this business is necessary. When it is understood that only the Army can close with the enemy and insure his defeat, the existence of the Army will be assured. Can our present Army do this job? Well, let's see.

At the end of sixty or one hundred days, or whatever time the strategic air and naval forces require to deliver their "massive blows of retaliation," the Army, according to present plans for a phase build-up, will have ordered to active duty five to ten National Guard divisions and will have activated perhaps five more. (These are my estimates; I wrote this without reference to mobilization plans.) It will have accomplished about fifteen per cent of its mobilization and will still be twenty months away from completing the build-up of forces considered necessary to launch an invasion of the enemy's homeland. These divisions will be similar to World War II units, and except for the addition of a few battalions of atomic cannons, free and guided missiles, the field army itself will have changed little since World War II or Korea.



DURING those sixty days the Army staff will be up to its neck in inducting, training, feeding and caring for millions of new citizen soldiers. It will be heavily involved in trying to salvage some good from a number of rear guard actions scattered around the world. It will be beset by investigators, harassed by shortages and burdened by an excess of advice. In short, mobilization will be in full swing—but the Army will be totally unable and unprepared to capitalize on the effect of the atomic offensive. While the slow, agonizing process of mobilization grinds away, the golden opportunity for a quick victory will escape. The shock of our massive nuclear blows will dissipate, the opportunity for full exploitation will disappear. Just as surely as infantry must "lean against an artillery barrage" to reap its full value so must the Army be prepared immediately to invade the enemy's homeland following the thermonuclear offensive. Only in this way can the full benefits of our tremendously expensive atomic offensive be realized.

"All true," says the Army planner, "but so what? It is a regrettable but incontrovertible fact that we cannot maintain an army in being of sufficient size to invade the enemy's homeland. The best we can do is maintain the nucleus—or base. The unhappy reality of mobilization is something that will forever haunt us."

Is this actually true? Suppose we abandoned our preconceived ideas. Suppose we junked the mobilization concept and all its subsidiary plans; suppose we forgot about our present organization and branches, about our experience, about World Wars I and II, about Korea a about the Louisiana maneuvers in 1940. Suppose ever body agreed to put his private prejudices, biases a partialities in cold storage. Suppose we did all this a then set out to design an army capable of invading aggressor's homeland immediate following our atomic counterblo What would such an army lo like?

FIRST, when and how should th Army fight? Obviously, if it is exploit the thermonuclear offensi it must be capable of moving rectly to the scene of destructi and coping with the situation finds there. To do this, our Arm must be organized into task forc capable of rapid independent mov ment to selected strategic areas a prepared on arrival to seize a maintain control of these are These attacks must be initiated i mediately after the strategic air offensive. The simu taneous capture of the key areas will provide the finishi blow of the war by preventing the enemy from recov ing from the shock of thermonuclear disaster. Sooner later—probably sooner—it will force his surrender. If D-day the Soviets begin the war by launching their ov strategic air offensive, and by setting off invasions Western Europe, the Near East and Japan, we must once counterattack with a devastating atomic offensiv In a few weeks hundreds of high-yield bombs rain on t Soviet's cities and installations. At the end of—say 1 days—her cities are in ruins, transportation at a standsti Her armies on her perimeter are held in check by o Allies, by tactical thermonuclear weapons and by a sho age of supplies. Beginning at about that time, corps-si task forces descend on fifteen or twenty key points, ca ture these localities and extend their control progressive toward each other. By quickly overrunning the disorga ized local defenders, capitalizing on the latent hatred f Communist tyranny and converting to our own adva tage the nationalism of various racial minorities, t relatively small force should be able rapidly to extend control over all of the enemy country.

WHAT kind of organization must we have to be capab of mounting a dozen or more independent long-ran invasions of the enemy's homeland? Briefly, the Arm should have the following characteristics:

- Complete and true air transportability
- Independence of land lines of communication
- A high degree of tactical mobility and fire power
- By World War II standards small tactical uni perhaps 50 divisions of 10,000 man strength—and a to active strength of around a million.

"A pipe dream," says your veteran Army plann

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An army in being and ready to fight, rather than one geared to mobilize later

How are you going to get fifty divisions out of one million men when today we can't get twenty divisions out of a million and a half? How are you going to make a division truly air transportable when the plane doesn't exist that will fly an M-48 tank? Even if you could lift your heavy equipment, you still couldn't begin to transport and supply fifty divisions by air transport alone. There aren't enough airplanes in the world for that. Also, how could a small, independent task force of thirty or forty thousand men sustain itself in the heart of an enemy's homeland? And while all this is going on, what will the Soviet Army be doing? Your strategic air blows won't stop it, because it has stockpiled supplies to keep going for a long time. Worst of all—you are putting all your eggs in one basket. What will you do if the Strategic Air Force doesn't get off the ground, or if the country is forced to revise its strategy?" These, of course, are but a few of the objections that will be expressed, but since they are among the most important, let's examine them. The fellow who expressed them, incidentally, is still thinking in terms of the mobilization concept, of near ground warfare, of land lines of communication and of TNT rather than TN (thermonuclear). These were valid concepts in their day, but they are not compatible with the realities of atomic warfare.

HOW can we get fifty divisions out of a million men? Two ways—by streamlining the division and by cutting down the non-divisional overhead. As it stands today, the Army is admittedly an inefficient fighting force, organized as the nucleus for an expanded army not at one intended to fight as it stands. Large portions of its strength, funds and energy are devoted to maintaining a mobilization base and a massive reserve. But if we accept the idea—as the Air Force and the Navy have of fighting with forces in being, these programs may be stopped or curtailed. We will no longer maintain a mobilization base. The long overdue reorganization of logistical services can be effected, and these services, having before them for the first time the clearly defined mission of supporting a fighting force of a definite size, can effect tremendous savings within themselves. In a similar manner, the Army's training base may be streamlined and tailored for a specific job. The reserve program will be limited to D-day ready units, with some of the units assuming a greater or even total responsibility for antiaircraft and other continental defense programs. The present plan to reduce the active Army's border guard duties in Korea, Japan and Europe can be accelerated, and the mission of containing the Communist land forces turned over to our allies, assisted by our tactical atomic weapons. All these steps will enable the Army to devote a far greater proportion of its assets to its strategic force. Perhaps more than half its total strength will be allotted to combat-ready fighting forces.

Within the field Army itself, even greater savings may be effected. Today the type—or typical—field army contains more artillery battalions than infantry battalions, approximately as many engineers as tankers. This tremendous proportion of total strength devoted to artillery derives from our world wars concept of massed artillery fires. That this was a sound concept is indisputable, but equally evident is the fact that it has been outmoded by tactical atomic weapons. In World War II the ability to mass the fires of twenty or more artillery battalions at any given point was a first factor in our successes. But today the same and even greater effect can be obtained by any one of several atomic weapons, and these weapons require a minute fraction of the men and matériel required by World War II artillery. It seems evident, therefore, that if we abandon the idea of indirect fire TNT weapons and accept the principle of relying entirely on tactical atomic weapons for area saturation purposes, we will have increased by almost fifty per cent the number of divisions within the field army.

THE efficiency, versatility and importance of our engineer units in the Army is widely acknowledged. Their vital role in maintaining our land lines of communication cannot be exaggerated. But if we become independent of land lines of communication, much of their now vital work need not be done and a great deal of their strength will be available for other purposes. In fact, independence of land LOCs should permit the revision of the entire science of field logistics, with perhaps a single base section providing direct logistical support via air lanes to all of the various task groups in the field. Such a program offers tremendous possibilities for conserving manpower.

Thus, by reorganizing the army as a whole, based on a concept of fighting the war with forces in being as opposed to a concept of mobilization, and by reorganizing the field army to obtain maximum advantage of thermonuclear weapons and air transport, sufficient manpower savings may be effected to permit the organization of perhaps fifty 10,000 man divisions. It is entirely possible that this will give us the power to carry out the strategic missions I have outlined. It will permit the formation of fifteen to twenty task forces of 20,000 to 30,000 men. Roughly, this appears to be about the proper number, although the determination of the precise number must, of course, be worked out in detailed plans. In any event, fifty divisions available on D-day will be of greater strategic value than two or



three times that number on D plus thirty-six months.

NEXT, the matter of making a division truly air transportable. The first step in this process we have already discussed—the substitution of tactical atomic missiles for the bulk of conventional artillery. This step will not only greatly reduce the size of the division but it will more than halve the tonnage necessary to sustain it. The second step involves redesign of the tank. Our present tank is so heavy—and its fuel requirements are so great—that it simply cannot be fitted into the airborne picture. But need the tank be so heavy? Must it consume more than a gallon of fuel per mile? A large number of men, within the armor arm, say no. They point out that a tank has three essential characteristics: mobility, fire power and armor or protection. The ideal tank embodies all three of these characteristics and if it were practical to have an air-transported tank similar to the M-48, then there would be no reason to redesign the tank. Unfortunately the problem of air transporting large numbers of M-48 tanks seems insolvable. If we are to have a tank in the air-transported Army, we must lessen its weight. Accordingly, let us cut down on the armor, but retaining its mobility and fire power. These are the characteristics which account for the tank's killing power, its shock action and its psychological effect. By sacrificing armor we are enabled to put a tank with great fighting power on the battlefield of our choice. Several practical suggestions toward this end have been made. One is laminated nylon armor. Another advocates acquiring armor at the battle area itself. This would be done by providing the vertical surfaces of the tank with pockets—and, after air movement to the combat zone, filling these pockets with local aggregate (sand and gravel to you and me). Either of these measures would make it possible to fly tanks to the battlefield—tanks that would retain considerable protection against small arms and shell fragments. Development of a tank combining mobility, fighting power and low weight is both practical and imperative.

This tank should be the basis of the strategic division, which would consist of three or more tank-infantry regiments, an atomic weapons battalion and a service support battalion. This division would be truly air transportable and it probably would require not more than half the airlift of the present infantry division.

CAN we maintain an army such as this in the field? Our present division is said to require about 560 tons of supplies per day of active combat. Of this total, 400 tons are ammunition, 70 tons are POL, 48 tons are rations and the balance other types of supply. Artillery accounts for about 80 per cent of the ammunition expenditures. Thus, elimination of the bulk of conventional artillery reduces tonnage requirements by about 300 tons daily. Reduction in the over-all size of the division cuts the consumption of supplies other than ammunition about 40 per cent. The total daily requirements of the new division, therefore, may be estimated at about 200 tons —or an amount sufficient to provide full loads for 2 aircraft capable of lifting 10 tons each. Assume th average penetration distance is about 1,200 miles. Be cause this distance is near the extreme radius of moder transport aircraft, allow two aircraft for each daily plan load of supplies required. Total aircraft requiremer necessary to support 50 divisions does not exceed 2,00(certainly a modest figure for a nation of our air transpo capability.

THE fourth objection is that a force of the propose size and composition could not survive in the heart o the enemy's homeland. It is true that one such forc —acting alone—could not survive. But the total impac of ten, fifteen or twenty of these task units, acting as a integral part of the grand strategic force, will be fa greater than the sum of their individual effects. Thes units will descend upon a demoralized and prostra land. The capture of all the enemy's key strategic area coupled with the disruption of his transportation sy tem, the destruction of his petroleum stocks and th impotence of his government, will deny him the capabi ity of concentrating large forces. This strategy does n visualize that the ground forces will fight with impunit Some losses will be inevitable. But the strategy does hol the hope of great gain for small loss.

AS for the enemy armies, it is reasonably certain thi when the war starts, the enemy will set its armies i motion toward such tempting objectives as Weste Europe, the Near East and Japan. These invasions mu be contained by our Allies, assisted by our air power ar tactical atomic weapons. As our strategic air offensiv unfolds, the Soviets will find that they cannot disenga their invading armies and return them to the interior Russia for defense of the homeland. Pressure from ou allies, disruption of transportation, attacks against petr leum and other vital stocks, all will serve to immobili the bulk of Soviet armies near the frontiers. Meanwhil at the proper time, our strategic army will deliver a assault directly on the enemy's heartland, by-passing th isolated armies along the perimeter. This is true vertic envelopment in the strategic sense.

FINALLY, consider the objection that the plan is i flexible, that we are committed to a single strateg incapable of adjusting ourselves to a set of circumstanc at variance with those we have predicted. It is true, course, that the early invasion of the enemy's strateg centers presupposes the success of the strategic air attac If SAC doesn't get off the ground—if the "massive blo of retaliation" are never delivered, then there will be early airborne invasion of the homeland. But this itself is not an indictment of the concept of a comba ready army. As a matter of fact, if, for any reason, th strategic air force is withheld or prevented from execu ing its mission of strategic bombardment, the existen of a strategically mobile combat-ready army becom

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even more desirable. By the same token, failing the SAC offensive, the chances of our present mobilization plan attaining fruition are highly speculative.

What does this all add up to? Let's return to the basic strategy: For the first time in the life of our Republic, we have changed our basic strategy of defense. We will defend our country with forces in being rather than depending upon mobilization after the start of war.

Primary responsibility for executing this strategy is vested in air and naval forces, but because these forces are unable to move into the enemy's heartland and force our will upon him, the strategy is indecisive and holds little hope for more than a stalemate. The Army has no part in this immediate retaliation plan, not because it isn't needed, but rather because the Army, in its present form, is not prepared to carry out its traditional mission of occupation and subjugation.

It is possible to organize our Army (no greater in size than our present force) so that it will be capable of joining the Air Force and Navy in achieving the decisive defeat of an aggressor. Such an Army would have as its basis the acceptance of the concept of fighting the war with forces in being. To make it possible, it will be necessary to reorganize the logistical force; transfer to D-day ready units of the reserve forces greater responsibility for continental defense, including antiaircraft; depend upon our allies, reinforced with U.S. tactical atomic weapons, for border guard duties in Western Europe, the 38th Parallel and similar areas; and organize the active field army into a strategic force—to be known as the Strategic Army—capable of mounting airborne attacks simultaneously or in rapid succession on the enemy's key strategic areas immediately following the strategic air offensive.

This Army will have the following characteristics:

- Complete air transportability.
- High degree of tactical mobility and fire power.
- Independence of land lines of communication.

These characteristics may be built into the Army by depending upon tactical atomic weapons for area saturation fires with the elimination of the bulk of conventional artillery; eliminating the forces connected with establishing, maintaining and operating land lines of communication; and redesigning the division based upon an air transportable tank.

These measures will remove from the country's new strategy the defect of indecisiveness. They will restore the Army to a dynamic role, essential not only for the security of the nation but for the health of the Army itself, and they will complete the transformation of the armed forces which began with the flight of the first plane at Kitty Hawk and gathered speed with the birth of the atomic age at Alamogordo.

I AM not so naïve as to believe that I have turned out in finished form a blueprint for a new army. Whatever changes are made will be the work of many minds and great labor. But I do fervently believe that the Army must free itself of the horse-and-buggy concepts of mobilization, linear warfare, conventional artillery, and dependence upon land LOCs. We must get in step with the other services, accept the new strategy and learn to live with it and contribute to it. That is our task. Let's get on with it.





Five Whirly-birds Lift 105 Section

The technique of air-lifting a 105mm howitzer and its 10-man crew by five H-19 helicopters described here gives medium artillery the capability of displacing rapidly. Limitations imposed by the absence of roads or the presence of impassable terrain or bodies of water are overcome by the use of helicopter lift. In Korea, for example, the 69th ROK Field Artillery Battalion was airlifted to new positions in a long, narrow and deep valley that was inaccessible by road and cut off at the open end of the valley by a reservoir.

The actual displacement of an artillery unit by helicopter requires a definite sequence. First the new site must be reconnoitered and an advance party sent in to prepare it. The advance party marks the site with predesignated code letters to show the pilots where to set down their loads.

The actual movement of a gun section begins with th disassembly of the howitzer. This can be done in 15 minute (reassembly takes 20). The disassembly requires the r moval of the breech mechanism, tube, recoil mechanism traversing swivel, nut bracket cap, front seat of the equilibr tor, pintle pin, top carriage, main shields (left behind t lessen weight), and the wheels.


The parts are assembled into three loads, as pictured i the pages that follow.

The flight is made in two echelons. The first echelon co sists of Loads Nos. 1 and 4 because they carry the axle an wheels.

The second echelon lands at about the time the whee are installed.

Special Equipment

Buckles, flexible lashing, and 1-inch steel rings one foot in diameter



Sling and hook assembly: to attach all external loads to the 'copter



Cargo nets: for the movement ammunition and supplies



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Disassembly



Removal of the pintle pin. It takes a nice touch to get the pin key recessed when re-assembling



The 10-man crew must be on the job when the barrel assembly is lifted from the how. If timber carrying bars aren't available strong tree limbs or saplings can be used

.oad No. 1 1,480 lbs.

Axle, equalizing support, pintle pin, trails and lifting bar

'rails and axle rigged for hook-up. Jote traversing wheel and pintle





Load No. 1 is airborne. One lifting bar is also attached.

oad No. 2 979 lbs.

Barrel and breech assembly

Barrel assembly rigged for hook-up






Load No. 2 in flight

Loads 3, 4 and 5

Load No. 3 1530 lbs.

Cradle, recoil mechanism, equilibrator, top carriage, auxiliary shields, sight mounts and lifting bar



Four men carry the recoil mechanism



Cradle, recoil mechanism equilibrators, top carriag auxiliary shields, sigh mounts and one lifting ba (serving as an outrigger) a assembled for the third loa

Loads Nos. 4 & 5 10-man crew

Load 4: Four crew members and wheels

The two wheels are carried in 'copter that also carries four of the crew



Load 5: Six men, breech block and tools

Breech block and tools are carried in 'copter lifting remaining me



In moving a battery five H-19s are assigned to carry each of the first five howitzer sections. Experience has shown that it is advisable to have the section truck driver stay with his vehicle and have one man from the sixth section replace him. Thus by the time the first five sections are in, most of the crew of the last section are on the new site and only four 'copters are needed to move it. Experience has also shown that it is wise to bring in the chief of the first section to be flown with the advance party and have the other chiefs of sections come in with the sections preceding their own. This permits a chief to be on the ground early enough to locate the scheduled position of his piece and to guide the 'copters carrying his piece and crew.

Reassembly can be rapid. Efficiency is obtained by havi each member of each section assigned definite duties.

The rear echelon remaining behind maintains a contin ous flow of ammunition and other supplies to the batte either by helicopter lift or by truck when and if roads a opened.

The H-13 which flew in the advance party returns to t battalion, laying wire as it flies. Five ½-mile wire dispens can be hooked together and placed in a container which fastened to the left skid of the H-13. The H-13 can also used to fly an observer to a vantage point, laying wire as flies, thus giving the observer immediate communicati with the battery.

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When an outfit sets out to "restore prestige" some painful surprises are in store; for the way back is a

LONG AND ROCKY ROAD

MASTER SERGEANT THOMAS C. GORDON

THERE has been a lot of talk about restoring the prestige of officers and noncommissioned officers. I don't know how many outfits have undertaken the long hard back. But I do know what has been done by the 33d Infantry under the leadership of Colonel A. G. Elegar.

"Return of prestige" and other such phrases are easy to say and sound fine. But my observation is that the road back is rocky indeed. It is heartbreaking work and if you engage in it you can expect to be shocked at times.

We in the 33d found that when initiative was given noncommissioned officers, some of them fell painfully short of accepting and exercising it and had to be relieved. We learned that some of today's noncoms cannot assume the responsibilities of noncoms of twenty years ago. I do not mean that there were wholesale reductions within our battalions—not at all. There were, however, more reductions among the top three grades than you would normally expect. When company officers found themselves with the responsibilities that had been handled by field grade officers they learned that they had to lean more and more on their noncoms. When a noncom crumpled under the burden, room had to be made for a man who could handle the job. It was as simple as that. And as difficult.

Why were there as many as there were who could not handle the job? That is a hard one. In all fairness you can't lay all the blame on command practices of World War II. Korea must take some share of the blame. And other things, too.

I think the best way to describe the situation is to use the example of a man I shall call Master Sergeant Blank. Blank had been in the Army for eight years when he was rotated from a combat unit in Korea to the 33d Infantry. Before he went to Korea Blank had been a corporal, but in Korea he was jumped to master sergeant. I do not mean to detract from Blank's combat record but the truth is the jump was too fast for Blank. Blank failed the 33d, particularly in leadership essentials.

A reclassification board found it necessary to recommend his reduction to E-5 and a transfer to another unit within the regiment. He recovered from the initial shock and is now doing well. In a year or so, he will qualify under 33d Infantry standards for consideration for promotion to E-6. Blank can't be blamed for all this; he was the victim of circumstance.

THERE was one other headache that should be mentioned. "Prestige is as prestige does," and we had to scrap to keep prestige sacred if we were to have it at all. The problem of fraternization between noncoms and privates had to be



The 33d's motto—*Smiling We Come*—is a good one for an outfit with the high spirits of "restored" prestige

met head-on and without quarter. Noncoms had to be thoroughly briefed (a continuing affair involving newly promoted NCOs) on the fact that noncoms are only as good as their conduct on and off duty. Military police reports and other incidents of misconduct could not and would not be tolerated. As usual there were those who challenged this, either through forgetfulness or perversity. Those that did fell by the wayside.

We had other methods to pave the way for the return of prestige. Some of these are:

- Privates and privates 1st class (including acting corporals) were excluded from the Noncommissioned Officers Club. Former practice had allowed them the use of the club on certain nights.
- The practice of requiring the top three graders to show their passes when they were entering or leaving the post in uniform was abolished.
- Top three graders were given off-duty passes good for all hours. They retained these in their possession.
- The establishment of sergeants' messes at each unit mess hall with table service.
- The establishment of a board of noncommissioned officers consisting of the senior noncoms of the regiment to advise the commanding officer at his request. This board is working on a plan for a workable method of selecting qualified men for promotion to the top three grades. This includes testing and maintenance of eligibility lists on a regiment-wide basis.
- The establishment of promotion boards consisting of three or more senior NCOs in each company, to make recommendations to the unit commander for promotions and/or reductions in the grades of PFC and corporal.
- The return of the First Sergeants' Call, conducted by the sergeant major, and the elimination of needless "command-line" paper work.
- The reduction of the number of courts-martial cases involving disrespect or insubordination to noncoms by the NCO handling less severe cases himself. Cases that do come up receive punishments.
- The sergeant major acts as a member of the commanding officer's staff during reviews and certain inspections.

THESE and many other changes have seen a definite rise in the morale of the lower ranks. At first, and it can be well understood, there was a sharp increase in incidents of disrespect to noncommissioned officers. Some privates and privates first class could not accept the change and fought it tooth and nail. A few had to learn the hard way. Eventually, though, education and patience paid off and it was satisfying to see the pendulum swing back.

CAVALRY,

And I Don't Mean Horses

MAJOR GENERAL JAMES M. GAVIN



SOME measure of undying fame was achieved by "Fighting Joe" Hooker in the War Between the States, when he asked, "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" From a war in which catch phrases were common, this one has been well remembered among the military; but it is a trifle lengthy for the soldiers of today. They are more likely to ask, "Who ever saw cavalry?"

Today it is the pastime of soldier-historians to speculate about the use of cavalry in that most bloody of all our national conflicts. What would have happened if Jeb Stuart, instead of wagon hunting, had been roving ahead of Lee when he debouched from the Cashtown pass on Gettysburg? If Buford on Willoughby Run had been driven in by the full impact of Stuart's incomparable cavalry, and the heights east and south of Gettysburg had been seized by the Southerners that first day, what effect would it have had on the hesitant Meade? Perhaps the whole course of our history would have changed. Perhaps.

In the meantime, we have fought a few more wars. Recently we reached a stalemate in one of them that historians may judge the most costly and least successful of all. In it, time after time, we committed our forces blindly to battle. While some historians are still lamenting the absence of Stuart at Gettysburg, no one has asked, "Where was Walker's cavalry in Korea?"—and it is high time

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One of the pioneers in the search for mobility that brought the airman and the soldier together, Major General James M. Gavin was a first lieutenant when he reported to the jump school at Fort Benning in August 1941. A little more than three years later he was a major general with a world-wide reputation as a fighting soldier and superb combat leader. After the war he wrote *Airborne Warfare*, published by the then Infantry Journal Press, and revealed himself as a man with an imaginative and searching mind. He recently left command of V Corps in Europe and is now Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Department of the Army.

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General Gavin in Europe during World War II



CAVALRY is supposed to be the arm of mobility. It exists and serves a useful purpose because of its mobility differential—the contrast between its mobility and that of other land forces. Without the differential it is *not* cavalry. Cavalry is the arm of shock and firepower; it is the screen of time and information. It denies the enemy that talisman of success—surprise—while it provides our own forces with the means to achieve that very thing, surprise, and with it destruction of the enemy.

Cavalry is not a horse, nor the crossed sabers and yellow scarves. These are the vestigial trappings of a gallant great arm of the U. S. Army, whose soul has been traded for a body. It is the arm of Jeb Stuart, and Custer, and Sheridan, and that someone did. Where was Walker's cavalry on November 26, 1950, when his handful of divisions was struck with complete and overwhelming surprise by thirty Chinese divisions? Unit after unit stumbled into ambush and suffered the worst defeat in the history of American arms.

Where was the cavalry? It was, and still is, in the minds of military planners and historians. And I don't mean horses. I mean helicopters and light aircraft, to lift soldiers armed with automatic weapons and hand-carried antitank weapons, and also lightweight reconnaissance vehicles, mounting antitank weapons the equal (or better) of the Russian T-34s.

Technologically we could have had them. Because of our deification of heavy equipment—and the combat practices of late World War II, which deluded us into believing that heavy armor is cavalry—we didn't have them. We lost the cavalry when we mounted it in weighty tanks and trucks, all of which move (if the terrain will allow them to move at all) at exactly the same speed as motorized infantry, if not slower.

Forrest. It is the arm that as late as World War II got there (in Forrest's phrase) the "fustest with the mostest," but is now rapidly becoming, in terms of firepower and mobility, lastest with the leastest. Certainly gallantry, venturesomeness, and willingness to die are abundant in our armored and cavalry units, as they have amply demonstrated at every combat opportunity. But with the motorization of the land forces, and the consequent removal of the mobility differential, the cavalry has ceased to exist in our Army except in name.

IN June 1950, when the victory-intoxicated North Korean forces were surging southward from the 38th Parallel, General MacArthur asked and was given authority to get in the ground battle. Obviously, the tactical situation called for a cavalry force to be committed at once, to screen and delay, while the heavier infantry and armored forces built up a more substantial defense.

What did we have that was equal to the occasion? One small infantry command of two-plus rifle companies and a battery of artillery, lifted to Korea by Air Force transport. Once under fire, they were slowed down to the speed of a foot soldier—actually slower than many of the tank-mounted North Koreans. They never had the proper means or mobility to perform their cavalry mission.

As Walker fell back, trading his infantry and artillery for time, his flanks were wide open. On his left, particularly, a gap of a hundred miles extending to the sea could readily have been penetrated. The situation begged for cavalry, but we lacked the contemporary kind of cavalry to do the job. As General Walker's forces fell back to the constricted perimeter about Pusan, only the valiant efforts of his fire-brigade infantrymen and their comrades of the Tactical Air Force made it possible to hold on.

Finally, when the landings at Inchon took place on September 15, there was again every promise of fluid action. I was present at Inchon, and after the first

crust of resistance was broken it seemed to me there was nothing worthy of the name in front of X Corps. The situation screamed for highly mobile cavalry forces to exploit this unprecedented opening. We should have pressed south to the rear of the Naktong River line in hours. Instead, we took almost two weeks to establish a link between these two forces. When the first breakout of our forces from the southern perimeter moved northward, it was a combined tank-truck column, essentially an infantry column limited in its performance by its road-bound equipment. We were fighting an Asiatic army on Asiatic terms.

Walker's divisions shortly thereafter swept forward and the entire peninsula was wide open. Cavalry patrols should then have been on their way to the Yalu; likely concentration areas for enemy forces in North Korea should have been scouted out, and the Yalu crossings kept under surveillance. With a properly composed and balanced cavalry force, this would have been entirely practicable—if we only had foreseen the need. Instead, the divisions of General Walker moved blindly forward, not knowing from road bend to road bend, and hill to hill, what the future held in store for them. If ever in the history of our armed forces there was a need for the cavalry arm—air-lifted in light planes, helicopters, and assault-type aircraft—this was it. The debacle that followed our acceptance of combat under these terms is now a tragic chapter in our history.

TODAY, in Europe, cavalry regiments are in battle positions, assigned the job of covering, screening, and delaying. One of the most frustrating experiences that a professional soldier can now know is to sit in at critiques of war games and maneuvers, and listen to staff officers endeavoring to rationalize the present-day cavalry's inability to fulfill its role. The most common analysis of the problem usually ends with some such conclusion as this: "They're cavalry regiments, aren't they? Their mission is a cavalry mission. The failure must be in the way they are handled." If cavalry units fail to provide timely information, or effective screening, their commanders are suspected of—and sometimes charged with—not having performed with sufficient celerity. Or an umpire is charged with allowing the enemy too much mobility.

What I find alarming is the lack of awareness that Russian motorized and armored forces are just as mobile as our own—if not more so. All the soul-searching in the world, and the most brilliant staff cerebrations, will not conjure up tactical success in cavalry action unless the means of achieving it are provided our cavalry commanders. They do not have the means today. They are road-bound. Even assuming they will be fortunate enough to fight in countries where roads are numerous, they are no more mobile than the mechanized infantry divisions they are expected to screen from the enemy.

IT is a simple matter to be critical after the event. It is another to provide, or attempt to provide, answers to the questions raised. Fortunately, most of the answers to the problems in the soldier's trade are not as difficult to come by as may first appear. Several thousand years of experience lie behind us, awaiting understanding.

One of the most striking aspects of man's military past is his persistent search for the technical means to get an edge on his opponent in mobility. When he was successful, and especially when he could organize elements of varying mobility into a cohesive combat team, he was successful in combat. When he failed to solve the technical problem created by his needs, he failed in combat.


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The consul . . . had never seen a phalanx in his life until he encountered one—for the first time—in the Roman war with Perseus; and, when it was all over, he used freely to confess to his friends at home that the Macedonian phalanx was the most formidable and terrifying sight that had ever met his eyes.

THE Persians who opposed the Greeks were fine horsemen. If they had acquired the teamwork and discipline of the Greeks, they should by all odds have won. The Greeks were not only good fighters, however, but smart enough to learn the handling of horses from the Persians. Philip of Macedon was the first great Greek soldier with the vision and organizational ability to match horsemen effectively with the superb Greek foot soldiers. He organized heavy and light cavalry, and trained them to fight in close co-operation with his infantry.

His skill was inherited by his son Alexander, the world's first great cavalry leader, who fulfilled his father's vision. "Cavalry was his dominant arm," writes General J. F. C. Fuller, "and in battle he invariably led [cavalry] in person." Alexander developed and exploited the mobility differential between his infantry and his cavalry to the fullest extent possible in his times. There were subdivisions of each, based upon mobility, and the peltast was retained for close-in screening tasks.

Even as the phalanx reached its highest performance, an opponent worthy of its challenge appeared in the Roman legion. The legion had been coming up



Lacking cavalry, divisions pushed blindly forward, not knowing from road bend to road bend, and hill to hill, what the future held in store for them

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e hard way, fighting the superb valry of Hannibal; it finally de- ated him and turned to the east. he legion, like the phalanx, was traveling fort; yet it had one great lvantage over the phalanx: every an was equipped and trained to ght as an individual. As a conse- uence, the legion was so flexible at it could fight in almost any di- ction; while the phalanx, in some spects like a modern triangular vision, was designed and trained fight where it was pointed.

The reign of the legion was long, d during it the field of combat perienced Pax Romana. But, as th all victorious ways in war, it uld not last forever; and, when the d came, the legion's adversary was igh, combat-ready cavalry. Signs the coming of the horseman had en seen but little appreciated til the great disaster at Adrian- le in A.D. 378, when Emperor lens lost his legions and his life der the onslaught of the Gothic valry.

The cavalrymen appeared invinci- after Adrianople, and with each pass- century they improved their armor til they knew no opponent worthy of ir mettle. True, they became heavier d more immobile, but in their eyes y became only more invincible. nally, in the thirteenth century, there peared on the eastern horizon a horse- n laying waste to all before him. On eighth of January 1258, he came to gates of Baghdad and challenged the de of the Western cavalry to come th. The story of this meeting is told an eyewitness.

We met at Nahr Bashir, one of the de- dencies of Dujayl; and there would ride th from amongst us to offer single com- a knight fully accoutred and mounted an Arab horse, so that it was as though and his steed together were [solid as] he great mountain. Then there would ne forth to meet him from the Mongols a seman mounted on a horse like a don- , and having in his hand a spear like a ndle, wearing neither robe nor armor, so t all who saw him were moved to laugh- Yet ere the day was done the victory s theirs, and they inflicted on us a great eat, which was the Key of Evil, and reafter there befell what befell us.

HE impact of the Mongol cavalry on he West was impressive but, on mili- y men in particular, of limited dura- n. Barely a century had passed before h men and horses had again been ar- red to the point of immobility. The ent of gunpowder clearly spelled the



Tanks are road-bound and no more mobile than the infantry divisions they are expected to screen

end of the armored knight, but this was little realized at the time; those who used gunpowder were often considered criminals and occasionally hanged on the spot. Finally, at Agincourt in 1415, the flower of French knighthood met its doom at the hands of a lightly armored, much more agile force, armed with the longbow.

Despite this crushing demonstration, the role of the armored knight in the warfare of the Middle Ages continued to be an important one. Often the presence of a mounted man in battle reflected his prosperous station in life, and thus an ability to afford a horse and all its trappings, rather than any awareness of a tactical need. Jousting was a popular military sport, and the charging of armored knights was an approved tactic through all the years while firearms continued to improve. Even after the efficiency of gunpowder had made the armored horse ineffective, many soldiers persisted in arguing that the most decisive and effective tactic in combat was still the cavalry charge.

IN our Civil War, the cavalryman shed his armor and adopted the pistol and saber as proper weapons for the charge. But it was in this war, the era of our great cavalry leaders, that such men as Sheridan first enunciated the heretical view that the purpose of cavalry was not merely to ride hell-for-leather. By the war's end, it was established beyond question that the real purpose of the horse was to deliver firepower where it was needed most. Frequently the cavalrymen dismounted, sheltered their horses and dug in to let the opposing side destroy itself against the high volume of fire they were able to develop—a shrewd adaptation of an existing weapons system to the existing combat environment.

Clearly firepower was building up to such intensity on the battlefield that flesh and bone could no longer prevail against it. The efficiency of firearms and the number of automatic weapons continued to increase until in World War I an impasse was reached. The mobility differential between the components of the land forces had disappeared. The defense completely dominated combat; and Verdun, the Somme, and Passchendaele were the result. British casualties at Passchendaele were 8,222 for each square mile captured—an all-time high in human sacrifice for the real estate gained.

While men were piling up their bodies in battles of attrition in World War I, the commanders and their staffs were desperately trying to solve their dilemma —only to fall back on a still greater massing of artillery, and assaulting infantry, in the hope of saturating the defenses. Yet already a new form of mobility had appeared; the gasoline-driven land vehicle. Its arrival was too late by a small margin for full exploitation in World War I, but to those who read its meaning correctly it showed certain promise of breaking the stalemate. Tank warfare was sufficiently tested to convince a few visionaries of its great possibilities.

Between the wars they preached. J. F. C. Fuller, Liddell Hart, de Gaulle, and Chaffee argued wherever they could obtain a hearing for the new form of war —or new form of cavalry, which it unquestionably was—offering a mobility differential never before seen or even thought of. Unluckily a number of the German senior officers foresaw its possibilities with equal clarity and instituted an appropriate development program in the Wehrmacht. The German campaigns in Poland in 1939 and France in 1940 proved men like Guderian and Rommel to be apt students of their Allied teachers.

NOW we are at a point in history where soldiers in the past have often found themselves. In our time, we have

seen the great defensive battles of World War I and the great offensive battles of the early 1940s. Understandably, many veterans remember vividly and well how the lessons of ten years ago were applied in battle. But memory can become idolatry of things past and close our minds to the meaning of events. We quote the preachings of Liddell Hart and Fuller in the twenties as though mere repetition would extend their validity into the present. We run the risk of forgetting that it is not what was said and done, but *why* it was said and *why* it was done, that is important. In the meantime, one of the most—if not *the* most—critically evolutionary periods in military history is upon us.

Not many years elapsed between Kitty Hawk and the great offensives of World War II, yet they were years full of intensive search for the proper exploitation of the new air vehicle in combat. There were those, like their predecessors in years past, who saw the new aerial instrument as the absolute weapon—one such was Douhet. Others, like the visionary Mitchell and Hap Arnold, saw it for what it was: mobility, to enable the means for victory to be brought to the area of decisive combat. General Mitchell's definition of air power is still the best written: *anything that flies.*

The common search for the means of survival brought the airman and the soldier together; and, once joined, their imaginative use of the new form of mobility was rapid. I consider myself most fortunate to have been associated with one of our first units in this new field. I was a member of the Army's 505th Parachute Regimental Combat Team in the invasion of Sicily on July 9, 1943. Its mission was to land between the known enemy reserves and the beaches to be used by our assault divisions, and to screen the landings. There were a number of subordinate missions: to deny the use of an airfield, seize dominant terrain, secure several crossroads, and so on—a typical cavalry mission.

AFTER the landings, the first ground forces we encountered were the reconnaissance elements of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division, the cavalry of Fuller's and Liddell Hart's disciples. We had a rough time. Badly scattered, we found that our mobility was not as great as we thought it was; badly outgunned —the Tigers were impressive against our 2.36 bazookas—we nonetheless survived. The success of our mission can best be judged by an enemy evaluation of it:

> It is my opinion that if it had not been for the Allied airborne forces blocking the Hermann Goering Armored Division from reaching the beachhead, that Division would have driven the initial seaborne forces back into the sea. [Postwar interrogation of General Kurt Student.]

We came back with a burning conviction on two points: we needed (1) more accurate air delivery and (2) better antitank weapons. Although first priority was immediately given these problems, when we jumped in Italy two months later we fared not much better. The mission was again a typical cavalry one. The 2nd Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry, was to land at Avellino, a key to the road network leading to Salerno, and block all enemy movement through that area. The remainder of the 82nd Airborne Division moved from Sicily to Salerno as a highly mobile reserve, and overnight was in combat on the beachhead.

Between Salerno and Normandy every effort was concentrated on improving antitank weapons and accuracy of delivery. For the first time we began the search for a lightweight land vehicle to exploit the unexpected opportunities which invariably characterized—so we were beginning to realize—a landing in the enemy rear. For accuracy of delivery we turned to Dr. Vannevar Bush's office in Washington and, through the personal efforts of Dr. Charles Waring (now head of the Chemistry Department of the University of Connecticut) we were able to obtain colored lights that could be jumped with an individual, set up after landing, and triggered remotely by code (they were later replaced by infrared lights). For antitank weapons, General Ridgway obtained a company of 57mms from a division newly arrived in North Africa. We also redistributed our individual jump loads so that we could jump seven hundred antitank mines per regiment, and we adopted the British Gammon antitank hand grenade.

The 57mms were the best guns we had, though we rarely had them when we wanted them, since they had to be flown by glider. They had to do until we captured the first German panzerfausts in Holland; these made one man equal to the heaviest German tank and started us on an era of relative prosperity. For the solution to the vehicle problem, we put extra armor plate on jeeps. When equipped with automatic weapons and panzerfausts, they—compared to other forms of mobility in World War II—were the best cavalry known to date. Capable of moving by glider several hundred miles in a few hours, and after they landed of coping with anything they met on favorable terms, they invariably gave a good account of themselves.

THE mission assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division in Normandy was t block all enemy attempts to reinforce th beaches and to attack them from th rear—again a typical cavalry mission Two months after Normandy the div sion was in the air once more and on it way to Nijmegen. Much had bee learned in the interim. The accuracy o the Holland landings was almost perfect and antitank weapons were soon ob tained in abundance. The division's cav alry troop, the reconnaissance platoon fully motorized with the new armored jeeps, proved worthy of every confi dence. Here was cavalry in the historica sense.

After Holland we began to talk abou droppable fuselages, track-laying aircraft assault transports, helicopters. We wer not sure what form the air vehicle would take but we knew that we were on th right track. What we needed next wa a closer integration with the inheritor of the cavalry role, the armored forces without loss to the highly mobile and aggressive character of the airborn forces, the "lean and mean" philosophy This at once suggested a future for ar mor in the air-transportable field, possibly *the* future. Certainly it was the are in which the frontier of military knowledge had to be pushed back.

It should be realized that at this tim a complementary development of th greatest significance was taking place in antitank weapons. In several fields o research the antitank weapon was show ing itself far superior to the tank, clearl indicating that in the near future ant tank weapons would reduce even furthe the mobility differential enjoyed by ar mor in the early 1940s. Hence the clea and immediate requirement was for ex ploration of the airborne-armor field i which a new mobility could be found.


IF we failed to do this, the least tha could happen would be a war of stag nation in which our armored forces, ou so-called cavalry, would be as immobil as the enemy. At the worst, an enem would develop it and achieve over whelming tactical surprise at the open ing of hostilities—as the Germans did i 1939 and 1940. We should find it worth remembering that the first maneuver o airborne troops was conducted by th Russians in 1930, and that in 1935 the moved an entire division by air from Moscow to Vladivostok—3,500 miles.

As an enthusiastic supporter of ou

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ıvalry arm, I am convinced that we will ever win another war without it, and ıat without it we may very likely lose. orea is eloquent testimony. My own ɔnvictions and experiences in World Var II led me to write a brief piece on ıe subject called "The Future of Ar-ıor," which was published in both the OMBAT FORCES JOURNAL and *Armored avalry Journal* in November 1947.

It seemed to me, at the time, that we ould have to lighten all items of com-ıt armored equipment, and develop and oduce the aircraft to carry the new ght armored forces into battle. But I complished little. The vehicles in our fantry and cavalry units are no lighter ow than they were five years ago—in ct, in most cases they are heavier. Cur-ntly, the mobility differential between ır infantry and our cavalry—in the rm of armored divisions and cavalry giments—is nil. The same is true of



The mobility differential is within our grasp in the air vehicles being developed: assault transports, light utility planes, helicopters and convertaplanes

e differential between ourselves and e Russians—unless, of course, if we ve to fight them, they will be accom-dating enough to walk while we are ling on wheels and tracks.

HERE is naturally much speculation ıow over the implications of atomic rfare. In spite of conflicting opinions, eems clear at least that bombs, guided ssiles, and artillery projectiles with de-uctive power measured in the kilotons d megatons are here to stay. If they used at all, they will sooner or later be used directly against land forces; and the only countermeasure possible is to reduce drastically the numbers of soldiers per square mile in the battle area, which will itself have to be regarded as a zone hundreds of miles deeper than it is at present. Since fewer soldiers will have to cover much more ground, there will be a proportionately greater need for automatic weapons and for a more rapid and efficient supply system to provide them with ammunition. In the solution of these problems the air vehicle will inevitably play a major part.

Since dispersion—individual and unit—will characterize the defense, the greatest need of all will be for the means of concentrating rapidly in the area, and at the time, of decision. Major reserves will have to move by air, and in the tactical zone smaller units will have to be mutually supporting by air as well as land.

Cavalry-type screening missions will have to be conducted at much greater distances, and with much greater rapidity, than have hitherto been considered acceptable. The mobility differential to make this possible *must* be achieved. It is within our grasp, fortunately, in the air vehicles now being developed—assault transports, light utility planes, helicopters, and convertaplanes.

Forces so organized and equipped will have a predominant influence on future warfare. Their readiness at the very outset of combat is essential, yet unfortunately they cannot be produced, Aladdin-like, overnight. The lead time to their availability could be measured in years while the lead time to disaster could be zero, and this could happen while we relied almost exclusively on the concept of mass retaliation—a concept which finds no justification in human experience as an exclusive and self-sufficient means to victory.

The appeal of the weapon of mass retaliation is understandable; it is spectacular, it carries the war far away from our homeland, and most people believe it to be uniquely American. It does have a role to play—that of destroying an enemy's strategic forces before they can be brought to bear. Thereafter it must take its place among the resources, human as well as material, that our people provide to make victory possible. The weapons system that encompasses every decisive role which men can play, with the least drain on a nation's economy, will be in the long run the system to survive. For man is a land animal and he remains the common denominator in war, whatever form it takes.

Today, even the most casual awareness of the historical lesson should suggest that in ground combat the mobility differential we lack will be found in the air vehicle. Fully combined with the armored division, it would give us real mobility and momentum. Military tactics are not so recondite that there should be anything mysterious in such a conclusion. We have an apt Americanism that sums it up: "Hit 'em where they ain't!"

ALL of this may seem very remote from the Greeks, with their hoplites and peltasts, the Roman legion, the armored knight, and the combat philosophy of Nathan Bedford Forrest. It is in time but not in substance; for, to survive and win in battle, soldiers have always had to think of these things, and to move along the curves of history, lest they giddily precipitate themselves and their people into oblivion.

When a modern nation embarks on an unwise military course, however, not only its soldiers are at fault. "In our democracy," said General George C. Marshall fifteen years ago, "where the government is truly an agent of the popular will, military policy is dependent on public opinion, and our organization for war will be good or bad as the public is well informed or poorly informed. . . ." What we now need, as a nation, is an understanding of the past that can be converted into tactics and battle hardware, and give its soul back to the cavalry.

The Month's Reading

'New Look' for Tomorrow

HANSON BALDWIN
The New York Times Magazine
18 April 1954

It is not likely—given the power of hydrogen weapons—that a war of the future will be deliberately initiated by urban attacks. For each side has too much to lose and at the start of any war each side might hope to win the war by other means. But if atomic weapons are used tactically—if they are fired from 280mm. cannon on the battlefield and dropped by fighter-bombers operating from carrier decks—atomic war may well spread; it would, indeed, be difficult to confine it.

If the United States hopes for a more stable world, we must retain and develop (as insurance against and for use in, total war) our atomic capabilities. We should continue to train our troops in the tactical use of atomic weapons. But the military and political cost will be heavy indeed if we depend too much upon these weapons. Our "new look" for tomorrow must preserve the capability of balanced forces—forces able to fight and win with conventional weapons, on land, on sea and in the air—and in any climate from the Arctic to the jungle.

All this may seem a heavy and onerous task; indeed there is no assurance that any such policy and strategy of limited aims and means can succeed. There is no assurance that we can win the "cold war" or avert total war; many observers think the odds are against both. But there is no absolute security in the world of man; there is no course without risks. One thing is clear; if we pin all our faith to a strategy calculated to "win" a total war we may lose the "cold war," and we may help to bring on the very thing we are trying to avert.

Single Commander?

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHARLES E. WILSON
Press Conference
14 April 1954

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, is there to be a single commander under the Department of Defense with all the Services included in that?

SECRETARY WILSON: We are talking about it. It hasn't been decided.

Do Not Be One-Sided

GENERALFELDMARSCHALL ALBERT KESSELRING
A Soldier's Record
William Morrow & Co., 1954

I am both an army and an air-force officer, in the later course of the war holding both air and Army Group commands; I therefore believe I am in a position to appreciate the tasks of individual commanders in both services. If performance is to be judged by results, there can be no question that the Luftwaffe, both strategically and tactically, played a decisive part in Army operations. Naval strategy is the pace maker for air strategy. In both arms technical problem loom larger than in the Army. There can be no doubt tha an air operation demands profound knowledge and planning which, although on a different level, is not less complicated than that required by the Army. Nor can it be doubted tha air operations in the army battle zone or in sea warfare cal for a high degree of knowledge and understanding of th rudiments of all three arms.

Results will demonstrate an officer's fitness to be a Field Marshal, and no one will then ask about his origins, whethe he came from the army or the Luftwaffe. But one piece o advice I give to all Air Field-Marshals: do not become a one sided technician but learn to think and lead in terms of al three services.

Background for Treason

WILLARD M. WALLAC
Traitorous Hero
Harper & Bros., 1954

Like any political organization not run by angels, how ever, it [the Continental Congress] made notable mistake and none was more glaring or more tragic in its consequence than the treatment of Benedict Arnold. The desire to b appreciated is among the most compelling urges of th human spirit, and when a man peculiarly susceptible to goo opinion has performed extraordinary services and is denie recognition, he may wonder, in anger or despair, if the gam is worth the candle. Not disposed by inclination or exper ence to be either philosophical or charitable when thwarte Arnold was not likely to forget his humiliation by Congress The background to the treason of 1780 was thus alread being filled in with heavy strokes in 1777.

NATO Today

THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUN
19 April 1954

The North Atlantic Treaty nations today have under a tive arms in the ground, air and naval forces which are con mitted to the defense of Western Europe and the NAT perimeter approximately 3,100,000 officers and men. Th force, spread from the North Cape of Norway to the Cau casus Mountains of Turkey, is organized in 48 divisions, an there are another 49½ NATO reserve divisions which Su preme Allied Headquarters could call up by "M-plus-30 The strength and table of organization of these divisio varies from country to country. Of the 48 active division 20 are committed to the Central Front in Germany; on Dutch, three Belgian, five French, four and two-thirds Bri ish, a third of a Canadian division and five American div sions plus three independent American armored comba teams.

Except for the French divisions, which have recently bee

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partially combed out to provide additional troops for Indo-hina, these 20 divisions are at virtually full combat strength. Their equipment is good, their state of readiness the best in NATO. In armor, this force counts about 3,000 tanks, but third of these are World War II types. They would face ough competition from the 5,500 Soviet Army tanks sitting n East Germany, of which about one-third are the Joseph Stalin III heavy tanks with a 122mm gun, and the rest are he T34's with an 85mm gun.

Wellington's Leadership

GODFREY DAVIES
Wellington and His Army
The Huntington Library, 1954

A study of the six years' campaign in the Peninsula may ot enhance admiration of the military successes of Welling-n and his army. That part of the story has been well nown since Napier's *History* appeared. What may be sur-rising is that the characters of the leader, his officers, and ien can stand the closest scrutiny. Of course, Wellington nd his lieutenants had their faults and soldiers were guilty crimes. Yet the clearer the realization of the difficulties con-onting the British army in the Peninsula, the greater the dmiration for the soldiers who overcame them. Composed every stratum of society from a duke's son to a jail-bird, ie army had become a unified whole. In spite of occasional pses the army steadily improved in discipline as the com-issariat improved. If the army could have been always well d and regularly paid, the cases of disorder and plunder id, perhaps, of drunkenness, would have been halved or ore than halved. Martial valour alone might have gained olated victories, but campaigns could not have been won gainst the superior French forces but for the daily care for ie men's welfare and comfort exercised by Wellington and l officers who performed their duties.

History—Pro and Con

BRIG. GEN. PAUL M. ROBINETT
Military Review
May 1954

The value of history in military education has always been cognized in the United States Army as in most armies. It is been at the very base of instruction in the Military cademy and the service schools and colleges since their in-ption. In this emphasis on the value of history in military struction, the American Army has followed the advice of ch great captains as Frederick the Great and Napoleon, as ell as others who have more recently made their mark on e pages of history. Napoleon has written, ". . . the knowl-lge of the higher arts of war is not acquired except by perience and the study of history of wars and the battles great captains." General George S. Patton, Jr., one of merica's great offensive battle leaders, also emphasized the portance of history. His words, written on the battlefield, ere: "To be a successful soldier you must know history, ad it objectively—dates and even minute details of tactics e useless. . . . You must [also] read biography and especial-

ly autobiography. If you will do it you will find war is simple."

There are dissenters from this point of view, however. Marshal Wavell, for one, holds that the study of psychology and leadership are [sic] of greater importance to a military man than the study of operations, contending that Napoleon's military success can be attributed to his knowledge of psychology rather than to his study of rules and strategy. And Le Bon, who was not a military man, has condemned histories on general principle, observing that "they are fanciful accounts of ill-observed facts accompanied by explanations the result of reflection" and that the writing "of such books is a most absolute waste of time."

Politics Invades Army

HANSON W. BALDWIN
The New York Times
22 April 1954

The atmosphere of politics and recrimination and division, not unusual in civilian life but relatively new to the Army, is indeed the more somber part of the background to the [McCarthy-Army] hearings.

For there is no doubt that the great issues of our generation have left their cleavages and lines of schism in the Army as in all our other institutions.

There is no doubt that Senator McCarthy and other politicians and two seemingly conflicting trends have contributed to a common result.

The extensive "civilianization" of the Army, the larger and larger number of civilian officials and civil servants who are working for but not in the Army, and the tendency, past and present, of some prominent Army generals to intrude into political fields have meant the ugly intervention of politics into the Army.

This is indeed one of the meanings of today's hearings; that they are held at all is significant of the extent to which a supposedly nonpolitical organization, the United States Army, is now permeated by politics and controlled by it.

If the hearings contribute to exposing this dangerous trend and to stemming it, they will not have been held in vain.

Job Description

MAJOR GENERAL J. C. T. WILLIS
Director General of Ordnance Survey, British Army
Contributed by Lt. Col. Robert I. Dice, Corps of Engineers

THE BOSS

I am the coachman.

I am responsible to the owners for the maintenance of the coach and the well-being of the horses.

I decide on the destination of the coach and on the pace at which it shall go.

I am responsible for seeing that the coach reaches its destination with regularity and punctuality.

I see that the willing horse does not overwork, and that the idle horse does his fair share.

I allow no one else to chide or strike my horses.

I hold the reins in my hand.

I accept the blame for all that goes wrong.

I do NOT get off the coach and shove.



Bedecked in scarlet blouses, white piped belts and bearskins, the 2d Battalion, Coldstream Guards is inspected at Buckingham Palace by the visiting Shah of Iran, the late King George VI, and the Duke of Gloucester

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The British Regimental System

MAJOR JULIAN PAGET

An English officer tells how the British "regimental system" gives the soldier something to "belong to" and how it works

IN the British Army the regimental system has proved to have very great morale value and it may be helpful to your Army to know how the system works.

I should first explain that the British Army uses the term "regiment" in a sense different from that of the U.S. Army. Our regiment is not a comb unit, but is used to refer to a group associated infantry battalions with a cor mon title and common interests, ar sometimes even recruited from the sam area. The British equivalent of the U. regiment is a "brigade," a combat ur composed of three battalions and su porting arms.

The essence of the regimental syste is that it means that an officer or soldi can serve throughout his military care within the same regiment and will a ways belong to it. It creates a grou small enough for loyalties and traditio to be built up to an extent which is

MAJOR JULIAN PAGET, British Army, joined the Coldstream Guards as a private in 1940, was commissioned a year later, and served in 1944-45 with the 21st Army Group in Northern Europe. After the war he served in Palestine for three years with the 3d Battalion of his regiment. He is now with the British Joint Services Mission to Washington.

most impossible in a larger and more impersonal unit. To take my own regiment, the Coldstream Guards, as an example: We are an English regiment with three battalions, and whenever I do duty with troops I shall serve with one of these battalions. These battalions are composed of a mixture of conscripts doing their two-year service, and of regulars who will serve the whole of their Army career in these units, except for periods when they are sent off on "Extra Regimental Employment." Many of them have followed their fathers and grandfathers into the regiment, and there they find themselves serving under officers whose families have likewise served in the Coldstreams for many generations. Even when I am detached on a staff, as I am at the moment, I still belong to my regiment as much as if I were in England; I still wear its uniform and am kept informed by letter of all its activities. All this means the regiment becomes the centre of life for every member of it. Every officer and man knows that he belongs to it always, he grows proud of it and feels a real interest in its every activity. In return, he knows that his regiment is directly interested in him personally, in his welfare and in his career.

OUR regimental system is partly organized on a geographical basis with the counties of Britain often having their own regiments of one or more battalions named after them. Some of the larger counties have two regiments, as for example the West Yorkshire regiment and the East Yorkshire regiment. Sometimes two counties combine to form one regiment, as in the case of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. There are also regiments with no direct geographic association, but they have their own distinctive titles and features, as much as the "County Regiments."

Each regiment consists of at least one regular Army battalion and also probably one or more Territorial Army (National Guard) battalions. On the outbreak of war, the Army is expanded by mobilizing the Territorial Army and then by recruiting new wartime battalions within the various regiments. For example, my own regiment was expanded in the last war from three to six battalions.

The heart of the regiment is the regimental Depot and Headquarters from which all the affairs of the regiment are run. It is commanded by a lieutenant-colonel or major with an adjutant, and they are responsible for all purely regimental matters, such as recruiting, induction and demobilization, individual and regimental records, veterans' welfare, and regimental customs and procedures. The senior retired officer of the regiment is given the honorary title and position of Colonel of the Regiment, with the responsibility of watching over all its interests. He will select candidates for commissions in the regiment from among those who apply, he will represent it on many official and unofficial occasions and will lay down policy on all domestic matters.

IT seems to me that the tremendous state pride that exists in the United States should be harnessed to build up a system of combat units in the U.S. Army, similar to the British regimental system, but based on the States. And it is no new and revolutionary proposal, for that was more or less the system in the days of the War of Independence and the War Between the States. Then, units were named after either the district from which they were recruited or the leader who had formed them.

The chief justification for the regimental system is the morale value that it undoubtedly has for all ranks of the combat forces.

Few things are more discouraging for a soldier than to feel that he does not belong anywhere, and that he is just a "number" to be pushed around from unit to unit with no regard for his personal interests and loyalties. But that is the inevitable result when men do not belong to anything more precise than the infantry or artillery.

Proof that this factor of pride and loyalty in one's unit is a very real asset in war comes from Korea, where it has been reported that the death rate among Allied PWs due to sickness and malnutrition was remarkably low among the British prisoners. Doctors attributed this



In Korea the Gloucestershire Battalion marches off smartly after ceremonies at which it was awarded the American Distinguished Unit Citation for its great stand against encircling Communists.

largely to the regimental system, because it built up a unit pride and loyalty among the men. The result was that men of each regiment invariably helped their comrades in troubles, while men's morale and will to live were raised by their determination not to "let the regiment down" by weak or dishonorable behaviour.

The knowledge of belonging to a regiment also gives a man a sense of security among the many uncertainties of Army life. He knows that he can always turn to his regiment for help and that he is always known there personally and that he matters to his regiment. Even if he leaves for a time, he knows that he will return, and this means a lot. Also, he gets to know his comrades in arms and the officers and men who will lead him in war, and that is of great value.

THE regimental system makes it possible to decentralize some of the administration of individuals and their welfare, and so develop more personal contact than when careers are handled centrally. Regiment can make recommendations for appointments based on personal knowledge of the officer concerned, such as can never be gathered from records and reports. It also gives commanders in the field more chance to obtain men whom they know and trust, rather than feeling that they are in the hands of planners and IBM runs.

Finally, it has a marked effect on morale if officers feel that they have some control over their own careers through their immediate commanders, who in turn are interested in the careers of all members of their units. Few will deny that personal affairs are best handled as far as possible on a personal basis, and therefore the more decentralization that can be achieved the better. Certainly the individuals concerned think so, and that is often more important than mere bureaucratic convenience.

EVERY soldier knows the value of tradition as a factor towards good morale and fighting spirit. The regimental system is the ideal means of achieving and fostering traditions in the combat forces. Regiments retain their identity and therefore any achievements of the unit belong to it always. They can be perpetuated in regimental records and built up into fighting traditions to stir future generations to even greater deeds. Men may come and go, but traditions remain. They give men standards by which to act, so that they know what is expected of them, if they are not to betray the honor of their regiment.

Take for example the Gloucestershire Regiment, known to all who fought in Korea. In 1801, the regiment fought against Napoleon's Army in Egypt, and at the Battle of Alexandria, it was surrounded. However, it turned the rear rank about and fought off the French front and rear, finally winning the day. In honor of this victory, its members were granted the distinction of wearing the regimental badge on the back as well as the front of their caps, a privilege granted to no other unit in the British Army. Clearly the proud tradition inspired every member of the Gloucesters as they fought off the Chinese Communists on all sides on the Imjin River, 150 years later.

A FURTHER advantage is the connection which is established between Regular Army and Territorial units. Since both are based on one area, an intimate liaison is set up increasing the efficiency of both in peace and in war. They can train together and they share the same customs and traditions. The Regimental Depot administers both these units too, so that it becomes one family.

It undoubtedly improves civilian morale in each area to know that they have a unit which they can claim as their own and feel as proud of as the men who are in it. It is a spur to civilians to do their share toward helping the Army, so as not to let down their local regiment.

A little rivalry properly controlled is a great incentive to achievement in peace and war. The regimental system encourages just this competitive spirit.

A true example of this spirit in war comes from the famous charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava in the Crimean War. Through a blunder in the orders, 800 British cavalry charged to almost certain death against Russian guns. As they raced at a gallop into the Valley of Death, a trooper of the 13th Light Dragoons was heard to shout, "Come on! Don't let those ------ of the Seventeenth [Lancers] get in front of us."

Such a spirit is encouraged by the existence of area units, and it is enough to raise a man's standard of conduct in both peace and war, because it makes him feel that it is the honor of the regiment as well as just his personal honor which is at stake. It is worth many military policemen and reams of orders and instructions.

FINALLY, a great advantage of this proposal is that it enables troop rotation to be carried out on the basis of units rather than individuals. In Korea, for instance, the British Brigade was maintained by keeping the brigade headquarters there and rotating complete new units into it at intervals. Thus the battalion which arrives to replace the unit due to go home has trained and lived as a complete unit for years, the officers and men all know and trust each other and it is all ready to go into the line and try to outdo its predecessors. And how much better it is from the individual soldier's point of view to go into battle with his comrades than to join a strange unit one night and have to fight with men he has never met before.

THERE are of course drawbacks to the regimental system, the main one being that it greatly complicates the work of adjutants general. This is true, because men can no longer be classified simply according to arm of service, but must also be listed according to their regiment so that they can be assigned to their regimental units.

This can cause extra work and complications for the staff, especially if casualties have been heavy. But the burden is not really as great as it sounds, because the bulk of the detailed work belongs to the regiments themselves. They are responsible for the formation and administration of any reinforcements for their own regiments, and they naturally have all necessary particulars available.

One disadvantage which is sometimes cited against the regimental system is that it increases the risk of one particular area suffering unduly if its units have heavy casualties. This possibility cannot be denied, but the risk is not great if units are not too large, since they are unlikely to be all committed to battle at the same time. In any case, the risk should be accepted as one of the inevitable risks of war; it is no more of a danger nowadays than the possibility of whole cities being wiped out by an atomic attack. So this disadvantage should not be allowed to weigh too heavily against the many advantages.

To sum up, the regimental system has proved itself a tremendous morale factor for combat troops, and has lost none of its effectiveness under modern conditions of war. Its value lies chiefly in the fact that it gives a man a unit in the Army which is his own and to which he can devote his loyalty and pride. It raises the efficiency and fighting spirit of any unit by building up fine traditions and a sense of unit pride. It encourages decentralization in administrative matters and improves relations between the Regular Army, the Territorials and the citizens of the country.

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SPAB noses into the Nahe River in its first public test.

ASSAULT BRIDGE FOR ARMOR

Heavy stuff leapfrogs stream over back of tank equipped with folding spans

A self-propelled assault bridge (SPAB) that uses an M-4 nk chassis as the center pier in a bridge that can span gaps approximately sixty feet was demonstrated recently by the l Armored Division on the banks of the Nahe River near enzingen, Germany.

SPAB was built by the Ordnance Corps depot at Mainz om specifications furnished by Brig. Gen. Hamilton H. owze, then assistant commander of the 2d Armored.

The center portion of the bridge is welded to the top of e tank chassis. At each end of the tank two hydraulic-erated treadways are hinged to it.

The pictures on this page show the SPAB bridging a nar- v but steep branch of the Nahe River. In another dem- stration (not pictured), SPAB positioned itself in the epest part of the Nahe and lowered its treadways into the ter until the ends rested on the river bed. An M-47 tank n waded through the shallow water, mounted the tread- ys and crossed the deepest, unfordable part of the stream. n still another demonstration *(see bottom cut)* the SPAB s used to provide a roadway up a steep railroad grade.

The Howze SPAB is not the first attempt to solve armor's ll-obstacles crossing problems. Among other types tested the Army was one built by the LeTourneau road machin- company. Major General L. L. Doan, CG of the 2d Ar- red Division, who has supervised tests of several types of ult bridges, said that in his opinion the Howze SPAB is e most practical solution developed thus far."



Hydraulic lifts uncoil treadways, position them on banks.

Patton M-47 tank rumbles across the self-propelled bridge.



Tank transport power must help SPAB emerge from stream.



SPAB demonstrates versatility as grade crossing aid.



ARTILLERY COMBAT

In a period of four months early in 1951, the Combat Forces Journal *published two articles on the subject of the defense of artillery positions from the attacks of enemy infantry. These articles reflected reports from Korea that told of swarming hordes of Communist infantrymen descending on artillery positions under the cover of darkness. One of those experiences must have been the one here described in detail for the first time. The article is drawn from* Combat Actions in Korea, *a new book just published by Combat Forces Press under an arrangement with the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Announcement of this book's publication appears on the back cover of this issue.*

The Defense of a Battery Position

CAPTAIN RUSSELL A. GUGELER

NORTH Korean Communist forces appeared to be near complete victory at the end of August and during the first part of September of 1950. Along the southern coast of Korea enemy troops were within thirty miles of Pusan, the only port and supply base left to the United Nations army. American troops holding this Pusan perimeter at the time consisted of four divisions and a brigade occupying a line in the general area of the Naktong River from Waegwan south to Masan—a straight-line distance of seventy miles. The irregular front line was twice that long. South Korean soldiers manned the northern section of the perimeter from Waegwan to Pohang-dong on the east coast.

At the beginning of September the North Koreans began a powerful drive against the southern end of the perimeter defended by the U.S. 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions. These attacks achieved limited success and carried the combat into the rear areas behind the American front lines. One penetration fell against the 35th Infantry, a regiment of the 25th Division, soon after midnight on the morning of 3 September. The enemy pushed Company B from its position, surrounded Company G and the 1st Battalion command post, and then attacked several batteries of artillery. Among the artillery units, the heaviest fighting took place within the gun position of Battery A, 64th Field Artillery Battalion, which was in direct support of the 35th Infantry. The headquarters of each of these units was located in Haman at that time.

On the night of 2-3 September Battery A was in position two and a half miles north of Haman near a main road and single-track railroad running east and west between Masan and Chinju. The narrow road from Haman joined the Masan-Chinju road at the small village of Saga, the buildings of which

A battery of howitzers being readied for acti



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vere strung along the main road. Be-ause of North Korean infiltrators, artil-ery units were alert to the necessity of lefending their own positions, and the battery commander, Capt. Leroy Ander-on, kept his area as compact as possible. Three or four hundred yards south of he road there was a low ridge shaped ike a half circle and forming a shallow owl. Here Captain Anderson positioned ve of his six howitzers. Since the area vas too small to accommodate all of the ieces, he placed the other howitzer on ne north side of a railroad track that aralleled the Masan road and divided ne battery area. The fire direction cen-er, on the south side of the tracks, was perating in a tent erected in a four-oot-deep dugout within shouting dis-nce of the guns. The wire section ad its switchboard north of the tracks a dugout fifteen to twenty yards south the cluster of houses, a few of which ere used by men of the wire section living quarters. In addition to the w ridge, there was only one other ter-in feature of importance—a gully, out four feet deep, next to the railroad acks.

Around the battery position Captain Anderson set up ten defensive posts including four .50-caliber machine guns, three .30-caliber machine guns, one observation and listening post, and two M16 halftracks each mounting four .50-caliber machine guns. Four of the posts were on the ridge around the gun position and were connected by telephone wire. The others were within shouting distance.

UNTIL 0245 on 3 September the battery fired its usual missions in support of the 35th Infantry. The night was dark, and there was a heavy fog in the area—a condition common along the southern coast of Korea during the summer. The battery first sergeant, MSgt. William Parker, was the first to suspect trouble. He was standing near the switchboard dugout when he noticed several men moving along the main road.

He called to them, "Who's there?" and then, when they continued walking, he yelled "Halt!"

Three North Koreans were pulling a machine gun (the type mounted on small, cast-iron wheels) down the road.

reans north of Seoul in September 1950



They moved down the road a few more steps and then dropped into a ditch, turned their gun toward the battery position, and opened fire. Almost immediately there was enemy fire from several other directions, a large part of it coming from the ridgeline that partially surrounded the main part of the battery. At the south end of the battery position the North Koreans had three machine guns in action against the gun sections and, soon after the first shots were fired, they had pulled another machine gun into place along the road in Saga. From the beginning, the action was divided between the two parts of the battery, divided by the railroad tracks.

Sgt. Herbert L. Rawls, Jr., the wire team chief, saw the North Koreans at the time Sergeant Parker challenged them. Realizing that there would be trouble, he ran first to one of the native houses by the road to awaken several men from his section who were sleeping there, then to the switchboard dugout to warn those men. Near the edge of the switchboard hole Sgt. Joseph R. Pursley was kneeling on the ground splicing a wire. Just as Rawls got there a North Korean appeared and killed both men with a burp gun. He then threw a grenade into the switchboard dugout. The explosion killed two of the three men in the hole; the third man, Cpl. John M. Pitcher, was not seriously injured. He continued to operate the switchboard throughout the night with the two bodies beside him in the hole.

ALL this had occurred within a few minutes. At the same time two other events were taking place in the same area. At the first sign of action, Cpl. Bobbie H. McQuitty ran to his ¾-ton truck upon which was mounted a machine gun. He had parked his truck near the road and now, by the time he reached it, the North Koreans had rolled one of their machine guns (one of the two they had in Saga) up just in front of it. With the two machine guns pointed toward each other at a distance of not more than thirty yards, McQuitty's gun failed to fire. He jumped from the truck and ran across the rice paddies toward the front lines of the infantrymen where he had seen a tank the previous afternoon. He now hoped to get help from it. By this time, neither the other two machine guns on that side of the railroad, nor the quad .50s, could fire against the North Koreans in that area without endangering men of the wire section.


Meanwhile, the communications men whom Sergeant Rawls had awakened

just before he was killed tried to get away from the building in which they had been sleeping, hoping to rejoin the main section of the battery. In one room of the building were three men, PFC Harold W. Barker, PFC Thomas A. Castello, and PFC Santford B. Moore. Barker left first, running. He had gone only a few steps when he saw one of the North Korean machine guns directly ahead. He turned quickly and dashed back to the house, but as he reached the doorway a bullet struck his knee. Castello and Moore pulled him back into the building and decided to remain in the house. They put Barker on the floor, and then stood in a corner of the room as close to the wall as possible. Unfortunately, several days before this Barker and Castello had picked up two small pups, which now shared the same room. The pups chewed on some paper and made considerable noise. In an adjoining room there had been another man who also tried to escape, but as he stepped from the building he encountered fifteen or twenty Communist soldiers standing in a group just outside the door. One of them shot him in the mouth and killed him.

Within a few minutes after the North Koreans appeared, five members of the communications section were dead and another man was wounded. Thereafter the enemy fired the two machine guns toward the area of the howitzers but made no attempt to move against the guns or even to search the area for other Americans.

Immediately after the first shot was fired against the men near the switchboard, three machine guns at the south end of the battery position opened fire against the howitzer sections. Two of these were in place on the low ridgeli at the left front of the guns and a thi fired from the left rear. In additio there was fire from a half dozen or mo enemy riflemen. Of the six guns, t three nearest the ridge were under t heaviest fire. There was an immedia interruption of the fire missions wh the crews took cover in their gun pi which were deep enough to afford sor protection. There was a period of s eral minutes, then, before the artille men realized what was happening a determined the extent of and directi of the enemy fire.

Meanwhile, on the left, an ene soldier threw several grenades at the occupied by MSgt. Frederick J. Ha mer's section. One of the grenades ploded inside the pit, killing one m and wounding several others; anoth exploded in an ammunition pit and fire to over a hundred 105mm she stored there. The men manning t machine-gun posts along the rid opened fire when the action began soon realized the enemy had alrea penetrated to the battery position. Th pulled back, going north toward t other halftrack mounting the quad .5 This weapon fired just a few rou before its power traversing mechani failed and, when it could not be op ated by hand, the gun crew backed t vehicle a short distance to the gully the railroad tracks.



IT was just about this time that battalion headquarters called Batt A to ask the reason for interrupt the fire mission. The battery execut officer, Lieut. Kincheon H. Bailey, answered the telephone at the fire di tion tent. Bailey had heard the mach guns firing but was not concerned ab it since at that time the front-line fantrymen were not far away and artillerymen could often hear the n of automatic weapons and small ar In turn, he called the gun crews to them. Sergeant Hammer and four ot gun sections reported their situation the sixth section, commanded by P Ernest R. Arnold, was under such tense machine-gun fire that no wanted to reach for the telephone the edge of the gun pit. Bailey repor back to the battalion and went out investigate for himself.

During the several minutes requi to relay this information to battal headquarters the situation in the tery position developed fast. Serge Hammer, seeing his ammunition b ing, ordered the men in his section

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make a dash for the gully by the railroad tracks. Within the next few minutes the men manning two other guns managed to escape and get back to this gully. Meanwhile, one of the platoon sergeants had raced over to the howitzer north of the railroad tracks and ordered the gun section to lay direct fire against the hill from which the enemy soldiers had apparently come.

IT was about the time the first of these shells landed that Lieutenant Bailey left the fire direction tent to find out what was happening. The powder in Hammer's ammunition pit was burning brightly by this time, illuminating one end of the battery position. As Bailey walked toward that area he saw North Koreans walking around the gun and concluded the crew was dead or gone. He ran back to the nearest howitzer and told the chief of section, Cpl. Cecil W. Meares, to start firing against the ridge. Two howitzers fired a total of eighteen rounds, which burst a hundred and fifty to two hundred yards away. Bailey also urged the gun crew to start firing their side arms against the North Koreans who now occupied the next gun pit—the one Sergeant Hammer's crew had abandoned. For five or ten minutes Corporal Meares's men fired at the enemy soldiers and threw grenades toward the gun pit. Then Bailey and Kotzur decided it would be best to get the crews back to the protection of the gully. They stopped the artillery fire and began calling for the other crews to move back. To give these men some protection, Sgt. Henry E. Baker ran to a nearby 2½-ton truck which carried a ring-mounted caliber .50 machine gun and began firing this toward the North Koreans. PFC Richard G. Haussler went with Baker to feed the ammunition belts through the gun. These two men, although up high where they could be seen from the entire area as long as the ammunition was burning brightly, fired five boxes of ammunition (1,250 rounds) through the gun in about ten minutes. The battery commander set out on an inspection of the battery position to make certain none of his men remained in foxholes or in the gun pits.

IT was about 0315 when all of the cannoneers reached the gully by the railroad tracks—half an hour after the action began. As it happened, the Catholic chaplain of the 25th Division, Capt. John T. Schag, had visited the battery earlier in the day and had decided to spend the night there. When the fighting began Father Schag took charge of a group of men who had been sleeping near him and guided them to the gully then used as the battery defensive position. Once in the gully, he gathered the wounded men together and then helped the medics care for them. Captain Anderson and Sergeant Kotzur organized the men for the defense of the gully. Everyone was now in this gully except for three men in the fire direction tent; Corporal Pitcher, who was still operating the battery switchboard; and Barker, Castello, and Moore, who were still waiting quietly in the house in Saga.

Enemy activity decreased after the men of the battery consolidated their position in the gully although there was a brisk exchange of rifle fire. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Arthur H. Hogan, called several times to find out what was happening and offered help from one of the other batteries in the battalion. One man at the fire direction tent, Sgt. Carl Francis, yelled to Lieutenant Bailey to ask if he wanted some 155mm fire placed in the area, and Bailey said they'd like to have some on the hill in front of the guns. Colonel Hogan was familiar with the hill and got the first shell squarely on it.

Bailey yelled back to the fire direction center, "Right 50; drop 100; fire for effect."

The men around him groaned when they heard this command, so Bailey changed it to "drop 50; fire for effect."

Colonel Hogan asked for two rounds from the battery of medium artillery and the rounds fell just in front of the guns. Soon after this a tank came down the Masan road from the north and began firing into the enemy positions. It was the tank for which Corporal McQuitty had gone, after his machine gun jammed at the beginning of the action. This helped to reduce the enemy activity although there was scattered rifle fire until the first signs of light that morning. The enemy soldiers then disappeared, and the gun sections returned to their howitzers to assess the damage. The North Koreans had killed 7 men and wounded 12 others of Battery A, destroyed four trucks, and let the air out of the tires on one of the howitzers. On three of the howitzer tubes they had written in chalk the numbers of their company, platoon, and squad. Otherwise, the guns were not damaged. There were 21 dead North Korean soldiers in the battery position. The battery was regrouped on the north side of the tracks and resumed the firing of normal supporting missions.

DISCUSSION

Lieutenant Colonel Carl D. McFerren

EVERY soldier must be mentally trained for the shock of battle and prepared for instant defense of his own and his unit's position. In fluid situations, it must be expected that the front will not be stabilized and that the hostile action will develop well to the rear. Under these conditions, artillery position areas must be selected that not only will permit accomplishing the primary mission of fire support but will also facilitate local defense against enemy action that might interrupt the fire support.

This action demonstrates how an attack of limited strength against an inadequately prepared battery position can be effective in neutralizing a battery. To avoid such interruptions in fire support, batteries must obtain an all-around, completely integrated defense. This is accomplished by assigning primary and contingent sectors of responsibility to each gun section, by preparing the firing positions of the individual pieces to insure complete cannon fire coverage of the position's perimeter, and by developing fire plans to cover all possible avenues of approach. Into this plan is integrated the fire of the battery's automatic weapons and rocket launchers. Each individual of the battery must be assigned and be ready to occupy a specific defense position. Specific personnel must be designated in advance as a reserve force.

An alarm system must be established and all battery personnel actually rehearsed in the actions they will take when the alarm is given. Day and night security must be completed by installing sufficient observation and listening posts, coupled with adequate communications and patrols that visit and maintain contact with adjacent units.

THIS action contains incidents of individual bravery and courage, of demonstrated devotion to duty, of the use of initiative, and of leadership in an emergency. But how was it possible for the enemy to walk down the road and into the battery position? The obvious answer is that the defensive organization was unsatisfactory. Weapons had not been checked to insure that they would fire. An alarm or alert system, if used, did not work. How much better to stop the enemy outside a battery position than to let him neutralize the battery, kill and wound soldiers, and destroy matériel. A well-organized and alert defense would have enabled Battery A to repel this attack with a minimum of effort.



No longer burdened with responsibilities, these field grade officers seem almost cheerful as they await Allied orders.

How the Germans Surrendered

During the last weeks of the war in Europe, the dam burst and a flood of what was once the flower of the *Wehrmacht* poured into Allied prisoner-of-war cages.



FORREST C. POGUE

This article is drawn from a chapter of UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. The European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command, *to be published on 7 June by the Office of Military History, Department of the Army.*

Here for the first time is told the full story of the surrender negotiations between the Germans and the Western Powers. In preparing this chapter, Dr. Pogue had access to all available records on both sides of the Atlantic and personally interviewed most of the surviving principals on both sides.

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HE first substantial overtures looking final surrender of German forces were ıde early in February [1945] by repre-ıtatives of the German command in rthern Italy, who arranged for meet-gs in Switzerland with Allied agents. lied authorities in Italy promptly in-med the Russians of these talks and ked them to nominate officers to attend ture peace conferences if they should arranged. Despite this frank approach, arshal Stalin became disturbed as the ks in Switzerland progressed. As his spicions deepened, he became worried er a possible peace settlement between Western Powers and Germany which uld leave the enemy free to continue war against the Red Army. He pro-ted strongly to Mr. Roosevelt and, en the latter assured him that nothing s being done against the USSR's in-est, declared that the President was being kept informed by his generals. . Roosevelt characterized the state-nts given Stalin by his informants as le misrepresentations." So strong were feelings engendered that some Allied ders wondered at the time if the pur-se of the German negotiators was to it the anti-Nazi forces. Delays in the gotiations ultimately postponed any al action in Italy until the last week the war. However, the suspicion used in the mind of Marshal Stalin l his advisers created an atmosphere distrust which was to surround most the peace negotiations in northwest rope.

The first important overtures in north-st Europe were made by members of nmler's staff. On 2 April Brigade-rer Walter Schellenberg of Himm-s Intelligence Service, apparently aking only for himself and without nmler's authority, approached Count ke Bernadotte, head of the Swedish l Cross. Bernadotte, who was in Ger-ny attempting to get Norwegian and nish prisoners released into the cus-y of Sweden, was asked if he would uss with General Eisenhower the sibility of arranging a capitulation. e Swedish nobleman declared that he uld go to the Supreme Commander y after Himmler announced: (1) he had been chosen as German ler by Hitler; (2) that the Nazi party dissolved; (3) that the Werewolf nization had been disbanded; and that all Danish and Norwegian pris-rs had been sent to Sweden.

Count Bernadotte's conditions were not met and the Schellenberg suggestion was not passed on to SHAEF. Not until mid-April were peace feelers concerning the surrender of forces in northwest Europe communicated to the Supreme Commander. At this time, reports came from agents in Denmark that General-oberst Georg Lindemann, German armed forces commander in Denmark, was willing to surrender the army there, but would not include SS and police units. Although the Supreme Commander authorized efforts through unofficial channels to get additional details of the proposal, he forbade Allied officers to be present at the conversations. In reporting this action to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, he suggested that the USSR be informed. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, therefore, on 21 April informed the Soviet Government that unconditional surrender of large-scale enemy forces was a growing possibility and suggested that accredited representatives of all three allies be made available to the headquarters on each front for the purpose of observing negotiations for surrender. The USSR was asked to designate such representatives both at SHAEF and at AFHQ. The Soviet high command readily agreed to the suggestion, saying that the names of their appointees would be submitted later.

HIMMLER again entered the picture on the evening of 23 April in a conference with Count Bernadotte at the Swedish consulate in Lübeck. Himmler began the conference by saying that the Germans were defeated, that Hitler would soon be dead, and that he (Himmler) was ready to order a capitulation on the Western Front. Count Bernadotte doubted that an offer to surrender on one front only would be acceptable to the Allies, but he agreed to forward the proposal if Himmler would promise to surrender forces in Denmark and Norway. The SS leader approved this suggestion and wrote the Swedish Foreign Minister that he wished to act through the Count. The Swedish Foreign Minister, who shared his fellow countryman's skepticism concerning the acceptability of a surrender on the Western Front alone, nonetheless arranged a meeting between Bernadotte and the British and U.S. ministers in Sweden, Sir Victor Mallet and Mr. Herschel Johnson, who dispatched Himmler's offer to their governments. Mr. Churchill relayed the information by trans-Atlantic telephone to President Truman and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the afternoon of 25 April, the day that Soviet and U.S. forces met near Torgau. The President, while emphasizing his desire to end the war quickly, declared he could accept only an unconditional surrender on all fronts and one made in agreement with the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

FORREST C. POGUE served in the Army from 1942 to the end of the war most of the time as an Army historian. He was on Omaha Beach soon after D-day interviewing the wounded and continued with the V Corps throughout the campaigns, entering Pilsen on VE-day. He was discharged as a master sergeant in 1945 and soon thereafter began to work on the history of SHAEF. He recently presented advance copies of the book to President Eisenhower and Generals Marshall and Bedell Smith at a White House ceremony. A Kentuckian, Dr. Pogue received his Ph.D. in history in 1939 at Clark University.

The 1st Infantry Division takes the surrender of the command of Lt. Gen. Fritz Benicke in Czechoslovakia. Then Brig. Gen. George A. Taylor, seated at the left, and then Capt. Carl Oelve, interpreter, watch the German commander sign.



This information was relayed to Marshal Stalin. General Eisenhower expressed his satisfaction with the reply and informed General Marshall that the Prime Minister had agreed that the peace overture was an attempt by the enemy to create a schism between the Allies. "In every move we make these days," said the Supreme Commander, making his position clear, "we are trying to be meticulously careful in these regards."

While peace negotiations were still in the talking stage in northwest Europe, the long-drawn-out negotiations in Italy were brought to a close. After a comic-opera interlude in which Kesselring removed the Commander in Chief, Southwest, and his chief of staff and ordered their arrest, and in which the deposed officers brought about the arrest of their successors, the German forces in Italy signed surrender agreements on 29 April effective at 1200, 2 May 1945. The surrender removed the last threat from General Eisenhower's southern front and spelled the doom of German forces remaining in the Balkans.


ADMIRAL Doenitz and his advisers canvassed the German position completely on 2 May. Agreeing that the military situation was hopeless, they decided that their main effort should be to save as many Germans as possible from the Red armies. They said they would continue to fight on against the British and U.S. forces only to the extent that they interfered with German efforts to elude the Soviets. Otherwise, the German armies would attempt to avoid combat on the Western Front and strive to escape further bombing attacks. It was recognized that the goal of capitulation on one front only was difficult to achieve at the highest levels because of agreements which existed between the Western powers and the USSR, but efforts were to be made to arrange surrender at army group levels and below.

The German military situation in the north was worsened on 2 May by the break-through of the British from Lauenburg to Lübeck and of the U.S. forces to Wismar. These actions closed "the last gate" through which the Germans could be brought back from the Mecklenburg-Pomerania area. Doenitz held that further fighting in northwest Europe against the Allied powers had now lost its purpose. Making use of a British offer to spare Hamburg as an opening for negotiations, he announced that the city would not be defended. He offered to send a delegation to discuss peace negotiations with Field Marshal Montgomery on the following day.



The bald gentleman is Lt. Ivan Cherniaeff, aide and interpreter to Maj. Gen. of Artillery Ivan Susloparoff, who witnessed the surrender at Reims.

Then Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, signs the unconditional surrender document.



On 3 May, Doenitz again review the German military situation. Staa minister Frank, present from Bohem was not sanguine about the Czechos vak situation, since he felt that a revo which might occur at any time, wou make it difficult to hold the protectora As possible solutions for strengthenin the situation there until the Germa in Bohemia could be saved, he suggest that (1) Prague be declared an op city, (2) possibilities be explored of sen ing German and Czechoslovak emissari to General Eisenhower to get favoral capitulation terms in that area, and (the Reich government be moved to B hemia. The third course had been pr viously considered, but Doenitz oppos it, believing the situation too uncertai Instead orders were sent to Prague prepare a plan for defense.

The situation in southern Germa and Austria was reported as being mu worse than in Bohemia. Staatssekret Franz Hayler declared that only in u per Austria was there any true control the government. Troops and administ tion in the south showed signs of d integration and there were numero indications of opposition by the pub to the army. Hayler noted that the c Bavarian flags were reappearing in t south and that there were evidences an Austrian freedom movement amo the Tyrolean *Volkssturm*. He char terized a putsch which had been tempted in Munich as symptomatic feeling in the south.

Doenitz said he felt the Germa should be pleased every time U.S. a British forces, rather than Soviet forc occupied a part of Germany. He agre that the over-all situation demand capitulation on all fronts, but held th the Germans should not consider it the moment since it would mean livering most of the forces east of t Elbe to the Russians.

True to his determination to surre der only to the Western Allies, Doen explored further the situation in nort west Europe, in the hope of findi something to offer the British and U commanders. He found some encoura ment in Norway and Denmark. Sin both those countries wished, now th liberation was near, to avoid any acti which would bring reprisals, Doen considered there would be no rev there. Therefore, he ordered his co manders to present a strong front these countries and directed that effo be continued to resolve the Norwegi question through Swedish mediatio He approved Seyss-Inquart's efforts explore peace possibilities in the Neth

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lands, but directed the continuance of he combat mission. He gave specific nstructions that the Netherlands should ıot be flooded further. The Commander n Chief, Northwest, was informed that delegation was on its way to British ieadquarters to discuss an armistice and hat he should prevent a fast Allied ›reakthrough to and over the Kiel Canal before negotiations could be con-luded. *Armeegruppe Mueller* was set ıp on 4 May to protect this area.

MEANWHILE discussions with Field Marshal Montgomery had begun. Admiral Friedeburg and his party had been instructed to promise that Ham-urg would not be defended, and they vere to try to secure the 21 Army Group ommander's permission for German roops, including the *Third Panzer, Twelfth,* and *Twenty-first Armies,* to re-re west of the Elbe. They also wanted ermission to pass German civilian refu-ees through the British lines to Schles-ig-Holstein. Such terms the army roup commanders were not allowed to rant. As early as August 1944, the Com-ined Chiefs of Staff had issued a short ocument which outlined instructions to ›ver possible capitulations by German ›rces surrendering as units through ieir commanders.

This document, apparently the basis the surrender instruments used by the and 6th Army Groups, rested on three ain principles: (1) terms of capitula-›n were unconditional and had to be early and expressly limited to the mediate military objects of local rrender; (2) no commitment of y kind was to be made to the emy; and (3) capitulation was be made without prejudice to d was to be superseded by any neral instrument of surrender ıich might be imposed by the nited States, the United King-m and the USSR. Therefore, ıen Field Marshal Montgomery dicated to General Eisenhower at overtures for negotiations ›re being made, the Supreme ›mmander declared that only un-ıditional surrender would be ac-›ted. He added that an offer to ›e up Denmark, the Nether-ıds, the Frisian Islands, Helgo-d, and Schleswig-Holstein could considered as a tactical matter d the surrender accepted.

In accordance with these in-uctions, Field Marshal Mont-nery refused to accept the with-ıwal into his zone of German troops then on the Soviet front, although he said that individual soldiers would be accepted as prisoners of war. The Field Marshal would not turn over these prisoners to the USSR.

ON the afternoon of 4 May, German representatives appeared at the 21 Army Group Headquarters at Lüneburg Heath with authority from Doenitz and Keitel to capitulate unconditionally on the British front. They signed an instrument of surrender to become effective at 0800, 5 May, which provided for the "surrender of all German armed forces in Holland, in northwest Germany including the Frisian Islands and Helgoland and all other islands, in Schleswig-Holstein, and in Denmark, to the C.-in-C. 21 Army Group. This to include all naval ships in these areas. These forces to lay down their arms and surrender unconditionally." The terms stipulated that the capitulation was independent of and would be superseded by any general instrument of surrender to be imposed on behalf of the Allied powers and applicable to the German armed forces as a whole. Since no discussion was made of the shift of refugees from East Prussia to the west and Kurland to western Germany, Konteradmiral Gerhard Wagner hoped that the way was still open to this action.

The same day, 4 May, also saw the end of operations of the *Twelfth* and *Ninth Armies* at the Elbe. The Red drive south of Berlin had threatened the extinction of the *Ninth Army,* but some 25,000 to 30,000 of its troops, without weapons and almost totally demoralized, made their way to the *Twefth Army* about 1 May. Strong Soviet thrusts near the Elbe now made clear that the overrunning of the forces east of the river was a matter of a few days. On the morning of 3 May, General der Panzertruppen Walter Wenck instructed one of his corps commanders to discuss with representatives of the U.S. Ninth Army the surrender of the *Twelfth Army* and the remaining elements of the *Ninth Army*. General Wenck's 100,000 troops, now about 40 per cent unarmed, were accompanied by many women and children fleeing from the Soviet zone. The corps commander asked that the Ninth Army permit the peaceful crossing of the Elbe by noncombatant personnel and civilians and the honorable surrender of other troops. The Ninth Army representatives, pointing to U.S. obligations to the USSR, refused to accept a mass surrender and forbade the civilians to cross the river. They agreed that individual soldiers might come over and surrender to U.S. units, and they apparently did not enforce too sternly the ban against civilians. By the close of hostilities on 7 May, the main body of General Wenck's forces and elements of the *Ninth Army* had crossed the Elbe and surrendered individually to U.S. forces. German estimates of the number who thus gave themselves up to the U.S. Ninth Army vary from 70,000 to 100,000.

Maj. Gen. Herman Kramer of the U.S. 66th Infantry Division receives the pistol of Lt. Gen. Fahrmbacker in symbol of the surrender at Lorient.



IN southern Germany and western Austria also, the war was moving swiftly to a close. Under Admiral Doenitz's authority to conclude a truce with the 6th Army Group for the area between the Boehmer Wald and the upper Inn, Field Marshal Kesselring on 4 May notified SHAEF of his readiness to send his chief of staff to Salzburg to discuss surrender terms. General Eisenhower declared that unless the offer included all enemy forces in *Army Groups Center, South, E,* and *G,* and all outlying garrisons, and all forces facing the Red Army, the Germans should send their representative not to SHAEF but to the 6th Army Group. Accordingly, General Schulz, commander of *Army Group G,* sent forward a delegation to the Thorak estate at Haar near Munich. There they met Generals Devers, Patch and Hai-

ship and on 5 May signed an instrument of surrender to become effective at 1200, 6 May. Included in the unconditional surrender were all elements under *Army Group G*. In spite of this surrender, some SS troops fought on, and one minor engagement ensued near Woergl when SS men attempted to retake Itter Castle, where important French prisoners had been held, after the original German garrison had surrendered it to the Americans. The original garrison helped to beat off the SS attack, and the garrison commander was killed in the process. An example of SS contempt for Regular Army groups was seen on 7 May when Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen SS Gottlieb Berger, near the top in SS ranks, asked to surrender his own battle group, saying that he was not bound by the *Army Group G* capitulation. His surrender marked the end of enemy opposition on the 6th Army Group front. The Seventh Army completed its activities on 8 May with the seizure of von Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List, Kesselring, and Goering, and the liberation of King Leopold.

General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger, commander of the *Nineteenth Army,* came to Innsbruck where on 5 May he signed an instrument of surrender handing over those parts of the provinces of Tirol, Vorarlberg, and Allgaeu up to the Italian frontier which were under the jurisdiction of the *Nineteenth Army* commander. Hostilities were to cease by 1800, 5 May. Lt. Gen. Edward H. Brooks, commander of the U.S. VI Corps, representing General Devers and General Patch, signed for the United States Army, and Col. T. Demetz (Chief of Staff), representing General de Lattre, signed for the French First Army. Complications arose, however, because General der Infanterie Hans Schmidt of the *Twenty-fourth Army* had previously made contact with the French First Army and arranged to negotiate the surrender of his forces. Just before the interview was to take place, his army was attached to General Brandenberger's and his forces were surrendered with those of the latter. Holding that the capitulation of the *Twenty-fourth Army* had not been made, General de Lattre ordered hostilities continued against General Schmidt's forces. He demanded that General Brandenberger take immediate measures required for the *Twenty-fourth Army* to surrender directly to the French. Fighting continued between French forces and General Schmidt's units until 7 May, when General Devers issued a cease fire order.

After Brandenberger capitulated, Keitel had instructed Kesselring to assume command of *OB SÜD*. Kesselring and his subordinates were ordered to conduct operations so that time could be won in order to save as much of the civilian population as possible from the Soviet forces. If the Bohemian front could not be held against superior enemy attacks, forces in the east were to retreat in a southwesterly direction with the goal of bringing the "valuable human material" of the army groups out of the Russian zone. On 6 May, Kesselring was ordered to make no further resistance to any penetration of U.S. forces eastward into the Protectorate of Bohemia and farther south.

MEANWHILE, arrangements had been made for Admiral von Friedeburg to proceed to Supreme Headquarters at Reims on 5 May to open negotiations for the surrender of the remaining forces in the west. The Germans still hoped to gain time in which to bring their troops facing the Russians into the western zone. Realizing this, General Eisenhower cabled Moscow of his intention to inform the German emissaries that they must surrender all forces facing the Red Army to the Russians. The surrender was to be purely military and entirely independent of political and economic terms which would be imposed on Germany by the heads of the Allied governments. The Supreme Commander believed it highly desirable for the surrender on the Eastern and Western Fronts to be made simultaneously, and indicated that he would invite General Susloparoff to attend negotiations looking toward surrender of the enemy in the west. The Soviet reply stated that it had no objection provided Doenitz surrendered German troops in front of the Soviets to the Red Army.

GENERAL Eisenhower was informed on the evening of 4 May that German representatives would be flown to Reims from 21 Army Group Headquarters the following morning. In preparation for the negotiations, he told General Smith that there would be no bargaining with the Germans and stipulated that he would not see them until after the surrender terms were signed. General Smith and General Strong, who had handled the Italian surrender in 1943, were chosen to discuss terms with the Germans. To assure the Soviets that nothing underhanded was being done, General Eisenhower gave instructions that General Susloparoff and Lt. Col. Zenkovitch be called to Supreme Headquarters befo the Germans arrived.

In addition to notifying General Susl paroff of approaching negotiations, Ge eral Eisenhower kept Moscow informe of the developments at Reims and aske if the Soviets wished to add to or modi the demands which had been presente Further, General Eisenhower aske whether they desired "the formality signing to be repeated before any oth Russian representatives" at any oth place they might care to designate, ar whether they wished to participate in th more formal ratification meeting to fo low. This message was handed to Sovi liaison representatives in Moscow b members of the Allied Military Mission but no direct contact could be esta lished with authorized members of th Red General Staff, who were said to b absent in the country as a result of th Russian Easter weekend. This mea a delay in any reply Moscow mig make, and was possibly responsible f the fact that General Antonov's reque that the surrender ceremony be held Berlin was not made until after the sig ing at Reims.

Shortly after 1700, 5 May, the Ge mans arrived at Reims and were take to General Smith's office. On comin before the SHAEF chief of staff, A miral Friedeburg proposed to surrend the remaining German forces on th Western Front. General Smith informe him of General Eisenhower's refusal continue discussions unless the Easte Front was also included in the surre der offer. To make clear the hopeles ness of the enemy situation, the SHAE chief of staff displayed maps of the exi ing enemy situation as well as speci maps on which some imaginary attac had been projected. The German em sary was impressed, but he declared th he lacked authority to surrender on bo fronts. After studying a copy of th proposed Allied terms, Friedeburg cabl Admiral Doenitz asking that he be giv permission to sign an unconditional a simultaneous surrender in all theate of operations or that the chief of OK and the commanders of the air and nav forces be sent to Reims for that purpos

GENERAL Eisenhower's strong stan shocked the members of the Germa high command when they receive Friedeburg's report. Doenitz found th demands unacceptable and decided send Jodl, strong opponent of surrend in the east, to explain why over-all c pitulation was impossible. His resoluti was strengthened on the morning of May by news of an uprising in Pragu

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This was the surrender that counted the most. In the War Room of the red schoolhouse at Reims on 7 May 1945, representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union sit across the table from Col. Gen. Gustaf Jodl, Doenitz's Chief of Staff, and his aides. Americans include Gen. Smith and Lt. Gen. Spaatz.

hich ended any hope of a political solu- on of the problem in Czechoslovakia nd made virtually impossible the with- rawal of Schoerner's forces. Doenitz irected his staff to continue to try to ave as many Germans as possible from he Soviets, while keeping rigidly to the rms of any armistice concluded with he Western powers.

General Jodl opened negotiations with eneral Smith and General Strong on he evening of 6 May. Concluding af- r more than an hour of discussion that he Germans were merely dragging out he talks to gain time for their forces in he east, the Allied officers put the prob- m before the Supreme Commander. lis reaction was that unless the Ger- ans speedily agreed to the terms of rrender "he would break off all nego- tions and seal the Western Front pre- nting by force any further westward ovement of German soldiers and civil- ns." This answer was also reported to eneral Susloparoff, who was not sitting on the meetings with the Germans. eneral Jodl, faced with General Eisen- ower's threat, wired Admiral Doenitz r authority to make a final and com- ete surrender on all fronts, saying that saw no other alternative except chaos. Admiral Doenitz characterized the Su- eme Commander's demands as "sheer tortion." He felt impelled nonetheless accede to them because Jodl, who only e day before had strongly opposed rrender of the forces in the east, now insisted that this was the only way out for the Reich. The Grand Admiral was consoled somewhat by the reflection that he could save many of the troops in the east during the forty-eight-hour period before the capitulation went into effect. Shortly after midnight he instructed Keitel to wire: "Full power to sign in accordance with conditions as given has been granted by Grand Admiral Doenitz." When this message arrived at Reims, activities were transferred from General Smith's office to the War Room, where the final signing was to take place.

SENTIMENTAL newspapermen gave the American public a misleading picture of the building in which the peace terms were signed with their dispatches saying that the capitulation ceremonies took place in the "little red schoolhouse of Reims." Actually, the Ecole Professionelle et Technique de Garçons—a modern, three-storied, red brick building —had more floor space than the Hotel Trianon Palace which had housed the General Staff of SHAEF at Versailles. The War Room, it is true, was not very large. Approximately thirty feet square, it was a small recreation hall where the students had played ping-pong and chess. Huge maps covered the walls, showing the location of all Allied divisions and supply units, the main airfields, results of air operation, data on transportation and supply, weather conditions, progress of daily operations, casualties, and the like. For the signing, the room had been filled with the equipment of the seventeen photographers and newsmen who had been chosen to represent the Allied press at the ceremony. A large table, which teachers had used in grading their papers, stood in the center of the room. Here about 0200, 7 May, General Jodl, Admiral Friedeburg, and the former's aide, Maj. Friedrich Wilhelm Oxenius, were brought before General Smith and other representatives of the Allies. When asked by General Smith if they were ready to sign, the Germans replied in the affirmative. General Jodl affixed his signature to the two documents placed before him, and they were then signed by General Smith for the Supreme Allied Commander and by General Susloparoff for the Soviet high command. General Sevez of the French Army signed as witness. The time was noted as 0241, 7 May 1945. At this point General Jodl rose and said: "General: With this signature the German people and German armed forces are, for better or worse, delivered into the victors' hands. In this war, which has lasted more than five years, both have achieved and suffered perhaps more than any other people in the world. In this hour I can only express the hope that the victor will treat them with generosity."

The subsequent surrender ceremony at Berlin was largely anticlimactic to most of the world, which viewed the surrender at Reims as the end.

CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

No. 10 | *Airborne Officers*

MANY officers with an eye to the future are alert to the capabilities (and limitations) of airborne forces. This article is intended to answer some of the questions and outline some of the advantages of being airborne trained.

Requirements for airborne officers have existed since the parachute test unit made their first jumps in August 1940. Although there are approximately 7,900 airborne officers on active duty, they are not always available to fill the 2,400 airborne requirements. It is not logical to assume that all airborne officers will be available at all times for assignments requiring airborne experience. Generally speaking, Career Management branches are not short of qualified airborne officers, but they sometimes experience a little difficulty in filling a requirement —usually because of non-availability. For example, there are approximately 1,000 airborne artillery officers on active duty to fill an authorization for some 500 officers; yet a shortage exists in our airborne units for artillery officers. There has been a constant need for volunteers in our Airborne Special Forces Units. These units are specially organized, trained and equipped to conduct operations within or behind enemy lines for military purposes.

FROM a career standpoint, the most distinct advantage of being airborne qualified is that it provides more varied assignments. Probably you have said many times that you would give anything to get back to troops. Being an airborne officer could increase your chances of getting troop duty. For example: an airborne artillery officer returning from overseas may be considered for assignment to any one of the eleven airborne artillery battalions, in addition to conventional artillery battalions. An airborne infantry officer has six additional regiments and one RCT. By the same token, an airborne officer needing staff duty has more opportunities of receiving such an assignment. Officers with airborne experience are in continuous demand on all high level staffs, including the Departments of the Army, and Defense. In addition, there are requirements for airborne officers in the XVIII Airborne Corps, 11th and 82d Airborne Divisions, 508th Airborne RCT, and various boards.

OFFICERS normally are selected for airborne training only if available for assignment to airborne duty following such training. This is not a hard and fast rule, however. The reason for the assignment to airborne duty immediately following training is to afford you an opportunity to gain airborne unit experience, and thus become qualified as an experienced airborne officer. An experienced airborne officer is defined as one who has served a minimum of one year in an airborne organization, unit or staff, and has participated in the planning, preparation and execution of an airborne operation, field exercise, or maneuver. In order to insure that newly qualified airborne officers will receive adequate unit training, Career Management Division has permitted lieutenants to serve at least nine months with an airborne unit, and all other grades have been permitted to serve at least one year prior to reassignment. An exception to this assignment procedure may be made in accordance with the needs of the Army or branch of service concerned.

After you become an experienced airborne officer, additional assignments w be opened to you on various staffs, a borne officer at DA, Army or Cor level, various military assistant adviso groups, military missions, and as an i structor in airborne tactics and tec niques in our service schools.

If an airborne officer is to be utiliz effectively, he must be readily identifi as such. Each airborne officer is iden fied as such by prefixing a "7" to l MOS, and retaining the prefix to h primary MOS as long as he remai qualified for airborne duty, irrespecti of duty assignment. This MOS pre is removed if the officer becomes phy cally disqualified, or if he submits request for removal from airborne du through command channels to his care branch, stating his reason or reasons f such a request. Career Management I vision maintains a ready reference of airborne officers on active duty by ke ing a current listing of these office showing name, rank, branch of servi MOS, major command assigned to, a other pertinent data. In order to ass Career Management Division in givi airborne officers assignments commens rate with their grade, experience a desires, the career branches should kn whether or not the officer desires an a borne assignment. A good place to p this information is in your annual pr erence card.

The needs of the service, the office qualifications, and when possible, l individual preferences are the fact which regulate the assignment process Airborne officers are utilized in nc airborne assignments when their servic are required, and career-wise to gain t broadening experience necessary for balanced military background.


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More Fire Power for a Fire Power-plus Army






The Corporal's "transporter-erector" comes equipped with a bulldozer blade to scoop out the launching site



The transporter-erector lifts the Corporal into position



AND AWAY SHE GOES!



New Rocket and Missile Give Field Artillery Much Heavier Punch and Far Longer Ranges

Honest John is a surface-to-surface, free flight rocket without electronic guidance controls. Simple in design, Honest John crews use standard fire control techniques. It can eliver either atomic or conventional explosives.

Its range is medium to long and it is designed for close fire support of ground combat forces.

Honest John consists of a rocket weighing several tons and a mobile, self-propelled auncher. The rocket has a forward compartment containing the warhead; a motor in the enter of which the propellant is fitted; and a fin assembly at the rear.

It comes from the arsenal assembled except for the explosive warhead and fins which are dded near the launching site.

Corporal is a surface-to-surface guided missile containing electronic equipment which ermits it to be guided in flight. Its ranges are far beyond those of any conventional artilery piece, including the 280mm gun, and also beyond those of the Honest John rocket. The attlefield commander can use it to strike selected targets far beyond the front lines in any ind of weather and without reference to visibility.

Corporal equipment consists of the missile, a mobile launcher and guidance devices. A elf-propelled, hydraulically operated erector places the missile in firing position.

Work on missiles and guidance systems that resulted in the Corporal began in 1944 when rmy Ordnance arranged with the California Institute of Technology to experiment in the pplication of rocket propulsion to artillery range missiles.

CEREBRATIONS

Picture the Errors

LET'S put our Army photographers to work. By work I don't mean the photographic stuff beloved of PIOs. Let them work at training soldiers in fieldcraft.

Colleges put the camera to work to train their football teams years ago. Coaches and their teams spend hours studying films of their previous games and the games of their forthcoming opponents. The fine points that are obtained through detailed study of these films have been of great worth, and more than justified the expense involved.

If our larger football farms have found that photographic analysis helps win games, is it not worth giving serious attention to the consideration of the role of the camera in safeguarding the nation's investment in its soldiers?

We have training films galore, but why stop there? Let's use still and motion picture cameras to pick out flaws in our field work.

Here's one way it could be done. When a unit is thought to be proficient, set up field tests that will really check its mastery of the technique involved. Then place motion picture cameras in the tactical area, one on each flank, and one on the enemy position. Assign a man with a 35mm camera with each umpire. Have another man with a portable tape recorder. When the problem starts, the still camera men shoot such pictures as the umpires request. When orders are given, they are picked up on the tape recorder.

As the troops near their LD, the umpire radios to the movie camera operators, and they shoot the entire problem from concealed and camouflaged cameras set down at the height of the enemy in his foxhole. Quite possibly a fourth camera might be placed in a liaison plane to get further coverage. The problem over, the normal critique is held, and the troops are dismissed.

A week or so later, when the films have been processed and edited by the umpire personnel, the *real* critique is held. The troops are reassembled, and the photographic evidence is presented, with appropriate comments. Properly exploited, this material should do a vast amount of good. Errors will be obvious to the most dull-witted. Deficiencies in the training of the unit and its individuals can be noted. While the good actors will have nothing to fear, the bad actors will have few chances to make excuses.

Our present training films show the right way to do things, or if they do present the wrong way, it is always corrected. But the pictures I want will show errors, and these errors are the sole justification for their existence. It is better to have a camera show up bad technique than to have the error exposed by enemy fire.

This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department of your JOURNAL is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

Stills from the films could be blown up and placed where the troops could see them, and profit by what they see. The training value of such material can be considerable.

CAPT. DONALD G. ROSS

Judging Distance

I WOULD like to suggest a quick, inexpensive, and simple way to encourage soldiers to learn to judge distance and thus encourage accurate marksmanship.

Perhaps one of the reasons soldiers do not fire in combat is that they are not confident of hitting the target. They do not hit the target because—among other things—they do not set their sights for the different ranges at which targets appear. They do not do this for several reasons, one of which is that they do not know how far away the target really is. They cannot judge distance. If a soldier does not set his sights, there is little chance of much effective fire being directed at the longer ranges.

This inability to judge distance is a product of modern life. Most of us live in cities where there is little demand for looking at things farther than—at most—one hundred feet away. Just watch yourself sometime and see how little distance looking you do. Looking at distances is something that goes—I suspect—almost exclusively with rural living. A person never learns to distinguish between 100 and 150 yards or between 375 and 425 yards if he never really needs to look beyond one hundred feet.

To remedy this lack of skill we must present the opportunity that has been missing in the past. We must give our rifleman the chance to see various distances over various types of terrain a to be told how great these distances a A mental yardstick must be set up the soldier's mind against which he c compare any distance that he meets combat firing. This can't be done, think you will agree, by a few classes range estimation. It must be a contin ous thing. The distance that he se every time he goes on the range hel establish this mental yardstick, but isn't nearly enough. Rifle ranges a flat and even. Combat isn't fought this type of terrain very often. Ther fore, the soldier must learn to judg distance in the various types of terra over which he will fight if he is to lea to quickly and accurately set his sigh and fire at targets now passed up as beir too far away or else fired at and misse

Here is a method of giving this trai ing quickly and effortlessly.

Every camp could be converted in an off-duty training area in range estim tion by covering it with small sig showing how far away it is between t sign and various points within seei distance of it. Everywhere a soldier goe he would see statements of distance various points on these small signs. The should be posted everywhere; several i front of the PX, several in each compan area, along deserted roads, in woode areas frequently used for training, alon frequently traveled highways and walk near the service club, etc. Everywhe combat terrain is found or everywhe soldiers congregate or even stop lon enough to notice a sign, would have few of them. Walking along the roa he constantly sees signs saying: "Fro here to the railroad crossing—35 yard or "From here to the water tower—90 yards." There are countless variatio possible.

Another version would be to have th signs ask a question with the answe painted on the opposite side of it. Th type would be impossible to nail to wall trees, fence posts, etc., but when stan ing on a stake would enable the in dividual to test his ability. Perhaps combination of both types would be bes "How far is it to the chapel?" The sam system can be used to teach men to judg height: "The flagpole is 75 feet tall. It could also be used to teach estimatin in mils or degrees: "From one end o the rifle range to the other at this poin is 1200 mils." "From this point, th

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Supporting Device for Telephone Lines

WHILE commanding amphibian units in World War II and Korea, I saw a need for a device to hold up poles used for supporting signs and telephone lines, instead of the conventional stakes and guy lines, that were constantly being knocked over by vehicles.

I adapted a standard engineer picket by flattening the screw point into a spade-shaped end and straightening out the lower and upper turns. The middle turn, by means of a rod or stick, was used to screw the picket into the ground. A ring or a turn was made at the top of sufficient size to hold a pole of 2-inch or less diameter (see sketch).

After the screw was bored into the ground, a twelve-inch hole was made for the butt of the pole adjacent to the screw. The pole was then placed through the top turn and into the hole.

About one hundred of these "beach screws" were made and used on many beach landings in the Far East during 1951-1952. During these same years "beach screws" were loaned to Marine Corps amphibian units to their great satisfaction.

These are the advantages of the "beach screw":

(1) Eliminates lines, stakes, hammers and other bulky materials necessary to erect poles in the conventional manner.

(2) Reduces the time necessary to erect poles by about seventy-five per cent.


(3) Changing or removing of pole is a simple process.

(4) Telephone poles and lines can be erected as fast as men can walk along the ground.

(5) Can be used in many types of loose soil, including rice paddies.

(6) Facilitates repair of telephone lines because inspection is simplified.

(7) Permits salvage of telephone lines that normally are unserviceable after combat use.



LT. COL. JOHN B. B. GIBBON, JR.

ridge and the top of the hill on the left are 1000 mils apart."

Some wouldn't bother to look, but most people would pick up knowledge of distance judging effortlessly from daily experience. If only the sniper in each squad took an interest, it would make the whole cost and effort of putting these signs up well worth while. Setting them up means valuable training for those who do it. Naturally, the longer distances can be most easily measured by range finder while setting the signs up.

We should set up a system that will give our men a chance to see as many firing ranges as possible so they will have some known terrain against which to compare combat terrain in estimating distances before they set their sights.

LT. ROBERT McQUIE, JR.

Only One in Eight . . .

ONLY one in eight Infantry officers will find it possible to attend any of the classes conducted at The Infantry School this year.

It is certain that a great many of you are not going to get a chance at that resident class you should and would like to attend.

If an Infantry officer has not finished one of the advanced classes at Fort Benning he is seriously handicapped. These courses are prerequisites for higher schools and for many command positions. Promotions also have a tendency to depend to some degree upon completion of this schooling.

You must consider the situation seriously. Not much chance to attend one of the classes, but you had better have the credit on your "66" if you want to get somewhere.

There is an answer to this problem: the Extension Courses program. But, right now, it is a partial answer only. You can do a fine job of learning the latest infantry doctrine and technique, and prepare yourself well for a higher position by extension courses, but you cannot get comparable credit. It's not the same thing as attending a resident course.

Unquestionably, extension courses are the best way, next to attendance at service schools, of increasing your military knowledge. The courses are written to parallel resident instruction. They are kept up to date by constant revision, and the same quality of teaching is maintained. An example is the Associate Advanced Course at The Infantry School, which offers 600 hours of extension work—only sixty hours less than the resident course. Those 60 hours are spent in practical work.

You can, with extension courses, prepare yourself very well, so far as doctrine and technique are concerned. But you will miss the demonstrations and practical work. Of course, the resident instruction is best for this very reason, but as a substitute, extension courses do a good job. They can be made to do better.

There are two aspects of the extension system which, if built up, would bring the courses to the point where they would warrant comparable credit with the resident classes.

First, a higher standard of work should be demanded, and the examinations made comparably more difficult. This should be carried to the point where the courses would be even more difficult than resident instruction. This would better determine the qualifications of the officer, and in a way offset the advantages gained from practical work. The prestige of the extension courses would be raised.

Secondly, the time limit on courses should be made definite and relatively short. The minimum now required, of 30 hours of accredited work every 12 months, is too lenient and allows the course to drag. This not only creates an administrative burden, but tends toward desultory work and poorer final results.

These two changes would revitalize the whole extension program and make it truly comparable in importance with resident courses.

There are many who think that it takes a great deal more initiative, determination and hard study to finish successfully an extension course than it does resident instruction. Many superiors are inclined to rate higher an officer who has taken extension work because they find he has acquired as much knowledge, and is much prouder of his achievement.

The successful completion of an extension course series, coupled with on-the-job training in comparable situations, should bring the student officer equal credit with that given resident students.

All this should be done as soon as possible so the ratio of one in eight would not be so discouraging.

LT. COL. RUSSELL S. PRICE

The Word from the Schools

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Tactics Added

The official title of the Department of Combined Arms has been changed to: Department of Tactics and Combined Arms.

Maintenance Funds Saved

A cut in maintenance inspections is one of TAS's several recent contributions to the management program designed to save time and money. Lengthening the period between ordnance (maintenance) inspections of artillery weapons in the Department of Matériel will result in a yearly saving of $4,819.00 in ordnance funds.

Lubrication orders specify that, during inactive periods, intervals between inspections may be extended commensurate with adequate preservation. The artillery weapons used by Department of Matériel are training aids, are seldom fired, and are rarely exposed to weather conditions; in addition, they are disassembled once every thirty days for instruction in battery and battalion level maintenance. On the basis of those facts, ordnance inspections were changed from once every 6 months to once every 12 months.

The GFT Fan

The graphical firing table (GFT) fan, more commonly known as the "Rizza" fan, has been tested by AFF Board No. 1 and recommended as interim standard FDC equipment. Existing GFTs and range-deflection fans are replaced by this instrument, which combines those two graphical aids. With the GFT fan, one operator can simultaneously derive deflection, elevation, and fuze setting for firing. Its use should significantly reduce time required in FDC to process a fire mission.

A training circular to cover this instrument has been prepared in draft by TAS and forwarded to OCAFF for approval. The proposed publication, "The Graphical Firing Table (GFT) Fan," provides a description of the fan, its uses (*e.g.*, methods for determination of chart data and application of corrections), and the techniques employed in setting up both the fan and firing charts. The TC will be published when final approval of the fan is given by the Department of the Army.

TAC in "Exercise Spear Head"

More than 350 officers and men of The Artillery Center participated last month in "Exercise Spear Head," the armored maneuver at Fort Hood.

Included in the group from Fort Sill were a platoon of the 88th Field Artillery Battery (Searchlight), (another platoon of the battery was in Operation Flash Burn in North Carolina); the 99th Transportation Army Aircraft Repair Team; the 163rd Transportation Company (Light Truck); a magazine platoon from the 424th Ordnance Company (Ammunition); and a provisional umpire detachment.

The umpire detachment of 67 officer and enlisted specialists received 50 hours of instruction here in preparation for their duties. At Fort Hood, they attended an additional week of class and then spent five days in the field with the Aggressor force before the maneuver began.

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Test Revisions Under Way

Infantry training tests are currently being revised at TIS. The revisions will generally follow the form of the present ATTs 7-13 and 7-25 (rifle squad and rifle platoon). More emphasis is being placed on a standardized test and a more complete test. Check sheets are being revised to eliminate non-specific questions.

Resupply by Helicopter

A demonstration of emergency resupply by regimental helicopter has been added to Phase II (Battalion Trains Area) of problem 7663 (Regimental Combat Supply Systems). Students are shown the practicality of using helicopters to deliver small quantities of supplies or equipment into areas for emergency use or until normal resupply procedures can be started (or re-established).

Graphic Training Aids Approved

Graphic Training Aids for use in mortar instruction have been approved. Large enough to accommodate a class of about 40 students, the following GTAs may be drawn through any Army Training Aid Center:

GTA 7-5	Theory of Target Grid System
GTA 7-7	Technique of Indirect Fire, 60mm Mortar
GTA 9-624	Mortar, 60mm M19
GTA 9-625	Mortar, 81mm M29
GTA 9-626	Mortar, 4.2 inch M30

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

ARTILLERY QUOTATION OF THE MONTH

Renown awaits the commander who first in this war restores artillery to its prime importance on the battlefield.

WINSTON CHURCHILL
1941

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

New Training Films

Production of two airborne films "Assen bly of an Airborne Unit" and "Duties c the Jumpmaster," has begun at TIS.

The initial script writing for the film "Men of the Airborne," began 1 February This film, which will be used for orient tion and recruiting purposes, shows th training received in the Airborne Qualific tion Course at the Airborne Departmen TIS. (Completion date of this film is July and it will be available about 1 Sep tember.)

ROTC Summer Training

Colonel Richard J. Werner, PMS&T c Clemson College has been named Deput Camp Commander for ROTC summe training at TIS.

The 1600 cadets will study Genera Military Science subjects. The majority c the training will be in the field and wi include demonstrations of the duties c technical service units and a number c exercises to be staged by TIS.

Ranges for Civilian Groups

Fort Benning rifle ranges are now avai able to qualified civilian organization when not in use by the Army. Request for use of the seven ranges must first b made through the Director of Civilia Marksmanship, Department of the Army Washington, D. C. After obtaining D/A permission, organizations must attach th D/A reply to a request to the Commandin General of TIC, for final authorization an requirements.

Groups using the ranges must suppl their own ammunition. However, qualifie range officers are present for supervision c safety and operation during all firing. A limited number of rifles may be loane upon request.

Map-Coloring Process

A TIS sergeant has devised a shorter easier way to color contour maps that wil result in faster operations by combat infan try units.

M/Sgt. Henry R. Sheridan, chief clerk of The Infantry School's Intelligenc Group in the Staff Department, devised a method to provide maps to small units an patrols quickly.

With the help of a brush, some hecto graph ink, colored pencils and duplicato gelatin film, Sgt. Sheridan can turn ou 25 to 35 colored maps from one maste copy.

First step in the process is to color a mas ter map with indelible transferrable ma terial, such as hectograph ink or ditto pencil. He then transfers the impressio from the master map to a damp gelati pad.

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Irons in the Fire

'THE FASTEST-FIRING AUTOMATIC GUN ever mass-produced" is the manufacturer's description of a cannon for jet aircraft. The manufacturer, ***Pontiac Division of GMC,*** says that the rate of fire of the "Gun, Automatic, 20mm, M39" is "acknowledged to be considerably greater than the firing rate of the latest caliber .50 machine gun, which fires 1200 rounds per minute." Designed by ***Army Ordnance,*** the gun has been on the drafting boards and in experimental stages for more than five years. In appearance the gun is like a giant revolver without a handgrip. Ammunition is carried into the firing chamber in a revolving cylinder. It is fired electrically and is gas-operated. The revolving cylinder is said to simplify cooling of the gun.




A NEW and efficient tool "layaway" system in which tools for the production of the M48 medium tank are "packaged" and stored in a new ***Corps of Engineers*** warehouse near the factory has been revealed by the Army and the ***Ford Motor Co.*** Photograph shows Ford engineers checking storage of tank-producing machinery in the warehouse.

WHILE THE HORROR of the H-bomb created talk of the even more horrible cobalt bomb, production of radioactive cobalt would be most efficient in the smaller A-bombs," according to ***Science News Letter.*** However, it is not likely that a cobalt bomb will ever be test fired, unless we do go absolutely mad," the magazine said. This is because it cannot be aimed and "its radioaction would be wafted upon every breeze and last for generations." The magazine says that "radioactive cobalt isotope 60 is an extremely useful chemical element that will probably do more good than harm" as a source of "gamma rays useful in treating cancer, irradiating industrial products, X-raying materials, etc."



ARMY AVIATORS are to receive flight, operational and maintenance familiarization instruction on the ***Cessna XL-19B*** aircraft and other Cessna planes at the Cessna Wichita plant during the coming year, the Cessna Company recently announced. The XL-19B sometime ago established an international altitude record while powered by a Boeing 502-8 turbo-prop engine.



THIS IS GREAT BRITAIN'S new heavy tank, the ***Conqueror,*** now in limited production and destined for British units in Germany. Few details are known but it has been officially announced that it is heavier in weight and bigger gunned than any existing British tank. According to reports, electronic controls stabilize the gun vertically and horizontally.

IN COOPERATION with industry the ***Corps of Engineers*** has produced attachments which are interchangeable among the three most common commercial bulldozers used by the armed forces. The cooperating companies are ***Allis-Chalmers, Caterpillar*** and ***International.***





The Month's Books

History and memoirs (in themselves a form of history) fill our book review co umns this month. Leading off with the memoirs of one of our most formidab opponents in Europe in World War II, we jump to Korea five years later with Ca tain Gugeler's surprisingly frank account of small-unit actions in a "little war," f which we were, as usual, unprepared. General Clark's From the Danube to the Ya *bridges both space and time, from Europe to Korea, and from the end of World W II to the truce of 1953.*

The Recapture of Guam *brings us back to the Pacific in World War II, to a action that was "the beginning of the end of the Japanese Asia dream."*

The three reviews that bring up the rear are of books that are not particular "important," but that cover fields of interest that literate soldiers have always fou fascinating.

Formidable Enemy

A SOLDIER'S RECORD
By Field Marshal Albert Kesselring
William Morrow & Co., 1954
381 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $5.00

Reviewed by
MAJ. GEN. AARON BRADSHAW

This is the intimate story, frankly told, of a distinguished German soldier who kept his sense of balance during many critical years. He was a great soldier who had the character and integrity to be great, both in victory and defeat.

In 1936 Kesselring was made Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe. But he later had disagreements with Milch (Secretary of State and Deputy to Goering in the Ministry). As a result, he asked for and was given a field command. This was a very important step in Kesselring's career as it gave him an opportunity to exercise command and also placed him in a position where he was immediately available to take a large air command when hostilities commenced.

It is particularly interesting to read the Field Marshal's comments with respect to the attitude and the actions of the Russians along the German-Russian border after the Polish campaign. He says the Russian fighters fired on German aircraft; they showed little friendliness even to the point of withholding necessary weather reports. In other words, the Russians have a "form," and they run true to form at all times.

The Field Marshal pays a great deal of attention to an explanation of the bombing of Rotterdam. In his explanation, a failure of certain communications at important moments is brought out. All in all, his story is convincing and if you accept the premise Kesselring was an honorable general, you may accept his statement as being the picture as he saw it.

The Battle of Britain is not given much space in the book. It was a failure and he discusses the various facets of the battle to make it clear that there were reasons for the failure. He points out that Goering initially wanted air warfare banned by international law, and he makes the argument that the air raids on open cities were first flown by the RAF.

One of the interesting things about Kesselring is that he apparently thinks in terms of all three services, Army, Navy and Air, having in mind the importance of balanced forces and coordinated offensives —something a great many people think about but not many practice.

Throughout the story of the various campaigns, Kesselring mentions that Hitler greatly underrated the importance of the Mediterranean Theater possibilities; in fact, Kesselring often points out the great importance he placed on that area.

The author stresses the great importance of the capture of Malta in order to strangle the Allied line of communications through the Mediterranean. On the other hand, there was Rommel and OKW backers who felt that Egypt was the target. At any rate, Kesselring did put an air attack on Malta which he says was completely successful and that a landing could have been made there on 10 May, and it was a grave mistake not to have made such a landing. In fact, he feels that Italy should have taken Malta at the outset of the war. At the time Kesselring got started in the North African campaign in early 1942, Rommel had just had some success and wanted to go on to Cairo, saying he could make it in ten days. So Malta was shelved in favor of Cair Kesselring feels that was a decisive actio

The Field Marshal's estimate of th situation as given in his book (regardle of what he may have actually estimated in 1942) is a very fine bit of G-2 wor However, Hitler and his Wehrmacht o eration staff (1) never gave sufficient i portance to the Mediterranean Theate and (2) misjudged the objective of th Allies' invasion (North Africa). Kesselri makes two comments that are interestin he says Montgomery "played for safety and was methodical; he also says Romm should have been removed because of th disharmony that existed between Romm and the Italians.

Kesselring states his strategic objecti was to keep Eisenhower's armies separa from Montgomery's. His problems we many and most difficult and even wit complete cooperation and resources h would have had a job on his hands. B during this important campaign Kesselri surprisingly enough complains that Ro mel was dispirited and his heart was n in the job, and there was a certain pi headedness on the part of both Romm (who was opposite Montgomery) and vo Arnim (who held the front against Eise hower).

Once a landing was made at Salern Kesselring gave his attention to his with drawal up the boot with stands at the bett topographical lines. At the same time h had to set up an Italian government, and a it finally worked out Kesselring feels would have been simpler to have fough the war in Italy without any Italian go ernment.

The Field Marshal goes into some deta in discussing the battle along the Cassin line and he rightly concludes that it was German success. Considering the relativ forces involved, he can take much satisfac tion in this determined fight by the Ge mans.

The Field Marshal makes a good cas for fighting the battle for Italy. His prin cipal point is that with the battle n fought as it was, the heart of German

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

LINES FROM A NEW BOOK

I am always happy to find that soldiers are often better and more sensitive politicians than those who feel they have a vocation for that profession. It is ironical to record that soldiers, so frequently repudiated, defamed and ridiculed by the whole world, in times of real need are called to leading positions and overwhelmed with honors.

FIELD MARSHAL ALBERT KESSELRING
Kesselring: A Soldier's Record

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

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would have been seriously threatened by the capture of the Brenner Pass area.

The Field Marshal's comments on the partisan war in Italy are written quite feelingly. He refers to it as guerrilla warfare and to indicate more clearly its implications he states that their strength was between 200,000 and 300,000 men toward the end of the war. He gives a very good description of the partisan organization and in well-selected words describes the nature of their operations including the professionally trained reconnaissance group at one extreme, and the riffraff of murderers and robbers at the other end.

There is no escaping Kesselring's intention to place part of the blame for what he calls "a violation of all the rules of law" on the Allied high command and on the Italian government of General Badoglio.

The Field Marshal describes in some detail the steps he took and had to take as a commander of a force from the theater of war to protect his men from this guerrilla warfare, and he says, "Unless one wanted to commit suicide, he had to reverse his natural feelings." It would be profitable to military men of countries who may get into civilized war in the future to read his chapter on this very distasteful and critical part of his service.

The transfer of Kesselring to Commander-in-Chief, West, came rather suddenly, having been precipitated by the fall of Remagen. Kesselring's immediate situation was 55 German divisions in various states of depletion opposed to 85 Allied divisions. The Luftwaffe in the west was not under his immediate command, but operated from a high command in the rear. The enemy was not only superior in numbers and matériel but much superior in the air.

OKW must have been in desperate straits because all the additional strength they could turn over to Kesselring was one full division!" However, Kesselring did not expect any sudden collapse. He apparently was dumbfounded when the Americans crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim, as he had warned his army commander of the possibility of that attempt. This crossing left the way to Frankfurt open and permitted the decisive blow at Aschaffenberg, 27-28 March, to take place. Following that, there was a crossing by the French of the lower Rhine. With the Rhine breached in the north, the center and the south, the story from then on is one of constant reverses. During his attempts to re-form in the midst of such reverses, Kesselring even gave thought to a counterattack on Patton's left flank!

When it came time to surrender, Kesselring's last thoughts were for his troops. He thanked them and asked them to conduct themselves properly.

It is difficult in this short review to try to describe Kesselring's feelings at the final moments of surrender; a most difficult time for his human emotions.

The charges on which Kesselring was tried, the new rules of international law that were applied *ex post facto,* the lack of attention to the accused's rights or the sentence itself can give little satisfaction to anyone connected therewith. It is a matter that might well be made a study for joint understanding by statesmen and defense officials, for in the future if the men in arms are to be held responsible to the new rules followed in the courts of Nürnberg and some of the other postwar trials, there is only one place for the American soldier to be, and that is on the winning side. Particularly important is the new rule under which a soldier must be responsible for the political orders of his government and must decide when to follow them and when to oppose them! In other words, when does he disobey an order given by his government, and when does he carry it out? Kesselring's discussion of this whole subject of the trials and the legal status of an officer is very well done. Or perhaps all the above may be pure theory, since the Communists follow no civilized rules of war or court trials.

It might be well to close this review with an extract from his closing pages, a statement in regard to himself wherein he walks out at the end of the book with his head held high and a philosophical attitude towards life. "The condemnation by Pharisees cannot touch a man who has or has had some self-respect. My life has been rich because it was filled with work and cares and responsibilities. It was not my doing that it had to end in suffering, but if in this situation I can and may still be something to my comrades, if men of standing are still glad to have a talk with me, this is a great grace."

Hard Facts of History

COMBAT ACTIONS IN KOREA:
Infantry, Artillery, Armor
By Capt. Russell A. Gugeler
Combat Forces Press; 1954
272 Pages; Maps; $5.00

Reviewed by
MAJ. GEN. J. C. FRY

Here are authentic accounts of conflict that should be read by every professional officer and soldier, for purely career educational purposes. The book is, in addition, a wonderful account of Korean battle action that the average citizen might well read to learn what takes place when ground forces clash. One who knows war can recognize complete authenticity. Here is stark truth, from the degrading pattern of abject cowardice to the superb level of valor where men give their lives proudly and gallantly for God and Country.

Within these pages can be found the basis for appreciation of our soldiers' performance under varying conditions of combat, and of the need to follow sound military procedures.

Too frequently we find evidences in accounts such as this of an inclination to discard sound principles of war and apply untested measures. Soldiers violate doctrines that have been pieced together as a result of centuries of combat, and payment is made in blood.

In the opening pages we find units engaged in serious field operations with a formidable enemy while under the impression they have a minor, unimportant, police action to deal with. These men and many of their officers have obviously grown soft under occupation days in Japan. They are not conditioned for war, either mentally or physically, and their losses are proof positive of the need to remain eternally vigilant and combat-ready.

Senior generals and lowly privates alike could learn much from a study of these initial paragraphs.

Consider the conduct of Captain Osborn's Company A. It is understandable that it was difficult for all ranks to realize that they were engaged in a desperate war, because information to that effect had not reached them with proper emphasis from command levels above. However, the rout of the organization which panicked and ran a mile to Pyongtaek can't be explained so easily. These men lacked discipline, and the chain of command leadership wasn't strong enough to cause them to wait for instructions from their leaders. Outwardly, the picture is one of fear and confusion, but basically the problem has additional deep roots. Twelve men of a platoon consisting of thirty-one men had dirty, broken, or improperly assembled weapons. Thirty per cent of the organization was lost for lack of proper battle indoctrination, strong leadership control, and because basic methods of communication and security were neglected.

The readers of this book should ponder the cost in human life. Some of the men who died in the early days of the conflict are dead because of indirect pressures to educate and entertain soldiers of our occupation forces rather than to train them for their basic mission. Between the lines, one can detect the fact that officers have catered to whims of their men beyond the best interests of their units. The primary mission of the ground soldier is to be able to kill an adversary. This requires mental and physical hardening and units that have learned through hard repetitive training how to mesh fire power, unit coordination, communication and control. The commander who requires high standards of readiness for combat will never have cause to spend a sleepless night because his failures contributed to the death of young soldiers.

Beyond the pattern of individual performance on the battlefield, the book contains factual descriptions of combat procedures that succeeded and of some that failed. Not least in importance are the activities of Air Force, liaison planes, and helicopters. A liaison plane does a superb job of locating the enemy and thus makes a great contribution to the success of one phase of an operation. Another example includes the dropping of food and ammunition which fail to reach friendly hands. A third example includes a napalm air at-

tack on friendly troops, where American soldiers are killed by our own Air Force. And a helicopter is employed to land a corps commander at an advanced battalion headquarters. Reflection on how air and ground efforts were coordinated might well lead to the conclusion that our ground forces need their own air support.

And for senior officers and those that seek such responsibilities, there is also the lesson of evaluation of information. A corps commander lands at an advanced battalion CP and lightly advises the unit not to be stopped by a bunch of laundrymen. Objective evaluation of information at that time might well have indicated greater deliberation and less optimism.

Examples flit across the pages that the man who aspires to battle leadership may well study to advantage. A young officer who is physically tired, mentally jaded, and with heavy heart over the responsibility for his men, is decorated with a Silver Star when he is in desperate need of counsel and assistance. When his senior departs, the decoration is thrown at a snow bank. And one can feel that only strong ties of discipline, courage, and character kept this young officer from weeping. Decorations have their place, but in the heat of battle, life is precious, courage is commonplace, and sound professional judgment and counsel are beyond value. The senior has the burden of justifying the faith of juniors.

The endless lessons of the book include confirmation of our principles of war, our training documents, and battle procedures as spelled out in our field manuals. In every war, there are lessons to be learned, but our training literature shouldn't be rewritten merely because an impractical plan succeeded. The discussion of the Outpost Eerie operation is an example. Here is a piece of ground that would have made a logical outpost for the enemy, but was an impractical position for United Nations troops. The mission of an outpost as spelled out in Field Manual 7-10 is correct, and such positions can be found without isolating units to a degree where they are at the mercy of the enemy. The outpost served no useful purpose. The same results could have been achieved at far less cost by aggressive patrol action. The lesson here is to avoid wasting life through ill-considered, costly tactical decisions.

Without Victory

FROM THE DANUBE TO THE YALU
By Mark Clark
Harper & Brothers, 1954
396 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00

Reviewed by
JOHN H. THOMPSON

There have been times in the military history of the United States when command meant frustration for the commander, but it would be difficult to find any example to compare with the Far East command during the Korean war. To Gen. Mark Wayne Clark that war was the war nobody wanted to win. His predecessors, Generals MacArthur and Ridgway, had had the same frustration, but it also fell to Clark's lot to become the first army commander in our history to sign an armistice without victory when he placed his signature on the document executed at Panmunjom.

Now retired to the presidency of The Citadel after forty years as a professional soldier, General Clark has told the story of "Operation Frustration" during the thirteen months he held the Far East Command. Like his *Calculated Risk,* the memoirs of commanding the Fifth Army and 15th Army Group in Italy in World War II, *From the Danube to the Yalu* is pithy and pungent. It picks up where he left off in Memoir No. One—hammering at the Russians across the Vienna conference table on the Danube in Austria in 1945-47 when he was supreme American commander—and tells the tale of Korea, as he saw it from the viewpoint of a military commander representing this country and the United Nations, and the viewpoint of a soldier-diplomat dealing with the unpredictable Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea, the Japanese, the militant Red Chinese and North Koreans, and our British allies. It certainly wasn't a dull life.

Outspoken even to the point of bluntness, Clark makes a number of points certain to keep the military and political hot-stove leagues buzzing for a long while. At no time after he assumed command six months after the war was deadlocked in stalemate and the Chinese had built a deep belt of mountain fortifications, states the general, was victory possible "unless." The "unless" meant accepting totally unacceptable casualties in a drive to the Yalu, or a tremendous build-up of more divisions, sea and air power and no restrictions on bombing China. Washington was not prepared to execute either plan.

But there had been a time for decision, a time for victory. To Clark this was in 1950 when the Red Chinese hurled their legions into the fray, after the North Korean army had been squashed. Had he been the commander then, Clark asserted, he would have "screamed to the high heavens" for authority to bomb Chinese airfields, bases and every installation from which the Chinese derived their source of strength and power. It was inconceivable to him—and he thinks it must have been to MacArthur—that this nation would countenance a situation in which "Chinese soldiers killed American youths in organized formal warfare and yet we would not fail to use the power at our command to protect those Americans." If we had shown determination then, Clark maintains, the chance of Soviet intervention and a third world war would have been far less than Washington feared.

As commander, Clark made a number of recommendations. They included a rapid build-up of the ROK army—which did not come about until it became a campaign issue of the Presidential electio —and the use of Nationalist Chinese div sions in Korea. The latter idea died in pigeonhole. His staff also prepared plan for an offensive to win the war and a estimate of what this would entail, bu when General Eisenhower—the Presiden elect—visited Korea, Clark was never aske for any such estimate by his old bos Washington wanted an armistice wit honor.

Clark was also unwilling to approve an of the proposals for attacks, made by th former Eighth Army commander, Ger James Van Fleet, believing the casualtie were not worth any limited gains, unles ultimate victory were the goal. He mad one exception, the action at Snipers Ridg and Triangle Hill which started 14 Octo ber 1952. In place of the pre-battle est mate of 200 casualties, the comman sustained more than 8,000, mostly Korear

Nor did he think much of the Unite Nations contribution to combat. Gallan and able though the UN troops were, say Clark, the total number of men was shame fully "piddling." In his relations wit President Rhee, Clark admired the dought patriot, but waxed caustic over Rhee intransigence, his efforts to break up th negotiated armistice, an action which cos the UN command 900 casualties a da when the truce had almost been settled.

Outside the main elements of over-a strategical conceptions with which the boo is largely concerned, Clark also speaks t the point about other events: the fak landing at Wonsan which scared th enemy command, the unique evacuation c thousands of friendly guerrillas from be hind the Chinese lines, the use of Russia pilots in the Chinese air force, the muc greater strength of the Chinese army as result of its battle training at our expens the time the Japanese tapped his telephon the failure of air power because of Wash ington-imposed restrictions, and the Re brain-washing technique imposed on pri oners and against which American soldie must now be trained.

He has a formula, too, for our foreig policy in Korea. Pull out. Get the Arm out now, and never again commit it to ba tle on a peninsula in a war it isn't allowe to win. Then announce in unmistakabl language that any violation of ROK terr tory will immediately result in our unlim ited use of air power, including our atomi bombs. This policy has the virtue, at leas of simplicity. It is the expected one offere by a general whose experience convince him that world communism understand only one thing: force.

THE RECAPTURE OF GUAM
By Major O. R. Lodge, USMC
U.S. Government Printing Offic
214 Pages; Index; Maps: $4.2

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. EDWIN H. RANDLE

The recapture of Guam was the "I shal return" of the United States Marine Corps

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But it was much more than a point of honor. It was the beginning of the end of the Japanese Asia dream. Admiral King had advocated a drive in the Central Pacific with the Marianas as a key objective, but it was General Arnold's support which in the end brought it about. He pointed out that B-29 bases in the Marianas, as compared with China, would simplify supply and save 1,200 miles on the round-trip flight to Japan.

While the fight for Saipan was in progress, intelligence studies indicated more Japanese troops on Guam than hitherto calculated. The operation was therefore postponed until the 77th Infantry Division (Army) could be brought up from Hawaii. One combat team, the 305th, was rushed to Eniwetok and attached to the 1st Provisional Brigade (Marine). The remainder of the 77th arrived a few days later. The new date for the assault was set at 21 July 1944.

The basic plan of III Amphibious Corps (Marine) was simple: (1) capture a beachhead which would pinch off Orote Peninsula by landings north and south of it; (2) capture the peninsula and its airfield; (3) push across and cut the island in half; (4) drive north and exterminate the enemy. The belief that the enemy would fall back to the north turned out to be correct.

South of Orote Peninsula the plan called for the 1st Brigade to swing left and close it off before the high ground 2,500 yards east of the beaches was captured. At Eniwetok it was suggested to General Shepherd, the brigade commander, that he would not dare turn a flank to high ground occupied by German troops. "I know," he said. "But with these bastards you can take chances." And he was right, as it turned out. But students of tactics would recognize this as an exception; that stopping short of high ground held by the enemy, or turning a flank to it, is not always to be recommended. At Okinawa the Japanese made better use of hills and escarpments.

The Japanese were well supplied with light artillery on Guam. Had they massed its fires they could have made the landings and the recapture of the island much more difficult and costly. The artillery was entirely dispersed as single accompanying guns and had little effect.

The recapture went as planned in spite of all efforts of the Japanese, rough terrain (much of it jungle) and an almost total absence of roads. At one time two divisions were supplied over a single narrow road. A fine cooperative spirit within both units insured the success of this unique sharing of a main supply route.

Relations between the Marines and the 77th Infantry Division were excellent throughout the operation. When the 305th Combat Team was ordered ashore the first night, the Marine command was somewhat less than generous in furnishing them no LVTs to negotiate the reefs. But the 77th



Pass In Review

Among the books received this month is one that is likely to appeal to large numbers of our readers if past reading tastes are a guide: *Inside Lincoln's Cabinet: The Civil War Diaries of Salmon P. Chase* ($6.50). Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury kept an intimate and detailed diary which David Donald of Columbia University has edited with consummate skill. In addition to the fascinating descriptions of Cabinet meetings, the preparation and discussion of the Emancipation Proclamation and the character sketches of important military and political leaders of the era, there are completely frank accounts of Northern politics during the Civil War period. Lincoln considered Chase to be one of the best public servants he knew and certainly this insight into the man, which is available for the first time, adds greatly to his stature.

Another Lincoln book that came out this month is *The Assassination of President Lincoln and the Trial of the Conspirators* ($7.50). This is a facsimile edition, reproduced photographically, of the original testimony taken down in the courtroom by Benn Pitman during the trial held in May and June, 1865.

For our travelogue this month, we should mention two books. The first of these should be of great interest to all who have served or are about to pull a tour of duty in the European Theater. It's called *Europe: A Journey With Pictures* ($7.50). Here we have a romantic tour of western Europe in text and pictures. There are over 270 pictures; the photography and reproduction are superb. This is not primarily a tourist guide but would serve more usefully as a treasured album of lovely villages, towns and cities; fabulous buildings and art treasures; and breathtaking scenery. It is a beautiful book.

Our other travel book takes us to the incredibly wild regions of the Northern Territory of Australia. Alan Moorehead has lent his unusual talents to this description of *Rum Jungle* ($3.50). Moorehead was born in Australia and this is an account of his rediscovery of this wilderness country still inhabited by the aborigine and the koala bear. Here is a completely fascinating book that sneaks up on you and you find yourself still engrossed long after the light should have been turned off.

For the home handyman there are two new books of interest. The first, *How to Use Portable Power Tools* ($2.95), reflects the tremendous growth in sales of these tools to home owners. In picture and text, Maurice Reid gives a full course in the proper use of power-driven drills, saws, sanders, planers, routers and shapers. He includes chapters on safety and tool maintenance as well as useful appendices on the characteristics of common woods, board measure chart, the decimal equivalents of wire, letter and fractional-size drills, drill and bit sizes, an abrasive chart for sanders, and recommended extension cord sizes for use with portable equipment. The second book in this field is a paper-backed *Home Repairs and Improvements* ($1.50). As the title indicates, this book is a how-to-do-it concerned with repair and redecoration of the home, refinishing furniture, and the use of wood, plaster, brick and concrete in these operations.

Graduates of the USMA will be interested in a new book called *The Black Knights of West Point* ($10.00). Here in yearbook format is the complete history of the exploits of the brave old Army football teams since 1890. Many team and individual pictures combined with short summaries of key games make this about as complete a record as is apt to be put together.

Our own Combat Forces Press will be making two notable contributions to the field of military literature this month. If you read last month's JOURNAL carefully you saw a chapter from one of these books: *Combat Actions in Korea* ($5.00). This book was written by Capt. Russell Gugeler of the Office of the Chief of Military History. It is filled with detailed accounts of small-unit combat actions and we think it's a highly interesting and very valuable book for all soldiers.

The second book which will roll from our presses this month is *The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division* ($6.50). This history of "Old Ironsides" in World War II has been years in preparation and the time has been well spent. As the publishers of the great majority of World War II division and unit histories we have a good yardstick for comparison. This book will rank with the best of them.

—R.F.C.

was determined to pull its weight in this, its first operation, and did. During the fighting the soldiers were pleased to be called, with some affection and admiration, "the 77th Marines."

While the enemy on Guam was outnumbered, outgunned and outclassed, his determination to die fighting for his Emperor, as always, made for a rugged and desperate fight. Major Lodge has had access to Japanese documents and interviews, all of which lend much interest and give a clearer picture of the enemy's plans, hopes, and circumstances.

The first chapter gives a concise background of the island and its seizure by the Japanese in 1941. Succeeding chapters detail the decision to return, planning and preparation, the landings and drive to the beachheads, as well as the deadly fight for Orote Peninsula. Chapter V is devoted to supporting elements: naval gunfire, air, artillery, engineer, shore-party, medical, and even war dogs. The last two chapters carefully describe the sustained fight to the north to exterminate the enemy and clear the island of all resistance. A great deal of information of value to the historian, and to participants, is contained in the appendices.

Major Lodge and the Historical Branch of the Marine Corps have prepared an excellent account of the entire Guam operation. The volume is profusely illustrated and strikingly bound. The twenty large color maps in the back are excellent. As a tactical study of an amphibious landing followed by a sustained attack it is well worth the time of any serious military student.

Moment of Truth

THE BOOK OF FAMOUS ESCAPES
By Eric Williams
W. W. Norton & Co., 1954
453 Pages; $4.95

Reviewed by
RICHARD G. MCCLOSKEY

To no one does the grass in the other pasture look greener than to a prisoner. A bee line to the other pasture seldom runs over two hundred feet. The problem is to cover that distance without being seen or heard. The stories of how that problem has been solved are among the most fascinating and exciting stories ever told. Eric Williams, whose *Wooden Horse* is one of the most fabulous of escape stories, has gathered eighteen first-hand accounts of flight from captivity.

This book is no mere anthology, though, no cut-and-paste job. Each escaper has during his struggle what the bullfighter calls the *moment of truth*. It is the moment when one says to oneself, "This is me, this is it." In that moment of truth the escaper "knows that he is alone, and that his self-respect, his reputation and his life depend on the coolness and skill that he can command in the next few seconds." Williams has chosen that portion of each escape story that recounts the moment of truth. That is the thread that holds these diverse narratives together. In addition, Williams has provided an introduction containing an expert analysis of the psychology and tactics of escape, and a commentary to each narrative that sets the stage for the moment of truth.

With the exception of the first two accounts, John Gerard's escape from the Tower of London in 1597 and Casanova's scramble across the rooftops of Venice in 1756, the accounts are all of military breakouts. Williams provides three from the Napoleonic wars (two English and one French); one of a Yankee lieutenant's escape from the "Hotel de Libby" during the Civil War; two from the Boer War; three from World War I (one each out of Germany, Libya, and Turkey); and seven during World War II. Of these seven, one tells of an American escape from Italy, and the others of Englishmen escaping from Germany, Greece, Poland, Malaya, and Italy.

So much for the statistics. The narratives themselves are rich in the humor and fortitude of great adventure, and peopled with frightened heroes—malcontents who pitted themselves against fantastic odds. It's a humdinger of a book.

Subtle Deceit

THE MAN WHO NEVER WAS
By Ewen Montagu
J. B. Lippincott Co., 1954
160 Pages; Illustrated; $2.75

Reviewed by
ORVILLE C. SHIREY

Publication of this book was made possible largely by chance—and a fortunate chance it was for the military student and lay reader alike. *The Man Who Never Was* is the story of the ruse that convinced the German high command that Sicily would not be the next operation after North Africa, that the Allied armies then in North Africa were going to split to invade Sardinia and Greece. The author is the man who conceived the deception and supervised its execution.

The "man" in the title is a corpse whose identity we shall never learn. This body is provided with the identity of a fictitious Major William Martin of the Royal Marines, down to the last detail of his personal life. He is also provided with a briefcase containing "background" letters of the sort high officers occasionally write to each other out of channels, one of them most indiscreet. He is carrying these letters to the addressee incidental to another mission. He is also provided with a Mae West to indicate that he has died in an air crash off the Spanish coast. The body is then taken by submarine to a point off that coast where it is as certain as wind and tide can make it that it will be found, and cast adrift there.

As intended, the letters are well studied by the German intelligence service through the courtesy of their "neutral" Spanish contacts before they are returned to England through diplomatic channels. German documents captured in 1945 and reproduced in this book show beyond any doubt that the ruse was a complete success—that the German intelligence service, the high command, and Hitler himself swallowed the story whole, thereby saving many Allied lives in the course of the Sicilian operation.

In addition to being one of the most fascinating yarns to come out of World War II, this book has a very practical value. Few officers, of course, will ever have an opportunity to conceive and put into effect a ruse on so high a level. But the book shows very clearly the forethought, the planning and the painstaking care that must go into an operation of this kind. It should also be a clear warning to the inevitable amateur G-2s of our own and other armies, including those who make up stories to tell if they should be taken prisoner, that deceiving the enemy is a difficult science and had best be left to the experts. A ruse, even at a very low level, can do incalculable damage if it backfires.

"The Great"

CHARLEMAGNE: The Legend and the Man
By Harold Lamb
Doubleday & Co., 1954
320 Pages; Index; $4.50

Reviewed by
COL. R. ERNEST DUPUY

Every few hundreds of years there is born into this hodgepodge world of ours an individual whose stature, by the time of his exit—and sometimes even before—has loomed so high above his contemporaries that popular opinion, history, folklore or what have you, has pinned forever to his name the suffix of "Great." Pontiffs, conquerors, emperors, kings—and a few queens too—have received this accolade, from Cyrus down to Napoleon. But to only one of this distinguished clan, so far as the reviewer can recall, has the suffix become indissolubly part of his name.

There has been but one Charlemagne.

His impact upon the Western world was, as Lamb writes, ". . . like the flash of a lighthouse beacon through the murk of Europe, and it did not appear again until the crusades."

Out of that Middle Ages murk, and despite the paucity of authentic records, the historians have given us a pretty fair idea of what Charlemagne accomplished, not only as a conqueror but, more important, as an administrator and an educator. He was the catalyzing agent resolving a chaotic jumble of races and tribes into the component parts of the Europe of today—from the Atlantic to the Elbe and Danube, from the North Sea to the Mediterranean.

Harold Lamb has proven, time and time again, an ability and an artistry which transport the reader into the past, presenting not only the actors, but also the spirit moving them. His protagonists are not puppets; they live and move and think

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neir problems out before the reader's eyes; nat is his spell.

In this book he has done it again. He arries us along with the gangling, ignorant on of Pepin and grandson of Charles Martel, from the first awakening of his inuisitive spirit to the culmination, when ope Leo III placed the Imperial crown pon the head of the man who tried, and most succeeded, in making a dream come ue—the dream of a Christian world liv-ng in peace.

All this and more Mr. Lamb unfolds in is usual entertaining style. Sugar-coated istory it is, if you will, but nevertheless istory and romance baked to a turn in the shion all Lamb fans enjoy. It's too bad e can't get more of this sort of history.

And, for those of us who during World War II trod the face of Europe, there is added interest in recalling that where American troops went, Charlemagne had already been. Names like Aix, Prüm, Paderborn, Fulda and Fritzlar; Monte Cassino, Rome and Marseilles; Thionville, Cologne, Mainz and Worms, all take on new meaning.

TRAITOROUS HERO: The Life and Fortunes of Benedict Arnold
By William M. Wallace
Harper & Brothers, 1954
394 Pages; Index; $5.00

Reviewed by
ORVILLE C. SHIREY

Benedict Arnold remains America's most notorious traitor. But we have concentrated so much on Arnold the traitor that we have forgotten his military accomplishments.

Mr. Wallace has given us a sharply written, soundly researched study of one of the most fascinating scoundrels in American history and has done much to resolve the apparent contradiction between Arnold the hero and Arnold the traitor. Interestingly enough, Arnold is an extreme example of the officer who is a brilliant battle leader but lacks the depth of character and moral toughness to withstand the boredom and routine—and often the discouragement—of military life out of combat. Mr. Wallace gives no possible solution to the problem—and there may very well be no solution to it—but *Traitorous Hero* provides endless possibilities for speculation on the subject.

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a current check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 56 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS. Compiled by Benn Pitman, with an introduction by Philip Van Doren Stern. Funk and Wagnalls, 1954. 422 Pages; Illustrated; $7.50. A facsimile edition of the original Pitman report of the trial which has been out of print for nearly seventy-five years.

FROM FLINTLOCK TO M1. By Joseph W. Shields, Jr. Coward-McCann, Inc., 1954. 220 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $7.50. Text and illustrations of the development of the rifle in America.

CHALLENGE IN EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by C. E. Black. Rutgers University Press, 1954. 276 Pages; Index; $4.00. Expert personal knowledge of seven Iron Curtain countries.

THE CHISHOLM TRAIL. By Wayne Gard. The University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. 296 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.50. A stirring history of the cattle route to Abilene.

DECISION IN KOREA: An Authentic History of the Korean War. By Rutherford M. Poats. The McBride Company, 1954. 340 Pages; Index; $4.75. One of the first one-volume histories of the war in Korea, written from the eyewitness vantage of a United Press correspondent. The author served in the Infantry during World War II.

EUROPE: A JOURNEY WITH PICTURES. By Anne Fremantle and Bryan Holme. The Studio Publications, Inc., in association with Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1954. 248 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $7.50. Heavily illustrated; a combination of travel, history, quotations, unusual sidelights and fascinating stories. It is not a travel book but a book which those who have traveled in Europe would be proud to place in their libraries.

THE FINAL SECRET OF PEARL HARBOR. By Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald, USN, ret. The Devin-Adair Company, 1954. 202 Pages; $3.50.

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDOCHINA. By Ellen J. Hammer. Stanford University Press, 1954. 370 Pages; Index; Maps; $5.00. An analytical history leading to the present situation. The author's prescription for solution to the problem is Viet Nam's independence and a non-Communistic leadership.

THE HEART OF AFRICA. By Alexander Campbell. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1954. 495 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. A survey of a troublesome continent by a *Life-Time* correspondent, including much information on the Mau Maus.

INSIDE LINCOLN'S CABINET: The Civil War Diaries of Salmon P. Chase. Edited by David Donald. Longmans, Green & Co., Inc., 1954. 342 Pages; Index; $6.50. The collected diaries of Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury, of whom the war-time President said "Chase is about one and one-half times bigger than any other man that I ever knew."

JOURNEY WITHOUT END. By Manes Sperber. Doubleday & Company, 1954. 317 Pages; $3.75. A novel about the guerrilla fighting in Yugoslavia and Poland during World War II.

LAUGHTER IN HELL. By Stephen Marek. The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1954. 256 Pages; Illustrated; $5.00. The experiences as POWs of the Japanese of a Navy lieutenant and a Marine sergeant. Grim but with characteristic American humor.

PHYSICAL METEOROLOGY. By John C. Johnson. The Technology Press and John Wiley & Sons, 1954. 393 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $7.50.

THE ROAD TO SECRETARIAL SUCCESS. By Irene Place and Madeline S. Strony. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954. 371 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.95.

ROCKET PROPULSION. By Eric Burgess. The Macmillan Company, 1954. 235 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.50. A British text republished in this country containing basic theories, possibilities and difficulties.

THE SEVEN MEN OF SPANDAU. By Jack Fishman. Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1954. 276 Pages; Illustrated; $3.50. A report on Doenitz, Hess, Von Schirach, Funk, Raeder, Speer and Von Neurath, with special attention to Doenitz and Hess who, the author feels, may some day lead new Nazi-like movements.

THE BLACK KNIGHTS OF WEST POINT. By James S. Edson. Bradbury, Sayles, O'Neill Co., Inc., 1954. 263 Pages; Illustrated. A history of football at the Academy from 1890 to 1953 covering every game played and with statistical data.

THIS NEW WORLD: THE CIVILIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA. By William Lytle Schurz. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1954. 435 Pages; Maps; Index; $6.00. An up-to-date summary of the place of the twenty Latin-American republics in the world today. A "must" for prospective military attachés and members of missions.

TYPHOON IN TOKYO. By Harry Emerson Wildes. The Macmillan Company, 1954. 356 Pages; Index; $4.50. A history and assessment of our occupation of Japan. Portions do not make pleasant reading for Americans.

U. S. GRANT AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY TRADITION. By Bruce Catton; edited by Oscar Handlin. Little, Brown & Company, 1954. 201 Pages; Index; $3.00. The first in the new Library of American Philosophy series. A short book mainly analytical in concept. "The subject of these biographies is thus not the complete man or the complete society, but the points at which the two interact."

WHERE TO EAT IN EUROPE. By Arthur and Evelyn Pastore. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954. 269 Pages; $3.50. A guide to over 1,000 selected restaurants in all the European countries this side of the Iron Curtain.

THE YAZOO. By Frank E. Smith; Illustrated by Janet E. Turner. Rinehart & Company, 1954. 362 Pages; Index; $4.00.

Selected Books For Military Readers

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
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
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M. B. RIDGWAY
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UNITED STATES ARMY

COMBAT FORCES Journal

Vol. 4, No. 12 July 1954

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ONE of the prime qualities of a good editorial staff is the power to visualize a future issue of the magazine in terms of raw, unedited copy, deadline and issue dates, and a limiting budget.

Those who read the JOURNAL critically will understand that your publication strives to present its material in an attractive form. A look at the masthead will reveal the absence of an Art Editor; this is one more detail handled by the editor himself.

All of this preamble is by way of telling you that Gil Walker, one of our more frequent illustrators, recently received a Medal for Distinctive Merit at the Washington Art Directors' Show—and the medal was awarded for the illustrations accompanying "And They Marched, Every One," by Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Randle, which appeared in our issue of September, 1953.

Finding competent military illustrators is a difficult chore; so many good artists know so little about the military that Sam Browne belts are likely to appear in illustrations that purport to illuminate happenings in late World War II. Gil Walker is a former soldier who also worked as a civilian artist for the Office of Public Information, Department of the Army. He has the happy combination of artistic talent and military know-how. More of his work appears in this issue with Colonel Rigg's piece on how to defeat Red armor.

A couple of other artists who do good work for us are George Warfel, who served in the Army Air Forces during World War II, and Stuart Freeman, now a free-lancer but formerly an artist in the Department of State. Neither has won a prize in the last few months that we know of, but both of them turn out prize-winning work for us right along.

Gil Walker won the medal—but the staff visualized General Randle's fine piece as one that was especially suited to Mr. Walker's talents. That's part of the teamwork that brings you a fresh, readable, informative JOURNAL each month.

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AT HOME AND ABROAD

Around the Bases: Berlin *Maj. Marco Polo*

DEPARTMENTS

The Month's Mail 4
Front and Center 9
The Month's Reading
The Word from the Schools
The Month's Books 49

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OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Association shall be to encourage and foster for all elements, branches, and components of the Army of the United States, and for such veterans' and unit organizations as may be appropriate:

The dissemination of information relating to history, activities, problems and plans.

The exchange of ideas on and discussion of military matters.

The perpetuation of those Army and unit traditions that contribute to *esprit de corps* and superior performance of duty.

The cultivation of cordial relations among the several armed services and with the public.

The promotion, attainment, and preservation of high professional standards.

INSTRUMENTALITIES

The primary instrumentality for the carrying out of the purposes and the attainment of the objectives of the Association shall be the publication of its magazine, COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. The secondary instrumentalities of the Association for the carrying out of its purposes and the attainment of its objectives shall be the preparation, publication, and distribution of military books, and the performance of related activities in fact contributing to the Association's stated aims.

Adopted 14 December 1953 by the Executive Council.

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The Month's Mail

Thanks

To the Editors:

Your March issue is certainly full of thought. In particular, th Baldwin-Norman-Millis series is very provocative.

One thing about being in Korea—we gobble up all such mag zines that we can get.

COL. JOHN D. BYRNE.

24th Division Artillery
APO 24, San Francisco, Calif.

Inaccurate Rifles

To the Editors:

I was pleased to read Captain Straight Shooter's article on i accurate rifles and worn muzzles [May issue]. But I was certain greatly surprised to read the reply from the Ordnance Corp I thought everyone realized that a worn muzzle would lead inaccurate shooting.

A rifle will shoot fairly well even though the barrel is bad worn, providing that the last several inches at the muzzle er are still in good condition. It is common practice in all gun sho to cut several inches from the end of a barrel that has a wo muzzle, and recrown it.

The gas pressure in the barrel of a .30-06, at the time th the bullet leaves, is about 7000 pounds per square inch. Whe the muzzle of the rifle is square and true and crowned properl this great burst of gas will escape uniformly around the base of th bullet just as the bullet clears the muzzle, and thus the bullet wi fly straight upon its course. Now if a person forms the habit holding in the same general manner each time he cleans it th muzzle will be worn unevenly as well as oversize. Then, whe fired, and just as the bullet is about to leave the muzzle, this gre pressure of gas pushes past the bullet on the worn side of th muzzle, exerting an uneven pressure upon the base of the bull as it leaves and causing the bullet to fly off at a slight angle.

If a rifle has a good barrel, properly bedded and tightly breeche and everything is uniform from shot to shot, then that rifle wi shoot accurately. In fact, if these items are uniform from shot t shot, you may even cut the muzzle of the rifle off at an angle an the group of bullets will continue to stay small.

However, with factory ammunition everything is not unifor from shot to shot. The weight of both the bullet and the powd charge may vary several grains, the intensity of the primer flas will not be the same each shot, and each cartridge case will n fit the chamber the same or have the same interior capacity. Th the pressure, pushing the bullet up the barrel, will also vary, an as it bursts out from the worn, no longer concentric muzzle, wi tip the bullet a different amount each time, causing inaccurac

I, of course, agree with the Ordnance Corps when they sa that such rifle deficiencies as metal fouling in the bore, in proper bedding of the stock, bent barrels, pitted bores, etc., wi cause inaccuracy but someone is sure missing the boat when the make a statement such as, "these investigations failed to estab lish a correlation between eccentric muzzle wear and inacc racy."

LEIGHTON L. BAKER.

The A. W. Peterson Gun Shop
Mount Dora, Fla.

To the Editors:

Inaccurate rifles surely do make inaccurate shooters. I am n sure what the Ordnance answer means by "accuracy" in its expl nation, but many smart people have made a lot of tests whic prove that worn muzzles certainly don't help accuracy.

However, other factors enter into the case. When an M1 ha a worn muzzle, it may also need a few other attentions, such a melting down for scrap iron. The 37th Division was issued a fin line of clunkers when it was federalized. Many defects were o the order that recruits could detect them with the naked ey

Busted gas cylinder locks, self-adjusting sights, wobbly piston surfaces, worn cylinders, and what have you. They averaged out as accurate as a *Pravda* travelogue about the U.S.A.

I cannot go along with Straight Shooter's idea about the thong. If a cleaning chain of the German type is used, OK, but why use that worthless piece of cheap string which so often busts in the center of the bore? A rod is necessary to ram out obstructions. Attachment of a rod section to each rifle, as almost every other nation does, would take care of that. The issue thong is inexpensive but has no other virtues.

One item that the best rifle can't fix is that we are blessed with large amounts of war production mild steel jacketed ammo. The early lots of this were made without change from the specs of the gilding metal jacketed rounds, and as a result, "issued from the bore unchanged," as an *American Rifleman* contributor who helped make them once wrote. I recently fired a couple of groups with some 1941 Western issue M2 ball, and with 1943 St. Louis M2 with steel jacket. The wide shots came from the 1943 stuff, the 1941 ammo went into the V ring at 100 yards. I am a reasonably good shot. At 300 yards I would have been able to keep the 1943 stuff on the target frame only. Until we get rid of this old stuff each John could draw a National Match rifle and he still couldn't coup inside a gymnasium.

JOHN P. CONLON.

2 Columbia Street
Newark, Ohio

RO Replies

o the Editors:

. The letter by Lt. Col. Douglas Lindsey May issue] referred to our work ["The uman Price of Combat"—March issue] as he poorest example . . . of front line research in Korea . . . I know of."

His position as Chief of Operations, edical Section, Eighth Army, should ve permitted him to become acquainted ith all of the facts concerning the work the stress research team in Korea. He as most helpful in solving the myriad oblems that faced the team when it first rived. Nevertheless, it is clear from his ter that he is not in possession of the rtinent facts concerning the actual work the team.

The statement in his letter that we were any miles behind the front" in a "conete-floor, running water laboratory" imes that we were therefore unable to our job—to record responses to stress. should be pointed out that the concreteor laboratory was erected at the 8063 ASH at *Colonel Lindsey's* suggestion. ne reasons were: (1) the availability of terial assistance, (2) the housing of our AVE officers, and, (3) Colonel Lindsey's sire to have a concrete-floor tropical shell ailable for the Medical Section's neurogical team upon our departure. We had ginally asked for two squad tents erected at a site to which we could transport samples of blood and urine rapidly enough to prevent spoilage. Actually, some of the analyses (in samples not subject to deterioration) were performed in Tokyo, in California, and in Massachusetts. The significance or validity of our analyses of these samples is in no way dependent upon the danger to which the analysts might incidentally be exposed.

Colonel Lindsey's implication is emphasized further by the statement "a few of the members of the team ventured up to stable positions and did a little work on patrols. . . . When fighting broke out and real stress was present, the team was in Japan . . ." The scientists on the team did not go to Korea to assist in the combat there, but rather to determine what happens to men physiologically and psychologically as a result of having been in combat. The original plan for our work in Korea was to study patrols. There were two reasons for this: (1) That was about the only activity taking place when our plans were made, and (2) since patrols varied in severity of action, it would provide a convenient scale of degree of stress. As it turned out, however, we were able to take measures on groups of men from two companies involved in Operation Showdown. This was the action in which the 7th Division took and held the Triangle Ridge area with the help of the ROKs on their right flank. We measured 24 men from Able Company of one of the regiments in the division. This company led the initial attack. It took 70 per cent casualties in the 18 hours it was engaged; only 5 of our original 24 men were not casualties. We increased the number of subjects to 20 by adding 15 men from the 60 remaining in the company. The company commander (one of our subjects) was recently awarded the Medal of Honor for his performance in this battle. Data such as we obtained from this company could *not* have been "obtained by studying a college ball team." The physiological changes measured have never been incurred from laboratory-induced stresses (including experiments on college ball teams). An authority in the field has declared: "These findings suggest an acute adrenal exhaustion in these subjects, which has never been demonstrated before in man."

The other stress group studied was a sample from George Company, of another regiment of the division which moved into positions on Pike's Peak after it had been taken in the first two days of fighting. It was on the hill five days, withstood three counterattacks, and almost continuous artillery fire. It suffered 10 per cent casualties in the five-day period. The third group studied was comprised of men from 3d

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
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Division occupying positions on the MLR, near White Horse. It provided our control data. In addition, we obtained measures on a few psychiatric casualties. Contrary to Colonel Lindsey's letter, the team returned to Japan *after* the Triangle Hill action had subsided, and *not* before.


Colonel Lindsey states that the work of the team was "superficial, uncoordinated, and unproductive." In answer, I would like to quote from three evaluations of our preliminary report (ORO-T-41 [FEC]), prepared by the Office of the Surgeon General, FEC:

(1) "A study of the physiological and psychological aspects of combat stress in the infantryman is considered a most appropriate and worthwhile project. The concept of this problem appears to have been well developed. The plan of attack was obviously well organized. The method used in carrying out this plan appears to be in line with the most up-to-date medical thinking."

(2) "The conclusions and recommendations are concurred in. It is considered this study is a very worthwhile application of scientific principles and techniques to the combat situation."

(3) "This particular research team is to be congratulated on getting out a report very expeditiously. This office was impressed by the high caliber of the members of the team and their thoroughly businesslike approach." It does not appear that there is universal feeling that the stress team was a "superficial, uncoordinated, and unproductive outfit."

Colonel Lindsey seems to have confused an overly popularized science article with the serious efforts of a competent research team and its reports. Certainly they cannot intelligently be classified as "claptrap 'science' stuff."



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It is regrettable that Colonel Lind saw fit to criticize the efforts of the te so harshly . . .

STANLEY W. DAVIS.
Operations Analyst
Operations Research Office
The Johns Hopkins University
Chevy Chase, Md.

Sell Education, Too

To the Editors:

Congratulations to Major Harry Morse on his letter, "Sell 'em Hard" [M issue].

I am the Professor of Military Scier and Tactics at the Joliet Township Hi School, Joliet, Ill., an organization anyc would be well proud of.

The ROTC program here, in additi to teaching the cadets the instruction quired by the Army Training Program, l such organizations as: Officers' Club, NC Club, Rifle Team, Crack Drill Team, a so forth. Also, we sponsor every drive the needy put on by the institution. V get a terrific amount of publicity in newspapers which keeps us always in t public eye, and the school faculty is l hind the ROTC program 100 per cent.

Our idea as to how to sell the Arm Services to these young men is similar Major Morse's, but one very importa thing must not be forgotten, especially high school: *education*. The cadets shou be indoctrinated with the importance education constantly, as well as selling t Army. All students should be encourag to continue their education, by either g ing to college or after entering the servi taking certain courses through the edu tion program offered by services.

CAPT. WALTER W. MCCREARY.
PMST, Joliet Township High School.
Joliet, Ill.

Applicant

AN AIR FORCE REGULAR CAPTAIN (TE PORARY MAJOR IN JUNE), AGE 35, HEAL EXCELLENT, GROUND OFFICER (GLASSE WHO CAN QUOTE S. L. A. MARSHALL, TRU COTT, AND GAVIN, WHO LIKES TO CO MAND, BUT NOT BEING A PILOT IS FOREV RELEGATED TO COMMAND NON-TACTIC UNITS IN THE USAF HAS TOYED WI RESIGNING HIS COMMISSION TO BECOM A RACE TRACK TOUT TO GET OUTDO WORK, BUT THINKS THE GROUND FIGHT WILL ALWAYS BE NEEDED, PERHAPS SO AGAIN, WANTS TO KNOW IF HE COU TRANSFER TO U. S. ARMY AS CAPTAIN GAIN COMPANY EXPERIENCE) IN COMB INFANTRY OR ARMORED UNIT.

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The Army Does "Catch 'em Young—and Sell 'em Hard"

At Fort Eustis, Boy and Girl Scouts from Philadelphia and Fort Eustis embark on the BARC for a James River voyage *(see letter below)*. And at Fort Belvoir, the Engineers, in the person of Sergeant First Class Martin A. Sorrel, "sell" a couple of young Alexandrians by showing them how to operate the controls of an Army bulldozer.

BEING CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY AT PRESENT AS ARMY OVER-STRENGTH IN CAPTAINS. YOU WILL BE NEEDED ONE OF THESE DAYS SO RECOMMEND YOU KEEP YOUR BLUE SUIT ON. RACE TRACK TOUTS ARE LESS WELL DRESSED.

THE EDITORS.

BARC Riders

To the Editors:

"Catch 'em Young—and Sell 'em Hard" in the March issue posed the query "Who, besides soldiers, have ridden in the BARC?"

We here at Fort Eustis have an answer to the specific question, although in all honesty, I must admit that your article stimulated a specific reply.

On 16 April thirty-four Boy Scouts from Philadelphia Troop 241, accompanied by an equal number of Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts from Fort Eustis, Troops 45 and 49 respectively, were taken on a James River voyage aboard the BARC *(see cut)*. The trip, a part of our continuing program to orient our citizens on the work of the Army with particular emphasis on the Transportation Corps, lasted over one hour. The visit of the Scouts was our own idea but, based on your dig, however, we made a special effort to give the Scouts a ride in the BARC.

In addition to "catching 'em young," we feel confident we sold these youngsters Hard. During the time they were our guests they slept three nights in one of our new barracks and ate "chow" in a field mess.

The troop toured Colonial Williamsburg and spent a half-day at Langley Air Force Base. On their last full day here, they were shown the operating intricacies of steam and diesel locomotives and the repair shops of the Fort Eustis rail system. Army helicopters and planes were demonstrated and explained to the group. The scouts were shown through ocean-going vessels and harbor craft belonging to the Army, and a deep-sea diving exhibition by Fort Eustis soldiers was witnessed by them.

When Philadelphia's Boy Scout Troop 241 left Fort Eustis in their chartered bus, they were tired, happy, knew a great deal more about the Army and expressed enthusiasm for an action-packed two days.

And they had ridden on the BARC.

BRIG. GEN. F. S. BESSON, JR.
Commanding General
Transportation Training Command
Fort Eustis, Va.

● We're lucky! Not only can we reproduce the photo General Besson sent us, but another one, from Fort Belvoir, showing that it also can "catch 'em young—and sell 'em hard." The Editors are now convinced, not only that the editorial note in the March issue was less well informed than it might have been, but that our readers are quick to catch us in such lapses!

Bunker Bombs

To the Editors:

This is in reference to comment by Sgt. Robert M. Lauth in the May issue.

The M1 ammo tin container was used in the construction of the bunker bomb as well as caliber .50 and .30 ammo boxes. The 1st Marine Division used the No. 10 can for the same purpose by punching a hole in the middle of the lid that had been removed, inserting the white phosphorus grenade, and then soldering this assembly onto the can body. Napalm was introduced by a separate hole. The round can was extremely adaptable to rolling into enemy bunkers or for rolling down the slopes from friendly positions onto attacking enemy troops. However, when it came to producing a large number of bunker bombs, it was found that the caliber .30 preferably, or caliber .50 ammo box were available in larger numbers and were more easily adapted to the purpose.

Reference Sgt. Lauth's second point: He is correct again. However, this was corrected, that is, the WP grenade was moved and fastened to the top lid so that the infantryman could carry and keep his hand on the safety lever of the grenade. This method proved to be preferred and did add a measure of control and safety to the user.

Another use of the bunker bomb was to place it in front of friendly positions with trip wires attached. The enemy in approaching would trip off the charge which caused casualties or created a back-lighting effect which at night allowed more effective use of infantry direct fire weapons. The bunker bomb was also valuable behind the enemy lines if placed for trip wire effect on roads.

LT. COL. WALTER L. MILLER, JR.
730 Conowingo Rd.
Bel Air, Md.


37th Division History

To the Editors:

Next-of-kin of 37th Division veterans of World War II may obtain a history of the famous division in which their loved ones served if they send their name, address, relationship, and also the name and outfit of the man to our address. The history will be sent with the compliments of the 37th Division Veterans Association.

FRANK WALKER.
37th Division Veterans Association
5620 Brinsted Ave.
Dayton 9, Ohio

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Front And Center

The high cost of helicopter maintenance has the Army worried. How costly maintenance is was stressed recently by Colonel William B. Bunker, Assistant Chief of Transportation for Army Aviation. He said that the original cost of an Army helicopter has to be duplicated in three and one-half years to buy spare parts for it. This, he observed, is a pretty high price to pay for a replacement for an Army truck that can be driven for twenty years without spending the equivalent of its original cost for parts. Today's "helicopters are being equipped, manned, and, we hope, designed to operate 100 hours a month," he said. Yet "A truck which this thing is supposed to replace, can . . . run 100 hours a week." Observing that engineers are speaking of building bigger and more high performance aircraft, Colonel Bunker warned them that "dependability, availability and economy must be undertaken today, in this era, or there will be no point at all in designing larger and more high performing, better aircraft, that nobody can afford to operate."

✓ ✓ ✓

It is quite evident that cynical Washingtonians and the ubiquitous tourists still love a parade. Thirty-five hundred persons showed up at Fort Myer, across the Potomac from Washington, on the first Sunday—23 May—of the renewal of the pre-war tradition of a parade during retreat. On the second Sunday an estimated 7,000 jammed the post to watch the 3d Infantry and to hear the Army Band.

✓ ✓ ✓

Some pre- and post-Korea Rangers (who are also paratroopers) don't like the new requirement that all new Regular Army second lieutenants of Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Corps of Engineers and Signal Corps now must complete either the Ranger or the Airborne course. Their objection is that Rangers and paratroopers have always been volunteers and this fact was largely responsible for the high *esprit* of Rangers and 'troopers. The proudest of them say that they think the mandatory requirement may not only destroy the high spirits of the breed, but may also result in a gradual lowering of the quality of the training.

✓ ✓ ✓

If we may utter a platitude, the purpose of a re-enlistment allowance is to encourage a soldier to re-enlist. That obviously is the purpose of the present effort to raise the re-up allowances. If he does a little figuring the soldier who remembers the pre-World War II Army may wonder about the degree of encouragement. The proposed bonus isn't as large percentagewise as his increase in base pay (about 90 percent), or the high cost of living, since the 1930s. In those days noncoms in the first three grades drew a re-enlistment allowance of $50 for each year served and other enlisted grades drew $25. Assuming a soldier in those days was a corporal or sergeant at the end of his first three-year hitch (the normal period then) he would draw a bonus of $75 upon re-enlistment. If during the next three years he got into the first three grades and stayed in them for the rest of his career he would be paid a bonus of $150 each time he re-enlisted after a three-year hitch. There would be eight of these periods in a thirty-year career for a total of $1,200 which added to the $75 would give him a total of $1,275. If the re-up bonus today was 90 per cent greater than it was in the 1930s, a soldier with a similar record would stand to receive about $2,400 during a thirty-year career. But the new proposal would limit him to about $1,800.

✓ ✓ ✓

The Army expects to have a pretty full schedule of field exercises in fiscal '55. Present plans, subject to change, call for these ten exercises:

Green Hill, Camp Carson, Colo., Sept.-Oct., 8th Inf. Div.

Hail Storm, Camp Carson, Colo., Jan.-Mar., 10th Inf. Div.

Snow Bird, Alaska, Jan.-Feb., RCT from 11th A/B Div.

Surf Board, West Coast, Feb.-Mar., RCT from 44th Inf. Div.

Blue Bolt I, Fort Hood, Tex., March, III Corps and others.

Fire Ball, Fort Bragg, N. C., April, XVIII A/B Corps and others.

High Tide, Little Creek, Va., May, 47th Inf. Div.

Blue Bolt II, Fort Hood, Tex., May, armored units.

Apple Jack, Yakima, Wash., May, 44th Inf. Div.

Jungle Jim, Panama, May-June, Units from 11th A/B Div. and others.

✓ ✓ ✓

The striking difference between the household shipping allowances of military and Foreign Service officers shows the inequity in the present limitations. For example, a general officer of the Army with large official responsibilities is limited to 9,000 pounds of household goods when he makes an official change of station, while a young $4,000-a-year Foreign Service officer has an allowance of 10,000 pounds.

REUNIONS

The information listed here was furnished by officers of the various associations. For further information we suggest you write directly to the organization in which you are interested.

30th Infantry Division. DeSoto Hotel, Savannah, Ga. 1-3 July. For details write: Box 1919, Savannah, Ga.

25th Infantry Division, Fifth Annual Reunion. Hotel Sherman, Chicago, Ill. 2-4 July. For details write: Lt. Col. G. W. Master, Secretary, PO Box 101, Arlington 1, Va.

94th Infantry Division. Hotel Sheraton Gibson, Cincinnati, Ohio. 8-11 July. For details write: Francis P. Burke, First National Bank Building, Covington, Ky.

9th Infantry Division. Hotel New Yorker, New York, N. Y. 29-31 July. For details write: Stanley Cohen, National Secretary, Box 428, Jersey City, N. J.

484th Engineer Construction Battalion. VFW Home, York Pa. 30-31 July. For details write: Harry Becker, R.F.D. 8, York, Pa.

4th Infantry Division. Hotel Alexandria, Los Angeles, Calif. 5-8 August. For details write: Lewis W. Smith, Reunion Chairman, 4517 Marmion Way, Los Angeles 65, Calif.

1st Infantry Division. Hotel Statler, Washington, D. C. 20-22 August. For details write: Society of the First Division, 5309 Germantown Ave., Philadelphia 44, Pa.

7th Armored Division. Statler Hotel, Detroit, Mich. 27-29 August. For details write: Reunion Comm., 7th Armd. Div. Assoc., c/o Hotel Statler, Detroit, Mich.

37th Infantry Division. Morrison Hotel, Chicago, Ill. 4-6 September. For details write: Jack R. McGuire, 1101 Wyandotte Building, 21 West Broad St., Columbus 15, Ohio.

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Out of its vast reservoir of battle experience the Army must develop combat organization and doctrines for a

Time of Atomic *Plenty*

LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. A. DE WEERD

T is almost nine years since the atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki announced an impending revolution in war ıethods. It was clear from the start that this was no ordiary development. The atomic bomb, as Captain Cyril Falls bserved, was a virtually "complete" weapon when it arrived. our years later, Major General James M. Gavin wrote: "if n H-bomb is developed and A-bombs become available for ıctical employment, we should realize *now* that this will ıdically revolutionize land warfare." Gordon Dean of the tomic Energy Commission pointed out in 1951 that "our ındamental concepts of what atomic warfare is and what it ıight mean to us must undergo revolutionary change." peaking before the Assembly of the United Nations on December 1953, President Eisenhower said that "the ınited States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, ıcreases daily, exceeds by many times the explosive equivant of the total of all the bombs and all the shells that came om every plane and every gun in every theater of war ırough all the years of World War II." He added that "in ze and variety the development of atomic weapons has been o less remarkable."

For better or for worse the Air Force developed a weapons system and doctrine for the employment of atomic weapons in strategic air war in the years after 1945. This was no mystery; its pros and cons were debated with conspicuous frankness in the B-36 and the MacArthur hearings. We have had no such detailed revelation of the reaction of the Army to the "revolution" which seemed to have been pending in its organization, equipment, and doctrine since 1945.

I do not mean to imply that the Defense Department has been slow to concern itself with the problems of atomic weapons and ground warfare. We have abundant grounds for assurance that it has been about its business with promptness and energy. The results of its work are not always visible, for it is not in the national interest that all aspects of our weapons systems and strategies be discussed in unclassified publications. But there is an area in the field of doctrine and organization in which no amount of free discussion can benefit the enemy. It is in this field that we cannot rely entirely on the operations analyst and scientist, valuable as their contributions may be. There is a tremendous reservoir of practical experience in the officer corps of the Army. These men have a great deal to contribute, for sound doctrine and organization can be achieved only

LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. A. DEWEERD, *USAR (inactive) is a member of the staff of the Rand Corporation. A former associate editor of* Infantry Journal, *Colonel DeWeerd has been an occasional contributor to this magazine for 25 years. He is the author of* Great Soldiers of World War I, Great Soldiers of World War II, *and other books including the co-authorship of* World War II: A Concise History. *Before going to the Rand Corporation he was Professor of History at the University of Missouri. He was educated in Michigan and also studied at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, N. J.*

through the give and take of open discussion between men with different experiences and skills. It is the purpose of this article to stimulate this kind of discussion.

IN an article in the February issue of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, remarkable for its clarity and insight, Lloyd Norman called attention to the dangers and weaknesses of a national policy which emphasizes air atomic power at the expense of ground and sea forces. Some readers may feel that he should have gone farther in stressing the implications which the "massive retaliation" policy may have in the day when the Soviet Union has relatively equal air atomic capability. But it is not enough merely to set forth the perils of present trends without systematically considering alternative strategies and policies and without offering some idea of the weapons systems which are to implement them. One must do more than warn against concluding that "ground fighting is now outmoded" or that "machines can never really replace men on the battlefield." Sooner or later one must deal with the 64-dollar question: *What preparations have been and are being made to prepare the ground forces for employment in the day of atomic plenty?*

Mr. Norman's article gives his opinion of the timetable involved. He writes that in 1950, five years after Hiroshima, "Army planners realized that atomic weapons and guided missiles would change the nature of future warfare." Then, later in his article, he suggests that it may be 1958 or 1960 "before the atomic-age infantry will appear." In other words a fifteen-year delay may have to be envisaged between the advent of atomic weapons and the appearance of atomic-age infantry. If this is to be the case, when may we expect to have a doctrine for the effective employment of these forces and atomic weapons in ground operations?

In the March issue of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, Walter Millis questions the wisdom of basing national policies and strategy primarily on atomic weapons. He warns that they cannot be considered as fully "conventional" ground weapons until we can reduce the artillery, armor and infantry components which heretofore provided the main sources of fire, shock and staying power. He questions the wisdom of hurrying atomic weapons into tactical use by suggesting that in a period of Soviet inferiority in *numbers* of atomic weapons, their use by our side in the ground defense of Western Europe or some other vital area, may force the Soviet Union to reply by expending their smaller stockpile on American cities. Thus he fears that an attempt to confine atomic weapons to the battlefield may merely insure bringing them onto our cities. By stressing the belief that in an atomic war that saw the use of both air and ground forces, we might need more, not fewer soldiers, Mr. Millis sees a confirmation of the value to the Soviet state of its advantage in manpower numbers.

Mr. Millis's thought-provoking article forces these questions: Unless it is able to employ an atomic ground capability against a Soviet invasion by conventional or atomic ground forces, especially at a time when the Soviet Union holds over the heads of Europe and America the blackmail threat of atomic attacks on our cities, how is the West to defend itself?

If the American capability for waging strategic air war with atomic weapons has exerted a powerful deterrent effect on the Soviet Union, may we not assume that a ground atomic capability would add to this deterrence?

Atomic weapons, like the airplane and the weather, are here to stay. If we do not develop a ground atomic capability, we run the risk that in time the Soviet Union may do so. If we judge by their ideology, objectives, and past methods, this application of atomic energy to war purposes would be "doing what comes naturally." In the face of this development, of what use would mere numbers of soldiers and conventional weapons be?

AFTER the advent of atomic weapons, one should have anticipated that our military press would be full of articles exploring the implications of this development. This has hardly been the case. Perhaps the Korean war, with its exclusive use of conventional weapons, has diverted attention away from the tactical employment of atomic weapons, and so added several years to the time lag involved in the transfer to advanced weapons. If that is the case, it may turn out to be the greatest gain the Communists will draw from the Korean war. Be that as it may, the fact remains that comparatively few articles have been written by military men on the tactical employment of atomic weapons. Why is this? Why have Army officers in particular been slow to make their views and opinions known?

As Professor I. B. Holley, Jr. h written:

> Even the most cursory survey of military history substantiates the premise that superior weapons give their users an advantage favoring victory. A somewhat closer study of military history shows that new and more effective weapons have generally been adopted slowly in spite of their obvious advantages. Since the character of modern weapons is such that their production as well as their use can dislocate whole economies, it is probably not too much to suggest that the survival of entire cultures may hinge upon an ability to perfect superior weapons and exploit them fully.

In order for a weapon to attain i maximum effectiveness military leade must recognize its capabilities and pote tialities, forces must be adapted to er ploy it, and a doctrine must be develope regarding its use. It would appear th although we have or will have atom weapons for tactical employment, w lack forces adapted to their use and doctrine covering their use. Here where the active participation of a soldiers is needed.

There are many understandable re sons why soldiers have been reluctar to "go out on a limb" with forecasts how atomic weapons will be used in ta tical operations. Since no one *know* what war will actually be like und these conditions, the soldier runs a ce tain amount of risk that his views ma look bad in retrospect. In earlier days or could offer official secrecy about atom weapons as an excuse for inaction, bu that is hardly possible now. Enoug literature is available and unclassified get at the essentials. To judge by th statements of President Eisenhower an Gordon Dean, the day of atomic plent is dawning if not already here. Ther fore no officer can at present preten that he does not have enough "facts" o hand to begin a study of the effects atomic weapons on ground force oper tions.

THE few books and articles written b ground force officers on this subject i the period from 1945-1954 show that th authors have assumed that very fe atomic weapons would be available fc tactical operations after the requirement of strategic air operations were met. Thi may have encouraged soldiers to loo upon atomic weapons as just another lim ited addition to an already large arsena

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at their disposal—and not as a weapon which might itself revolutionize ground warfare. It may account for what on the surface appears to be an effort to fit atomic weapons into existing ground force organization and doctrine with a minimum dislocation. This is the traditional way of armed forces with new weapons and accounts at least in part for the astonishing time lag which has accompanied the exploitation of new weapons in the past.

In the period of transition from high explosives to atomic weapons, there is a great danger these new weapons will be farmed out to existing organizations with the public assuming that this constitutes preparing for atomic war. One suspects the emergence of a strange hermaphrodite creature, half HE and half atomic, having all the limitations of the former with only half the potentiality of the latter.

Rather than trying to save as much as possible of existing institutions and organizations, it may be helpful for ground force officers to hammer out some kind of hard and detailed answers to questions of the following kind:

(1) How can targets be found and attacked with atomic weapons by ground force organizations with the minimum delay?

(2) What is the most advantageous size for a self-contained combat unit which can utilize atomic weapons in a ground campaign?

(3) What kind of specialized training will be required and what kind of command structure can control the operation of many of these units when widely dispersed or in rapid movement?

THE limitations of a less drastic approach to the problem are illustrated in *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat,* written by Colonels G. C. Reinhardt and W. R. Kintner. While these officers deserve highest praise for their pioneer effort in this field, their book suffers under the handicap of assuming that the next war will be fought by regiments, battalions, and divisions of World War II type, and that the Army may use a few atomic weapons now and then as weapons of opportunity along with conventional types. The Colonels pay some attention to the need for dispersion, concealment and mobility, but when the chips are down, they speak primarily in terms of World War II experience. In their efforts to reassure Army readers that the problems of atomic war can be mastered, the authors may have unintentionally conveyed a misleading impression of the survival possibilities under atomic attack of ground force organizations employing World War II numbers, tactics, weapons and logistics. They have also, perhaps unwittingly, helped to strengthen the existing impression that atomic weapons are and will continue to be low powered, very expensive, limited in numbers, and difficult to obtain.

The framework in which Colonels Reinhardt and Kintner foresee the application of atomic weapons to ground force operations is one in which they will be used to perform tasks which cannot be handled effectively by conventional weapons. The supply will be too limited and these weapons will be too "valuable for expenditure on area targets or blanket interdiction." Need is seen for specially-trained forces to service and deliver the weapons but our main reliance must be placed on "many divisions backed by adequate tactical air power." Then, in a rather astonishing follow-up, it is insisted that these "divisions must possess the mobility of command, and the organization and training to survive hostile atomic attacks." How is this to be achieved? Certainly not by giving our "divisions" discipline and mobility at least equal to that of the elite divisions of World War II.

Even if it were possible for an old-fashioned division to survive in the day of atomic scarcity—which is open to doubt—their use on the battlefield in the day of atomic plenty would seem to invite disaster. One can only hope that Colonels Reinhardt and Kintner will try their hands at writing a new book based on the assumption that atomic weapons will be plentiful enough in the future to fight through an entire ground campaign without relying in any important way on HE for fire and shock power. Such an effort might lead to the conclusion that an entirely new type ground combat organization is required. It might also force them to work out a basic doctrine for the employment of atomic weapons in land warfare, not as weapons of opportunity, but as the main source of shock power, not as something to exploit the power of the infantry but as something whose power the infantry might exploit. It is worth pointing out that the British Defense Ministry's *White Paper,* issued early this year, speaks of employing conventional forces to exploit atomic and advanced weapons rather than the other way around.

When anyone gets to this point in a discussion of the implications of atomic weapons for the United States, Korea and Indochina are mentioned and there is an anvil chorus of objections all ending with the refrain: we can't afford to dismantle our conventional military organizations at this stage and rely on an untried weapons system. One could list these objections—and what I think are fairly convincing counter arguments, if space were available—but all this rhetoric will not alter the fact that a great technological revolution is pushing us in the direction of advanced weapons, whether we like it or not. We must consider the advantages as well as the risks involved. As for relying on "untried weapons," it is helpful to recall Bernard Brodie's observation that "all weapons are untried" as far as atomic warfare is concerned.

THERE are reasons to believe that the introduction of atomic weapons into ground force operations will offer advantages to the United States and to our Allies. We have shown in the past a remarkable aptitude for solving the engineering and logistical problems of modern war. We should be able to produce machines which would give small, well-trained atomic ground forces a mobility and radius of action undreamed of in World War II. Such ground forces could exert a fire or shock power dwarfing that of army groups in earlier days without being burdened by vast weights of high explosives. The mobility and radius of action which could be achieved by investing this saving in weight in new machines for transporting men and supplies cross-country should be enough to revolutionize war plans. If we free ourselves from dependence on roads, movement and surprise will be restored to the battlefield. Being specialists in confusion, we should not be the ones to worry if the old familiar war of lines disappears in the interaction of widely dispersed small units. We do not have to insist on wooden and rigid controls. We can trust our people!

SINCE no one knows what form and character ground combat operations will take in the day of atomic plenty, it is highly desirable that something be done to reduce the delay involved in finding out. In the absence of knowledge and lacking the resources of the operations analyst, one must begin by resorting to speculation. This speculative ef-

fort might well be divided into two phases. In the first phase, an attempt should be made to establish the organizational requirements of a ground combat unit capable of employing atomic weapons and having in addition as many of the following capabilities as possible: (1) rapid movement across terrain; (2) air transportability, (3) maximum dispersion and radius of action; (4) operation in a flankless, frontless war; (5) expending its own atomic weapons with minimum delay on air and ground targets in its area; and (6) close cooperation with tactical air.

If all these capabilities cannot be built into a single new organization, and it is unlikely that they can, then the best compromise possible should be accepted. Once a combat unit designed exclusively for atomic operations has been devised, one can move to the second phase during which efforts should be made to play frontless and flankless campaigns in map exercises and war games in the environment of atomic plenty. If nothing else presents itself one could begin with Rommel's campaigns of November 1941 and June 1942 in the Western Desert. These exercises would show, I think, the need for a command structure which can keep track of a battle of confusion and which will allow decisions to expend atomic munitions to be made at the lowest echelon possible. They may also show that *a start on the tactical air support problem cannot be made until after the nature of the ground force atomic units and the doctrines governing their employment have been worked out.*

Army officers should not be discouraged by the magnitude of the overall problem, frightening though it may seem. Fortunately there are limited segments of the overall problem which may be handled separately. Fortunately also they are in the general areas in which the United States has shown special skill in the past. If someone could, for example, devise a target acquisition and fire control system which would give our atomic combat units the capacity to bring their shock power to bear on a target area a few minutes faster than the enemy can, that alone might decide the outcome of a future campaign —or war. Similarly the perfection of a communications system which would be twenty percent more dependable, faster than that of the enemy, and impervious to counter measures, might have the same value. There is also the field of camouflage and concealment, together with provisions for misleading the enemy as to the location of our own units.

LITTLE is to be gained by dealing with the atomic weapons problem as if it were the principal cause for inter-service rivalries. Nor is there much to be happy about in dwelling on the limitations of an air atomic strategy, unless the organization, equipment, and doctrine exist for the effective employment of atomic weapons in tactical operations on the ground. Above all it is not helpful to imply that one strategy or arm of the service somehow is convinced that men are not important in war. Sir Winston Churchill, after a lifetime of study and participation in military matters, summed up the problem when, receiving the Chesney Gold Medal from the Royal United Service Institution in July 1950, he said:

> You cannot help men who have had experience and handled matters, after ten or fifteen years of peace having rooted in their minds the strong impressions which they derived from the actual conduct of operations in the field. That is of the greatest value because, in the main, war consists of the same tunes played through the ages . . . But it is of the utmost consequence that, besides cherishing the fruits of experience, everyone's mind should be open to the ceaseless and almost baffling rapidity of the changes which science is introducing into the whole field of war, into every aspect of it . . .
>
> Above all we have this intruder—the air, which has shoved its way in and continues to push forward in all directions . . . until a lot of people begin to think that there is only one pebble on the beach. That would be going too far because I am quite sure of this, that when all modern science has been exploited and employed, and when all the worst that can be done has been done in some terrible encounter, which pray God may never occur, but if it should be so, still the life of nations will depend on the spirit, the courage of their race and of their men and women . . . [This] will be the final decider of the life of nations, whether in a civilized or a barbaric world.

SINCE nothing clarifies ideas more effectively than an attempt to set them forth in writing, it is to be hoped that a larger number of Army officers and men will express their ideas in print about the problems of ground atomic operations. That is the way that weapons, organization and doctrine have evolved in the past. As Mr. Norman correctly indicated: "the Army can offer no glittering promises in the dirty business of war," but it can speed the day when alternative atomic strategies and policies may be possible. It can do this best by analyzing the organization and doctrine of ground forces in the day of atomic plenty.

Progress Is Not Inevitable

We must adjust our military affairs to the progress of science. We must not make the error of employing the weapons of today, or of the future, under the tactics of a previous war. Obviously, the introduction of atomic and nuclear weapons is going to bring changes to land forces. Each step will take us closer and closer to the point of no return; that will call for a major political decision.

Change is inevitable. Progress is not inevitable. Progress depends on sound decisions, and then on action.

We must make a serious study of the shape of future war on land. It is little use to superimpose new weapons on World War II organizations, and then try to work out the tactical changes involved; this sort of approach to the problem is unprofitable.

Any suggestion that the introduction of atomic and thermonuclear weapons is not going to affect the organization of armies and the tactics of land warfare is nonsense. We must examine our armies, and their equipment, to see what changes are needed in an atomic age. . . .

FIELD MARSHAL VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY
24 May 1945

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Life of a Jaycock

Every man a VIP; every man an Honorary Doughboy

THANKS to the good fortune of being able to renew an old friendship with Mr. Fred Seaton, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for legislation and public affairs, the editor of this magazine was recently rewarded (no other word seems to fit) with an invitation to be a member of the eighteenth Joint Civilian Orientation Conference and spent six busy days visiting four military and naval installations in the United States, preceded by a day of high-level briefing in the Pentagon.

For the hard-working soldier who seldom gets to look in on the activities at the highest levels of the military establishment, it should, perhaps, be explained that the impressively named Joint Civilian Orientation Conference (JCOC for short and rendered "Jaycock" in the vernacular) is equally impressive so far as its host and guests are concerned. The Secretary of Defense issues the invitations to American industrial, business and professional leaders. Eighteen orientation conferences have been held since 1948 when the late James Forrestal, then Secretary of Defense, adapted a Navy program to inter-service use. Altogether about a thousand Americans have been "jaycocked" and presumably each displays in his rumpus room or office certificates attesting that he is an "Honorary Doughboy" in the Army, a "Jet Jockey" in the Air Force, an "Honorary Twirlie" in a Marine helicopter squadron, and a "Carrier Observer" in the Navy. As you can see, the benefits of membership are also impressive.

Briefly, the purpose of the JCOC is to orient civilian leaders on the problems and progress of the military establishment. It is primarily a public relations function and a good one. I have assurance of that from the President of the Public Relations Society of America who has called it "one of the most efficient public relations instruments I have ever had the opportunity to observe in action." As it happened, the gentleman who made this statement—Mr. Frederic Bowes, Jr. of Pitney-Bowes, Inc.—was a member of the eighteenth JCOC and I observed that he was one of the most active, inquisitive and perceptive of the sixty of us. I should say that his judgment was not lightly given.

TO get this report down to a working level, let me say here and now that the Army did itself proud. Fort Benning was the last stop and the Army had a job cut out for it as we were all quite full of orientation after five strenuous days: one at the Pentagon; most of one at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico (the rest of the day was spent in flying to Florida); one at the Naval Air Training Station, Pensacola; and two at the Air Force Proving Ground, Eglin AFB.

The Marines, the Navy and the Air Force were all fine hosts and each gave us something we shall long remember. But to me (and I think to most of us) Fort Benning was the most memorable visit.

THE demonstrations at Fort Benning were remarkably well conducted and impressively staged. The briefing of the operations of The Infantry School and its work load were lucid and helpful to our understanding of the mission of Fort Benning. The airborne demonstrations, the explanation of infantry weapons and company organization, and two fire-power demonstrations—infantry-tank team in attack and a fire-power demonstration of a reinforced rifle company in defense at night—were superbly organized, narrated and staged. The night show, using all tracer ammunition, was a dramatic and explosive climax to the whole conference. But to me the most useful show of all was the demonstration of types of supporting fires staged by artillery elements assigned to The Infantry School. This well presented demonstration, plus the quite extensive display of armor, engineer, signal, chemical and other equipment, made the Benning show an all-Army demonstration. It was not confined to infantry.

But the most effective part of the Fort Benning performance was infantry and rightly so. Wherever we were at Benning we were not far away from a reminder that in the final analysis wars are won by men who are physically and mentally trained, disciplined and ready to lead Americans into ground combat under the Benning precept of "Follow Me." Whether it was at the official dinner where there was a deeply touching (but too long) tribute to the infantryman, at the OCS where many of the businessmen among us were greatly impressed by the very thorough personnel selection and testing procedures used in the OCS, or on the various ranges—the infantryman got his due.

One final touch may have been the clincher. This was a subtle one that gradually entered our consciousness. It was the continued, unescorted presence among us of General Meloy and his assistant commandant, General Fritzsche. They elected to tag along with us and hitch-hiked (if I may use an obviously inaccurate term) rides in our several busses, seemingly without design, but with one I am now confident.

The little things wherein the Army was revealed were, I think, all to the Army's credit. Hanson Baldwin will be delighted to hear that General Meloy not only had the band at Lawson Field to greet us, but drums and bugles playing martial music woke us each morning.

Such service differences as I or others may have noted were all minor and the one impression that I am sure was common to every member of the eighteenth Jaycock—I am sure of this because I heard it repeated over and over again—was of the high quality of men in the services. In the Pentagon and from Quantico to Benning we had unending association with alert, intelligent, decisive men. I can't remember seeing a potbelly from the time we left the Pentagon until we landed back at the MATS terminal in Washington eight days later.



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The Reds outnumber us in men and armor, but if we mix ingenuity with mobility we can take their measure. Here are some of the ingredients of a

DESIGN FOR THE DEFEAT OF RED ARMOR

Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg

ILLUSTRATED BY GIL WALKER

IF Red Armor should be unleashed, we can block, divert and finally defeat it by using new tactics and techniques at river barriers, by using helicopters to sow minefields, and by engaging in vertical envelopment to destroy armor and artillery behind his leading forces. More armor on our side would make the task easier. Tank for tank we are outnumbered, so the defeat of Communist armor can only partially be achieved by pitting armor against armor. It will be necessary for us to combine a variety of unique methods—each in itself not overly decisive—that in combination can destroy the Red armor.

New techniques and concepts are needed to properly exploit natural tank barriers. Rivers are conventionally defended from one bank or another but always the defense is parallel to the river. We should reorient river defense so as to include *on water* attacks, from upstream or downstream by the use of naval PT type boats and amphibian tanks. The latter's capabilities for maneuver and mobility are great compared to the landlocked Red tanks.

Naval PT boats can navigate the principal rivers of Europe, and being fast they are hard to hit. The PT boats should carry torpedoes and recoilless 105mm guns as well as caliber .50 machine guns. Torpedoes can be used to destroy bridges. Where the Reds establish a bridgehead and complete a span across it, these PT boats could be sent up or down stream for rapid torpedo attacks and quick getaway. These attacks can be launched suddenly. Torpedoes can also be effective against underwater bridges.

Floating mines could be used more effectively in on-river attacks. These explosive packets should be developed to where they can become electronically guided, water missiles. Employed in great mass, and *air dropped* upstream at night they could be devastating to Red crossing attempts. Every effort must be made at river crossings and especially at bridges after Red armor has crossed. If the fuel and ammunition supply of armor is effectively cut off and kept cut off, we can expect tankers and SP gunners in our PW cages in a few days. It is cheaper to defeat a battalion of tanks by cutting off its supplies than it is by gunfire. Underwater demolition teams can also be used. We should develop methods of letting some armor across a river and then sealing up its supply source and isolating it; thus gradually chewing up the enemy's armor.

LAND mines can be laid on a large scale by helicopters, both in front of the enemy and in rear areas where reinforcements and reserves are centered. The heavy work of unloading and stringing the mines out over thousands of yards of terrain can be done more rapidly by helicopters which would fly low and drop mines through a slide or chute arrangement, leaving engineers or infantry on the ground to adjust them into the final pattern holes. The H-19 Sikorsky could be easily adapted to this purpose. Mines can be flown from supply points directly to the minefields in one operation. Each H-19 helicopter could carry 65 to 70 M6 mines or about 300 of the M7A1 antitank mines. With a round-trip mileage of 135 miles from supply point to minefield it is estimated that two and one-half to three hours would be required for loading, flight forward, unloading, and return. Thus one helicopter could be expected to provide about 200 M6 mines, or 900 M7A1 mines per day at this distance. (M15 mines can also be sown. The weight of the M15 is greater than the M6). Fifty helicopters could deliver and sow a total of 10,000 M6 or 45,000 M7A1 mines in one day. If we used M6 mines we could plant a belt 1000 yards wide and almost seven mines deep. If we used M7A1 mines we could plant a 1000-yard belt 30 mines deep.

On-the-ground manpower requirements to dig the mines in and fuze them would have to be proportioned to the delivery rate for speed of final installation.

In the event of serious enemy armored thrust the creation of minefields must be considered on an extremely large scale. Helicopter delivery and sowing has great potential where speed is essential. Helicopters of greater capacity can spread mines in greater density.

Mines by the magnificent mile should be contemplated and should far exceed any past use. Our combat investment here is in easily manufactured material and not in human lives. When we need to use mines in large quantities we should hire thousands of laborers. The effect should not be halfhearted. The mine plans should envisage not only stopping Red armor but diverting it to points where our ground and air forces can destroy it.

OUR man power will never let us engage hostile armor on a frontal basis entirely. Our depth of resistance should be built forward into the enemy's zones

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as well as backward into our own. Furthermore, we should increase the mobility of our means over those of enemy armor. Deep attacks that are fast and sure are necessary, not only so as to present the enemy with the least profitable targets, but to preserve our own forces for a succession of deep-in strikes.

The main pressure and effort would have to be wrought by conventional forces in our main body. However, to supplement this effort it would be simple for us to design and employ mobile forces for deep-in use.

The helicopter is already contemplated for this, but the scale of employing helicopter-landed combat teams needs greater emphasis. Likewise the purpose and mission of deep-in forces must be as singular and objective as possible. Deep-in combat teams should be armed to destroy the enemy's *main might:* tanks and self-propelled guns.

For this purpose we should create Vertical Destruction Companies. Call them what you may, their mission would be the destruction of hostile armor *at night* when tanks are most vulnerable. Forty-eight-man companies with the principal armament of about twelve 3.5-inch rocket launchers and ammunition towed handily in golf-bag-like trailers could be helicopter landed (the Sikorsky XHR_2S carries three jeeps or 26 men) at night to work against armored assembly and bivouac areas. Evacuate these units in early morning unless circumstances are extremely favorable to their daylight employment. These units would not hold ground or establish defense areas. Their forte would lie in their ability to strike *night after night* in *all directions.* The multiplied and coordinated use of these Vertical Destruction Companies in enemy rear areas would account for many tanks and self-propelled guns and also divert the enemy's effort and attention. Several tanks destroyed at night mean several less tanks in combat the next day. Multiply this by many nights of destruction and you have attrition that becomes significant. The Vertical Destruction Companies can actually become targets of no opportunity (for the enemy) and the source of steady loss. The units should obviously be composed of volunteers. Actuarial rates for raider forces, tank hunters and parachutists are high. The rate can be greatly lowered for this new organizational breed of men, because they can (and should) count on daily evacuation, adequate rest during the day, and vigorous, daring reemployment again at night. Like the Air Force, they will come back to roost in some comfort. They will not always succeed but there is always another night! They should rarely see much of daylight. They will be attacking Red troops tired from daylight combat, and, if nothing more, they can tire these tankers by successive nights of unrest. Infrared sighting devices are necessary for these blackout operating companies whose main stock in trade will be mobility.

By holding Red armor up at river barriers we force it to telescope upon itself to some degree. It is against such concentrations that the Vertical Destruction Companies should operate. We could use 200 of these units in Europe.

LACKING sufficient tanks to meet the Red masses it will be necessary for our artillery to deliberately engage hostile armor by direct fire in a proportion much greater than we have heretofore thought of or practiced. Artillery casualties will of necessity be higher than in previous conflicts, but in terms of the tank destruction that can be wrought we will have fewer casualties in the long run. Self-propelled artillery will have to forget its SP designation and act in a *direct assault role*—and be designated "assault artillery." This is necessary because of our shortage of tanks and the Red technique of using their self-propelled guns in direct support of tanks.

Too little attention has been paid to the Red use of self-propelled artillery in direct support of tanks. By this technique the Reds bring tremendous firepower into play in their tank attacks. We have been too prone to count Red tanks and ignore the smashing impact of SU-85s, SU-100s and the JSU-122s and JSU-152s. At this date the SU-100 and the JSU-152 are the primary Red weapons of this category.

We did see a few obsolete SU-76s in Korea, but *nowhere* in combat have we seen the real Red tank and SU combination in action. The power of Red armor lies in the slugging support the SUs (in over-watching roles) give tanks. Red technique here is well developed for the SUs engage in direct fire, overrun,



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ram and crush just like the tanks they follow. Their *shock* must be met with *shock* from our SP artillery.

SUPERB gunnery, most rapid and accurate, is the first requisite for our armored units. Our new range finders and our fire control instruments give us some advantage here. Mobility-wise we cannot claim any distinct advantage over the Communists. Here is where we need the most attention, especially in training.

Our armor commanders must concentrate on increasing the speed and mobility of units, experimenting with column organization, vehicle dispersion, SOPs, elimination of non-combat vehicles and other equipment so as to come up with maneuvering elements that can strike swiftly and destructively and then move to strike elsewhere the *same day*.

Red manuals are conspicuous for their omission of the "calculated risk doctrine" in the use of armor. This should be remembered as should also the fact that Soviet reactions in command actions on lower levels usually are not as swift as our own. Our forte for success lies in swift action, disconcerting moves and maneuvers, and a measure of calculated daring—but always, swift movement, for we cannot stand overlong and slug it out tube to tube from one direction.

Higher commanders can well consider that rapid and deceptive shifts of our armored elements in action will be the best way to project their destructive potential, insure it against atomic strikes and devour the effort and attention of Red forces. Our armor should rest the least and move the most.

ONE's crystal ball may be clouded or cracked, and the things-to-come department is an uncertain bureau at best. However, certain known facts about the past performance of Red armor suggest that we should watch for these weaknesses:

Lead tanks have a way of getting ahead of their infantry. This led the Germans to wait patiently while (limited) deep tank drives were made—and then mop up at night. The Reds finally caught on so they tank-mounted their infantry (a good target package for big guns). Today, the Red ratio of truck transport is still far behind ours. Infantry can be slow in coming.

Compared with our armored division, the ratio of infantry to tanks is very low in the Red tank division and only slightly higher in the mechanized division.

Communications-wise the Reds don't yet measure up to us, except in telephones. This means their armor has a lower coordinated rate of shift than we have. Time can count, especially when we add the Malenkov factor of hesitation common to lower commanders who must query higher authority. One can gain tactical advantage here of 10 to 55 minutes! This is a big advantage, if exploited by rapid action.

Antiaircraft-wise Red armor is not the best protected even though Red tank generals are conscious of the need and seek more.


Make 'em maneuver, both to force fuel consumption of tanks and to get broadside of Red armored formations. Red logistics, especially fuel resupply, are not as efficient and modern as ours.

As for rapid tank gunnery, Red tanks can be out-dueled on a mass basis, but a grave danger lies in the SUs behind the tanks.

In summary: Red armored blitz can be halted best by taking measure of their day's progress and then wading in deep to isolate their armor from logistical and infantry-artillery support for the next day. A multiple combination of measures must be employed in coordinated action. *Mobility,* over and above that of the Reds, can best insure success.



TACTICS



Reflections on the Use and Misuse of PATROLS IN KOREA

Lieutenant David Abshire

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PATROLLING, always important in war, achieved unusual, and perhaps even unique, importance in the Korean war, especially in the static warfare of 1952-53. In those days patrols often were the main operational effort and patrol policies (and supervision) originated from division and corps.

In a more fluid war higher commanders and staffs would be unable to devote comparable time to such small operational efforts and so it cannot be said that such high-level attention to patrols will continue.

But patrols will still be important. There is always a great need for exact information about the enemy. And patrols, properly planned and conducted, are unsurpassed for this purpose.

It is important, therefore, to examine the patrol actions of 1952-53 in Korea in light of some common sense principles, and see where, how, and why those principles were applied or violated. We will find, unfortunately, that they were violated more often than they were applied.

Principle 1: *Each patrol should be assigned a single mission, clearly stated.*

Too often this was forgotten, and the assignment came out something like this: "Recon the route for signs of enemy activity, screen suspected areas, and kill or capture any enemy sighted." The patrol leader is given no clear-cut guide to decision. Instead, he is given several missions and authorized to follow any one of several courses, with the result that the patrol will probably accomplish nothing unless the leader is a man of exceptional drive and intelligence.


Commanders who frequently complained of a lack of aggressiveness from patrol leaders might have found that ambiguous missions were a chief cause. Confusion is the rule in battle, and commanders and staff officers must not compound it by failing to be explicit, certain, and simple.

As an example, suppose a regiment needs a prisoner. Then the patrol must be planned just for that purpose. The patrol leader is assigned the mission "to capture enemy personnel." Then, regardless of fire fights and casualties, of external pressure and confusion, the patrol leader knows his job and, knowing it, he will probably bring in a prisoner.

Principle 2: *Reconnaissance patrols must be small, mobile, and flexible.*

A friendly outpost had been overrun and counterattack plans were being made. The counterattacking company wanted to know: "In what strength does the enemy occupy those positions? What is he doing there?" But they never got the timely information they needed because patrols of ten, twelve, and fourteen men sent out to get it were easily detected and defeated by the enemy. Three men, using stealth, patience, deception, and cover of darkness, could have obtained that information. Yet three-men patrols were never dispatched because of policies

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hat developed from the early days in Korea when the Communists ambushed arge numbers of small UN patrols. These ambushes occurred when it was necessary to conserve our meager forces. Therefore, the practice was adopted of ending out much larger patrols. These tronger combat patrols could accomplish heir mission of engaging the enemy but s *recon patrols* they were unsatisfactory. For a recon at night must use tealth to penetrate the enemy position, o see and hear without itself being seen r heard. Three men are quieter than squad.

There are other disadvantages in using a combat patrol for reconnaissance. Men were taken from their positions on he MLR because only the rifle platoons had the manpower for such patrols. A arge patrol created a larger target for nortar fire. Control was more difficult. Mobility and flexibility were reduced. The route of the cumbersome patrol was asily detected by small *enemy* recons of ne, two, and three men.

It appears that in trying to minimize sks of ambush we incurred greater risks. Obviously, increasing the size of a patrol is not the solution to dangers of ambush.

Principle 3: *To prevent itself from being ambushed, a recon patrol must rely on camouflage, stealth, supporting fires, suitable weather and darkness.*

This principle holds the key to safety from enemy ambush. Let's enlarge on it:

(1) Paradoxically, a small patrol often has considerable fire support—direct and indirect—from the MLR. This was especially the case in Korea in 1952 and 1953. Company OPs furnished a view of patrol routes. Company commanders had available not only battalion weapons, but also many sector weapons. Direct fire weapons for close support were especially important. Frequently five heavy machine guns, three caliber .50 machine guns, tanks, AA weapons, three 57mm rifles, and three 75mm rifles could be used.

(2) Smaller patrols would result in a smaller manpower drain, and the men in each company selected for patrols could receive special training.

(3) Night recons generally should leave friendly lines at dusk. The patrol can see the immediate surroundings where enemy might lurk, and still not be seen from the enemy MLR. At dusk, too, the enemy has not reached most of his ambush sites. Varying the times of departure from day to day looks well on the acetate at higher headquarters. But the risk of ambush is not reduced, for the enemy moves out early, and stays out until dawn.

(4) We know in advance many probable areas of enemy ambush, and sporadic harassing and interdiction fires should be placed on these areas to make them untenable to the enemy. Just before the patrol reaches these sites, MLR fire can hit the areas again.

(5) If a recon patrol is moving deep into enemy territory, or far from supporting units, then a patrol base should be established. This, of course, is a larger unit located on advantageous ground to furnish the same type of support the MLR fires furnish closer-in patrols. However, such a concept is entirely different from the "support group" which continually followed the recon element, and was widely used in Korea.

If these five factors had been applied to reduce ambush dangers, patrolling would have been more fruitful.

Principle 4: *Attempt to introduce surprise into every possible operation.*

Surprise begets confusion, and confusion does the worst damage to the mind. But UN patrols too frequently neglected the element of surprise.

Suppose, for example, that a regiment had taken over a new sector. What pattern of patrolling was followed? Patrols initially were close in, then were gradually pushed out.

When these patrols first approached enemy outposts, they could find some of them napping. Then regiment would start planning a raid on the outpost. There would be more recons, each one finding the enemy increasingly alert. By the time the raid took place the enemy was ready for it.

Here is an illustration of proper use of surprise: It was a summer night on the eastern front and a friendly patrol was deep in Mungdun-ni Valley with enemy outposts on high ground and on both sides overlooking the valley. An enemy communications trench extended across the valley, and the friendly patrol was advancing eastward along it. Then contact was made, and a fire fight started by enemy approaching from the east.

At this, enemy on the high ground to the west immediately began descending the hill toward the rear of the friendly patrol. But a friendly machine gun team a hundred yards to the rear of the patrol set up to fire to the west cut loose. The enemy from the west were stunned and disorganized, not so much by the fire power of the machine gun as by its position and by the fact that they were not accustomed to UN patrols carrying that weapon in this particular sector.

Rifle grenades and rocket launchers can have the same or greater effect. Used at the right moment in a night fire fight, they introduce surprise and shock far out of proportion to their often inaccurate fire.

Principle 5: *Fire support is a matter of intricate coordination, cooperation, and foresight.*

Improper fire support coordination at the company level was a frequent event in Korea. For example, almost as a rule, the company commander had attached one or more sections of heavy machine guns and several 75mm recoilless rifles. Tanks were often under his operational control; quad .50s were available on continuous call. Including sector weapons, the company frequently had four or more additional caliber .50 machine guns. In a fluid situation, the company commander would not be responsible for so much fire coordination, but the fact remains that in Korea, he *was* responsible for it.

The following homemade list of fire support capabilities will give you an idea

of the complex fires that are often necessary to support a patrol:

(1) To soften an objective area by preparatory fires.

(2) To isolate by fire the ground around a patrol, and to neutralize vulnerable approaches to the patrol when it makes contact with the enemy.

(3) To furnish close continuous support to cover the advance of a raiding patrol.

(4) To cover the withdrawal of a patrol, and any evacuation necessary.

(5) To furnish counter battery and mortar suppression fires.

(6) To furnish harassing interdiction fires, diversionary fires, and to clear suspected ambush areas.

(7) To limit or neutralize enemy observation during daylight; to illuminate during the night.

It takes experience and a degree of imagination to apply these to the maximum. It also requires centralized direction. We talk about fire support coordination centers and coordinators at high levels. But we often forget that the same principle must be applied within the company. When a patrol makes enemy contact, one officer must coordinate all fires from the MLR. He must not himself adjust fire, or get involved in phone or radio transmissions. His sole duty is supervision.

COMMUNICATIONS necessary to control the different weapons are equally important. Mortars and artillery present no problem; communications from OP to FDC are SOP. But this is not quite true of direct fire weapons. And perhaps that is why the great misfortune of the fire support in Korea was related to direct fire weapons.

With so many weapons under company control, the best solution was a direct fire direction wire and radio net, which included the 57 and 75 recoilless rifles, certain key caliber .50 machine guns, heavy caliber .30 machine guns, tanks, and quad .50s. With such a net all these weapons can be brought into use effectively and instantaneously. This net must be separate from the company administrative net.

Third, consider the fire-support plan. The success or failure of a patrol depends just as much on the supporting fires as on the actions of the patrol members. All fire-support crews should have a separate briefing in which the patrol plan, any preplanned sequence of fires, specific code designations for fires, designation of terrain features, definite targets, rates of fire, and missions for each weapon are discussed.

Principle 6: *Sustained, well-aimed fire counts—especially in rugged terrain.*

The time was shortly after daylight in eastern Korea. A combat patrol divided into two groups moved up the steep slopes approaching an enemy outpost. The close-in fire support to soften and neutralize the objective had not been effective. The alerted enemy started throwing grenades and satchel charges down on the patrol. The first group began to direct wild, uncontrolled fire toward the enemy trenches. It accomplished nothing. Two men in the second group started firing single, well-aimed shots from the top of the outpost trench line. This fire had an immediate effect on the enemy.

What about a night fire fight? Even then, sustained, well-aimed shots alone produce success. For it has not been an uncommon occurrence to have both enemy and UN troops fire over each other's heads at night. Automatic weapons climb when fired from the hip. And at night the soldier cannot realize just how hig he is firing. Likewise, how many of ou men know, and are thankful for th high, erratic firing of the enemy bur gun? Once again sustained, accurate fi counts!

Suppose a night patrol is ambushed The first five seconds usually determin the result. If the friendly forces fire wil and high they may spare a crouchin close-by opponent. Furthermore, the in itial fire of the enemy is often to distrac and mislead a patrol, so that it is expose in another direction. The predesignate plan of returning fire in event of ambus must therefore encompass specific dire tions of fire assigned each patrol mem ber. Patrol members will then be ab to sweep the entire area, thus disorgan izing all enemy elements lurking nearb Wild, heavy fire alone will not be e fective.

Principle 7: *Weather and terrai between the line of departure an the objective can make a patrol in effective.*

A patrol moved out toward an enem outpost on a snowy December nigh The slopes were steep and icy; the rout was long, rough, circuitous, selected s that the patrol could approach the ou post from an unsuspected direction. A the patrol slid and waded along, me slipped, fell, crouched—and cursed aloud Ordinarily the patrol leader had a stron hold over his men, but not that nigh Two hours later, as the patrol neare the objective, noise discipline was s poor that the patrol leader established perimeter. Then he and the scout pro ceeded. He suddenly sighted two enemy unaware of his presence. He raised hi carbine to fire, and tried to press the trig ger. His finger did not move. He re moved his mitten and tried again. N result. The cold had taken its toll.

In spite of bad weather and roug routes, grease pencils will glide easil over ridges and draws on acetate maps But staff planners must beware. Th route would have been excellent in th summer. Not so in the winter. For pa trols must reach their objective with th strength and energy to accomplish th missions.

* * * *

OBVIOUSLY these comments are fa from conclusive. The backdrop is th Korean conflict in 1952 and 1953. No a typical war, to be sure. But these prin ciples are so basic that they will again be applicable, even though the scene motives, and nature of a new war ma be different.

Corrections

The staff hopes it isn't coming apart at the seams despite the horrible evidence in the form of editorial and typographical errors that we have committed in the past couple of months. We hereby rectify the worst of them as best we can and beg the indulgence of our readers.

In "Where Can We Get the Fighting Men?" by Major Irvin M. Kent, the first paragraph, second column, page 35, of the May issue should have read: "In times of war or general mobilization the probable increase in pension liability of the government because of the induction of what was hitherto considered substandard personnel is *NOT* a valid consideration when weighed against the necessity for combat replacements." We regret that the unintentional dropping of the negative completely altered Major Kent's position.

In the June issue we committed these crimes:

We used the word Coldstreams instead of Coldstream Guards at one place in Major Paget's article. We hasten to assure his Colonel that the mistake was ours and not Major Paget's! He also called us up short for calling the Guards' "scarlet tunics" blouses. Again we're sorry.

We unaccountably botched up the by-line of Lt. Col. John B. Gibbons, Jr. This is an unforgivable error and we shall carry the shame to our final resting place.

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The author *(left)* and Major General R. O. Barton on Normandy in 1944

D PLUS TEN YEARS

A participant reflects on the great events of ten years ago when General Eisenhower carried out his orders to "enter the continent of Europe . . ."

MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY

EARLY in the afternoon of 6 June 1944 in Normandy, three senior officers of the 4th Infantry Division—Maj. Gen. R. O. Barton and two brigadiers, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and I—caught up with the colonel of the regiment which had made the assault landing on Utah Beach. He was pushing his battalions forward, contact with the Germans was close, and the situation was far from clear. It is doubtful that he appreciated having three generals breathing down his neck for the next half hour. However, he survived it, and went

MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY, retired, was the Artillery Commander of the 4th Infantry Division at the time of the invasion. He later became commander of the Division and led it through the remainder of the campaigns in northern Europe. He lives in Washington and is a regular contributor to this and other magazines.

This view of one of the Allied beaches was made on 9 June—three days after the assault was launched



on to wear four stars and command the Eighth Army in Korea. His name was James A. Van Fleet.

Van Fleet was only one of the notable cast of characters for the D-day show. A young major general who had parachuted into Normandy in the dark of the previous night spent the day trying to collect his widely-scattered 101st Airborne Division. He was Maxwell Taylor who now commands the Eighth Army. His artillery commander, one Anthony C. McAuliffe, had also arrived by parachute. He now commands the Seventh Army, and sometimes regrets that he ever said "Nuts!" The commander of the other airborne division, the 82d, was Matthew Ridgway, now the Army's Chief of Staff. His assistant commander was James Gavin, now General Ridgway's G3. And about to come ashore was a corps commander whose future also included four stars and the title of Chief of Staff—J. Lawton Collins.

The complexity of the planning of the greatest amphibious operation in history was obscured at the time by the need of secrecy until the invasion was an accomplished fact and by the rapid flow of headline news afterward. Of the more than two million soldiers, sailors, and airmen eventually involved in the operation none was more entitled to ulcers than Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan of the British Army. From March 1943 until General Eisenhower arrived to take over as Supreme Commander in January of 1944, Morgan was COSSAC—Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate). His basic trouble was that there was no Supreme Allied Commander, either in fact or "designate." That meant not only that he had no commander to turn to for decisions on literally thousands of important matters, but that there was no one in a position to fight effectively for the additional troops, landing craft, airplanes, and munitions which he believed, correctly, were needed for a successful invasion.

With General Eisenhower's appointment as Supreme Commander came a statement of his misssion: "You will enter the continent of Europe and . . . undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces." D-day was to be in May. With a commander at the helm, however, it became possible to urge successfully that the number of troops should be increased, the area of the attack widened. D-day was postponed to 5 June.

The final plan provided for assaults on five beaches—three British (Sword, Juno, and Gold) and two American (Omaha and Utah), plus three airborne division drops—one British behind Sword Beach, and two American behind Utah Beach.

THE 4th Infantry Division was scheduled for Utah Beach, and we were soon busy with a series of landing exercises. In one, surprisingly, the Division suffered its first casualties, when German torpedo boats got through to our convoy and sank two ships. The Division also captured its first prisoner during this exercise when an enemy pilot parachuted down from his burning plane. Another exercise was named "Hound" and it was long remembered because of the bitter weather with high winds and driving sleet and snow. Later, in France I happened to be reminiscing with a soldier about that particular exercise and commented how unpleasant it had been. "Yes, sir," he agreed, "that Hound was a son of a bitch."


The handling of the contradictory requirements of secrecy and of giving all possible information to the troops was a vital factor in the ultimate success of the invasion. That there was no serious leak during all the months of preparation is something both astounding and ground for pride in the discipline of British and American soldiers, sailors, and airmen. This is particularly true of the hundreds of enlisted men—typists and draftsmen for example—who knew for a long period where the landings were to be made. They mingled freely with their comrades and civilian, but kept their mouths shut.

Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. joined the 4th Division during the planning phase. He had not only been Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Governor of Puerto Rico, and Governor General of the Philippines, but he had served with distinction in the 1st Division in both world wars. At fifty-seven, he could well have been sitting at home. Instead, he insisted, unsuccessfully at first, that he should land with the first assault wave. He finally wrote a note in longhand which resulted in his wish being granted:

May 26th '44

To Major General R. O. Barton, C.G.
4th Inf. Div.

1. Since your informal refusal of my request to go with the assault companies I have given much thought to the question and decided to request reconsideration because of the following facts.
2. The force & skill with which the first elements hit the beach & proceed may determine the ultimate success of the operation.
3. The rapid advance inland of the assault companies is vital to our effort as the removal of underwater obstacles cannot be accomplished unless the beach is free from small arms fire.
4. With troops engaged for the first time the behavior pattern of all is apt to be set by those first engaged.
5. Considered, accurate information of the existing situation should be available for each succeeding element as it lands.
6. You should have when you get to shore an overall picture in which you can place confidence.
7. I believe I can contribute materially on all of the above by going with the assault companies. Furthermore I know personally both officers and men of these



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BRADLEY
First Army

GEROW
V Corps

EISENHOWER
SHAEF

COLLINS
VII Corps

Six weeks later four of the D-day commanders got together for a group photograph

advance units and believe that it will steady them to know I am with them.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT
B.G. U.S.A.

I SAW much of General Roosevelt during the first weeks in Normandy. His jeep was named "Rough Rider" after his father's Spanish-American War regiment, but he took it to places which gave its name a more factual reason. I well remember stopping my jeep one day just short of a crossroads which was being heavily shelled. Suddenly out of the smoke and dust came the "Rough Rider," windshield smashed, Roosevelt driving. He pulled up alongside of me and asked, "Any news?" in the same tone he might have used when sitting down to chess in a training area.

During General Eisenhower's first visit to the 4th Division soon after our arrival in England, a new record was established for going up and down through channels. As commander of Division Artillery, I had strongly urged that our light artillery battalions be issued self-propelled guns, but we had not received a decision. My seat at luncheon was about halfway down the table, with General Barton opposite me. I leaned over and said, "How about getting a decision as to the self-propelled guns?" He passed the idea on in more detail to the corps commander. It went on up the table to General Omar Bradley, then commander of the First Army, got a quick examination by Eisenhower, and in something like three minutes was back through channels to me with a firm decision: we would get our self-propelled guns.

The Allied side of the picture as D-day approached was generally good. The completeness of the planning and orders was well exemplified in J. Lawton Collins' VII Corps when a final meeting of senior commanders turned up almost no questions.

IF things were going well at the lower levels, there were soul-searing problems for General Eisenhower. On May 30, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, the Air Commander-in-Chief, renewed his protests against the dropping of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions as planned. He believed that the combination of unsuitable landing areas and expected strong resistance would result in "futile slaughter." On the other hand, Utah Beach had a large inundated area behind it, and there was serious doubt that the troops making the seaborne landing would be able to get inland unless airborne troops seized the exits from the causeways crossing the inundated area. Eisenhower decided that the attack would go as planned.

Then, on the night of 3-4 June, with many of the convoys already at sea, he weather experts changed their hitherto optimistic forecasts; the overcast would not permit visual air bombing in the early hours of 5 June, and sea conditions would make the use of landing craft difficult. Eisenhower, at a 0430 hours meeting on 4 June, decided on a twenty-four-hour postponement – actually twenty-four hours and thirty minutes because of the tide difference.

My small headquarters group had sailed from Dartmouth during the evening of 3 June in a convoy of thirty-five landing craft, tank. A little after 0900 the next day, I went up on the bridge. Our LCT was the right rear vessel of a three-column formation. With the whitecaps, and the strong wind whipping out the flag at the masthead of each craft the convoy made a striking picture in spite of the low overcast. Suddenly, the LCTs at the head of the three columns turned sharp left. Our crew was immediately on the alert because this might be evasive action from an enemy attack, but almost immediately, the columns turned left again and the whole formation following along in trace, was headed back over our route. It was evident that D-day had been postponed.

It was a letdown for everyone. A day's postponement meant the possibility of serious errors in getting thousands of vessels into formation and on schedule again, and only two days of postponement were possible because of tides. If we had to return thousands of men to England, all with considerable knowledge of the invasion plan, what chance of keeping that information secret?

I think we spent the night off Weymouth. It was a confused night of hails from strange craft and yelled warnings

about a mine field. When I went on deck the next morning we were on our way again. General Eisenhower had made the fateful decision during the night: D-day and H-hour were now, for Utah Beach, 6 June at 0630.

We spent the day plowing along the Channel. We had with us a British Royal Artillery major attached for liaison with the British warships supporting us. He was an old hand at assault landings. I remember talking to him that day about his combat experiences and asking him, "How many beaches will this make for you?" He answered quite seriously: "The seventh, sir, if you'll allow me to count Dunkirk."

THE weather on the morning of the Day was not very encouraging. The sea was rough, the ceiling low, and visibility poor. As we passed through the transport assembly area, the small assault craft were gone from their decks. The ships of the gunfire support group were firing rapidly. Our LCT was a "free boat," but according to the plan, we were to follow the two leading infantry regiments and their attached artillery. I had no real function ashore until there was enough artillery there for my headquarters to take over the massing of fires. It was quickly evident that we could go in as planned, but neither the LCT's officers nor I could identify any landmarks. My aide, Lt. John B. Swanson, got out a strip elevation and a photograph. In spite of weeks of study for this moment, we could not make things fit. The skipper wanted to hunt for a guide ship which was supposed to be anchored off the beaches, but when he couldn't locate it (it had been sunk), I decided to go in anyway.

Some artillery shells were landing among the boats and vehicles near the water's edge. Mindful of obstacles and mines (we had already lost one battery of artillery, but I didn't know it), I told the skipper to put her in where another LCT was just backing off, went down the ladder to the main deck, and climbed over the vehicles to my command car. Then I discovered that my driver was too seasick to drive!

When we hit the beach, the ramp dropped, and my substitute driver didn't waste any time. We seemed to drop into a hole as we came off the ramp, but we made the beach without trouble. Just as we got through an opening in the sea wall, we caught it. The artillery concentration which came down on us was, I think, from only two batteries, but it was plenty, and we all did some notable burrowing into the sides of bomb and shell craters in the vicinity.

We were lucky. One man was badly wounded, and my operations officer had a shell fragment in his lunch, but his lunch, fortunately, was still in his musette bag. After about four or five volleys the fire shifted from our immediate vicinity. Swanson moved over to me, spread out his map, and said, "We're here, sir." Swanson, whom I was to see killed within a month, rarely made mistakes, but my first reaction was doubt as to the accuracy of the location to which he was pointing. It was 2,000 yards to the left of where we were supposed to be, and in an area which had been



BRIGADIER GENERAL
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, JR.

eliminated in the planning in the belief that the beach would be too muddy. A quick check proved that Swanson was right. Most of the carefully planned assembly areas were still in German hands, and the troops had a real chance to prove their resourcefulness and flexibility, with the situation complicated by the fact that they had to fight their way across about 1,000 yards of land, and then get across about a mile of German-made lake.

The six airborne regiments of the two airborne divisions had, as we were to learn later, made their drops approximately on schedule. They had been flown from England in transport planes which circled west of Cherbourg and came over the drop zones flying from west to east. The drops were widely scattered, but if this resulted in confusion for the paratroopers, it also confused the German commanders who had reports of airborne landings from practically all parts of the Cotentin peninsula. Two vital missions were accomplished, however. The 82d capture Ste.-Mère Eglise and the 101st secure the western ends of the causeways ove the inundated area. Parachutes hangin from trees and crashed gliders decorate the landscape for days.

I sent liaison officers to establish cor tact with the two airborne artillery com manders—Tony McAuliffe and And March. They were hard to find, becaus they weren't where they were suppose to be, and, in fact, didn't themselve know for some time where they were Both found my CP, separately, soo after daylight of D plus 1. Betwee them they only knew where three o their airborne howitzers were. My drive fixed them some hot coffee and pow dered eggs. McAuliffe, nearly forty-si at the time, had parachuted in. March who was forty-eight, weighed about tw hundred pounds and was suffering fro a bad knee, had come in by glider—whic had crashed. Both, after two rugge nights with an equally rough day i between, were very much on the jo got the information they wanted abou the situation, and shoved off at once t try to round up their commands.

The VII Corps part of the invasio plan was essentially to cut off th Cotentin peninsula, and then captur Cherbourg. The 90th, 9th and 79t Infantry Divisions, in that order, fo lowed the 4th ashore. Under the de cisive leadership of "Lightnin' Joe" Co lins, the corps completed the first of it tasks on the night of 17-18 June whe the 9th Division under Maj. Gen Manton Eddy (also destined to be a army commander in later years) com pleted the crossing of the peninsula an cut the coastal road along its west side The Corps then drove on to Cherbour and captured it on 27 June.

The Utah Beach landing had bee easier than expected, but the rest of th Cherbourg campaign was marked b some of the hardest fighting of the war The 4th Infantry Division, for example had nearly 5,500 battle casualties in it first three weeks ashore. (The 1st Ma rine Division had 2,736 battle casualtie in four months of fighting on Guadal canal.)

THE British landings, in the mean while, had gone generally according to plan. Only on Omaha Beach, be tween the British zone and Utah Beach was there near-disaster. Here Maj. Gen Leonard Gerow's V Corps ran into the bulk of an alert German infantry divi sion instead of an overextended static regiment as had been expected. The assault landing was made by Maj. Gen.

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Life photo. Copyright Time, Inc.

The Normandy hedgerow country is pretty and peaceful here but in June and July of 1944 it was the setting for some of the dirtiest infantry combat of World War II

Clarence Huebner's experienced 1st Infantry Division, with a regimental combat team of the 29th Division and two Ranger battalions attached. The air bombardment had not been effective on the beach defenses, most of the "swimming" tanks had been sunk by the rough water or were not launched at all, and, more important perhaps, smoke and dust resulted in many of the small task forces not being landed accurately, with the result that they could not promptly perform their assigned missions. At the end of the day, the outcome was still in doubt, but the Corps fought its way out of its first precarious foothold and at the end of a week had a beachhead 15 to 20 miles deep. It then went on the defensive until the VII Corps should capture Cherbourg, be able to turn, and join in attacking out of the peninsula. The 29th Division had suffered most with more than 2,400 casualties.

WHAT of the German side? In western Europe, Field Marshal von Rundstedt was nominally commander-in-chief, but he did not have control over the air and naval units in the West, or, in fact, of some of the ground forces. He was handicapped, too, by Hitler's decree that any invasion must be dealt with in such a way that it should collapse "before, if possible, but at the latest upon the actual landing," and that no headquarters and no unit may initiate retrograde movement . . ." Later, he for the first time emphasized the need of "first-rate, fully mobile reserves suitable for offensive operations."

With inadequate forces for either concept and without air forces capable of even a fifty-fifty chance of countering Allied air power, Rundstedt was forced into a fatal compromise. More than that, in one of the most peculiar developments of the war, Field Marshal Rommel, who in the eyes of the world was the foremost advocate and practitioner of mobility in warfare, now, in his capacity as commander of the army group defending the Channel coast, put all his efforts into improving coast fortifications, minefields, and underwater obstacles with a resultant essentially static defense at the shore line. Whether or not he believed in this unorthodox method is controversial. It may well be that he was convinced after his North African experience that reserves could not be moved under the conditions of air superiority which the Allies could create. Furthermore, he had been unable to get adequate mobile reserves assigned to his command, and he well knew Hitler's psychopathic aversion to giving up ground.

When the invasion came, the German defense was marked by incomplete beach defenses, no depth, inability to maneuver, lack of unity of command, inadequate reserves, and failure to commit what reserves they had promptly and accurately. Notable among the enemy's failure was his stubborn maintaining of the belief that our main attack would follow the Normandy landings and be in the Pas-de-Calais area. This belief was carefully nurtured by one of the most effective deception efforts in the history of warfare; a deception so successful that it was late July before any troops in the Pas-de-Calais area were moved toward Normandy.

On the Allied side, the mistakes were minor and the inadequacies of the preparations were mostly forced by time. For example, because of late arrival of landing craft very few Army units were ever "married up" with the vessels in which they made the assault landings. The dive bombing and strafing attacks of the Air Force were often inaccurate and were sometimes put down on our own troops. Lack of experience and of ground liaison parties accounted for most of these troubles.

A German division commander paid tribute to the spirit of the American troops in Normandy and to the completeness and efficiency of the organization behind them: "Each night we know we have cut them to pieces, inflicted heavy casualties, mowed down their transport . . . But—in the morning, we are suddenly faced with fresh battalions, with complete replacements of men, machines, food, tools, and weapons. This happens day after day."

And Von Rundstedt, after the fall of Cherbourg, gave the High Command some sound advice which cost him his job: "Make peace, you fools!"



GENERAL RIDGWAY (with grenades) AND GENERAL GAVIN
Photographed in Belgium six months after the Normandy invasion

The Month's Reading

The Military Press

THE TIMES OF LONDON
1 May 1954

. . . How, then, does [the British Army officer] learn what is going on outside his own parish and his own arm and army? If he were serving in the United States Army he would have easy access to a variety of well-produced, semi-official monthly journals such as COMBAT FORCES or *Armor* to give him facts, pictures, and opinions. In the better daily newspapers and magazines he would read long and expert articles. But the British officer is unhappily placed. His plight is not new, but a surfeit of military security and a shortage of newsprint have aggravated it. He takes what his general offers him.

* * *

The Imperial Defence College, the Staff Colleges, and the higher specialist schools do much to teach officers to think of their profession as such. But if an officer does not begin his military thinking as a subaltern he will start too late; and it must be made somebody's business to provide him with solid and varied food for military thought, particularly now that so many young officers are married, and the mess is no longer a forum for late and leisurely debate. In some Commands officers are required to write essays; might they not be better occupied in reading, if they had the right material to read? In the next ten years the Army will have to fight hard for its new equipment and vehicles—for helicopters, for example, which are fast becoming as much a part of the United States Army as the jeep. Military conservatism and the Treasury will link hands, and it will need strong pressure from both inside and outside the Army to get the money. Ideas have wings, but they need fair winds. In building up since 1946 its large public relations branch the War Office has forgotten its duty to provide for its own officers. It is afraid of telling its secrets to the Russians, and the plain truth to serious students of military affairs. . . .

Zeal for the Air Force

GILL ROBB WILSON
Air University Quarterly Review
Winter 1953-54

Beyond doubt the public is aware of air power. This awareness is the more acute because of the warheads of air power—the atomic and hydrogen bombs . . . of which air power is the chief carrier and against which air power is the chief defender. On the indubitable thesis that the public loves nothing more than its own neck, we may be sure of its interest in air power. But equally we may be sure the public could not care less who saves its neck. It is merely that air power is pertinent to existence. That is the sum and substance of that.

The Air Force could make no sadder mistake than to believe that public concern about air power is *ipso facto* zeal for the Department of the Air Force. The fact is that Army and Navy could quietly absorb every major role of the Air Force without enough public outcry to disturb a nursery.

Armies Win Cold Wars

RAYMOND ARON
The Century of Total War
Doubleday & Company
1954

The approach being taken by the United States in order to counter the new problems arising from Soviet production of atomic weapons and the existence of limited hot wars, seems to be as follows:

In the first place, the United States, which must now maintain not only the arsenal but the army of the coalition, must be secured against a sudden attack. If we assume that the Kremlin calculates rationally, one consideration should be decisive for it: the possibility or impossibility of paralyzing, or substantially weakening American power in a first attack. As long as the United States itself is invulnerable, the most spectacular initial successes would not guarantee ultimate victory. The organization of the Communist empire in the midst of war would meet with even greater difficulties than those encountered by Hitler's attempt at a European empire.

Next, in waging the cold war the West needs conventional armaments greatly superior to those it had in 1950. The reasons are obvious: The United States had not even the necessary resources for a local hot war like that of Korea. In the absence of rearmament, every Soviet aggression, direct or through a satellite, would drive them to a choice between capitulation (or retreat) and total war. The aim of the West is not to win a war, but to avoid it. Knowing this, Russia rightly expects the West to capitulate or retreat.

It may be urged that it is difficult to conceive the multiplication of local wars of the Korean type. In the Middle East, in Iran, the threatened countries do not possess the minimum of military forces without which resistance is out of the question. In Southeastern Asia civil wars are raging. Chinese intervention there would no longer mean local strife, but war against China herself.

Admitting that other local wars are improbable, the West is nevertheless obliged to make an effort at rearmament. The West did not succeed between 1943 and 1945 in using its actual superiority to influence negotiations with the U.S.S.R. But since 1950 the U.S.S.R. has used its superior armament to spread terror. The industrial potential of the United States remains a supreme argument which prevents irreparable initiatives, but it is not enough to reassure the populations doomed to occupation in the event of war, or perhaps to convince the Kremlin that its adversaries are determined to resist.

In other words, this simple proposition has finally been

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ccepted: Regular armies have no substitutes as an instrument of cold war. Whatever the technique of the next war, livisions, tanks, soldiers, are still regarded by the statesman nd the man in the street as an essential element of power. To restore confidence in the masses of Europe, of the Middle East, and of Asia and to instill fear or respect in the masters f the Kremlin, atom bombs and production figures are not nough.

The Virtue of Insanity

THE BOSTON HERALD
7 May 1954

he author of this editorial is Don Murray, winner of the 1953 Pulitzer Prize for editorial writing.

What is it to a young man, bent over in the cutting straps f a parachute, dug at and poked by the uncomfortable apes of battle equipment?

What does he think when the plane roars in maddening rescendos at the end of the runway, shaking and fluttering, sking to be allowed to fly; to speed to its target and home gain: What does the boy think who is cargo; who won't ake the flight home?

What does he think when he looks out the gaping hole here the door has been taken out of the old plane, to make easier to jump? Listening to the uneven growl of the otors, looking at the ground, seeming to rise and fall, lurch long unevenly after the plane; what are his thoughts?

In this crew, who is the boy? Is he a Legionnaire who ompares the green-brown of river land, the dark color of ngles, the angry back of mountains to the comfortable hine country?

Is he a Frenchman and, if so, what kind of patriotism oes he feel, seeing this wild land instead of the manicured apes of the cultivated farms of his own centuries-civilized nd?

What do men think, flying into battle? They thrust aside ie sick, warm fear; the fiendish shadow of death. Their ind plays with pictures from a past (building sand castles n a warm beach or picking up a laughing, squirming baby r a toss into the air). They see flashes from a future they ant (where they are successful in a world after wars; well d and well loved).

But as soldiers they turn from memories and dreams to ie comforting details of preparedness. Check the straps and ie equipment. Your weapon and is the ammunition handy? hin strap. Stand up and hook up the parachute. Follow ie routine of getting ready. Push aside the past, the future. oncentrate on straps and equipment and orders. Lumber the door, anxious to get it over with, fight to get out, to ill down to the mud of Dien Bien Phu.

What does a young man think about swinging gracefully ove a green world, letting the quiet close about him? What does he feel when the quiet is cut and sliced and run red by the sounds of bullets?

Smashing to the ground; running from the shells to cover; getting ready to fight; is he so busy with the fight for survival that he has no time to think about the wild idiocy of being in the lonely garrison of Dien Bien Phu? Isolated from friends; from hope itself; does he wonder, as we do, where he got the courage; where he had the insane idea of going to defend Western Europe by way of a muddy hell hole in a ravaged jungle half way around the globe?

And yet his insanity, even if he loses, may by its very intensity keep the walls of the Free World strong. We, a comfortable half a world away, salute his glorious insanity.

Research—More for Less

HON. DONALD A. QUARLES
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development
Speech, Atlanta, Georgia
13 May 1954

To ensure this technical leadership, we must have and must continue to have a sound military research and development program. This year, the Department of Defense is spending for research and development about 1.3 billion dollars, the highest level of such expenditure in our history. This is about two and one-half times the average research and development expenditure in the years immediately before Korea, when the level ranged around one-half billion dollars per year. Such fluctuations are unwise. We paid the heavy penalty in the rapid build-up both in the initial inefficiency of the research and development work, as such, and in the attempt to produce in large quantity matériel for Korea that had not been completely developed. The present program, however, taken together with the military-related programs of the Atomic Energy Commission, accounts for about one-half the total research and development under way in the United States. As important as this work is to the security of the country, I doubt that we could devote a very much higher fraction of our research and development effort to defense without damage to the essential civilian economy and the long-term welfare of the nation. In fact, the budget now under consideration by the Congress for the next fiscal year cuts back this level of expenditure by about 10 per cent. There is, of course, no prospect for the kind of peace that would justify letting down our guard, so the challenge is to get substantially full value from the moderately lower expenditure level. This situation in research and development is part of the preparation for the long pull. Realizing how quickly things will happen in the next major conflict, it is apparent that we must perfect the most modern and effective weapons now and have them ready in our arsenals and in the hands of our troops before war starts. We must realize that we will never again be allowed the time for orderly build-up from a peacetime to a war footing.



In Berlin the service family can never forget the close presence of the Communists, but it isn't a cloak-and-dagger existence

BERLIN

An Island in the Soviet Sea

MAJOR MARCO POLO

AROUND THE BASES—6

THE U.S. soldier stationed in Berlin is on an island, surrounded by the Soviet zone of Germany. The movies and some of the news stories that have come out of the city lend a cloak-and-dagger air to the assignment, but actually the tension isn't that high. Many men and their families who have served in Berlin would like to go back.

The zone of Berlin that is open to the Western allies (the United States, Great Britain and France) covers only 185 square miles. But in that area living is good and comfortable and offers all of the conveniences of a large and cosmopolitan city anywhere.

You can expect to stay in Berlin three years, now the normal tour. Travel may be either by sea or by air, depending on what is available and how fast they want you to get there. If you travel by sea the ocean trip will take about nine days, leaving from New York and landing at Bremerhaven, with the trip into Berlin by rail. If you fly, you will leave either from Washington National Airport or Westover Field, and land at Frankfurt-Main air field, to make the last leg of the trip sometimes by train, but normally on the daily courier plane.

At this writing concurrent travel is not authorized, and if you ask the trans-

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portation people they will tell you it will take forty weeks for your family to join you in Berlin. However if current plans are carried through there will be concurrent travel by November; and in any event the delay between the time the sponsor gets there and his family joins him will not be nearly as long as it is now. Normal practice today is to assign only bachelors to Berlin with the exception of people in so-called "key" positions. Those family men assigned there can expect to have housing allotted them shortly after they sign in, and as soon as housing is promised families can move Berlin-ward.

HOUSING is good. In the past year and a half there have been several apartments built by the Army, and some day they will probably be entirely occupied by military families. But now they are used largely as bachelor quarters for senior noncoms and company-grade officers. Families are normally provided German roomy and comfortable houses. Each house has a good yard, and a part-time gardener-fireman goes with the quarters.

You need take no furniture with you. Everything you need will be provided. But there are some exceptions. Take your own beds, for example, if you like to sleep in deep comfort. Many wise Army travelers always carry their own beds, and this is a smart move if you are headed for Berlin (or anywhere in Germany) where the bedsteads are handsome, but the springs and mattresses are not exactly conducive to relaxed sleep.

You'll need your own linens and your own pots and pans. True, you can get handsome table linens in Germany and the other parts of Europe you will probably visit during your tour, but you'll want your own to carry you over. And while kitchen utensils can be obtained from the Quartermaster they won't be what you are used to.

You can buy good furniture at good prices in Germany (and also in France and Belgium) if you are willing both to shop and to wait while it is made for you. So unless you have occasional pieces that you simply can't live without, don't take your furniture. The same is true of pictures, about which I'll have more to say later.

Be careful about electrical appliances. The current in Berlin is 220 volt, 50 cycle, and your clocks, radios and record players will not work unless they have been converted. Conversion is a simple job that you can have done either in the States before you leave or in Berlin after you get there. Most people recommend having it done before you leave, since the home-grown job seems to be more satisfactory.

You will have to have converters, too, for your other appliances. These transformers can be bought either here or in Germany; $6.00 is a top price. Working through such a transformer you can run your toaster, waffle iron, vacuum cleaner, or what have you. However, if you don't want to bother you can get excellent electrical goods on the local market at good prices.

The outlets in Berlin, by the way, are different from the American style, so you will find you will have to change the plugs on all of the electrical equipment you take with you. This is a simple task.

You will probably find a television set just extra baggage. There is some German television, but the U.S. radio nets are not telecasting and there are no plans for American television in Berlin in the foreseeable future.

Washing machines are good to have, but not a necessity since you will probably have domestic help. If you do take a machine make it a non-automatic model, since the water pressure in Berlin is not designed for U.S. automatic washers.

SHOPPING facilities in Berlin are good. The commissaries are well stocked with the regular supplies of canned and packaged goods you will find in a United States commissary, green vegetables are plentiful both frozen and fresh from the European markets, and milk, butter and other dairy products are brought in from the Scandinavian countries. Meats are good and plentiful.

The Post Exchange (this is true throughout Europe) offers large varieties of things, but still leaves a good deal to be desired in the clothing department. Items of uniform can be easily obtained. So can standard items of sports clothes for men, men's shoes, and simple clothes for women. Sporting equipment, toilet articles, books and magazines can be bought at the PX, and you can even buy a car through the Exchange system.

You will need a pretty complete wardrobe for your Berlin tour. Social life is active, so you will need dinner clothes (summer and winter, although you can have them made there) as well as uniform. Winter uniform is prescribed for the entire year for duty, but there is a short period in the summer when tropicals are authorized for off-duty wear.

Civilian clothes are authorized, and you will want some. In choosing clothes for the family, remember that Berlin has a temperate climate, seldom dropping to zero and seldom rising above 80.

The ladies should make arrangements with the personal shopper in their favorite department store before leaving the States. Also arrange for shoes and clothes for the kids. These things are hard to find both in the PX and on the German market. Women can, however, find some very pretty clothes in the Berlin specialty shops. Berlin has a tradition of good fashions (Germany's pre-war movie industry was centered in Berlin) and it has grown out of the rubble along with the rest of the city. The specialty shops have very few ready-made garments, but they have excellent fashions and materials which can be made for somewhat less than custom-made specialty shop items in the United States. You can dress in good fashions for between $40 and $100 a garment in Berlin. For sports clothes and less expensive ready-made dresses you had better use your Stateside department store.

EQUALLY as valuable as your personal shoppers are the mail order houses. The Post Exchanges in Berlin have mail order desks where catalogues from Sears, Montgomery Ward and the other large mail order houses are available, but it is easier if you have your own catalogue. You will find it useful for keeping your children in shoes, cold and wet weather gear, and special toys, and your family in other small but important odds and ends.

Men will find that while they can get uniform items and some standard sports clothes through the PX, they will want to import some clothing from the States and also find a good tailor in Berlin. Since Berlin is such an inclosed community the people who live there are thrown close together. Social life is more formal than elsewhere in Germany. Possibly one reason is that many of your friends will be British and French. At any rate you are in luck because German tailors are good and they now understand American tastes in the cut of clothes.

A good deal of your recreation will be social. Because travel is limited and there is no "country" you can reach easily from Berlin, the life is urban. And because the Russians have sealed off their sector of the city so completely they have thrown the British, French and Americans more closely together. There is a great deal of "international" social life between the members of the forces of the three Western powers, and you will find that you are eagerly welcomed at the French and British clubs. It is true that there is a closer bond between the Americans and British than between

Americans and French, but this is only because of the language problem, and if you speak French or are willing to try to learn you will have many chances to make good friends among your Gallic allies.

Aside from social life, Berlin offers great opportunity for recreation. For the athletically inclined there are golf (on an excellent course), tennis, riding, swimming, boating, and skating. The swimming is still confined to pools (of which there are several), since the U.S. medical authorities frown on the rivers and streams.

In addition to the outdoor sports there are the ubiquitous (on U.S. installations) movies, legitimate theater, opera, fine music and art.

BERLIN has two opera companies and one light opera house. All three do a fine job. The Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra plays frequent concerts, and there are several legitimate theaters. Unfortunately the museums and art galleries that were once world famous have not yet been rebuilt, but there are a number of new galleries which offer large showings of modern art. By careful selection and interesting shopping you may be able to pick up some paintings which will delight you for years to come.

All of this, of course, is confined to your 185-mile island. For hunting, fishing, skiing, or more ambitious shopping you must leave the city, and this a major undertaking. In Berlin you are 104 miles from the nearest "free" city.

Actually the trip is not too bad. If you want to get out of Berlin you must plan on three days at least.

You can get out of the city in one of three ways: fly, ride the train, or drive. There is a courier plane which leaves Berlin twice a day for Frankfurt and, with proper orders, you and your dependents can travel on it if space is available. The catch is, of course, that once you are in Frankfurt you are on foot.

Trains leave once a day, for Frankfurt and Bremerhaven. Here again the trip is easy but leaves you on foot.

Driving, you travel out the Autobahn, through the Soviet zone, and into West Germany. It is 104 miles to Helmstedt, the closest western city. If you are on a routine assignment in Berlin this is the best way to go, because once you are into West Germany you have your transportation with you. For people on so-called "sensitive" assignments, however, it is a little more difficult. They must make arrangements with the Provost Marshal to have an MP drive their car to Helmstedt while they take the train. Once in Helmstedt they pick up their car and go their merry way. On the way back they drop the car in Helmstedt for an MP to return to Berlin, and again make the rest of the trip by train. This is a simple security measure, but does add to the cloak-and-dagger aspect of the trip. Once outside of Berlin and the Soviet zone, all of the recreational facilities of Germany and the rest of Europe are available to you.

BERLIN is a good place for your children. Because it is a city and movement is somewhat restricted, the Special Services people have a large program of activities for young people. In addition, the schools are excellent. The Army operates schools from the first grade through high school, and many people consider these to be the best U.S. schools in Europe. For the nursery school set, many parents have felt it wise to send them to German schools. There are a number of good German pre-school age schools, and the American children seem both to enjoy them and to get a lot out of them. They learn more of the language, and normally get along very well with the German children.

All of the U.S. schools teach German as a normal part of the curriculum, starting with the first grade, and through Special Services your children can study music, musical instruments or art from good teachers.

Recreation-wise, all of the facilities that are open to adults are also open to children, and the British and French will take the kids in as graciously and eagerly as they will accept the parents.

Your children will get a good deal of marginal education from your servants, too. Servants in Berlin are good, and while they are not as cheap as in some other places in the world, they are inexpensive by American standards. Average wages are from $20 to $25 a month, the latter being for a housekeeper who will not only keep the house and cook but will do the shopping, often advantageously as far as your budget is concerned.

If the $20 or so seems high, and if you and your family are willing to do more of the work around the house, you can frequently find a German college student who will do the heavy work, help in the kitchen and help serve for his room and board. Since German college hours are not the same as ours (most students are at school no more than half a day) this is frequently a satisfactory solution. The labor office of Army headquarters can give you assistance and up-to-the-minute advice on the household help problem.

THERE are certain things you will need to make your tour of Berlin more pleasant. One is an automobile. While it is true there is a limited area in which you can roam in Berlin, public transportation is slow, crowded and infrequent. Since you may find yourself living a considerable distance from the commissary, PX and your job, a car will be useful. Also, your social and recreational activities may be quite a distance from your house.

You can take a car with you. The government will ship one automobile to Europe for you on your travel orders. If you have a small car of a popular make, and it is in pretty good shape, it may be wise to take it. Otherwise you might find it more advantageous to buy one when you get there.

Service facilities through the PX are good in Berlin and the rest of Germany, but only for the popular brands. Parts for other makes are sometimes hard to find. Standard gear shifts are more easily repaired in European country garages than the automatic type, a fact worth keeping in mind. Also, European roads are narrow and rough (except for the Autobahn and a few other superhighways) and gasoline (other than at QM stations) costs from 60 to 75 cents a gallon.

You can buy U.S. cars in Germany, through the PX, for a good price, since you escape most taxes and if you do not take a car with you you get free cross-ocean transportation. Or you can buy European cars, which are smaller and harder-riding than American automobiles, but are easy to drive, easy on gas, and built for European driving. Here again you may be able to make a good deal since the seller can get dollar credits from you, a big item in the economy of Europe today.

ONE of the most interesting—and most trying—things about an assignment in Berlin is of course the international situation. It is hard for Americans to get used to living in a city where there are streets they must not cross, neighborhoods they must not visit. At first all soldiers and their dependents are worried about this, and it colors both their thoughts and their actions. But they soon find that Berlin is a vital and exciting city, and they get over their fears. They find that it is interesting to be on the front line of an ideological battle, where they can look across the street and see how the other side is doing.

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Lament for a Skulker

COLONEL FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER



PRIVATE EDDIE D. SLOVIK

I'll run away again if I have to go out there

DURING the Second World War there were 318,274 deaths in the United States Army, of which 225,618 were battle deaths. Of the larger number, 142 were deaths by execution, all for murder, rape, and rape-murder except one. The one exception was Private Eddie D. Slovik, 36896415, who was "shot to death by musketry" on 31 January 1945 for the crime of desertion in the face of the enemy. He was the only American to be executed for a purely military offense since the end of the Civil War.

Slovik was not the sole American soldier in those eighty years to desert in the face of the enemy, nor was he the sole soldier to be tried and convicted for that offense. He was the only one to pay the extreme penalty provided by law. Many Americans have regretted that this "fine record" was broken.

But is this a "fine record" of which Americans could be proud? Is it not possible that it is instead a shameful record that reveals a national refusal to face hard facts, a squeamishness that could so weaken our moral

COLONEL FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, *JAGC-USAR*, is an experienced lawyer, a soldier whose military knowledge goes far beyond that required of a JAG, a skilled raconteur, and the author of magazine articles and books on both legal and military subjects. In our opinion he is at his best when he combines these two fields to write on military law as in the instance of this article. Colonel Wiener has been a reserve officer for eighteen years and a contributor to this magazine and its predecessors for about the same period. During the Second World War he



served in Trinidad, on Guadalcanal, and with the Tenth Army on Okinawa. Now in the private practice of law in Washington, specializing in appellate cases, Colonel Wiener as a trial judge advocate has prosecuted military cases, and as a civilian attorney has defended military persons before boards of review and the Court of Military Appeals. In addition to serving the Association of the U. S. Army as its General Counsel, Colonel Wiener cheerfully lends his considerable talents to the staff of the Association and Journal whenever they are needed.

fibre as to make Americans unwilling to fight and if need be die in the defense of their country?

The answers to these questions can well be sought through an examination of the case history of Private Slovik. Slovik's story recently was told by William Bradford Huie in *The Execution of Private Slovik,* produced in both hard-cover and paper-cover editions, and condensed in *Look* magazine. Unfornately, neither the book nor most of the reviews of it that have appeared in the literary magazines and metropolitan newspapers escaped the emotionalism the subject usually arouses in Americans. Consequently there has been an almost complete lack of objective appraisal of the real problems raised by the case of Private Slovik.

SLOVIK was born in Detroit, 18 February 1920, of Polish ancestry. His father, originally named Slowikowski and a native of Poland, was a punch-press operator in an automobile parts plant; employment in the twenties was intermittent; home conditions were poor; and Eddie grew up as a dead-end kid with a police record that began when he was twelve.

For five years there is a list of petty recurring offenses, and then late in 1937, just short of 18, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for embezzling $59.60 over a six-month period. Released on parole in September 1938, he stayed at liberty four months, after which he drove off with someone else's car, and was once more sent to prison; he remained in confinement until released on parole a second time in April 1942. An ex-convict, he was automatically classified IV-F.

He found work, and met and in November 1942 married a girl five years older than himself, who, though crippled and subject to epileptic attacks, gave him the strength to go straight; significantly, he usually addressed her, in his voluminous letters, as "Mommy." They were happy together and prospered, moved into a larger apartment for which they bought new furniture, and also bought a second-hand Pontiac. Mr. Huie says, "They had their own private war plans: while the boom lasted they wanted to get as much as they could as fast as they could."

GORDON HARRISON
The Saturday Review

Since the Army had drafted Slovik after first declaring him unfit material for a soldier, did the Army not undertake a special responsibility to make a soldier out of him? More than justice to one man was involved. If the Army by rejecting ex-convicts proclaims the need for a moral fiber in its fighting men, it has said in effect that the weak, the maladjusted, the anti-social, constitute an intolerable danger to the discipline of the organization. Yet Slovik was at last accepted as though he were just another recruit to be fitted into whatever table of organization had a vacancy. He was trained for the infantry. Apparently he was trained well. Mr. Huie, quoting from letters which Slovik wrote from boot camp, comments that the Army almost succeeded in making a soldier out of him. The near success, however, only underlines the final failure, for it is apparent that once Slovik was absorbed in the system, the system no longer remembered the special problem that he represented.

But the Army was beginning to scrape the bottom of its manpower barrel, and Slovik was reclassified I-A on his first wedding anniversary, reporting for duty in January 1944. He was sent to the Infantry RTC at Camp Wolters, Texas.

There followed a wave of letters home breathing self-pity—"I'm so lonesome"; "I can't understand why they did this to us"; "Why couldn't they leave us alone"; "Mommy why did they have to do this to us? We were headed for love and happiness. All we needed was a home and a new car." But in all of Slovik's letters home, which are quoted extensively, and which Mr. Huie says should be preserved in the Library of Congress as "required reading for any scholar who would understand the Second World War," there is not a trace of any suggestion that millions of other Americans, who likewise had been headed for love and happiness, were being similarly inconvenienced. Nor does Mr. Huie, who writes of Slovik that "more than anything on earth, including the United States, he loved his wife; that he loved their newly furnished apartment," ever seem to be aware that similar preferences were—well, hardly unusual—among others in the service.

Slovik wrote home from Wolters, "I am trying to act just as dum as I can 'cause the smarter you are the faster you have to go overseas." "I am going on the rifle range Saturday and I am going to foul up. I'll try to have a poor score so they won't send me overseas." "I'm not trying to be a good soldier." "I'm sick and tired of shooting my rifle." "You know how much I hate to use a rifle." But then a change crept in. "I have that speed hike to make today. . . . I'll try my best. So far I've been doing purty good

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and I don't want to fail now." "Well darling I made that speed hike and I feel swell this morning." As Mr. Huie notes, the Army *almost* made a soldier of Slovik.

But, as his wife was not able to work because of ill-health and so could not maintain the cherished apartment, Slovik applied for a dependency discharge. The Red Cross's suggestion that Mrs. Slovik move to more modest quarters was not acceptable to the Sloviks, and the application for discharge was denied. But, apparently because of its pendency, Slovik was not shipped out with the buddies with whom he had trained, but stayed behind at Wolters. After a short furlough in July, he was sent overseas on 7 August with 7000 other infantry replacements, complete strangers. On the trip over, while cleaning his rifle, Slovik said to one Tankey, a new buddy, "I never intend to fire it."

LANDED in England, Slovik received two days' instruction in hedgerow fighting, and was then shipped to Omaha Beach. On 25 August, after five days of processing at the 3d Replacement Depot, Slovik and eleven others, accompanied by an NCO, were issued ammunition, put into a truck, and told they were assigned to Company G, 109th Infantry, 28th Division. The truck set out for Elbeuf to join the unit, passing over the wreckage, destruction, and death that remained of what had been the Falaise pocket—hardly an auspicious introduction to the war. Arrived at Elbeuf, shelling began; the men dug themselves in on the NCO's order. There was an order to move out, and some of the replacements reached G Company; Slovik later wrote conflicting versions of his own conduct on that occasion.

At any rate, he and Tankey did not join Company G, but turned themselves in to a Canadian outfit, the 13th Provost Corps, with which they remained for about forty-five days. Slovik did odd jobs for the Canadians, principally cooking. On 7 October, he and Tankey finally reached the 109th's headquarters, and on the next day he reported to Company G.

He told the CO that he was "too scared, too nervous" to serve with a rifle company and that unless he could be kept in a rear area he would run away. The CO assigned Slovik to the 4th Platoon, turned him over to the platoon leader, and forbade him to leave the company area without permission. The platoon leader introduced Slovik to his squad leader. Later Slovik came to the CO and inquired if he could be tried for AWOL; the CO said he would find out, and had him placed in arrest and returned to his platoon area. About an hour later, Slovik went back to the CO and asked, "If I leave now will it be desertion?" The CO said yes, and Slovik left, without his gun, walking fast.

At this point, the CO came out and said to Tankey, who was there, "Soldier, you better stop your buddy. He is getting himself into serious trouble." Tankey ran after Slovik, grabbed him by the shoulder, and stopped him. "Come on back, Eddie, you don't want to do this. . . ." Slovik said, "Johnny, I know what I'm doing." He jerked away from Tankey and kept going.

At about 0830 hours the next morning, Slovik turned himself in to the Military Government detachment, 112th Infantry, told the cook he had made a confession, and handed him a green slip containing the following:

> I Pvt. Eddie D. Slovik #36896415 confess to the Desertion of the United States Army. At the time of my Desertion we were in Albuff in France. I came to Albuff as a Replacement. They were shelling the town and we were told to dig in for the night. The following morning they were shelling us again. I was so scared nerves and trembling that at the time the other Replacements moved out I couldn't move. I stayed their in my foxhole till it was quite and I was able to move. I then walked in town. Not seeing any of our troops so I stayed over night at the French hospital. The next morning I turned myself over to the Canadian Provost Corp. After being with them six weeks I was turned over to American M.P. They turned me lose. I told my commanding officer my story. I said that if I had to go out their again I'd run away. He said their was nothing he could do for me so I ran away again AND I'LL RUN AWAY AGAIN IF I HAVE TO GO OUT THEIR."

This confession was turned over to a Lieutenant Colonel of the 109th Infantry, who warned Slovik that the written confession could be damaging to him, and suggested he take it back and destroy it. Slovik refused, and then signed the following on the reverse of the green slip.

> I have been told that this statement can be held against me and that I made it of my own free will and that I do not have to make it.

After that, Slovik was confined in the division stockade—"just one of the kids bucking for a court-martial so he could stay out of the line," observed one of the sergeants. When some of the others came back from their trials saying they had received sentences of twenty years, Slovik rejoiced with them.

Since Slovik had never even tried soldiering in a rifle company, he was sent for by the Staff JA, who offered to suspend action on the court-martial if Slovik would go back. Slovik refused; "I'd be willing to take a job way back from the line with a quartermaster outfit or something like that, but if I can't get that, then give me my court-martial." The Staff JA warned of the consequences—desertion in time of war is a capital offense, "You might even get a death sentence." Slovik was adamant. "No, I've made up my mind. I'll take my court-martial."

AND he did, on 11 November, before a nine-man general court-martial composed exclusively of staff officers. The combat people were otherwise engaged, for this was the period of the Hürtgen Forest, and, in particular, of the 28th Division's repulse at Schmidt, "one of the most costly division actions in the whole of World War II," according to the Army's official history. (The battle began on 2 November, most of it

S. L. A. MARSHALL
The New York Times

IN every war which I have attended for this country, I have seen men forced to do duty in the combat line who obviously had no emotional fitness for it. They were potential crackups who should have been detected at the induction center. In a noncombat service they could have been useful. But they were sent forward where they invariably became a load on their able comrades, a disgrace to their families and a drain upon the national substance. This was done in the name of "fair play." In the long run, it is as costly as is our other bad habit of siphoning culls into infantry service.

Conceivably, in this age of massive retaliation the infantry requirement is no longer the decisive consideration. But there is always a first line of some kind, and it is not a place for Eddie Sloviks.

Unless that is the point, Mr. Huie should have left the incident decently buried. And unless Mr. Huie's readers approach this book reflectively, dwelling less on its horror than upon its meaning, then it should never have been written.

was over by the 9th, and on 19 November the 28th Division was relieved by the 8th Division.)

The case against Slovik was open and shut and the trial lasted less than two hours. Actually, there was nothing to try, Slovik having fully admitted his guilt. After findings of guilty, the court took three ballots on the sentence. All were unanimous: death.

The record was then forwarded for review, at which time Slovik's civilian background became material. But whether Slovik's past influenced the convening authority, Maj. Gen. Norman D. Cota, CG, 28th Division, may well be doubted. General Cota's attitude was crystal clear:

> Given the situation as I knew it in November, 1944, I thought it was my duty to this country to approve that sentence. If I hadn't approved it—if I had let Slovik accomplish his purpose—then I didn't know how I could have gone up to the line and looked a good soldier in the face.

And so, on 27 November, General Cota approved the sentence, after which the record was sent to the Theater Judge Advocate for further review. That officer had before him Slovik's plea to General Eisenhower for clemency, which, although saying, "I don't believe I ran away the first time as I stated in my first confession," and, "I'd like to continue to be a good soldier," was pointedly silent about offering to return to the infantry duty for which Slovik had been trained.

The Theater JA's review said in pertinent part,

> These prior offenses are not of sufficient gravity to influence my recommendations in the instant case. However, they indicate a persistent refusal to conform to the rules of society in civilian life, an imperviousness to penal correction and a total lack of appreciation of clemency . . .
>
> There can be no doubt that he deliberately sought the safety and comfort of the guardhouse. To him and to those soldiers who may follow his example, if he achieves his end, confinement is neither deterrent nor punishment. He has directly challenged the authority of the government, and future discipline depends upon a resolute reply to this challenge. If the death penalty is ever to be imposed for desertion it should be imposed in this case, not as a punitive measure nor as retribution, but to maintain that discipline upon which alone an army can succeed against the enemy.

And so General Eisenhower confirmed the sentence, on—23 December 1944. The Battle of the Bulge was raging, Bastogne was surrounded. Indeed, on the day before, 22 December, General McAuliffe of the 101st Division had responded to the German demand for surrender with "Nuts!"—a monosyllable that has become part of our history.

General Eisenhower's action completed AW 48 confirmation; AW 50½ review was still to come. The record of trial was found legally sufficient by a board of review, and then by the Assistant Judge Advocate General for the ETO. The latter officer wrote:

> This soldier has performed no front line duty. He did not intend to. He deserted from his group of fifteen when about to join the infantry company to which he had been assigned. His subsequent conduct shows a deliberate plan to secure trial and incarceration in a safe place. The sentence adjudged was more severe than he had anticipated, but the imposition of a less severe sentence would only have accomplished the accused's purpose of securing his incarceration and consequent freedom from the dangers which so many of our armed forces are required to face daily. His unfavorable civilian record indicates that he is not a worthy subject of clemency.

Slovik was sent back to the 28th Division to be executed, somewhat to the surprise of General Cota, who, however, "conceded the logic in the theater commander's action: a deserter should be shot by the outfit he deserts."

And he was, on 31 January 1945, the only execution for a purely military offense from the close of the Civil War until this day. He died far more bravely than he lived; as the attending chaplain later said, "Slovik was the bravest man in the garden that morning."

MAJ. GEN. JIM DAN HILL (NGUS)
in syndicated newspaper column

Slovik had every opportunity to be a man. He arrived in the bitter Hürtgen Forest fighting at a time when military courts were becoming a joke. Every dogface on the line knew the rear area, chair borne soldiers were commuting the long sentences of the front line courts to three months "in the interest of morale and the war effort." A death sentence often meant no more than a comfortable prison through the duration.

Private Slovik, far from being the maladjusted psychopath Mr. Huie would have you believe, traded on this trend at the wrong time and place. When every effort to get him to fight met with confessed cowardice and AWOL from assigned posts of duty, he faced a court; begged cowardice, received the death penalty.

It was properly reviewed by higher authority. He was publicly shot by a firing squad.

With him also died a fast burgeoning front line theory that assimilated psychopathic cowardice could pay dividends—not while brave men were dying for their fellow men in the bitter Battle of the Bulge.

II

UNFORTUNATELY Mr. Huie set out to write a macabre horror story and arranged his materials to that end. He starts the book with a trip to the cemetery plot where lie Slovik's unhonored remains, begins and ends most of his chapters with the actual execution, and then lingers in infinite detail over the mechanics of putting a human being to death in cold blood. There is good coverage in the sense that everyone connected with the case who is still living and could be found was interviewed at length, but the story is never told consecutively, and the author jumps back and forth past the act of execution, not to discuss basic central problems of military sanctions, but to pull out all the stops and start the tears flowing.

Not unnaturally, the book contains numerous errors and at least one seriously misleading suggestion, namely, that the Slovik case only came to light after the author struggled for seven years to get the file declassified.

Actually, Mr. Huie knew the essential details of Slovik's offense over most of that period. In the June 1948 issue of the now defunct magazine *Liberty*, Mr. Huie contributed an article on "Are Americans Afraid to Fight?", in which, at page 80, he told the essentials of Slovik's desertion, calling the man "Lewis Simpson." He was vague about the process of review, to the point of suggesting that General Ben Lear may have participated therein. A look at the law would have cleared up that point without declassification. But, with information from the record available to him, Mr. Huie had access to the names of the participants, whom he was then enabled to interview. It is a pity that the standards of his approach and presentation do not measure up to those of his thoroughness and industry.

For instance, he says that Slovik was executed "for the crime of *avoiding* a duty," to which is also given the verbal twist of "put to death for a crime of omission." The fact of course is that Slovik was shot for two acts of desertion —which are plainly acts of commission. The difference is perhaps of more significance emotionally than legally, but the

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istortion is unhappily characteristic of ıe author's treatment.


Mr. Huie says, "The last American to ssume final responsibility in such a case ad been Abraham Lincoln; the last Vest Pointer, acting for the United tates, had been General Winfield cott." In fact, the last President who ealt with death sentences imposed on merican soldiers for purely military ffenses was Woodrow Wilson, in re- ɔect of four death cases from the 1st)ivision in the winter of 1917-1918. The details are in Frederick Palmer's iography of Secretary Baker and in the 919 hearings before the Senate Military ffairs Committee on the court-martial ystem during World War I.) More- ver, the last West Pointer who con- rmed death sentences for military of- ɛnses in the Civil War was probably ieneral Meade, who approved them for ıe Army of the Potomac right up to ppomattox; Winfield Scott was not a raduate of the Military Academy.

Mr. Huie says, "Throughout virtually l our national history the power of fe-and-death over American soldiers has ɛen exclusively the President's . . . But y the Act of 1920 (the 1920 Articles of Var) confirming power was delegated to ıe theater commanders in certain death ıses, one of which was desertion in me of war." The fact is otherwise. xcept for the period 17 July 1862 to March 1863, the President's approval as never requisite for such sentences in me of war. AW 65 of 1806; AW 105 1874; AW 48 of 1916 and 1920. Not ıtil AW 48(a) of 1948 was the law ıanged to eliminate field confirmation wartime death cases.

In one instance, Mr. Huie has un- ɔubtedly learned something since 1948. hen he wrote (*Liberty,* June 1948), The 28th Division was not one of our ore distinguished divisions." Today he ys, "No unit bearing arms for this com- unity of free men is older or has a ouder heritage," and he calls it "a big, ugh, hard-luck, meat-grinding outfit."

UT whatever the author may thus have learned over the years, surely the ost shameful aspect of this book is the lse hope it attempts to raise in Slovik's idow for obtaining Slovik's insurance. hat insurance went unpaid because ovik died "under dishonorable circum- ıances," as indeed he had, and because e law specifically provides that "No surance shall be payable for death in- cted as lawful punishment for crime ." Mr. Huie attempts to make a case ıt of the circumstances that General Cota disapproved the portions of the sentence other than the shooting, and that the Theater Judge Advocate recommended confirmation of the sentence for disciplinary reasons. But the reason for the partial disapproval was that the sentence as adjudged did not comply with the form in the *Manual for Courts-Martial,* and of course desertion in time of war is a crime, one that routinely, regardless of sentence, entails a loss of citizenship unless the deserter is subsequently restored to duty. It was cruel to raise such hopes; but it was more than cruel, it was sordid exploitation to bring Mrs. Slovik to Washington, there to be photographed clutching a copy of the book, to seek relief legislation. (Both Michigan Senators refused their aid.)

The most charitable appraisal of Mr. Huie's book is the suggestion that he is out of his depth and on unfamiliar ground. He wrote more convincingly when, in *The Revolt of Mamie Stover,* he chronicled the life and work of a Honolulu harlot.



The men who made the soldierly decisions: Generals Eisenhower and Cota photographed in Europe before the case of Private Slovik came to their official attention.

III

BUT the problems posed by the Slovik case are far more significant—and far more disturbing—than Mr. Huie's failures of commission and omission.

The first of these is: Are Americans afraid to fight? How can we indoctrinate our young men so that, when the next test comes, they will stand and not run away? The Army *almost* made a soldier of Slovik, and the chaplain helped him die far more of a man than he had lived. One of the men in the firing squad said, "I can't understand why a man who had the guts to face a firing squad like that wouldn't stay in the line with the rest of us."

What went wrong?

Significantly enough, in all of Slovik's voluminous letters to his wife, there are only three references to patriotic emotion. Is that simply a reflection of the circumstances that, as a member of an underprivileged racial minority, Slovik may have had but scant attachment to the United States? That cannot be the whole story, because he was similarly devoid of attachment to the country of his father's birth; he had no urge to avenge the Nazis' brutal treatment of the Poles. Indeed, while with the Canadians, he treated a captured German pilot with obviously unnecessary kindness. "Eddie just didn't hate anybody, not even the Germans." Perhaps patriotism and hatred of those who have wronged one's own blood are overrated as motivating factors.

S. L. A. Marshall thinks so; in his *Men Against Fire* he points out that the real attachment that a soldier has is not to his ideals, but to his buddy: "I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade."

It was coincidence, unhappy coincidence, that Slovik's Camp Wolters friends went off while his application for discharge was being processed. But surely a more intelligent use of the admittedly faulty World War II replacement system could have avoided sending twelve green men in a truck across the carnage of the Falaise pocket. At the very minimum, they should have been sent, not to one company, but to Division HQ. If Slovik's story does nothing else, it underscores the wisdom of having a replacement company as an organic

unit in each division, and it likewise emphasizes the essential psychological soundness of the packet replacement system.

That is not to say that everyone can expect always to be surrounded by old buddies; on that basis we would be back to the Civil War fallacy of letting units be decimated and reinforcing the armies with new units. There must be individual replacements, and while the replacement will perhaps never be completely happy, his morale can be improved, and his military effectiveness increased, by giving him some feeling of cohesion with his new unit, by giving him what Slovik in all fairness never had.

Still—Slovik had a buddy. Tankey was his constant companion for two months, from Kilmer, on the trip overseas, in England, at Elbeuf, with the Canadians, and when the two rejoined the 28th Division. They had much in common: both were from Detroit, both had worked in auto plants, both were of Polish descent, both were happily married—and Tankey endeavored, without success, to dissuade Slovik from deserting in October. Lack of a buddy does not fully explain the Slovik case.

OF course not all men can be made into front-line doughboys. Some lack the physical stamina, some lack the necessary emotional fortitude, some have both but break down sooner than their fellows. Here again, Slovik does not fit into the usual categories.

First, there was never any question of Slovik's sanity or legal responsibility, and the facts simply do not raise the issue of general-versus-psychiatrist that Mr. Huie attempts to inject. Nor do General Cota's doubts as to the effectiveness of some of the military psychiatry practiced in his division have the slightest relevance in the present connection.

Next, there was no question here of combat fatigue, of a good soldier who had served under fire ultimately refusing to do more, or deliberately running away after having previously chalked up a good record. Slovik never gave the line a try. He was universally liked, he was a good buddy, "do anything in the world for you," "do anything I told him to" —anything, that is, except his assigned duty.

Finally, the recorded reluctance of Slovik ever to use his rifle—it is in his letters home, it was in his remarks to Tankey on the overseas journey—suggests inquiry into what S. L. A. Marshall reported on the findings of the psychiatrists in the ETO: "They found that fear of killing, rather than fear of being killed, was the most common cause of battle failure in the individual, and that fear of failure ran a strong second."

Well, fear of killing may have been part of Slovik's trouble, but assuredly he had but little fear of failure; and while his first glimpse of the war at Falaise and at Elbeuf made him understandably frightened, the real question is posed by the contrast between his panic when he took off in October and his fortitude on the morning of his death. And that question, in all fairness, remains unanswered.

A weaker man would have quailed before the firing squad; the SOP for military executions provides for "a suitable braceboard and straps" if "collapse has taken place or is imminent." Slovik had no need of it, and one of the provost sergeants said, "I came nearer needing it than he did." Whence did Slovik draw his strength on that last day?

Said Father Cummings, the chaplain: "If you ask me where Eddie Slovik found his courage, I'll have to give you the 'commercial.' For two thousand years the Catholic Church has been supplying what Eddie Slovik needs on the day he meets his death. From where else can a little man find strength?"

The Communists indoctrinate their soldiers without resort to religion. Is there not some military specific, with or without the aid of the chaplains, th will similarly inspire Americans? And Father Cummings is right, why can n why should not, his source of streng be applied to the Sloviks beforehand?

WALTER MILLIS
The New York Herald Tribune

Was it justice? One cannot answer in the negative without a thought for all the others whom a modern nation drives to terror and death in war. Can one really distinguish with any precision between those whose personalities cannot stand the strain and those who can? Public sentiment and the new military code are so hostile to execution for cowardice that Mr. Huie believes the Slovik case will be the last of the kind so long as we retain our democratic form of government. But without a death penalty, can men be driven to battle in sufficient numbers? Mr. Huie does not attempt to answer these or the many similar questions which arise. He has recounted the tragedy, simply, movingly and illuminatingly, for what it was.

IV

IN *War As I Knew It,* written short before his accidental death, Gene Patton wrote:

> One of the great defects in our mi tary establishment is the giving of we sentences for military offenses. . . . am convinced that, in justice to oth men, soldiers who go to sleep on po who go absent for an unreasonable tin during combat, who shirk in batt should be executed;' and that Arm Commanders or Corps Commande should have the authority to approve t death sentences. It is utterly stupid say that General Officers, as a result whose orders thousands of gallant ar brave men have been killed, are n capable of knowing how to remove t life of one miserable poltroon.

That, unquestionably, is medicine t strong for the temper of our nation—ar has been for some time. Even in th first World War, General Pershing request for broader confirming powe over death sentences than those co ferred by AW 48, in order to put him o a parity with the British and Frenc commanders, was turned down by Se retary Baker and President Wilson. W have come a long way from the stan ards of colonial days, when Colon George Washington in 1756 and 175 hanged deserters from his Virginia Reg ment in preference to shooting then because he thought that hemp taug the lesson better than lead.

The decreasing number of civilian o fenses for which death can now be in flicted as a punishment by the civ courts reflects a deep-seated nationa mood. "A man's life is at stake," has powerful impact in daily affairs, not jus in the movies, as witness what is no apparently a standard feature of ever capital sentence: the tedious appellat process, the dramatized appeal for execu tive clemency, the last-minute resort t habeas corpus, and then an applicatio for a stay of execution. The acrobatic in the Rosenberg case last summer com readily to mind.

AND so it is perhaps not to be won dered at that the same currents o opinion have affected military law. In dependent appellate review in the court martial system, outside of the chain o command, got its start when, after th accused had been executed, the Wa Department first heard of the 24th In fantry death cases that arose out of th

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The Execution of a Civil War Deserter



Readers of *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper* found the ›ove drawings of the execution of a Civil War deserter ›read across two pages of the issue of January 4, 1862.

The captions under the smaller drawings across the top ›ad, from left to right:

"To the Execution"; "The deserter Johnson"; "Troops ıssing the body."

The legend across the bottom reads:

"Scenes attending the military execution near Washington of Private William H. Johnson, of the Lincoln Cavalry, on Friday afternoon, 13th December, in presence of Gen. Franklin's division, for desertion and intended communications with the enemy.—*From sketches made on the spot by our Special Artist. See Page 102.*"

ouston riot in 1917. As it happened, e records were legally sufficient, but a ›lding of legal insufficiency would not ıve accomplished resurrection. So GO ›9 of 1917 varied AW 48 of 1916 to ›ovide that no death sentences could be ›ecuted until after review in the War epartment. And the Texas mutiny ses invoked another reform, GO 7 of ›18, requiring similar review before a shonorable discharge could be exe-ıted.

Those provisions were codified in AW ›½ of 1920; that is why Slovik's case ıs reviewed both by the Theater Judge Advocate and by the Assistant Judge Advocate General. After World War II, all field confirmation in death cases was abolished by AW 48(a) of 1948, a circumstance barely noticed at the time, but which hardly amounted to an accolade of approval for the several theater commanders' stewardship of death cases in the struggle with the Axis. Now, under Articles 67(b)(1) and 71(a) of the Uniform Code, all death cases require mandatory review by the Court of Military Appeals and confirmation by the President, with the result that, in the usual murder case carrying a death sentence, several years elapse between crime and punishment. (In the Guam rape-murder incident, tried under the 1948 Articles of War, where the accused resorted to habeas corpus and reached the Supreme Court, the offense was committed on 11 November 1948 and the accused were not hanged until 28 January 1954.) Thus, as sought to be applied to purely military offenses, capital punishment has become an empty threat: the war would be over long before any such sentence could be executed. In those circumstances punishment has lost its deterrent effect—which in mili-

tary life is its principal justification.

EVERY year, nearly 40,000 Americans are killed in automobile accidents, and the number is increasing. The great majority of citizens approve the stern decision that killed almost 200,000 human beings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And yet when it comes to a single killing by musketry as punishment, General Cota himself, whose personal courage is attested by a DSC, said of the Slovik execution which he deemed it his duty to witness, "That was the roughest fifteen minutes of my life."

Is that a reflection of national feeling? Or is it simply squeamishness? At any rate, the same sentiment finds its way into routine military administration. Between the World Wars, an American officer was hanged in the Philippines for murdering his fiancée. But he is listed among the "casualties" in the following year's *Army Register* simply as "Died." Huie writes that the only notification Mrs. Slovik received was that her husband had "died in the ETO." This is not quite correct. The Army knows that the Chaplain who last attended Private Slovik wrote in full to Mrs. Slovik shortly after the execution took place.

The Army's refusal for many years to let the Slovik record be seen rests however on a different basis. The policy, the tradition, always was, court-martial records are privileged, regardless of the type of offense. Whether AWOL, drunk and disorderly, larceny, rape, or whatnot, no one except the accused and his family or counsel could have access to a record of trial. Whether, as an original proposition, this was a sound policy, may well be a matter admitting of doubt; after all, the verbatim record of every criminal trial in a civilian court is available to anyone who will visit the courthouse. Somewhat more difficult to explain is why the Army's policy should have been varied for this particular case, why information from the Slovik file was suddenly made available to one who from past published perfomances was something less than a disinterested scholar.

THERE are references in the book, there has been much talk over the years by JAG officers, about the "fine record" of no death sentences for military offenses in the AEF; and some have deplored the Slovik case for that reason. Well, General Pershing did recommend execution of the four 1st Division death sentences, for sleeping on post and willful disobedience, sentences that President Wilson, on Secretary Baker's recommendation, later commuted. But was it a "fine record," and does such an approach by judge advocates serve the best interests of the service?

Not all of the 225,618 individuals who were battle deaths in the World War II Army died bravely, but surely the great majority of them did. Why then, is it a "fine record" to condemn the brave to a high risk of death, and then to make certain that those, like Slovik, who deliberately refused duty, should be spared and later released, to be thereafter free to attend to their own pursuits? What is the sense of all the panoply of trial procedure, and all the careful reviewing, if the sentence that has been prescribed and adjudged is simply to be commuted? Is not the prevailing attitude, whatever may be its emotional origin, mightily unfair to every mother's son who, when ordered forward to probable death, goes willingly without flinching?

The president of the court-martial that sentenced Slovik remarked, "There was his confession: he had run away from his duties as a rifleman and he would run away again. Given the circumstances of a division locked in bloody battle and taking heavy casualties, I didn't think I had a right to let him get away with it." How can anyone quarrel with that conclusion? Mr. Huie hints that the sentence might have been different if the court has been composed, not of staff officers, but of combat officers, but this is highly improbable. Combat veterans are understandably more severe with respect to combat offenses, as unit commanders are always more severe as to disciplinary offenses, besides which, the 28th Division had just suffered, at Schmidt, what the *Three Battles* study describes as "a major repulse to American arms." A court composed of combat officers would not have taken three ballots; one would have sufficed, and it would probably not have required much preliminary discussion.

IT is similarly difficult to disagree with the views of one of the firing squad, a fine combat soldier: "We decided he had it coming to him. He had deserted us when he was needed most, and his leaving could have caused a whole company of good men to have been slaughtered by Jerry patrols, of which there was plenty running around loose."

Yes, Slovik had it coming to him, but why was he the only one? That is Mr. Huie's repeated question—and one to which the answer is less clear.

When Slovik was being tied to the execution post, he said to the provo sergeant, "They're not shooting me fo deserting the United States Army. Thou sands of guys have done that. They ju need to make an example out of some body and I'm it because I'm an ex-con I used to steal things when I was a kid and that's what they are shooting me fo They're shooting me for bread an chewing gum I stole when I was twelv years old."

As the legal reviews previously quoted have shown, Slovik's civilian record wa a factor in his being denied clemency though probably not the determinativ one, for assuredly his civilian offense paled by comparison with the enormit —and the brazen effrontery—of his mil tary offenses. Would he have been sho if he had never tangled with the polic as a boy, if as a youth he had never seen the inside of a prison or a reformatory The answer there must be a qualifie one: Yes, given the other factors. Slovi was sentenced while his unit was takin a pasting in the Hürtgen Forest, hi sentence was approved towards the clos of a month that cost the 28th Divisio almost 5700 casualties, and his sentenc was confirmed just when the 101st Air borne was besieged in Bastogne, whil the outcome of the Battle of the Bulg hung in the balance. Given the aggra vated circumstances of his case, given th timing of reviewing and confirming ac tion in relation to the war situation Slovik would undoubtedly have been shot regardless of his civilian back ground. The only thing that could pos sibly have saved him would have been what he specifically refrained from put ting into his clemency appeal—an offe to go into the line and so do his duty.

STILL—why was Slovik the only one executed by his own people? There remains an irreducible residuum of troubling doubt, not as to Slovik—he had his full measure of justice—but as to the others. Were there not many others equally guilty who deserved the same fate? Was the final result of only one execution for desertion in all of World War II fair to the 225,618 battle deaths of that conflict? If without qualms we conscript men and force them to fight and invoke the full sanctions of national power to lead them to death in line of duty, must we not, in fairness to such men, deal with similar lack of qualms with the few who deliberately and calculatingly shirk their duty?

And if we do not, how can we, in General Cota's words, ever again look any decent fellow-citizen in the face?

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The cold objective look

Instead of committing ourselves to either limited or total war, we should be prepared to exert whatever force is needed to preserve our security

COLONEL SHILLELAGH

MANY years ago one of my very wise teachers said: "Other Americans may cultivate illusions and prejudices about war, but we soldiers cannot afford to do so. We have to fight it, and we must look on it with cold objectivity." That is the look we need today when it is fashionable to take "new looks" at our military establishment.

The enemy of objectivity is hope. Through the ages, men have tried hard to believe what they wanted to believe about preserving peace, and in doing so they became weak, invited aggression and conquest. Hope must be flanked by prudence if it is to lead men to peace.

The pressures of hope in the world today are obvious to all. They have not only complicated the problems of alliance but also have inspired the "new" theories of war. The argument of intolerable destruction is old, but strengthened by the birth of atomic warfare. The objective is limited war. The philosophy is found in four principal theses which are:

- Force is total.
- The professional military man thinks in terms of total victory and total destruction.
- The civilian policy maker must limit the destruction of war to preserve civilization.
- Wars can be limited by forbearance.

THE concept that force is total implies that it is uncontrollable and inevitable. Once man becomes embroiled in the use of this total power, the only end is obliteration for one or both parties to the struggle.

Is this concept valid? We know that atomic warfare has vastly increased the power of weapons and that the offensive air weapons have a high capability of penetrating enemy defenses. Yet we also know that offensive and defensive capabilities are subject to continuing adjustment with the development of new weapons; so that this balance represents a present and temporary condition which is subject to change. The apparent present trend is to increase the offensive advantage.

If force is total, what is the impact of this consideration on war? How do we prevent the application of this total force? Our defense planning has given one answer in the creation of a deterrent capability which would answer aggression with swift and devastating retaliation. Are there other practical and less expensive courses open to us?

Slavery is a possible alternative. It seems to be the logical end of all the intermediate positions. Certainly total force is limited only by the objectives of the one who holds it. If you grant the advantage to an enemy who wields total power, you hold no escape from his will but death.

There is nothing new, however, in the subjection of the weak to the powerful. It is the implication that power can and will be used to destroy civilization that is behind "force is total."

THE thesis that professional soldiers think in terms of total power and total destruction implies that their judgment cannot be trusted if civilization is to be preserved. This position prepares for the argument that new answers are required and that the new theorists have them.

There is something to this. Some military men and some civilians are so dazzled by power in its various forms that they see nothing else. Such thinking, however, is not in the best military tradition. Hitler was dazzled by power, but the German General Staff was not.

The American soldier has traditionally been conservative in the use of power. His point of view has been to appraise power realistically but always as the servant of the national interest.

There is no unanimity about this appraisal today. Each new weapon brings a new chorus of claims that it has revolutionized warfare, that old forms are obsolete. This was claimed for the

COLONEL SHILLELAGH is a combat-arms officer who contributes to this magazine from time to time.

airplane after World War I, for the atomic weapon after World War II. In changing the dimensions of power, the atomic claim to revolution is more impressive than others have been. It has tended to upset the tradition of objective appraisal as military men adjust to this new scale of power. Some are afraid to use it; others regard it as the arbiter of all power conflicts of the future.

As the atomic arsenal grows, there will be tremendous pressure to use it. We must maintain our atomic armament as the essential element of our deterrent power. Must we carry also the burden of conventional armament?

The arithmetic of atomic power is simple. The art of using it in war is far more complex. It is new. The implications of using the atom are uncertain and the consequences of misjudgment are appalling. These factors are apparent in the first eight years of the atomic era. There is serious doubt that atomic weapons can or should replace conventional weapons at this stage of history.

NO one can quarrel with the thesis that the civilian policy maker must limit the destruction of war to preserve civilization. In the first place, it is clearly his responsibility, in our country at least, to make the vital policy decisions. The Second World War destroyed enough of our civilization to indicate what would happen in unrestrained atomic warfare.

The danger of the thesis is in the implication that limitation of destruction can be achieved by some agreement of civilian policy makers or by restraining the military leadership. It suggests that there is an alternative to the carefully planned preparedness which has been our shield in the past. Would there were. If there is a cheaper way than our present course to guard the independence and security of the United States, we should be following it. For the objective of military preparedness must be not alone to guard our security, but to do the job as cheaply as possible. If the statesman can reduce the real threat, the soldier can reduce his defenses correspondingly.

Restraint of the military leadership can, however, lead to some very gross mistakes of policy. Policy is properly a framework within which military affairs must be conducted, and it is made by the political leadership of the country. When, however, the restraint spells out details of military action, we can develop a political interference in military action which will insure the failure of military operations. It is therefore the implication that civilians should move into the proper domain of military leadership which holds potential danger.

THE thesis that war can be limited by forbearance is popular today, especially among the smaller border nations which fear that they may be engulfed in an atomic struggle. This position has been stated by the Secretary General for the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold, in these words: ". . . As you know, the United Nations, in full harmony with what we believe should be the standards of the future, is an organization dedicated to the principle that military force should not be used save in self-defense and to repel aggression . . ."

This position appeals to all who hope for peace based on reason. Can we accept it? Does it stand the scrutiny of cold objectivity? What does it really mean in terms of practical politics and real security?

This "standard of the future" does not conform to historic American concepts of the use of force. In World War II, President Roosevelt did not stop with the recapture of the Philippines but went on to Okinawa and planned for the invasion of Japan. Our armies in Europe did not stop at the borders of Germany but fought on to an unquestioned victory. World War I, the Spanish-American War, the Civil War—all our wars before Korea—followed this same pattern. We then accepted that the issues for which we fought could be resolved only by victory. Victory required acceptance by the enemy of our terms of settlement or the destruction of his military forces or both.

If this United Nations position were accepted by the aggressor-minded nations, a truly great achievement would be realized. It is not. This has been the tragedy of pacifism through history: it is accepted by the peace-loving people to the detriment of their own security and rejected by the war-making people through whom alone it might benefit mankind.

In practice, the suggestion is that the peace-loving nations forbear. They always have, in so far as initiating war is concerned. But the suggestion today is that they forbear after an aggressor has initiated war. Does forbearance at such a time truly promote peace? Or does it promote war?

If the punishment for burglary were mere ejection from the premises, with no arrest or trial or imprisonment, it seems highly probable that burgla would increase. Under these circu stances, if the burglar succeeded in g ting away with the loot, he wou achieve his aim; if he failed, he mig get hit by a shot, but he would be fr to try again at his leisure.

The force for order which police ex cise in a community of people can exercised among nations only by t victors. The United Nations positi would persuade peace-loving nations withhold such force when they have t capability of punishing aggressors. Th the world would be like a communi that does not punish its burglars. T proposal does not seem to define a po tion that will promote peace.

Moreover, forbearance can be pra ticed by the peace-loving nations wh they hold overwhelming power; but a closely fought struggle, it could be su cidal. In such a struggle, victory is n something which you can take or leav The opportunity may come to you toda and only today. If you do not seize i the enemy may win victory and you destruction tomorrow. The United N tions position seems to be a form pacifism which only the strong ca enjoy.

THE terms of public discussion do n suggest that we have evaluated Kore This tragic struggle has in fact been ou first test of war in the atomic age an in the United Nations period. It doe not provide answers to all the questior which face us, but it does shed signif cant light on prevalent theories of lim ited war. In particular, it bears on tota power and forbearance.

It was public knowledge before Kore that U.S. strategy was based upon th retaliatory capability of strategic ai forces and atomic bombs. It was clea that our strategic concept was define only for war with the Soviet Union an that our use of atomic weapons in small er wars was unplanned. It seems doubt ful that the possibility of such small wa was seriously considered. This was t be the age of total power and total de struction.

There was a good prospect that th prompt threat of using atomic bomb against the North Koreans in June o 1950 would have stopped that aggressior immediately. We may attribute our in decision to the lack of a plan. We pre sumably had a plan for war with th Soviet Union, but this did not fit th case. Using the bomb against a smal aggressor must have raised a whole host of new questions of psychology and poli

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cs and practical application of the omb which could not be resolved when ction was required. Our failure to nnounce immediately our intention to se the bomb set a strong precedent gainst the use of atomic weapons in nall-scale war. We never reversed this osition in Korea.

Thus we have inherited from Korea strong taboo against the use of atomic eapons. But times have changed. Whereas in 1950 we were practically the le possessor of atomic weapons, we ust assume that the Soviet Union now as them in quantity to support large-ale warfare. The risk of starting un-nited atomic warfare was negligible en, but is real and substantial now. Who first uses atomic weapons today ust anticipate the prospect of atomic prisal.

THE crucial problem in the waging of atomic war lies with the President, ho must initiate it. The use of atomic eapons in retaliation involves no new ajor problems for military men.

Most discussions of total power dis-gard the very important fact that you nnot control the ground from the air. he air avenue affords great flexibility applying atomic destruction, but it oes not give control of the ground. erhaps the threat of destruction will use the enemy to surrender and submit your orders; but this is likely only if ou have overwhelming power and he as no capability of retaliation.

If we had intervened in Korea only ith atomic weapons and without round forces, the Soviet advisor to the orth Koreans might have chosen to vacuate Pyongyang and continue his mpaign to conquer the peninsula. He ight have reasoned that he could estab-sh his headquarters in Seoul, which e would not attack, and accept the de-ruction of Pyongyang as a cost of vic-ry. Our atomic power could have opped the North Korean Army if we ad enough ground strength to force the orth Koreans to concentrate. But we ould not have stopped the North Ko-an Army with air power and atomic eapons alone.

Apply this theory elsewhere. Assume at we are prepared to apply our omic power ruthlessly against an ag-essor until he cries "Uncle." What oes this involve for us? Shall we find urselves inflicting widespread and in-iscriminate damage to property and ci-lians in order to accomplish a mission hich could have been accomplished ith better effect and with far less cost

Design Contest Ends 30 September

The announcement of a $100 prize contest for the design of a seal for the Association of the United States Army has brought in a few entries and we expect many more. We hope those interested will remember that there is no limit on the number of submissions any one person may send in. Get your entry in soon; if you have a better idea later send that one in also. Final entries must arrive at the Association offices no later than 30 September, 1954.

For those who missed the May issue, or who have discarded their copies, a postal card to the Secretary will get you a set of rules.

One hint to contestants—the accepted design will be the basis for ROTC medals, and possibly lapel pins, so there is a limit on the amount of detail the design can carry. In other words: keep it simple.

by ground forces? Would the American people permit it? Shouldn't the prime lesson of Korea be final destruction of the myth that you can control the ground from the air?

General Van Fleet has stated flatly that he could have destroyed the Communist armies in Korea if he had not been restrained by higher authority in the summer of 1951. When the Communist armies had the capability, they had not failed to make a second invasion of South Korea; but the U. N. Command was restrained on the threshold of victory. This was a laboratory sample of substituting forbearance for victory.

One consequence was two more years of war, with higher casualties on both sides than would have been incurred in decisive combat in 1951. We left the initiative to the enemy, surrendered our advantages of superior armament, and fought on his terms.

It may be argued that stopping at the 38th parallel avoided World War III. It seems a thin thesis, plausible in a period of panic but difficult to believe in cool appraisal. We then had an advantage in power which we shall never again possess. It seems more likely that we could have destroyed the Communist field armies, obtained wholesale surrenders, caused a collapse of the regime in China. What are the rewards of victory?

THE implied merit of the policy of forbearance is that you curtail the losses and suffering of war. There is much historical evidence on this issue, for these ideas are not new. Generally, a short war is cheaper in all costs, a prolonged war costlier. The Thirty Years War exhausted Europe with indecisive struggle; in contrast, Napoleon's quick victories involved comparatively smaller losses and damage. If the policy does shorten the period of warfare, it should reduce the losses of that particular contest, whatever its other effects may be. The test, however, is actual accomplishment. There is evidence that the policy of forbearance will prolong the struggle and increase losses and may lead to defeat.

If the policy of forbearance has merit, there must be some controls in application which will insure that it is effective and not a boomerang. For instance, if we had said in 1951 that we would grant an armistice (and we were winning then) if the Communists ceased fighting and disengaged promptly, we would have stopped hostilities or determined the enemy's lack of interest in an armistice. If the enemy preferred to continue fighting, we would then have had to make that alternative less attractive to him.

LIMITED war and total war are dummies. These arbitrary concepts rarely fit into the practical choices which confront a nation.

If we were bent on conquest, we might indeed face a choice of alternatives between the full application of our power and the partial progressive employment of it. The Soviet Union faces such choices today.

As a peace-loving nation, we are interested only in the minimum power required to preserve our security. When that security is threatened, we must take necessary action to preserve it. Whether this action involves us in limited or total war will depend on the occasion and circumstance which lead to the use of force.

It is not wise to approach the event with preconceived notions either for limited war or for total war. The enemy will have something to say about the kind of war which is fought.

If the issue can be resolved with a small use of force, we should use no more. Certainly we do not want a narrow conception of total war to warp our judgment of the event. On the other hand, if the enemy is bent on waging total war, I hope we shall not be prepared—mentally or spiritually or physically—only for limited war.

A Line Officer Looks At Ordnance

COLONEL S. LEGREE

AFTER twenty-four years of Reserve commissioned service in artillery, I have finally had a chance to change my mind about Ordnance Corps and its people. To me, Ordnance was always some vague collection of people whose main function was to say "No." Individual Ordnance officers were usually fine, likeable men, but as an organization, Ordnance offered us high-silhouette tanks when our enemies had low-silhouette jobs, antitank guns that were too low-powered for the job, and AAA matériel that appeared too complicated for its effect.

Much this same attitude, of course, applied to my ideas about the other technical branches. I was told, but didn't deeply believe that the services were on the same team, and tried hard to help the line.

A 15-day tour of active duty at Frankford Arsenal has changed a lot of my ideas. I now work on the assumption that the services are composed of people with the same (or better) intelligence, patriotism, selflessness and diligence as those of the line.

For eighty working hours I toured the laboratories, the shops, the offices and the production lines at Frankford. I talked to youngsters who signed official papers as "John Doe, Pfc., Ph.D.," Second Johns who were as sharp as any I have met in the line, Light Colonels and Majors who were turning down better-paying jobs in industry because they believed in what they were doing, and civilians who had assignments that ranged from research scientist through electronics engineer, chemist, machinist, inspector, and floor-sweeper. All seemed happy at the opportunity to explain to a line officer what they were doing.

Frankford Arsenal performs many functions in a varied field. It is responsible for research and development on projectiles and cartridge cases, artillery mechanical time fuzes, ammunition up to and including 30mm, aircraft personnel catapults and canopy removers, VT fuzes, recoilless rifles, and fire-control instruments. It does process and production engineering for the same list of commodities, less recoilless rifles. It prepares, stocks and issues drawings and specifications for the same list, again, except recoilless rifles. It procures artillery mechanical time fuzes, aircraft personnel catapults and canopy removers, VT fuzes, and fire-control instruments. It manufactures and/or assembles projectiles, cartridge cases, artillery mechanical time fuzes, ammunition up to and including 30mm, aircraft personnel catapults and canopy removers, VT fuzes for non-rotated munitions, and fire-control instruments.

In addition, the Arsenal is responsible for maintaining and operating the Ordnance facility for the manufacture and assembly of metal cartridge cases and projectiles, and for R&D, process and production engineering, and the preparation of drawings and specifications for selected cartridge cases, projectiles, and recoilless rifle ammunition rounds.

There are other departments that do important work of a similar nature. I can't possibly mention all of them.

THE commanding officer, whom I knew twenty years ago as a tough, capable and efficient captain of Field Artillery, was proud of his arsenal and the Ordnance Corps, but far from satisfied that the ultimate in perfection had been reached. His instructions to me included a request that I keep my eyes open as I toured the arsenal so that I could offer him suggestions for improvement in any department. This is the place to confess that I wasn't of much help to him.

As I went through each department, I approached the tour with the attitude that: "The operations here are designed to help the line. Can I find here any attitudes, procedures or ideas that indicate their eyes are not on the ball?" The answer to the question was, "No, I couldn't." The worst I could find was that some of the people, especially in research, were more interested in the scientific aspects of their work than they were in the application of it—but I'd be the first to argue with anyone who b lieves that attitude, in moderation, wrong.

As a line officer who has suffere through my share of unfilled requi tions, I welcomed the opportunity examine the stock-control setup for Fi Control Instruments. Think of the pre sures on this fairly small group. It ha dles thousands of line items, throug many depots. You want the rang finder for your tank; you're not intereste in excuses.

But did you know, for instance, tha the taxpayer is telling Ordnance, "Don buy or build any more of these expensiv instruments than you need"? The ma ufacturer says, "It still takes nine montl to make a baby and it still takes *X* day to make a range-finder." Congress say "Follow this complicated procedure i making your contracts; we're sorry it going to slow procurement, but you mus protect the government against incom petent contractors, take the lowest bid help distressed labor areas, buy Amer can, and don't over-obligate your funds . . ." The Civil Service Commissio insists that the procurement and stock control people are graded too high—"I these experienced people won't take lesser grade find ones who will."

So the item you want isn't in th nearest depot, the one that the book say services your particular location, and i takes time to locate a depot that has it and it takes more time to process th paperwork. You're sore, and Ordnance is so tied up in its own red tape that it forgets its job is one of service to the troops. Don't believe it. Ordnance knows what the job is, and tries to do it to the best of its ability—and it has plenty o ability. The trouble is that Ordnance has problems, too. Maybe you could do better. I couldn't. And they asked me for suggestions; they'd ask you, too. They're never satisfied.

ANOTHER question that interested me personally was why the long, long procession of different models of practically everything. About the time the using service learns how to maintain and operate an item, along comes an

COLONEL S. LEGREE, the pseudonym of a reserve colonel of artillery, has been an occasional contributor to this magazine for many years.

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"improved" model and we start training all over again.

This situation obtains because the Ordnance research people, and their development people, and their industrial engineering people, are always looking for ways to get more metal on the target, and to save the taxpayer a buck. And it goes deeper than saving that dollar; the dollar is just a measure of man-hours, materials, and machine-tool use—and these are scarce commodities in time of war. If Ordnance can redesign an item so it costs $4 instead of $5, that's a twenty per cent saving in money, but it may insure supply in time of war by the use of more abundant materials, labor of lower skills, and simpler machinery. And if adding Widget Z adds to the probability of hitting the target, you do want Widget Z, don't you?

Each time I saw a new piece of equipment, on the drawing board or at some other stage of development, I asked: "Why so complicated? Don't you people realize we have to train people to operate this stuff and maintain it and repair it—and training time will be scarce in the next war?"

Each time the answer was the same. "In most cases, Army Field Forces gives us the requirements. If they want a rock to throw, of a certain weight, it won't be very complicated. But when they tell us they want to penetrate a certain weight of armor at X yards, and they want to do it with the first round, at certain relative speeds, with a weapon that weighs no more than Y pounds, and with a round of ammunition that has certain specified qualities—the item gets complicated. We aren't happy about it, either, but if there is a requirement we fill it, and with as much simplicity as we're smart enough to come up with. Even after the item is standardized, if we can simplify it we do so. Remember, we deal with industry every day and we know their limitations also."

They are very convincing but I still think some of the stuff is over-engineered and over-elaborate.

Casually the engineers drop into their conversation: "When I was at Knox [or Bragg, or Benning, or Sill] last week a unit commander came up with an idea we're working on. Those boys use the stuff, and their experience is worth more than all our theory."

NO, the Ordnance people don't think we are knuckleheads, even if we don't know which end of the slide-rule bites and which end kicks. They're trying to give us what we want, and they understand the difference between theory and practice. If occasionally they take an impatient attitude toward us and our ideas—they are human and have the same failings we do. They're the experts. Do we give much weight to the recommendations of the armchair strategists and the enlisted veterans?

I didn't have to bring up the old topic about operating and maintenance manuals, or even spare-parts allowances. The Ordnance people weren't on the defensive on these points; they merely wanted me to understand that when lead-time is cut sixty per cent or more, logical steps often must be omitted. You just can't write a manual from a drawing board. You must know what the item will do, what its weaknesses are, how it should be maintained—all the things that come from experience are lacking because there hasn't been any experience. Logical guesses are not really a substitute for experience factors.

The subject of inspections and quality control is one that Ordnance takes very seriously. Sure we get a defective round every so often; usually when it's most embarrassing. Once in a while something turns up unserviceable in the original package. We have all had those experiences, and they rankle. But, as the hen said to the cook, could you lay a better egg? There is inspection at every step of every process, and the equipment Ordnance designs for inspection is weird and wonderful. Mechanics, electronics and the old reliable human eye examine everything many times. There are gauges that look like the control panel for KDKA, and other testing gadgets that, if I may lift a phrase from many training-aid stories in the JOURNAL, "are made from salvaged materials at no cost to the Government." Some of the destructive testing, designed to learn just how much punishment an item can take, simulates battle and climatic conditions to a faithful degree.

Deft craftsmen with many years of experience turn out models of intricate fire-control instruments in this Frankford Arsenal machine shop



ALL this may sound rather lyrical. It isn't meant to. It is just that I, a Reserve line officer, had an opportunity to see the other side of a fuzzy picture, and what I saw was good. Suppose we all go on the assumption that Ordnance (and we could probably assume it for Chemical, Signal, Quartermaster, Transportation, Engineers, and the others) is composed of a group of men which contains the same proportion of geniuses, 8-balls and run-of-the-mill Joes as Infantry, Artillery or Armor. We can assume they are trying their best, even as you and I, to perform their stated duties in the most efficient manner possible. The men at the top reached there through the same processes of seniority and selection. They wear the same "U.S." on their collars.

They have problems we don't know about; they know much more about ours than we do about theirs. If we know them better, we can work better with them. They're on the team.

The Word from the Schools

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

New Commander

Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Harper, former Infantry Center deputy Chief of Staff, is the new Commanding General of The Infantry Center, succeeding Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Jr., who now commands the 1st Infantry Division in Europe.

Brig. Gen. A. S. Newman, Deputy Commanding General of The Infantry Center, has also left Fort Benning for assignment in Europe. Brigadier General Ernest A. Barlow has replaced General Newman as Deputy Commanding General.

Operations "Trainfire" & "Hi-Lo"

Two major research projects are now in progress at The Infantry Center to improve the individual effectiveness of the combat soldier through training. The projects have been named "Trainfire" and "Hi-Lo."

"Trainfire" has been designed to improve the individual accuracy of the rifleman in combat. Plans call for the building of record courses to study the accuracy of riflemen and the use of certain weapons on different targets.

"Hi-Lo" is a study of failure due to fear. The Research Unit is attempting to determine such things as why a paratrooper fails to jump after he has completed his rigorous training. The Unit will also study the ability of individuals to condition themselves to height. To accomplish this, a mock tower with different jump levels will be employed.

Reservists Summer Training

More than 3,000 Reservists from the Third Army area will receive active duty training this summer at Fort Benning. The 15-day training periods for the Reservists are scheduled from July 18 to August 30.

Reserve chaplains, Engineers, medics, Infantrymen and members of the Judge Advocate General and Quartermaster Corps will participate in the training.

Rifle and Pistol Matches

Fort Benning has been selected as the site of the Third Army and All-Army Rifle and Pistol Matches during June and July.

Lt. Colonel Richard H. Smoot of Honolulu, Hawaii, executive officer of the matches, said that personnel competing for berths on the U.S. Army Rifle and Pistol Teams must qualify at Fort Benning to be eligible to participate in the National Trophy Matches at Camp Perry, Ohio, August 7-September 16. The same teams will participate in the Southeastern Regional Pistol Matches at Jacksonville, Florida, July 29-August 1, and the Southeastern Regional Rifle matches at Fort Benning, August 5-8, before departing for Camp Perry.

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ARTILLERY QUOTATION OF THE MONTH

That guns will never be deserted simply because danger threatens is a point of honor around which the artillery has largely built the solid discipline of its corps.

S. L. A. Marshall
May 1953

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Electronic Warfare

To acquaint students with electronic warfare (*i.e.*, jamming) and the means of combating it, TAS is now introducing jamming into certain periods of instruction in the field.

Jamming operations are conducted by the Department of Communications monitor station but could be accomplished from any vehicle in the field. The actual jamming is done either by use of jammer devices—specially issued to the Department of Communications—or through use of the 3-position, dial light switch in the "ring" position on any RT-66, -67, or -68. Such use of the switch is probably the most effective means of jamming and may be employed by troops in the field; it is especially effective if, simultaneously, the frequency band is rotated back and forth through the frequency being used. In instructional periods, care must be exercised to insure transmission is restricted to authorized frequencies only.

Gunnery service practices are presently the media for this instruction. Jamming is timed to be coincident with a gunnery problem being fired by radio: Normally starting in the middle of a transmission from the FO to the FDC, the interference is continued for a period not in excess of 4 minutes. During that period, the FO radio operator attempts to operate through the jamming. If operation is impossible, he tunes his set slightly to either side of the frequency being used or turns to the monitor station's frequency to request an alternate frequency. The operator is instructed to wire only as a last resort.

To insure the highest standards for this instruction, the communications instructor for each period notes: (1) the adequacy of briefing given students, (2) action by student operators during the jamming, (3) the amount of disruption suffered by the class, and (4) if the jamming is of instructional benefit to the class.

Commo Doctrine on OPs

Current communications instruction for battalion OPs requires the installation of both wire and radio communications. This principle is applicable to all howitzer and gun battalions, not to 105 direct support units only.

Wire must be laid in, in addition to radio communication. (Normally, the battalion Commo directs the nearest howitzer battery to install a wire circuit from its switchboard to a phone at the battalion OP; this line, as time permits, may be extended to the battalion switchboard by battalion wire crews. On the other hand, an additional circuit can be installed from the battalion switchboard to the battalion OP; this solution provides "back-up" communication should the initial line fail.)

OP radio communication is normally established on the battalion command channel, K, for control and coordination of fires with the battalion S3. (This communication may be established by the S2 if the battalion reconnaissance and survey officer is occupied by duties elsewhere at the time; he usually is. Both the S2 and the RO use an AN/PRC-9. If the OP is manned by firing battery personnel, they will switch to the battalion K channel. However, the unit SOP may state that if fire missions are to be conducted from the OP, its radio will operate on the normal fire direction frequency or, when applicable, on the frequency of the forward observers with the reserve infantry battalion.)

Unit Histories

The preparation and publication of Artillery unit histories—where such histories are presently nonexistent or technically and academically inadequate—has been initiated as a continuing project at TAS. The mission has been assigned to the Department of Publications and Nonresident Training under the direct supervision of the Assistant Commandant.

The project is presently scheduled for implementation in eight phases, seven of which are writing phases. The final phase, the nonwriting phase currently under way, is devoted to detailed and intricate planning and other preparatory activity required for such a vast writing program and is expected to continue for the next eight months. Commencing upon the conclusion of Phase I, the second phase is devoted to the preparation and publication of narrative histories for all field artillery and divisional antiaircraft battalions now in the active Federal service.

The project is based on two concepts: First, unit histories—so neglected in the past—will promote appreciation and pride in troops for the traditions and achievements of their own units. The traditions

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of the past will then work for today's commanders and will contribute immeasurably to that essential, *esprit de corps;* and military history for instructional purposes must be grounded in the battery and battalion, where the results of decisions and actions are most immediate.

Recommendations or suggestions are requested and should be forwarded directly to: Chief, Department of P&NRT, TAS, Fort Sill, Okla.

Variations in Metro Effects

In order to make a limited demonstration of variations in metro effects of successive messages four hours apart, the Department of Observation computed the metro effects during four consecutive days, for the 155mm howitzer, 155mm gun, and 8-inch howitzer. During the period, there were no abnormal weather conditions.

The assumed direction of fire for each weapon was 4800 mils. The assumed range to the target was 13,000 yards for the 155mm howitzer, 23,000 yards for the 155mm gun, and 16,000 yards for the 8-inch howitzer.

Messages were taken on a 4-hour schedule from 0700 to 1900. The effects for the 155mm howitzer and 155mm gun are charted at the right.

Examination of the charts indicates that:


(1) If the metro change is a straight-line function, rounds fired with the 155mm howitzer three hours after one of the metro messages was taken would have missed the target by as much as 140 yards in range. Rounds fired three hours after other messages would have missed the target by as much as 75 yards in deflection.

(2) Changes in metro effects do not follow an established pattern; consequently, it is not possible to estimate on any one day the changes in weather effects which will take place after a 4-hour metro message is taken.

In fact, though charted as straight-line functions, it is considered certain that changes in metro effects do not follow a straight line. It is even possible that the change in metro effects three hours after a particular message is taken will be greater than the change four hours later.

Results of this test confirm those of some 10 or 12, 3-day tests conducted by a division's artillery in Korea between June and December 1952. The tests in Korea were run through the entire 24 hours of the day. It was determined by the division artillery staff that metro changes during the hours of darkness were so slight that metro messages every four hours during darkness were sufficient. However, the division artillery SOP was revised to require metro messages every two hours during daylight.

Incident to verification of the change in metro effects over 4-hour periods, it was again confirmed that metro changes dictate that registrations be conducted during the flight of the metro balloon, if the registration corrections are to be valid.



CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

No. 11 | *Military Missions and MAAG*

AN assignment with one of the many United States Military Missions and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) scattered throughout the world is a satisfying and challenging duty. Countless opportunities to demonstrate Americanism first hand by example and teaching and making more friends for the United States come to officers on such assignments. These officers are in almost daily contact with the leaders of the government, diplomatic corps, and armed forces at the highest level. Understandably officers selected for such assignment (and their families as well) must meet the most exacting and highest standards of professional attainments and social acceptance. In return for hard work and in some cases personal inconvenience there are many personal advantages in such assignments.

United States Army personnel serve with Military Missions and/or MAAGs located in the following countries:

Belgium	Iran
Brazil	Italy
Bolivia	Liberia
Chile	Netherlands
Colombia	Nicaragua
Costa Rica	Norway
Cuba	Panama
Denmark	Paraguay
Ecuador	Peru
El Salvador	Philippines
England	Portugal
Ethiopia	Saudi-Arabia
Formosa	Spain
France	Thailand
Greece	Turkey
Guatemala	Venezuela
Honduras	Yugoslavia
Indo-China	

THE purpose of a Military Mission is to aid in the training of the armed forces of the host government. The purpose of the MAAG on the other hand is to administer the military assistance to the host country under the Mutual Security Program. This military assistance is in the form of military equipment, materials and services, including technical and training assistance.

Each of the Missions and MAAGs is a team and positions are established which will best provide the desired assistance for the host government. Many of the teams are composed of men from all branches of the service.

IN meeting the officer personnel requirements of the Missions and MAAGs, the Career Management Division must assign qualified officers who are available for an overseas assignment and whose careers have progressed so as to make such an assignment appropriate. Selected officers must be professionally qualified and possess qualities of personality, tact and judgment that will reflect credit on the Army and the United States. In most cases the Career Branch makes the final selection of an officer, but in some instances they must be further nominated to the Mission or MAAG or presented to the host government for acceptance. Normally requirements are received and selections made from three to five months in advance of the reporting date. In those cases where the replacement officer must be presented to and accepted by the host government or must be able to speak the language of the host country, requirements are received eleven months in advance to provide sufficient time for nomination and training of the officer selected.

MANY officers would like to know how they can get an assignment to one of the Military Missions or MAAGs. Special Regulation 600-175-5, dated 12 February 1951, outlines the basic qualifications required for selection. Qualified officers interested in assignment should indicate their desires on the Officer's Preference Card so that consideration can be given to their assignment at the time they become eligible for an overseas assignment. Also, those officers desiring one of these assignments may volunteer for such foreign service at any time prior to receipt of overseas orders by making application under the provisions of AR 600-175. Upon being placed on the volunteer list, consideration will be given to their assignment according to stated preferences, although when they become eligible for foreign service in their normal turn, they automatically lose their volunteer status and are placed on the regular roster for an overseas assignment. This does not automatically bar further consideration for such assignments, however.

Only officers selected for assignment to a Mission or MAAG in Central or South America must be able to handle the language of the host country. Those selected who are not language qualified are sent to the Army Language School for a twenty-three weeks' course in Spanish or Portuguese before assignment. In some cases officers receive this training at commercial language schools. Only in a very few instances is language proficiency required for assignment to other Missions and MAAGs; however, it is always desirable and whenever possible officers with demonstrated linguistic ability are assigned provided they are otherwise qualified.

AUTHORITY for travel of dependents varies with local conditions in the host countries. At the present time families may accompany officers assigned to Missions or MAAGs located in: Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Norway, Netherlands, Ethiopia, Italy, France, Denmark, England, Belgium, Liberia, and all countries of Central and South America. Travel of dependents to other countries is possible only with the specific approval of the Chiefs of the agencies. The tours vary from one to three years, based primarily on the local conditions (specific lengths of tours may be found in AR 600-175).

To aid in preparing for one of these assignments, each officer selected receives a brochure written by the members of the Mission or MAAG from their actual experience. These brochures include information covering all manner of things from how and what to pack to the price of corn flakes on the local market.

From a career standpoint, assignment to a Military Mission or MAAG may well be advantageous. All positions require ingenuity and ability. Some are for instructors and as such are similar to assignments on the staff and faculty of a service school. Other positions such as advisors to commanders and staff officers of units ranging from battalion to army size broaden one's vision and capacity. The opportunities are great for the individual officer and present a unique opportunity to be of service to the Army and the United States.

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The Month's Books

A word about our reviewers this month. Gen. Adams, now Deputy G3, commanded the 24th Division in 1952, and is an old friend of Gen. Dean's. Col. Dupuy, well known to JOURNAL *readers, was in the SHAEF public information setup in World War II. Col. McCarthy was a member of the U.N. truce team in Korea and observed many of the events about which Mr. Poats writes. Col. Thomson is an authority on totalitarian regimes, an economist, and a student of international relations. Gen. Blakeley commanded the 4th Division in World War II and is well launched on a second career as a military writer. N. J. Anthony, assistant to a long succession of* JOURNAL *editors, is no mean military antiquarian himself. Stefan Possony is the author of several books on air power and international relations.*



MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. DEAN

Great Soldier

GENERAL DEAN'S STORY
As told to William L. Worden by Maj. Gen. William F. Dean
The Viking Press, Inc., 1954
296 Pages; Photographs; Maps; Index; $5.00

Reviewed by
MAJ. GEN. PAUL D. ADAMS

General Dean's Story is a story of brilliant leadership and outstanding heroism on the field of battle, combined with unflinching and enduring courage and fortitude during his three years of captivity under the harshest conditions of deprivation and inhuman treatment.

The story is a character study of a man who had served his country well in peace and war for twenty-seven years, with courage, wisdom, compassion, resourcefulness, and honor.

General Dean's story passes swiftly over his youth and young manhood, describes modestly his earlier but outstanding military career culminating in the World War II command of the 44th Infantry Division, and leads the reader rapidly to the dramatic events of June 30, 1950, when President Truman ordered United States Army forces to Korea to repel Communist aggression. The world did not know much about General Dean at that time, but those in the military services who did know him felt sure that General MacArthur selected the 24th Division for the initial deployment because of its stouthearted commander.

The war in Korea for General Dean was brief and frustrating because he and his gallant band of soldiers had so much to do and so little with which to do it. The best that could be done was to conduct a delaying action to cover the concentration of the Eighth United States Army on the Naktong Perimeter. The 24th Division met the overwhelming hordes with determination and succeeded in its mission at the expense of heavy casualties. One of the missing on July 21, 1950 was the intrepid commander who was last heard of as personally leading a small group of men armed with bazookas in an effort to kill enemy tanks then overrunning the town of Taejon, Korea. Silence fell over General Dean and only now is his complete story available, although parts of it have been told in the press and on other occasions since his return on September 4, 1953, after three years of captivity.

General Dean's own account is as absorbing as any story that could be devised by an imaginative writer. He describes his belated efforts to escape from Taejon; the mustering of the small party at the roadblock and his accidental separation from the party, to wander for thirty-five days in the Korean hills in an effort to avoid capture, only to be finally physically overpowered, captured and held in inhuman bondage for three years. His ability to speak objectively and as honestly as it is possible for a human being to speak of painful personal experiences, makes this book an important study of the Communists which should be read by both military and civilian students.

A most important characteristic of the Communists, as observed by General Dean, was their persistent effort throughout his captivity to obtain from him some form of approval or rationalization for their own lawlessness and aggression. Their persistence causes the reader to wonder whether the Communists, in spite of their bold front, are not filled with doubts and misgivings about themselves and their ways.

While appreciating his own limitations in evaluating the overall results of military operations, General Dean throws considerable light on the measures taken by the Communists to counter aerial bombardment. In speaking only of that which he saw, he observed that the Communists organized the whole population to prepare shelters, repair roads and railroads, and move large quantities of supplies at nighttime by using rigid traffic control and management. The methods used by the Communists explain to a great measure their success in supplying their armies in spite of the intense air efforts to strangle these activities.

Perhaps the most informative part of the story is the description of the Communist propaganda campaign charging the United Nations Command with employing biological warfare. The account of how the Communists propagandized their own people first, inoculated the entire population and required wide-scale counter measures such as catching flies, mosquitoes, and other vermin, followed by the publicized charges, shows the extremes the Communists will go to in lying to their own people as well as the entire world if it suits their own ends. The brutality shown their own people to convince them of a lie and their total disregard for the truth in trying to blame the historical diseases of the Orient on the UN Command illustrate clearly the techniques and moralities involved in the big-lie technique, which is now a common tool of their propaganda.

The stupid inhumanity of the Communists as described by General Dean is totally outside of the provisions of the Geneva Convention. For example, he was held in such close confinement that he was not permitted to stand up except for the most necessary purposes; when he was sleepless at night he was not permitted to lie down during the daytime; when his physical con-

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

LINES FROM A NEW BOOK

The Russian officers were usually brave men who were little concerned about casualties, but in the higher ranks there were signs of a kind of inertia. This displayed itself in the formalism and simplicity of the operative plan, which excluded manoeuvring and was obstinately pursued to victory or defeat. The Russians based their art of war on weight of material, and were clumsy, ruthless, and extravagant.

MARSHAL MANNERHEIM
Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

dition cried out for fresh air and sunshine, he was hardly permitted to see the light of day; and never did he have minimum food requirements.

One very puzzling aspect of the cruel treatment received by General Dean was the stringent measures taken by his North Korean captors to prevent anyone outside of his immediate circle of guards from seeing him, except for Burchett and Winnington, the Communist reporters.

While General Dean feels that he must have had it better than other prisoners of war, one can doubt that this is so in view of his long periods of illness, solitude, inactivity, lack of fresh air and sunshine, and little better than starvation rations. Good soldier that he is, he worried about his men, as much as a prisoner of war could, and wanted to be with them to help them if that were possible. Even this was denied him.

To be captured, although physically overpowered, was a bitter blow to Bill Dean and throughout his captivity he was troubled by the thought that he had somehow failed in his duty. Nothing could be farther from the truth, for throughout his combat and his captivity he lived up unflinchingly to the highest calls of duty, personal conduct, and traditions of the United States Army as expressed in the words Duty—Honor—Country, revealing himself to be truly a great man and a great soldier.

The Biggest Story

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: THE SUPREME COMMAND
By Forrest C. Pogue, Ph.D.
Department of the Army, 1954
607 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Charts; Index; $6.50

Reviewed by
COL. R. ERNEST DUPUY

The Allied Expeditionary Force in 1944-1945 successfully assaulted Hitler's *Festung Europa*. It was an operation in which the armed forces of the U.S., Great Britain, Canada, France, and other free nations joined in complete integration for the first time in history under a single high command. Next to the Creation it was, as one newspaperman aptly put it at the time, "the biggest story in the world." Three-dimensional—air, ground and sea—and mounted with infinite care and after long preparation, its scope was enormous, the difficulties legion, and the stakes world freedom. It was opposed by a tenacious, cunning enemy of proved military ability.

This AEF was directed by a Supreme Commander whose task was further complicated by the very instantaneousness of modern communications. Our President, our Chief of Staff, and Britain's aggressive Prime Minister were thus enabled to join with the U.S. Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to breathe hotly down General Eisenhower's neck while France's erratic, intransigent de Gaulle confused the issue to the best of his ability.

Dr. Pogue here relates the story of the AEF command direction. A spate of personal memories, histories and official reports has issued since the last shot was fired; but up to this time no objective analytical account of the actual operations of SHAEF—Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force—has been published.

The Supreme Command fills this vacuum. More than that, from the viewpoint of this reviewer, who by the fortunes of war took an humble part in SHAEF operations from a position enabling him to observe in one fashion or another all the events detailed herein, Dr. Pogue must be congratulated not only for his ability as a historian but also for his impartial objectivity. These congratulations extend also to the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, since official histories always go to bat with one strike against them: the suspicion that official prejudices and national policies will combine to exercise censorship, gloss mistakes and overemphasize favorable situations.

The author portrays Eisenhower's problems and his solutions. He has also caught the influence of the even-tempered, pipe-smoking Tedder, balance-wheel of this intricate machine; and of the terrible-tempered "Beetle" Smith, whom Dr. Pogue well characterizes as Ike's "hatchet-man." He has, perhaps, missed the calming influence of Britain's quizzical "Freddie" Morgan who, after laying the foundation of Operation OVERLORD as COSSAC—Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander—cheerfully stepped down in good soldierly fashion when General Eisenhower selected Smith as his Chief of Staff, to the position of deputy. General Morgan's part in allaying the bad effects of what he himself characterized as "this Monty business"—the heated and long-lasting discussions of the Montgomery-Bradley command status—must not be minimized.

No war had ever been covered by the press in such voluminous fashion as was the campaign in Western Europe. Yet, due not only to the exigencies of security but also, on several occasions, to the stupid "heads-in-sand" policy to which all military commands, it seems, are dedicated, the world public never caught the complete picture. What was happening, it seemed, was that seven armies—four U.S., and one each British, Canadian and French—were dashing haphazardly over France and Germany like so many jealous knights errant.

So far as the public was concerned, that nebulous organization, SHAEF, far from exercising real command, was merely a whipping boy for the alternate lashings of Fleet Street and the BBC, and of our own press and radio, when chauvinism overflowed. Dr. Pogue shows the real facts in this matter.

"An alliance is based on an agreement by two or more powers that they will oppose their combined forces and resources to a common enemy. They do not agree thereby to have an absolute community of interest. The success of such an alliance is to be judged, therefore, not by the amount of heat which may be engendered between the powers in their attempts to find a course of action which will most nearly preserve their individual aims while gaining a common goal, but rather by the degree to which the powers, while frankly working on a basis of self-interest, manage to achieve the one aim for which their forces were brought together. On that basis the Western Powers forged a unity seldom, if ever, achieved in the history of grand alliances."

That, it seems, covers the whole picture.

The author discusses, with complete documentation, the vexing problems that arose before, during and after the campaign—problems which soldiers and civilians have argued hotly ever since the war ended. Principal among them, of course, are the status and actions of Field Marshal Montgomery, commanding 21 Army Group, from the initial action before Caen down through the Bulge and his later insistence on making the main effort by a spearhead thrust into Germany.

"It is difficult," writes the author—and this reviewer agrees—"to sustain the charge that Montgomery wilfully disobeyed orders. It is plausible to say that he felt he was representing firmly the best interests of his country and attempting to set forth what he and his superiors in the United Kingdom considered to be the best strategy for the Allies to pursue in Europe. When his statements on these matters were accompanied by what appeared to be a touch of patronage or cocky self-assurance, some members of the SHAEF staff viewed them as approaching insubordination. There is no evidence that General Eisenhower shared these views."

But the illuminating point raised by Dr. Pogue—and this gives an insight into the reactions and thought-processes of the great soldier who is now our President—is contained in this remark:

"In both the U. S. and British armies it was understood that proposed plans might be debated and various views developed. General Eisenhower encouraged this type of discussion and often invited criticism of his plans. It is possible, however, that he added to his own command problems by failing to make clear to Field Marshal Montgomery when the 'discussion' stage had ended and the 'execution' stage had begun."

When Monty did receive a final directive he gave forthright and loyal assurance that "you will hear no more on the subject of command from me . . . I have given you my views and you have given your answer. I and all of us will weigh in one hundred per cent to do what you want and we will pull it through without a doubt."

The moot questions of Ardennes intelligence before the Hitler counter-offensive, and the later decision to turn from Berlin are both discussed copiously. It is doubtful if the emotionally-minded will be convinced, but the facts are laid bare. The command decision in the first case took account of a calculated risk; in the second

case it followed the military principle of the objective—elimination of the enemy's armed force.

One thing Dr. Pogue brings out with reference to the Ardennes: the vicious crystal-gazing tendency to neglect "enemy capabilities" by an overemphasis of "enemy's probable intentions."

The Supreme Command belongs in the library not only of every soldier and every civilian interested in military history, but also of every student of current international events. It is all the more important because it gives us an index to the pitfalls and problems confronting the SHAPE of today and tomorrow.

Hot History


DECISION IN KOREA
By Rutherford M. Poats
The McBride Co., 1954
340 Pages; Index; $4.75

Reviewed by
COL. C. W. MCCARTHY

Hot history is hard to handle but Mr. Poats, in his reportorial style, has done an excellent job. One must note, however, that in his hard-pressed effort to make a deadline, he has in some instances failed to do a thorough job of research on his background material.

However this does not detract from the feeling of history related by one who saw it made. This is especially true of his accounts of the give and take military action that moved up and down the wasteland called Korea for nearly two years. Those who are looking for an account of the fighting will enjoy his military style of reporting. They will appreciate particularly the care with which he has given credit and placed blame by carefully stating unit designation in each case. This touch also adds to the feeling of authenticity which his accounts of the action convey. But the "Decision" which Mr. Poats writes about encompasses much more than the military decision or, as some might say, the lack of one in Korea.

By placing together the many decisions, military and political, international and national, which had to be made during the course of the Korean action, Mr. Poats gives a clear picture of what in his opinion was the great decision—one that reached far beyond Korea. In his words, "We had shown that we meant it when we said we sought peace and opposed the use of war to settle international disputes." We would fight when we had to as evidenced by our aid to the Republic of Korea in June of 1950, but after the loss of many lives and the expenditure of billions of dollars, we had the courage to stop when our military strength was at its peak and try to work out a settlement through the medium of a political conference. It was hard to hold this ideal high and rally around it the support needed to keep it before the eyes of the world. It is not quite clear to whom Mr. Poats would give the major credit for formulating and adhering to this decision.



STRATEGY FOR THE WEST

MARSHAL OF THE R.A.F.

SIR JOHN SLESSOR


G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

Bold, dynamic, controversial—this book is as important for our era as the ideas of General Billy Mitchell were in the twenties and those of Major Alexander P. de Seversky in the past decade. . . . Slessor believes that another world war not only *must* but *can* be prevented. The Great Deterrent to Communism, he says, is modern air power armed with atomic weapons, and he gives chapter and verse to disprove the theory that an armament race causes war. In detail he examines such subjects as Russia's fears of our atomic power . . . the inevitability, for the time being, of localized conflict . . . and the fabulous new weapons of 1954 and after. *$3.00*

KESSELRING

A SOLDIER'S RECORD

ALBERT KESSELRING



A behind-the-scenes, first-hand account by a great German Field Marshal. Telling the story as he sees it, in plain words, without shading, without apology, his excellent account of the war on all fronts is also a fascinating picture of the professional German soldier's mind. "There is much in this record of general interest to both the military student and the layman. Kesselring's comments on personalities, strategy and methods of exercising high command make excellent reading. A valuable contribution to the history of World War II."—*L. K. Truscott, Jr., N.Y. Times.* *18 photographs. 7 maps. $5.00*

UNITED STATES ARMY
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Pass In Review

One of the new books sure to be talked about is Jonathan Daniels' *The End of Innocence* ($5.00). This is chiefly an account of the Wilson administration (1913-1921) when Daniels' father, Josephus, was Secretary of the Navy, and young Franklin D. Roosevelt was an assistant. Daniels draws heavily on his father's unpublished diaries to give an entertaining, backstage account of those hectic years. This is one of those cases where you get some excellent historical material with a nice sugar-coating of unessential but entertaining trivia.

Harcourt-Brace has passed along some gladsome tidings. This fall will see the publication of Carl Sandburg's famous *Abraham Lincoln* ($7.50) in a one-volume edition. This 800-page book will be a distillation of his monumental six-volume work which is considered by most as the top Lincoln biography.

Many Army wives would undoubtedly enjoy the new biography of the President's wife, *Mamie Doud Eisenhower* ($3.75). This portrait of the First Lady takes up in great detail her treks from one Army post to another and provides an excellent opportunity to compare notes and share reminiscences.

For some years now we've been doing business with Bill Corrigan, Doubleday's irrepressible agent in this area. Bill rarely misses an opportunity to plug for one of their books, which led him to give me a call last week and remind me that after the editors of this magazine had selected Bruce Catton's *A Stillness at Appomattox* ($5.00) as one of the twelve best military books of 1953, it went on to win the National Book Award and the Pulitzer Prize. Since our readers have expressed approval of the book anyhow, I don't mind falling for his subtle effort.

Speaking of selections of winners, I would like to nominate one for the best title of the year. There's a new book coming out written by an ex-alcoholic, describing his jousts with John Barleycorn, entitled *Comin' Through the Rye.* If the book is half as good as that title, I wouldn't miss it for the world.

All great minds certainly don't run in the same channel around here. Several of the staff as well as some of our more eminent reviewers have been conducting a two-month discussion on the merit of giving space to a full-length review of Cecil Woodham-Smith's *The Reason Why* ($4.00). This is a fine and exciting book to read, but the "nays" won out primarily because it is not basically a military book, although one of the final chapters is devoted to the "brave six hundred" who galloped into the jaws of death at Balaklava. The book has lots to recommend it for pleasurable reading. It draws fine portraits of the Earl of Lucan and the Earl of Cardigan who, though brothers-in-law, were bitter enemies. Few books have caught as well the flavor of arrogant British aristocracy of the period, and the manner in which they bought their commissions and promotions. And, finally, it covers in rich detail the high degree of military ineptitude and heroism that resulted in the famous "Charge of the Light Brigade." See why it was so hard to make up our minds?

Professor Richard W. Leopold of Northwestern has recently made a worthwhile historical contribution with the publication of *Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition* ($3.00). Root is best remembered by the Army for his splendid work as Secretary of War in creating the American army's General Staff. He resigned that job in 1904 but Teddy Roosevelt soon had him back in harness as Secretary of State. Root had a relatively unhappy life as an ultra-conservative in a progressive era but nonetheless he made substantial contributions to the country and this study brings him into better focus.

Last month, I forgot to mention an intriguing new book called *Confederate Agent* ($5.00). This tells the story of Tom Hines, agent extraordinary, who led a conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. Government for the Confederacy during the Civil War. There seems to be lots of new material in this hair-raising account of some of the most daring adventures of the Civil War.—R.F.C.

He leaves no question as to where in his opinion the credit should go for the ultimate military success enjoyed. For an old "MacArthur man" it must have been extremely difficult to admit that "young" Ridgway had all the qualities of the old master, including "eloquence" and a greater capacity for military leadership. The book contains a brief sketch fitted into the narrative of each of the military leaders. In no case has the author been unduly harsh or extravagantly praiseful, but by good reporting he clearly indicates the strengths and weaknesses of the individuals, which opinion has, in many cases, been substantiated by more recent events.

Possibly Poats' greatest contribution to current history is the complete account of the imbroglio between President Truman and General MacArthur. Here we have factual recording without a pronouncement by the author on the wisdom of the action taken. All of the documents relating to the case as well as the full account of the Wake Island Conference and the MacArthur utterances which forced the President's stand are included.

Mr. Poats includes a complete coverage of the armistice negotiations without filling the pages with extraneous detail which might detract from the real accomplishments of the negotiators. The limitation imposed by trying to include within the covers of a book the entire story of Korea has forced him to pass rather hurriedly through many of the more interesting episodes involved in the prisoner-of-war exchange and the establishment of the Neutral Nations Advisory Commission. An appendix which includes the armistice agreement will not only enable the reader better to appreciate the problem of the negotiators but will be useful as a reference.

He has probably given too much attention to the Schwable case at the expense of a more definitive account of the problems which faced the Indian Security Forces responsible for maintaining order among the prisoners of war in the neutral zone.

There is some question as to the validity of the blurb used on the cover: "The First Definitive History of the Korean War." History written before the smoke of battle has settled must necessarily be confined somewhat by the inability of one man to cover the entire action. We must accept that until after-action reports have been written and digested and the secret files of departments and individuals have been opened to researchers, a definitive history cannot be written.

Extravagant claims are not necessary. The author and the publisher should be proud of the fact that they have been able to put into the hands of the American public shortly after the end of the conflict a history which will not only prove useful to researchers and students but has a great value in providing the families of the hundreds of thousands of Americans a picture of what their menfolk who fought in Korea did before these same men had outgrown

LIBRARY

the uniforms they wore.

It might be well to point out for the record that the 38th Parallel was not selected as the dividing line between U.S. and Russian forces by the Chiefs of State at Potsdam as stated by the author, but was an expedient arrived at at the time that the Japanese surrender documents were being formulated in mid-August of 1945 in order to provide a line of demarcation between U.S. and Russian forces for the surrender of the Japanese Armies. It is not fair to accuse our military and political officers of being so unrealistic as to select a parallel instead of some easily defined geographic boundary for a political division. There are other slight errors in the book regarding assignments of senior officers, but research cannot be perfect when speed is essential.

It is the sincere hope of this reviewer that Mr. Poats' book will serve to fix in the minds of all readers why we went to war in Korea and how we gained as a result.

Complexity Compounded

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDOCHINA
By Ellen J. Hammer, with a preface by Rupert Emerson
Stanford University Press, 1954
332 Pages; $5.00

Reviewed by
COL. C. A. H. THOMSON

Humbly, Dr. Hammer has made "a study of a valiant people and of the tragic situation in which they find themselves . . . (in an effort) to understand a little of the world, in Asia and in Europe, which we have onl· learned to know at all in recent years and still need to understand so much better." The reasons for our need are apparent to the reader of every day's newspaper; here in Indochina the forces of Communism, nationalism, and colonialism cross in such manner that the free world and the Communist world cannot ignore the outcome. Yet the struggle is being waged not only here; the forces involved respond to world conditions of politics, economics, diplomacy, and fighting. Hence the probability of any particular move in Indochina cannot be inferred simply from a plausible or from a comparable estimate of the interests of the free world. Dr. Hammer has done us the service of detailing, without highlighting, many occasions on which Communists in Indochina have failed to get support either from Moscow or Peking, or from the French Communist Party. Thus, in 1946, French Communists blandly sacrificed the interests of their party comrades in Indochina to the hope of seizing power in France itself.

Complexity is the keynote of the local situation, complexity further complicated by the tangled web of world politics. This irreducible complexity is further compounded by Dr. Hammer's non-chronological approach to her subject. She first sketches the world problem; takes up the situation at the end of the Japanese occupation; then traces Franco-Japanese rela-



Pride of the Airborne

PARATROOPER. By Lt. Col. Francis X. Bradley and Lt. Col. H. Glen Wood. The Military Service Publishing Company, 1954. 96 Pages; Illustrated; $3.50.

Colonels Bradley and Wood have come through with a *Life*-like picture-and-text combination that brings out the pride in accomplishment of the paratrooper by revealing the rugged details of airborne and ground combat training. Although designed primarily as a keepsake for those who have just won their jump wings, this book explains just why the man who drops from airplanes is a little different from most other men.

tions from early in the war through to the end. She then leaps back to the pre-French position, estimating the impact of the French onset and years of pre-World War II French rule. With a look at the thousand years of struggle against Chinese invaders, she details the beginning of the Communist movement and the emergence of Ho Chi-minh. Her story then goes through the war years, dealing with the Chinese occupation, the return of the French with British support, the subsequent negotiations with the French, the demands for independence, and the outbreak of the war on December 19, 1946. The story of Bao Dai and his relations with Ho, the Japanese, and the French is followed by the failure of the attempt of Bao Dai and Ho to find a common basis, and the emergence of Bao Dai, with French support, as leader of Viet Nam. Then come the emergence of Viet Minh into the Communist camp, the intensification of fighting, and the repercussions on French policy and action. A final chapter entitled "Perfecting Independence" brings the story down to early 1954, and concludes with a brief estimate of the meaning of Indochina for American policy and interests.

Several conclusions seem to emerge, although Dr. Hammer herself is cautious about drawing many sweeping ones. The one point which seems to unite Vietnamese is the desire for independence; much of Ho's strength comes from his position as leader of a nationalist movement. The other main pillar of Ho's power is terror. The people of the country are caught between two terrors—Ho's and the French. Whatever else has happened to Indochina, there has been an enormous amount of human suffering there—and not only during the past seven years. Attempts to repel the Chinese invader are centuries old. It does appear, however, that terror alone is not enough. Going beyond Lyautey's maxim that one should show power in order not to have to use it, the French for many years have used terror here. Thus the Vietnamese peasant must reckon with a good chance of brutality from either side.

Could the French really carry out the Pignon policy of setting native against native, so as to perpetuate French rule? The answer seems to have turned on the French reluctance to give Bao Dai—or any of the various possible sources of a national movement opposed to Viet Minh—the reality of power. Dr. Hammer shows in detail the French unwillingness to bring into reality by acts, the promises of independence emerging from the course of several postwar agreements with Vietnamese representatives. Without the French, Bao Dai would last but a moment. But he cannot consolidate and spread his power unless the French give him real freedom.

In concluding, Dr. Hammer reports the fear by many Vietnamese and Frenchmen that the solution to the struggle may be subordinated to the solution of more general and perhaps even insoluble problems of Far Eastern and international policy. The general import of her book makes dim indeed the prospect that the solution could possibly be made without reference to the broader context. She expresses the hope that Vietnam may become not a Chinese satellite nor a proving ground for new forms of Western colonialism, but a fully independent nation endowed with democratic institutions. The reality of world politics seems to render such an outcome remote indeed.

In many respects this is a disappointing book. It could hardly have been more timely, but it is far from a clear and comprehensive overview of the subject.

Rupert Emerson has contributed a preface which further illuminates the complexities of the choices facing American policy, in a situation where anti-Colonialism and anti-Communism clash, and the balance of effort in Europe and Asia must be drawn. There surely is no simple way forward.

Armored History

IMPACT: The Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division
By Lester M. Nichols
Bradbury, Sayles, O'Neill Co., 1954
350 Pages; Maps; Charts; Illustrated; $7.50

Reviewed by
MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

Veterans of the 10th Armored Division should like this book. It has good maps, excellent pictures, and the text sticks to the subject. The 10th, trained for two years by the late Maj. Gen. Paul Newgarden who was killed in an airplane accident, and commanded throughout its combat service in Europe by Maj. Gen. (now Lt. Gen.) William H. H. Morris, was the first Third Army division to join the First Army in what became the Battle of the Bulge. On the basis of the Division's part in that engagement and the subsequent advance to the Rhine, General Bradley sent a message to the Division congratulating it on its "magnificent accomplishments."

The author, who served in all ranks from private to major, has done an excellent job of lightening his story with personal incidents, and he never forgets that the best tank or self-propelled gun in the world is useless without trained, dependable men to make it function. The 10th, he thinks, had real *esprit de corps* which "stemmed from pride in oneself and pride in belonging to a crack outfit."

Let It Rest

THE AMERICAN SWORD 1775-1945
By Harold L. Peterson
Ray Riling, Bookseller
275 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $10.00

Reviewed by
N. J. ANTHONY

Some years ago when the Army saber was consigned to the boneyard, a mighty heave of relief was given out by all and sundry who had been tripped or near-tripped by their own pig-stickers. Now that the sword has been resurrected by the Navy and Coast Guard, all hands fervently pray that the Army can find no reason for disturbing its rest—not even for ceremonial use. Except on the persons of horse cavalrymen, the saber in modern times seemed as outlandish as boots and spurs on a Coast Artillery or Air Corps officer.

Mr. Peterson has placed all American makes of swords, sabers, cutlasses and their relatives where they belong—into a collector's item. He does a thorough job on 186 items in this latest addition to Ray Riling's series for military collectors. His text was reviewed by and has the blessing of the Company of Military Collectors and Historians. Mr. Peterson begins with terminology. (Bless us, he turns up no less than 12 points of nomenclature on the hilt, 7 on the blade, 6 on the scabbard!) Detailed histories and place of deposit accompany pictures of each model of enlisted men's, officers', cadets', diplomatic, presentation and silver-hilted swords, as well as scabbards and attachments. This bookshelf museum ends with a directory of American makers, a list of comparative values, and an essay on sources. Any professional library will be enriched by acquiring this contribution to military Americana. An arms collector's library is deficient without it.

Malthus Reexamined

THE CHALLENGE OF MAN'S FUTURE, An Inquiry Concerning the Condition of Man During the Years that Lie Ahead
By Harrison Brown
Viking Press, 1954
297 Pages; Charts; Index; $3.75

Reviewed by
STEFAN T. POSSONY

Up to now the Malthusian theory has proved to be as fallacious as the cerebrations in physics which assumed the existence of phlogiston and ether. Its fundamental fallacy consists in the oversight that man is not only a consumer but also a producer. Therefore, the increase of population is tantamount to an increase of significant resources. The second fallacy of Malthusianism has been the assumption that population growth would go on forever and probably in accelerated fashion while, in fact, growth rates tend to decline as wealth, industrialization and education become more widespread. True, Malthusianism is based on *one* correct fact: mineral and vegetal resources are limited.

Harrison Brown, a first-rate geochemist, has produced a very interesting book. He must have begun writing it when he was still very much impressed by Malthusian thought. But by the time we are at page 220, we find that "given adequate supplies of energy, man can, in principle, extract everything that he needs for his existence at a high standard of living from substances which exist abundantly on the earth surface—air, seawater and ordinary rock . . . The resources available to man permit him, in principle, to provide adequately for a very large population for a very long period of time." More specifically, it turns

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out that despite minor difficulties and perhaps some space restrictions, a population of 50 billion and even more, could be sustained indefinitely. This being the situation, I may be forgiven for thinking that mankind has more urgent problems to worry about than the apocalyptic visions of economic doom sketched by Malthus and filled in by a legion of imitators.

In spite of the invalidity of Dr. Brown's basic point, his book is a useful source of valuable information. He has pulled together pertinent statistics on resources and while sometimes his figures may be questionable and hypothetical, he has done an outstanding job of reporting. His chapters on food, energy and raw materials are highly informative and may serve as a handy reference on these problems seen in the full range of their global and time dimensions. The demographic chapter is more open to criticism and in general his economic and historical analyses are, if I may be pardoned for saying so, what could be expected from a natural scientist.

Insofar as the military reader is concerned, the author has failed to analyze the very serious problems which arise for the industrialized countries of Western civilization, including the United States.

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a current check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 56 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

AERODYNAMICS: Selected Topics in the Light of Their Historical Development. By Theodore von Karman. Cornell University Press, 1954. 203 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.75.

ANIMALS, MEN, AND MYTHS. By Richard Lewinsohn. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 422 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. The second book in the series which started with *Gods, Graves and Scholars*. A "social history of the animal kingdom."

APPLIED ATOMIC ENERGY. By K. Fernside, E. W. Jones and E. N. Shaw. Philosophical Library, 1954. 156 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.75. Of British origin, this book offers a quick background in nuclear physics and discusses peace-time applications of atomic energy.

BEST SPORTS STORIES 1954. Edited by Irving T. Marsh and Edward Ehre. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1954. 328 Pages; Illustrated; $3.50. The tenth annual edition, for those who want to re-read great sports moments of the year.

CAVALRY OF THE SKY. By Lynn Montross. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 270 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.00. The Marines' part in development of helicopter transport.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: An Annotated Bibliography, 1940-1952. Prepared under the direction of the Committee on Civil-Military Relations Research of the Social Science Research Council. Columbia University Press, 1954. 140 Pages; Index; $2.00.

MAMIE DOUD EISENHOWER: A Portrait of a First Lady. By Dorothy Brandon. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954. 307 Pages; $3.75. An informal and casual biography.

ENGINEERS OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945, Vol. II, Organizations, Troops and Training. By the Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters Army Forces, Pacific, 1954. 330 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.00.

HOW TO BUY A USED CAR. By Alexander Walordy. Hanover House, 1954. 93 Pages; Illustrated; $1.00. Pictures and text; covers both the mechanical and the financial sides of the deal.

FREEDOM AGAINST ITSELF. By Clarence K. Streit. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 316 Pages; Index; $3.75. The controversial author of *Union Now* approaches the question from a new angle; primarily an appeal for closer union of the free nations.

FINGERPRINTS: Fifty Years of Scientific Crime Detection. By Douglas G. Browne and Alan Brock. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1954. 260 Pages; Index; $3.50.

HISTORY OF THE 111th FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, 1917-1919
HISTORY OF THE 116th U.S. INFANTRY REGIMENT 1917-1919
Compiled and revised by Henry F. Seal, Jr., The Adjutant General's Office, Virginia National Guard, 1954. Short histories, photographically reproduced, of Virginia units famous in World War I.

EPICS OF SALVAGE. By David Masters. Little, Brown & Company, 1954. 234 Pages; $3.50. Dramatic accounts of sea salvage in World War II.

HOW TO CHOOSE THAT CAREER, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY. By S. Norman Feingold. Bellman Publishing Company, 1954. 52 Pages; Illustrated; $1.00.

HOW TO HELP OLDER PEOPLE: A Guide for You and Your Family. By Julietta K. Arthur. J. B. Lippincott Company, 1954. 500 Pages; Index; $4.95.

IMPACT: The Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division. By Lester M. Nichols. Bradbury, Sayles, O'Neill Company, Inc. 344 Pages; Illustrated; $7.50. A well-illustrated history of a unit that served in four armies and seven corps.

JUNGLE GREEN. By Arthur Campbell. Little, Brown & Company, 1954. 298 Pages; $4.00. Personal glimpses of the war in Malaya by a British Army major.

THE MEMOIRS OF MARSHAL MANNERHEIM. Translated by Count Eric Lewenhaupt. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1954. 540 Pages; Maps; Index; $6.75. The life story of the strong man of Finland. A great patriot recounts his achievements and explains his motives which had their effect on the present situation in Europe.

MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES. By John Alan Appleman. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1954. 421 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $8.00. A study of the procedure followed, and the substantive law applied, in war crimes trials at Nuremberg, Tokyo, and elsewhere.

MY DIARY NORTH AND SOUTH. By William Howard Russell, edited and introduced by Fletcher Pratt. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 268 Pages; $4.00. A re-issue of the diaries of "Bull Run" Russell. The book was originally published in 1863. Russell was a correspondent of the *Times* of London and covered both sides of the War Between the States.

N.A.T.O. AND ITS PROSPECTS. By Wing-Commander J. D. Warner, R.A.F. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1954. 110 Pages; $3.00.

THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS OF FLIGHT. As visualized by Bernt Balchen and told to Erik Bergaust. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 214 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.00.

PARATROOPER. By Lt. Col. Francis X. Bradley and Lt. Col. H. Glen Wood. The Military Service Publishing Company, 1954. 96 Pages; Illustrated; $3.50. A picture book with explanatory text to make the paratrooper proud and the walking soldier envious.

REACH FOR THE SKY. By Paul Brickhill. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1954. 312 Pages; Illustrated; $3.75. A biography of Douglas Bader, the British ace.

SPIN-FISHING. By Hal Sharp. Sterling Publishing Co., 1954. 128 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $1.50. A pocket-size illustrated handbook for those to whom spinning is something new. Very little on salt-water fishing.

STRATEGY FOR THE WEST. By Sir John Slessor. William Morrow and Company, 1954. 180 Pages; $3.00. The famous Royal Air Force officer speaks of nuclear weapons and their effect on our strategy both in the Cold War and what may follow.

TIME COUNTS: The Story of the Calendar. By Harold Watkins. Philosophical Library. 274 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.75. The history of the calendar and the many attempts at calendar reform.

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: The Supreme Command. By Forrest C. Pogue. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954. 607 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.50. The workings of SHAEF from the selection of the Supreme Commander to the closing out of the headquarters. Another in the series of complete and authoritative histories issued by the Office of Military History. A text for future practitioners of coalition warfare.

V-2. By Walter Dornberger. The Viking Press, Inc., 1954. 281 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. The story of one of Hitler's secret weapons by the man who directed Peenemunde, the German experimental rocket station. Its principal value lies in the fact that it offers an account of the frustrations of a scientific organization attempting to function under a totalitarian system.

Selected Books For Military Readers

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INDEX

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

VOLUME 4

AUGUST 1953

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Index of Volume 4 (August 1953-July 1954)
THE ARMY Combat Forces JOURNAL

Authors 2
Numbered Units 4
Title and Subject 4
Books and Periodicals Reviewed 7

AUTHORS

Abshire, David M: Patrols in Korea, 20 Jul 54
Aclin, Jack, Jr: Guardsman's Salute to TIS, 6 Jan 54
Ageton, Arthur A: Malenkov's Dilemma, 30 Feb 54
Alford, Elijah Clarence: Concentrate on Movement, 6 Jun 54
Arn, Robert E: Electronic Gun Data Computer, T29, 27 Nov 53
Aron, Raymond: Armies Win Cold Wars, 28 Jul 54
Baker, Leighton L: Inaccurate Rifles, 4 Jul 54
Baldwin, Hanson W: Let's Have Martial Music, 38 Dec 53; Strategy of Restraint, 10 Jan 54; Report on Flash Burn, 10 Jun 54; New Look for Tomorrow, 28 Jun 54; Politics Invades Army, 29 Jun 54; On Military Bands, 8 May 54
Banigan, George E: Soldier, 6 May 54; Why They're Generals, 7 Jun 54
Bard, Philip L: On the Hill, 8 Apr 54
Barr, David G: Artillery Quotation of the Month, 46 Feb 54
Benson, Edward E: This is Logistics, 30 Mar 54
Bergin, William E: New Officer Efficiency Report, 38 Oct 53
Besson, Frank S, Jr: BARC Riders, 7 Jul 54
Beville, Norborne P: Fish or Cut Bait, 12 Oct 53
Blakeley, Harold W: D Plus Ten Years, 23 Jul 54
Boatner, Mark M, III: Countering Communist Artillery, 24 Sep 53; Magnificent Piece, 5 Mar 54
Bolté, Charles L: The Modern Army, 34 Feb 54; Tell the Army's Story, ii Mar 54
Bolton, John H, Jr: Tired, but Unbowed Guardsman, 8 Apr 54
Bowles, Chester: Lines from a New Book, 50 May 54
Bradley, Omar N: Quoted, 48 Aug 53
Brigham, Erwin R: Armor is Mobile, 46 Oct 53
Brodie, Bernard: Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 34 Feb 54
Brodie, Robert B: Praise, 7 Feb 54
Brohman, Edmund T: Renewal and Criticism, 8 Oct 53
Brooksbank, W H: Coast Watchers Memorial, 6 Nov 53
Buettner, J R: Efficiency Blots, 4 Sep 53
Buitenhuis, Joe H: The Artillery Has Been Terrific, 49 May 54
Bunker, William B: Cost of Helicopter Maintenance, 9 Jul 54
Bynell, Harlan D: Fish or Cut Bait, 10 Oct 53
Byrne, John D: Thanks, 4 Jul 54
Cahill, James P: Infantry Song, 14 Oct 53
Canzona, Nicholas A: Attack Along a Ridgeline, 26 May 54
Carlin, Edward J, Jr: Rank in the Air Force, 26 Jan 54
Carmen, Jonathan: Service in the Ranks, 5 Mar 54
Carver, Weyman S: The Aviation Company, 23 Dec 53
Case, Clarence C: CCC Veterans, 7 Jan 54
Catton, Bruce: The Blessings of Bounty, 26 Jan 54
Ceder, Robert: Inflation of Rank, 4 Sep 53
Chamberlain, Paul E: Solutions, 6 Aug 53
Chancellor, George M: Gripe, 9 Apr 54
Churchill, Winston: The Candid PM, 34 Feb 54; Delayed Decorations, 35 Feb 54; Press on With the Beer, 28 May 54; Artillery Quotation of the Month, 48 Jun 54
Clark, Mark W: Lines from a New Book, 50 Apr 54
Clay, Lucius D: Opportunities and Responsibilities, 3 May 54
Cleland, John R D, Jr: What About the Helmet?, 24 Jan 54
Clendenen, Clarence C: Volume of Fire, 46 Aug 53
Close, Donald E: Replacement Training, 16 Oct 53
Cocklin, Robert F: Fish or Cut Bait, 26 Aug 53
Collier, John H: Quoted, 37 Dec 53
Collins, J Lawton: Artillery Quotation of the Month, 48 Apr 54
Conlon, John P: Thermo-Nukes and Strategy, 4 Mar 54; Inaccurate Rifles, 4 Jul 54
Corley, John T: New Courses for Old Traditions, 14 Jun 53
Craven, Virgil E: Operation Touchdown, 24 Dec 53
Davies, Godfrey: Wellington's Leadership, 29 Jun 54
Davis, Stanley W: ORO Replies, 5 Jul 54
Dean, William F: Why We Fight, 26 Apr 54; After the Bombers Pass, 29 May 54
Decker, Bert R: Napalm, 45 Oct 53; Copter Cavalry, 36 Apr 54
Devers, Jacob L: Stimulating and Satisfying Life, 3 May 54
DeWeerd, Harvey A: Time of Atomic Plenty, 11 Jul 54
Diehl, Edwin: Not an Atomic Gun, 26 Jan 54
Dixon, Louis F: Commo, 8 Nov 53
Douglas, James S: Assault Under Friendly Fire, 46 Aug 53
Dunn, Jerry F: Self-Propelled Artillery in Positional Warfare, 14 Nov 53
Dunn, William P: Area Fire versus Aimed Fire, 8 May 54
Dupuy, R Ernest: Celerity: Secret of Success, 28 Apr 54
Eason, Sidney S: Why I Read Combat Forces Journal, 4 May 54
Eisenhower, Dwight D: Quoted, 45 Dec 53; State of the Nation's Defenses, 11 Feb 54
Elliott, Richard B: Chamber of Commerce Support, 5 Nov 53
Exton, Hugh M: Troop Duty Can be Rewarding, 39 Feb 54
Fisher, Francis P: Smith versus Smith, 8 Jan 54
Fleming, Raymond H: Fish or Cut Bait, 10 Oct 53
Folsom, Samuel B, Jr: Interdiction in Korea, 27 Apr 54
Fox, Victor B: Tank Identification for Training, 36 Nov 53
Fries, Charles J V: Squaring Not the only Solution, 7 Jan 54
Gage, Charles S: Fish or Cut Bait, 10 Oct 53
Garrott, Warren A: Machine Guns, 5 Sep 53
Garthoff, Raymond L: Red Infantry: Decisive Arm, 27 Jan 54
Gavin, James M: Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses, 22 Jun 54
Gibbons, John B, Jr: Supporting Device for Telephone Lines, 47 Jun 54, 22 Jul 54
Gordon, Thomas C: Long and Rocky Road, 21 Jun 54
Grant, Andrew R: Alaska Base, 6 Mar 54
Greene, Joseph I: What More Can We Learn About Leading?, ii Aug 53
Gugeler, Russell A: Attack Along a Ridgeline, 22 May 54; Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54
Guhl, Edward R: Too Much Artillery Fire?, 9 Apr 54
Guild, Eugene R: Commissaries, 12 Dec 53
Hammersley, John: Thanks, 12 Dec 53
Harmeling, Henry, Jr: Armor versus Paratroopers, 21 Feb 54
Harmon, Ernest N: Quoted, 36 Dec 53
Harper, Arthur M: Artillery Quotation of the Month, 42 Jan 54
Harper, Robert S: The Proper Use of Armor, 10 Sep 53
Hayes, John D: Mahan Today, 38 Dec 53
Hazlett, Harry F: Artillery Quotation of the Month, 49 May 54
Herr, John K: The Case for Horse Cavalry, 39 Dec 53; Lines from a New Book, 43 Mar 54
Holley, I B: Firing for Record, 34 Feb 54
Howard, Robert A, Jr: Responsibilities of a Great Power, 4 May 54
Hughes, John A, Jr: Let 'em Go, 45 Aug 53
Hunt, Robert G, Jr: Rommel Fan, 8 Aug 53
Hunter, Edward: Our POWs are not Traitors, 36 Oct 53; Improved Brain-Washing, 26 Apr 54
Jackson, Henry M: Army Will Carry On, 26 Apr 54
Jacobs, Bruce: Memoir-Writing Commanders, 6 Jan 54
Jeffrey, Jack C: Let's Use our Brains, 34 Dec 53
Jenkins, Frederick: Building Community Relations, 36 Sep 53; What to do with AWOLs, 42 Dec 53
Jennings, Richard M: Overhead Cover for Artillery, 28 Aug 53
Johnson, Melvin M, Jr: Division Objective, 5 Dec 53
Jurgenson, Martin H: Air Strike Control, 42 Dec 53
Juskalian, George: The Rifle Squad, 43 Apr 54
Kelley, Gerard W: Fish or Cut Bait, 10 Oct 53
Kennedy, William V: Fish or Cut Bait, 12 Dec 53; Be a Soldier, 7 Jan 54
Kent, Irvin M: Where Can We Get the Fighting Men?, 33 May 54, 22 Jul 54
Kent, James R: Let's March Again, 43 Apr 54
Kern, Daniel J: Abolish Propaganda, 43 Apr 54
Kesselring, Albert: Do Not be One-Sided, 28 Jun 54; Lines from a New Book, 50 Jun 54
Kettring, L C W: Efficiency Reports, 6 Feb 54
Kintner, William R: Tactics of Atomic War, 27 Sep 53; Commo to the Signal Corps, 39 Sep 53; Making an Armistice Work, 14 Jan 54

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY

Kirsten, Elwyn N: When Joseph "Got It" from the New King, 16 Sep 53; Promotion System in Transition, 21 Nov 53
Koch, Harlan G: Tanks and Infantry at Night, 35 Dec 53; Terrain Tailors Tactics in Indochina, 22 Apr 54
Kolb, Avery E: Independent, Ear to the Ground, 6 Jun 54
Kyes, Roger M: Quoted, 45 Dec 53
Kyle, Jim: On the Hill, 18 Jan 54
Kyne, Peter B: The Test of Gentility, 29 Jan 54
Lane, Thomas A: What Would You Do?, 4 Sep 53
LaSala, Bruce: Semper Fidelis, 6 May 54
Lauer, Arthur L: Secretary Stevens, 6 Apr 54
Lauth, Robert M: Bunker Bomb, 7 May 54
LaVertue, Francis W: Recon Company, 14 Oct 53
Levi, Werner: Sino-Soviet Relations, 27 Jan 54
Liddell Hart, B H: Thanks, 7 Apr 54
Lindsey, Douglas: Poor Example of Research, 5 May 54
Linnell, Frank H: Stretching the Square, 7 Jan 54
Lippmann, Walter: Investment in the Army, 29 May 54
Little, Donald C: Rate the Rater, 39 Sep 53
Loosbrock, John F: Division Objective, 5 Dec 53
Lynch, George E: Where is the Regimental Commander?, 18 Aug 53; The Infantry Division, 9 Nov 53; Reserves in Atomic Warfare, 15 May 54
McLean, Donald F: Commissaries and PXs, 5 Nov 53
Maney, John R: Minds and Strategy, 35 Feb 54
Manley, Patsy Jean: Division Objective, 5 Dec 53
Mannerheim, Carl: Lines from a New Book, 49 Jul 54
Marshall, S L A: Artillery Quotation of the Month, 46 Feb 54
McAnsh, Andrew T: The Making of a Marine, 38 May 54
McCreary, Walter W: Sell Education, Too, 6 Jul 54
McCutcheon, William S: Division Objective, 5 Dec 53
McFerren, Carl D: Defense of a Battery Position, 37 Jun 54
McGillivray, James F: Fish or Cut Bait, 12 Oct 53
McGreevey, Don: On the Hill, 8 Apr 54
McGrotty, P: Error?, 8 Oct 53
McGuire, William H: Stamp of Approval, 6 Feb 54
McKinney, C E: Unit Pride, 8 Oct 53
McMahon, William D: Impressed, 10 Dec 53
McQuie, Robert, Jr: Judging Distance, 46 Jun 54
Miller, Walter L, Jr: The Uses of Flame in Korea, 37 Mar 54; Bunker Bombs, 7 Jul 54
Millis, Walter: Destroying an Illusion, 39 Dec 53; The New Strategy's Unanswered Questions, 13 Mar 54; Objective is the Same, 27 Apr 54
Miltonberger, Butler B: Community Traditions, 8 Oct 53
Mitchell, James W: Caption Writing, 4 Sep 53
Mittenthal, Lothrop: Counterfire Intelligence, 44 Dec 53
Montgomery, Sir Bernard: Interview with Monty, 21 Mar 54; The Artillery Has Been Terrific, 49 May 54; Progress is not Inevitable, 14 Jul 54
Morin, Relman: Our Fine New Army, 44 May 54
Morris, William H H: Quoted, 36 Dec 53
Morse, Harry W: GI Schooling for Pros, 5 Mar 54; Sell 'em Hard, 6 May 54
Mraz, Alex N: Why a Round Bull's Eye?, 44 Oct 53
Mudgett, Charles F, Jr: FSCC, 6 Sep 53
Murphy, Edward L, Jr: Night Fighting, 18 Nov 53
Murray, Don: The Virtue of Insanity, 29 Jul 54
Nash, Thomas D: 65th Division History, 5 Mar 54
Nichols, M G: Disagrees with our Ideals, 6 Jun 54
Norman, Lloyd H: The New Look Strategy, 15 Feb 54
Norstad, Lauris: Lightweight Fighter, 8 May 54
Novak, Frank: Promotion and Command, 8 Aug 53
O'Brien, Robert W: Fly 'em in in Pieces, 5 Nov 53
O'Connor, Richard; Lines from a New Book, 44 Nov 53
Paget, Julian: The British Regimental System, 30 Jun 54, 22 Jul 54
Palmer, Williston B: Life Among the Indians, 36 Feb 54
Patton, George S, Jr: Quoted, 36 Dec 53
Phillips, Thomas R: Hole in the Reservoir, 26 Apr 54
Pogue, Forrest C: How the Germans Surrendered, 39 Jun 54
Powell, Earl P: Commissaries, 5 Nov 53
Powers, John L: Inner Lines, 21 May 54
Powers, Patrick W: The Authors Answer, 7 Sep 53
Price, Russell S: Only One in Eight, 47 Jun 54
Prince, David C: Thermo-Nukes and Strategy, 4 Mar 54; Copter Cavalry Now, 7 May 54
Putt, Donald L: The Way It Is, 28 May 54
Pykosz, Edward H: The George Method, 46 Apr 54
Quarles, Donald A: Research—More for Less, 29 Jul 54
Randle, Edwin H: And They Marched, Every One, 18 Sep 53
Reinhardt, George C: Tactics of Atomic War, 27 Sep 53; Stars, Stripes and A-Bombs, 19 Apr 54
Reinhardt, Gough C: Frame-Up, Communist Style, 35 Oct 53
Remy, John P: Gridding the Single Vertical Photograph, 30 Dec 53
Ridgway, Matthew B: Loyalty, Cliques, Criticism, 38 Nov 53; Letter to General Decker, 17 Dec 53; The Indispensable Weapon, 9 Jan 54; Artillery Quotation of the Month, 40 Mar 54; To the Members of the Infantry, ii Jul 54
Rigg, Robert B: Blow Up Your Commander, 18 Dec 53; Design for the Defeat of Red Armor, 17 Jul 54
Robinett, Paul M: History, Pro and Con, 29 Jun 54
Rodgers, P L: Experience, 10 Dec 53
Ross, Donald G: Picture the Errors, 46 Jun 54
Rothschild, Jacquard H: CBR Training, 6 Feb 54
Rowny, Edward L: Tanks and Infantry, 11 Sep 53
Ruyffelaere, Raymond F: Combat Films, 7 Apr 54
Safer, Joseph: Fix-Your-Car Shop, 39 Apr 54
Saltonstall, Leverett: Army Will Carry On, 26 Apr 54
Sampson, William T, II: The Puff Target, 40 Dec 53
Sawyer, Robert K: Check Your Records, 45 Aug 53
Short, Dewey: Fair Play and Restoration of Prestige, 33 Dec 53
Simpson, Robert S: Disgracing the Uniform, 7 Jun 54
Sloan, George B: Design for an Atomic Army, 13 Jun 54
Small, Ballard B: Night Raid on Hill 528, 42 Aug 53
Smith, Dale O: Service Schools, 34 Feb 54
Smith, Gerald A: Best Years of our Lives, 4 Nov 53
Smith, Richard: On the Hill, 18 Jan 54
Standley, William H: Malenkov's Dilemma, 30 Feb 54
Steele, Howard M, Jr: Organic Tac Air, 7 Apr 54
Steinberg, Isaac N: Communist Laws of War, 39 Dec 53
Stevens, Leslie: Why the Reds Attack Science, 35 Feb 54
Stevens, Robert T: Artillery 1917-1953, 38 Dec 53; More Firepower, 26 Jan 54; Testament of Faith, ii Apr 54
Stough, Charles S, Jr: Leadership and Rank, 14 Oct 53
Strong, Paschal N: An Invasion is Jeopardized, 29 Nov 53
Sundahl, Albert H: Commissaries and PXs, 5 Nov 53
Swift, Eben F: Division Objective, 18 Oct 53, 8 Dec 53
Taibbi, Raymond V: It's Your Association, 7 Apr 54
Taylor, Wilton M: 9th Infantry Division Association, 8 Nov 53
Thomas, Shipley: Combat is More Than Charge, 34 Aug. 53; Division Objective, 5 Dec 53
Thompson, Dana L: Gridding the Single Vertical Photograph, 26 Mar 54
Thyng, Harrison R: A Kill in MIG Alley, 38 Nov 53
Todd, John E: Work Hard for the Army, 6 Jan 54
Trousdale, George W: Commissaries, 4 Nov 53
Truscott, Lucian K: Initiative Breeds Leadership, 26 Apr 54; No Place for Pity, 27 Apr 54
Tuck, G N: Engineered Scorched Earth, 28 May 54
Tusing, William C: The Overread Mechanic, 43 Dec 53
Twining, Nathan F: Interview, 35 Feb 54; Strategic and Tactical Air, 8 May 54
Underhill, Garrett: What the Russians Say About How We Fight, 41 Oct 53
Van de Water, Marjorie: The Human Price of Combat, 24 Mar 54
Van Rooy, Silvio: Information Wanted, 8 Feb 54
Volpe, Lewis F: This is Tactics?, 32 Aug 53
Walker, Frank: 37 Division History, 12 Dec 53, 7 Jul 54
Wallace, Willard M: Background for Treason, 28 Jun 54
Waller, S Gardner: Fish or Cut Bait, 10 Oct 53
Ware, Thomas A, Jr: The Rifle Squad, 40 Apr 54
Waterman, Bernard S: Mobilization of Total Power, 38 Aug 53
Watson-Watt, Robert A: Radar Defense of U.S., 29 May 54
Weible, Walter L: What is the General Staff?, 28 May 54
Weller, Jac: Fustest and Cheapest: 27 Apr 54
White, Frederic G: Let's Harness the Weather, 30 Aug 53
White, John Baker: The Armies of Communism, 33 Mar 54
White, Theodore H: America in Europe, 38 Nov 53; The Use of U.S. Machines, 27 Jan 54
Wiener, Frederick Bernays: Lament for a Skulker, 33 Jul 54
Wilkins, Frederick J: A Standard Combat-in-Towns Course, 40 Aug 53
Willis, J C T: Job Description, 29 Jun 54
Wilson, Charles E: Foxing the Wings, 39 Dec 53; Quoted, 45 Dec 53; Single Commander?, 28 Jun 54
Wilson, Gill Robb: Zeal for the Air Force, 28 Jul 54
Young, F L, Jr: No Discipline, 4 Nov 53
Young, Mason J, Jr: Economical Fire Power, 37 Nov 53, 10 Dec 53
Zieg, Donald E: Inflation of Rank, 4 Sep 53

NUMBERED UNITS

1 Infantry Division: Division Objective, 18 Oct 53

2 Infantry Division: Operation Touchdown, 24 Dec 53

4 Infantry Division: D Plus Ten Years, 23 Jul 54

5 Infantry Division: Building Community Relations, 36 Sep 53; What to do with AWOLs, 42 Dec 53

5 Mountain Division (German): Armor vs. Paratroopers, 21 Feb 54

7 Parachute Division (German): Armor vs. Paratroopers, 21 Feb 54

9 Infantry Regiment: Operation Touchdown, 24 Dec 53

14 Infantry Regiment: The Test of Gentility, 29 Jan 54

17 Infantry Regiment: Night Fighting, 18 Nov 53

23 Infantry Regiment: Night Raid on Hill 528, 42 Aug 53; Operation Touchdown, 24 Dec 53

33 Infantry Regiment: Long and Rocky Road, 21 Jun 54

34 Infantry Regiment: Attack Along a Ridgeline, 22 May 54

37 Infantry Division: 37th Division History, 7 Jul 54

38 Infantry Regiment: Operation Touchdown, 24 Dec 53

47 Infantry Regiment: And They Marched, Every One, 18 Sep 53

64 Field Artillery Battalion: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54

70 Tank Battalion: Tank Identification for Training, 36 Nov 53

72 Tank Battalion: Operation Touchdown, 24 Dec 53

937 Field Artillery Battalion: SP Artillery in Positional Warfare, 14 Nov 53

TITLE AND SUBJECT

Abolish Propaganda (Kern), 43 Apr 54

Absenteeism: What to do with AWOLs, 42 Dec 53

Administration: When Joseph "Got It" from the New King, 16 Sep 53; Reorganization of the Army Establishment, 25 Feb 54

Advisers, Military: Let's Use our Brains, 34 Dec 53

Africa Campaign, 1942-43: And They Marched, Every One, 18 Sep 53

Air Attack: Copter Cavalry, 36 Apr 54

Air Force, U.S.: *See* New Look Concept

Air Observers: The Aviation Company, 23 Dec 53; Air Strike Control, 42 Dec 53

Air Strike Control (Jurgenson), 42 Dec 53

Air Transport Developments Lag, 36 May 54

Air-Transportability: Fly 'em in in Pieces, 5 Nov 53; Design for an Atomic Army, 13 Jun 54; Five Whirlybirds Lift 105 Section, 18 Jun 54

Airborne Operations: Armor vs. Paratroopers, 21 Feb 54; Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses, 22 Jun 54; Design for the Defeat of Red Armor, 17 Jul 54

Airborne Troops: Airborne Officers, 44 Jun 54

Aircraft, Cargo: New Props for C-119, 51 Aug 53

Aircraft, Fighter: Cutaway of Starfire, 43 Jan 54; Lightweight Fighter for Close Support, 8 May 54

Aircraft, Helicopter. *See* Helicopters

Aircraft, Liaison: The Aviation Company, 23 Dec 53; Cessna XL-19B, 49 Jun 54

Air Craft, Training: Beechcraft T-34A Delivered, 47 Dec 53

Aircraft, Transport: Seeing-Eye Airplane, 47 Dec 53; Jet Transport Designed, 43 Jan 54; Air Transport Developments Lag, 36 May 54

Airpower. *See* New Look Concept

Alaska, 33 Jan 54, 6 Mar 54

Alfonso, Albert F: Attack Along a Ridge line, 22 May 54

American Medical Association: Creeping Danger, 34 Nov 53

Ammunition, Artillery: Iron Powder Bands, 51 Aug 53

Amphibious Operations: Design for the Defeat of Red Armor, 17 Jul 54

And They Marched, Every One (Randle), 18 Sep 53

Anderson, Leroy: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54

Antennas, Nonstandard, 48 Apr 54

Armies of Communism (White), 33 Mar 54

Armistice Agreements: Making an Armistice Work, 14 Jan 54

Armor is Mobile (Brigham), 46 Oct 53

Armor versus Paratroopers (Harmeling), 21 Feb 54

Armored Unit Actions: The Proper Use of Armor, 10 Sep 53; Tanks and Infantry, 11 Sep 53; Operation Touchdown, 24 Dec 53; Tanks and Infantry at Night, 35 Dec 53; Armor vs. Paratroopers, 21 Feb 54; Design for the Defeat of Red Armor, 17 Jul 54

Armored Vehicles: Tank Identification for Training, 36 Nov 53; Patton Tank Snubber, 51 Aug 53; Armor is Mobile, 46 Oct 53; British Conqueror Tank, 49 Jun 54

Army, United States: Give Us Back Our Pride, 24 Aug 53; On Commissaries and Productivity, ii Sep 53; Promotion System in Transition, 21 Nov 53; Fair Play and Restoration of Prestige, 33 Dec 53; What the Russians Say About How We Fight, 41 Oct 53; Austerity, 45 Dec 53; Reorganization of the Army Establishment, 25 Feb 54; Tell the Army's Story, ii Mar 54; Battle Future of our Army, 13 Apr 54; If We Are to Have Less, 18 Apr 54; Words to Help You Serve, 3 May 54; The Army is Still in Business, 11 May 54; Our Fine New Army, 44 May 54; Design for an Atomic Army, 13 Jun 54; Time of Atomic Plenty, 11 Jul 54

Army General Staff: Selection for General Staff Duty, 32 Jan 54; Reorganization of the Army Establishment, 25 Feb 54; Life Among the Indians, 36 Feb 54

Army is Still in Business, The, 11 May 54

Army Reserve: Fish or Cut Bait, 26 Aug 53; New Look for Reserves, 20 Mar 54; Reserve Component Duty, 48 May 54

Arnold, Ernest R: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54

Around the Bases: Alaska, 33 Jan 54; Austria, 47 Feb 54; Japan, 27 Mar 54; Germany, 33 Apr 54; Okinawa, 30 May 54; Berlin, 30 Jul 54

Artillery, Airborne: Five Whirlybirds Lift 105 Section, 18 Jun 54

Artillery, Defense Against: Countering Communist Artillery, 24 Sep 53; Double Exposure Locates Enemy Artillery, 44 Apr 54

Artillery Matériel: Oily Tube Decreases Velocity, 40 Mar 54

Artillery, Self-Propelled: SP Artillery in Positional Warfare, 14 Nov 53; Design for the Defeat of Red Armor, 17 Jul 54

Artillery, Support by: Assault Under Friendly Fire, 46 Aug 53; Tactics of Atomic War, 27 Sep 53; SP Artillery in Positional Warfare, 14 Nov 53; Economical Fire Power, 37 Nov 53

Artillery Survey: Survey in Meters, 42 Jan 54

Artillery Positions, Defense of: Overhead Cover for Artillery, 28 Aug 53; Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54

Artillery School, Reorganization of, 41 Sep 53

Assault Bridge for Armor, 33 Jun 54

Assault Under Friendly Fire (Douglas), 46 Aug 53

Assignments. *See* Career Management

Association of the U. S. Army: Personal Service, 39 Jan 54; Purposes and Objectives, ii Feb 54

Atomic Warfare: Tactics of Atomic Warfare, 27 Sep 53; The New Look Strategy, 15 Jan 54; The New Strategy's Unanswered Questions, 13 Mar 54; Interview with Monty, 21 Mar 54; Stars, Stripes and A-Bombs, 19 Apr 54; The Army is Still in Business, 11 May 54; Reserves in Atomic Warfare, 15 May 54; Design for an Atomic Army, 13 Jun 54; Time of Atomic Plenty, 11 Jul 54; The Cold Objective Look, 41 Jul 54

Atomic Weapons: The Cobalt Bomb, 49 Jun 54

Attack Along a Ridgeline (Gugeler & Canzona), 23 May 54

Attack Principles: Tactics of Atomic War, 27 Sep 53; Celerity: Secret of Success, 28 Apr 54; Attack Along a Ridgeline, 22 May 54

Austerity (Editorial), 45 Dec 53

Austria, 47 Feb 54

Aviation Company, The (Carver), 23 Dec 53, 6 Feb 54

Bailey, Kincheon H: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54

Baker, Henry E: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54

Bands: Air Force Reductions, 8 May 54

Barker, Harold W: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54

Battle Future of our Army, 13 Apr 54

Berlin, 30 Jul 54

Blow Up Your Commander (Rigg), 18 Dec 53

Bombardment, Air: The New Look Strategy, 15 Feb 54; The New Strategy's Unanswered Questions, 13 Mar 54

Bombs, Bunker, 7 May 54

Bradley Takes Research Position, 48 Aug 53

Brennen, Leo M: Attack Along a Ridgeline, 22 May 54

Bridge, Assault, for Armor, 33 Jun 54

British Regimental System, The (Paget), 30 Jun 54, 22 Jul 54

Building Community Relations (Jenkins), 36 Sep 53

Bulldozers: Interchangeable Attachments, 49 Jun 54

Cable, Arctic, 51 Aug 53

Camera, Aerial, Liaison, 39 Nov 53

Career Management and Your Future: Who Goes to School?, 34 Sep 53; Rotation of Assignments, 47 Oct 53; Selection for Overseas Service, 40 Nov 53; Assignment of Overseas Returnees, 46 Dec 53; Selection for General Staff Duty, 32 Jan 54; Specialization for Combat Arms Officers, 51 Feb 54; Civilian School Program, 42 Mar 54; Transfer or Detail?, 47 Apr 54; Reserve Component Duty, 48 May 54; Airborne Officers, 44 Jun 54; Military Missions and MAAG, 48 Jul 54

Castello, Thomas A: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54

Catch 'em Young—and Sell 'em Hard (Editorial), 32 Mar 54, 6 May 54, 6 Jul 54, 7 Jul 54

Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses (Gavin), 22 Jun 54

Celerity: Secret of Success (Dupuy), 28 Apr 54

Check Your Records (Sawyer), 45 Aug 53

Chemicals, Combat Uses: CBR Training, 6 Feb 54; The Uses of Flame in Korea, 37 Mar 54

Chest Out, Eyes Bright (Editorial), 44 Feb 54

Chief of Staff: Reorganization of the Army Establishment, 25 Feb 54

City Hall Has its Hand Out Too (Editorial), 6 Oct 53

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY

Civil Control: Civil Control in Danger, 22 Jan 54; Reorganization of the Army Establishment, 25 Feb 54
Civilian Conservation Corps Veterans, 7 Feb 54
Cleaborn, Edward O: Attack Along a Ridgeline, 22 May 54
Coalition Warfare: Strategy of Restraint, 10 Jan 54
Cold Objective Look, The, 41 Jul 54
Collins, J. Lawton: Salute to the Former Chief, 9 Sep 53
Collins, Roy E: Attack Along a Ridgeline, 23 May 54
Combat, The Human Price of, 24 Mar 54
Combat Company Commanders Should be Majors, 4 Sep 53, 14 Oct 53, 6 Nov 53, 10 Dec 53
Combat Course: Blow Up Your Commander, 18 Dec 53
Combat Forces Journal: Why I Read CFJ, 4 May 54; Independent, Ear to the Ground, 6 Jun 54; Disagrees with our Ideals, 6 Jun 54; Why They're Generals, 7 Jun 54
Combat is More than Charge (Thomas), 34 Aug 53
Command Post: Where is the Regimental Commander?, 18 Aug 53
Command Principles: Where is the Regimental Commander?, 18 Aug 53; Troop Duty Can be Rewarding, 39 Feb 54
Commo to the Signal Corps (Kintner), 39 Sep 53, 8 Nov 53, 10 Dec 53, 7 Jan 54
Communications: Commo to the Signal Corps, 39 Sep 53; SP Artillery in Positional Warfare, 16 Nov 53; Electronic Warfare, 46 Jul 54; Commo Doctrine on OPs, 46 Jul 54
Communism, The Armies of, 33 Mar 54
Computer, Gun Data: Target Attack, 23 Nov 53
Consolidation Propaganda Company: Abolish Propaganda, 43 Apr 54
Continental Army Command: Reorganization of the Army Establishment, 25 Feb 54
Coordinates, Map: Gridding the Single Vertical Photograph, 30 Dec 53, 26 Mar 54
Copter Cavalry (Decker), 36 Apr 54, 7 Jun 54
Corporal, The: More Fire Power for a Fire Power-Plus Army, 45 Jun 54
Counterfire: Counterfire Intelligence, 44 Dec 53; Double Exposure Locates Artillery Positions, 44 Apr 54
Countering Communist Artillery (Boatner), 24 Sep 53
Courage: Fast Thinking and Guts, ii Nov 53
Cover, Overhead, for Artillery, 28 Aug 53
Cramer, Kenneth F: Soldier, 6 May 54
Creeping Danger (Editorial), 34 Nov 53
Crete, Battle of: Armor vs. Paratroopers, 21 Feb 54
D Plus Ten Years (Blakeley), 23 Jul 54
Dav, Breckinridge Atwater, 39 Jan 54
Decision (Editorial), 34 Nov 53
Defense, Department of: Civil Control in Danger, 22 Jan 54
Defense of a Battery Position (Gugeler & McFerren), 34 Jun 54
Defense Principles: Tactics of Atomic Warfare, 27 Sep 53
Dependents Benefits: Creeping Danger, 34 Nov 53
Design for an Atomic Army (Sloan), 13 Jun 54
Design for the Defeat of Red Armor (Rigg), 17 Jul 54
Detail or Transfer?, 47 Apr 54
Distance, Judging, 46 Jun 54
Division Objective (Swift), 19 Oct 53, 5 Dec 53, 8 Dec 53, 5 Mar 54
Dock Barge, 39 Nov 53
Double Exposure Locates Enemy Artillery Positions, 44 Apr 54
Economical Fire Power (Young), 37 Nov 53, 10 Dec 53
Efficiency Reports: Importance of Being Average, 6 Aug 53; One Bad Report, 10 Aug 53; Efficiency Blots, 4 Sep 53; Rate the Rater, 39 Sep 53; The New Officer Efficiency Report, 38 Oct 53
Electronic Gun Data Computer (Arn), 27 Nov 53
Emplacements: Bunker Roof Tested by Fire, 49 Apr 54
Engines, Jet Propelled: Drone Jet for AAA Gunners, 43 Jan 54
Engines, Motor Vehicle: One Engine—Four Motors, 47 Dec 53
Executions: Lament for a Skulker, 33 Jul 54
Exercise Flash Burn: Preview to Flash Burn, 32 Apr 54; Report on Flash Burn, 10 Jun 54
Fair Play and Restoration of Prestige (Short), 33 Dec 53
Fast Thinking and Guts, ii Nov 53
Fire Adjustment: The Puff Target, 40 Dec 53
Fire Direction Center: SP Artillery in Positional Warfare, 14 Nov 53
Fire Support Coordination Center (Mudgett), 6 Sep 53
Firepower, Infantry: Volume of Fire, 47 Aug 53; The Rifle Squad, 40 Apr 54; The George Method, 46 Apr 54
Fish or Cut Bait (Cocklin), 26 Aug 53, 10 Oct 53, 12 Dec 53
Five Whirlybirds Lift 105 Section, 18 Jun 54
Fix-Your-Car Shop (Safer), 39 Apr 54
Flame, Uses of, in Korea, 37 Mar 54
Foley, Regis J: Attack Along a Ridgeline, 22 May 54
Footwear: New Armored Boot, 43 Jan 54
Foreign Service: Selection for Overseas Service, 40 Nov 53; Assignment of Overseas Returnees, 46 Dec 53
Fort Belvoir Papers Please Copy (Editorial), 18 Apr 54
Forward Observer: Observer Message Modified, 49 Dec 53; On the Hill, 18 Jan 54
Frame-Up Communist Style (Reinhardt), 35 Oct 53
France, Invasion of, 1944: An Invasion is Jeopardized, 29 Nov 53; D Plus Ten Years, 23 Jul 54
Francis, Carl: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54
Frankford Arsenal: A Line Officer Looks at Ordnance, 44 Jul 54
General Staff. *See* Army General Staff
George Method, The (Pykosz), 46 Apr 54
German Army: Information Wanted, 8 Feb 54; How the Germans Surrendered, 39 Jun 54
Germany, 33 Apr 54, 30 Jul 54
Gibson, Willie C: Attack Along a Ridgeline, 22 May 54
Give Us Back Our Pride, 24 Aug 53, 8 Oct 53, 4 Nov 53
Graphic Firing Table Fan, 48 Jun 54
Great Britain: The British Regimental System, 30 Jun 54
Greene, Joseph I: Soldier, 12 Aug 53
Gridding the Single Vertical Photograph (Remy & Thompson) 30 Dec 53, 26 Mar 54
Guided Missiles: More Fire Power for a Fire Power-Plus Army, 45 Jun 54
Gun, Automatic, Fastest Firing, 49 Jun 54
Gunnery: Improvements in Gunnery, 48 Dec 53; Rough Sine Factors, 41 Mar 54; Variations in Metro Effects, 47 Jul 54
Hammer, Frederick J: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54
Haussler, Richard G: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54
Head Protection, 45 Aug 53
Headgear: Helmets: Head Protection, 45 Aug 53; What About the Helmet?, 24 Jan 54
Heartbreak Ridge: Operation Touchdown, 24 Dec 53
Helicopters: Copter Cavalry, 36 Apr 54; Five Whirlybirds Lift 105 Section, 18 Jun 54; High Cost of Maintenance, 9 Jul 54
Hernandez, Jesus R: Fast Thinking and Guts, ii Nov 53
Hogan, Arthur H: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54
Honest John: More Fire Power for a Fire Power-Plus Army, 45 Jun 54
Household Goods Allowance: Comparison with Foreign Service, 9 Jul 54
How the Germans Surrendered (Pogue), 39 Jun 54
How to Write a Staff Study, 45 Apr 54
Human Factor in War: The Indispensable Weapon, 9 Jan 54
Human Price of Combat, The (Van de Water), 24 Mar 54, 5 May 54, 5 Jul 54
Humor: This is Tactics?, 32 Aug 53
If We Are to Have Less We Must Have Better, 18 Apr 54
Inaccurate Rifles Make Inaccurate Riflemen, 45 May 54, 4 Jul 54
Indispensable Weapon, The (Ridgway), 9 Jan 54
Indochina, Terrain Tailors Tactics in, 22 Apr 54
Indoctrination, Military: The Making of a Marine, 38 May 54
Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Mobilization of Total Power, 38 Aug 53
Infantry and Infantry Action: Where is the Regimental Commander?, 18 Aug 53; Night Raid on Hill 528, 42 Aug 53; Assault Under Friendly Fire, 46 Aug 53; Tanks and Infantry, 11 Sep 53; And They Marched, Every One, 18 Sep 53; Tactics of Atomic War, 27 Sep 53; Division Objective, 19 Oct 53; The Infantry Division, 9 Nov 53; Night Fighting, 18 Nov 53; Blow Up Your Commander, 18 Dec 53; Operation Touchdown, 24 Dec 53; Tanks and Infantry at Night, 35 Dec 53; The Human Price of Combat, 24 Mar 54; Attack Along a Ridgeline, 22 May 54; Where Can We Get the Fighting Men?, 33 May 54
Infantry-Armor Team: The Proper Use of Armor, 10 Sep 53; Tanks and Infantry, 11 Sep 53
Infantry Branch: To the Members of the Infantry, ii Jul 54
Infantry Division: Triangular or Square? (Lynch), 9 Nov 53, 7 Jan 54
Infantry School: Only One in Eight, 47 Jun 54
Inner Lines: Strength or Weakness? (Powers), 21 May 54
Intelligence, Counterfire, 44 Dec 53
Interior Lines: Inner Lines: Strength or Weakness?, 20 May 54
Invasion is Jeopardized, An (Strong), 29 Nov 53
Japan, 27 Mar 54
Joint Civilian Orientation Conference (Editorial), 15 Jul 54
Joseph I. Greene: Soldier (Editionial), 12 Aug 53
Judging Distance (McQuie), 46 Jun 54
Knee Board, Aviator's, 39 Nov 53
Korea, Operations in: Overhead Cover for Artillery, 28 Aug 53; Night Raid on Hill 528, 42 Aug 53; Countering Communist Artillery, 24 Sep 53; Frame-up Communist Style, 35 Oct 53; Our POWs are not Traitors, 36 Oct 53; SP Artillery in Positional Warfare, 16 Nov 53; Night Fighting, 18 Nov 53; Operation Touchdown, 24 Dec 53; Making an Armistice Work, 14 Jan 54; On the Hill, 18 Jan 54; The Human Price of Combat, 24 Mar 54; The Uses of Flame in Korea, 37 Mar 54; Attack Along a Ridgeline, 22 May 54; Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54; Patrols in Korea, 20 Jul 54
Lament for a Skulker (Wiener), 33 Jul 54
Leading, What More Can We Learn About?, ii Aug 53
Let 'em Go (Hughes), 45 Aug 53
Let's Harness the Weather (White), 30 Aug 53
Let's March Again (Kent), 43 Apr 54
Let's Use Our Brains (Jeffrey), 34 Dec 53
Life Among the Indians (Palmer), 36 Feb 54
Life of a Jaycock (Editorial), 15 Jul 54
Line Officer Looks at Ordnance, A, 44 Jul 54
Logex-54, Preview to, 43 May 54
Logistical Services: Reorganization of the Army Establishment, 25 Feb 54
Logistics: An Invasion is Jeopardized, 29 Nov 53; This is Logistics, 30 Mar 54; Inner Lines, 21 May 54; Preview to Logex-54, 43 May 54; Design for an Atomic Army, 13 Jun 54
Long and Rocky Road (Gordon), 21 Jun 54
Loyalty Downward (Editorial), 16 Apr 54
Machine Guns: We Need Them (Garrott), 5 Sep 53

Mahan, Dennis Hart: Celerity: Secret of Success, 28 Apr 54
Making an Armistice Work (Kintner), 14 Jan 54
Making of a Marine, The (McAnsh), 39 May 54
Malenkov's Dilemma (Standley & Ageton), 30 Feb 54
Maneuvers: List for Fiscal 1955, 9 Jul 54
Manpower, Use of: If We Are to Have Less, 18 Apr 54; Where Can We Get the Fighting Men?, 33 May 54; Design for an Atomic Army, 13 Jun 54
Marches: And They Marched, Every One, 18 Sep 53; Let's March Again, 43 Apr 54
Marine, The Making of a, 38 May 54
Marksmanship Training: Division Objective, 18 Oct 53; Why a Round Bull's Eye?, 44 Oct 53; Area Fire vs. Aimed Fire, 8 May 54
Marshall, George C: Soldier-Statesman, 38 Jan 54
McQuitty, Bobbie H: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54
Meares, Cecil W: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54
Mechanic, The Overread, 43 Dec 53
Medical Attendance: Creeping Danger, 34 Nov 53
Meet the Army's Boss, 8 Mar 54
Metro Effects, Variations in, 47 Jul 54
Military Missions and MAAG, 48 Jul 54
Military Policy of U. S.: Strategy of Restraint, 10 Jan 54: Civil Control in Danger, 22 Jan 54; New Look, 38 Jan 54; State of the Nation's Defenses, 11 Feb 54; The New Look Strategy, 15 Feb 54; The New Strategy's Unanswered Questions, 13 Mar 54; Battle Future of our Army, 13 Apr 54; The Army is Still in Business, 11 May 54
Mobility, Strategic: Inner Lines, 21 May 54
Mobility, Tactical: Armor is Mobile, 46 Oct 53; Tell the Army's Story, ii Mar 54; Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses, 22 Jun 54
Mobilization, Industrial: Mobilization of Total Power, 38 Aug 53
Mobilization, Manpower: Design for an Atomic Army, 13 Jun 54
Mobilization of Total Power (Waterman), 38 Aug 53
Moore, Santford B: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54
Morale: Solutions, 6 Aug 53; Give Us Back Our Pride, 24 Aug 53; No Discipline, 4 Nov 53; Work Hard for the Army, 6 Jan 54; Tommy This and That, 38 Jan 54; Be a Soldier, 7 Feb 54; Gripe, 9 Apr 54
More Fire Power for a Fire Power-Plus Army, 45 Jun 54
Motor Vehicles: Fix-Your-Car Shop, 39 Apr 54
Motor Vehicles: Trucks: Fork-Lift Truck, 47 Dec 53
Movement, Principle of: Celerity: Secret of Success, 28 Apr 54; The Rifle Squad, 40 Apr 54
Napalm (Decker), 45 Oct 53
National Defense: State of the Nation's Defenses, 11 Feb 54; Battle Future of our Army, 13 Apr 54; The Army is Still in Business, 11 May 54; The Cold Objective Look, 41 Jul 54
National Guard: Program: Fish or Cut Bait, 26 Aug 53
National Guard: Training: Reserve Component Duty, 48 May 54
Navy, U. S. *See* New Look Concept
New Chief of Staff (Editorial), 8 Sep 53
New Look (Editorial), 38 Jan 54
New Look Concept: New Look, 38 Jan 54; State of the Nation's Defenses, 11 Feb 54; The New Look Strategy, 15 Feb 54; The Soldier's Way, 44 Feb 54; The New Strategy's Unanswered Questions, 13 Mar 54; Responsibilities of a Great Power, 4 May 54; The Army is Still in Business, 11 May 54; Time of Atomic Plenty, 11 Jul 54; The Cold Objective Look, 41 Jul 54
New Look for Reserves (Editorial), 20 Mar 54
New Look Strategy, The (Norman), 15 Feb 54, 4 Mar 54
New Officer Efficiency Report (Bergin), 38 Oct 53, 4 Nov 53, 6 Feb 54
New Strategy's Unanswered Questions, The (Millis), 13 Mar 54
Night Actions: Night Raid on Hill 528, 42 Aug 53; Night Fighting, 18 Nov 53; Tanks and Infantry at Night, 35 Dec 53
Night Fighting (Murphy), 18 Nov 53
Night Raid on Hill 528 (Small), 42 Aug 53
Noncommissioned Officers: NCO Grade Structure, 37 Nov 53; Stars, Stripes and A-Bombs, 18 Apr 54; Long and Rocky Road, 21 Jun 54
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Interview with Monty, 21 Mar 54
Offenses, Combat: Lament for a Skulker, 33 Jul 54
Officers, Assignment. *See* Career Management
Officers, Career: Words to Help You Serve, 3 May 54
Officers, Use of: Let's Use Our Brains, 34 Dec 53
Okinawa, 30 May 54
On Commissaries and Productivity, ii Sep 53, 4 Nov 53, 12 Dec 53
On the Hill (Kyle & Smith), 18 Jan 54, 8 Feb 54
Only One in Eight (Price), 47 Jun 54
Operation Overlord: An Invasion is Jeopardized, 29 Nov 53
Operation Touchdown Won Heartbreak Ridge (Craven), 24 Dec 53
Operations Research: The Human Price of Combat, 24 Mar 54
Opportunities and Responsibilities (Clay), 3 May 54
Ordnance, A Line Officer Looks at, 44 Jul 54
Organization: Armored Units: The Proper Use of Armor, 10 Sep 53; Tanks and Infantry, 11 Sep 53
Organization: Army: Reorganization of the Army Establishment, 25 Feb 54; Design for an Atomic Army, 13 Jun 54; Time of Atomic Plenty, 11 Jul 54
Organization: Infantry Division: The Infantry Division, 9 Nov 53
Our Fine New Army (Morin), 44 May 54
Our POWs Are Not Traitors (Hunter), 36 Oct 53
Overhead Cover for Artillery (Jennings), 28 Aug 53
Overread Mechanic, The (Tusing), 43 Dec 53
Parker, William: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54
Patrolling: The George Method, 46 Apr 54; Patrols in Korea, 20 Jul 54
Patrols in Korea (Abshire), 20 Jul 54
Pay, Armed Forces: No Longer Highest Paid, 8 May 54
Periodicals, Military: Number of Army Newspapers, 8 May 54
Personal Service (Editorial), 39 Jan 54
Photographs, Aerial: Gridding the Single Vertical Photo, 30 Dec 53, 26 Mar 54
Photography, Combat Use: Double Exposure Locates Enemy Artillery Positions, 44 Apr 54, Picture the Errors, 46 Jun 54
Picture the Errors (Ross), 46 Jun 54
Pitcher, John M: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54
Politburo (USSR): Malenkov's Dilemma, 30 Feb 54
Post Exchanges: Breakdown of Dollar Spent, 49 Dec 53
Prestige: Long and Rocky Road, 21 Jun 54
Preview to Flash Burn, 32 Apr 54
Preview to Logex-54, 43 May 54
Prisoners of War: Frame-Up, Communist Style, 35 Oct 53; Our POWs are not Traitors, 36 Oct 53; Making an Armistice Work, 14 Jan 54
Progress is not Inevitable (Montgomery), 14 Jul 54
Promotion: Promotion and Command, 8 Aug 53; Promotion System in Transition, 21 Nov 53
Proper Use of Armor, The (Harper), 10 Sep 53
Psychological Warfare: Frame-Up, Communist Style, 35 Oct 53; Our POWs are not Traitors, 36 Oct 53; Abolish Propaganda, 43 Apr 54
Public Relations: Building Community Relations, 36 Sep 53; Chest Out, Eyes Bright, 44 Feb 54; Tell the Army's Story, ii Mar 54; Catch 'em Young—and Sell 'em Hard, 32 Mar 54; Life of a Jaycock, 15 Jul 54
Puff Target, The (Sampson), 40 Dec 53
Pursley, Joseph R: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54
Radio, Wrist, 47 Dec 53
Range Estimation: Judging Distance, 46 Jun 54
Rate the Rater (Little), 39 Sep 53
Rawls, Herbert L: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54
Reconnaissance: Combat is More than Charge, 34 Aug 53
Records, Check Your, 45 Aug 53
Red Flood, The (Mitchell), 5 Sep 53
Reenlistment Blues (Editorial), 45 Dec 53
Reenlistment Bonus: Reenlistment Blues, 45 Dec 53; Reenlistment Allowance, 9 Jul 54
Refrigerated Boxes, Portable, 43 Jan 54
Regiment, Armored Cavalry: Combat is More than Charge, 35 Aug 53
Regiment, Infantry: Where is the Regimental Commander?, 18 Aug 53
Regimental System, British, 30 Jun 54
Reorganization of the Army Establishment, 25 Feb 54
Replacements: Replacement Training, 16 Oct 53; Where Can We Get the Fighting Men?, 33 May 54
Report on Flash Burn (Baldwin), 10 Jun 54
Reserve, Army. *See* Army Reserve
Reserve Component Duty, 48 May 54
Reserve, Tactical: Reserves in Atomic Warfare, 15 May 54
Reserves in Atomic Warfare (Lynch), 15 May 54
Retired Personnel: Let's Use Our Brains, 34 Dec 53
Ridgeline, Attack Along a, 22 May 54
Ridgway, Matthew B: The New Chief of Staff, 8 Sep 54
Rifle: Comparison of M1, T44 and FN, 41 Jan 54; Inaccurate Rifles Make Inaccurate Riflemen, 45 May 54
Rifle Squad (Juskalian), 43 Apr 54
Rifle Squad: Key to Movement (Ware), 40 Apr 54, 6 Jun 54
Rizza Fan: The GFT Fan, 48 Jun 54
Rockets: More Fire Power for a Fire Power-Plus Army, 45 Jun 54
Rommel Fan, 8 Aug 53
Roosevelt, Theodore, Jr: D Plus Ten Years, 23 Jul 54
Rotation of Assignments, 47 Oct 53
ROTC: Service in Ranks, 5 Mar 54; Reserve Component Duty, 48 May 54
Sady, Joseph J: Attack Along a Ridgeline, 22 May 54
Salute to the Former Chief (Editorial), 9 Sep 53
Sandtables: Terrain Boards Used to Teach, 47 Aug 53
Schag, John T: Defense of a Battery Position, 34 Jun 54
Schiller, Melvin D: Attack Along a Ridgeline, 23 May 54
Schools, Civilian: GI Schooling for Pros, 5 Mar 54; Civilian School Program, 42 Mar 54
Schools, Service: Who Goes to School?, 34 Sep 53.
Sea Rescue: Air Force Rescue Craft, 39 Nov 53
Security: There Ain't No Spies in Here, 40 Dec 53
Selection for General Staff Duty, 32 Jan 54
Selection for Overseas Service, 40 Nov 53
Self-Propelled Artillery in Positional Warfare (Dunn), 14 Nov 53
Shea, Edward L: Attack Along a Ridgeline, 23 May 54
Shelters, Maintenance, 51 Aug 53
Signal Corps, Commo to, 39 Sep 53
Sill, Fort: Fix-Your-Car Shop, 39 Apr 54
Simoneau, Joseph H: Attack Along a Ridgeline, 22 May 54
Slogans (Editorial), 34 Nov 53
Slovik, Eddie D: Lament for a Skulker, 33 Jul 54
Snow Hall, 49 May 54

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY

Soldier's Way, The (Editorial), 44 Feb 54
Song, Infantry, 14 Oct 53
Specialists: Where Can We Get the Fighting Men?, 33 May 54; NCO Grade Structure, 37 Nov 53; *see also* Career Management
Specialization for Combat Arms Officers, 51 Feb 54, 6 May 54
Speed in Maneuver: Celerity: Secret of Success, 28 Apr 54
Squad, Infantry: The Rifle Squad, 40 Apr 54, 43 Apr 54
Staff Study, How to Write a, 44 Apr 54
Standard Combat-in-Towns Course (Wilkins), 40 Aug 53
Stars, Stripes and A-Bombs (Reinhardt), 19 Apr 54
State of the Nation's Defenses (Eisenhower), 11 Feb 54
McCarthy-Army Hearings: Secretary Stevens, 6 Apr 54; Loyalty Downward, 16 Apr 54
Stevens, Robert T: Meet the Army's Boss, 8 Mar 54; Secretary Stevens, 6 Apr 54; Loyalty Downward, 16 Apr 54
Stimulating and Satisfying Life (Devers), 3 May 54
Storage Battery: Battery Failures, 49 Apr 54
Strategy of Restraint or Chaos Unlimited (Baldwin), 10 Jan 54
Street Fighting: A Standard Combat-in-Towns Course, 40 Aug 53
Supporting Device for Telephone Lines (Gibbons), 47 Jun 54
Swett, Morris: TAS Librarian to Retire, 49 Apr 54
Tactical Air Support: Air Strike Control, 42 Dec 53; Organic Tac Air, 7 Apr 54; Strategic and Tactical Air, 8 May 54
Tactics, Armored Units: Tactics of Atomic Warfare, 27 Sep 53· The Proper Use of Armor, 10 Sep 53; Tanks and Infantry, 11 Sep 53; Operation Touchdown, 24 Dec 53; Tanks and Infantry at Night, 35 Dec 53; Design for the Defeat of Red Armor, 17 Jul 54
Tactics, Infantry Units: Night Raid on Hill 528, 42 Aug 53; Assault Under Friendly Fire, 46 Aug 53; Tanks and Infantry, 11 Sep 53; Tactics of Atomic War, 27 Sep 53; Night Fighting, 18 Nov 53; Operation Touchdown, 24 Dec 53; Tanks and Infantry at Night, 35 Dec 53; Stars, Stripes and A-Bombs, 18 Apr 54; Terrain Tailors Tactics in Indochina, 22 Apr 54; Reserves in Atomic Warfare, 15 May 54
Tactics of Atomic War (Reinhardt & Kintner), 27 Sep 53
Tank Identification for Training (Fox), 36 Nov 53
Tanks. *See* Armored Vehicles
Tanks and Infantry (Rowny), 11 Sep 53
Tanks and Infantry at Night (Koch), 35 Dec 53
Target Attack (Arn & Marriott), 23 Nov 53
Target-Car Railroad, 35 Nov 53
Target Location: Air Strike Control, 42 Dec 53; Rough Sine Factors, 41 Mar 54
Targets, Improvised: Target-Car Railroad, 35 Nov 53; The Puff Target, 40 Dec 53
Task Force Hill: Attack Along a Ridgeline, 22 May 54
Task Force Sturman: Operation Touchdown, 24 Dec 53
Taxes: City Hall Has its Hand Out Too, 6 Oct 53
Taylor, Maxwell D: Our Fine New Army, 44 May 54
Tell the Army's Story (Bolté), ii Mar 54
Terrain Boards Used to Teach Security and Fortification of Artillery Positions, 47 Aug 53
Terrain Tailors Tactics in Indochina (Koch), 22 Apr 54
Test of Gentility, The (Kyne), 29 Jan 54
Testament of Faith (Stevens), ii Apr 54
There Ain't No Spies in Here, 40 Dec 53
This is Logistics (Benson), 30 Mar 54
This is Tactics. (Volpe), 32 Aug 53
Time of Atomic Plenty (DeWeerd), 11 Jul 54
To the Members of the Infantry (Ridgway), ii Jul 54
Tommy This and That (Editorial), 38 Jan 54
Total War: The Cold Objective Look, 41 Jul 54
Training: Division Objective, 18 Oct 53; Troop Duty Can be Rewarding, 39 Feb 54; What to do with AWOLs, 42 Dec 53
Training Films: Combat Films, 7 Apr 54
Training Literature: The Overread Mechanic, 43 Dec 53
Training, Realism in: Blow Up Your Commander, 18 Dec 53
Training Supervision: Picture the Errors, 46 Jun 54
Training Aids: The Puff Target, 40 Dec 53; Fluorescent Training Aids, 40 Mar 54
Trajectory: Target Attack, 23 Nov 53
Transfer or Detail, 47 Apr 54
Troop Duty Can be Rewarding (Exton), 39 Feb 54
Truce Comes in Korea, 15 Sep 53
Two-Reel Wire Cart, 45 Apr 54
Uniform, Disgracing the, 7 Jun 54
Uses of Flame in Korea (Miller), 37 Mar 54, 7 May 54, 7 Jul 54
USSR: Countering Communist Artillery, 24 Sep 53; What the Russians Say About How We Fight, 41 Oct 53; Malenkov's Dilemma, 30 Feb 54; The Armies of Communism, 33 Mar 54; Inner Lines, 21 May 54; Design for the Defeat of Red Armor, 17 Jul 54
Volume of Fire (Clendenen), 47 Aug 53
Volunteers: Let 'em Go, 45 Aug 53
War: Methods: The Cold Objective Look, 41 Jul 54
Weather, Let's Harness the, 30 Aug 53
What About the Helmet? (Cleland), 24 Jan 54
What is Civil Control? (Wiener), 23 Jan 54
What More Can We Learn About Leading? (Greene), ii Aug 53
What the Russians Say About How We Fight (Underhill), 41 Oct 53
What to do with AWOLs (Jenkins), 42 Dec 53
When Joseph "Got it" from the New King (Kirsten), 16 Sep 53
Where Can We Get the Fighting Men? (Kent), 33 May 54, 22 Jul 54
Where is the Regimental Commander? (Lynch), 18 Aug 53, i Oct 53
Who Goes to School?, 34 Sep 53
Why a Round Bull's-Eye? (Mraz), 44 Oct 53
Wire, Combat: Supporting Device for Telephone Lines, 47 Jun 54
Wirelaying: Two-Reel Wire Cart, 45 Apr 54
Womble Report: Tommy This and That, 38 Jan 54
Words to Help You Serve (Devers & Clay), 3 May 54
Zwicker, Ralph W: Loyalty Downward ,16 Apr 54

BOOKS AND PERIODICALS REVIEWED

Adventures of Augie March, The (Bellow), 51 Dec 53
Aerodynamics (Von Karman), 55 Jul 54
Aircraft Carrier (Bryan), 54 May 54
Allies and the Russian Revolution, The (Warth), 53 May 54
Always the Young Strangers (Sandburg), 48 Sep 53
America Rebels (Dorson), 46 Nov 53
American Empire, The (McCormick), 46 Nov 53
American Everyday Dictionary, The, 55 Apr 54
American Legion Reader, The (Lasky), 55 Apr 54
American Sword, The (Peterson), 54 Jul 54
American Thesaurus of Slang, The (Berrey & Bark), 48 Sep 53
Americans are Alone in the World (Barzini), 47 Mar 54
Animals, Men and Myths (Lewinsohn), 55 Jul 54
Applied Atomic Energy (Fearnside et al), 55 Jul 54
Arctic Solitudes (Mountevans), 48 Sep 53
Arab World, The (Izzeddin), 47 Jan 54
Army Lineage Book, The, 54 May 54
Army Wife, The (Shea), 44 Mar 54
Art of War in the Middle Ages, The (Oman), 52 May 54
Assassination of President Lincoln and the Trial of the Conspirators (Pitman), 55 Jun 54
Atom Story, The (Feinberg), 48 Sep 53
Atomic Weapons in Land Combat (Reinhardt & Kintner), 50 Oct 53
Back Down the Ridge (White), 44 May 53
Battle Cry (Uris), 56 Aug 53
Best Sports Stories, 1954, 55 Jul 54
Beyond Containment (Chamberlin), 47 Jan 54
Black Knights of West Point, The (Edson), 55 Jun 54
Book of Famous Escapes, The (Williams), 44 Mar 54
Book of Flags, The (Campbell & Evans), 48 Sep 53
Brassey's Annual, 1953, 45 Jan 54
Breakthrough on the Color Front (Nichols), 55 Apr 54
Bridges at Toko-ri, The (Michener), 53 Oct 53
Britain at Arms (Gilby), 53 Dec 53
Bull Run Remembers (Hanson), 47 Mar 54
Caesar's War Commentaries, 56 Aug 53
Can Russia Survive? (Czarnomski), 46 Nov 53
Caucasian Battlefields (Allen & Muratoff), 45 Jan 54
Cavalry of the Sky (Montross), 55 Jul 54
Ceiling Unlimited (Morris & Smith), 47 Jan 54
Century of Conflict, A (Possony), 42 Sep 53
Challenge in Eastern Europe (Black), 55 Jun 54
Challenge of Man's Future, The (Brown), 54 Jul 54
Changing Greenland (Williamson), 54 May 54
Charlemagne (Lamb), 54 Jun 54
Chisholm Trail, The (Gard), 55 Jun 54
Churchill by His Contemporaries (Eade), 54 May 54
Ciano's Hidden Diary, 46 Nov 53
City, The (Horwitz), 54 Dec 53
Civil-Military Relations, 55 Jul 54
Climate, Vegetation and Man (Hadlow), 47 Jan 54
Collected Stories (Sitwell), 55 Feb 54
Columbia-Viking Desk Encyclopedia, 47 Jan 54
Command Missions (Truscott), 43 Mar 54
Commodore John Paul Jones (Munro), 54 May 54
Complete and Authentic Life of Jesse James, The (Breihan), 55 Apr 54
Confederate Agent (Horan), 54 Jul 54
Conquest of Everest, The (Hunt), 55 Feb 54
Contemporary Foreign Governments (Beukema et al), 46 Nov 53
Coorina (Wilson), 55 Apr 54
Decision for War, 1917 (Spencer), 47 Mar 54
Decision in Korea (Poats), 51 Jul 54
Denizens of the Deep (Wylie), 47 Mar 54
Education and Liberty (Conant), 56 Aug 53
Eight Bailed Out (Inks), 55 Apr 54
Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition (Leopold), 52 Jul 54
Encyclopedia of American History (Morris), 56 Aug 53
End of Innocence, The (Daniels), 52 Jul 54
Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, Vol II, 55 Jul 54
Epics of Salvage (Masters), 55 Jul 54
Europe: A Journey with Pictures (Fremantle & Holme), 53 Jun 54
Execution of Private Slovik, The (Huie), 33 Jul 54
Exploits of Sherlock Holmes, The (Doyle & Carr), 54 May 54
Family Doctor (Williams), 55 Feb 54
Far from the Customary Skies (Eyster), 56 Oct 53
Fate and Freedom (Frank), 47 Mar 54

Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, The (Theobald), 55 May 54
Fingerprints (Browne & Brock), 55 Jul 54
Fire in the Ashes (White), 44 Jan 54
Flags of the World (Carr), 48 Sep 53
Flying Years, The (Buchanan) 47 Mar 54
Food Service for the Army and Air Force, 55 Feb 54
Ford at Fifty, 48 Sep 53
Freedom Against Itself (Streit), 55 Jul 54
From Arrow to Atom Bomb (Coblentz) 50 Dec 53
From Down Under to Nippon (Krueger), 42 Nov 53
From Flintlock to M1 (Shields), 55 Jun 54
From Lenin to Malenkov (Seton-Watson), 52 Dec 53
From the Danube to the Yalu (Clark), 52 Jun 54
General Dean's Story (Worden & Dean), 49 Jul 54
General William Jenkins Worth (Wallace), 54 Apr 54
Generals and Admirals (Creswell), 48 Sep 53
Geography from the Air (Walker), 47 Mar 54
Glorious Mornings, The (Bonner), 54 May 54
Great Iron Ship, The (Dugan), 55 Apr 54
Great Man, The (Swiggett), 52 Oct 53
Haig: Master of the Field (Davidson), 52 Oct 53
Heart of Africa, The (Campbell), 55 Jun 54
Hemingway Reader, The, 51 Dec 53
Historian and the Army, The (Greenfield), 50 May 54
History of Russia, A (Pares), 52 Dec 53
History of the 11th Field Artillery Regiment (Seal), 55 Jul 54
History of the 116th U.S. Infantry Regiment (Seal), 55 Jul 54
History of the Southern Confederacy, A (Eaton), 54 May 54
Home Repairs and Improvements (Stieri), 53 Jun 54
How Russia is Ruled (Fainsod), 46 Jan 54
How to be a Consistent Winner in the Most Popular Card Games (Crawford), 53 Dec 53
How to Buy a Used Car (Walordy), 55 Jul 54
How to Choose that Career, Civilian and Military (Feingold), 55 Jul 54
How to Help Older People (Arthur), 55 Jul 54
How to Lie with Statistics (Huff), 54 Apr 54
How to Make Sense (Flesch), 54 May 54
How to Operate Excavation Equipment (Nichols), 54 May 54
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How to Use Portable Power Tools, 53 Jun 54
How to Write Reports (Linton), 55 Feb 54
How Your Retirement Pay Can Provide Survivors' Benefits (Walter), 47 Jan 54
Hundred Years of War, A (Falls), 52 May 54
Hunting and Fishing in North America (Cramond), 47 Mar 54
I Was a Captive in Korea (Deane), 50 Dec 53
Ideas and Weapons (Holley), 43 Mar 54
Immigration Laws of the United States (Crosswell), 55 Feb 54
Impact (Nichols), 54 Jul 54
Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism, The (Tomasic), 46 Nov 53
Imperial Communism (Bouscaren), 46 Nov 53
In the Workshop of the Revolution (Steinberg), 46 Jan 54
Incompatible Allies, The (Hilger & Meyer), 52 Apr 54
Indian Wars of the West, The (Wellman), 54 May 54
Inside Lincoln's Cabinet (Chase), 53 Jun 54
Introduction to Political Philosophy, An (Murray), 54 May 54
Journey Without End (Sperber), 55 Jun 54
Jungle Seas, The (Ageton), 54 Apr 54
Kesselring: A Soldier's Story, 50 Jun 54
Laughter in Hell (Marek), 55 Jun 54
London Calling North Pole (Giskes), 54 Dec 53
Lord Vanity (Shellabarger), 51 Dec 53
Mamie Doud Eisenhower (Brandon), 52 Jul 54
Man Behind Roosevelt, The (Stiles), 55 May 54
Man from Main Street, The (Maule & Cane), 56 Aug 53
Man Who Never Was, The (Montagu), 54 Jun 54
Man's Search for Himself (May), 56 Aug 53
Map Interpretation (Drury), 46 Nov 53
Mapmaker's Art, The (Lynam), 46 Nov 53
Maps and Diagrams (Monkhouse & Wilkinson), 48 Sep 53
Marching Bands (Hjelmervik & Berg), 47 Jan 54
Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, The, 55 Jul 54
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Middle East Dilemmas (Hurewitz), 46 Nov 53
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Reason Why, The (Woodham-Smith), 52 Jul 54
Recapture of Guam, The (Lodge), 52 Jun 54
Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped (Kessler), 47 Jan 54
Report on the Atom (Dean), 53 Apr 54
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Rommel Papers, The, 54 Aug 53
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Russian Assignment (Stevens), 53 Apr 54
Russian Mind, The (Tompkins), 48 Sep 53
Saturday Evening Post Stories, 1953, 54 May 54
Scribner Treasury, The, 46 Nov 53
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Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy (Churchill), 50 Apr 54
Secretary Stimson (Current), 55 May 54
Seduction of the Innocent (Wertham), 55 Apr 54
Seven Men of Spandau, The (Fishman), 55 Jun 54
Shadow of Power, The (Guirey), 53 Aug 53
Sheridan the Inevitable (O'Connor), 45 Nov 53
Sir Winston Churchill (Cowles), 56 Aug 53
Soldiers and Soldiering (Wavell), 54 May 54
Sopranino (Ellam & Mudie), 54 Dec 53
Soviet Military Doctrine (Garthoff), 52 Feb 54
Spin-Fishing (Sharp), 55 Jul 54
Spirit of St. Louis, The (Lindbergh), 47 Jan 54
Statesmanship of the Civil War, The (Nevins), 46 Mar 54
Stillness at Appomattox, A (Catton), 44 Jan 54
Stones of the House, The (Morrison), 48 Sep 53
Story of the U.S. Cavalry, The (Herr & Wallace), 50 Dec 53
Strategy for the West (Slessor), 55 Jul 54
Struggle for Indochina, The (Hammer), 53 Jul 54
Struggle for Poland, The (Stern), 54 Dec 53
Study of Bolshevism, A (Leites), 53 May 54
Substitute for Victory (Dille), 44 Mar 54
Taft Story, The (White), 55 May 54
These Men My Friends (Stewart), 55 Apr 54
They Have Their Exits (Neave), 54 Dec 53
This New World (Schurz), 55 Jun 54
Thorndike-Barnhart Handy Pocket Dictionary, 44 Mar 54
Time Counts (Watkins), 55 Jul 54
Tomorrow! (Wylie), 44 Mar 54
Traitor and the Spy, The (Flexner), 53 Dec 53
Traitorous Hero (Wallace), 55 Jun 54
Triggernometry (Cunningham), 48 Sep 53
Typhoon in Tokyo (Wildes), 55 Jun 54
Ukraine Under the Soviets (Manning), 56 Oct 53
UN: Today and Tomorrow (Roosevelt & DeWitt), 47 Mar 54
Unconditional Hatred (Grenfell), 50 Apr 54
Undeclared War, The (Langer and Gleason), 42 Nov 53
Undersea Patrol (Young), 51 Dec 53
U.S. 40 (Stewart), 56 Aug 53
United States and Italy, The (Hughes), 54 Dec 53
United States and Mexico, The (Cline), 46 Nov 53
U.S. Army in World War II:
- Fall of the Philippines, The (Morton), 53 Feb 54
- Logistical Support of the Armies (Ruppenthal), 54 Feb 54
- The Supreme Command (Pogue), 50 Jul 54
- Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare (Matloff & Snell), 45 Sep 53
- The Quartermaster Corps (Risch), 47 Jan 54
- Stilwell's Mission to China (Romanus & Sunderland), 52 Aug 53

United States of America, The (Parkes), 45 Nov 53
U. S. Grant and the American Military Tradition (Catton), 55 Jun 54
V-2 (Dornberger), 55 Jul 54
Valiant Occasions (MacDonnell), 56 Aug 53
Victory Rode the Rails (Turner), 52 Dec 53
War in Korea, The (Thomas), 54 May 54
What to do When (Colton), 48 Sep 53
Where to Eat in Europe (Pastore), 55 Jun 54
White House, The (McConnell), 55 May 54
Who Speaks for Man? (Cousins), 46 Nov 53
Why Dictators? (Hallgarten), 54 May 54
Wise Bamboo, The (Morris), 54 Dec 53
Wonderful World of Insects, The (Gaul), 48 Sep 53
World Beneath the Sea, The (Barton), 47 Jan 54
Yalta Betrayal, The (Wittmer), 46 Jan 54
Yazoo, The (Smith), 55 Jun 54
Year, 55 Feb 54

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